1
Pulse Secure Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-2 Level 1 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version: 2.5
Last Updated: March 2017
Pulse Secure, LLC
2700 Zanker Road, Suite 200 San Jose, CA 95134 http://www.pulsesecure.net
Pulse Secure Cryptographic Module
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Revision History
Authors Date Version Comment
Pulse Secure, LLC 2017-Mar 2.5 Updated based on review comments
Pulse Secure, LLC 2017-Feb 2.4 Updated based on review
Pulse Secure, LLC 2016-Oct 2.3 Updated based on lab comments
Pulse Secure, LLC 2016-Aug-23 2.2 Add Pulse One to platform list
Pulse Secure, LLC 2016-Aug-2 2.1 Update per review comments
Pulse Secure, LLC 2016-05-25 2.0
186-4 RSA key generation support
Update integrity tests to use HMAC-
SHA256
Pulse Secure, LLC 2015-12-16 1.1 Deprecation of X9.31 RNG and Dual EC
DRBG
Pulse Secure, LLC 2014-12-16 1.1 Changes for rebranding
Pulse Secure Cryptographic Module
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Contents
Revision History .............................................................................................................................. 2
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 4
2 Tested Configurations .............................................................................................................. 6
3 Ports and Interfaces ................................................................................................................. 7
4 Modes of Operation and CryptographicFunctionality............................................................. 8
4.1 Critical Security Parameters and PublicKeys...................................................................... 10
4.2 Special Notes on GCM ........................................................................................................ 12
4.3 Special Notes on Entropy ................................................................................................... 12
5 Roles, Authentication and Services........................................................................................ 14
6 Self-tests................................................................................................................................. 16
7 Operational Environment....................................................................................................... 17
8 Mitigation of Other Attacks.................................................................................................... 17
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1 Introduction
This document comprises the non-proprietary FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for the Pulse Secure
Cryptographic Module, hereafter referred to as the Module.
Figure 1 - Block Diagram
The Module is a software library providing a C-language application program interface (API) for
use by other processes that require cryptographic functionality. The Module is classified by FIPS
140-2 as a software module, multi-chip standalone module embodiment. The physical
cryptographic boundary is the general purpose computer on which the Module is installed. The
logical cryptographic boundary of the Module is the fipscanister object module, a single object
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module file named fipscanister.o. The Module performs no communications other than with the
calling application (the process that invokes the Module’s services).
The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security NA
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks NA
Table 1 - Security Level of Security Requirements
The Module’s software version for this validation is 2.0.
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2 Tested Configurations
Operational
Environment
Processor Optimizations
(Target)
Hardware Device
1. IVE OS 2.0 32-bit Intel Atom Processor N270 (x86) None Pulse Secure
MAG2600
2. IVE OS 2.0 64-bit Intel Pentium Processor E2160 (x86) None Pulse Secure MAG
4610
3. IVE OS 2.0 64-bit Intel Pentium Processor E2160 (x86) None Pulse Secure MAG
SM160
4. IVE OS 2.0 64-bit Intel Core2 Quad Q9400 (x86) None Pulse Secure MAG
SM360
5. IVE OS 2.0 64-bit Intel Celeron Processor J1900 (x86) None Pulse Secure PSA300
6. IVE OS 2.0 64-bit Intel Celeron Processor J1900 (x86) None Pulse Secure
PSA3000
7. IVE OS 2.0 64-bit Intel Pentium Processor G3420 (x86) None Pulse Secure
PSA5000
8. IVE OS 2.0 64-bit Intel Xeon E3-1275v3 (x86) AES-NI Pulse Secure PSA
7000f
9. IVE OS 2.0 64-bit Intel Xeon E3-1275v3 (x86) AES-NI Pulse Secure PSA
7000c
10. Pulse One version 2.0 Intel Xeon E3-1275v3 (x86) AES-NI Pulse Secure PSA
7000f
11. Pulse One version 2.0 Intel Xeon E3-1275v3 (x86) AES-NI Pulse Secure PSA
7000c
12. IVE OS 2.0 64-bit on
VMware ESXi
Intel Xeon E5-2620 v4 None Dell Power Edge
R430/R530, Intel
Xeon E5-2620 v4
Table 2 - Supported Platforms
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3 Ports and Interfaces
The physical ports of the Module are the same as the computer system on which it is executing.
The logical interface is a C-language application program interface (API).
Logical interface type Description
Control input API entry point and corresponding stack parameters
Data input API entry point data input stack parameters
Status output API entry point return values and status stack parameters
Data output API entry point data output stack parameters
Table 3 - Logical interfaces
As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside the Module’s scope. However, when
the Module is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the logical data output
interface is inhibited. The Module is single-threaded and in error scenarios returns only an error
value (no data output is returned).
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4 Modes of Operation and CryptographicFunctionality
The Module supports Approved and non-approved mode selection of mode depends on which
algorithms are chosen from Tables 4a and 4b. Tables 4a and 4b list the Approved and Non-
approved but Allowed algorithms, respectively. Table 4c lists Non-approved algorithms not
allowed in FIPS-mode of operation. If any algorithm listed in table 4c is chosen, the module is
operating in non-FIPS mode of operation.
Function Algorithm Options Cert. #
Encryption,
Decryption and CMAC
[FIPS 197] AES
[SP 800-38C] CCM
[SP 800-38D] GCM
ECB; CBC; CCM; GCM 128/ 192/256 AES 4334
[SP 800-38B] CMAC Encryption, Decryption and CMAC generate and verify AES 4341
ECC CDH Primitive [SP 800-56A]
CURVES (P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-
409, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571)
CVL 1046
Random Number
Generation;
Symmetric key
generation
[SP 800-90Ar1] DRBG
Prediction resistance
supported for all
variations
Hash DRBG (SHA-1, all SHA-2 sizes)
HMAC DRBG (SHA-1, all SHA-2 sizes)
CTR DRBG (AES 128/192/256)
DRBG 1384
Digital Signature and
Asymmetric Key
Generation
Digital Signature and
Asymmetric Key
Generation
Encryption,
Decryption and CMAC
[FIPS 186-4] DSA
(Legacy use only)
PQG Ver, Sig Ver (1024 with SHA-1 only)
DSA 1152
[FIPS 186-4] DSA
PQG Ver, Sig Ver (2048/3072 with all SHA-2 sizes)
PQG Gen, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen (2048/3072 with all
SHA-2 sizes)
[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA
(Legacy use only)
SigVer: CURVES (P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256,
384, 512) P-224: (SHA-1) P-256: (SHA-1) P-384: (SHA-
1) P-521: (SHA-1) K-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-
233: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-283: (SHA-1) K-409:
(SHA-1) K-571: (SHA-1) B-163: (SHA-1) B-233: (SHA-1)
B-283: (SHA-1) B-409: (SHA-1) B-571: (SHA-1) )
ECDSA 1026
[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA PKG: CURVES (P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K-224 K-256 K-
384 K-521 B-224 B-256 B-384 B-521
ExtraRandomBits TestingCandidates) PKV: CURVES
(ALL-P ALL-K ALL-B )
SigGen: CURVES P-224: (SHA-224, 256, 384,
512) P-256: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-384:
(SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-224, 256,
384, 512) K-233: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) K-
283: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) K-409: (SHA-
224, 256, 384, 512) K-571: (SHA-224, 256, 384,
512) B-233: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) B-283:
(SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) B-409: (SHA-224, 256,
384, 512) B-571: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) )
SigVer: CURVES (P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256,
384, 512) P-224: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-
256: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-384: (SHA-1,
224, 256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-1, 224, 256,
384, 512) K-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-
233: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-283: (SHA-
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1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-409: (SHA-1, 224, 256,
384, 512) K-571: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512 B-
163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-233: (SHA-
1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-283: (SHA-1, 224, 256,
384, 512) B-409: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-
571: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) )
Keyed Hash [FIPS 198] HMAC HMAC with SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512) HMAC
2880
Digital Signature and
Asymmetric Key
Generation
[FIPS 186-4] RSA
(Legacy use only)
SigVer9.31, SigVerPKCS1.5, SigVerPSS (1024/4096 with
all SHA sizes) RSA 2345
[FIPS 186-4] RSA SigVer9.31, SigVerPKCS1.5, SigVerPSS (2048/3072 with
all SHA-2 sizes) GenKey9.31, SigGen9.31,
SigGenPKCS1.5, SigGenPSS (2048/3072with all SHA-2
sizes)
Message Digests [FIPS 180-4] SHA SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512) SHS 3577
Encryption,
Decryption and CMAC
[SP 800-67] Triple-
DES
TECB (Encrypt/Decrypt); TCBC (Encrypt/Decrypt)
Triple-DES
2346
[SP 800-38B] CMAC 3-Key Triple-DES; CMAC generate and verify
Triple-DES
2347
Table 4a – FIPS Approved Cryptographic Functions
The Module supports only NIST defined curves for use with ECDSA and ECC CDH. Refer to the
transition tables available at the CMVP Web site (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/).
Category Algorithm Description
Key Agreement EC Diffie-
Hellman
Non-compliant (untested) Diffie-Hellman scheme using elliptic curve,
supporting all NIST defined B, K and P curves. Key agreement is a service
provided for calling process use, but is not used to establish keys into the
Module.
Key Encryption,
Decryption
RSA The RSA algorithm may be used by the calling application for encryption or
decryption of keys. No claim is made for SP 800-56B compliance, and no CSPs
are established into or exported out of the module using these services.
Digital Signature and
Asymmetric Key
Generation
RSA RSA Key Generation, Signature Generation, and Signature Verification with all
sizes between 2048 and 4096 (aside from the Approved and tested sizes of
2048 and 3072).
Table 4b – Non-FIPS Approved But Allowed Cryptographic Functions
The Module implements the following services which are Non-Approved per the SP 800-131A
transition:
Function Algorithm Options
Random Number
Generation; Symmetric
key generation
[ANSI X9.31] RNG AES 128/192/256
Symmetric Encryption [SP800-38E AES-XTS] AES 128/256
(Not compliant to IG A.9)
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Function Algorithm Options
Digital Signature and
Asymmetric Key
Generation
[FIPS 186-4] DSA
(Legacy use only)
PQG Ver, Sig Ver (1024 with SHA-1 only)
[FIPS 186-4] DSA PQG Ver, Sig Ver (2048/3072 with all SHA-2 sizes)
[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA
(Legacy use only)
PKG: CURVES( P-224 P-384 P-521 K-233 K- 283 K-409 K-571 B-233
B-283 B-409 B-571 ) PKV: CURVES( P-192 P-224 P-256 P-384 P-
521 K-163 K-233 K-283 K-409 K-571 B-163 B-233 B-283 B-409 B-
571 )
[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA PKG: CURVES( P-192 K-163 B-163 ) SigGen: CURVES( P-192: (SHA-
1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-224:(SHA-1) P-256:(SHA-1) P-384:(SHA-1)
P-521:(SHA-1) K-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-233:(SHA-1)
K-283:(SHA-1) K-409:(SHA-1) K-571:(SHA-1)
B-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B- 233:(SHA-1) B-283:(SHA-1)
B-409:(SHA-1) B-571:(SHA-1) )
[FIPS 186-4] RSA GenKey9.31, SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5, SigGenPSS (1024/1536
with all SHA sizes, 2048/3072/4096 with SHA-1)
Key Agreement EC Diffie-Hellman All NIST Recommended B, K and P curves sizes 163 and 192
ECC CDH (CVL) [SP 800-56A] (§5.7.1.2) All NIST Recommended B, K and P curves sizes 163 and 192
Table 4c – FIPS Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions
The Module is in the Approved mode as long as none of the algorithms in Table 4c are used, and is
in the Non-Approved mode when those algorithms are used.
When the Module is being loaded by the application, a set of power up self-tests are run before
invoking the main application code using compile constructor, in the case of any power up self-test
fail, the Module loading is aborted and application would exit. The Module requires an
initialization sequence (see IG 9.5): the calling application invokes FIPS_mode_set(), which returns
a “1” for success and “0” for failure. No services are performed during this sequence. Note that,
while in FIPS mode, the module always performs the self-tests immediately upon initialization.
The Module is a cryptographic engine library, which can be used only in conjunction with
additional software. Aside from the use of the NIST defined elliptic curves as trusted third party
domain parameters, all other FIPS 186-4 assurances are outside the scope of the Module, and are
the responsibility of the calling process.
4.1 Critical Security Parameters and PublicKeys
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All access to these CSPs by Module
services are described in Section 4. The CSP names are generic, corresponding to API parameter
data structures.
CSP Name Description
RSA SGK RSA (2048 to 4096 bits) signature generation key
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RSA KDK RSA (2048 to 4096 bits) key decryption (private key transport) key
DSA SGK [FIPS 186-4] DSA (2048/3072) signature generation key
ECDSA SGK ECDSA (CURVES( P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K-233 K-283 K-409 K-571 B-233 B-283
B-409 B-571)) signature generation key
EC DH Private EC DH (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves of size 224 or greater) private key agreement
key.
AES EDK AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt key
AES CMAC AES (128/192/256) CMAC generate / verify key
Triple-DES EDK Triple-DES (3-Key) encrypt / decrypt key
Triple-DES CMAC Triple-DES (3-Key) CMAC generate / verify key
HMAC Key Keyed hash key (160/224/256/384/512)
Hash_DRBG CSPs V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security
strength)
HMAC_DRBG CSPs V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy input
(length dependent on security strength)
CTR_DRBG CSPs V (128 bits) and Key (AES 128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on security
strength)
CO-AD-Digest Pre-calculated HMAC-SHA-256 digest used for Crypto Officer role authentication
User-AD-Digest Pre-calculated HMAC-SHA-256 digest used for User role authentication
Table 4.1a – Critical Security Parameters
Authentication data is loaded into the Module during the Module build process, performed by an
authorized operator (Crypto Officer), and otherwise cannot be accessed.
The Module does not output intermediate key generation values. The Module generates
cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy.
Public Key Name Description
RSA SVK RSA (2048 to 4096 bits) signature verification public key
RSA KEK RSA (2048 to 4096 bits) key encryption (public key transport) key
DSA SVK [FIPS 186-4] DSA (2048/3072) signature verification key or [FIPS 186-2] DSA
(1024) signature verification key
ECDSA SVK ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) signature verification key
EC DH Public EC DH (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) public key agreement key.
Table 4.1b – Public Keys
For all CSPs and Public Keys:
Storage: RAM, associated to entities by memory location. The Module stores RNG and DRBG state
values for the lifetime of the RNG or DRBG instance. The Module uses CSPs passed in by the calling
application on the stack. The Module does not store any CSP persistently (beyond the lifetime of
an API call), with the exception of RNG and DRBG state values used for the Module’s default key
generation service.
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Generation: The Module implements SP 800-90Ar1 compliant DRBG services for creation of
symmetric keys, and for generation of DSA, elliptic curve, and RSA keys as shown in Table 4a. The
calling application is responsible for storage of generated keys returned by the Module.
Entry: All CSPs enter the Module’s logical boundary in plaintext as API parameters, associated by
memory location. However, none cross the physical boundary.
Output: The Module does not output CSPs, other than as explicit results of key generation
services. However, none cross the physical boundary.
Destruction: Zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by API functioncalls for
temporarily stored CSPs. In addition, the Module provides functions to explicitly destroy CSPs
related to random number generation services. The calling application is responsible for
parameters passed in and out of the Module.
Private and secret keys as well as seeds and entropy input are provided to the Module by the
calling application, and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls. Keys
residing in internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API call) can only be
accessed using the Module defined API. The operating system protects memory and process space
from unauthorized access. Only the calling application that creates or imports keys can use or
export such keys. All API functions are executed by the invoking calling application in a non-
overlapping sequence such that no two API functions will execute concurrently. An authorized
application as user (Crypto-Officer and User) has access to all key data generated during the
operation of the Module.
4.2 Special Notes on GCM
Key and IV management are crucial for GCM. A single instance of IV reuse with any given key can
expose the hash subkey. This Module’s AES-GCM implementation meets the third option in IG A.5.
• The fixed field of the IV is variable in length, but is always at least 32 bits. (This allows for at
least 232
distinct module names.)
• There are three options for construction of the IV invocation field upon first invocation for
a given key: user-supplied value, all zeros, or DRBG output. (While the DRBG output is
random, the construction of subsequent IVs is deterministic.)
• In any of the above cases, the IV increments by 1 after each invocation. As there are 264
possible invocation field values, wraparound will not occur in any reasonable timeframe.
• In the event Module power is lost and restored, the calling application must ensure that
any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.
4.3 Special Notes on Entropy
This Module meets IG 7.14 option 2b. For operation in the Approved mode, Module users (the
calling applications) shall use entropy sources containing at least 112 bits of entropy. To ensure full
DRBG strength, the entropy sources must meet or exceed the security strengths shown in the table
Pulse Secure Cryptographic Module Security Policy
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below.
DRBG Type Underlying Algorithm Minimum Seed Entropy
Hash_DRBG or
HMAC_DRBG
SHA-1 128 bits
SHA-224 192 bits
SHA-256 256 bits
SHA-384 256 bits
SHA-512 256 bits
CTR_DRBG AES-128 128 bits
AES-192 192 bits
AES-256 256 bits
Table 5 – DRBG Entropy Requirements
This entropy is supplied by means of callback functions. Those functions must return an error if the
minimum entropy strength cannot be met.
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5 Roles, Authentication and Services
The Module implements the required User and Crypto-Officer roles, as well as role-based
authentication. Only one role may be active at a time and the Module does not allow concurrent
operators. The User or Crypto Officer role is assumed by passing the appropriate password to the
FIPS_module_mode_set() function. The password values may be specified at build time and must
have a minimum length of 16 characters. Any attempt to authenticate with an invalid password
will result in an immediate and permanent failure condition rendering the Module unable to enter
the FIPS mode of operation, even with subsequent use of a correct password.
Authentication data is loaded into the Module during the Module build process, performed by the
Crypto-Officer, and otherwise cannot be accessed.
The minimum password length is 16 characters, and each character can be any octet value other
than the null terminator (0x00), leaving 255 possible values for each character. As such, the
probability of a random successful authentication attempt in one try is a maximum of 1/25516
, or
less than 1/1037
. The Module permanently disables further authentication attempts after a single
failure, so this probability is independent of time.
Both roles have access to all of the services provided by the Module.
• User Role (User): Loading the Module and calling any of the API functions.
• Crypto-Officer Role (CO): Installation of the Module on the host computer system and
callingof anyAPI functions.
All services implemented by the Module are listed below, along with a description of service CSP
access.
Service Role Description
Initialize User, CO Module initialization, inclusive of all Table 9 tests (FIPS_module_mode_set). Does not
access CSPs.
Self-test User, CO Perform all Table 9 tests (FIPS_selftest). Does not access CSPs.
Show status User, CO Functions that provide module status information:
• Version (as unsigned long or const char*)
• FIPS Mode (Boolean)
Does not access CSPs.
Zeroize User, CO Function that destroys DRBG CSPs:
• fips_drbg_uninstantiate: for a given DRBG context, overwrites DRBGCSPs
(Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs)
All other services automatically overwrite CSPs stored in allocated memory. Stack
cleanup is the responsibility of the calling application.
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Service Role Description
Random number
generation
User, CO Used for random number and symmetric key generation.
• Seed or reseed an RNG or DRBGinstance
• Determine security strength of an RNG or DRBGinstance
• Obtain random data
Uses and updates RNG CSPs, Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs.
Asymmetric key
generation
User, CO Used to generate DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys:
RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK
Symmetric
encrypt/decrypt
User, CO Used to encrypt or decrypt data.
Executes using AES EDK, Triple-DES EDK (passed in by the calling process).
Symmetric
digest
User, CO Used to generate or verify data integrity with CMAC.
Executes using AES CMAC, Triple-DES, CMAC (passed in by the calling process).
Message digest User, CO Used to generate a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest.
Does not access CSPs.
Keyed Hash User, CO Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC.
Executes using HMAC Key (passed in by the calling process).
Key transport
(algorithms only)
User, CO Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the calling process (does not
establish keys into the module).
Executes using RSA KDK, RSA KEK (passed in by the calling process).
Key agreement
(algorithms only)
User, CO Used to perform key agreement primitives on behalf of the calling process (does not
establish keys into the module).
Executes using EC DH Private, EC DH Public (passed in by the calling process).
Digital signature User, CO Used to generate or verify RSA, DSA or ECDSA digital signatures.
Executes using RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK,
ECDSA SVK (passed in by the calling process).
Utility User, CO Miscellaneous helper functions. Does not access CSPs.
Table 6 - Services and CSP Access
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6 Self-tests
The Module performs the self-tests listed below on invocation of Initialize of self-test.
Table 7a - Power On Self Tests (KAT = Known answer test; PCT = Pairwise consistency test)
The FIPS_mode_set() function performs all power up self-tests listed above with no operator
intervention required, returning a “1” if all power-up self-tests succeed, and a “0” otherwise. If any
component of the power up self-test fails an internal flag is set to prevent subsequent invocation
of any cryptographic function calls. The Module will only enter the FIPS Approved mode if the
Module is reloaded and the call to FIPS_mode_set() succeeds.
The power up self-tests may also be performed on-demand by calling FIPS_selftest(), which returns
a “1” for success and “0” for failure. Interpretation of this return code is the responsibility of the
calling application.
The Module also implements the following conditional tests:
Algorithm Test
DRBG Tested as required by [SP800-90Ar1] Section 11
DRBG FIPS 140-2 continuous test for stuck fault
DSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair
ECDSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair
RSA Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair
Entropy Continuous test for stuck fault on DRBG inputs
Table 7b - Conditional Tests
In the event of a DRBG self-test failure, the Module enters the same error state as for a power up
self-test failure.
Algorithm Type Test Attributes
Software integrity Integrity test HMAC-SHA256 verification of software
AES KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 128 bit key length
AES CMAC KAT Sign and verify CBC mode, 128, 192, 256 key lengths
AES CCM KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, 192 key length
AES GCM KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, 256 key length
DSA PCT Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-384
DRBG KAT CTR_DRBG: AES, 256 bit with and without derivation function
HASH_DRBG: SHA256
HMAC_DRBG: SHA256
ECDSA PCT Keygen, sign, verify using P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233 and SHA512.
The K-233 self-test is not performed for operational environments that
support prime curve only (see Table 2).
ECC CDH KAT Shared secret calculation per SP 800-56A §5.7.1.2, IG 9.6
HMAC KAT One KAT per SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512
RSA KAT Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-256, PKCS#1
Triple-DES KAT Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 3-Key
Triple-DES CMAC KAT CMAC generate and verify, CBC mode, 3-Key
Pulse Secure Cryptographic Module Security Policy
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Pairwise consistency tests are performed for both possible modes of use, e.g. Sign/Verify and
Encrypt/Decrypt. When the test fails during pairwise consistency test function would return a
failure and the calling application needs to handle the failure.
7 Operational Environment
The tested operating systems segregate user processes into separate process spaces. Each process
space is logically separated from all other processes by the operating system software and
hardware. The Module functions entirely within the process space of the calling application, and
implicitly satisfies the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a single user mode of operation.
8 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The Module is not designed to mitigate against attacks which are outside of the scope of
FIPS 140-2.