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PacketLight Networks Ltd.
PL-2000GM and PL-2000GA
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version 1.0
June 2026
Prepared by:
www.lightshipsec.com
PL-2000GM and PL-2000GA FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2026
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Table of Contents
1 General.................................................................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Security Levels...............................................................................................................................................................5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification ..................................................................................................................................6
2.1 Description....................................................................................................................................................................6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification ................................................................................7
2.3 Excluded Components ..................................................................................................................................................7
2.4 Modes of Operation......................................................................................................................................................7
2.5 Algorithms.....................................................................................................................................................................7
2.6 Security Function Implementations..............................................................................................................................9
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information...................................................................................................................................12
2.8 RBG and Entropy.........................................................................................................................................................12
2.9 Key Generation ...........................................................................................................................................................13
2.10 Key Establishment.....................................................................................................................................................13
2.11 Industry Protocols.....................................................................................................................................................13
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces.....................................................................................................................................14
3.1 Ports and Interfaces....................................................................................................................................................14
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication .................................................................................................................................17
4.1 Authentication Methods.............................................................................................................................................17
4.2 Roles............................................................................................................................................................................18
4.3 Approved Services.......................................................................................................................................................18
4.4 Non-Approved Services...............................................................................................................................................32
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded..........................................................................................................................32
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status...........................................................................................................................................32
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status ..................................................................................................................32
5 Software/Firmware Security.............................................................................................................................................33
5.1 Integrity Techniques ...................................................................................................................................................33
5.2 Initiate on Demand .....................................................................................................................................................33
6 Operational Environment .................................................................................................................................................34
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements....................................................................................................34
7 Physical Security................................................................................................................................................................35
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required.............................................................................................................................35
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals...........................................................................................................................................35
8 Non-Invasive Security........................................................................................................................................................38
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ...................................................................................................................39
9.1 Storage Areas..............................................................................................................................................................39
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9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods.........................................................................................................................................39
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ............................................................................................................................................39
9.4 SSPs .............................................................................................................................................................................40
9.5 Transitions...................................................................................................................................................................45
10 Self-Tests..........................................................................................................................................................................46
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................................................................46
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................................................................46
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ..................................................................................................................................47
10.4 Error States ...............................................................................................................................................................48
11 Life-Cycle Assurance........................................................................................................................................................50
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ..................................................................................................50
11.2 Administrator Guidance............................................................................................................................................50
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance....................................................................................................................................51
11.4 End of Life .................................................................................................................................................................51
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ............................................................................................................................................52
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels...........................................................................................................................................................5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware................................................................................................................7
Table 3: Modes List and Description.......................................................................................................................................7
Table 4: Approved Algorithms ................................................................................................................................................9
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms.....................................................................................................................................9
Table 6: Security Function Implementations........................................................................................................................12
Table 7: Entropy Certificates.................................................................................................................................................12
Table 8: Entropy Sources ......................................................................................................................................................13
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces ................................................................................................................................................16
Table 10: Authentication Methods.......................................................................................................................................18
Table 11: Roles......................................................................................................................................................................18
Table 12: Approved Services.................................................................................................................................................32
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required.......................................................................................................................35
Table 14: Storage Areas ........................................................................................................................................................39
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods ...................................................................................................................................39
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods ......................................................................................................................................39
Table 17: SSP Table 1 ............................................................................................................................................................43
Table 18: SSP Table 2 ............................................................................................................................................................44
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests ....................................................................................................................................46
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests............................................................................................................................................47
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information ..................................................................................................................47
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information..........................................................................................................................48
Table 23: Error States............................................................................................................................................................49
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List of Figures
Figure 1: PL-2000GA................................................................................................................................................................6
Figure 2: PL-2000GM...............................................................................................................................................................7
Figure 3: PL-2000GA (Front)..................................................................................................................................................14
Figure 4: PL-2000GM (Front) ................................................................................................................................................14
Figure 5: PL-2000GA and PL-2000GM (Rear)........................................................................................................................14
Figure 6: PL-2000GA (Front, Rear, Left, Right, Bottom)........................................................................................................36
Figure 7: PL-2000GM (Front, Rear, Left, Right, Bottom).......................................................................................................36
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1 General
1.1 Overview
This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for the PacketLight Networks Ltd. PL-2000GA and PL-2000GM
cryptographic modules (also referred to as “the module(s)” hereafter) running firmware version 1.4.5. It contains specification of the
security rules, under which the cryptographic module operates, including the security rules derived from the requirements of the FIPS
140-3 standard for an overall Security Level 2 module.
1.2 Security Levels
The table below describes the individual security areas of FIPS 140-3, as well as the Security Levels of those individual areas.
Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic module specification 2
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2
4 Roles, services, and authentication 2
5 Software/Firmware security 2
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 2
10 Self-tests 2
11 Life-cycle assurance 2
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
Table 1: Security Levels
The Module has an overall security level of 2.
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2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
The PL-2000GA and PL-2000GM are two product variations of the PL-2000Gx clone. The hardware modules run the same firmware
and provide the same cryptographic security services.
The PL-2000GA provides modular and cost-effective high transport capacity of up to 200G by aggregating multiple services into dual
100G OTU4 uplinks. The solution is low power consumption and saves rack space, reducing overall CAPEX and OPEX, and enabling it
to easily and cost-effectively increase capacity of short haul networks. The device delivers up to 200G in a 1U chassis using dual 100G
QSFP28-DCO OTU4 standards-based pluggable coherent modules. The PL-2000GM provides a full demarcation point between the
service and the OTN/DWDM network and is interoperable with any third-party switch or router. This provides full visibility and
performance monitoring of both line optical transport layer (OTN) and 10/40/100GbE, 8/16/32G FC, STM-64/OC-192, OTU2/2e/3/4
service interfaces.
The PL-2000GA can be configured to work in the following system modes:
- 200G Muxponder: mix of client interfaces aggregated into two 100G uplinks
- Optical Amplifiers: Up to two EDFA modules (optional)
- Optical Switch: 1+1 facility protection (optional)
The PL-2000GM is the smallest and most integrated transport solution of its kind, reaching up to 200km/42dB without intermediate
sites and 4,500km with inline sites. A powerful 200G multi-protocol multi-rate muxponder/ transponder/ADM solution for building
high-capacity optical transport networks. The device supports either one 200G OTUC2 or two 100G OTU4 CFP2-DCO pluggable uplink
optical modules depending on configuration. The PL-2000GM integrates mux/demux, EDFA and OSW and delivers the entire optical
layer. This flexible solution enables pay-as-you-grow architecture. The solution provides a full demarcation point between the service
and the DWDM network and is interoperable with any third-party switch or router. This provides full visibility and performance
monitoring of both the optical transport layer (OTN) and 10/40/100GbE, 8/16/32G FC, STM-64/OC-192, OTU2/2e/3/4 service
interfaces.
The PL-2000GM can be configured to work in the following system modes:
- 200G Muxponder: mix of client interfaces aggregated into one 200G uplink
- 200G Muxponder: mix of client interfaces aggregated into two 100G uplinks
- Optical Amplifiers: Up to two EDFA modules (optional)
- Mux/Demux: 2ch mux/demux module (optional)
- Optical Switch: 1+1 optical switch (optional)
Module Type: Hardware
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary of the modules is defined as the entire outer casing of the chassis as pictured below.
Figure 1: PL-2000GA
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Figure 2: PL-2000GM
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model
and/or
Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
PL-2000GA PL-2000GA 1.4.5 NXP Layerscape LS1026A AC/DC PSU
PL-2000GM PL-2000GM 1.4.5 NXP Layerscape LS1026A AC/DC PSU
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
2.3 Excluded Components
None.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
The table below details the Mode of Operation supported by the module.
Mode
Name
Description Type Status
Indicator
Approved
Mode
When installed, initialized and configured as specified in Section 11 of the
Security Policy, and with the tamper evident seals installed as indicated in
Section 7 of the Security Policy, the module only runs in the approved mode of
operation.
Approved Global
Table 3: Modes List and Description
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
The table below lists all the Approved Algorithms supported by the module.
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CFB128 A7344 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A7344 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A7536 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38A
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-ECB A7344 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A7344 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 256
SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC C221 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - External
Key Length - 256
SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG A7344 Prediction Resistance - Yes
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - No
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7344 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5)
A7344 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7344 Curve - P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
A7344 Curve - P-384
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-384
FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA2-256 A7344 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A7344 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A7344 Key Length - Key Length: 8-524288 Increment 8 FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A7344 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-256, P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A7344 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072,
MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096
Scheme -
dhEphem -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDA OneStep
SP800-56Cr2
A7344 Derived Key Length - 2048
Shared Secret Length - Shared Secret Length: 224-8192 Increment
8
SP 800-56C
Rev. 2
KDF SNMP (CVL) A7344 Password Length - Password Length: 64-160 Increment 8 SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SSH (CVL) A7344 Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
A7344 Key Generation Mode - probableWithProbableAux
Modulo - 2048
Primality Tests - 2powSecStr
Private Key Format - standard
FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes Key
Generation
A7344 Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, MODP-2048, MODP-
3072, MODP-4096
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
Safe Primes Key
Verification
A7344 Safe Prime Groups - ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, MODP-2048, MODP-
3072, MODP-4096
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA-1 A7344 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A7344 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
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Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
SHA2-384 A7344 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A7344 Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8 FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (CVL)
A7344 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384 SP 800-135
Rev. 1
TLS v1.3 KDF (CVL) A7344 HMAC Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384
KDF Running Modes - DHE
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
The table below lists all the Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms supported by the module.
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key
Type:Asymmetric
N/A IG D.H, SP800-133r2 (Section 4/example 1) The seed used in
asymmetric key generation is the unmodified output from a NIST SP
800-90A DRBG.
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
The table below lists the Security Function Implementations supported by the module.
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Config File
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-UnAuth Encryption/Decryption
of respective SSPs in
configuration files
AES-CTR: (A7344)
Key Length: 256
Key File
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-UnAuth Encryption/Decryption
of respective SSPs in
key files
AES-ECB: (A7344)
SNMPv3
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-UnAuth Encryption/Decryption
of SNMPv3 packets
AES-CFB128: (A7344)
SSH Encrypt/Decrypt
1
BC-UnAuth Encryption/Decryption
of SSH session packets
AES-CTR: (A7344)
SSH Encrypt/Decrypt
2
BC-Auth Encryption/Decryption
of SSH session packets
AES-GCM: (A7344)
TLS Encrypt/Decrypt BC-Auth Encryption/Decryption
of TLS session packets
AES-GCM: (A7344)
Client Data
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-Auth Encryption/Decryption
of Client Data (PL-
2000GA/PL-2000GM
hardware block)
AES-CTR: (A7536)
AES-GMAC: (C221)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
TLS Key
Pair/Certificate
Generation
AsymKeyPair-KeyGen Generation of
certificate and keys
for TLS server
authentication
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5): (A7344)
Curve: P-384
Counter DRBG:
(A7344)
SSH Key Pair
Generation
AsymKeyPair-KeyGen Generation of keys for
SSH server
authentication
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5): (A7344)
Counter DRBG:
(A7344)
TLS Key Pair
Verification
AsymKeyPair-KeyVer TLS Key Pair
Verification
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5): (A7344)
Curve: P-384
TLS Digital Signature
Generation
DigSig-SigGen TLS Digital Signature
Generation
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5): (A7344)
TLS Digital Signature
Verification
DigSig-SigVer TLS Digital Signature
Verification
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5): (A7344)
SSH Message
Authentication 1
MAC SSH Message
Authentication
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A7344)
SSH Message
Authentication 2
MAC SSH Message
Authentication
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A7344)
SHA2-512: (A7344)
TLS Message
Authentication 1
MAC TLS Message
Authentication
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A7344)
TLS Message
Authentication 2
MAC TLS Message
Authentication
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A7344)
SHA2-384: (A7344)
SNMP Message
Authentication 1
MAC SNMP Message
Authentication
HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A7344)
SNMP Message
Authentication 2
MAC SNMP Message
Authentication
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A7344)
SHA2-384: (A7344)
SNMP Message
Authentication 3
MAC SNMP Message
Authentication
HMAC-SHA2-512:
(A7344)
SHA2-512: (A7344)
Data Plane KEX
Message
Authentication
MAC Data Plane KEX
Message
Authentication
(prevents man-in-the-
middle)
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A7344)
SHA2-384: (A7344)
Verify Firmware
Integrity
MAC Verify Firmware
Integrity
HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A7344)
SHA2-384: (A7344)
Verify Firmware Load MAC Verify Firmware Load HMAC-SHA2-384:
(A7344)
SHA2-384: (A7344)
KAS 1 KAS-Full Data exchange keys
generation and
distribution
IG:D.F Scenario 2
path (2)
Bit Strength
Caveat:provides
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A7344)
KDA OneStep SP800-
56Cr2: (A7344)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
between 128 and
256 bits of
encryption strength
KAS 2 KAS-Full Key Agreement for
SSH
IG:D.F Scenario 2
path (2)
Bit Strength
Caveat:provides
between 128 and
256 bits of
encryption strength
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A7344)
KDF SSH: (A7344)
KAS 3 KAS-Full Key Agreement for
SSH
IG:D.F Scenario 2
path (2)
Bit Strength
Caveat:provides
between 112 and
152 bits of
encryption strength
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A7344)
Domain Parameter
Generation
Methods: MODP-
2048, MODP-3072
and MODP-4096
KDF SSH: (A7344)
KAS 4 KAS-Full Key Agreement for
TLSv1.2
IG:D.F Scenario 2
path (2)
Bit Strength
Caveat:provides
between 128 and
256 bits of
encryption strength
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A7344)
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627: (A7344)
KAS 5 KAS-Full Key Agreement for
TLSv1.3
IG:D.F Scenario 2
path (2)
Bit Strength
Caveat:provides
between 128 and
256 bits of
encryption strength
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A7344)
TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A7344)
KAS 6 KAS-Full Key Agreement for TLS
v1.3
IG:D.F Scenario 2
path (2)
Bit Strength
Caveat:provides 112
or 128 bits of
encryption strength
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A7344)
Domain Parameter
Generation
Methods: ffdhe2048,
ffdhe3072
TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A7344)
SNMP Key Derivation KAS-135KDF Derives SNMPv3 Keys KDF SNMP: (A7344)
SHA-1: (A7344)
SSH Key Derivation KAS-135KDF Derives SSH Keys KDF SSH: (A7344)
TLS Key Derivation KAS-135KDF Derives TLS 1.2/3 Keys TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627: (A7344)
TLS v1.3 KDF:
(A7344)
Password
Obfuscation
SHA Operator Password
obfuscation in config
file
SHA2-256: (A7344)
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Entropy Source ENT-ESV Entropy Source
KAS Key Pair
Generation 1
KAS-KeyGen KAS Key Pair
Generation (ECDH)
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5): (A7344)
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-5): (A7344)
Counter DRBG:
(A7344)
KAS Key Pair
Generation 2
KAS-KeyGen KAS Key Pair
Generation (DH)
Safe Primes Key
Generation: (A7344)
Safe Primes Key
Verification: (A7344)
Counter DRBG:
(A7344)
DRBG DRBG Deterministic Random
Bit Generation
Counter DRBG:
(A7344)
Table 6: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
The module's TLS v1.2 firmware AES-GCM implementation conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H Scenario #1. The module is compatible with
TLS v1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM ciphersuites from SP 800-52 Rev2, Section 3.3.1. The counter portion of the IV
is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given
session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key (in
accordance with RFC 5246).
The module's TLS v1.3 firmware AES-GCM implementation conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H Scenario #1. The module is compatible with
TLS v1.3 and provides support for acceptable GCM ciphersuites from SP 800-52 Rev2, Section 3.3.1. The counter portion of the IV is
set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. The sequence number, and the client_write_iv or server_write_iv value
(depending on role) are used to construct the per-record nonce, following the procedure in Section 5.3 of RFC 8446. Furthermore, as
required by Section 5.3 of RFC 8446, the module ensures that when the sequence number would wrap, the first party, client or server,
to encounter this condition rekeys (in accordance with Section 4.6.3 in RFC 8446) or terminates the connection.
The module's SSHv2 firmware AES-GCM implementation conforms to FIPS 140-3 IG C.H Scenario #1. The SSHv2 implementation is
compliant with RFC 4252 and RFC 4253, and the IV generation of SSHv2 AES-GCM implementation is compliant with RFC 5647.
The module's hardware AES-GCM implementations conform to IG C.H, scenario #4. The module uses a 96-bit IV, which is constructed
deterministically per SP 800-38D Section 8.2.1 from a nonce and counter.
Frame Counter (which is comprised of MFAS and MFI-38 bits and 26 zero pads), and Frame Block Counter (32-bits) are used.
Per the requirements specified in Section 8 in NIST SP 800-38D, the probability that the authenticated encryption function ever will
be invoked with the same IV and the same key on two (or more) distinct sets of input data is no greater than 2-32
.
In all cases the module enforces FIPS 140-3 IG C.H, which states, “In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for
use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.”
2.8 RBG and Entropy
The tables below detail the modules ESV information.
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E63 ID QUANTIQUE SA
Table 7: Entropy Certificates
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Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
IDQ Quantis IID QRNG Physical IDQ250C2 2 bits 1.75 bits
Table 8: Entropy Sources
2.9 Key Generation
Please see SFI table.
2.10 Key Establishment
Please see SFI table.
The module implements the DH and ECDH key agreement schemes specified in NIST SP 800-56Arev3.
This specification requires that certain checks are performed to provide assurances regarding the keys being used.
The following assurance checks are performed by the cryptographic module:
• Assurances of domain parameter validity (section 5.5.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3)
• Assurances required by the key pair owner (section 5.6.2.1 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3)
• Assurances required by the public key recipient (section 5.6.2.2 of NIST SP 800-56Arev3)
2.11 Industry Protocols
No parts of the SSH protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and
CMVP.
No parts of the TLS protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and
CMVP.
No parts of the SNMP protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and
CMVP.
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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Figure 3: PL-2000GA (Front)
Figure 4: PL-2000GM (Front)
Figure 5: PL-2000GA and PL-2000GM (Rear)
The table below details the modules Ports and Interfaces.
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Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
QSFP28 100G Uplink ports (PL-2000GA) Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status
Output
Muxponded/Transponded data, Inband
management
QSFP28 100G, QSFP+10G/40G service ports (PL-
2000GA)
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status
Output
Data
SFP+ 8G/10G/12G-SDI, SFP28 32G service ports (PL-
2000GA)
Data Input
Data Output
Status
Output
Data
SFP 100/1000M Base-X MNG ports (PL-2000GA) Control Input
Status
Output
Management
RJ-45 Control port (PL-2000GA) Control Input
Status
Output
Local CLI
RJ-45 Alarm port (PL-2000GA) Status
Output
External alarms dry contacts
RJ-45 10/100/1000M Base-T LAN ports (PL-2000GA) Control Input
Status
Output
Management
LEDs (PL-2000GA) Status
Output
Status
Power connectors (PL-2000GA) Power Power
200G/100G CFP2-DCO Uplink ports (PL-2000GM) Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status
Output
Transponded data, Inband management
QSFP28 100G, QSFP+ 10G/40G service ports (PL-
2000GM)
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status
Output
Data
SFP 100/1000M Base-X MNG ports (PL-2000GM) Control Input
Status
Output
Management
RJ-45 Control port (PL-2000GM) Control Input
Status
Output
Local CLI
RJ-45 External Alarm port (PL-2000GM) Status
Output
External alarms dry contacts
SFP28 32G, SFP+ 8G/10G/16G/12G-SDI service ports
(PL-2000GM)
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Data
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Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
Status
Output
10/100/1000M Base-T LAN ports (PL-2000GM) Control Input
Status
Output
Management
LEDs (PL-2000GM) Status
Output
Status
Power connectors (PL-2000GM) Power Power
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
The table below details the modules Authentication Methods.
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute
WebGUI
(HTTPS)
Auth
Grants access to
GUI according to
role
Username
and
Password
Passwords are required to be at
minimum 8 characters in length, and
at maximum 20 bytes. Accepted
characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and
[$@#&_!%^*]. An 8-character
password allowing all legal
characters (73) with repetition
equates to a 1:(73^8), or 1:
806,460,091,894,081 chance of false
acceptance.
Assuming 10 attempts per
second via a scripted or
automatic attack, the
probability of a success with
multiple attempts in a one-
minute period is 600/73^8,
which is less than 1/100,000.
SSH/SFTP
Auth
Grants access to
CLI according to
role
Username
and
Password
Passwords are required to be at
minimum 8 characters in length, and
at maximum 20 bytes. Accepted
characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and
[$@#&_!%^*]. An 8-character
password allowing all legal
characters (73) with repetition
equates to a 1:(73^8), or 1:
806,460,091,894,081 chance of false
acceptance.
Assuming 10 attempts per
second via a scripted or
automatic attack, the
probability of a success with
multiple attempts in a one-
minute period is 600/73^8,
which is less than 1/100,000.
Console
Auth
Grants access to
CLI according to
role
Username
and
Password
Passwords are required to be at
minimum 8 characters in length, and
at maximum 20 bytes. Accepted
characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and
[$@#&_!%^*]. An 8-character
password allowing all legal
characters (73) with repetition
equates to a 1:(73^8), or 1:
806,460,091,894,081 chance of false
acceptance.
The fastest data rate for the
serial port is 115,200 bps.
Each ASCII character is 10 bits
(1 Start, 8 data, 1 Stop), so
that is (115,200 / 10 =) 115,20
characters per second or
(115,20 * 60 =) 691,200
characters per minute.
Running 100,000 trials in a
minute will require a
minimum of (4 * 10 * 100,000
=) 4,000,000 characters to be
sent. This exceeds the 691,200
limit imposed by the data rate
of the serial port. Therefore,
the probability that a random
attempt will succeed in one
minute is less than 1/100,000.
SNMPv3
Auth
Verifying the
rights of SNMP
based processes
to access for
monitoring and
management
Username
and
Password
Passwords are required to be at
minimum 8 characters in length, and
at maximum 20 bytes. Accepted
characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9, and
[$@#&_!%^*]. An 8-character
password allowing all legal
characters (73) with repetition
Assuming 10 attempts per
second via a scripted or
automatic attack, the
probability of a success with
multiple attempts in a one-
minute period is 600/73^8,
which is less than 1/100,000.
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Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength Each Attempt Strength per Minute
equates to a 1:(73^8), or 1:
806,460,091,894,081 chance of false
acceptance.
Table 10: Authentication Methods
4.2 Roles
The module supports four different roles: Admin, Crypto, Read-Write and Read-Only, which are detailed in the table below.
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Admin Role CO WebGUI (HTTPS) Auth
SSH/SFTP Auth
Console Auth
SNMPv3 Auth
Crypto Role CO WebGUI (HTTPS) Auth
SSH/SFTP Auth
Console Auth
Read-Write Role CO WebGUI (HTTPS) Auth
SSH/SFTP Auth
Console Auth
SNMPv3 Auth
Read-Only Role CO WebGUI (HTTPS) Auth
SSH/SFTP Auth
Console Auth
SNMPv3 Auth
Table 11: Roles
4.3 Approved Services
The table below lists all approved services supported by the module. The abbreviations of the access rights to keys and SSPs have the
following interpretation:
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g., the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP.
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Initialization Initial
Configuration
N/A Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
status
None Admin
Manage
Accounts
Add, Edit, Delete,
View user
accounts
Global ("FIPS
Compliant
Mode") in
combination
with
successful
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
status
Password
Obfuscation
Admin
- Operator
Passwords: W
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
completion of
service
Change
Password
Admin to any
except Crypto,
each user its own
Global ("FIPS
Compliant
Mode") in
combination
with
successful
completion of
service
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
status
Password
Obfuscation
Admin
- Operator
Passwords: W
Crypto
- Operator
Passwords: W
Read-Write
- Operator
Passwords: W
Read-Only
- Operator
Passwords: W
Encryption
Service
Transfer of
encryption data
Global ("FIPS
Compliant
Mode") in
combination
with
successful
completion of
service
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
status
Client Data
Encrypt/Decrypt
Data Plane KEX
Message
Authentication
KAS 1
KAS Key Pair
Generation 1
Admin
- EC DH Key
Pair for DEK:
G,E
- ECC CDH
primitive for
DEK: G,E
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): G,E
- Peer-
Authentication
Pre-Shared
Secret: R,W,E
Read-Write
- EC DH Key
Pair for DEK:
G,E
- ECC CDH
primitive for
DEK: G,E
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): G,E
- Peer-
Authentication
Pre-Shared
Secret: R,W,E
Add/Change
Pre-Shared
Secret
Add/Changes the
pre-shared secret
used for the
authentication of
the key exchange
messages.
Global ("FIPS
Compliant
Mode") in
combination
with
successful
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
status
Config File
Encrypt/Decrypt
Crypto
- Peer-
Authentication
Pre-Shared
Secret: W
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
completion of
service
Lock
Encrypted
Service
Locks the
encrypted uplink
port.
N/A Command Command
response/
status
None Crypto
Change
Provisioning
Type
Provisions the
service port or
remove
provisioning
from the
selected port
N/A Command Command
response/
status
None Admin
Read-Write
View System
Information
View system
specific
information
N/A Command Command
response/
status
None Admin
Crypto
Read-Write
Read-Only
View
Performance
Monitoring
View port
performance
monitoring info
N/A Command Command
response/
status
None Admin
Crypto
Read-Write
Read-Only
View Faults or
Alarms
Used to localize
and identify
problems in the
network
N/A Command Command
response/
status
None Admin
Crypto
Read-Write
Read-Only
Configure
Firewall
Configure
Firewall
rules/policies
N/A Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
status
None Admin
Show Status Outputs current
module status
N/A Command Command
response/
status
None Admin
Read-Write
Read-Only
Show
Versioning
information
Returns module
name/identifier
and versioning
information
N/A Command Module
versioning
information
None Admin
Read-Write
Read-Only
Set
Configuration
data
Device
configuration
tool
N/A Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
status
None Admin
Read-Write
Establish SSH
session
Establish an SSH
session
Global ("FIPS
Compliant
Mode") in
combination
with
successful
completion of
service
Command Command
response/
status
Key File
Encrypt/Decrypt
SSH
Encrypt/Decrypt
1
SSH
Encrypt/Decrypt
2
SSH Key Pair
Generation
SSH Message
Authentication 1
SSH Message
Admin
- Operator
Passwords: W
- Diffie-Hellman
(DH) Key Pair:
G,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key
Pair: G,E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Authentication 2
KAS 2
KAS 3
SSH Key
Derivation
KAS Key Pair
Generation 1
KAS Key Pair
Generation 2
- EC Diffie-
Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- SSH/SFTP
Host Key Pair:
G,E
- SSH/SFTP
Session
Encryption Key:
G,E
- SSH/SFTP
Session
Authentication
key: G,E
Crypto
- Operator
Passwords: W
- Diffie-Hellman
(DH) Key Pair:
G,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key
Pair: G,E
- EC Diffie-
Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- SSH/SFTP
Host Key Pair:
G,E
- SSH/SFTP
Session
Encryption Key:
G,E
- SSH/SFTP
Session
Authentication
key: G,E
Read-Write
- Operator
Passwords: W
- Diffie-Hellman
(DH) Key Pair:
G,E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key
Pair: G,E
- EC Diffie-
Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- SSH/SFTP
Host Key Pair:
G,E
- SSH/SFTP
Session
Encryption Key:
G,E
- SSH/SFTP
Session
Authentication
key: G,E
Read-Only
- Operator
Passwords: W
- Diffie-Hellman
(DH) Key Pair:
G,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key
Pair: G,E
- EC Diffie-
Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- SSH/SFTP
Host Key Pair:
G,E
- SSH/SFTP
Session
Encryption Key:
G,E
- SSH/SFTP
Session
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Authentication
key: G,E
Establish TLS
session
Establish a web
session using TLS
protocol
Global ("FIPS
Compliant
Mode") in
combination
with
successful
completion of
service
Command Command
response/
status
Key File
Encrypt/Decrypt
TLS
Encrypt/Decrypt
TLS Key
Pair/Certificate
Generation
TLS Key Pair
Verification
TLS Digital
Signature
Generation
TLS Digital
Signature
Verification
TLS Message
Authentication 1
TLS Message
Authentication 2
KAS 4
KAS 5
KAS 6
TLS Key
Derivation
KAS Key Pair
Generation 1
KAS Key Pair
Generation 2
Admin
- Operator
Passwords: W
- Diffie-Hellman
(DH) Key Pair:
G,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key
Pair: G,E
- EC Diffie-
Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- TLS Key Pair:
G,E
- TLS Premaster
Secret: G,E
- TLS Master
Secret: G,E
- TLS Session
Encryption Key:
G,E
- TLS Session
Authentication
Key: G,E
Crypto
- Operator
Passwords: W
- Diffie-Hellman
(DH) Key Pair:
G,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key
Pair: G,E
- EC Diffie-
Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- TLS Key Pair:
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
G,E
- TLS Premaster
Secret: G,E
- TLS Master
Secret: G,E
- TLS Session
Encryption Key:
G,E
- TLS Session
Authentication
Key: G,E
Read-Write
- Operator
Passwords: W
- Diffie-Hellman
(DH) Key Pair:
G,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key
Pair: G,E
- EC Diffie-
Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- TLS Key Pair:
G,E
- TLS Premaster
Secret: G,E
- TLS Master
Secret: G,E
- TLS Session
Encryption Key:
G,E
- TLS Session
Authentication
Key: G,E
Read-Only
- Operator
Passwords: W
- Diffie-Hellman
(DH) Key Pair:
G,E
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key
Pair: G,E
- EC Diffie-
Hellman
Shared Secret:
G,E
- TLS Key Pair:
G,E
- TLS Premaster
Secret: G,E
- TLS Master
Secret: G,E
- TLS Session
Encryption Key:
G,E
- TLS Session
Authentication
Key: G,E
Configure
SNMPv3
Configure
SNMPv3 security
profile,
authentication,
privacy, etc.
settings
Global ("FIPS
Compliant
Mode") in
combination
with
successful
completion of
service
Command
and
parameters
Command
response/
status
SNMPv3
Encrypt/Decrypt
SNMP Message
Authentication 1
SNMP Message
Authentication 2
SNMP Message
Authentication 3
SNMP Key
Derivation
Admin
- SNMP Privacy
Key: G,E
- SNMP
Authentication
Key: G,E
- SNMPv3
Passwords
(Privacy and
Auth): W
SNMPv3 traps Provide system
condition
information
Global ("FIPS
Compliant
Mode") in
combination
with
successful
completion of
service
Command Command
response/
status
None Admin
- SNMPv3
Passwords
(Privacy and
Auth): W
Read-Write
- SNMPv3
Passwords
(Privacy and
Auth): W
Export Backup
of
Configuration
file over
HTTPS/SFTP
Save device and
services
configuration
into file
Global ("FIPS
Compliant
Mode") in
combination
with
successful
completion of
service
Command Command
response/
status
Config File
Encrypt/Decrypt
Password
Obfuscation
Admin
- Operator
Passwords: R
- Peer-
Authentication
Pre-Shared
Secret: R
- SNMPv3
Passwords
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
(Privacy and
Auth): R
Restore
Configuration
file over
HTTPS/SFTP
Restore device
and services
configuration
into file
Global ("FIPS
Compliant
Mode") in
combination
with
successful
completion of
service
Command Command
response/
status
Config File
Encrypt/Decrypt
Password
Obfuscation
Admin
- Operator
Passwords: W
- Peer-
Authentication
Pre-Shared
Secret: W
- SNMPv3
Passwords
(Privacy and
Auth): W
Random
Number
Generation
Random Number
Generation
Global ("FIPS
Compliant
Mode") in
combination
with
successful
completion of
service
Command Command
response/
status
Entropy Source
DRBG
Admin
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Entropy Input:
E
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Seed: E
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG key
value: E
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG V
value: E
Crypto
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Entropy Input:
E
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Seed: E
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG key
value: E
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG V
value: E
Read-Write
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Entropy Input:
E
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Seed: E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG key
value: E
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG V
value: E
Read-Only
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Entropy Input:
E
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Seed: E
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG key
value: E
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG V
value: E
Perform Self-
Tests On-
Demand
Run self-tests N/A Command Command
response/
status
Verify Firmware
Integrity
Admin
Read-Write
Factory Reset See Section 9.3 Status Command Command
response/
status
None Admin
- Operator
Passwords: Z
- EC DH Key
Pair for DEK: Z
- ECC CDH
primitive for
DEK: Z
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): Z
- Peer-
Authentication
Pre-Shared
Secret: Z
- Diffie-Hellman
(DH) Key Pair: Z
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
Z
- Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key
Pair: Z
- EC Diffie-
Hellman
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Shared Secret:
Z
- SNMP Privacy
Key: Z
- SNMP
Authentication
Key: Z
- SNMPv3
Passwords
(Privacy and
Auth): Z
- TLS Key Pair: Z
- TLS Premaster
Secret: Z
- TLS Master
Secret: Z
- TLS Session
Encryption Key:
Z
- TLS Session
Authentication
Key: Z
- SSH/SFTP
Host Key Pair: Z
- SSH/SFTP
Session
Encryption Key:
Z
- SSH/SFTP
Session
Authentication
key: Z
- Firmware
Update Key: Z
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Seed: Z
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Entropy Input:
Z
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG key
value: Z
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG V
value: Z
Read-Write
- Operator
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Passwords: Z
- EC DH Key
Pair for DEK: Z
- ECC CDH
primitive for
DEK: Z
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): Z
- Peer-
Authentication
Pre-Shared
Secret: Z
- Diffie-Hellman
(DH) Key Pair: Z
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
Z
- Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key
Pair: Z
- EC Diffie-
Hellman
Shared Secret:
Z
- SNMP Privacy
Key: Z
- SNMP
Authentication
Key: Z
- SNMPv3
Passwords
(Privacy and
Auth): Z
- TLS Key Pair: Z
- TLS Premaster
Secret: Z
- TLS Master
Secret: Z
- TLS Session
Encryption Key:
Z
- TLS Session
Authentication
Key: Z
- SSH/SFTP
Host Key Pair: Z
- SSH/SFTP
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Session
Encryption Key:
Z
- SSH/SFTP
Session
Authentication
key: Z
- Firmware
Update Key: Z
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Seed: Z
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Entropy Input:
Z
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG key
value: Z
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG V
value: Z
Zeroization See Section 9.3
(Zeroization)
Status Command Command
response/
status
None Admin
- Operator
Passwords: Z
- EC DH Key
Pair for DEK: Z
- ECC CDH
primitive for
DEK: Z
- Data
Encryption Key
(DEK): Z
- Peer-
Authentication
Pre-Shared
Secret: Z
- Diffie-Hellman
(DH) Key Pair: Z
- Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret:
Z
- Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key
Pair: Z
- EC Diffie-
Hellman
Shared Secret:
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Z
- SNMP Privacy
Key: Z
- SNMP
Authentication
Key: Z
- SNMPv3
Passwords
(Privacy and
Auth): Z
- TLS Key Pair: Z
- TLS Premaster
Secret: Z
- TLS Master
Secret: Z
- TLS Session
Encryption Key:
Z
- TLS Session
Authentication
Key: Z
- SSH/SFTP
Host Key Pair: Z
- SSH/SFTP
Session
Encryption Key:
Z
- SSH/SFTP
Session
Authentication
key: Z
- Firmware
Update Key: Z
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Seed: Z
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Entropy Input:
Z
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG key
value: Z
- SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG V
value: Z
Firmware
Update
Upload and
deploy firmware
Global ("FIPS
Compliant
Mode") in
Command Command
response/
status
Verify Firmware
Load
Admin
- Firmware
Update Key:
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
combination
with
successful
completion of
service
G,E
Read-Write
- Firmware
Update Key:
G,E
Table 12: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The version signature is verified by HMAC-SHA-384. Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate,
is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status
The Bypass capability is the ability of a service to partially or wholly circumvent a cryptographic function or process.
The following two independent internal actions are required to activate the bypass capability, to prevent the inadvertent bypass of
plaintext data due to a single error:
1. The admin shuts down the interface.
2. Then switches the interface to non-encrypted mode.
*Both actions are accompanied by a service impact warning
The module shows status to indicate that the bypass capability is alternately activated and deactivated, and that the module is
providing some services with cryptographic processing and some services without cryptographic processing, as follows: If the bypass
service indicator is “Bypass is in effect”, it means that at least one active service is not encrypted. If the bypass service indicator is
“Bypass in not in effect”, it means that all active services are encrypted.
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status
The Self-initiated cryptographic output capability is the ability of the module to perform cryptographic operations and other approved
security functions or SSP management techniques without external operator request.
The following two independent internal actions are required to activate the self-Initiated cryptographic output capability to prevent
the inadvertent output due to a single error:
1. The admin selects the service type and turns on the interface.
2. The admin confirms the changes.
The module shows status to indicate whether the self-Initiated cryptographic output capability is activated through the Admin Status
of the respective channel. If the self-Initiated cryptographic output service indicator is “Up” for a respective channel, it means that
the capability is activated. If the self-Initiated cryptographic output service indicator is “Down” for a respective channel, it means
that the capability is not activated.
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5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The firmware is delivered as an executable file and the module implements a HMAC-SHA2-384 keyed hash firmware integrity test.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The Software Integrity Test can be invoked by rebooting the module.
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6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
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7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
The table below details the Physical Security Mechanisms supported by the module.
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Tamper-
evident Seals
Minimum of
every 30 days.
The CO shall inspect the enclosure and tamper-evident seals for physical signs of
tampering or attempted access to the cryptographic module. The physical security
of the module is intact if there is no evidence of tampering with the tamper-
evident seals.
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required
The module has a multi-chip standalone embodiment and is made of commercially available, production grade components meeting
commercial specifications for power, temperature, reliability, shock and vibration. All production-grade components include standard
passivation techniques, in the form of a coating applied over the module’s circuitry to protect against environmental and other physical
damage. The production grade metal enclosure is opaque to the visible spectrum, and all openings are designed in such a way to
obscure visual access to the security relevant innards of the module.
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals
Number: The PL-2000GA and the PL-2000GM are sealed with 3 tamper-evident seals.
Placement: The locations of the tamper-evident seals are indicated by the red rectangles in Figures 6 and 7.
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Figure 6: PL-2000GA (Front, Rear, Left, Right, Bottom)
Figure 7: PL-2000GM (Front, Rear, Left, Right, Bottom)
Surface Preparation:
For optimum adhesion, surfaces must be cleaned with alcohol to remove surface contaminants before affixing the tamper-evident
seals:
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o Use 90% (or higher) Isopropyl Alcohol
o Apply alcohol to a clean paper towel and wipe the intended surface to remove contaminants.
o Dry the surface with another clean paper towel (some contaminants will remain on the surface if the alcohol is
allowed to air dry)
o Apply the label to the clean surface. NOTE: The adhesive side of the label must not be touched during the label
placement. If it is inevitable, tweezer must be used for handling.
Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Crypto-Officer
Part Numbers: Holo-Guard FIPS
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8 Non-Invasive Security
Currently, the ISO/IEC 19790:2012 non-invasive security area is not required by FIPS 140-3 (see NIST SP 800-140F). The requirements
of this area are not applicable to the module.
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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
The table below lists Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) storage areas for the module. Section 9.4 below selects from the storage
areas listed and specifies the appropriate parameter in the “Storage” column if applicable to a specific SSP.
Storage Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
DDR4 SDRAM Random memory access Dynamic
QSPI FLASH Flash file system Static
Table 14: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
The table below lists SSP input and output methods for the module. Section 9.4 below selects from the input and output methods
listed and specifies the appropriate parameter in the “Inputs/Outputs” column if applicable to a specific SSP.
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
SSP Input 1 External QSPI FLASH Plaintext Manual Electronic
SSP Input 2 External QSPI FLASH Encrypted Manual Electronic
SSP Input 3 External DDR4 SDRAM Plaintext Automated Electronic
SSP Output 1 QSPI FLASH External Encrypted Manual Electronic
SSP Output 2 DDR4 SDRAM External Plaintext Automated Electronic
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
The table below lists SSP zeroization methods for this module. Section 9.4 below selects from the zeroization methods listed and
specifies the appropriate parameter in the “Zeroization” column if applicable to a specific SSP.
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Session
Termination
All session ephemeral keys are zeroized. Loss of
contents
By closing of HTTPS/SSH session.
Key Lifetime Data Plane ephemeral keys are zeroized. Loss of
contents
N/A
Power Cycle All session ephemeral keys are zeroized. Loss of
contents
Power cycle
Zeroization
Command
All SSPs are zeroized. System IP is restored
to default.
Loss of
contents
Input zeroization command in
console.
Factory Reset All SSPs are zeroized. System IP is kept. Loss of
contents
Input factory reset command in
console.
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods
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9.4 SSPs
The following table summarizes the keys and Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services
implemented in the module:
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By Established
By
Used By
Operator
Passwords
Authentication
for the Admin,
Crypto, Read-
Write and
Read-Only roles
Minimum of
8 bytes (64
bits) and
maximum of
20 bytes
(160 bits)
string value
- Minimum
of 8 bytes
(64 bits) and
maximum of
20 bytes
(160 bits)
string value
Authentication
string - CSP
EC DH Key Pair
for DEK
Key pair used in
NIST SP 800-
56Arev3
(Section
5.7.1.2) ECC
CDH Primitive
computation
P-384 - 192
bits
Public/Private
- CSP
KAS Key Pair
Generation 1
KAS 1
ECC CDH
primitive for
DEK
Shared Secret
(Z) value that
will be used to
derive the DEK
384-bit
string - 192
bits
Key Material -
CSP
KAS 1 KAS 1
Data
Encryption Key
(DEK)
Used for
encrypting or
decrypting
payload data
256-bit -
256 bits
Symmetric key
- CSP
KAS 1 Client Data
Encrypt/Decrypt
Peer-
Authentication
Pre-Shared
Secret
Entered by
Crypto.
Parameter used
for Peer-
Authentication
during key
exchange
384-bit
string - 384
bits
Authentication
hex string -
CSP
Data Plane KEX
Message
Authentication
Diffie-Hellman
(DH) Key Pair
Negotiating
TLS/HTTPS or
SSH/SFTP
sessions
Public:
2048-bit,
3072-bit,
4096-bit /
Private:
224-bit,
256-bit,
325-bit -
112 bits,
Public/Private
- CSP
KAS Key Pair
Generation 2
KAS 3
KAS 6
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By Established
By
Used By
128 bits,
152 bits
Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
2048-bit,
3072-bit,
4096-bit -
112 bits,
128 bits,
152 bits
Shared Secret -
CSP
KAS 3
KAS 6
KAS 3
KAS 6
Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key
Pair
Negotiating
TLS/HTTPS or
SSH/SFTP
sessions
P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Public/Private
- CSP
KAS Key Pair
Generation 1
KAS 2
KAS 4
KAS 5
EC Diffie-
Hellman
Shared Secret
EC Diffie-
Hellman Shared
Secret
P-256, P-
384, P-521 -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Shared Secret -
CSP
KAS 2
KAS 4
KAS 5
KAS 2
KAS 4
KAS 5
SNMP Privacy
Key
Encryption /
Decryption of
SNMP traffic
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Symmetric key
- CSP
SNMP Key
Derivation
SNMPv3
Encrypt/Decrypt
SNMP
Authentication
Key
Message
authentication
and verification
in SNMP
HMAC-
SHA2-256,
HMAC-
SHA2-384,
HMAC-
SHA2-512 -
256 bits,
384 bits,
512 bits
Symmetric key
- CSP
SNMP Key
Derivation
SNMP Message
Authentication 1
SNMP Message
Authentication 2
SNMP Message
Authentication 3
SNMPv3
Passwords
(Privacy and
Auth)
SNMPv3
Passwords
Minimum of
8 bytes (64
bits) and
maximum of
20 bytes
(160 bits)
string value
- Minimum
of 8 bytes
(64 bits) and
maximum of
20 bytes
(160 bits)
string value
Authentication
string - CSP
SNMP Key
Derivation
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By Established
By
Used By
TLS Key Pair Key Pair used
for TLS
authentication
P-384 - 192
bits
Public/Private
- CSP
TLS Key
Pair/Certificate
Generation
TLS Digital
Signature
Generation
TLS Digital
Signature
Verification
TLS Premaster
Secret
Establish the
TLS Master
Secret
384-bit
string - 192
bits
Key material -
CSP
KAS 4
KAS 5
KAS 6
TLS Key
Derivation
TLS Master
Secret
Establish the
TLS Session
Keys
384-bit
string - 192
bits
Key material -
CSP
TLS Key
Derivation
TLS Key
Derivation
TLS Session
Encryption Key
Used for
encrypting/
decrypting TLS
messages
128-bit,
256-bit -
128 bits,
256 bits
Symmetric Key
- CSP
TLS Key
Derivation
TLS
Encrypt/Decrypt
TLS Session
Authentication
Key
Used for
authenticating
TLS messages
HMAC
SHA2-256,
HMAC
SHA2-384 -
256 bits,
384 bits
Symmetric Key
- CSP
TLS Key
Derivation
TLS Message
Authentication 1
TLS Message
Authentication 2
SSH/SFTP Host
Key Pair
Key Pair used
for SSH/SFTP
authentication
2048-bit -
112 bits
Public/Private
- CSP
SSH Key Pair
Generation
SSH/SFTP
Session
Encryption Key
Used for
Encrypting
SSH/SFTP
messages
128-bit,
192-bit,
256-bit -
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Symmetric Key
- CSP
SSH Key
Derivation
SSH
Encrypt/Decrypt
1
SSH
Encrypt/Decrypt
2
SSH/SFTP
Session
Authentication
key
Data
authentication
for SSH/SFTP
sessions
HMAC
SHA2-256,
HMAC
SHA2-512 -
256 bits,
512 bits
Symmetric Key
- CSP
SSH Key
Derivation
SSH Message
Authentication 1
SSH Message
Authentication 2
Firmware
Update Key
Firmware
Update Key
HMAC
SHA2-384 -
384 bits
Symmetric Key
- CSP
Verify Firmware
Load
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Seed
Seeding
material for the
SP800-90A
CTR_DRBG
384-bit
value - 384-
bit value
Key material -
CSP
Entropy Source DRBG
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Entropy Input
Entropy Input
for the SP800-
90A CTR_DRBG
384-bit
value - 384-
bit value
Key material -
CSP
Entropy Source DRBG
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type -
Category
Generated By Established
By
Used By
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG key
value
Used for the SP
800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Internal
state value -
Internal
state value
Internal state
value - CSP
DRBG DRBG
SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG V
value
Used for the SP
800-90A
CTR_DRBG
Internal
state value -
Internal
state value
Internal state
value - CSP
DRBG DRBG
Table 17: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
Operator Passwords SSP
Input 1
SSP
Input 2
SSP
Output 1
QSPI
FLASH:Obfuscated
Zeroization
Command
Factory Reset
EC DH Key Pair for DEK SSP
Input 3
SSP
Output 2
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Key Lifetime
Power Cycle
ECC CDH primitive for
DEK:Derives
ECC CDH primitive for
DEK
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Key Lifetime
Power Cycle
EC DH Key Pair for
DEK:Derived From
Data Encryption Key
(DEK)
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Key Lifetime
Power Cycle
ECC CDH primitive for
DEK:Derived From
Peer-Authentication
Pre-Shared Secret
SSP
Input 1
SSP
Input 2
SSP
Output 1
QSPI
FLASH:Encrypted
Zeroization
Command
Factory Reset
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key
Pair
SSP
Input 3
SSP
Output 2
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Session
Termination
Power Cycle
Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret:Derives
Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Session
Termination
Power Cycle
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key
Pair:Derived From
Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) Key
Pair
SSP
Input 3
SSP
Output 2
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Session
Termination
Power Cycle
EC Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret:Derives
EC Diffie-Hellman
Shared Secret
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Session
Termination
Power Cycle
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) Key Pair:Derived
From
SNMP Privacy Key DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Power Cycle SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy
and Auth):Derived From
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
SNMP Authentication
Key
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Power Cycle SNMPv3 Passwords (Privacy
and Auth):Derived From
SNMPv3 Passwords
(Privacy and Auth)
SSP
Input 1
SSP
Input 2
SSP
Output 1
QSPI
FLASH:Encrypted
Zeroization
Command
Factory Reset
SNMP Privacy Key:Derives
SNMP Authentication
Key:Derives
TLS Key Pair QSPI
FLASH:Encrypted
Zeroization
Command
Factory Reset
TLS Premaster Secret DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Session
Termination
Power Cycle
TLS Master Secret:Derives
TLS Master Secret DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Session
Termination
Power Cycle
TLS Premaster
Secret:Derived From
TLS Session Encryption
Key:Derives
TLS Session Authentication
Key:Derives
TLS Session Encryption
Key
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Session
Termination
Power Cycle
TLS Master Secret:Derived
From
TLS Session
Authentication Key
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Session
Termination
Power Cycle
TLS Master Secret:Derived
From
SSH/SFTP Host Key Pair QSPI
FLASH:Encrypted
Zeroization
Command
Factory Reset
SSH/SFTP Session
Encryption Key
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Session
Termination
Power Cycle
SSH/SFTP Session
Authentication key
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Session
Termination
Power Cycle
Firmware Update Key QSPI
FLASH:Encrypted
N/A
SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG
Seed
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Power Cycle SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG
Entropy Input:Derived From
SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG
Entropy Input
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Power Cycle
SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG
key value
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Power Cycle SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG
Seed:Derived From
SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG
V value
DDR4
SDRAM:Plaintext
Power Cycle SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG
Seed:Derived From
Table 18: SSP Table 2
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9.5 Transitions
Please see the latest revision of SP 800-131A and CMVP Programmatic Transitions page for transitions that may affect this module.
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10 Self-Tests
This section specifies the pre-operational and conditional self-tests performed by the module. The pre-operational and conditional
self-tests ensure that the module is not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected.
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Pre-operational Self-Tests are run upon the power up/initialization of the module. The module transitions to the operational state
only after the pre-operational self-tests (and the cryptographic algorithm self-tests (CASTs) are passed successfully. The design of the
modules ensures that all data output, via the data output interface, is inhibited whenever the module is in a pre-operational self-test
condition. The Pre-Operational Self-Tests are detailed in the table below.
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
HMAC-SHA2-384
(A7344)
384-bit Integrity
Test
SW/FW
Integrity
Status Keyed message authentication code-based
firmware integrity verification
SHA2-384
(A7344)
384-bit Bypass
Test
Bypass Status Ensures the correct operation of the logic
governing activation of the bypass capability.
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Conditional Self-Tests are run when an applicable security function or process is invoked. The Conditional Self-Tests are detailed in the
table below.
Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CTR (A7536) 256-bit KATs CAST Status Separate Encrypt
and Decrypt
Power Up
AES-GMAC (C221) 256-bit KATs CAST Status Separate Encrypt
and Decrypt
Power Up
AES-ECB (A7344) 128-bit KATs CAST Status Separate Encrypt
and Decrypt
Power Up
AES-GCM (A7344) 256-bit KATs CAST Status Separate Encrypt
and Decrypt
Power Up
Counter DRBG
(A7344)
128-bit KAT CAST Status SP 800-90A Section
11.3
Power Up
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A7344)
P-384, SHA2-384 PCT PCT Status - Key Pair
Generation
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A7344)
P-384, SHA2-384 KAT CAST Status Sign Power Up
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5)
(A7344)
P-384, SHA2-384 KAT CAST Status Verify Power Up
HMAC-SHA2-384
(A7344)
384-bit KAT CAST Status - Power Up
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A7344)
P-256 KAT CAST Status Ephemeral Unified
Shared Secret (Z)
Computation
Power Up
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Algorithm or Test Test Properties Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A7344)
2048-bit KAT CAST Status Ephemeral Unified
Shared Secret (Z)
Computation
Power Up
KDA OneStep
SP800-56Cr2
(A7344)
SHA2-384 KAT CAST Status - Power Up
KDF SNMP
(A7344)
SHA1 KAT CAST Status - Power Up
KDF SSH (A7344) SHA2-256 KAT CAST Status - Power Up
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5)
(A7344)
2048-bit PCT PCT Status - Key Pair
Generation
Safe Primes Key
Generation
(A7344)
MODP-2048, MODP-
3072, MODP-4096,
ffdhe2048,
ffdhe3072
PCT PCT Status - Key Pair
Generation
SHA2-256
(A7344)
256-bit KAT CAST Status - Power Up
SHA2-512
(A7344)
512-bit KAT CAST Status - Power Up
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (A7344)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Status - Power Up
TLS v1.3 KDF
(A7344)
SHA2-256 KAT CAST Status - Power Up
Firmware Load
Test (HMAC-
SHA2-384
(A7344)
HMAC-SHA2-384 - SW/FW
Load
Status - Firmware Loading
SHA2-384
(A7344)
384-bit - Bypass Status - Bypass
modification
Adaptive
Proportion Test
(APT)
- FD CAST Status SP 800-90B Section
4
Power Up, On
Demand and
Continuously
Repetition Count
Test (RCT)
- FD CAST Status SP 800-90B Section
4
Power Up, On
Demand and
Continuously
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Pre-operational self-tests can be run on-demand, for periodic testing, by rebooting the module.
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-384
(A7344)
Integrity Test SW/FW Integrity On Demand Power Cycle
SHA2-384 (A7344) Bypass Test Bypass On Demand Power Cycle
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-CTR (A7536) KATs CAST On Demand Power Cycle
AES-GMAC (C221) KATs CAST On Demand Power Cycle
AES-ECB (A7344) KATs CAST On Demand Power Cycle
AES-GCM (A7344) KATs CAST On Demand Power Cycle
Counter DRBG
(A7344)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5) (A7344)
PCT PCT On Demand Power Cycle
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-5) (A7344)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-5) (A7344)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
HMAC-SHA2-384
(A7344)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 (A7344)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 (A7344)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
KDA OneStep SP800-
56Cr2 (A7344)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
KDF SNMP (A7344) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
KDF SSH (A7344) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-5) (A7344)
PCT PCT On Demand Power Cycle
Safe Primes Key
Generation (A7344)
PCT PCT On Demand Power Cycle
SHA2-256 (A7344) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
SHA2-512 (A7344) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (A7344)
KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
TLS v1.3 KDF (A7344) KAT CAST On Demand Power Cycle
Firmware Load Test
(HMAC-SHA2-384
(A7344)
- SW/FW Load On Demand Provided Service
SHA2-384 (A7344) - Bypass On Demand Provided Service
Adaptive Proportion
Test (APT)
FD CAST On Demand Power Cycle
Repetition Count
Test (RCT)
FD CAST On Demand Power Cycle
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
If any of the Pre-operational Self-Tests or Cryptographic Algorithm Self-Tests fail, the module will output an error status and enter a
critical error state, where all data output is inhibited. Upon entering a critical error state, an operator can attempt to clear the
critical error state by rebooting the module. If the critical error state cannot be cleared, the module must be returned to the
PL-2000GM and PL-2000GA FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
PacketLight Networks Ltd. 2026
This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 49 of 52
manufacturer. The action taken upon failure of a conditional self-test is context dependent. The table below shows the different
causes that lead to the Error States and the status indicators reported.
Name Description Conditions Recovery Method Indicator
Critical Error - Pre-Operational, A7344 CAST,
A7536 CAST, C221 CAST or A7344
PCT fails
Attempt reboot, if reboot does not
clear error return to manufacturer.
"...Self-Test
FAILED"
Data Plane
Critical Error
- A7536 CAST or C221 CAST or
Conditional Bypass self-test fails
Attempt reboot, if reboot does not
clear error return to manufacturer.
"...Self-Test
FAILED"
Soft Error - RCT or APT self-test fails Module returns to operational
state once error is logged.
"...Self-Test
FAILED"
Table 23: Error States
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This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
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11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The secure delivery of the modules is guaranteed by the trusted courier (DHL). Upon receipt of the module, the Crypto-Officer is
responsible for verifying the packaging information slip and checking the delivery packaging for any irregularities (such as openings or
tears). If the Crypto-Officer suspects any tampering, they should immediately contact PacketLight Networks Ltd. If the Crypto-Officer
does not suspect tampering upon delivery of the module, they shall follow the steps defined in the Installation section of the
PacketLight PL-2000GA/PL-2000GM Security Guides (shipped with the cryptographic module).
The operator shall set up the device as defined in the PacketLight PL-2000GA/PL-2000GM Security Guides.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The following steps are required to enable the secure operation of the Module:
• Verify that the firmware version of the module is 1.4.5.
• The default password of the Admin and Crypto shall be changed upon first use.
• All operator passwords shall be a minimum of 8 characters in length.
• The default Pre-Shared Secret for Data Plane Encryption shall be changed by Crypto prior to enabling the Data Plane Encryption
Service.
• Admin shall configure firewall to only allow secure protocols.
o Ensure HTTPS is enabled.
o Ensure SSH/SFTP is enabled.
o Ensure that SNMPv3 is enabled, and Authentication is not set to use “No Auth” or “No Priv”.
• Telnet shall be disabled and not be used in the Approved mode of operation.
• HTTP shall be disabled and not be used in the Approved mode of operation.
• SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 shall be disabled and not be used in the Approved mode of operation.
• RADIUS shall be disabled and not be used in the Approved mode of operation.
• TACACS+ shall be disabled and not be used in the Approved mode of operation.
• FTP shall be disabled and not be used in the Approved mode of operation.
• TFTP shall be disabled and not be used in the Approved mode of operation.
• Ensure Encryption License is installed.
• The Crypto-Officer shall be aware that performing the “Lock Encrypted Service” command will prevent the module from zeroizing
SSPs.
• RSA keys shall be at least 2048-bits.
• The Crypto Officer shall ensure the Key Exchange Period for OTU4 traffic does not exceed 24 hours.
• Ensure all traffic is encapsulated in a TLS tunnel as appropriate. Ensure use of Approved algorithms for TLS:
1.2:
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
1.3:
o TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
o TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
o Curves: P-256:P-384:P-521: ffdehe3072: ffdhe2048
• Ensure use of Approved algorithms for SSH:
o Key Exchange Algorithms:
▪ ecdh-sha2-nistp256
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This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
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▪ ecdh-sha2-nistp384
▪ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
▪ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 (use modulus size 2048 or greater)
o Encryption Algorithms:
▪ AES128-CTR
▪ AES192-CTR
▪ AES256-CTR
▪ AES128-GCM
▪ AES256-GCM
o Mac Algorithms:
▪ HMAC-SHA2-256
▪ HMAC-SHA2-512
• Ensure use of Approved algorithms for SNMP:
o Authentication Algorithms:
▪ SHA-256
▪ SHA-384
▪ SHA-512
o Privacy Algorithms:
▪ AES-CFB128-128
▪ AES-CFB128-192
▪ AES-CFB128-256
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
If the module’s power is lost and then restored, the operator shall establish a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption.
Refer also to Security Policy Section 2.7.1 – AES-GCM (IG C.H conformance).
Additional guidance is provided separately in other operator documentation, including the User Manual.
11.4 End of Life
Once the module has reached its end-of-life, the Crypto Officer shall sanitize the module by invoking the “configure system reset
zeroize” service. This will zeroize all SSPs stored in volatile and non-volatile memory.
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This document may be reproduced and distributed only in its original entirety without revision
Page 52 of 52
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
The module does not claim mitigation of other attacks.