Copyright © 2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd.
This document may be reproduced and distributed providing such a reproduction is complete and
unmodified.
Baltimore ACCE
Family
010387 FIPS 140-1 Security Policy
Table of Contents
3 Baltimore ACCE Family - 010387 FIPS 140-1 Security Policy - 2.0
Copyright © 2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd.
This document may be reproduced and distributed providing such a reproduction is complete and
unmodified.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ..........................................................................................................5
1.1.The Baltimore ACCE Family .............................................................................................5
1.2.The SureWare Keyper ......................................................................................................6
1.3.SureWare PCI ..................................................................................................................6
2. Non-FIPS Operating Modes...................................................................................7
2.1.General...........................................................................................................................7
2.2.Support of non-FIPS algorithms........................................................................................7
2.3.Further non-FIPS operation..............................................................................................7
3. Physical Security ...................................................................................................8
3.1.Introduction.....................................................................................................................8
3.2.Physical Security Rules .....................................................................................................9
4. Roles and Services ..............................................................................................10
4.1.User Role.......................................................................................................................10
4.2.Crypto Officer Role ........................................................................................................10
5. Identity Based Authentication ............................................................................12
5.1.User 12
5.2.Crypto Officers ..............................................................................................................12
6. Security Data ......................................................................................................13
7. Firmware Loading ...............................................................................................14
7.1.Factory Firmware Download and Key Initialisation .........................................................14
7.2.Firmware Upgrade.........................................................................................................14
8. Maintenance .......................................................................................................15
Introduction
5 Baltimore ACCE Family - 010387 FIPS 140-1 Security Policy - 2.0
Copyright © 2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd.
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unmodified.
1. Introduction
This document describes the FIPS PUB 140-1 view of the Baltimore ACCE family security
policies.
1.1. The Baltimore ACCE Family
The Baltimore Advanced Configurable Crypto Environment (see front cover picture) is a “multi-
chip embedded” cryptographic module.
This module is available in two physical forms:
1. (The ACCE) is contained within a tamper resistant and detecting
enclosure certified as meeting FIPS PUB 140-1 level 4.
2. (The ACCE-L3) is contained within an epoxy resin enclosure certified
as meeting FIPS PUB 140-1 level 3. The ACCE-L3 also incorporates
power and temperature detection and response mechanisms certified
as meeting FIPS PUB 140-1 level 4.
! The cover picture is of an ACCE. The ACCE-L3 is similar but does not
have a flexible cable connector.
All ACCE/ACCE-L3 variants are single user modules i.e.; they provide cryptographic
services to exactly one user. This single user is an embedded firmware application which can
only be generated and loaded by Baltimore or licensed OEMs (FIPS approved
Cryptographic techniques (see Section 5: Identity Based Authentication for details) ensure
this. Note: user code cannot be loaded dynamically, though authenticated field updates are
possible). ACCE/ACCE-L3s do not allow this single user to undertake crypto officer
functions; Crypto Officers are differently authenticated and have access to an independent
data interface (dedicated serial port assumed to be connected to a display, keypad &
SmartCard reader.).
ACCE/ACCE-L3’s include a commercial RISC (Reduced Instruction Set Computing)
microprocessor which manages and/or undertakes the cryptographic services provided by
the module. They also include dedicated hardware modules for carrying out common
cryptographic functions (modular exponentiation and symmetric algorithm operations).
Introduction
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1.2. The SureWare Keyper
The Baltimore SureWare Keyper is an example of Baltimore product containing the ACCE
combined with an application (the single user of the ACCE; in this case the “SureWare
Keyper Professional” application) to provide ACCE cryptographic functions such as
Encrypt/Decrypt, Hash, MAC, Sign, Verify, Generate Keys, etc. to a standard (network)
interface.
The SureWare Keyper physically consists of an ACCE module, a SmartCard interface unit,
case, keypad, display, battery, power supply unit and the network interface. (The battery
maintains internal storage keys during power-off state; the unit is not battery powered.)
The SureWare Keyper is designed to be connected directly to a host computer, not to a
public network. In operation, plain text/ cypher text and end user commands all pass over
the same interface – the SureWare Keyper does not enforce data separation at that level.
(Thus its operation is similar to an embedded “crypto PCIcard”, not a Virtual Private
Network (VPN) device. However, unlike a PCI card, the SureWare Keyper has its own
SmartCard Reader contained in the box and can easily be disconnected from the host
computer for secure storage when not in use.)
Although technically possible, Baltimore does not currently offer the SureWare Keyper with
theACCE-L3 cryptographic module (only the “Level 4” ACCE). If a “Level 3” SureWare
Keyper is of interest, please contact your local Baltimore sales office.
1.3. SureWare PCI
The Baltimore SureWare PCI card is an example of the application of the ACCE-L3.
Functionally identical to the SureWare Keyper, but in a PCI card package, the SureWare
PCI provides a highly secure key protection solution where “single box” operation is
required.
Non-FIPS Operating Modes
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Copyright © 2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd.
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2. Non-FIPS Operating Modes
2.1. General
The Baltimore ACCE/ACCE-L3 family offer a range of cryptographic facilities and
mechanisms, subject to factory build options.
When operated in FIPS mode, the ACCE is certified to operate at FIPS PUB 140-1 level 4
after the initialisation process is completed (Initialisation generates or imports the data used
to authenticate Crypto Officers.) The ACCE-L3 is similarly certified, but to FIPS PUB 140-1
level 3.
2.2. Support of non-FIPS algorithms
Where build options permit, non-FIPS modes operation for cryptographic functions or non-
FIPS approved algorithms (where non-FIPS approved algorithms are provided) may also be
selected.
Choice of FIPS/non-FIPS cryptographic functions or algorithms is determined by an API
(Application Programming Interface) parameter and is selected on a command-by-
command basis by the embedded application (i.e. the user).
2.3. Further non-FIPS operation
In addition to the above, two (or more) Authenticated Crypto Officers acting together may
enable further non-FIPS modes of operation. These modes may enable (for example) the
user to export plain text private keys via the data interface in order to support legacy
applications.
A significant non-FIPS service is the ability of Crypto Officers to “backup” protected (i.e.
encrypted) user keys to Smart Cards via the Smart Card port. (This function can be
prohibited at initialisation on “SV” variants.)
Physical Security
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Copyright © 2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd.
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3. Physical Security
3.1. Introduction
The ACCE is contained within an embedded module certified as meeting the requirements
of FIPS PUB 140-1 level 4. Similarly, the ACCE-L3 is contained within an embedded
module certified as meeting the requirements of FIPS PUB 140-1 level 3 (+EFP).
A cryptographic key hierarchy headed by the Storage Master Key (SMK) protects security
relevant data within the ACCE/ACCE-L3. Another similar cryptographic key hierarchy
headed by the Image Master Key (IMK) protects the operation of the ACCE/ACCE-L3 itself
and permits authorised firmware field updates. (Authorised updates must be FIPS
validated to retain FIPS-certified operations).
For the ACCE, the module surrounding the cryptographic processor (and associated
memory, cryptographic acceleration devices, etc.) provides a tamper-detecting envelope,
within an opaque resin coating and an outer metal case. Attempts to access the
cryptographic processor and/or associated devices (including cutting, chemically
dissolving or removing battery power as this enables the protection circuitry) cause the
module to halt and to zeroise all plain text (secret or private) keys (user keys and the two
storage master keys – the SMK & IMK). The ACCE-L3 features an opaque epoxy resin
coating which deters attempts to access the module, but does not feature the detection and
response mechanisms of the ACCE. The ACCE-L3 does, however, zeroise keys as described
above if battery power is removed.
For all ACCE/ACCE-L3s, once the IMK has been zeroised, on-site recovery (including any
attempt to re-install firmware) of the module is impossible. The module must then be
removed from service (it will be non-functional) and we recommend that it is returned to
Baltimore for repair.
If the ACCE/ACCE-L3 is taken beyond its operational temperature range, it halts and
zeroises all plain text (secret or private) keys and the SMK. On return to normal
temperature, the unit can be restarted and (where the user application provides this service
as in SureWare Keyper) keys can be re-entered from backup (if such backups exist).
Note:
! Latest (i.e. all except the obsolete “ACCE-G1”) build variants feature an
additional measure. If the ACCE is taken beyond its storage
temperature range the IMK is also zeroised (in addition to the halting
and zeroisation of all other plain text secret or private keys that will
have already occurred as a result of exceeding the operational
temperature range). Note also, all ACCE-L3 modules provide this
feature. As described above, once zeroisation of the IMK has occurred,
the ACCE/ACCE-L3 cannot be recovered on-site.
Physical Security
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3.2. Physical Security Rules
The unit must be disconnected and removed from service in the following instances:
a) The battery voltage indicator is showing low state. (Where supplied as in the SureWare
Keyper)
b) There are signs of physical tamper, i.e. any security labels (where fitted) have been
damaged, holes have been drilled, or there is evidence of attempts to gain entry to the unit.
c) A power module other than the module approved has been connected.
d) It is known that the unit has been subjected to temperatures outside the specified storage
temperature range.
e) There is evidence of chemical attack, i.e. corrosion or discoloration.
We recommend that the unit is returned to Baltimore for inspection/investigation/repair
where any of the above occur.
Roles and Services
10 Baltimore ACCE Family - 010387 FIPS 140-1 Security Policy - 2.0
Copyright © 2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd.
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4. Roles and Services
ACCE/ACCE-L3s support (single) User and Crypto Officer Roles. Two variations of
software functionality exist (BE and SV) these variations only affect the Crypto Officer role
as shown below.
4.1. User Role
(User role services are accessed by a single user; the embedded application.)
Services Available:
• Encrypt/Decrypt.
• Sign/Verify Signature
• Hash/Verify Hash
• MAC/Verify MAC
• Generate Symmetric Key.
• Generate Asymmetric Key Pair.
• Export/Import Protected Key.
• Store Protected Key.
The user has no direct access to Security Parameters. (i.e., the user utilises keys by label &
function. The user does not access the actual value of a key.)
4.2. Crypto Officer Role
The Crypto Officer accesses the ACCE/ACCE-L3 via the administration interface. This
interface requires a display panel, keypad and SmartCard reader (as provided in the
SureWare Keyper). The Crypto Officer cannot carry out user functions.
The Crypto Officer can:
• Generate a new SMK.
• Create a new Crypto Officer SmartCard set.
• Enable/Disable non-FIPS operation modes (requires at least two Crypto Officers).
In BE variants, the Crypto Officer can:
• Export the SMK (in n from m component form).
• Import a new SMK (in n from m component form).
• Generate a new SMK.
Roles and Services
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• Export/Import protected user keys. (non-FIPS operation)
In BE variants, the Crypto Officer has access to the SMK and to all user protected keys.
In SV variants, the Crypto Officer can (at initialization):
• Prevent all access to the additional crypto officer functions available permanently to BE
variants.
In SV variants, once the Crypto Officer has disabled these functions, no Crypto Officer has
access to the SMK or to any user protected keys. (The functions cannot be re-enabled except
by re-initialisation, which generates a new SMK and hence causes all user keys to become
inaccessible (They are encrypted by a key which no longer exists.).)
Identity Based Authentication
12 Baltimore ACCE Family - 010387 FIPS 140-1 Security Policy - 2.0
Copyright © 2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd.
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5. Identity Based Authentication
5.1. User
There is a single user of the ACCE/ACCE-L3 Application Program Interface (API). This is
the companion embedded application. This application is linked to the ACCE/ACCE-L3 at
factory build time and the resultant firmware image is digitally signed. This digital
signature is verified during construction and then stripped by the loader firmware (i.e. the
digital signature is not stored). This firmware then calculates a DES MAC (as defined in
ISO/IEC 9797:1994 & FIPS PUB 113) of the user application which it stores. Every time an
ACCE/ACCE-L3 is restarted (i.e. power on) or reset, the MAC is recalculated and
compared with the stored version. In the event that an ACCE/ACCE-L3 is unable to verify
this MAC, it will refuse to operate and should be returned to Baltimore for
reloading/repair.
5.2. Crypto Officers
The ACCE/ACCE-L3 identifies and authenticates their Crypto Officers via a challenge
response protocol to a device capable of responding to a formatted random challenge.
Correct response depends on knowing a 56 bit shared secret.
The ACCE/ACCE-L3 provides software support for an attached SmartCard reader/writer
and display panel/keypad for user messages. Compatible SmartCard readers and a
combined display/keypad are built into Baltimore products such as the SureWare Keyper
and provided as hand-held units for the SureWare PCI.
The application end user must ensure that proper procedures are followed to protect the
Crypto Officer SmartCards and their PINs from improper use or disclosure.
Security Data
Baltimore ACCE Family - 010387 FIPS 140-1 Security Policy - 2.0 13
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Copyright © 2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd.
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unmodified.
6. Security Data
The following are security data.
• Storage Protection Keys:
IMK (Image Master Key), SMK (Storage Master Key)
• Crypto Officer Authentication Keys:
These are derived (proprietary, non-FIPS derivation) 56 bit secrets. The
fundamental secret from which they are derived is stored in protected form (for
properties of “protected” see note below in “user keys” definition) in non-volatile
RAM.
• User Keys:
All user keys. (when unencrypted)
Notes:
! All user keys are protected.
Protected keys are always encrypted (DES CBC under the SMK) except
when they are decrypted for use. These “working copy” Plain Text
instances of protected keys can only exist within the regions of the ACCE
which are actively zeroised on tamper.
! The user application cannot access plain text keys. (For example, the
software interface providing functionality such as “get key value”
simply does not exist.)
! By definition, the storage protection keys, (the SMK and IMK) always
exist in plain text form. The SMK never leaves the protected physical
area except via the Crypto Officer interface in component form when
required by authenticated Crypto Officers (note this can be prevented in
SV variants). The IMK can never be exported.
Firmware Loading
14 Baltimore ACCE Family - 010387 FIPS 140-1 Security Policy - 2.0
Copyright © 2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd.
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7. Firmware Loading
7.1. Factory Firmware Download and Key Initialisation
Firmware is downloaded into ACCE/ACCE-L3s (namely the application, the secure
download facility itself and software to generate / set up the ACCE/ACCE-L3’s Storage
Protection Keys, ACCE/ACCE-L3’s Firmware Download Keys and Initialisation Keys)
during factory initialisation. This firmware is signed with a factory key and downloaded to
ACCE/ACCE-L3s on secure premises on Baltimore’s site, supervised by the Baltimore
Security Officer.
ACCE/ACCE-L3s rejects improperly signed firmware. The initial load facility is disabled
by the ACCE/ACCE-L3s on receipt of the secure download firmware and re-enabled
should an ACCE/ACCE-L3 be the subject of an actual tamper (breech of the tamper
resistant mesh).
Should an ACCE/ACCE-L3 be the subject of an actual tamper (and thus, zeroisation of the
IMK), a challenge/response mechanism is invoked prior to the firmware reload. This
makes use of a public/private key encryption mechanism and a large random number. As
this mechanism requires knowledge of Baltimore’s private key, it can only be undertaken
on Baltimore’s secure premises.
7.2. Firmware Upgrade
ACCE/ACCE-L3s application firmwares can be upgraded while on the application owner’s
site using the secure download process.
Note:
! If “FIPS-mode” operation of the module is required after firmware
upgrade, the new firmware must be FIPS validated.
The download process replaces the factory-supplied application with new software. This
downloaded firmware is digitally signed by Baltimore and may also be encrypted.
If the signing keys are not recognised by an ACCE/ACCE-L3s, it will reject the download
and restart using its existing firmware.
Maintenance
Baltimore ACCE Family - 010387 FIPS 140-1 Security Policy - 2.0 15
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8. Maintenance
No user maintenance of an ACCE/ACCE-L3 is possible. If a fault develops (including
faults indicated by the self-test system), the ACCE/ACCE-L3 must be removed from
service.
Repair of an ACCE/ACCE-L3 requires return to Baltimore, no third party or site service is
possible. Products based on the ACCE/ACCE-L3 (for example, the SureWare Keyper or
SureWarePCI) may potentially be repaired on the customer’s site where the fault does not
involve ACCE/ACCE-L3 components (for example, SmartCard reader or display/keypad
faults).
Configuration Control of this Document
Document details
File Name: FIPSSecurityPolicy.doc
Document Title: Baltimore ACCE Family - 010387 FIPS 140-1 Security Policy
Document Revision No.: 2.0.
Author: Baltimore
Approved By: Paul Goffin
Number of pages: 16
Revision Date: 27 March 2001