Americas Headquarters:
Cisco Systems, Inc., 170 West Tasman Drive, San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA
© 2021-2026
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Cisco Systems logo is registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc.
Cisco Systems, Inc
Firepower Management Center Virtual VMware Cryptographic Module
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Page 2 of 39
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Table of Contents
1 General................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 5
2 Cryptographic Module Specification........................................................................................ 5
2.1 Description ....................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification........................................ 7
2.3 Excluded Components...................................................................................................... 8
2.4 Modes of Operation.......................................................................................................... 8
2.5 Algorithms ........................................................................................................................ 8
2.6 Security Function Implementations..................................................................................11
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information .........................................................................................15
2.8 RBG and Entropy ............................................................................................................16
2.9 Key Generation................................................................................................................16
2.10 Key Establishment.........................................................................................................17
2.11 Industry Protocols..........................................................................................................17
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces............................................................................................17
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................17
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.......................................................................................18
4.1 Authentication Methods ...................................................................................................18
4.2 Roles...............................................................................................................................18
4.3 Approved Services ..........................................................................................................18
4.4 Non-Approved Services...................................................................................................24
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded................................................................................24
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status..............................................................................................24
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status ........................................................................24
4.8 Additional Information......................................................................................................24
5 Software/Firmware Security ...................................................................................................24
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................24
5.2 Initiate on Demand ..........................................................................................................24
6 Operational Environment........................................................................................................24
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ..........................................................24
7 Physical Security....................................................................................................................25
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................25
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management..........................................................................25
9.1 Storage Areas .................................................................................................................25
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9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods..............................................................................................25
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods................................................................................................26
9.4 SSPs ...............................................................................................................................26
9.5 Transitions.......................................................................................................................32
10 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................33
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests ............................................................................................33
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests....................................................................................................33
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information........................................................................................36
10.4 Error States ...................................................................................................................37
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ...........................................................................................................38
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures..........................................................38
11.2 Administrator Guidance .................................................................................................38
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance..........................................................................................38
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks ...................................................................................................39
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets).... 7
Table 3: Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware.............................................. 7
Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid .................................. 8
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid ................... 8
Table 6: Modes List and Description .......................................................................................... 8
Table 7: Approved Algorithms - CiscoSSL FOM - Virtual with PAA ............................................ 9
Table 8: Approved Algorithms - CiscoSSL FOM - Virtual without PAA ......................................11
Table 9: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms ........................................................................................11
Table 10: Security Function Implementations............................................................................15
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces ..................................................................................................17
Table 12: Roles.........................................................................................................................18
Table 13: Approved Services ....................................................................................................23
Table 14: Storage Areas ...........................................................................................................25
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................26
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods..........................................................................................26
Table 17: SSP Table 1..............................................................................................................29
Table 18: SSP Table 2..............................................................................................................32
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................33
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests ...............................................................................................36
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information.........................................................................36
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................37
Table 23: Error States...............................................................................................................38
List of Figures
Figure 1 Block Diagram.............................................................................................................. 7
Americas Headquarters:
Cisco Systems, Inc., 170 West Tasman Drive, San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA
© 2021-2026
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Cisco Systems logo is registered trademark of Cisco Systems, Inc.
1 General
1.1 Overview
This is Cisco Systems, Inc. non-proprietary security policy for the Firepower Management
Center Virtual VMware Cryptographic Module (hereinafter referred to as the Module or FMCv)
with software version 7.0.5. The following details how this module meets the security
requirements of FIPS 140-3, SP 800-140 and ISO/IEC 19790 for a Security Level 1 Software
cryptographic module.
The security requirements cover areas related to the design and implementation of a
cryptographic module. These areas include cryptographic module specification; cryptographic
module interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; software/firmware security; operational
environment; physical security; non-invasive security; sensitive security parameter
management; self-tests; life-cycle assurance; and mitigation of other attacks. The following table
indicates the actual security levels for each area of the cryptographic module.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 1
2 Cryptographic module specification 1
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 1
4 Roles, services, and authentication 1
5 Software/Firmware security 1
6 Operational environment 1
7 Physical security N/A
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 1
10 Self-tests 1
11 Life-cycle assurance 1
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
This module is a multi-chip standalone software cryptographic module deployed as the
virtualized version of the Cisco Firepower Management Center with underlying operating system
identified as Linux 4 (also referred to as Firepower eXtensible Operating System or FX-OS)
throughout this document. The Module’s operational environment is modifiable.
Page 6 of 39
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The module is the administrative nerve center for managing critical Cisco network security
solutions. It provides complete and unified management over firewalls, application control,
intrusion prevention, URL filtering, and advanced malware protection, quickly and easily go from
managing a firewall to controlling applications to investigating and remediating malware
outbreaks. It is a key part of the broad and integrated Cisco Secure portfolio, delivering in-depth
analysis, streamlined security management across the network and cloud, and accelerated
incident investigation and response, working across Cisco and third-party technologies. The
Firewall Management Center (FMC) discovers real-time information about changing network
resources and operations. The Management Center is the centralized point for event and policy
management for the following solutions:
• Cisco Firepower Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW)
• Cisco ASA with FirePOWER Services
• Cisco Firepower Next-Generation IPS (NGIPS)
• Cisco FirePOWER Threat Defense
• Cisco Advanced Malware Protection (AMP)
Module Type: Software
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Module Characteristics:
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic module (red dash box) is a multi-chip standalone software cryptographic
module.
The block diagram below shows the boundary of the Tested Operational Environment’s Physical
Perimeter (TOEPP) being defined as the physical perimeter of the tested platform enclosure
around which everything runs. The cryptographic boundary is the module (red dash box) and its
interfaces with the operational environment.
Processor
Hypervisor
FMC
API
API
FOM
Tested Platform TOEPP
Page 7 of 39
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Figure 1 Block Diagram
The Block Diagram above comprises the following components
• Processor: Chip on the tested platforms handle all processes.
• API: Host API between hypervisor and processor
• Hypervisor: VMWare ESXi 6.7/7.0
• FMC: Firepower Management Center
• API = API between the FMC Module and FOM Crypto library
• FOM = Cisco FIPS Object Module (FOM) Crypto Library
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
Package or File Name Software/
Firmware
Version
Features Integrity
Test
Cisco_Firepower_Mgmt_Center_Virtual300_VMware-
7.0.5-72.tar.gz
7.0.5 HMAC-
SHA2-512
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
Model and/or Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
UCS C220 M5S SFF
Server
1.0 VMware ESXi
7.0
Intel Xeon Platinum 8160
(Skylake)
Table 3: Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
Linux 4 (FX-OS)
on VMware ESXi
6.7
UCS C220
M5S SFF
Server
Intel Xeon Gold
6128 (Skylake)
Yes VMware
ESXi 6.7
7.0.5
Linux 4 (FX-OS)
on VMware ESXi
6.7
UCS C220
M5S SFF
Server
Intel Xeon Gold
6128 (Skylake)
No VMware
ESXi 6.7
7.0.5
Linux 4 (FX-OS)
on VMware ESXi
7.0
UCS C220
M5S SFF
Server
Intel Xeon Gold
6128 (Skylake)
Yes VMware
ESXi 7.0
7.0.5
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Operating
System
Hardware
Platform
Processors PAA/PAI Hypervisor
or Host OS
Version(s)
Linux 4 (FX-OS)
on VMware ESXi
7.0
UCS C220
M5S SFF
Server
Intel Xeon Gold
6128 (Skylake)
No VMware
ESXi 7.0
7.0.5
Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Operating
System
Hardware Platform
Linux 4 (FX-OS) C220 M5 w/KVM/AWS
Linux 4 (FX-OS) C240 M5 w/ESXi/KVM/AWS
Linux 4 (FX-OS) C480 M5 w/ESXi/KVM/AWS
Linux 4 (FX-OS) E160-M3 w/ESXi/KVM/AWS
Linux 4 (FX-OS) E180D-M3 w/ESXi/KVM/AWS
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid
2.3 Excluded Components
N/A for this module.
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved The module is always in the approved mode of
operation after initial operations are performed.
Approved "CC" mode is
configured.
Table 6: Modes List and Description
Once the module is configured in the Approved mode of operation by following the steps in
section 11 of this document, the module will be ready for approved mode of operation. The
module doesn’t claim the implementation of a degraded mode operation.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
CiscoSSL FOM - Virtual with PAA
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A2952 Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A2952 Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG A2952 Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A2952 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A2952 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A2952 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
HMAC-SHA-1 A2952 MAC - MAC: 32-160 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 256-448
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A2952 MAC - MAC: 32-256 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 256-448
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A2952 MAC - MAC: 32-384 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 256-448
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A2952 MAC - MAC: 32-512 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 256-448
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A2952 Domain Parameter Generation Methods
- P-256, P-384, P-521
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A2952 Domain Parameter Generation Methods
- modp-2048
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF SSH (CVL) A2952 Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256,
TDES
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A2952 Modulo - 2048, 3072 FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A2952 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5
Modulo - 2048, 3072
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A2952 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5
Modulo - 2048, 3072
FIPS 186-4
Safe Primes Key
Generation
A2952 Safe Prime Groups - modp-2048 SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA-1 A2952 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A2952 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A2952 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A2952 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (CVL)
A2952 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 7: Approved Algorithms - CiscoSSL FOM - Virtual with PAA
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CiscoSSL FOM - Virtual without PAA
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A3376 Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A3376 Key Length - 128, 256 SP 800-38D
Counter DRBG A3376 Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A3376 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A3376 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A3376 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
HMAC-SHA-1 A3376 MAC - MAC: 32-160 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 256-448
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A3376 MAC - MAC: 32-256 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 256-448
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A3376 MAC - MAC: 32-384 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 256-448
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A3376 MAC - MAC: 32-512 Increment 8
Key Length - Key Length: 256-448
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A3376 Domain Parameter Generation Methods
- P-256, P-384, P-521
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A3376 Domain Parameter Generation Methods
- modp-2048
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF SSH (CVL) A3376 Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256,
TDES
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A3376 Modulo - 2048, 3072 FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A3376 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5
Modulo - 2048, 3072
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A3376 Signature Type - PKCS 1.5
Modulo - 2048, 3072
FIPS 186-4
Safe Primes Key
Generation
A3376 Safe Prime Groups - modp-2048 SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA-1 A3376 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A3376 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A3376 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
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Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
SHA2-512 A3376 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (CVL)
A3376 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 8: Approved Algorithms - CiscoSSL FOM - Virtual without PAA
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key
Type:Asymmetric
N/A The cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for
asymmetric keys as per sections 4 and 5 in
SP800-133rev2 (vendor affirmed) and FIPS
140-3 IG D.H. A seed (i.e., the random value)
used in asymmetric key generation is a direct
output from SP800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG
(A2952/A3376)
Table 9: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
KAS-FFC
(SSHv2)
CKG
KAS-Full
Full KAS-FFC
Key Agreement
used for SSHv2
service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 112
bits of security
strength IG : IG
D.F Path 2,
Scenario 2, Split
Key
Confirmation :
No Key
Derivation : IG
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A2952, A3376)
Domain
Parameter
Generation:
MODP-2048
Safe Primes Key
Generation:
(A2952, A3376)
KDF SSH:
(A2952, A3376)
Counter DRBG:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
(A2952, A3376)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
CKG
KAS-Full
Full KAS-ECC
Key Agreement
used for
TLSv1.2 service
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128
and 256 bits of
security strength
IG : IG D.F
Scenario 2, Path
2, Split Key
Confirmation :
No Key
Derivation : IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3:
(A2952, A3376)
Curves: P-256,
P-384, P-521
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A2952, A3376)
Counter DRBG:
(A2952, A3376)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
KTS (SSHv2
with AES and
HMAC)
KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
KTS via SSHv2
service by using
AES and HMAC
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 or
256 bits of
security strength
Standard : SP
800-38F IG D.G
: "combination"
method: use any
approved
symmetric
encryption mode
together with an
approved
authentication
method
AES-CBC:
(A2952, A3376)
Key Length:
128, 256
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A2952, A3376)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A2952,
A3376)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A2952,
A3376)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A2952,
A3376)
SHA-1: (A2952,
A3376)
SHA2-256:
(A2952, A3376)
SHA2-384:
(A2952, A3376)
SHA2-512:
(A2952, A3376)
KTS (TLSv1.2
with AES and
HMAC)
KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
KTS via TLSv1.2
service by using
AES and HMAC
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 or
256 bits of
security strength
Standard : SP
AES-CBC:
(A2952, A3376)
Key Length:
128, 256
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A2952, A3376)
HMAC-SHA2-
Page 13 of 39
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
800-38F IG D.G
: "combination"
method: use any
approved
symmetric
encryption mode
together with an
approved
authentication
method
256: (A2952,
A3376)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A2952,
A3376)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A2952,
A3376)
SHA-1: (A2952,
A3376)
SHA2-256:
(A2952, A3376)
SHA2-384:
(A2952, A3376)
SHA2-512:
(A2952, A3376)
KTS (TLSv1.2
with AES-GCM)
KTS-Unwrap
KTS-Wrap
KTS via TLSv1.2
service by using
AES-GCM
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 128 or
256 bits of
security strength
Standard : SP
800-38F IG D.G
: method: use of
any approved
authenticated
symmetric
encryption mode
AES-GCM:
(A2952, A3376)
Key Length:
128, 256
RSA KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
RSA KeyGen for
SSHv2 and
TLSv1.2
services
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A2952, A3376)
Modulus: 2048,
3072
Counter DRBG:
(A2952, A3376)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
DigSig-SigGen RSA SigGen for
SSHv2 and
TLSv1.2
services
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A2952, A3376)
Modulus: 2048,
3072
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
DigSig-SigVer RSA SigVer for
SSHv2 and
TLSv1.2
services
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A2952, A3376)
Modulus: 2048,
3072
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
ECDSA KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
ECDSA KeyGen
for TLSv1.2
service
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A2952, A3376)
Curves: P-256,
P-384, P-521
Counter DRBG:
(A2952, A3376)
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Asymmetric
ECDSA SigGen
(TLSv1.2)
DigSig-SigGen ECDSA SigGen
for TLSv1.2
service
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A2952, A3376)
Curves: P-256,
P-384, P-521
ECDSA SigVer
(TLSv1.2)
DigSig-SigVer ECDSA SigVer
for TLSv1.2
service
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A2952, A3376)
Curves: P-256,
P-384, P-521
SSHv2 Session
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-UnAuth SSHv2 session
protection.
Bit-strength
Caveat:Provides
128 or 256 bits
of encryption
strength
AES-CBC:
(A2952, A3376)
Key Length:
128, 256
SSHv2 Session
Authentication
MAC SSHv2 Session
Authentication.
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A2952, A3376)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A2952,
A3376)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A2952,
A3376)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A2952,
A3376)
SHA-1: (A2952,
A3376)
SHA2-256:
(A2952, A3376)
SHA2-384:
(A2952, A3376)
SHA2-512:
(A2952, A3376)
SSHv2 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF SSHv2 session
keying materials,
used to derive
SSHv2 session
keys.
KDF SSH:
(A2952, A3376)
Page 15 of 39
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
TLSv1.2
Session
Encrypt/Decrypt
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
TLSv1.2 session
protection.
Bit-strength
Caveat:Provides
128 or 256 bits
of encryption
strength
AES-CBC:
(A2952, A3376)
Key Length:
128, 256
AES-GCM:
(A2952, A3376)
Key Length:
128, 256
TLSv1.2
Session
Authentication
MAC TLSv1.2 session
authentication.
HMAC-SHA-1:
(A2952, A3376)
HMAC-SHA2-
256: (A2952,
A3376)
HMAC-SHA2-
384: (A2952,
A3376)
HMAC-SHA2-
512: (A2952,
A3376)
SHA-1: (A2952,
A3376)
SHA2-256:
(A2952, A3376)
SHA2-384:
(A2952, A3376)
SHA2-512:
(A2952, A3376)
TLSv1.2 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF TLSv1.2 session
keying materials,
used to derive
TLS session
keys.
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A2952, A3376)
DRBG Function DRBG Used for DRBG
generation
Counter DRBG:
(A2952, A3376)
Table 10: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
• For TLSv1.2, the Module’s AES-GCM implementation conforms to Implementation
Guidance C.H scenario #1 following RFC 5288 for TLS. The Module is compatible with
TLSv1.2 and provides support for the acceptable GCM cipher suites from SP 800-52
Rev1, Section 3.3.1. The keys for the client and server negotiated in the TLSv1.2
handshake process (client_write_key and server_write_key) are compared and the
module aborts the session if the key values are identical. The operations of one of the
two parties involved in the TLS key establishment scheme were performed entirely
within the cryptographic boundary of the module being validated. The counter portion of
the IV is set by the module within its cryptographic boundary. When the IV exhausts the
maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or
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server, to encounter this condition will trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption
key. In case the Module’s power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the
AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.
• In accordance with FIPS 140-3 IG D.H, the cryptographic module performs
Cryptographic Key Generation as per section 5 in SP800-133rev2. The resulting
generated seed used in the asymmetric key generation is the unmodified output from
SP800-90Arev1 DRBG.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
The module employs a Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) implementation based on
SP800-90Arev1. This DRBG is used internally by the module (e.g. to generate symmetric keys,
seeds for asymmetric key pairs, and random numbers for security functions).
The DRBG implemented is an AES-256 Counter DRBG, seeded by the Entropy within the
TOEPP which is passively loaded into the Module to seed the SP 800-90Arev1 DRBG by the
Operating System. The Counter DRBG utilizes the Derivation Function. It does not employ
prediction resistance.
The DRBG is instantiated with a 384-bits long entropy input (corresponding to 384 bits of
entropy). Additionally, the DRBG is reseeded with a 256-bits long entropy input (corresponding
to 256 bits of entropy).
2.9 Key Generation
The module implements Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG, vendor affirmed), compliant with
SP 800-133r2. When random values are required, they are obtained from the SP 800-90Ar1
approved DRBG, compliant with Section 4 of SP 800-133r2. The following methods are
implemented:
• Safe primes key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133rev2, Section 5.2, which
maps to SP 800-56Arev3. The method described in Section 5.6.1.1.4 of SP 800-56Ar3
(“Testing Candidates”) is used.
• RSA key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133rev2, Section 5.1, which maps to
FIPS 186-4. The method described in Appendix B.3.4 of FIPS 186-4 (“Provable Primes
with Conditions Based on Auxiliary Provable Primes”) is used.
• ECC (ECDH and ECDSA) key pair generation: compliant with SP 800-133r2, Section
5.1, which maps to FIPS 186-5. The method described in Appendix B.4 of FIPS 186-4
(“Testing Candidates”) is used. Note that this generation method is also used to
generate ECDH key pairs.
Additionally, the module implements the following key derivation methods:
• SSH KDF, TLS 1.2 KDF: compliant with SP 800-135r1. These implementations shall
only be used to generate secret keys in the context of the SSHv2 and TLSv1.2
protocols, respectively.
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Intermediate key generation values are not output from the module and are explicitly zeroized
after processing the service
2.10 Key Establishment
The Module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of
operation:
KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation:
• The Module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS
140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation. The shared
secret computation provides 112 bits of encryption strength.
• The module supports the use of the safe primes defined in RFC 4419 (SSH). Note that
the module only implements domain parameter generation, key pair generation and
verification, and shared secret computation:
o SSH (RFC 4419):
▪ MODP-2048 (ID = 14)
KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation:
• The Module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to FIPS
140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (2) with KAS-ECC shared secret computation. The shared
secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
The module also provides the following key transport mechanisms:
• Key wrapping using AES-CBC with HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384,
or HMAC-SHA2-512 with a security strength of 128 or 256 bits.
• Key wrapping using AES-GCM with a security strength of 128 or 256 bits.
2.11 Industry Protocols
The Module supports SSHv2 and TLSv1.2 industrial protocols. No parts of the SSHv2 or
TLSv1.2 protocols, other than the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. Please
refer to SSPs Table for more information.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical
Port
Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
N/A Data Input Arguments for an API that provide the data to be used for
processed by the module.
N/A Data Output Arguments output from an API call.
N/A Control Input Arguments for an API call used to control and configure module
operation.
N/A Control
Output
N/A
N/A Status Output Return values, and/or log messages.
N/A Power N/A
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces
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The module’s physical perimeter encompasses the case of the tested platform mentioned in
Section 2.2. The module provides its logical interfaces via Application Programming Interface
(API) calls. The logical interfaces provided by the module are mapped onto the FIPS 140-3
interfaces (data input, data output, control input, control output and status output) as follows.
The module’s data output interface will be disabled when performing pre-operational self-tests,
zeroizing keys, or when in an error state.
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
N/A for this module
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Role Crypto Officer None
Table 12: Roles
The module supports Crypto Officer (CO) role. The module does not allow concurrent operators.
The Crypto Officer is implicitly assumed based on the service requested.
4.3 Approved Services
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Show
Status
Provide
Module's
current
status
None API
comman
d to
show
status.
Module's
current
status.
None Crypto
Officer
Show
Version
Provide
Module's
name/ID
and
versioning
informatio
n.
None API
comman
ds to
show
version.
Module's
name/ID
and
versioning
information
None Crypto
Officer
Perform
Self-
Tests
Perform
Self-Tests
(Pre-
operationa
l self-tests
and
Conditiona
l Self-
Tests)
None API
comman
ds to
conduct
on-
demand
Self-
Tests.
Status of
the self-
tests
results.
None Crypto
Officer
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Perform
Zeroizati
on
Perform
Zeroizatio
n.
None API
comman
ds to
conduct
Zeroizati
on
operation
or Power
down the
tested
platform.
Status of
the SSPs
zeroization.
None Crypto
Officer
- DRBG
Entropy
Input: Z
- DRBG
Seed: Z
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value: Z
- DRBG
Key: Z
- SSH DH
Private Key:
Z
- SSH DH
Public Key:
Z
- SSH Peer
DH Public
Key: Z
- SSH DH
Shared
Secret: Z
- SSH RSA
Private Key:
Z
- SSH RSA
Public Key:
Z
- SSH
Session
Encryption
Key: Z
- SSH
Session
Authenticati
on Key: Z
- TLS
ECDH
Private Key:
Z
- TLS
ECDH
Public Key:
Z
- TLS Peer
ECDH
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Public Key:
Z
- TLS
ECDH
Shared
Secret: Z
- TLS RSA
Private Key:
Z
- TLS RSA
Public Key:
Z
- TLS
ECDSA
Private Key:
Z
- TLS
ECDSA
Public Key:
Z
- TLS
Master
Secret: Z
- TLS
Session
Encryption
Key: Z
- TLS
Session
Authenticati
on Key: Z
Configur
e
Network
Sets
configurati
on of the
systems.
None API
comman
ds to
configure
the
module.
Status of
the
completion
of network
related
configuratio
n.
None Crypto
Officer
Configur
e SSHv2
Function
Configure
SSHv2
Function
Global
Indicator
and
SSHv2
configurati
on
success
status
message.
API
comman
ds to
configure
SSHv2.
Status of
the
completion
of SSHv2
configuratio
n.
KTS (SSHv2
with AES and
HMAC)
KTS
(TLSv1.2 with
AES and
HMAC)
KTS
(TLSv1.2 with
AES-GCM)
RSA KeyGen
Crypto
Officer
- SSH RSA
Private Key:
G,W,E
- SSH RSA
Public Key:
G,R,W
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
DRBG
Function
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key: G,W,E
Configur
e HTTPS
over
TLSv1.2
Function
Configure
HTTPS
over
TLSv1.2
Function.
Global
Indicator
and
HTTPS
over
TLSv1.2
configurati
on
success
status
message.
API
comman
ds to
configure
HTTPS
over
TLSv1.2
Status of
the
completion
of HTTPS
over
TLSv1.2
configuratio
n.
KTS (SSHv2
with AES and
HMAC)
KTS
(TLSv1.2 with
AES and
HMAC)
KTS
(TLSv1.2 with
AES-GCM)
RSA KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
ECDSA
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
DRBG
Function
Crypto
Officer
- TLS RSA
Private Key:
G,W,E
- TLS RSA
Public Key:
G,R,W
- TLS
ECDSA
Private Key:
G,W,E
- TLS
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,R,W
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key: G,W,E
Run
SSHv2
Function
Execute
SSHv2
Function
Global
Indicator
and
Successful
SSHv2 log
message.
API
comman
ds to
execute
SSHv2
service.
Status of
SSHv2
secure
tunnel
establishme
nt.
KAS-FFC
(SSHv2)
KTS (SSHv2
with AES and
HMAC)
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
Crypto
Officer
- SSH DH
Private Key:
G,W,E
- SSH DH
Public Key:
G,R,W
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
RSA SigVer
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
SSHv2
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
SSHv2
Session
Authenticatio
n
SSHv2
Keying
Materials
Development
DRBG
Function
- SSH Peer
DH Public
Key: W,E
- SSH DH
Shared
Secret:
G,W,E
- SSH RSA
Private Key:
G,W,E
- SSH RSA
Public Key:
G,R,W
- SSH
Session
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- SSH
Session
Authenticati
on Key:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key: G,W,E
Run
HTTPS
over
TLSv1.2
Function
Execute
HTTPS
over
TLSv1.2
Function.
Global
Indicator
and
Successful
HTTPS
over
TLSv1.2
log
message.
API
comman
d to
execute
HTTPS
over
TLSv1.2
service.
Status of
HTTPS over
TLSv1.2
establishme
nt.
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
KTS
(TLSv1.2 with
AES and
HMAC)
KTS
(TLSv1.2 with
AES-GCM)
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
RSA SigVer
Crypto
Officer
- TLS
ECDH
Private Key:
G,W,E
- TLS
ECDH
Public Key:
G,R,W
- TLS Peer
ECDH
Public Key:
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Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
ECDSA
SigGen
(TLSv1.2)
ECDSA
SigVer
(TLSv1.2)
TLSv1.2
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
TLSv1.2
Session
Authenticatio
n
TLSv1.2
Keying
Materials
Development
DRBG
Function
W,E
- TLS
ECDH
Shared
Secret:
G,W,E
- TLS RSA
Private Key:
G,W,E
- TLS RSA
Public Key:
G,R,W
- TLS
ECDSA
Private Key:
G,W,E
- TLS
ECDSA
Public Key:
G,R,W
- TLS
Master
Secret:
G,W,E
- TLS
Session
Encryption
Key: G,W,E
- TLS
Session
Authenticati
on Key:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Entropy
Input:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Seed:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Internal
State V
value:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key: G,W,E
Table 13: Approved Services
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4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
N/A for this module
4.6 Bypass Actions and Status
N/A for this module.
4.7 Cryptographic Output Actions and Status
N/A for this module.
4.8 Additional Information
The module supports unauthenticated service. The unauthenticated operator can trigger the
self-test service by power-cycling the module.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module is provided in the form of binary executable code. To ensure the software security,
the module is protected by HMAC-SHA2-512 (Certs. #A2952 with PAA or #A3376 without PAA)
algorithm. The software integrity test key (non-SSP) was preloaded to the module’s binary the
factory and used for software integrity test only at the pre-operational self-test. At Module’s
initialization, the integrity of the runtime executable is verified using a HMAC-SHA2-512 MAC
which is compared to a value computed at build time. If at the load time the MAC does not
match the stored, known MAC value, the module would enter to an Error state with all crypto
functionality inhibited.
5.2 Initiate on Demand
Integrity test is performed as part of the Pre-Operational Self-Tests. It is automatically executed
at power-on. The operator can power-cycle or reboot the tested platform to initiate the software
integrity test on-demand.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable
Page 25 of 39
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The module is a software module, which is operated in a modifiable operational environment per
FIPS 140-3 level 1 specifications. The module’s software version running on each tested
platform is 7.0.5.
The module has control over its own SSPs. The process and memory management functionality
of the host device’s OS prevent unauthorized access to plaintext private and secret keys,
intermediate key generation values and other SSPs by external processes during module
execution. The module only allows access to SSPs through its well-defined API. The operational
environments provide the capability to separate individual application processes from each
other by preventing uncontrolled access to CSPs and uncontrolled modifications of SSPs
regardless of whether this data is in the process memory or stored on persistent storage within
the operational environment. Processes that are spawned by the module are owned by the
module and are not owned by external processes/operators.
7 Physical Security
The FIPS 140-3 physical security requirements do not apply to the Module since it is a software
module.
8 Non-Invasive Security
Currently, non-invasive security is not required by FIPS 140-3 (see NIST SP 800-140F). The
requirements of this area are not applicable to the module.
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
DRAM Volatile memory provided by the ESXi host for the module
temporary.
Dynamic
Flash Non-Volatile memory provided by the ESXi host for the module to
retain memory across power-cycles.
Static
Table 14: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Peer Public
Key Input
External
(Outside of
the TOEPP)
TOEPP Plaintext Automated Electronic
Module
Public Key
Output
TOEPP External
(Outside
of the
TOEPP)
Plaintext Automated Electronic
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Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorithm
Secret Input
via SSHv2
encrypted
by AES and
HMAC
External
(Outside of
the TOEPP)
TOEPP Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS
(SSHv2
with AES
and HMAC)
Secret Input
via TLS
encrypted
by GCM
External
(Outside of
the
Module's
Boundary)
TOEPP Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS
(TLSv1.2
with AES-
GCM)
Secret Input
via TLS
encrypted
by AES and
HMAC
External
(Outside of
the
Module's
Boundary)
TOEPP Encrypted Automated Electronic KTS
(TLSv1.2
with AES
and HMAC)
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Zeroization
Command
CO issues
zeroization service
The zeroization command will
erase all SSPs stored in the
DRAM of the module.
Delete the virtual
machine from the
VMware ESXi host.
Session
Termination
Zeroization upon
session
termination
Session termination will
automatically zeroize all
session based temporary
SSPs
Terminate Session
Reboot Zeroization upon
rebooting the
module
Reboot to zeroize all
temporary SSPs stored in
volatile memory
Reboot
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods
9.4 SSPs
Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establishe
d By
Used By
DRBG
Entropy
Input
Used to
seed the
DRBG
384 bits
- at
least
256 bits
Entropy
Input - CSP
DRBG
Function
DRBG
Seed
Used in
DRBG
Generation
256 bits
- 256
bits
DRBG
Seed - CSP
DRBG
Function
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Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establishe
d By
Used By
DRBG
Internal
State V
value
Used in
DRBG
Generation
256 bits
- 256
bits
DRBG
Internal
State V
value - CSP
DRBG
Function
DRBG Key Used in
DRBG
Generation
256 bits
- 256
bits
DRBG Key
- CSP
DRBG
Function
SSH DH
Private Key
Used to
derive the
SSH DH
Shared
Secret
MODP-
2048 -
112 bits
Private Key
- CSP
KAS-FFC
(SSHv2)
KAS-FFC
(SSHv2)
SSH DH
Public Key
Used to
derive SSH
DH Shared
Secret
MODP-
2048 -
112 bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-FFC
(SSHv2)
SSH Peer
DH Public
Key
Used to
derive SSH
DH Shared
Secret
MODP-
2048 -
112 bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-FFC
(SSHv2)
SSH DH
Shared
Secret
Used to
derive SSH
Session
Encryption
Keys, SSH
Session
Authenticati
on Keys
MODP-
2048 -
112 bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS-FFC
(SSHv2)
SSHv2
Keying
Materials
Development
SSH RSA
Private Key
Used for
SSH
session
authenticati
on
Modulu
s: 2048,
3072 -
112-
128 bits
Private Key
- CSP
RSA
KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
SSH RSA
Public Key
Used for
SSH
session
authenticati
on
Modulu
s: 2048,
3072 -
112-
128 bits
Public Key -
PSP
RSA
KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
SSH
Session
Encryption
Key
Used for
SSH
session
confidentiali
ty protection
128,
256 bits
- 128,
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
SSHv2
Keying
Materials
Developme
nt
SSHv2
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
SSH
Session
Authenticati
on Key
Used for
SSH
Session
At least
160 bits
- At
Session
Key - CSP
SSHv2
Keying
Materials
SSHv2
Session
Authenticatio
n
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Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establishe
d By
Used By
integrity
protection
least
160 bits
Developme
nt
TLS ECDH
Private Key
Used to
Derive TLS
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curves:
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
128-
256 bits
Private Key
- CSP
KAS-
ECC
(TLSv1.2
)
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
TLS ECDH
Public Key
Used to
Derive TLS
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curves:
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
128-
256 bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
TLS Peer
ECDH
Public Key
Used to
derive TLS
ECDH
Shared
Secret
Curves:
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
128-
256 bits
Public Key -
PSP
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
TLS ECDH
Shared
Secret
Used to
Derive TLS
Session
Encryption
Key and
TLS
Session
Authenticati
on Key
Curves:
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
128-
256 bits
Shared
Secret -
CSP
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
TLSv1.2
Keying
Materials
Development
TLS RSA
Private Key
Used to
support CO
HTTPS
interfaces
Modulu
s: 2048,
3072 -
112-
128 bits
Private Key
- CSP
RSA
KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
RSA SigGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
TLS RSA
Public Key
Used to
support CO
HTTPS
interfaces
Modulu
s: 2048,
3072 -
112-
128 bits
Public Key -
PSP
RSA
KeyGen
(SSHv2,
TLSv1.2)
TLS
ECDSA
Private Key
Used to
support CO
HTTPS
interfaces
Curves:
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
128-
256 bits
Private Key
- CSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2
)
ECDSA
SigGen
(TLSv1.2)
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Name Descriptio
n
Size -
Strengt
h
Type -
Category
Generat
ed By
Establishe
d By
Used By
TLS
ECDSA
Public Key
Used to
support CO
HTTPS
interfaces
Curves:
P-256,
P-384,
P-521 -
128-
256 bits
Public Key -
PSP
ECDSA
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
TLS Master
Secret
Used to
protect
HTTPS
Session
At least
112 bits
- At
least
112 bits
Master
Secret -
CSP
TLSv1.2
Keying
Materials
Developme
nt
TLSv1.2
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
TLSv1.2
Session
Authenticatio
n
TLS
Session
Encryption
Key
Used to
protect
HTTPS
Session
128,
256 bits
- 128,
256 bits
Symmetric
Key - CSP
TLSv1.2
Keying
Materials
Developme
nt
TLSv1.2
Session
Encrypt/Decr
ypt
TLS
Session
Authenticati
on Key
Used to
authenticate
HTTPS
Session
160,
256,
384,
512 bits
- 160,
256,
384,
512 bits
Message
Authenticati
on Key -
CSP
TLSv1.2
Keying
Materials
Developme
nt
TLSv1.2
Session
Authenticatio
n
Table 17: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
DRBG Entropy
Input
DRAM:Plaintext Until
Reboot
Zeroization
Command
Reboot
DRBG
Seed:Used With
DRBG Internal
State V
value:Used
With
DRBG
Key:Used With
DRBG Seed DRAM:Plaintext Until
Reboot
Zeroization
Command
Reboot
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG Internal
State V
value:Used
With
DRBG
Key:Used With
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
DRBG Internal
State V value
DRAM:Plaintext Until
Reboot
Zeroization
Command
Reboot
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG
Seed:Used With
DRBG
Key:Used With
DRBG Key DRAM:Plaintext Until
Reboot
Zeroization
Command
Reboot
DRBG Entropy
Input:Used With
DRBG
Seed:Used With
DRBG Internal
State V
value:Used
With
SSH DH
Private Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
SSH
session is
active
Zeroization
Command
Session
Termination
Reboot
SSH DH Public
Key:Paired With
SSH Peer DH
Public
Key:Used With
SSH DH
Public Key
Module
Public Key
Output
DRAM:Plaintext While
SSH
session
is active
Zeroization
Command
Session
Termination
Reboot
SSH DH Private
Key:Paired With
SSH Peer DH
Public Key
Peer Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintext While
SSH
session is
active
Zeroization
Command
Session
Termination
Reboot
SSH DH Private
Key:Used With
SSH DH
Shared Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While
SSH
session is
active
Zeroization
Command
Session
Termination
Reboot
SSH DH Private
Key:Derived
From
SSH Peer DH
Public
Key:Derived
From
SSH RSA
Private Key
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
SSH RSA
Public
Key:Paired With
SSH RSA
Public Key
Module
Public Key
Output
Secret
Input via
SSHv2
encrypted
by AES and
HMAC
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
SSH RSA
Private
Key:Paired With
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
SSH Session
Encryption Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
SSH
session is
active
Zeroization
Command
Session
Termination
Reboot
SSH Session
Authentication
Key:Used With
SSH Session
Authentication
Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
SSH
session is
active
Zeroization
Command
Session
Termination
Reboot
SSH Session
Encryption
Key:Used With
TLS ECDH
Private Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLS
session is
active
Zeroization
Command
Session
Termination
Reboot
TLS ECDH
Public
Key:Paired With
TLS Peer
ECDH Public
Key:Used With
TLS ECDH
Public Key
Module
Public Key
Output
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLS
session is
active
Zeroization
Command
Session
Termination
Reboot
TLS ECDH
Private
Key:Paired With
TLS Peer
ECDH Public
Key
Peer Public
Key Input
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLS
session is
active
Zeroization
Command
Session
Termination
Reboot
TLS ECDH
Private
Key:Used With
TLS ECDH
Shared Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLS
session is
active
Zeroization
Command
Session
Termination
Reboot
TLS ECDH
Private
Key:Derived
From
TLS Peer
ECDH Public
Key:Derived
From
TLS RSA
Private Key
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
TLS RSA Public
Key:Paired With
TLS RSA
Public Key
Module
Public Key
Output
Secret
Input via
TLS
encrypted
by GCM
Secret
Input via
TLS
encrypted
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
TLS RSA
Private
Key:Paired With
Page 32 of 39
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Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duration
Zeroization Related SSPs
by AES and
HMAC
TLS ECDSA
Private Key
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
TLS ECDSA
Public
Key:Paired With
TLS ECDSA
Public Key
Module
Public Key
Output
Secret
Input via
TLS
encrypted
by GCM
Secret
Input via
TLS
encrypted
by AES and
HMAC
Flash:Plaintext Zeroization
Command
TLS ECDSA
Private
Key:Paired With
TLS Master
Secret
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLS
session is
active
Zeroization
Command
Session
Termination
Reboot
TLS ECDH
Shared
Secret:Derived
From
TLS Session
Encryption Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLS
session is
active
Zeroization
Command
Session
Termination
Reboot
TLS Session
Authentication
Key:Used With
TLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
TLS Session
Authentication
Key
DRAM:Plaintext While
TLS
session is
active
Zeroization
Command
Session
Termination
Reboot
TLS Session
Encryption
Key:Used With
TLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
Table 18: SSP Table 2
9.5 Transitions
SHA-1: Per SP800-131Ar2, the use of SHA-1 is disallowed for digital signature generation, but
is permitted for digital signature verification (legacy use) and all non-digital signature
applications. This implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031.
User should move to SHA2, which is available in this module.
FIPS 186-4/186-5: As of February 5, 2024, the CMVP does not accept module submissions that
implement DSA or RSA X9.31 in the approved mode, other than for signature verification which
Page 33 of 39
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is approved for legacy use. This module does not implement DSA or RSA X9.31 for signature
generation and therefore is unaffected by the current transition from 186-4 to 186-5. As detailed
in section 2.7, the CAVP testing performed on the 186-4 algorithms is mathematically similar to
the testing performed on the 186-5 algorithms and therefore this module claims compliance with
186-5. This means that no timeline exists in which any of the implemented algorithms will
transition from approved to non-approved.
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or
Test
Test Properties Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
HMAC-SHA2-
512 (A2952)
MAC with HMAC-
SHA2-512
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
Module is in
normal state
HMAC-
SHA2-512
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
The module performs the following self-tests, including Pre-operational and Conditional self-
tests. Prior to the module providing any data output via the data output interface, the module
performs and passes the pre-operational self-tests. Following the successful pre-operational
self-tests, the module executes the Conditional Cryptographic Algorithm Self-tests (CASTs).
The self-test success or failure results are an output of the return value of the library load API
call, which is functioning as the self-test status indicator. If anyone of the self-tests fails, the
module transitions into an error state and outputs the error message via the module’s status
output interface. While the module is in the error state, all data through the data output interface
and all cryptographic operations are disabled. The error state can only be cleared by reloading
the module. All self-tests must be completed successfully before the module transitions to the
operational state.
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorithm or Test Test
Propertie
s
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Condition
s
AES-CBC Encrypt KAT
(A2952/A3376)
256 bits KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
Encrypt Power up
AES-CBC Decrypt KAT
(A2952/A3376)
256 bits KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
Decrypt Power up
AES-GCM Authenticated
Encrypt KAT
(A2952/A3376)
256 bits KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
Authenticat
ed Encrypt
Power up
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Algorithm or Test Test
Propertie
s
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Condition
s
AES-GCM Authenticated
Decrypt KAT
(A2952/A3376)
256 bits KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
Authenticat
ed Decrypt
Power up
Counter DRBG
Instantiate/Generate/Res
eed KAT (A2952/A3376)
AES-128 KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
Instantiate,
Generate,
and Reseed
KATs
Power up
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4) KAT
(A2952/A3376)
Curve P-
256 with
SHA2-
256
KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
ECDSA
SigGen
KAT
Power up
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) KAT
(A2952/A3376)
Curve P-
256 with
SHA2-
256
KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
ECDSA
SigVer KAT
Power up
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
(A2952/A3376)
SHA-1 KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA-1
Power up
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A2952/A3376)
SHA2-
256
KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA2-256
Power up
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(A2952/A3376)
SHA2-
384
KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA2-384
Power up
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A2952/A3376)
SHA2-
512
KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
HMAC-
SHA2-512
Power up
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT
(A2952/A3376)
Curve: P-
256
KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
Primitive Z
KAT
Power up
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT
(A2952/A3376)
MODP-
2048
KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
Primitive Z
KAT
Power up
KDF SSH KAT
(A2952/A3376)
N/A KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)
KAT (A2952/A3376)
2048 bit
modulus
with
KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
RSA Power up
Page 35 of 39
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Algorithm or Test Test
Propertie
s
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Condition
s
SHA2-
256
normal
state
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
KAT (A2952/A3376)
2048 bit
modulus
with
SHA2-
256
KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
RSA Power up
SHA-1 KAT
(A2952/A3376)
N/A KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627
KAT (A2952/A3376)
N/A KAT CAS
T
Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Power up
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4) PCT
(A2952/A3376)
N/A PCT PCT Module
is in
normal
state
ECDSA Performs
all
required
pair-wise
consisten
cy tests
on the
newly
generated
key pairs
before the
first
operation
al use.
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT
(A2952/A3376)
N/A PCT PCT Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Performs
all
required
pair-wise
consisten
cy tests
on the
newly
generated
key pairs
before the
first
operation
al use.
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT
(A2952/A3376)
N/A PCT PCT Module
is in
normal
state
N/A Performs
all
required
pair-wise
Page 36 of 39
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Algorithm or Test Test
Propertie
s
Test
Metho
d
Test
Type
Indicat
or
Details Condition
s
consisten
cy tests
on the
newly
generated
key pairs
before the
first
operation
al use.
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
4) PCT (A2952/A3376)
N/A PCT PCT Module
is in
normal
state
RSA Performs
all
required
pair-wise
consisten
cy tests
on the
newly
generated
key pairs
before the
first
operation
al use.
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
HMAC-SHA2-
512 (A2952)
KAT SW/FW Integrity Recommend 60
Days
Reboot
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-CBC Encrypt KAT
(A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-CBC Decrypt KAT
(A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-GCM Authenticated
Encrypt KAT (A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
AES-GCM Authenticated
Decrypt KAT (A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
Counter DRBG
Instantiate/Generate/Reseed
KAT (A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)
KAT (A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
KAT (A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
(A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-256 KAT
(A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-384 KAT
(A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
HMAC-SHA2-512 KAT
(A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT (A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 KAT (A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KDF SSH KAT
(A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4)
KAT (A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4)
KAT (A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
SHA-1 KAT (A2952/A3376) KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
TLS v1.2 KDF RFC7627
KAT (A2952/A3376)
KAT CAST Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-
4) PCT (A2952/A3376)
PCT PCT Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-ECC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT (A2952/A3376)
PCT PCT Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 PCT (A2952/A3376)
PCT PCT Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4)
PCT (A2952/A3376)
PCT PCT Recommend
60 Days
Reboot
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information
The module performs on-demand self-tests initiated by the operator, by powering off and
powering the module back on. The full suite of self-tests is then executed. The same procedure
may be employed by the operator to perform periodic self-tests.
10.4 Error States
Page 38 of 39
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Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Error
State
If self-test tests fail, the module is
put into an error state.
Self-test
failure
Reboot the
module
System
halt
Table 23: Error States
If any of the above-mentioned self-tests fail, the module reports the error and enters the Error
state. In the Error State, no cryptographic services are provided, and data output is prohibited.
The only method to recover from the error state is to reboot the module and perform the self-
tests, including the pre-operational integrity test and the conditional CASTs. The module will
only enter into the operational state after successfully passing the pre-operational integrity test
and the conditional CASTs.
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The module meets all the Level 1 requirements for FIPS 140-3. The validated Module’s
executable file Cisco_Firepower_Mgmt_Center_Virtual300_VMware-7.0.5-72-disk1.vmdk is the
only allowable software image file running on the respective test platform listed in the Section
2.2 above while in the approved mode. The Crypto Officer must configure and enforce the
following initialization steps. Operating this module without maintaining the following settings
would put module operated in a non-compliance state.
Step 1: For all Management Centers, the setup process must be completed by logging into the
Management Center’s web interface and specifying initial configuration options on a setup page.
Step 2: Choose System > Configuration (Choose SSH or HTTPS or a combination of these
options to specify which ports you want to enable for these IP addresses).
Step 3: System>Licenses>Smart Licenses, add and verify licenses (Firepower Management
Center Configuration Guide provides more detailed information). Install AES SMART license to
use AES (for data traffic and SSH).
Step 4: System > Configuration; Devices > Platform Settings; STIG Compliance, choose Enable
STIG Compliance; Click on save. This sets the approved mode of operation. The CO shall only
use approved cryptographic algorithms listed in Section 2.5 above.
Step 5: Reboot the security appliances.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
No specific Administrator guidance.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
No specific Non-Administrator guidance.
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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
N/A for this module.