© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Redline Communications, Inc.
AN-80i Broadband Wireless
Infrastructure Radio
(Hardware Version: AN-80i, Firmware Version: 4.00.075 and 13.00.135)
FIPS 140-2
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Level 2 Validation
Document Version 2.1
Prepared for: Prepared by:
Redline Communications, Inc. Corsec Security, Inc.
302 Town Centre Boulevard
Markham, ON, Canada L3R 0E8
10340 Democracy Lane, Suite 201
Fairfax, VA 22030
Phone: (905) 479-8344 Phone: (703) 267-6050
Fax: (905) 479-7432 Fax: (703) 267-6810
www.redlinecommunications.com http://www.corsec.com
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 2 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Table of Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................................................3
1.1 PURPOSE ......................................................................................................................................................3
1.2 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................3
1.3 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION.........................................................................................................................3
2 REDLINE AN-80I BROADBAND WIRELESS INFRASTRUCTURE RADIO...........................................4
2.1 OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................................................................4
2.2 MODULE INTERFACES ..................................................................................................................................5
2.3 ROLES AND SERVICES ..................................................................................................................................6
2.3.1 Crypto-Officer Role.........................................................................................................................6
2.3.2 User Role ........................................................................................................................................8
2.3.3 Bypass Mode ...................................................................................................................................8
2.3.4 Authentication Mechanisms ............................................................................................................9
2.4 PHYSICAL SECURITY ....................................................................................................................................9
2.5 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................................................................10
2.6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT........................................................................................................10
2.7 ELECTROMAGNETIC INTERFERENCE / ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY...............................................13
2.8 SELF-TESTS................................................................................................................................................13
2.9 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS ..............................................................................................................13
3 SECURE OPERATION....................................................................................................................................14
3.1 CRYPTO-OFFICER GUIDANCE.....................................................................................................................14
3.1.1 Initialization..................................................................................................................................14
3.1.2 Management..................................................................................................................................14
3.2 USER GUIDANCE ........................................................................................................................................15
4 ACRONYMS......................................................................................................................................................16
Table of Figures
FIGURE 1 – REDLINE AN-80I BROADBAND WIRELESS INFRASTRUCTURE RADIO...........................................................4
FIGURE 2 – TAMPER-EVIDENT LABEL LOCATIONS FOR REDLINE AN-80I ....................................................................10
List of Tables
TABLE 1 – SECURITY LEVEL PER FIPS 140-2 SECTION ..................................................................................................5
TABLE 2 – FIPS 140-2 LOGICAL INTERFACES ................................................................................................................5
TABLE 3 – MAPPING OF CRYPTO-OFFICER ROLE’S SERVICES TO CSPS AND TYPE OF ACCESS.......................................6
TABLE 4 – MAPPING OF USER ROLE’S SERVICES TO CSPS AND TYPE OF ACCESS..........................................................8
TABLE 5 – AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS EMPLOYED BY THE MODULE.....................................................................9
TABLE 6 – CERTIFICATE NUMBERS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM IMPLEMENTATIONS ........................................10
TABLE 7 – LIST OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY COMPONENTS, AND CSPS.....................................11
TABLE 8 – ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................................................16
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 3 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for Redline Communications, Inc.'s AN-80i
Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio (running firmware version 4.00.075 or 13.00.135). This Security Policy
describes how the AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio meets the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) and the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) requirements for
cryptographic modules as specified in Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 140-2. This
document also describes how to run the module in its Approved FIPS 140-2 mode of operation. This policy was
prepared as part of the Level 2 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module.
The AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio running firmware version 4.00.075 or 13.00.135 is referred to
in this document as the AN-80i, the cryptographic module, or the module.
1.2 References
This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2
cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:
 The Redline website (http://www.redlinecommunications.com/) contains information on the full line of
products from Redline.
 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cryptographic Module Validation Program
(CMVP) website (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/) contains information about the FIPS 140-2
standard and validation program. It also lists contact information for answers to technical or sales-related
questions for the module.
1.3 Document Organization
The Security Policy document is one document in a FIPS 140-2 Submission Package. In addition to this document,
the Submission Package contains:
 Vendor Evidence document
 Finite State Machine
 Submission Summary
 Other supporting documentation as additional references
This Security Policy and the other validation submission documentation were produced by Corsec Security, Inc.
under contract to Redline Communications, Inc.. With the exception of this Non-Proprietary Security Policy, the
FIPS 140-2 Validation Documentation is proprietary to Redline and is releasable only under appropriate non-
disclosure agreements. For access to these documents, please contact Redline.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 4 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2 Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio
2.1 Overview
The AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio is Redline Communications, Inc.'s point-to-point (PTP)
carrier grade broadband wireless infrastructure product. Operating in the licensed or licenced/exempt spectra, the
AN-80i acts as a bridge between networks and enables organizations such as schools, hospitals, utilities, and service
providers to solve the middle mile challenge and deploy cost effective reliable connections in even the most
challenging conditions. The middle mile challenge involves mitigating bottlenecks between a location and the core
Internet backbone. It supports advanced applications such as transparent LAN1
, VoIP2
, and high-quality video.
The AN-80i is an all outdoor hardware platform powered by an industry standard Power over Ethernet (POE) feed.
Available with a wide variety of antennas, the system includes an audible antenna alignment indicator and a built-in
spectrum analyzer function for quick and simple installation. The product is manageable through the use of a
standard Web browser or through Redline's Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)-based element
management system, RMS. Although SNMPv3 can support AES encryption in CFB mode, it does not utilize a
FIPS-Approved key generation method; therefore, the module firmware has been designed to block the ability to
view or alter critical security parameters (CSPs) through this interface. Also note that the SNMPv3 interface is a
management interface for the Redline devices and that no CSPs or user data are transmitted over this interface.
Redline’s family of Broadband Wireless Infrastructure (BWI) products consists of both RedCONNEX point-to-point
and RedACCESS point-to-multipoint solutions, available through different installations of software. Unlike 802.11
based systems, the core engine of the BWI products is based on the IEEE3
802.16 family of standards with
proprietary extensions designed around achieving high throughput and low latency in order to optimize performance
for backhaul and premium access applications. It is this core MAC4
/PHY5
engine, which allows Redline's BWI
products to achieve the best latency, highest throughput and greatest line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight range in the
industry.
Figure 1 – Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio
The AN-80i is validated at the FIPS 140-2 section Levels shown in Table 1 below.
1
LAN – local area network
2
VoIP – Voice-over-Internet Protocol
3
IEEE – Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
4
MAC – Media Access Controller
5
PHY – Physical Interface
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 5 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Table 1 – Security Level Per FIPS 140-2 Section
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 2
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 2
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 2
4 Finite State Model 2
5 Physical Security 2
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Cryptographic Key Management 2
8 Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC) 3
9 Self-tests 2
10 Design Assurance 2
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
14 Cryptographic Module Security Policy 2
2.2 Module Interfaces
The AN-80i is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module that meets overall Level 2 FIPS 140-2 requirements.
The cryptographic boundary of the AN-80i is defined by the aluminum case, which surrounds all the hardware and
software components. Interfaces on the module can be categorized into the following FIPS 140-2 logical interfaces:
 Data Input Interface
 Data Output Interface
 Control Input interface
 Status Output Interface
 Power Interface
Ports on the module can be categorized into the following physical interfaces:
 Ethernet port
 RF port
 Buzzer
All of these physical interfaces are separated into logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2, as described in the
following table:
Table 2 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interfaces
FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Redline Broadband Radio AN-80i Port/Interface
Data Input Ethernet port, RF port
Data Output Ethernet port, RF port
Control Input Ethernet port, RF port
Status Output Ethernet port, buzzer
Power Ethernet port
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 6 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
2.3 Roles and Services
The module supports role-based authentication. There are two roles in the module that operators may assume: a
Crypto-Officer role and a User role.
2.3.1 Crypto-Officer Role
The Crypto-Officer (CO) performs administrative services for the module, such as initialization, configuration, and
monitoring of the module. Before accessing the module for any administrative service, the operator must
authenticate to the module. The module offers two management interfaces:
 Web Interface
 Command Line Interface (CLI)
 SNMPv3 (Non-FIPS Mode)
The Web Interface is Redline’s proprietary web-based GUI6
that can be accessed via the local network using a web
browser. The Web Interface serves as the primary management tool for the module. All Web Interface sessions
with the module are protected over a secure Transport Layer Security (TLS) channel. Authentication of the CO
requires the input of a username and password which is checked against a local password database.
The CLI is accessed via the Ethernet port using a Secure Shell (SSH) session. Authentication of the CO on the CLI
requires the input of a username and password and/or radius server.
Descriptions of the services available to the Crypto-Officer role are provided in the table below. The services listed
for the Crypto-Officer role are mapped to relevant CSPs and the type of access required to CSPs associated with the
service (Execute, Read, or Write).
Table 3 – Mapping of Crypto-Officer Role’s Services to CSPs and Type of Access
Service Description CSP Type of Access
Key Agreement Used to establish keys for setting up a
secure communications tunnel
Authentication Keys,
TLS Key Agreement
Keys, TLS Session
Authentication Key,
TLS Session Key,
SSH Key Agreement
Keys, SSH Session
Authentication Key,
SSH Session Key
Execute
Authenticate Used to log in to the module Administrator
Password
Execute
Enable FIPS Mode Allows Crypto-Officer to configure the
module for FIPS Mode.
None None
Configure Bypass
Mode
Allows Crypto-Officer to turn off encryption
and go into bypass mode.
None None
Encryption Allows Crypto Officer to enable encryption TLS Session
Authentication Key,
TLS Session Key,
SSH Session
Authentication Key,
SSH Session Key
Execute
6
GUI – Graphical User Interface
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 7 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Service Description CSP Type of Access
Get FIPS Status Allows Crypto-Officer to view general
system identification and Configuration
Settings.
None None
Perform Self Tests Allows the Crypto-Officer to run on-
demand self tests.
None None
System Status Allows Crypto-Officer to view system,
Ethernet, and wireless statistics.
None None
System Log Allows Crypto-Officer to view the system
status messages.
None None
Configure System Allows Crypto-Officer to view and adjust
configuration system, IP address,
management, and wireless settings.
None None
Upload Firmware Allows Crypto-Officer to upload new
software binary file
Redline Firmware
Update Public Key
Execute
Add/Delete
Operators
Allows Crypto-Officer to add/delete users Administrator
Passwords, User
Passwords
Read/Write
Change Password Modify existing login passwords Administrator
Passwords, User
Passwords
Read/Write
Spectrum Sweep Allows Crypto-Officer to scan radio
frequencies to detect additional RF
sources which could be a source of
interference
None None
Zeroize Zeroize all keys and CSPs. When the
command is issued all keys and CSPs will
be erased from memory and replaced with
“1”s.
All keys and CSPs Write
Clear Clears frequency list and log messages None None
Del Deletes a specified key/certificate Any specified
key/certificate
Write
Freq Used to enter the frequency ranges for
autoscan and dynamic frequency selection
None None
Generate Creates new Diffie Hellman keys or DSA
keys for use with SSH
Authentication Keys,
Key Agreement Key
Write
Get Displays statistic and parameter values None None
Load Cert Loads new certificates CA public keys Execute
Load Script Loads a script for backup. The config script
contains a string of CLI commands that
can be used to restore a previously
exported configuration of the AN-80i.
None None
Ping Ping utility None None
Reboot Restarts the module None None
Reset Statistics Resets the statistical values stored in the
module
None None
Save Saves the selected configuration settings None None
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 8 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Service Description CSP Type of Access
Export Script Generates and outputs a config script.
The config script contains a string of CLI
commands that can be used to restore the
current (active) configuration of the AN-80i.
None None
Set Displays system parameter values and
allows modification to the displayed values
None None
Show Displays configuration and additional
system compound objects
None None
Test Config Allows configuration changes to be run for
a five minute test period. During the test
period the configuration changes can be
saved. If they are not saved by the end of
the test period the previously saved
settings are reloaded.
None None
2.3.2 User Role
The User has the ability to view general status information about the module, and utilize the module’s data
transmitting functionalities via the Ethernet port. Descriptions of the services available to the User role are provided
in the table below. The services listed for the User role are mapped to relevant CSPs and the type of access required
to CSPs associated with the service (Execute, Read, or Write).
Table 4 – Mapping of User Role’s Services to CSPs and Type of Access
Service Description CSP Type of Access
Key Agreement Used to establish keys for setting up a
secure communications tunnel
Authentication Keys,
TLS Key Agreement
Keys, TLS Session
Authentication Key,
TLS Session Key,
SSH Key Agreement
Keys, SSH Session
Authentication Key,
SSH Session Key
Execute
Authenticate Used to log in to the module User Password Execute
General Information Allows Users to view general system
identification and Configuration Settings.
None None
System Status Allows Users to view system, Ethernet, and
wireless statistics.
None None
System Log Allows Users to view the system status
messages.
None None
Change Password Allows Users to change login password User Password Read/Write
2.3.3 Bypass Mode
The cryptographic module supports an exclusive bypass capability by allowing the encryption type configuration
parameter to be set to NONE, AES7
128, AES 192, and AES 256. When encryption is enabled, no Ethernet packets
are allowed to be transferred over-the-air in plaintext. The Crypto-Officer can determine the bypass status by
7
AES – Advanced Encryption Standard
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 9 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
examining the wireless encryption status with the web interface and CLI. If wireless encryption is enabled, then
bypass capability is not activated; if wireless encryption is disabled, then bypass is activated.
2.3.4 Authentication Mechanisms
The module employs the following authentication methods to authenticate Crypto-Officers and Users. Passwords
are used for authenticating with the AN-80i and certificates are used when establishing a TLS session.
Table 5 – Authentication Mechanisms Employed by the Module
Type of Authentication Authentication Strength
Password Passwords are required to be at least 8 characters long.
Alpha (uppercase and lowercase) and numeric characters
can be used, which gives a total of 62 characters to choose
from. With the possibility of repeating characters, the
chance of a random attempt falsely succeeding is 1 in 628
,
or 1 in 218,340,105,584,896.
MD5 hashes are used for authentication via RADIUS. MD5
hashes are typically represented as 32-digit hexadecimal
values. The chance of a random authentication attempt
falsely succeeding is 1 in 16
32
, or 1 in 3.4028 x 10
38
.
Certificate Certificates used as part of TLS are (at a minimum) 1024
bits. The chance of a random attempt falsely succeeding is
1 in 280
, or 1 in 1.2089 x 10
24
.
2.4 Physical Security
The Redline AN-80i is a multi-chip standalone cryptographic module. The module is enclosed in a weatherproof
aluminum alloy case, which is defined as the cryptographic boundary of the module. The module’s enclosure is
opaque within the visible spectrum. The module’s enclosure is sealed using tamper-evident labels, which prevent
the case covers from being removed without signs of tampering.
It is the responsibility of the Crypto-Officer to ensure that both tamper-evident labels are properly placed on the
module before use. The location of tamper-evident labels is indicated with the red circles in Figure 2 below. Two
tamper labels on opposite sides of the module will prevent unauthorized users from gaining undetected access, even
if screws not covered by tamper labels are removed.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 10 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Figure 2 – Tamper-Evident Label Locations for Redline AN-80i
2.5 Operational Environment
The module does not provide a general purpose operating system nor does it allow operators to load untrusted
software. The operating system (OS) employed by the module is the Wind River VxWorks version 6.5 OS. The OS
is not modifiable by the operators of the module, and only the module’s custom written image can be run in the
system. The module provides a method to update the firmware in the module with a new version. This method
involves uploading a digitally-signed firmware update to the module. If the signature test fails, the new firmware
will be ignored, and the current firmware will remain loaded. If the signature test passes the new firmware will be
loaded and the Crypto-Officer is responsible to following the steps listed in Secure Operation to place the module in
FIPS-approved mode of operation.
NOTE: In order to maintain validation for the module, only FIPS-validated firmware may be loaded, and it must be
configured to execute in its defined FIPS mode of operation.
2.6 Cryptographic Key Management
The module implements the FIPS-approved algorithms shown in Table 6 below.
Table 6 – Certificate Numbers for Cryptographic Algorithm Implementations
Approved Function Certificate Number
Symmetric Key Algorithm
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128-, 192-, 256-bit
in CBC
8
, ECB
9
, CFB
10
modes
997
AES 128-, 192-, 256-bit in ECB, CCM
11
modes 944
Triple-DES
12
in CBC mode (2- and 3-key) 777
Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA)
SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 962
Message Authentication Code (MAC) Function
8
CBC – Cipher-Block Chaining
9
ECB – Electronic Codebook
10
CFB – Cipher Feedback
11
CCM – Counter with CBC-MAC
12
DES – Data Encryption Standard
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 11 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Approved Function Certificate Number
HMAC
13
using SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 562
Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG)
NIST
14
SP 800-90 DRBG
15
: Hash SHA-1 and Hash SHA-
256
9
Asymmetric Key Algorithm
RSA
16
PKCS
17
#1 sign/verify 1024, 1536, 2048-bit 480
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) sign/verify – 1024-bit 343
The module implements the following non-FIPS-Approved algorithm implementations:
 Redline 64-bit proprietary encryption (in non-FIPS mode only)
 Diffie-Hellman (DH) 1024- and 2048-bits key (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides 80
and 112 bits of encryption strength, respectively)
 RSA 2048-bits key (key wrapping, key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength)
 MD5
The module supports the following critical security parameters:
Table 7 – List of Cryptographic Keys, Cryptographic Key Components, and CSPs
Key Key Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
SNMPv3
Session Key
AES 128-,
192-, 256-bit
CFB key
Internally
generated but
not FIPS
Compliant
Never exits
the module
Stored in
volatile
memory
Upon reboot
or session
termination
Provides secured
channel for SNMPv3
management that is not
FIPS-Approved.
Authentication
public/private
keys
RSA 1024-,
1536-, 2048-
bit keys or
DSA 1024-bit
key
DSA keys are
Internally
generated
and RSA keys
are externally
generated
and imported
in encrypted
form
Public key
exported
electronically
in plaintext
via Ethernet
port
Stored in
non-volatile
memory
By Zeroize
command
Peer Authentication of
SSH/TLS sessions
Peer
RSA/DSA
public keys
RSA/DSA
1024-, 1536-,
2048-bit keys
or DSA 1024-
bit key
Imported
electronically
during
handshake
protocol
Never exits
the module
Stored in
volatile
memory
Upon reboot
or session
termination
Peer Authentication for
SSH sessions
13
HMAC – Hash Message Authentication Code
14
NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology
15
DRBG – Deterministic Random Bit Generator
16
RSA – Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
17
PKCS – Public Key Cryptography Standard
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 12 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Key Key Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
Local and CA
RSA
public/private
(local unit
only) keys
RSA 1024-,
1536-, 2048-
bit keys
Externally
generated
and imported
in encrypted
form
Public key
certificate
exported
electronically
in plaintext
via Wireless
port; private
component
not exported
Stored in
non-volatile
memory
By Zeroize
command
Establish trusted point in
peer entity
SSH Key
Agreement
keys
Diffie-Hellman
1024-, 2048-
bit exponents
Internally
generated
Public
exponent
electronically
in plaintext;
private
component
not exported
Stored in
volatile
memory
Upon reboot
or session
termination
Key
agreement/establishment
for SSH sessions as
defined above in Section
2.6
TLS Key
Agreement
Keys
RSA 2048-bit
key
Externally
generated
Public
exponent
electronically
in plaintext;
private
component
not exported
Stored in
volatile
memory
Upon reboot
or session
termination
Key
wrapping/establishment
for TLS sessions as
defined above in Section
2.6
TLS Session
Authentication
Key
HMAC SHA-1
key
Internally
generated
Never exits
the module
Stored in
volatile
memory
Upon reboot
or session
termination
Data authentication for
TLS sessions
TLS Session
Key
Triple-DES,
AES-128,
AES-192,
AES-256
Internally
generated
Never exits
the module
Stored in
volatile
memory
Upon reboot
or session
termination
Data encryption for TLS
sessions
SSH Session
Authentication
Key
HMAC-SHA1
key
Internally
generated
Never exits
the module
Stored in
volatile
memory
Upon reboot
or session
termination
Data authentication for
SSH sessions
SSH Session
Key
Triple-DES,
AES-128,
AES-192,
AES-256
Internally
generated
Never exits
the module
Stored in
volatile
memory
Upon reboot
or session
termination
Data encryption for SSH
sessions
Redline
Firmware
Update Public
Key
RSA 2048-bit
public key
Externally
generated
and hard
coded in the
image
Never exits
the module
Stored in
non-volatile
memory
Hard-coded Verifies the signature
associated with a
broadband radio
firmware update package
Administrator
Passwords
8-character
ASCII
18
string
Entered in
plaintext
Never exits
the module
Stored in
non-volatile
memory in
plaintext
By Zeroize
command
Authentication for
administrator login
18
ASCII – American Standard Code for Information Interchange
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 13 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Key Key Type
Generation /
Input
Output Storage Zeroization Use
User
Passwords
8-character
ASCII string
Entered in
plaintext
Never exits
the module
Stored in
non-volatile
memory in
plaintext
By Zeroize
command
Authentication for user
login
NIST SP 800-
90 DRBG
seed
256-byte
random value
Internally
generated
Never exits
the module
Generated
after reset.
Stored in
non-volatile
memory
Overwritten
(as a circular
buffer) by
random
value
Used during FIPS-
approved random
number generation
2.7 Electromagnetic Interference / Electromagnetic Compatibility
The Redline AN-80i was tested and found to be conformant to the Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMI/EMC) requirements specified by Federal Communications Commission 47 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR), Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B (i.e., for home use).
2.8 Self-Tests
The AN-80i performs the following self-tests at power-up:
 Firmware integrity check using an Error Detection Code (16-bit CRC19
)
 Known Answer Tests (KATs) for the following FIPS-Approved algorithms:
o AES
o DSA
o HMAC SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
o NIST SP 800-90 DRBG
o RSA (2048 bit sign/verify)
o SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
o Triple-DES
If any of the power-up tests fail, the module enters into a critical error state. An error message is logged in the
System Log for the Crypto-Officer to review, and a CO must power cycle the module or reload the module image to
clear the error state. A CO may initiate on demand self-tests by power cycling the module.
The AN-80i also performs the following conditional self-tests:
 Continuous RNG Test for the NIST SP 800-90 DRBG
 DSA Pair-wise Consistency Test
 Bypass Test
 Firmware Load Test
If any of the above tests fail, the module enters a soft error state and logs an error message in the System Log.
2.9 Mitigation of Other Attacks
In a FIPS Mode of operation, the module does not claim to mitigate any additional attacks.
19
CRC – Cyclic Redundancy Check
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 14 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
3 Secure Operation
The AN-80i meets the Level 2 requirements for FIPS 140-2. The sections below describe how to place and keep the
module in FIPS-approved mode of operation.
3.1 Crypto-Officer Guidance
The Crypto-Officer is responsible for the initialization and management of the module. Please view the AN-80i
User Manual for additional information on configuring and maintaining the module. The Crypto-Officer can receive
the module from the vendor via trusted delivery couriers including UPS, FedEx, and Roadway. The Crypto-Officer
can also arrange for pick up directly from Redline.
Upon receipt of the module, the Crypto-Officer should check the package for any irregular tears or openings. Upon
opening the package the Crypto-Officer should inspect the tamper-evident labels. If the Crypto-Officer suspects
tampering, he/she should immediately contact Redline.
3.1.1 Initialization
The Crypto-Officer is responsible for the initialization of the module through the Web interface. The Crypto-Officer
must login to the module using the default username and password. Once initial authentication has completed, the
Crypto-Officer must setup all Crypto-Officer and User accounts with passwords (eight characters minimum) and
verify via the System Configuration window that FIPS Mode is enabled. If FIPS Mode is disabled, the Crypto-
Officer can enable it by performing the following steps:
1. Change the default Crypto-Officer password and default User password
2. Set the Encryption Type to None
3. Disable HTTP20
, SNMP, and Telnet
4. Enable HTTPS21
and SSH
5. Turn FIPS Mode Flag to ON
6. Reboot
7. Load the Local RSA public/private keys and Authentication (RSA) public/private keys
8. Load the Certificate Authority’s public key
9. Reboot
10. Set the Encryption Type to AES 128, AES 192 or AES 256
11. Enable wireless authentication and encryption
For additional initialization guidance, please reference the Redline AN-80i User Manual.
3.1.2 Management
The module can run in two different modes: FIPS-Approved for Point-to-Point (PTP) connections and FIPS-
Approved for Point-to-Multipoint (PMP) connections. In FIPS-Approved mode only FIPS approved algorithms
listed in Table 6 are used.
The Crypto-Officer is able to configure and monitor the module via the Web Interface over TLS and CLI over SSH.
The Crypto-Officer should check the System Status and System Logs frequently for errors. If the same errors
reoccur or the module ceases to function normally, then Redline customer support should be contacted.
The Crypto-Officer is able to switch between FIPS Mode and non-FIPS mode by changing the FIPS Mode Flag
between ON and OFF. When the mode is changed to or from FIPS mode of operation, the files in memory are
replaced with “0”s and a reboot is forced. To prevent sharing of the FIPS mode keys in non FIPS mode or vice-
20
HTTP – Hypertext Transfer Protocol
21
HTTPS – Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 15 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
versa there exists two different set of files, one for each mode. The one set that is not being used is not accessible to
the user in any way.
3.2 User Guidance
The User role is able to access the module over the Ethernet port and perform basic services including: viewing
general system status information and changing their own password. A list of commands available to the User role
is found in Table 4. A user should check the system status information to confirm the FIPS mode flag is set to ON.
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 16 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
4 Acronyms
This section defines the acronyms used throughout this document.
Table 8 – Acronyms
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange
BOM Bill of Materials
BWI Broadband Wireless Infrastructure
CAPA Corrective and Preventive Action
CBC Cipher-Block Chaining
CCM Counter with CBC-MAC
CFB Cipher Feedback
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CLI Command Line Interface
CM Configuration Management
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CO Crypto-Officer
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSEC Communications Security Establishment Canada
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Digital Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECB Electronic Codebook
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GUI Graphical User Interface
HALT Highly-Accelerated Life Testing
HMAC (Keyed-) Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol
ID Identification
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
KAT Known Answer Test
Non-Proprietary Security Policy, Version 2.1 June 7, 2010
Redline AN-80i Broadband Wireless Infrastructure Radio Page 17 of 17
© 2010 Redline Communications, Inc.
This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact including this copyright notice.
Acronym Definition
LAN Local Area Network
MAC Media Access Controller
MAC Message Authentication Code
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS Operating System
PHY Physical Interface
PKCS Public Key Cryptography Standard
PMP Point-to-Multipoint
POE Power Over Ethernet
PTP Point-to-Point
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SSH Secure Shell
TLS Transport Layer Security
VoIP Voice-over-Internet Protocol
VSS Visual SourceSafe