



# CareView Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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## References

<i>Reference</i>	<i>Full Specification Name</i>
<b>[ANS X9.31]</b>	<i>Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA)</i>
<b>[FIPS 140-2]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001</i></a>
<b>[FIPS 180-4]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Secure Hash Standard (SHS)</i></a>
<b>[FIPS 186-2]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [withdrawn]</i></a>
<b>[FIPS 186-4]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</i></a>
<b>[FIPS 197]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)</i></a>
<b>[FIPS 198-1]</b>	<a href="#"><i>The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)</i></a>
<b>[IG]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program</i></a>
<b>[SP 800-38A]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques</i></a>
<b>[SP 800-38B]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication</i></a>
<b>[SP 800-38C]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality</i></a>
<b>[SP 800-38D]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC</i></a>
<b>[SP 800-38E]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices</i></a>
<b>[SP 800-56Ar1]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography</i></a>
<b>[SP 800-56Ar3]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography</i></a>
<b>[SP 800-57r5]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Recommendation for Key Management: Part 1 - General</i></a>
<b>[SP 800-67r2]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher</i></a>
<b>[SP 800-89]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications</i></a>
<b>[SP 800-90Ar1]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators</i></a>
<b>[SP 800-131Ar2]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths</i></a>
<b>[SP 800-133r2]</b>	<a href="#"><i>Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation</i></a>

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# 1 Introduction

This document is the non-proprietary Security Policy for the *CareView Cryptographic Module*, hereafter referred to as the Module.

The Module is a software library providing a C language application program interface (API) for use by other processes that require cryptographic functionality. The Module is classified by FIPS 140-2 as a software module, multi-chip standalone module embodiment. The physical cryptographic boundary is the general-purpose computer on which the module is installed. The logical cryptographic boundary of the Module is the *fipscanister* object module, a single object module file named *fipscanister.o*. The Module performs no communications other than with the calling application (the process that invokes the Module services).

The current version of the *CareView Cryptographic Module* is 1.0.

The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:

*Table 1: Security Level of Security Requirements*

Security Requirement	Security Level
<b>Cryptographic Module Specification</b>	1
<b>Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces</b>	1
<b>Roles, Services, and Authentication</b>	2
<b>Finite State Model</b>	1
<b>Physical Security</b>	NA
<b>Operational Environment</b>	1
<b>Cryptographic Key Management</b>	1
<b>EMI/EMC</b>	1
<b>Self-Tests</b>	1
<b>Design Assurance</b>	3
<b>Mitigation of Other Attacks</b>	NA




Figure 1: Module Block Diagram

## 2 Ports and Interfaces

The physical ports of the Module are the same as the computer system on which it is executing. The logical interface is a C language application program interface (API).

Table 2: Logical Interfaces

Logical interface type	Description
Control input	API entry point and corresponding stack parameters
Data input	API entry point data input stack parameters
Status output	API entry point return values and status stack parameters
Data output	API entry point data output stack parameters

As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside module scope; however, when the module is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the logical data output interface is inhibited. The module is single-threaded and in error scenarios returns only an error value (no data output is returned).

### 3 Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality

The Module supports FIPS 140-2 Approved, Allowed and Non-Approved algorithms in a single mixed mode of operation.

#### 3.1 Approved Mode

The Module supports the following services and algorithms in FIPS Approved mode:

Table 3: FIPS Approved Cryptographic Functions

Function	Algorithm	Options	Cert. #
Random Number Generation; Symmetric Key Generation	[SP 800-90Ar1] DRBG <sup>1</sup>	Hash_Based DRBG: All SHA sizes HMAC_Based DRBG: All SHA sizes	<a href="#">C904</a>
	Prediction resistance supported for all variations	CTR_DRBG: AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 (with and without derivation function)	
Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG)	[SP 800-133r2] CKG		Vendor affirmed
Encryption, Decryption and CMAC	[SP 800-67r2] Triple-DES	TECB, TCBC, TCFB, TOFB: 3-Key	<a href="#">C904</a>
	[SP 800-38B] CMAC	CMAC generate and verify: 3-Key	
	[FIPS 197] AES	ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB, CTR: 128/192/256	<a href="#">C904</a>
	[SP 800-38B] CMAC	CMAC generate and verify: 128/192/256	
	[SP 800-38C] CCM	CCM: 128/192/256	
[SP 800-38D] GCM	GCM: 128/192/256		
[SP 800-38E] XTS	XTS: 128/256		
Message Digests	[FIPS 180-4] SHA	SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512)	<a href="#">C904</a>
Keyed Hash	[FIPS 198] HMAC	SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512)	<a href="#">C904</a>
Digital Signature and Asymmetric Key Generation	[FIPS 186-2] RSA	SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5, SigGenPSS: 4096 with all SHA-2 sizes SigVer9.31, SigVerPKCS1.5, SigVerPSS: 1024/1536/2048/3072/4096 with all SHA sizes	<a href="#">C904</a>
	[FIPS 186-4] RSA	KeyGen: 2048/3072 SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5, SigGenPSS: 2048/3072 with all SHA2 sizes	<a href="#">C904</a>
	[FIPS 186-4] DSA	KeyPairGen: 2048/3072 PQGen, SigGen: 2048/3072 with all SHA-2 sizes PQGen, SigVer: 1024/2048/3072 with all SHA sizes	<a href="#">C904</a>
	[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA	PKG: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571; ExtraRandomBits, TestingCandidates PKV: All NIST defined B, K and P curves SigGen: P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571; all SHA2 sizes SigVer: All NIST defined B, K and P curves; all SHA sizes	<a href="#">C904</a>
ECC CDH (KAS) (CVL)	[SP 800-56A] (§5.7.1.2)	All NIST defined B, K and P curves except sizes 163 and 192	<a href="#">C904</a>
KAS-SSC [X1] <sup>2</sup>	[SP 800-56Ar3]	Diffie-Hellman ≥ 2048 bits ECDH B, K, and P curves ≥ 256-bit curves	Vendor affirmed

<sup>1</sup> For all DRBGs the "supported security strengths" is just the highest supported security strength per [SP 800-90Ar1] and [SP 800-57r5].

<sup>2</sup> In the approved mode, KAS-SSC can only be used in conjunction with an Approved KDF from SP 800-56C or SP 800-135.

### 3.2 Non-Approved but Allowed Services

The Module supports the following non-Approved but allowed services:

Table 4: Non-FIPS Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions

Category	Algorithm	Description
Key Encryption/ Decryption	RSA	RSA may be used to perform key establishment with another module by securely exchanging symmetric encryption keys with another module.

The module supports the following non-FIPS 140-2 approved but allowed algorithms:

- RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength)

### 3.3 Non-Approved Services

The Module implements the following services which are non-approved per the [SP 800-131Ar2] transition:

Table 5: Non-FIPS Approved Cryptographic Functions

Function	Algorithm	Options
Digital Signature and Asymmetric Key Generation	[FIPS 186-2] RSA	GenKey9.31, SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5, SigGenPSS (1024/1536 with all SHA sizes, 2048/3072/4096 with SHA-1)
	[FIPS 186-2] DSA	PQGen, KeyPairGen, SigGen (1024 with all SHA sizes, 2048/3072 with SHA-1)
	[FIPS 186-4] DSA	PQGen, KeyPairGen, SigGen (1024 with all SHA sizes, 2048/3072 with SHA-1)
	[FIPS 186-2] ECDSA	PKG: P-192, K-163, B-163 SigGen: P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-163, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-163, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571
	[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA	PKG: P-192, K-163, B-163 SigGen: P-192, K-163, B-163 with all SHA sizes; P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521, K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571, B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571 with SHA-1
ECC CDH (KAS)	[SP 800-56Ar1] (\$5.7.1.2)	P-192, K-163, B-163

These algorithms shall not be used when operating in the FIPS Approved mode of operation. Use of the non-conformant algorithms listed in Table 5 will place the module in a non-approved mode of operation.

### 3.4 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys

All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All access to these CSPs by Module services is described in Section 4. The CSP names are generic, corresponding to API parameter data structures.

Table 6: Critical Security Parameters

CSP Name	Description
<b>RSA SGK</b>	RSA (2048 to 15360 bits) signature generation key
<b>RSA KDK</b>	RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) key decryption (private key transport) key
<b>DSA SGK</b>	[FIPS 186-4] DSA (2048/3072) signature generation key
<b>DH Private</b>	Diffie-Hellman $\geq$ 2048 private key agreement key
<b>ECDSA SGK</b>	ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves except sizes 163 and 192) signature generation key
<b>EC DH Private</b>	EC DH (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves except sizes 163 and 192) private key agreement key
<b>AES EDK</b>	AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt key
<b>AES CMAC</b>	AES (128/192/256) CMAC generate / verify key
<b>AES GCM<sup>3</sup></b>	AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt / generate / verify key
<b>AES XTS</b>	AES (256/512) XTS encrypt / decrypt key
<b>Triple-DES EDK</b>	Triple-DES (3-Key) encrypt / decrypt key
<b>Triple-DES CMAC</b>	Triple-DES (3-Key) CMAC generate / verify key
<b>HMAC Key</b>	Keyed hash key (160/224/256/384/512)
<b>Hash_DRBG CSPs</b>	V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
<b>HMAC_DRBG CSPs</b>	V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
<b>CTR_DRBG CSPs</b>	V (128 bits) and Key (AES 128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
<b>CO-AD-Digest</b>	Pre-calculated HMAC-SHA-1 digest used for Crypto Officer role authentication
<b>User-AD-Digest</b>	Pre-calculated HMAC-SHA-1 digest used for User role authentication

Authentication data is loaded into the module during the module build process, performed by an authorized operator (Crypto Officer), and otherwise cannot be accessed.

The module does not output intermediate key generation values.

Table 7: Public Keys

Public Key Name	Description
<b>RSA SVK</b>	RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) signature verification public key
<b>RSA KEK</b>	RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) key encryption (public key transport) key
<b>DSA SVK</b>	[FIPS 186-4] DSA (2048/3072) signature verification key
<b>ECDSA SVK</b>	ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) signature verification key
<b>DH Public</b>	Diffie-Hellman public key agreement key
<b>EC DH Public</b>	EC DH (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) public key agreement key

<sup>3</sup> The Module's IV is generated internally by the Module's Approved DRBG. The DRBG seed is generated inside the Module's physical boundary. The IV is 96 bits in length per [SP 800-38D] §8.2.2 and [IG] A.5 scenario 2. The selection of the IV construction method is the responsibility of the user of this Module. In Approved mode, users of the Module must not utilize GCM with an externally generated IV. The only Approved use of GCM is with TLS and with a randomly generated IV.



**For all CSPs and Public Keys:**

**Storage:** RAM, associated to entities by memory location. The Module stores DRBG state values for the lifetime of the DRBG instance. The module uses CSPs passed in by the calling application on the stack. The Module does not store any CSP persistently (beyond the lifetime of an API call), with the exception of DRBG state values used for the Module's default key generation service.

**Generation:** The Module implements SP 800-90A compliant DRBG services for creation of symmetric keys, and for generation of DSA, elliptic curve, and RSA keys as shown in Table 3. The calling application is responsible for storage of generated keys returned by the Module. For operation in the Approved mode, Module users (the calling applications) shall use entropy sources that contain at least 112 bits of entropy. To ensure full DRBG strength, the entropy sources must meet or exceed the security strengths shown in the table below:

Table 8: DRBG Entropy Requirements

DRBG Type	Underlying Algorithm	Minimum Seed Entropy
Hash_DRBG or HMAC_DRBG	SHA-1	128
	SHA-224	192
	SHA-256	256
	SHA-384	256
	SHA-512	256
CTR DRBG	AES-128	128
	AES-192	192
	AES-256	256

**Entry:** All CSPs enter the Module's logical boundary in plaintext as API parameters, associated by memory location; however, none cross the physical boundary.

**Output:** The Module does not output CSPs, other than as explicit results of key generation services; however, none cross the physical boundary.

**Destruction:** Zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by API function calls for temporarily stored CSPs. In addition, the module provides functions to explicitly destroy CSPs related to random number generation services. The calling application is responsible for parameters passed into and out of the module.

Private and secret keys as well as seeds and entropy input are provided to the Module by the calling application, and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls. Keys residing in internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API call) can only be accessed using the Module defined API. The operating system protects memory and process space from unauthorized access. Only the calling application that creates or imports keys can use or export such keys. All API functions are executed by the invoking calling application in a non-overlapping sequence such that no two API functions will execute concurrently. An authorized application as user (Crypto-Officer and User) has access to all key data generated during the operation of the Module.

**Use:** In the case of AES-GCM, the IV generation method is user selectable and the value can be computed in more than one manner.

Following RFC 5288 for TLS, the module ensures that it's strictly increasing and thus cannot repeat. When the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key, the first party, client or server, to encounter this condition may either trigger a handshake to establish a new encryption key in accordance with RFC 5246, or fail. In either case, the module prevents and IV duplication and thus enforces the security property.

In the event that Module power is lost and restored, the calling application must ensure that any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.

The calling application shall ensure that the same Triple-DES key is not used to encrypt more than  $2^{16}$  64-bit blocks of data.

## 4 Roles, Authentication and Services

The Module implements the required User and Crypto Officer roles and requires authentication for those roles. Only one role may be active at a time, and the Module does not allow concurrent operators. The User or Crypto Officer role is assumed by passing the appropriate password to the `FIPS_module_mode_set()` function. The password values may be specified at build time and must have a minimum length of 16 characters. Any attempt to authenticate with an invalid password will result in an immediate and permanent failure condition rendering the Module unable to enter the FIPS mode of operation, even with subsequent use of a correct password.

Authentication data is loaded into the Module during the Module build process, performed by the Crypto Officer, and otherwise cannot be accessed.

Since the minimum password length is 16 characters, the probability of a random successful authentication attempt in one try is a maximum of  $1/256^{16}$ , or less than  $1/10^{38}$ . The Module permanently disables further authentication attempts after a single failure, so this probability is independent of time.

Both roles have access to all of the services provided by the Module.

- User Role (User): Loading the Module and calling any of the API functions.
- Crypto Officer Role (CO): Installation of the Module on the host computer system and calling of any API functions.

All services implemented by the Module are listed below, along with a description of service CSP access. The access types are determined as follows:

- Generate (G): Generate the Critical Security Parameter (CSP) using an approved Random Bit Generator
- Read (R): Export the CSP
- Write (W): Enter/establish and store a CSP
- Destroy (D): Overwrite the CSP
- Execute (E): Employ the CSP
- None: No access to CSPs

Table 9: Services and CSP Access

Service	Role	Description	Access Type
<b>Initialize</b>	User, CO	Module initialization. Does not access CSPs. CO-AD-Digest, User-AD-Digest	E
<b>Self-test</b>	User, CO	Perform self-tests (FIPS_selftest).	None
<b>Show Status</b>	User, CO	Functions that provide module status information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Version (as unsigned long or const char *)</li> <li>FIPS Mode (Boolean)</li> </ul>	None
<b>Zeroize</b>	User, CO	Functions that destroy CSPs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>fips_drbg_uninstantiate</li> </ul> DRBG CSPs (Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs) All other services automatically overwrite CSPs stored in allocated memory. Stack cleanup is the responsibility of the calling application.	D
<b>Random Number Generation</b>	User, CO	Used for random number and symmetric key generation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Seed or reseed a DRBG instance</li> <li>Determine security strength of a DRBG instance</li> <li>Obtain random data</li> </ul> DRBG CSPs (Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs)	E
<b>Asymmetric Key Generation</b>	User, CO	Used to generate DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys: RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK	G
<b>Symmetric Encrypt/Decrypt</b>	User, CO	Used to encrypt or decrypt data. AES EDK, Triple-DES EDK, AES GCM, AES XTS (passed in by the calling process)	E
<b>Symmetric Digest</b>	User, CO	Used to generate or verify data integrity with CMAC. AES CMAC, Triple-DES CMAC (passed in by the calling process)	E
<b>Message Digest</b>	User, CO	Used to generate a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest.	None
<b>Keyed Hash</b>	User, CO	Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC. HMAC Key (passed in by the calling process)	E
<b>Key Transport<sup>4</sup></b>	User, CO	Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the calling process (does not establish keys into the module). RSA KDK, RSA KEK (passed in by the calling process)	E
<b>Key Agreement</b>	User, CO	Used to perform key agreement primitives on behalf of the calling process (does not establish keys into the module). Diffie-Hellman/EC Diffie-Hellman Private, Diffie-Hellman/EC Diffie-Hellman Public (passed in by the calling process)	E
<b>Digital Signature</b>	User, CO	Used to generate or verify RSA, DSA or ECDSA digital signatures. RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK (passed in by the calling process)	E
<b>Utility</b>	User, CO	Miscellaneous helper functions.	None

<sup>4</sup> "Key transport" can refer to a) moving keys in and out of the module or b) the use of keys by an external application. The latter definition is the one that applies to the *Module*.

## 5 Self-Tests

The Module performs the self-tests listed below on invocation of “initialize” or “self-test”.

Table 10: Power-On Self-Tests (KAT = Known answer test; PCT = Pairwise consistency test)

Algorithm	Type	Test Attributes
<b>Software integrity</b>	KAT	HMAC-SHA1
<b>HMAC</b>	KAT	One KAT per SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 Per [IG] 9.3, this testing covers SHA POST requirements.
<b>AES</b>	KAT	Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 128-bit key length
<b>AES CCM</b>	KAT	Separate encrypt and decrypt, 192-bit key length
<b>AES GCM</b>	KAT	Separate encrypt and decrypt, 256-bit key length
<b>XTS-AES</b>	KAT	128, 256-bit key sizes to support either the 256-bit key size (for XTS-AES-128) or the 512-bit key size (for XTS-AES-256)
<b>AES CMAC</b>	KAT	Generate and verify CBC mode, 128, 192, 256-bit key lengths
<b>Triple-DES</b>	KAT	Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 3-Key
<b>Triple-DES CMAC</b>	KAT	CMAC generate and verify, CBC mode, 3-Key
<b>RSA</b>	KAT	Sign and verify using 2048-bit key, SHA-256, PKCS#1
<b>DSA</b>	PCT	Sign and verify using 2048-bit key, SHA-384
<b>DRBG</b>	KAT	CTR_DRBG: AES, 256 bits with and without derivation function HASH_DRBG: SHA-256 HMAC_DRBG: SHA-256
<b>ECDSA</b>	PCT	Key gen, sign, verify using P-224, K-233 and SHA-512
<b>ECC CDH</b>	KAT	Shared secret calculation per SP 800-56A §5.7.1.2, [IG] 9.6

The Module is installed using one of the set of instructions in Appendix A, as appropriate for the target system. The HMAC-SHA-1 of the Module distribution file as tested by the CMT Laboratory and listed in Appendix A is verified during installation of the Module file as described in Appendix A.

Per [IG] 9.10, the Module implements a default entry point and automatically runs the FIPS self-tests upon startup.

The module has a function called `FIPS_module_mode_set()` within the init code that is automatically set to enable “FIPS Mode” by default. When the Module is initialized, it will always run its power-on self-tests, meeting the [IG] 9.10 requirement.

The module also has a Boolean check value to verify whether the module has run its power-on self-tests upon subsequent instantiations. If the module is determined to have already run its power-on self-tests, future instantiations will only run the power-up integrity test and not the full set of POSTs. If power is lost to the module, the Boolean check value “1” is zeroized and the module will run its power-up self-tests again to verify the correctness of the module operation. Upon successful completion of the POSTs, the Boolean check value is restored. This is consistent with the requirement described in [IG] 9.11.

The Module also implements the following conditional tests:

*Table 11: Conditional Tests*

Algorithm	Test
<b>DRBG</b>	Tested as required by [SP 800-90Ar1] Section 11
<b>DRBG</b>	FIPS 140-2 continuous test for stuck fault
<b>NDRNG</b>	FIPS 140-2 continuous test for NDRNG
<b>DSA</b>	Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair
<b>ECDSA</b>	Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair
<b>RSA</b>	Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair

In the event of a DRBG self-test failure, the calling application must unstantiate and re-instantiate the DRBG per the requirements of [SP 800-90Ar1]; this is not something the Module can do itself.

Pairwise consistency tests are performed for both possible modes of use, e.g. Sign/Verify and Encrypt/Decrypt.

## 6 Operational Environment

The tested operating systems segregate user processes into separate process spaces. Each process space is logically separated from all other processes by the operating system software and hardware. The Module functions entirely within the process space of the calling application, and implicitly satisfies the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a single user mode of operation.

The module was tested in the following configurations.

*Table 12: Tested Configurations*

#	Operating System	Processor	Optimizations (Target)	Platform
<b>1</b>	Ubuntu 18.04 LTS	Intel Xeon E5-2609	PAA	HPE ProLiant DL60 Gen9
<b>2</b>	Ubuntu 18.04 LTS	Intel Xeon E5-2609	None	HPE ProLiant DL60 Gen9

As described in [IG] 1.21, Processor Algorithm Acceleration (PAA) describes mathematical constructs and not the complete cryptographic algorithm (as defined in the NIST standards). Examples of PAA supported by the Module include AES-NI and NEON.

See Appendix A for additional information on build method and optimizations. See Appendix C for a list of the specific compilers used to generate the Module for the respective operational environments.

As allowed by [IG] G.5, *Maintaining validation compliance of software or firmware cryptographic modules*, the validation status of the Module is maintained when operated in the following additional operating environments:

- Debian 10 Linux executing on x86\_64 architecture
- Debian 10 Linux executing on armv7 architecture

The CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the Module or the security strengths of the generated keys when the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

## **7 Mitigation of other Attacks**

The module is not designed to mitigate against attacks which are outside of the scope of FIPS 140-2.

## Appendix A - Installation and Usage Guidance

The test platforms represent different combinations of installation instructions. For each platform that was tested, there is a build system, the host providing the build environment in which the installation instructions are executed, and a target system on which the generated object code is executed. The build and target systems may be the same type of system or even the same device, or may be different systems – the Module supports cross-compilation environments.

The command set is relative to the top of the directory containing the uncompressed and expanded contents of the distribution files `OpenSSL_2.0.13_OracleFIPS_1.0`.

### Installation and Configuration Instructions

As FIPS mode is enabled by default, the administrator can verify FIPS mode is set by calling the `FIPS_module_mode()`. The module can be downloaded from the [Solaris Git Repository](https://github.com/oracle/solaris-openssl-fips/releases). The link to the Module code is here:

[https://github.com/oracle/solaris-openssl-fips/releases/download/v1.0/OpenSSL\\_2.0.13\\_OracleFIPS\\_1.0.tar.gz](https://github.com/oracle/solaris-openssl-fips/releases/download/v1.0/OpenSSL_2.0.13_OracleFIPS_1.0.tar.gz)

If one wishes to download and build the Module to the exact instructions for which the module was validated, they can follow the following steps:

1. Download the Module from the link above.
2. Verify the HMAC-SHA-1 digest of the distribution file; see Appendix B. An independently acquired FIPS 140-2 validated implementation of SHA-1 HMAC must be used for this digest verification. Note that this verification can be performed on any convenient system and not necessarily on the specific build or target system.
3. Unpack the distribution

```
$ tar -zxf OpenSSL_2.0.13_OracleFIPS_1.0.tar.gz
```
4. Run the command set

```
$ ./config
$ make
$ make install
```
5. The resulting `fipscanister.o` file is now available for linking into the latest OpenSSL 1.0.2 distribution.

Note that failure to use one of the specified command sets exactly as shown will result in a module that cannot be considered compliant with FIPS 140-2.

### Linking the Runtime Executable Application

Note that applications interfacing with the FIPS Object Module are outside of the cryptographic boundary. When linking the application with the FIPS Object Module, two steps are necessary:

1. The HMAC-SHA-1 digest of the FIPS Object Module file must be calculated and verified against the installed digest to ensure the integrity of the FIPS Object Module.
2. An HMAC-SHA-1 digest of the FIPS Object Module must be generated and embedded in the FIPS Object Module for use by the `FIPS_mode_set()` function at runtime initialization.

The `fips_standalone_shal` command can be used to perform the verification of the FIPS Object Module and to generate the new HMAC-SHA-1 digest for the runtime executable application. Failure to embed the digest in the executable object will prevent initialization of FIPS mode.

At runtime, the `FIPS_mode_set()` function compares the embedded HMAC-SHA-1 digest with a digest generated from the FIPS Object Module object code. This digest is the final link in the chain of validation from the original source to the runtime executable application file.

### **Optimization**

The “asm” designation means that assembler language optimizations were enabled when the binary code was built; “no-asm” means that only C language code was compiled.

For OpenSSL with x86, there are three possible optimization levels:

1. No optimization (plain C)
2. SPARC optimization (Solaris)
3. AESNI+PCLMULQDQ+SSSE3 optimization

For more information on enabling AES-NI on Intel processors, see:

- <http://www.intel.com/support/processors/sb/CS-030123.htm?wapkw=sse2>
- <http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-advanced-encryption-standard-instructions-aes-ni>

For OpenSSL with ARM, there are two possible optimization levels:

1. Without NEON
2. With NEON (ARM7 only)

For more information, see <http://www.arm.com/products/processors/technologies/neon.php>



## Appendix B - Controlled Distribution File Fingerprint

The *CareView Cryptographic Module* consists of the FIPS Object Module (the `fipsanister.o` contiguous unit of binary object code) generated from the specific source files.

The source files are in the specific Oracle OpenSSL distribution *OpenSSL\_2.0.13\_OracleFIPS\_1.0.tar.gz* with HMAC-SHA-1 digest of

```
ef8f7a91979cad14d033d8803a89fdf925102a30
```

located at

[https://github.com/oracle/solaris-openssl-fips/releases/download/v1.0/OpenSSL\\_2.0.13\\_OracleFIPS\\_1.0.tar.gz](https://github.com/oracle/solaris-openssl-fips/releases/download/v1.0/OpenSSL_2.0.13_OracleFIPS_1.0.tar.gz)

The set of files specified in this tar file constitutes the complete set of source files of this module. There shall be no additions, deletions, or alterations of this set as used during module build. The Module distribution tar file shall be verified using the above HMAC-SHA-1 digest.

The arbitrary 16-byte key of:

```
65 74 61 6f 6e 72 69 73 68 64 6c 63 75 70 66 6d
```

(equivalent to the ASCII string "etaonrishdlcupfm") is used to generate the HMAC-SHA-1 value for the FIPS Object Module integrity check.

## Appendix C - Compilers

This appendix lists the specific compilers used to generate the Module for the respective Operational Environments. Note this list does not imply that use of the Module is restricted to only the listed compiler versions, only that the use of other versions has not been confirmed to produce a correct result.

*Table 13: Compilers*

#	Operational Environment	Compiler
1	Ubuntu 18.04 LTS	gcc 7.4.0
2	Ubuntu 18.04 LTS	gcc 7.4.0