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SK hynix PE8111 E1.L NVMe TCG Opal SSC SED
HFS15T3DFMX098N
HFS15T3DFLX098N
HFS15T3DFMX130N
FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module
Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Document Version: 1.1
Date: 7/28/2022
SK hynix PE8111 E1.L FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
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CHANGE RECORD
Revision Date Author Description of Change
1.0 10/28/2021 Yongtae Kim First release
1.1 7/28/2022 Yongtae Kim Changes made in response to CMVP
Comments
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Table of Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................5
1.1 Hardware and Cryptographic Boundary ...................................................................................... 5
1.2 Block Diagram with Cryptographic Boundary.............................................................................. 7
1.3 Mode of Operation ...................................................................................................................... 8
Cryptographic Functionality .........................................................................................................9
2.1 Critical Security Parameters....................................................................................................... 11
2.2 Public Security Parameters ........................................................................................................ 12
Roles, Authentication and Services.............................................................................................13
3.1 Assumption of Roles .................................................................................................................. 13
3.2 Authentication Methods............................................................................................................ 14
3.3 Services ...................................................................................................................................... 15
Self-Tests...................................................................................................................................23
Physical Security Policy ..............................................................................................................25
Operational Environment...........................................................................................................26
Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy..............................................................................................27
Security Rules and Guidance ......................................................................................................28
8.1 Invariant Rules ........................................................................................................................... 28
8.2 Cryptographic Officer Initialization............................................................................................ 28
8.3 Un-Initialize the Module ............................................................................................................ 29
References and Definitions.........................................................................................................30
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Level of Security Requirements.........................................................................................5
Table 2: Module Configurations ...................................................................................................................5
Table 3: Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................................6
Table 4: Approved Cryptographic Functions.................................................................................................9
Table 5: Critical Security Parameters..........................................................................................................11
Table 6: Public Security Parameters ...........................................................................................................12
Table 7: Authenticated Roles......................................................................................................................13
Table 8: Unauthenticated Roles..................................................................................................................14
Table 9: Authentication Description...........................................................................................................14
Table 10: Unauthenticated Services ...........................................................................................................15
Table 11: Authenticated Services ...............................................................................................................16
Table 12: CSP Access within Services..........................................................................................................18
Table 13: PSP Access within Services..........................................................................................................21
Table 14: Power-On Self-Tests....................................................................................................................23
Table 15: Conditional Self-Tests..................................................................................................................24
Table 16: References...................................................................................................................................30
Table 17: Acronyms and Definitions...........................................................................................................31
List of Figures
Figure 1: PE8111 E1.L 9.5mm Form Factor (HFS15T3DFMX098N and HFS15T3DFMX130N).......................6
Figure 2: PE8111 E1.L 18mm Form Factor (HFS15T3DFLX098N)..................................................................6
Figure 3: PE8111 E1.L 18mm Form Factor (HFS15T3DFLX098N) – Perspective View ..................................6
Figure 4: Module Block Diagram...................................................................................................................7
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Introduction
This document defines the Security Policy for the SK hynix PE8111 E1.L NVMe TCG Opal SSC SED
cryptographic module, hereafter denoted the Module. The Module is a multiple chip embedded self-
encrypting drive (SED) compliant with TCG Core, TCG Opal, TCG Single User Mode (SUM), PCIe, and NVMe
specifications. It is also compliant with the IEEE1667 storage specification. The cryptographic module’s
controller has a built-in AES-XTS HW engine which encrypts and decrypts the user data without any
performance loss. The Module meets FIPS 140-2 overall security Level 1.
The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:
Table 1: Security Level of Security Requirements
Security Requirement Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security 1
Operational Environment N/A
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall Level 1
The Module has the following configurations:
Table 2: Module Configurations
HW P/N and Version FW Version Description
1 HFS15T3DFMX098N 31180A10 E1.L 9.5mm 15.3TB
2 HFS15T3DFLX098N 31180A10 E1.L 18mm 15.3TB
3 HFS15T3DFMX130N 31280A10 E1.L 9.5mm 15.3TB
1.1 Hardware and Cryptographic Boundary
The Module is designed to be embedded in a general-purpose computer (host) and is connected through
the PCIe connecter. The module does not support a maintenance access interface.
The Module PE8111 is provided in E1.L 9.5mm and 18mm physical form factors as depicted in Figure 1
and Figure 2 respectively. The only components exposed are the PCIe (NVMe, SMBus and Power) port.
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the entire enclosure as indicated by the red outline in Figure 1
and Figure 2.
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Figure 1: PE8111 E1.L 9.5mm Form Factor (HFS15T3DFMX098N and HFS15T3DFMX130N)
Figure 2: PE8111 E1.L 18mm Form Factor (HFS15T3DFLX098N)
Figure 3: PE8111 E1.L 18mm Form Factor (HFS15T3DFLX098N) – Perspective View
Table 3: Ports and Interfaces
Port Interfaces Description Logical Interface Type
PCIe
Connector
Power Power Connector Power
NVMe NVMe interface Control in, Data in, Data out, Status out
SMBus Management Interface Control in, Status out
JTAG Debug Port
(permanently disabled)
N/A
UART Debug Port
(permanently disabled)
N/A
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1.1.1 NVMe Interface
The NVMe interface provides the primary interface to interact with the Module. Most services provided
by the Module are accessed via the NVMe Interface including Opal configuration, reading and writing user
data, retrieving FIPS capability support, and retrieving FIPS status reporting.
1.1.2 SMBus Interface
The SMBus interface provides the ability to audit the SSD environment (temperature, Vital Product Data).
1.2 Block Diagram with Cryptographic Boundary
The Module uses a single chip controller (Aquarius) with a PCIe/NVMe and SMBus interface on the
systems side and SK hynix NAND flash internally. The following figure depicts the Module operational
environment. The red outline in Figure 3 below depicts the cryptographic boundary which is the physical
boundary as depicted above (Figure 2). All firmware runs on the controller within this boundary.
Figure 4: Module Block Diagram
The Module is composed of the following components:
• Aquarius Controller – The controller SoC (System On Chip). This component is responsible for
terminating PCIe/NVMe commands; reading or writing data to the Host platform; encrypting or
decrypting data from the Host platform; and storing or retrieving data to SK hynix NAND nonvolatile
memory.
• PMC – Power Management Controller –Manages power control of the Module
• PCIe/NVMe Interface – Provides PCI/NVMe Interface access to the controller
• SMBus Interface – Provides SMBus Interface access to the controller
• CPU – Central Processing Unit of the controller
• ROM – Read only memory – Non-volatile memory which has first bootable code for controller
• ECC – Error Correction Code memory provides Error correction and detection access to the
controller
• SRAM – Static Random Access memory
Aquarius Controller
Nand
Nand
SK HYNIX NAND Memory
PCIe/NVMe
DRAM
NAND
Interface
ROM
CPU
PMC
SRAM
ECC
DRAM Interface
PCIe/
NVMe
Interface
SMBus
Interface
AES 256
TRNG CTR DRBG
SHA/HMAC
SMBus
Power
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• DRAM Interface – Provides access to SK hynix DRAM
• NAND Interface – Provides access to SK hynix NAND Memory
• SK hynix DRAM – Dynamic Random Access Memory. DRAM Provides variable storage, instruction
memory, data mapping tables and buffer for user data going into and out of the device.
• SK hynix NAND memory – NAND flash is the storage medium where encrypted user data, firmware
for the Aquarius controller, and other non-volatile configuration data needed by the Aquarius
controller during execution.
The Module relies on the PCIe/NVMe interface as input/output devices.
1.3 Mode of Operation
The Module is always in the FIPS Approved Mode of operation. The module has two distinct operational
modes in the approved mode of operation as described below.
Uninitialized Mode – In this operational state, the ownership of the drive is not taken. Once the
ownership is taken, the module transitions to initialized mode.
• Initialized Mode - In this operational state, the ownership of the drive is taken. To initialize the
drive, the module owner must take ownership of the device and activate Locking SP by following
steps in the Crypto Officer Initialization section from the uninitialized mode.
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Cryptographic Functionality
The Module implements the FIPS Approved cryptographic functions listed in the tables below. The term
FIPS Approved cryptographic function is defined by FIPS 140-2 specifications.
Table 4: Approved Cryptographic Functions
Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats
A913 AES [197]
ECB
[38A]
Key Sizes: 256
Boundary: Hardware
Encrypt, Decrypt
Underlying for XTS, KW,
and CTR_DRBG
XTS [38E]
Key Sizes: 256
Per IG A.9, the module
assures Key1 and Key2 are not
equal.
Boundary: Hardware
Encrypt, Decrypt
A913 AES [197] KW [38F]
Forward
Key Sizes: 256
Boundary: Hardware
Authenticated Encrypt,
Authenticated Decrypt
VA CKG [IG D.12]
[133 Rev2] Section 6.10F
1
Direct Symmetric Key
generation using
unmodified DRBG output
[133 Rev2] Section 6.2.31F
2 Derivation of symmetric
keys from a Password
A912 DRBG [90A] CTR
Prediction Resistance: Yes, No
Supports Reseed
Mode: AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled: Yes
Additional Input: 0-2048
Increment 128
Entropy Input: 256-2048
Increment 128
Nonce: 128-1024 Increment 128
Personalization String Length: 0-
2048 Increment 128
Returned Bits: 512
Additional Input used: 256 Bits
Entropy Input used: 1792 Bits
Nonce used: 896 Bits
Personalization String: 256 Bits
Boundary: Firmware
Deterministic Random Bit
Generation
1
CKG – The module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) meeting the requirements in FIPS 140-
2 IG D.12 and SP 800-133 rev2, Section 6.1. The generated symmetric key is the unmodified output from
the Approved SP 800-90A AES-256 CTR DRBG.
2
CKG – The module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) meeting the requirements in FIPS 140-
2 IG D.12 and SP 800-133 rev2, Section 6.2.3. The symmetric key is derived from a password using the
Approved SP 800-132 PBKDF. The key can only be used for storage applications.
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Cert Algorithm Mode Description Functions/Caveats
A913 HMAC [198-1] SHA-256
Key Sizes: 256 bits
λ = 32 bytes
Boundary: Hardware
Integrity Check Public
Security Parameter (PSP)
and PBKDF
ENT (P)
ENT (P) [90B]
[Annex C]
–
Hardware Non-Deterministic RNG;
minimum of 512 bits per access.
Boundary: Hardware
The ENT (P) output is used
to seed the Approved
DRBG.
Synopsys
A912 PBKDF [132]
Option
1a
sLen = 32 bytes salt
C = 1,000 iterations
HMAC SHA-256 Cert. #A913
Boundary: Firmware
Password Based Key
Derivation. The keys
derived from passwords are
used only in storage
application. The probability
of guessing the key is
1/(2^256) = 1.16e+77.
A912 RSA [186-4] PSS
n = 2048 SHA 256
Boundary: Firmware
SigVer - Digital Signature
verification (Firmware
Download, Maker
Authentication)
Firmware
A914 RSA [186-4] PSS
n = 2048 SHA 256
Boundary: Hardware
SigVer - Digital Signature
verification (ROM Secure
Boot)
Hardware
A913 SHS [180-4] SHA-256 Boundary: Hardware
Firmware Integrity Self-Test
and HMAC-SHA-256
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2.1 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All usage of these CSPs is described in the
services detailed in Section 4.
Table 5: Critical Security Parameters
CSP Description / Usage
DRBG-EI Deterministic Random Bit Generator – Entropy Input
Size: 1792 bits of entropy data. Provides 268 bits of security strength. (268.8 bits of
min-entropy input without a nonce.)
DRBG V The secret value V (128 bits) in the current DRBG internal working state
DRBG Key The secret Key (256 bits) in the current DRBG internal working state
DRBG
seed_material
The DRBG-internal seed_material value (2944 bits) used within the CTR_DRBG
algorithm
CO Password Crypto Officer password
Type: Password
Purpose: used for authenticating the CO role
User Password User Password
Type: Password
Purpose: used for authenticating User roles
HRK Hidden Root Key
Type: AES wrapping key
Purpose: Used to wrap following keys: PSP_HMAC_KEY, MEK_KEK, TPER_SALT_KEK,
and KS_HMAC_KEY.
PSP_HMAC_KEY Public Security Parameter HMAC Key
Type: 256-bit
Purpose: Key is used for PSP Integrity Check
MEK_KEK Type: AES 256
Purpose: Key wraps the MEKs.
TPER_SALT_KEK Type: AES 256
Purpose: Key wraps the SALT PSP.
KS_HMAC_KEY Type: HMAC
Purpose: Key is used to RSA public key integrity check
TPER_KEK Type: AES 256
Purpose: Key wraps the MEKs.
SUM_KEKi
Where i is 0-8 keys.
Type: AES 256
Purpose: It is the key wrapping key used for MEKs.
MEKj
Where j is 0-8 keys.
Type: AES 256
Purpose: MEK0 is the Global Range Key. MEK1-8 keys are used for User data encryption.
AUTH_KEYm
Where m is 0-15 keys.
Type: key derived from PBKDF2 using password provided by the host. This includes
the CO and User passwords.
Purpose: Key is used for KEK wrapping.
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2.2 Public Security Parameters
Table 6: Public Security Parameters
Key Description / Usage
SALT This is the 256-bit salt used as input to the PBKDF2. A unique salt is associated
with the derivation of each AUTH_KEY.
PSID PIN This 32-byte PIN is used to access the TCG Revert service. The PSID PIN is visibly
printed on a production label on the Module.
MSID PIN This 32-byte default PIN is used to authenticate the CO role (Admin SP SID)
during the Initialize service. It can be displayed via the Show Status/Read
Security Configuration service.
FW Public Key Type: 2048-bit RSA Public Key
Purpose: Key is used for RSA signature verification of the firmware image.
Maker Public Key Type: 2048-bit RSA Public Key
Purpose: Key is used to authenticate Maker role to access Zeroize service.
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Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Assumption of Roles
The module supports Cryptographic Officer (CO), User, Maker and PSID roles. The method for assuming a
role is explicit by the TCG authentication. The operator of the module is not required to authenticate as
this is a level 1 module. However, a password authentication is required to assume CO, User and PSID role
as per the module design, although the provided mechanism does not fully comply with FIPS
authentication requirement and so cannot be claimed as Authentication in this context.
The cryptographic module enforces the separation of roles by enforcing re-authentication with the
appropriate password (or PIN) when changing roles. Note that although each TCG role includes a unique
identifier (UID) as part of the authentication process, authentication is still considered role-based because
the UID corresponds to the TCG role itself, not an individual operator.
Table 7 lists all operator roles supported by the module. The Module does not support a maintenance role
and/or bypass capability. The Module does not support concurrent operators. Authentication data is
stored encrypted and never output from the module. Authentication is cleared during each power cycle.
Table 7: Authenticated Roles
Role
Name
Description / Corresponding Roles Authentication Data
Authentication
Type
CO Crypto Officer –
- Admin SP SID - This role is responsible for
transitioning from uninitialized mode to
initialized mode.
- Admin SP Admin 1 – This role is disabled by
default but can be enabled by SID authority.
When enabled, it can transition the Module
back to uninitialized mode from initialized
mode.
- Locking SP Admin 1, 2, 3, and 4 –This role is
used to enable and disable Users, create and
delete user ranges, lock or unlock the ranges
and cryptographically erase the user ranges.
Password
- After five (5) failure
attempts requires
power cycle to
authenticate again
Authentication is
not required for
FIPS 140-2 Level
1.
A password
mechanism is
provided but
does not comply
with FIPS 140-2.
User User –
- Locking SP User 1 – 9 - This role can unlock
and lock the drive to allow the operator to
read and write data to the drive. This user can
also call the Cryptographic Erase service.
Password
- After five (5) failure
attempts requires
power cycle to
authenticate again.
Authentication is
not required for
FIPS 140-2 Level
1.
A password
mechanism is
provided but
does not comply
with FIPS 140-2.
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Maker Maker –
This is an assumed role which enables the
operate to execute Zeroize Service command.
RSA Signature
- After five (5) failure
attempts requires
power cycle to
authenticate again.
Role-based
PSID TCG PSID Authority –
This authority is considered an authenticated
role because the PSID PIN (32 bytes) must be
entered to perform the PSID Revert as an
authenticated service. The PSID PIN is
intended to only be available to an operator
that is physically present with the Module. This
role is used to access PSID Revert service.
PIN
- After five (5) failure
attempts, it requires
power cycle to
authenticate again.
Authentication is
not required for
FIPS 140-2 Level
1.
A PIN
mechanism is
provided but
does not comply
with FIPS 140-2.
Table 8: Unauthenticated Roles
Role Name Description
Anybody TCG Anybody Authority – This authority is considered unauthenticated because no
password is needed for this authority. This authority can read the MSID PIN, and other
security configuration data through TCG Get method. It has a 64-bit UID.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The module supports PIN authentication and RSA Signature verification methods. The strength of
authentication is described in Table 12.
Table 9: Authentication Description
Authentication
Method
Description
Password
(or PIN)
The module’s minimum Password/PIN length is zero bytes, but a 32-byte length is
recommended. If a particular Password/PIN has a length of zero bytes, then
authentication by Password/PIN is disabled.
RSA Signature Key Length is 2048-bit, Key strength is equal to 112 bits.
RSA 2048 has a key strength of 112 bits, which is the minimum approved by CMVP.
The probability of guessing the key of 112 bit strength is 1/(2^112) = 1/(5.19e+33)
= 1.9e-34, which is less than 1/1,000,000. This effectively eliminates the possibility
of determining the private key through exhaustive methods. Each verification takes
86 milliseconds. Limiting it to less than 11 attempts per second.
After five (5) consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts have occurred, the
Module requires a reset before any more login attempts can be attempted. The
reset time required in performing a reset to the Module is eight (8) seconds.
Therefore, a maximum of (60/(11 + 8))*5 = 15 attempts are possible in one minute
and the probability that a false acceptance occurs over a one minute interval is 15/
2^112 = 2.89e-33, which is smaller than 1/100,000.
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3.3 Services
All services implemented by the Module are listed in the tables below. CSP usage for each service
described is specified in Table 10 below. The services highlighted in bold in Table 10 and Table 11 can be
called in uninitialized mode.
The unauthenticated Anybody role can do unauthenticated services.
Table 10: Unauthenticated Services
Service Description
Power Cycle
(Self-Test)
Powers the module off and on again. This triggers the following:
1. Power-On Self-Tests of the Module.
2. Unblock locked-out authorities that have exhausted their Try Limit.
3. Enable CO authority (Admins SP SID) if it is previously blocked by Block SID
Authentication service.
Hot reset Resets one of the ports of the Module by performing a PCIe Hot Reset.
Warm reset Resets the Module by performing an NVMe Subsystem Reset or PCIe Warm reset.
Show Status
This is a set of commands from the TCG and NVMe protocols to read Security
Configuration. Specifically, this includes NVMe Security Send/Receive, Identify
Controller commands, which can be used for reading FIPS mode
(Initialized/Uninitialized), error messages, and other status information.
The FIPS Mode indicator is a subset of the NVMe Security Receive command (TCG
Level 0 Discovery) and the returned word of the NVMe Identify Controller
command (word at offset 4092, bit 0).
Read FIPS
Compliance
The Module’s FIPS 140 Compliance descriptor (hardware and firmware versions)
can be retrieved in the format specified by SFSC specification using TCG IF-RECV
command with Protocol Id 0 and ComID 2.
Block SID
Authentication
Disables CO (Admin SP SID) authentication when ownership of the drive is not
taken.
TCG
Authentication
Authenticates an operator using TCG PIN through Start session or TCG
Authentication method.
Enable Zeroization
Service
Authenticates an operator using RSA 2048 signature verification using Zeroization
Public Key (the Maker Public Key).
Get Random
Number
TCG Random method used to generate and output a random number from the
DRBG.
Telemetry logs
The Module allows the collection of debugging information through NVMe log
pages. The purpose of the telemetry log data is to provide information required to
debug firmware issues remotely.
Read/Write User
Data
Reads/Writes user data. This service is only successful if the module is in
uninitialized mode.
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Service Description
Firmware Update
Loads a firmware image. All firmware loaded into the module is authenticated with
RSA signature verification over the entire firmware image. Loaded firmware only
executes if the firmware load test is successful. The version of the loaded firmware
must be listed on the Module’s FIPS certificate in order to remain in an Approved
Mode.
Format NVM /
Namespace
Management
Wipes the data of a particular namespace by generating new MEK. This service is
only successful if the range is unlocked for read/write access via Lock/Unlock range
service.
Sanitize
Wipes the data of a particular namespace by generating new MEK. This service is
accessible only in Uninitialized mode.
Enable/Disable
edrive mode
Enables or disables edrive mode. In edrive mode, the Probe Silo specific commands
can be issued, and the TCG commands and responses can be transported within
the IEEE1667 protocol.
Probe Silo specific
commands (edrive
mode only)
The Probe Silo specific commands can be issued only in the edrive mode to
configure silos within the module and get IEEE1667 capabilities of the module
Note:
• CO= Cryptographic Officer Role
• U = User Role
• M = Maker Role
• ASP = Admin SP (Security Provider)
• LSP = Locking SP (Security Provider)
• P = PSID Role
Table 11: Authenticated Services
Service Description
CO U M P
ASP
SID
ASP
Admin
1
LSP
Admin
1
-
4
LSP
User
1
-
9
Maker
PSID
Take ownership
Changes default password of SID to a value other than
MSID.
X - - - - -
Activate OPAL
Enables Locking SP via TCG Activate method. Activate
method can enable SUM.
X - - - - -
Deactivate
OPAL
Reverts the drive back to the Original Factory State
through TCG Revert or Revert SP methods.
Note: For Revert SP,
1. the Global Range data is preserved if KeepGlobal
parameter is TRUE.
2. TPER_SALT_KEK and PSP_HMAC_KEY are also preserved.
X X X - - -
Admin Set PIN Updates Admin authority PIN. X X X - - -
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Service Description
CO U M P
ASP
SID
ASP
Admin
1
LSP
Admin
1
-
4
LSP
User
1
-
9
Maker
PSID
User Set PIN
Updates User authority PIN.
Locking SP Admins can set PINs for any Non-SUM Users.
- - X X - -
Enable/Disable
User Set PIN
Disables a non-SUM User’s ability to change its own PIN. - - X - - -
Enable/Disable
Admin SP
authorities
Enables or disables an Admin SP authority. X - - - - -
Enable/Disable
Locking SP
authorities
Enables or disables a Locking SP Admins and non-SUM
Users.
- - X - - -
Enable/Disable
SUM
Configures users and ranges in SUM through TCG
Reactivate method.
- - X - - -
Locking Range
Configuration
For non-SUM ranges: Used to modify a range starting
address, capacity, and attributes of non-SUM ranges.
- - X - - -
For SUM Policy 1: Used to modify a SUM range starting
address, capacity and attributes by Admins if allowed.
- - X - - -
For SUM Policy 0: Used to modify a SUM range starting
address, capacity and attributes by SUM Users if allowed.
- - - X - -
Lock/Unlock
range
Controls read and write access to a range by either locking
or unlocking the LBA range. In Non-SUM, Admins and
Users (if allowed by Admins) have access. In SUM, only
Users have access.
- - X X - -
Set common
name
Customizes the name of a TCG Authority. Admins and
Users (if allowed by Admins) have access.
- - X X - -
Data store table
Set
Writes a stream of bytes to unstructured storage. Admins
and Users (if allowed by Admins) have access.
- - X X - -
Crypto Erase of
a range
For Non-SUM Ranges: Erases a range by destroying its
existing MEK and generating a new one. This service is
performed via TCG GenKey method. By default, Admins
have access. If Admins allows, Users also have access.
- - X X - -
For SUM Ranges via TCG Erase method: Erases a range by
destroying its existing MEK and generating a new one. The
range’s LBA range is unlocked, and the User PIN is reset to
the NULL password. This service is performed via the TCG
Erase method.
- - X X - -
For SUM ranges via TCG GenKey method: Erases a range by
destroying its existing MEK and generating a new one. This
service is performed via the TCG GenKey method.
- - - X - -
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Service Description
CO U M P
ASP
SID
ASP
Admin
1
LSP
Admin
1
-
4
LSP
User
1
-
9
Maker
PSID
Read/Write
User Data
Reads/Writes user data. This service is only successful if
the range is unlocked for read/write access via
Lock/Unlock range service.
- - X X - -
Zeroization
Destruction of plaintext keys and CSPs. This service
decommissions the drive.
- - - - X -
PSID Revert
TCG Revert method using PSID. This service returns the
Module to its original factory state. The authentication
data (PSID) is printed on the label of the Module.
- - - - - X
• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the CSP.
• I = Input: The CSP is input into the Module.
• X = Execute: The Module reads and uses the CSP.
• W = Write: The Module writes the CSP to storage.
• Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
• - = Not accessed by the service.
Table 12: CSP Access within Services
Service
CSPs
CO
Password
User
Password
DRBG-EI
DRBG
V
DRBG
Key
DRBG
seed_material
HRK
PSP_HMAC_KEY
MEK_KEK
TPER_SALT_KEK
KS_HMAC_KEY
TPER_KEK
SUM_KEK
i
MEK
j
AUTH_KEY
m
Authenticated Services
Take ownership
I,
X,
Z
-
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X -
G,
X
- -
G,
X,
Z
Activate OPAL
I,
X,
Z
X
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X - -
G,
X
-
G,
X,
Z
Deactivate OPAL X -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X
Z,
G,
X
Z,
G,
X
Z,
G,
X
-
X,
Z
X,
Z
X,
Z,
G
G,
X,
Z
Admin Set PIN
I,
X,
Z
-
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X - X -- -
G,
X,
Z
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Service
CSPs
CO
Password
User
Password
DRBG-EI
DRBG
V
DRBG
Key
DRBG
seed_material
HRK
PSP_HMAC_KEY
MEK_KEK
TPER_SALT_KEK
KS_HMAC_KEY
TPER_KEK
SUM_KEK
i
MEK
j
AUTH_KEY
m
User Set PIN -
I,
X,
Z
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X - X X -
G,
X,
Z
Enable/Disable User Set
PIN
- - - - - - - X - - - - - - -
Enable/Disable Admin SP
authorities
X -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X - - - -
G,
X,
Z
Enable/Disable Locking SP
authorities
X X
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X - X - -
G,
X,
Z
Enable/Disable SUM
I,
X,
Z
X
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X -
Z,
G,
X
Z,
G,
X
-
G,
X,
Z
Locking Range
Configuration
- -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X X - - X X
G,
X,
Z
-
Lock/Unlock range - - - - - - - X - - - X X
X,
Z
-
Set common name - - - - - - - X - - - - - - -
Data store table Set - - - - - - - X - - - - - - -
Crypto Erase of a range - X
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X X X - X X
Z,
G,
X
G,
X,
Z
Read/Write User Data - - - - - - - - - - - - - X -
Zeroization - - - Z Z Z Z Z, Z Z Z Z Z Z -
PSID Revert X -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X
Z,
G,
X
Z,
G,
X
Z,
G,
X
- Z Z
Z,
G
G,
X,
Z
Unauthenticated Services
Power Cycle
(Self-Test)
- - -
X,
G,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X,
G,
Z
X X X X X - - X -
Hot reset - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Warm reset - - - - - - - X - - - - - - -
Show Status - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SK hynix PE8111 E1.L FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
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Service
CSPs
CO
Password
User
Password
DRBG-EI
DRBG
V
DRBG
Key
DRBG
seed_material
HRK
PSP_HMAC_KEY
MEK_KEK
TPER_SALT_KEK
KS_HMAC_KEY
TPER_KEK
SUM_KEK
i
MEK
j
AUTH_KEY
m
Read FIPS Compliance - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Block SID Authentication - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
TCG Authentication
I,
X,
Z
I,
X,
Z
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X - X -
G,
X
X -
G,
X,
Z
Enable Zeroization
Service
- -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- - - - - - - - -
Get Random Number - -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- - - - - - - - -
Firmware update - - - - - - X - - - X - - - -
Telemetry logs - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Read/Write User Data - - - - - - - - - - - - - X -
Format / Namespace
Management
- -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X X - - X X
Z,
G,
X
-
Sanitize - -
G,
X,
Z
X,
G
X,
G
X,
G
- X X - - - -
Z,
G,
X
-
Enable/Disable edrive
mode
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Probe Silo specific
commands (edrive mode
only)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SK hynix PE8111 E1.L FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
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• G = Generate: The Module generates or derives the PSP.
• I = Input: The PSP is input into the Module.
• X = Execute: The Module reads and uses the PSP.
• - = Not accessed by the service.
Table 13: PSP Access within Services
PSPs
SALT
PSID
PIN
MSID
PIN
FW
Public
Key
Maker
Public
Key
Authenticated Services
Take ownership G, X - - - -
Activate OPAL G, X - - - -
Deactivate OPAL G, X - X - -
Admin Set PIN G, X - - - -
User Set PIN G, X - - - -
Enable/Disable User Set PIN - - - - -
Enable/Disable Admin SP authorities G, X - - - -
Enable/Disable Locking SP authorities G, X - - - -
Enable/Disable SUM G, X - - - -
Locking Range Configuration - - - - -
Lock/Unlock range - - - - -
Set common name - - - - -
Data store table Set - - - - -
Crypto Erase of a range G, X - - - -
Read/Write User Data - - - - -
Zeroization - - - - -
PSID Revert G, X - X - -
Unauthenticated Services
Power Cycle
(Self-Test)
- - - X -
Hot reset - - - - -
Warm reset - - - - -
Show Status - - - - -
Read FIPS Compliance - - - - -
Block SID Authentication - - - - -
TCG Authentication G, X I, X - - -
Enable Zeroization Service - - - - X
Get Random Number - - - - -
SK hynix PE8111 E1.L FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc.,2022 Version 1.1 Page 22 of 31
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PSPs
SALT
PSID
PIN
MSID
PIN
FW
Public
Key
Maker
Public
Key
Firmware update - - - X -
Telemetry logs - - - - -
Read/Write User Data - - - - -
Format / Namespace Management - - - - -
Sanitize - - - - -
Enable/Disable edrive mode - - - - -
Probe Silo specific commands (edrive mode
only)
- - - - -
SK hynix PE8111 E1.L FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc.,2022 Version 1.1 Page 23 of 31
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Self-Tests
Each time the Module is powered up, tests are run to guarantee the proper functioning of the crypto
algorithms. Power on self-test are available on demand by power cycling the Module.
On power-on or reset, the Module performs self-tests as described in Table 14 below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the Module. If one of the KATs fails
during the ROM boot stage of the device, then the Module enters an internal error state. If the Module
has exited ROM boot stage, the Module enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state which can be retrieved by NVMe
Identify Controller command word at offset 4092, bit 0 will be 1. Power cycle is required to recover the
Module from self-test failure.
Table 14: Power-On Self-Tests
Test Target Description Failure Behavior
Firmware
Integrity
RSA 2048 and SHA-256 verification performed over
all firmware located in NAND storage on the
Aquarius controller.
Enters INTERNAL_STATE_ERROR
state.
The SSD will not enumerate,
PCI_DEVICE_ID value will be
0x0100.
RSA (Cert.
#A914)
RSA PSS verify with 2048-bit key is used for the
firmware integrity test.
Enters INTERNAL_STATE_ERROR
state.
The SSD will not enumerate,
PCI_DEVICE_ID value will be
0x0100. (This error would be found
during the firmware integrity self-
test.)
SHA RSA is used to verify the signature of the firmware
and a KAT of the underlying SHA-256 hashing
function is not required. SHA-256 is tested in the
Firmware Integrity test.
Enters INTERNAL_STATE_ERROR
state.
The SSD will not enumerate,
PCI_DEVICE_ID value will be
0x0100. (This error would be found
during the firmware integrity self-
test.)
RSA (Cert.
#A912)
Only RSA PSS verify with 2048-bit key is
implemented in the module. This SigVer must be
tested separately from the one for Cert. #A914).
Enters INTERNAL_STATE_ERROR
state.
The SSD will not enumerate,
PCI_DEVICE_ID value will be
0x0100.
AES-XTS Performs encrypt and decrypt KATs using a 256-bit
key.
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
AES-ECB Encryption and Decryption KATs
Key size: 256 bits
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
AES-KW KATs: Both forward and inverse ciphers are tested
via encryption and decryption. See IG 9.4
Modes: KW
Key size: 256 bits
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
SK hynix PE8111 E1.L FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
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Test Target Description Failure Behavior
Note: This test covers AES-ECB as per IG 9.4, #4 (c).
HMAC Performs HMAC generate and verify KATs using a
256-bit key.
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
PBKDF Performs KAT using a known password and 256-bit
key.
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
DRBG Performs a fixed input KAT inclusive of the SP 800-
90A instantiate, generate, and reseed health tests.
Mode: AES CTR DRBG
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
ENT (P) Performs ENT (P) startup test. Generates 32-byte
noise that will force RCT and APT on 1536 bits.
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR state.
Table 15: Conditional Self-Tests
Test Target Description Failure Behavior
ENT (P) The Module performs a Continuous Random Number
Generator Test (RCT and APT) for each call to the ENT (P).
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR
state.
AES XTS Key
generation
An IG A.9 key comparison test is performed on Key1 and
Key2 for each generation.
Enters SELF_TEST_ERROR
state.
Firmware
load Test
The Module performs a SHA-256 and RSA 2048 (Cert.
#A912) signature verification on all firmware loaded into
the Module.
The Module returns an
invalid image for
download commit
command and the image
is discarded. The module
transitions back to the
Unauthenticated Service
Processor state without
entering an error state.
SK hynix PE8111 E1.L FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
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Physical Security Policy
The Module meets commercial-grade specifications for power, temperature, reliability, and
shock/vibrations. The Module uses standard passivation techniques.
SK hynix PE8111 E1.L FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc.,2022 Version 1.1 Page 26 of 31
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Operational Environment
The Module is designated as a non-modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-2 definitions.
The Module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. The Module will not load or
execute firmware which is not signed with SK hynix 2048-bit RSA Private Key. The mechanism available to
perform a firmware load is through NVMe Firmware Download and Commit command. New firmware
versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the CMVP under FIPS 140-2. Any
other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS
140-2 validation.
SK hynix PE8111 E1.L FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
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Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy
The Module does not support the mitigation of other attacks outside the scope of FIPS 140-2.
SK hynix PE8111 E1.L FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc.,2022 Version 1.1 Page 28 of 31
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Security Rules and Guidance
The Module design corresponds to the Module Security rules. This section documents the security rules
enforced by the Module and the Cryptographic Officer instructions that are necessary to implement in
order to maintain compliance with FIPS 140-2 security requirements.
8.1 Invariant Rules
The Module implementation also enforces the following security rules:
1. No additional interface or service is implemented by the Module which would provide access to
CSPs.
2. Data output is inhibited during self-tests, Key generation, Zeroization and in error states.
3. Data output is logically disconnected while the Module is performing key generation and
zeroization.
4. All the CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service. Only the Maker role can call the zeroization
service.
5. The module does not support manual key entry.
6. The module does not output plaintext CSPs or intermediate key values.
7. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a
compromise of the module.
8. The Module does not support a bypass capability.
9. The Module shall provide four (4) distinct operator roles: Cryptographic Officer, User, Maker, and
PSID
10. The Module shall clear previous authentication on power cycle.
11. When the Module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator shall not have access to any
cryptographic services.
12. The operator shall be capable of commanding the Module to perform the power up self-tests by
power cycling or resetting the Module.
13. Power on self –tests do not require any operator action.
14. The Module does not support the update of the serial number and vendor ID.
15. The Module does not support concurrent operators.
8.2 Cryptographic Officer Initialization
The Module is shipped from the factory in an approved mode of operation (uninitialized mode). The keys
generated during manufacturing are used to encrypt/decrypt the user data. The shipping container
protecting the Module or set of Modules in transit should be verified for evidence of tampering.
SK hynix PE8111 E1.L FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
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8.2.1 Verifying the Module is in an approved mode of operation
To verify that a module is in the Approved mode of operation the operator will perform the Read FIPS
Compliance by issuing TCG IF-RECV command with Protocol Id 0 and ComID 2. Refer [SFSC] spec.
For example, the sample of data below is returned from the module:
----------------FIPS 140 compliance descriptor------------------------
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR INFORMATION LENGTH -> 528
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR DESCRIPTOR TYPE -> 1
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR DESCRIPTOR LENGTH -> 520
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR RELATED STANDARD -> FIPS 140-2
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR OVERALL SECURITY LEVEL -> Level-1
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR HARDWARE VERSION -> HFS15T3DFMX098N
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR VERSION ->31180A10
COMPLIANCE DESCRIPTOR MODULE NAME -> SK hynix PE8111 E1.L NVMe TCG Opal SSC
SED
----------------------------------------------------------------------
8.2.2 Initialize the Module
The CO should initialize the Module by taking the following steps:
1. Take Ownership - Set Admin SP SID password to a value other than MSID.
2. Activate Opal with Single User Mode.
3. Set WriteLockEnabled and ReadLockEnabled column of all valid Locking ranges.
4. Set PINs for all authorities (Admins and Users) that are enabled.
5. PIN length at least 0 bytes or more but 32-byte length is recommended.
6. Power cycle the Module.
7. Verify the module is in initialized mode by checking the
• LockingEnabled bit of the TCG Level 0 Discovery Locking Feature Descriptor is set to 1
• WriteLockEnabled and ReadLockEnabled columns of all valid Locking ranges in the Locking
Table are set to True.
8.3 Un-Initialize the Module
The TCG Revert or Revert SP Methods may be invoked by an authenticated role to affect a transition
into the uninitialized mode of operation. The PSID Revert may be done by the PSID role to affect a
transition into the uninitialized mode of operation. This is analogous to restoring the module to the
factory default state.
SK hynix PE8111 E1.L FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
Copyright SK hynix Inc.,2022 Version 1.1 Page 30 of 31
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References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this security policy
Table 16: References
Acronym Full Specification Name
[FIPS 140-2] NIST, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[Annex C] NIST, Annex C: Approved Random Number Generators for FIPS PUB 140-2, June 10, 2019
[FIPS 180-4] NIST, Secure Hash Standard, FIPS Publication 180-4, August 2015
[FIPS 186-4] NIST, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS Publication 186-4, July 2013
[FIPS 197] NIST, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS Publication 197, November 26, 2001
[FIPS 198-1] NIST, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), FIPS Publication 198-1, July 2008
[IG] NIST, Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program, last updated May 04, 2021
[NVMe] Standard spec available online https://nvmexpress.org/wp-content/uploads/NVM-Express-1_3c-
2018.05.24-Ratified.pdf Revision 1.3C May 24, 2018
[PKCS#1] PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, June 14, 2002
[SFSC] Information technology – Security Features for SCSI Commands (SFSC)
[SP800-38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation,
December 2001
[SP800-38E] NIST Special Publication 800-38E, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The
XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, January 2010
[SP800-38F] NIST Special Publication 800-38F, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods
for Key Wrapping, December 2012
[SP800-90A
Rev1]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A Revision 1,
June 2015.
[SP800-90B] National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used
for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018.
[SP800-108] NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom
Functions (Revised), October 2009
[SP800-132] NIST Special Publication 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation,
December 2010
[SP800-133
Rev2]
NIST Special Publication 800-133 Revision 2, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation,
June 2020
[TCG Core] TCG Storage Architecture Core Specification, version 2.01 Revision 1.0, 5 August 2015
[TCG Opal] TCG Storage Security Subsystem Class: Opal Specification, Version 2.01 Revision 1.00, 5 August
2015
[TCG SIIS] TCG Storage Interface Interactions Specification (SIIS), Version .08, 14 August 2018
[TCG ADS] TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: Additional Datastore Tables Specification, Version 1.00 Revision
1.00, 24 February 2012
SK hynix PE8111 E1.L FIPS 140-2 Security Policy
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SK hynix Public Material – May be reproduced only in its original entirety (without revision).
Acronym Full Specification Name
[TCG SUM] TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: Single User Mode Specification, Version 1.00 Revision 2.00, 5
August 2015
[TCG PSID] TCG Storage Opal SSC Feature Set: PSID, Version 1.00 Revision 1.00, 5 August 2015
[TCG Block
SID]
TCG Storage Feature Set: Block SID Authentication, Version 1.00 Final, Revision 1.00, 5 August
2015
[IEEE 1667] IEEE Std 1667-2018 – IEEE Standard for Discovery, Authentication, and Authorization in Host
Attachments of Storage Devices, February 2018
Table 17: Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APT Adaptive Proportion Test
CO Cryptographic Officer
CSP Critical Security Parameter, see [FIPS 140-2]
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book mode of AES Encryption/Decryption
ENT (P) Entropy – Physical validated entropy source
KAT Known Answer Test
PBKDF Password Based Key Derivation Function
LBA Logical Block Address
MSID Manufactured Security Identifier
MEK Media Encryption Key
NVMe Non-Volatile Memory express
PBKDF Password Based Key Derivation Function
PCIe Peripheral Component Interconnect Express
PSP Public Security Parameter
PIN Personal Identification Number (or Password)
PSID Physical Security Identifier
RCT Repetitive Count Test
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SED Self-Encrypting Drive
SID Security Identifier
SSD Solid-state Drive
SSC Security Subsystem Class
TCG Trusted Computing Group
UID Unique Identifier
XTS XEX Tweakable Block Cipher with Cipher text Stealing