Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module
version rhel8.20200305.1
FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
version 1.3
Last Update: 2021-03-02
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
Table of Contents
1 Cryptographic Modules' Specifications......................................................................................................3
1.1 Description of the Module.......................................................................................................................3
1.2 Description of the Approved Modes........................................................................................................4
1.3 Cryptographic Boundary.......................................................................................................................10
1.3.1 Hardware Block Diagram...................................................................................................................10
1.3.2 Software Block Diagram....................................................................................................................11
2 Cryptographic Modules' Ports and Interfaces..........................................................................................12
3 Roles, Services and Authentication.........................................................................................................13
3.1 Roles.................................................................................................................................................... 13
3.2 Services................................................................................................................................................ 13
3.3 Operator Authentication........................................................................................................................15
3.4 Mechanism and Strength of Authentication..........................................................................................15
4 Physical Security.....................................................................................................................................16
5 Operational Environment.........................................................................................................................17
5.1 Applicability........................................................................................................................................... 17
5.2 Policy.................................................................................................................................................... 17
6 Cryptographic Key Management.............................................................................................................18
6.1 Random Number and Key Generation.................................................................................................18
6.2 Key Establishment................................................................................................................................18
6.3 Key/Critical Security Parameter (CSP).................................................................................................19
6.4 Key/CSP Storage.................................................................................................................................20
6.5 Key/CSP Zeroization............................................................................................................................20
7 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)................................................21
7.1 Statement of compliance......................................................................................................................21
8 Self-Tests................................................................................................................................................. 22
8.1 Power-Up Tests....................................................................................................................................22
8.2 Conditional Tests..................................................................................................................................23
9 Guidance................................................................................................................................................. 24
9.1 Crypto Officer Guidance.......................................................................................................................24
9.1.1 FIPS module installation instructions.................................................................................................24
9.2 User Guidance.....................................................................................................................................25
9.2.1 TLS and Diffie-Hellman.....................................................................................................................25
9.2.2 AES-XTS Guidance...........................................................................................................................25
9.2.3 AES-GCM IV.....................................................................................................................................26
9.2.4 Triple-DES Keys................................................................................................................................26
9.2.5 RSA and DSA Keys...........................................................................................................................26
9.2.6 Handling Self-Test Errors...................................................................................................................26
9.2.7 Key derivation using SP800-132 PBKDF..........................................................................................27
10 Mitigation of Other Attacks.....................................................................................................................28
11 Glossary and Abbreviations...................................................................................................................29
12 References............................................................................................................................................ 30
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
1 Cryptographic Modules' Specifications
This document is the non-proprietary Security Policy for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8
OpenSSL Cryptographic Module version rhel8.20200305.1 and was prepared as part of the
requirements for conformance to Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Level
1.
1.1 Description of the Module
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module (hereafter referred to as the
“Module”) is a software libraries supporting FIPS 140-2 Approved cryptographic algorithms.
The code base of the Module is formed in a combination of standard OpenSSL shared library,
OpenSSL FIPS Object Module and development work by Red Hat. The Module provides a C
language application program interface (API) for use by other processes that require
cryptographic functionality.
The following table shows the security level for each of the eleven sections of the validation.
Security Component FIPS 140-2 Security Level
Cryptographic Module Specification 1
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
Roles, Services and Authentication 1
Finite State Model 1
Physical Security N/A
Operational Environment 1
Cryptographic Key Management 1
EMI/EMC 1
Self-Tests 1
Design Assurance 1
Mitigation of Other Attacks 1
Overall Level 1
Table 1: Security Level of the Module
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module has been tested on the
following multi-chip standalone platforms:
Manufact
urer
Model O/S & Ver. Processor
Dell PowerEdge
R430
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5
Table 2: Test Platform
The Module has been tested for the following configurations:
• 64-bit library, x86_64 with and without AES-NI enabled.
To operate the Module, the operating system must be restricted to a single operator mode of
operation. (This should not be confused with single user mode which is run level 1 on Red Hat
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
Enterprise Linux (RHEL). This refers to processes having access to the same cryptographic
instance which RHEL ensures this cannot happen by the memory management hardware.)
1.2 Description of the Approved Modes
The Module supports two modes of operation:
• in "FIPS mode" (the FIPS Approved mode of operation) only approved or allowed
security functions with sufficient security strength can be used.
• in "non-FIPS mode" (the non-Approved mode of operation) non-approved security
functions can also be used.
The Module verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA-256 digest
computed at build time. If the digests matched, the power-up self-test is then performed. The
module enters FIPS mode after power-up tests succeed. Once the module is operational, the
mode of operation is implicitly assumed depending on the security function invoked and the
security strength of the cryptographic keys.
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module supports the following FIPS
140-2 Approved algorithms in FIPS Approved mode:
Algorithm Validation Certificate Standards/Usage Keys/CSPs
AES Certs. #A562, #A563,
#A564, #A565, #A566,
#A567, #A568, #A569 and
#A570
FIPS 197 (AES)
SP 800-38D (GCM)
Encryption and
Decryption
AES keys 128 bits, 192
bits (except XTS-AES)
and 256 bits
Certs. #A549, #A550,
#A551, #A552, #A554,
#A555 and #A556
FIPS 197 (AES)
SP 800-38A (ECB)
Encryption and
Decryption
Certs. #A554, #A555 and
#A556
FIPS 197 (AES)
SP 800-38A (CBC, OFB,
CFB1, CFB8, CFB128,
CTR)
SP 800-38C (CCM)
SP 800-38E (XTS)
SP 800-38F (KW, KWP)
Encryption and
Decryption
Certs. #A554, #A555 and
#A556
SP 800-38B (CMAC) Mac length of 128 bits
Triple-DES Certs. #A549, #A550,
#A551, #A552 and #A557
SP 800-67
SP 800-38A (ECB)
Encryption and
Decryption
Triple-DES keys 168
bits
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
Algorithm Validation Certificate Standards/Usage Keys/CSPs
Triple-DES Cert. #A557 SP 800-67
SP 800-38A (CBC, OFB,
CFB1, CFB8, CFB64)
SP 800-38B (CMAC)
Encryption and
Decryption
Triple-DES keys 168
bits
DSA Certs. #A558, #A559,
#A560 and #A561
FIPS 186-4
Domain Parameters
Generation and
Verification, Key
Generation, Signature
Generation
DSA keys:
• L=2048, N=224
• L=2048, N=256
• L=3072, N=256
FIPS 186-4
Signature Verification
DSA keys:
• L=1024, N=160
• L=2048, N=224
• L=2048, N=256
• L=3072, N=256
Note: 1024 bit DSA
signature verification is
legacy-use.
RSA Certs1
. #A558, #A559,
#A560 and #A561
FIPS 186-4
Appendix B.3.3
Key Generation
RSA keys
• 2048 bits
• 3072 bits
• 4096 bits
Signature Generation
(PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS)
SHA-1,SHA-224,SHA-
256,SHA-384,SHA-512
RSA keys:
• 2048 bits
• 3072 bits
• 4096 bits
Signature Verification
(PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS)
SHA-1,SHA-224,SHA-
256,SHA-384,SHA-512
RSA keys:
• 1024 bits
• 2048 bits
• 3072 bits
• 4096 bits
Note: 1024 bit RSA
signature verification is
legacy-use.
Signature Generation
(ANSI X9.31)
RSA keys:
• 2048 bits
1 Use of SHA-1 for signature generation is allowed in the context of TLS protocol per SP800-52.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
Algorithm Validation Certificate Standards/Usage Keys/CSPs
SHA-1,SHA-256,SHA-
384,SHA-512
• 3072 bits
• 4096 bits
Signature Verification
(ANSI X9.31)
SHA-1,SHA-256,SHA-
384,SHA-512
RSA keys:
• 1024 bits
• 2048 bits
• 3072 bits
• 4096 bits
Note: 1024 bit RSA
signature verification is
legacy-use.
ECDSA Certs. #A558, #A559,
#A560 and #A561
FIPS 186-4
Key Pair Generation
and Public Key
Verification
ECDSA keys based on
P-256, P-384, or P-521
curve
FIPS 186-4
Signature Generation
SHA-224,SHA-256,SHA-
384,SHA-512
ECDSA keys based on
P-224, P-256, P-384, or
P-521 curve
FIPS 186-4
Signature Verification
SHA-1,SHA-224,SHA-
256,SHA-384,SHA-512
DRBG Certs. #A554, #A555,
#A556 and #A581
SP 800-90A
(CTR_DRBG)
Random Number
Generation
AES-128,AES-192,AES-
256
Entropy input string,
seed, C, V and Key
Cert. #A581 SP 800-90A
(Hash_DRBG,
HMAC_DRBG)
Random Number
Generation
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
Algorithm Validation Certificate Standards/Usage Keys/CSPs
SHS Certs. #A558, #A559,
#A560 and #A561
FIPS 180-4 (SHA-1,
SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512)
Hashing
N/A
SHA-3 Certs. #A546, #A547 and
#A548
FIPS 202 (SHA3-224,
SHA3-256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512, SHAKE-128,
SHAKE-256)
Hashing
N/A
HMAC Certs. #A558, #A559,
#A560 and #A561
FIPS 198-1 (HMAC-SHA-
1, HMAC-SHA-224,
HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-
SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-
512,
Message Integrity
At least 112 bits HMAC
Key
Certs. #A546, #A547 and
#A548
HMAC-SHA3-224,
HMAC-SHA3-256,
HMAC-SHA3-384,
HMAC-SHA3-512)
Message Integrity
SP 800-56A
DLC primitive
Diffie-
Hellman
(CVL)
CVL Cert. #A580 SP 800-56A
Shared Secret
Computation
Public key size 2048
bits or larger, and
private key size 224
bits or 256 bits
shared secret
SP 800-56A
DLC primitive
EC Diffie-
Hellman
(CVL)
CVL Certs. #A558, #A559,
#A560 and #A561
NIST curves P-224, P-
256, P-384, P-521
shared secret
SP 800-56A
DLC primitive
EC Diffie-
Hellman
(CVL)
CVL Certs. #A558, #A559,
#A560 and #A561
SP 800-56A
EC CDH Component
NIST curves P-256, P-
384, P-521
SP 800-135
Section 4.2
Key
Derivation in
TLS v1.0,
v1.1 and v1.2
(CVL)
CVL Certs. #A558, #A559,
#A560 and #A561
SP800-135
Key Derivation in TLS
TLS Pre-Master Secret
and Master Secret
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
Algorithm Validation Certificate Standards/Usage Keys/CSPs
PBKDF (vendor affirmed)2
SP 800-132 (SHA-1,
SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-512, SHA3-224,
SHA3-256, SHA3-384,
SHA3-512)
PBKDF password
PBKDF Derived Key
SSH KDF CVL Certs. #A549, #A550,
#A551 and #A552
SP 800-135 SSH-KDF Derived Key
Single-step
KDF
(KDA vendor affirmed) SP 800-56C (SHA-1,
SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512)
Derived key
KTS Certs. #A554, #A555,
#A556, #A562, #A563,
#A564, #A565, #A566,
#A567, #A568, #A569 and
#A570
SP800-38F
AES KW, KWP
AES CCM
AES GCM
AES keys 128, 192,
256 bits
Certs. #A554, #A555,
#A556, #A558, #A559,
#A560 and #A561
SP800-38F
AES CBC and HMAC
AES keys 128, 192,
256 bits
Certs. #A557, #A558,
#A559, #A560 and #A561
SP800-38F
Triple-DES CBC and
HMAC
Triple-DES keys 168
bits
Note: with encryption
strength of 112 bits
Table 3: Approved Algorithms
The Module supports the following non-Approved algorithms but allowed in FIPS Approved
mode:
Algorithm Usage Keys/CSPs
RSA (encrypt, decrypt)
with key size equal or
larger than 2048 bits
key wrapping; key establishment
methodology provides between
112 and 256 bits of encryption
strength
RSA private key
Diffie-Hellman with
public key size 2048
bits or larger and
private key size 224
bits or 256 bits
key agreement; key
establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 256
bits of encryption strength
Diffie-Hellman private key
EC Diffie-Hellman with
key sizes according to
P-256, P-384 and P-521
NIST curves
key agreement; key
establishment methodology
provides between 128 and 256
bits of encryption strength
EC Diffie-Hellman private key
MD5 Message Digest used only in TLS N/A
NDRNG Seeding the module's DRBG Internal state
2 Even though the PBKDF has CAVP certificates (#A546, #A547, #A548, #A558, #A559, #A560
and #A561), the KAT is not implemented.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
Table 4: Non-Approved but allowed Algorithms
Per FIPS 140-2 IG G.5, the CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the
Module or the security strengths of the generated keys when those Module are ported and
executed in an operational environment not listed on the validation certificate.
The Module supports the following non-FIPS 140-2 Approved algorithms, which shall not be
used in the FIPS Approved mode. Any use of the non-Approved functions will cause the
Module to operate in the non-FIPS mode implicitly:
Algorithm Usage Keys/CSPs
RSA (encrypt, decrypt) with key
size smaller than 2048 bits
key wrapping RSA keys
RSA with key sizes not listed in
Table 3
sign, verify, and key
generation
RSA keys
Digitial Signature Generation
(DSA, ECDSA and RSA) using
SHA-1
sign DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys
DSA with key sizes not listed in
Table 3
sign, verify, and key
generation
DSA keys
Diffie-Hellman with key sizes
not listed in Table 4
key agreement Diffie-Hellman keys
ANSI X9.31 RNG (with AES-128
core)
random number
generation
PRNG seed value and seed key
128 bits
AES-OCB Authenticated
Encryption/Decryption
Symmetric key
Camellia Encryption/decryption Symmetric key
CAST Encryption/decryption Symmetric key
DES Encryption/decryption Symmetric key
IDEA Encryption/decryption Symmetric key
KBKDF (Cert. #A553)3
Key derivation Derived key
RFC-3961 KDF Key derivation Derived key
MD2 Hash function N/A
MD4 Hash function N/A
RC2 Encryption/decryption Symmetric key
RC4 Encryption/decryption Symmetric key
RC5 Encryption/decryption Symmetric key
RIPEMD Hash function N/A
Whirlpool Hash function N/A
Table 5: Non-Approved Algorithms
3 Even though the KBKDF has CAVP certificates, the KAT is not implemented.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
1.3 Cryptographic Boundary
The Modules' physical boundaries are the surface of the case of the platform (depicted in the
hardware block diagram).
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module logical cryptographic
boundary is the shared library files and their integrity check HMAC files, which are delivered
through Red Hat Package Manager (RPM) as listed below.
The openssl-libs-1.1.1c-15.el8.x86_64.rpm (64 bits) file contains the following files that are
part of the module boundary:
• /usr/lib64/.libcrypto.so.1.1.1c.hmac
• /usr/lib64/.libssl.so.1.1.1c.hmac
• /usr/lib64/libcrypto.so.1.1.1c
• /usr/lib64/libssl.so.1.1.1c.
The OpenSSL RPM package of the Module includes the binary files, integrity check HMAC files,
Man Pages and the OpenSSL Engines provided by the standard OpenSSL shared library. The
OpenSSL Engines and their shared object files are not part of the Module, and therefore they
must not be used.
1.3.1 Hardware Block Diagram
Figure 1: Hardware Block Diagram
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1.3.2 Software Block Diagram
Figure 2: Software Block Diagram
(the cryptographic boundary includes the HMAC integrity files)
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
2 Cryptographic Modules' Ports and Interfaces
The physical ports of the Module are the same as the computer system on which it executes.
The logical interface is a C-language Application Program Interface (API).
The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API functions. The Data
Output interface consists of the output parameters of the API functions. The Control Input
interface consists of the actual API functions. The Status Output interface includes the return
values of the API functions. The ports and interfaces are shown in the following table.
FIPS Interface Physical Port Modules' Interfaces
Data Input Ethernet ports API input parameters, kernel
I/O – network or files on
filesystem
Data Output Ethernet ports API output parameters, kernel
I/O – network or files on
filesystem
Control Input Keyboard, Serial port, Ethernet port,
Network
API function calls, or
configuration files on
filesystem
Status Output Serial port, Ethernet port, Network API
Power Input PC Power Supply Port N/A
Table 6: Ports and Interfaces
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
3 Roles, Services and Authentication
This section defines the roles, services, and authentication mechanisms and methods with
respect to the applicable FIPS 140-2 requirements.
3.1 Roles
There are two users of the Module:
• User
• Crypto Officer
The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing services
implemented by the Module. For User documentation, please refer to the man pages of ssl(3),
crypto(3) as an entry into the Modules' API documentation for SSL/TLS and generic crypto
support. Installation of the Module is only done by the Crypto Officer.
3.2 Services
The Module supports services that are available to users in the various roles. All of the
services are described in detail in the Modules’ user documentation. The following tables
show the services available to the various roles and the access to cryptographic keys and
CSPs resulting from services.
The following table lists the Approved services available in FIPS Approved mode. Please refer
to Table 3 and Table 4 for the Approval key size of each algorithm used in the services.
Service Role CSPs Access
Symmetric
encryption/decryption
User AES and Triple-DES key read/execute
Asymmetric key
generation
User RSA, DSA and ECDSA private key read/write/execute
Digital signature
generation and verification
User RSA, DSA and ECDSA private key read/execute
TLS network protocol User AES or Triple-DES key, HMAC Key read/execute
TLS key agreement User AES or Triple-DES key, RSA, DSA or
ECDSA private key, HMAC Key,
Premaster Secret, Master Secret,
Diffie-Hellman Private Components
and EC Diffie-Hellman Private
Components
read/write/execute
Shared secret computation User Diffiie-Hellman shared secret and EC
Diffie-Hellman shared secret
read
RSA key wrapping User RSA, private key read/execute
Certificate Management/
Handling
User RSA, DSA or ECDSA private key
parts of certificates
read/write/execute
Keyed Hash (HMAC) User HMAC Key read/execute
Keyed Hash (CMAC) User CMAC key read/execute
Message digest (SHS) User none N/A
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Service Role CSPs Access
Random number
generation (SP800-90A
DRBG)
User Entropy input string and seed (C, K
and V values)
read/write/execute
Key Derivation (through
PBKDF or SSH-KDF
or Single-step KDF)
User PBKDF password and derived key
and SSH-KDF derived key
and Single-step KDF derived key
read/write/execute
Show status User none N/A
Module initialization User none N/A
Self-test User none N/A
Zeroize User All aforementioned CSPs read/write/execute
Module installation Crypto
Officer
none N/A
Table 7: Approved Service Details
The following table lists the non-Approved services available in non-FIPS mode. Please refer to
Table 6 for the non-Approved key size of each algorithm.
Service Role Access
Asymmetric encryption/decryption using non-Approved RSA key
size
User read/execute
Symmetric encryption/decryption using non-Approved algorithms User read/execute
Hash operation using non-Approved algorithms User read/execute
Digital signature generation and verification using non-Approved
RSA and DSA private key sizes
User read/execute
Digital signature generation using SHA-1 User read/execute
TLS connection using keys established by Diffie-Hellman with
non-Approved key sizes
User read/write/execute
TLS connection using keys established by RSA with key size less
than 2048 bits
User read/write/execute
Asymmetric key generation using non-Approved RSA and DSA
key sizes
User read/write/execute
Random number generation using ANSI X9.31 RNG User read/write/execute
Key derivation using SP 800-108 KBKDF User read/write
Key derivation using RFC-3961 User read/write
Table 8: Non-Approved Service Details
Note:
The Module does not share CSPs between an Approved mode of operation and a non‐
Approved mode of operation. All cryptographic keys used in the FIPS-Approved mode of
operation must be generated in the FIPS-Approved mode or imported while running in the
FIPS-Approved mode. If the DRBG is used for key generation for non-Approved services in non-
FIPS mode, reseeding the DRBG before and after the key generation is mandatory.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
More information about the services and their associated APIs can be found in the Man Pages
included in the rpm packages. The evp(3) is the starting point of the Man Pages.
3.3 Operator Authentication
At security level 1, authentication is neither required nor employed. The role is implicitly
assumed on entry.
3.4 Mechanism and Strength of Authentication
At security level 1, authentication is not required.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
4 Physical Security
The Module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
5 Operational Environment
5.1 Applicability
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux operating system is used as the basis of other products which
include but are not limited to:
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux CoreOS
• Red Hat Virtualization (RHV)
• Red Hat OpenStack Platform
• OpenShift Container Platform
• Red Hat Gluster Storage
• Red Hat Ceph Storage
• Red Hat CloudForms
• Red Hat Satellite.
Compliance is maintained for these products whenever the binary is found
unchanged.
The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 level 1
specifications. The module runs on a commercially available general-purpose operating
system executing on the hardware specified in section 1.2.
5.2 Policy
The operating system is restricted to a single operator (concurrent operators are explicitly
excluded). The application that request cryptographic services is the single user of the
module, even when the application is serving multiple clients.
In the operational mode, the ptrace(2) system call, the debugger (gdb(1)), and strace(1) shall
be not used.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
6 Cryptographic Key Management
6.1 Random Number and Key Generation
The Module provides an SP800-90A-compliant Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) for
creation of key components of asymmetric keys, and random number generation.
The seeding (and automatic reseeding) of the DRBG is done with getrandom().
The module performs the health tests for the SP800-90A DRBG as defined per section 11.3 of
SP800-90A.
The Key Generation methods implemented in the module for Approved services in FIPS mode
is compliant with [SP800-133].
For generating RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys the module implements asymmetric key generation
services compliant with [FIPS186-4]. A seed (i.e. the random value) used in asymmetric key
generation is directly obtained from the [SP800-90A] DRBG.
The public and private key pairs used in the Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman KAS are
generated internally by the module using the same DSA and ECDSA key generation compliant
with [FIPS186-4] which is compliant with [SP800-56A].
The NDRNG provides 128 bits of entropy to the DRBG. Therefore, the following caveat applies:
The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy.
6.2 Key Establishment
The module provides Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman key agreement In addition, the
module offers AES key wrapping per [SP800-38F] (using GCM, CCM, AES-KW, AES-KWP and a
combination of any approved block chaining modes with HMAC for authentication), Triple-DES
key wrapping per [SP800-38F] (using a combination of any approved block chaining modes
with HMAC for authentication), and RSA key wrapping (encapsulation) using public key
encryption and private key decryption primitives as allowed by [FIPS140-2_IG] D.9.
AES, RSA, Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman) provide the following security strengths:
• AES: key wrapping provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
• Triple-DES: key wrapping provides 112 bits of encryption strength.
• RSA: key wrapping provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength.
• Diffie-Hellman: key agreement provides between 112 and 256 bits of encryption
strength.
• EC Diffie-Hellman: key agreement provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption
strength.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
6.3 Key/Critical Security Parameter (CSP)
An authorized application as user (i.e., the User role) has access to all key data generated
during the operation of the Module. The following table summarizes the Critical
Security Parameters (CSPs) that are used by the cryptographic services implemented in the
module:
Key/CSP Generation Storage Zeroization
AES Symmetric Key N/A(passed in as API input
parameter) Alternatively, key
can be established during a
TLS handshake
RAM EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup()
Triple-DES Symmetric
Key
HMAC Key HMAC_CTX_cleanup()
CMAC Key N/A(passed in as API input
parameter)
RAM CMAC_CTX_cleanup()
RSA Private Key Generated using FIPS 186-4
key generation method and
the random value used in the
key generation is generated
using SP800-90A DRBG.
RAM RSA_free()
DSA Private Key DSA_free()
ECDSA Private Key EC_KEY_free()
Diffie-Hellman
Private Components
Generated as specified in
SP800-56A and the random
value used in the key
generation is generated using
SP800-90A DRBG.
RAM DH_free()
EC Diffie-Hellman
Private Components
EC_KEY_free()
Shared secret. Generated during the Diffie-
Hellman or EC Diffie-Hellman
shared secret computation
RAM DH_free(),
EC_KEY_free()
SP 800-90A DRBG
seed and entropy
input )
Obtained from NDRNG RAM FIPS_drbg_free()
SP 800-90A DRBG
internal values (C, K,
V values)
Derived from the seed and
entropy input using SP800-90A
mechanisms
TLS Pre-Master
Secret
and Master Secret
Established during the TLS
handshake
RAM SSL_free() and SSL_clear()
PBKDF Password N/A RAM kdf_pbkdf2_free()
PBKDF Derived Key SP800-132 PBKDF
mechanisms
kdf_pbkdf2_free()
SSH-KDF Derived Key Derived SP800-135 SSH KDF
mechanisms
RAM kdf_sshkdf_free()
Single-step KDF
derived key
SP 800-56C KDF mechanism RAM sskdf_free()
Table 9: Key Life Cycle
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
6.4 Key/CSP Storage
Public and private keys are provided to the Module by the calling process, and are destroyed
when released by the appropriate API function calls. The Module does not perform persistent
storage of CSPs.
6.5 Key/CSP Zeroization
The application that uses the Module is responsible for appropriate destruction and
zeroization of the key material. The library provides functions for key allocation and
destruction, which overwrites the memory that is occupied by the key information with
“zeros” before it is deallocated.
The memory occupied by keys is allocated by regular libc malloc/calloc() calls. The application
is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions from the OpenSSL API. The
destruction functions then overwrite the memory occupied by keys with pre-defined values
and deallocates the memory with the free() call. In case of abnormal termination, or swap
in/out of a physical memory page of a process, the keys in physical memory are overwritten
by the Linux kernel before the physical memory is allocated to another process.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
7 Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic
Compatibility (EMI/EMC)
MARKETING NAME......................…. PowerEdge R430
REGULATORY MODEL................….. E28S
REGULATORY TYPE.....................…. E28S001
EFFECTIVE DATE..........................… December 02, 2014
EMC EMISSIONS CLASS...............… Class A
7.1 Statement of compliance
This product has been determined to be compliant with the applicable standards, regulations,
and directives for the countries where the product is marketed. The product is affixed with
regulatory marking and text as necessary for the country/agency. Generally, Information
Technology Equipment (ITE) product compliance is based on IEC and CISPR standards and
their national equivalent such as Product Safety, IEC 60950-1 and European Norm EN 60950-1
or EMC, CISPR 22/CISPR 24 and EN 55022/55024. Dell products have been verified to comply
with the EU RoHS Directive 2011/65/EU. Dell products do not contain any of the restricted
substances in concentrations and applications not permitted by the RoHS Directive.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
8 Self-Tests
FIPS 140-2 requires that the Module performs self-tests to ensure the integrity of the Module,
and the correctness of the cryptographic functionality at start up. In addition, some functions
require continuous verification of function, such as the Random Number Generator. All of
these tests are listed and described in this section. No operator intervention is required during
the running of the self-tests.
See section 9.2.6 for descriptions of possible self-test errors and recovery procedures.
8.1 Power-Up Tests
The Module performs both power-up self-tests (at module initialization) and continuous
conditional tests (during operation). The power-up self test start with the integrity test, where
the FIPS_mode_set() function verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC
SHA-256 digest, which is computed at build time. If this computed HMAC SHA-256 digest
matches the stored, known digest, then the rest of the power-up self-test (consisting of the
algorithm-specific Pairwise Consistency and Known Answer Tests) is performed. Input, output,
and cryptographic functions cannot be performed while the Module is in a self-test or error
state because the Module is single-threaded and will not return to the calling application until
the power-up self-tests are complete. After successful completion of the power-up tests, the
module is loaded and cryptographic functions are available for use. If the power-up self-tests
fail the module will enter the error state, subsequent calls to the Module will fail - thus no
further cryptographic operations are possible.
Algorithm Test
AES (ECB, CCM, GCM, XTS modes) KAT, encryption and decryption are tested separately
Triple-DES KAT, encryption and decryption are tested separately
DSA Pairwise consistency test (PCT), sign and verify
RSA KAT, signature generation and verification are tested
separately
ECDSA PCT, sign and verify
Diffie-Hellman Primitive "Z" Computation KAT
EC Diffie-Hellman Primitive "Z" Computation KAT
SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG KAT
SP 800-90A Hash_DRBG KAT
SP 800-90A DRBG_HMAC KAT
SP 800-90-A DRBG Health test per section 11.3 of SP 800-90A DRBG
HMAC-SHA-1, 224 -256, -384, -512 KAT
SHA-1, -256, -512 KAT
SHA3-256, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128,
SHAKE-256
KAT
CMAC (AES and Triple-DES) KAT
Module integrity HMAC-SHA-256
Table 10: Modules' Self-Tests
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
8.2 Conditional Tests
Algorithm Test
DSA PCT: signature generation and verification
ECDSA PCT: signature generation and verification
RSA PCT: signature generation and verification, encryption and
decryption
Table 11: Modules' Conditional Tests
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
9 Guidance
9.1 Crypto Officer Guidance
The version of the RPM containing the FIPS validated Module is stated in section 1. The RPM
package of the Module can be installed by standard tools recommended for the installation of
RPM packages on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux system (for example, yum, rpm, and the RHN
remote management tool). The integrity of the RPM is automatically verified during the
installation of the Module and the Crypto Officer shall not install the RPM file if the RPM tool
indicates an integrity error.
The OpenSSL static libraries libcrypto.a and libssl.a in openssl-static package are not
approved to be used. The applications must be dynamically linked to run the OpenSSL.
9.1.1 FIPS module installation instructions
Recommended method
The system-wide cryptographic policies package (crypto-policies) contains a tool that completes the
installation of cryptographic modules and enables self-checks in accordance with the requirements of
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 140-2. We call this step “FIPS enablement”.
The tool named fips-mode-setup installs and enables or disables all the validated FIPS modules and it is
the recommended method to install and configure a RHEL-8 system.
1. To switch the system to FIPS enablement in RHEL 8:
# fips-mode-setup --enable
Setting system policy to FIPS
FIPS mode will be enabled.
Please reboot the system for the setting to take effect.
2. Restart your system:
# reboot
3. After the restart, you can check the current state:
# fips-mode-setup --check
FIPS mode is enabled.
Note: As a side effect of the enablement procedure the fips-mode-enable tool also changes the system-
wide cryptographic policy level to a level named “FIPS”, this level helps applications by changing
configuration defaults to approved algorithms.
Manual method
The recommended method automatically performs all the necessary steps.
The following steps can be done manually but are not recommended and are not required if the systems
has been installed with the fips-mode-setup tool:
- create a file named /etc/system-fips, the contents of this file are never checked
- ensure to invoke the command ‘fips-finish-install --complete’ on the installed system.
- ensure that the kernel boot line is configured with the fips=1 parameter set
- Reboot the system
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
NOTE: If /boot or /boot/efi resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter boot=<boot
partition> must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command "df | grep boot". For
example:
$ df |grep boot
/dev/sda1 233191 30454 190296 14% /boot
The partition of the /boot file system is located on /dev/sda1 in this example.
Therefore the parameter boot=/dev/sda1 needs to be appended to the kernel command line in addition
to the parameter fips=1.
9.2 User Guidance
To operate the Module in FIPS Approved mode, the user should use services and security
functions listed in Table 7. Any use of non-approved services will put the module in the non-
FIPS mode implicitly.
Interpretation of the return code is the responsibility of the host application.
9.2.1 TLS and Diffie-Hellman
The TLS protocol implementation provides both, the server and the client sides. As required
by SP800-131A, Diffie-Hellman with keys smaller than 2048 bits must not be used any more.
The TLS protocol cannot enforce the support of FIPS Approved Diffie-Hellman key sizes. To
ensure full support for all TLS protocol versions, the TLS client implementation of the
cryptographic module must accept Diffie-Hellman key sizes smaller than 2048 bits offered by
the TLS server.
The TLS server implementation of the cryptographic Module allows the application to set the
Diffie-Hellman key size. The server side must always set the DH parameters with the API call
of:
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh)
Alternatively it is possible to use SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, 1); function call that makes
OpenSSL to use built-in 2048 bit parameters when the server RSA certificate is at least 2048
bits and 3072 bit DH parameters with RSA certificate of 3072 bits.
To comply with the FIPS 140-2 standard the requirement to not allow Diffie-Hellman key sizes
smaller than 2048 bits must be met, to do this the Crypto Officer must ensure that:
• in case the Module is used as TLS server, the Diffie-Hellman parameters (dh argument)
of the aforementioned API call must be 2048 bits or larger;
• in case the Module is used as TLS client, the TLS server must be configured to only
offer Diffie-Hellman keys of 2048 bits or larger.
Using DH parameters and keys smaller than 2048 bits will implicitly place the module into
non-FIPS mode, as specified in section 1.2 of the Security Policy.
9.2.2 AES-XTS Guidance
The length of a single data unit encrypted or decrypted with the XTS-AES shall not exceed 2²⁰
AES blocks that is 16MB of data per AES-XTS instance. An XTS instance is defined in section 4
of SP 800-38E.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
The AES-XTS mode shall only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage
devices. The AES-XTS shall not be used for other purposes, such as the encryption of data in
transit.
9.2.3 AES-GCM IV
In case the module's power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM
encryption or decryption shall be redistributed.
The nonce_explicit part of the IV does not exhaust the maximum number of possible values
for a given session key. The design of the TLS protocol in this module implicitly ensures that
the nonce_explicit, or counter portion of the IV will not exhaust all of its possible values.
The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with the [RFC5288] and shall only be used for the
TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with [FIPS140-2_IG] IG A.5, provision 1 (“TLS protocol
IV generation”); thus, the module is compliant with [SP800-52].
When a GCM IV is used for decryption, the responsibility for the IV generation lies with the
party that performs the AES GCM encryption and therefore there is no restriction on the IV
generation.
The module supports the TLS GCM ciphersuites from SP800-52 Rev1, section 3.3.1.
9.2.4 Triple-DES Keys
According to IG A.13, the same Triple-DES key shall not be used to encrypt more than 216
64-
bit blocks of data. It is the user’s responsibility to make sure that the module complies with
this requirement and that the module does not exceed this limit.
9.2.5 RSA and DSA Keys
The Module allows the use of 1024 bit RSA and DSA keys for legacy purposes, including
signature generation.
RSA must be used with either 2048, 3072 or 4096-bit keys because larger key sizes have not
been CAVP tested.
DSA must be used with either 2048 or 3072-bit keys because larger key sizes have not been
CAVP tested.
Application can enforce the key generation bit length restriction for RSA and DSA keys by
setting the environment variable OPENSSL_ENFORCE_MODULUS_BITS. This environment
variable ensures that 1024 bit keys cannot be generated.
9.2.6 Handling Self-Test Errors
Any self-test error transitions the module into the error state. The application must be
restarted to recover from these errors. Self-test errors include:
• Pairwise consistency test failure: failing a PCT for RSA, DSA or ECDSA
• Integrity test failure: failure to verify the integrity of the module and its shares libraries
• Known-Answer-Test failure: failure to pass a KAT for any algorithm.
These errors are reported through the regular ERR interface of the module and can be queried
by functions such as ERR_get_error(). See the OpenSSL manual page for the function
description.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
When a fatal error occurs, the module enters the error state. Any calls to a crypto function of
the module returns an error with the error message: 'FATAL FIPS SELFTEST FAILURE' printed to
stderr and the Module is terminated with the abort() call.
The only way to recover from the error state is to restart the module. If failures persist, the
module must be reinstalled. If downloading the software, make sure to verify the package
hash to confirm a proper download.
9.2.7 Key derivation using SP800-132 PBKDF
The module provides password-based key derivation (PBKDF), compliant with SP800-132. The
module supports option 1a from section 5.4 of [SP800-132], in which the Master Key (MK) or a
segment of it is used directly as the Data Protection Key (DPK).
In accordance to [SP800-132] and IG D.6, the following requirements shall be met.
Derived keys shall only be used in storage applications. The Master Key (MK) shall not be used
for other purposes. The length of the MK or DPK shall be of 112 bits or more.
A portion of the salt, with a length of at least 128 bits, shall be generated randomly using the
SP800-90A DRBG,
The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to
generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users. The minimum value
shall be 1000.
Passwords or passphrases, used as an input for the PBKDF, shall not be used as cryptographic
keys.
The length of the password or passphrase shall be of at least 20 characters, and shall consist
of lower-case, upper-case and numeric characters. The probability of guessing the value is
estimated to be 1/6220
= 10-36
, which is less than 2-112
.
The calling application shall also observe the rest of the requirements and recommendations
specified in [SP800-132].
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
10 Mitigation of Other Attacks
RSA is vulnerable to timing attacks. In a setup where attackers can measure the time of RSA
decryption or signature operations, blinding must be used to protect the RSA operation from
that attack.
The API function of RSA_blinding_on turns blinding on for key rsa and generates a random
blinding factor. The random number generator must be seeded prior to calling
RSA_blinding_on.
Weak Triple-DES keys are detected as follows:
/* Weak and semi week keys as taken from
* %A D.W. Davies
* %A W.L. Price
* %T Security for Computer Networks
* %I John Wiley & Sons
* %D 1984
* Many thanks to smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin) for the reference
* (and actual cblock values).
*/
#define NUM_WEAK_KEY 16
static const DES_cblock weak_keys[NUM_WEAK_KEY]={
/* weak keys */
{0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01},
{0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE,0xFE},
{0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x1F,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E,0x0E},
{0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xE0,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1,0xF1},
/* semi-weak keys */
{0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE},
{0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01,0xFE,0x01},
{0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1},
{0xE0,0x1F,0xE0,0x1F,0xF1,0x0E,0xF1,0x0E},
{0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1},
{0xE0,0x01,0xE0,0x01,0xF1,0x01,0xF1,0x01},
{0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE},
{0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x1F,0xFE,0x0E,0xFE,0x0E},
{0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E},
{0x1F,0x01,0x1F,0x01,0x0E,0x01,0x0E,0x01},
{0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE},
{0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xE0,0xFE,0xF1,0xFE,0xF1}};
Please note that there is no weak key detection by default. The caller can explicitly set the
DES_check_key to 1 or call DES_check_key_parity() and/or DES_is_weak_key() functions on its
own.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
11 Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Specification
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cypher Block Chaining
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message
Auhentication Code
CFB Cypher Feedback
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DES Data Encryption Standard
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECB Electronic Code Book
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
MAC Message Authentication Code
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
OFB Output Feedback
OS Operating System
RHEL Red Hat Enterprise Linux
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 OpenSSL Cryptographic Module FIPS 140-2 Non-proprietary Security Policy
12 References
[1] OpenSSL man pages where crypto(3) provides the introduction and link to all OpenSSL
APIs regarding the cryptographic operation and ssl(3) to all OpenSSL APIs regarding the
SSL/TLS protocol family
[2] FIPS 140-2 Standard, https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-
program/standards
[3] FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance,
https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-Validation-
Program/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402IG.pdf
[4] FIPS 140-2 Derived Test
Requirements,https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Module-Validation-
Program/documents/fips140-2/FIPS1402DTR.pdf
[5] FIPS 197 Advanced Encryption Standard,
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197.pdf
[6] FIPS 180-4 Secure Hash Standard, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-
4.pdf
[7] FIPS 198-1 The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.198-1.pdf
[8] FIPS 186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
[9] ANSI X9.52:1998 Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation,
http://webstore.ansi.org/FindStandards.aspx?
Action=displaydept&DeptID=80&Acro=X9&DpName=X9,%20Inc.
[10] NIST SP 800-67 Revision 2, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
(TDEA) Block Cipher, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
[11] NIST SP 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode
for Authentication, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38b.pdf
[12] NIST SP 800-38C, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode
for Authentication and Confidentiality,
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf
[13] NIST SP 800-38D, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter
Mode (GCM) and GMAC,
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38d.pdf
[14] NIST SP 800-38E, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES
Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices,
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-38e.pdf
[15] NIST SP 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes
using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (Revised),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3.pdf
[16] NIST SP 800-90A Revision 1, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators,
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf
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