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Juniper Networks MX10003 3D Universal Edge Router with
JNP-MIC1-MACSEC MACSec MIC and EX9253 Ethernet Switch
with EX9253-6Q12C-M MACSec Line Card
Firmware: Junos OS 19.3R1
Non-Proprietary FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Module Security
Policy
Document Version: 1.0
Date: January 20, 2021
Juniper Networks, Inc.
1133 Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, California 94089
USA
408.745.2000
1.888 JUNIPER
www.juniper.net
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Contents
1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................................4
Hardware and Physical CryptographicBoundary ..........................................................................6
1.2 Modes of Operation....................................................................................................................11
1.2.1 FIPS ApprovedMode..................................................................................................................11
1.2.2 Non-ApprovedMode .................................................................................................................12
1.3 Zeroization ........................................................................................................................................13
2 CryptographicFunctionality................................................................................................................14
2.1 Allowed Algorithms and Protocols....................................................................................................14
2.2 DisallowedAlgorithms and Protocols................................................................................................17
2.3 Critical Security Parameters ..............................................................................................................18
3 Roles, Authentication and Services .....................................................................................................20
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles................................................................................20
3.2 Authentication Methods .............................................................................................................20
3.3 Approved and Allowed Services..................................................................................................21
3.4 Non-Approved Services...............................................................................................................23
4 Self-tests..............................................................................................................................................25
5 Physical Security Policy........................................................................................................................27
6 Security Rules and Guidance...............................................................................................................28
6.1 Cryptographic-Officer Guidance .................................................................................................29
6.1.1 Installing the FIPS-Approved Firmware Image...........................................................................29
6.1.2 Enabling FIPS-Approved Mode of Operation......................................................................30
6.1.3 Placing the Module in a Non-Approved Mode of Operation..............................................32
6.2 User Guidance.............................................................................................................................32
7 References and Definitions .................................................................................................................33
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List of Tables
Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Hardware Configurations .........................................................................5
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements.......................................................................................5
Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces ....................................................................................................................10
Table 4 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions .................................................................................14
Table 5 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions .................................................................................14
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions..............................................................................14
Table 7 – QuickSec Approved Cryptographic Functions .............................................................................16
Table 8 – MACSec Approved Cryptographic Functions ..............................................................................16
Table 9 – JNP-MIC1-MACSEC/EX9253-6Q12C-M BCM82391 Chip ............................................................17
Table 10 – Allowed Cryptographic Functions .............................................................................................17
Table 11 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode................................................................................................17
Table 12 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) ...........................................................................................18
Table 13 – Public Keys.................................................................................................................................19
Table 14 – Authenticated Services in FIPS Standard and Reduced Throughput Modes ............................21
Table 15 – Authenticated Services in FIPS Recovery Mode........................................................................21
Table 16 – Unauthenticated Services in FIPS Standard and Reduced Throughput Modes ........................22
Table 17 – Unauthenticated Services in Recovery Mode ...........................................................................22
Table 18 – CSP Access Rights within Services .............................................................................................22
Table 19 – Non-Approved Authenticated Services in FIPS Standard and Reduced Throughput Modes....23
Table 20 – Non-Approved Authenticated Services in FIPS Recovery Mode...............................................24
Table 21 – Non-Approved Unauthenticated Services.................................................................................24
Table 22 – References.................................................................................................................................33
Table 23 – Acronyms and Definitions .........................................................................................................33
Table 24 – Datasheets.................................................................................................................................34
List of Figures
Figure 1 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary (MX10003/EX9253 Front View) .............................................6
Figure 2 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary (MX10003/EX9253 Rear View)...............................................7
Figure 3 – Routing Control Board (RCB)........................................................................................................7
Figure 4 – JNP10003-LC2103.........................................................................................................................8
Figure 5 – MACSec MIC JNP-MIC1-MACSEC .................................................................................................9
Figure 6 – MACSec Line Card EX9253-6Q12C-M...........................................................................................9
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1 Introduction
This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Juniper Networks MX10003 3D
Universal Edge Router with JNP-MIC1-MACSEC MACSec MIC and EX9253 Ethernet Switch with EX9253-
6Q12C-M MACSec Line Card . The MX series provides dedicated high-performance processing for flows
and sessions and integrates advanced security capabilities that protect the network infrastructure as
well as user data. The EX9200 series enables collaboration and provides simple and secure access
for the delivery of mission-critical applications in the enterprise campus. In the data center, it
simplifies operations to align the network with fast-changing business requirements.
This FIPS 140-2 validation includes the MX10003 router and the EX9253 switch. The FIPS validated
version of firmware is Junos OS 19.3R1.
The cryptographic boundary for the MX10003 and EX9253 is defined as follows for the validation:
• The outer edge of the chassis including the Routing Control Board (RCB) (which integrates
the Routing Engine (RE) and Control Board functions into a single management unit) in the
following configurations:
o For MX10003 (2 available RCB slots, 2 additional slots): 1 RCB (1 Built-in: JNP10003-
RE1) and at least 1 MACsec MIC (JNP-MIC1-MACSEC) inserted into 1 MPC (JNP10003-
LC2103). All empty module bays must have a slot cover installed for proper cooling air
circulation.
o For EX9253 (2 available RCB slots, 2 additional slots): 1 RCB (1 Built-in: EX9253-RE)
and at least 1 MACsec Line Card (EX9253-6Q12C-M). All empty module bays must
have a slot cover installed for proper cooling air circulation.
• Includes the inverse three-dimensionalspace where non-crypto-relevantline cards fit,
with the backplane port serving as the physical interface.
• Excluding the power distribution module on the rear of the device.
The cryptographic modules provide for an encrypted connection, using SSH, between the management
station and the module. The cryptographic modules also provide for an encrypted connection, using
MACSec, between devices. All other data input to or output from the modules are considered plaintext
for this FIPS 140-2 validation.
The cryptographic modules are defined as multiple-chip standalone modules that execute Junos OS
19.3R1 firmware on the Juniper Networks MX10003 3D Universal Edge Router and the Juniper Networks
EX9253 Ethernet Switch as listed in Table 1 below.
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Table 1 – Cryptographic Module Hardware Configurations
Chassis PN Power PN RCB PN MACSec LineCard/MIC
PN
MX10003
JNP-PWR1600-AC
JNP-PWR1100-DC
JNP10003-RE1
(RE: RE-S-1600x8;
CB: Control Board)
JNP-MIC1-MACSEC
inserted into an MPC
JNP10003-LC2103
EX9253 JNP-PWR1600-AC
JNP-PWR1100-DC
EX9253-RE
(RE: EX9253-RE;
CB: Control Board)
EX9253-6Q12C-M
The modules are designed to meet FIPS 140-2 Level 1 overall:
Table 2 – Security Level of Security Requirements
Area Description Level
1 Module Specification 1
2 Ports and Interfaces 1
3
Roles, Services, and
Authentication
3
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security 1
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self-test 1
10 Design Assurance 3
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Overall 1
The modules have a limited operational environment as per the FIPS 140-2 definitions. It includes a
firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware versions within the scope of this
validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into the
modules are out of the scope of this validation and require a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.
The modules do not implement any mitigations of other attacks as defined by FIPS 140-2.
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Hardware and Physical CryptographicBoundary
The cryptographic modules’ operational environment is a limited operational environment.
The images below depict the physical boundary of the modules, which includes the Routing Engines and
the MACSec card (the JNP-MIC1-MACSEC MIC for the MX10003 and the EX9253-6Q12C-M Line Card for
the EX9253). The boundary excludes the non-crypto-relevant line cards included in the figure. The
modules exclude the power supplies from the requirements of FIPS 140-2. The power supplies do not
contain any security relevant components and cannot affect the security of the module.
Figure 1 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary (MX10003/EX9253 Front View)
1 — Routing and Control Boards (RCBs) 3 — MIC installed in MIC1 slot of MPC1
2 — MPCs 4 — MIC installed in MIC1 slot of MPC0
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Figure 2 – Physical Cryptographic Boundary (MX10003/EX9253 Rear View)
1 — Power supply modules 2 — Fan modules
Figure 3 – Routing Control Board (RCB)
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1—USB port 8—Time of day (ToD) port with LEDs
(This port is reserved for future use)
2—Management (MGMT) port 9—BITS port with LEDs
3—Console (CON) port 10—Clocking ports
4—SSD LEDs 11—OFFLINE button
5—SSD slots (0 and 1) 12—ONLINE LED
6—Master (MST) LED 13—OK/FAIL LED
7—Alarm (ALM) LED 14—RESET button
Figure 4 – JNP10003-LC2103
The JNP10003-LC2103 supports Multi-Rate Ethernet Modular Interface Card (MIC) (JNP-MIC1-MACSEC
as seen on the left in the image above) and the fixed-port PIC (6 built-in QSFP+ ports as seen on the right
in the image above). Each of the six QSFP+ ports can be configured as a 40-Gigabit Ethernet port or as
four 10-Gigabit Ethernet ports (by using a breakout cable).
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Figure 5 – MACSec MIC JNP-MIC1-MACSEC
The JNP-MIC1-MACSEC has 12 100-Gigabit Ethernet ports. The ports support QSFP28 transceivers. The
ports are numbered 0 through 11 (with the MIC orientation as shown in Figure 4). Each port can be
configured as a 100-Gigabit Ethernet port, 40-Gigabit Ethernet port, or as four 10-Gigabit Ethernet ports
(by using a breakout cable).
Figure 6 – MACSec Line Card EX9253-6Q12C-M
1—Ejector levers 6—ONLINE LED
2—Lane LEDs 7—OFFLINE button
3—LEDs for the QSFP28 ports 8—QSFP+ ports (without MACsec capability)
4—LEDs for the QSFP+ ports 9—QSFP28 ports (with MACsec capability)
5—OK/FAIL LED
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Table 3 – Ports and Interfaces
Port Device (# of ports) Description Logical Interface Type
Ethernet
MX10003: Management
port (1),
JNP10003-LC2103
interfaces: 40 Gigabit
Ethernet/ 4X10-Gigabit
Ethernet (using a
breakout cable) QSFP+
ports (6)
JNP-MIC1-MACSEC
MACSec MIC interfaces: 4
10-Gigabit Ethernet
(using a breakout
cable)/40-Gigabit
Ethernet/100-Gigabit
Ethernet MACsec-capable
QSFP28 ports (12)
EX9253: Management
port (1),
EX9253-6Q12C-M Line
Card interfaces:
40 Gigabit Ethernet/
4X10-Gigabit Ethernet
(using a breakout cable)
QSFP+ ports (6), 4 10-
Gigabit Ethernet (using a
breakout cable)/40-
Gigabit Ethernet/100-
Gigabit Ethernet MACsec-
capable QSFP28 ports
(12)
LAN
Communications/Remote
management
Control in, Data in, Data out,
Status out
Serial
MX10003 (1), EX9253 (1)
Console serial port
Control in, Data in, Data out
Status out
USB MX10003 (1), EX9253 (1) USB port - load Junos image Control in, Data in
Power MX10003 (6), EX9253 (6) Power connector Power
LEDs MX10003 (10), EX9253 Status indicator lighting Status out
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Port Device (# of ports) Description Logical Interface Type
(10), JNP10003-LC2103
(11), JNP-MIC1-MACSEC
(18), EX9253-6Q12C-M
(29)
Reset Button
MX10003 (1), EX9253 (1)
Reset Control in
Backplane
MX10003 (1), EX9253 (1) Line card backplane
interface
Control in, Data in, Status
out, Data out
BITS
MX10003 (1), EX9253 (1) Connects the module to
external clocking devices
Control in
Clocking ports
(1PPS and 10
MHz GPS)
MX10003 (4), EX9253 (4) connect the module to
external clock signal
sources
Control in
Time of day
(ToD) port
MX10003 (1), EX9253 (1) connects the module to
external timing signal
sources
Control in
Offline Button
MX10003 (0), EX9253 (0),
JNP-MIC1-MACSEC (0),
JNP10003-LC2103 (1),
EX9253-6Q12C-M (1)
Power off Control in
1.2 Modes of Operation
The module supports three FIPS Approved modes of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation.
The module must always be zeroized when switching between any FIPS Approved mode of operation
and the non-Approved mode of operation and vice versa.
1.2.1 FIPS Approved Mode
The hardware versions contained in Table 1, with Junos OS 19.3R1 installed, contain three FIPS-
Approved modes of operation and a non-Approved mode of operation. The Junos OS 19.3R1 firmware
image must be installed on the device. The module is configured during initialization to operate in an
approved mode or a non-approved mode.
The Crypto-Officer places the module in an Approved mode of operation by following the instructions in
cryptographic officer guidance (Section 6.1).
The Crypto-Officer can verify that the cryptographic module is in an Approved mode by observing the
console prompt and running the “show version” command. When operating in FIPS mode, the
prompt will read “<user>@<device name>:fips>” (e.g. crypto-officer@mx10003:fips>). The “show
version” command will allow the Crypto-Officer to verify that the validated firmware version is
running on the module. The Crypto-Officer can also use the “show system fips chassis level”
command to determine if the module is operating in FIPS mode.
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The module supports three Approved modes of operation. The three modes are identified as “FIPS
Standard Mode”, “FIPS Reduced Throughput Mode” and “FIPS Recovery Mode.”
The FIPS Standard Mode is entered when the module is configured for FIPS mode and successfully
passes all the power on self-tests (POST) in the routing engine (RE) and in each of the JNP-MIC1-
MACSEC MACSec MICs installed in the chassis in case of the MX10003 module (the maximum
number of JNP-MIC1-MACSEC MACSec MICs that can be installed in the MX10003 module chassis is
2) and in each of the EX9253-6Q12C-M MACSec Line Cards installed in the chassis in case of the
EX9253 module (the maximum number of EX9253-6Q12C-M MACSec Line Cards that can be
installed in the EX9253 module chassis is 2). The FIPS Standard Mode supports the approved and
allowed algorithms, functions and protocols identified in Table 4 – 11. The services available in this
mode are described in Tables 14 and 16.
The FIPS Reduced Throughput mode is automatically selected by the module at power-up when all
the power on self-tests (POST) in the routing engine (RE) pass successfully, at least one JNP-MIC1-
MACSEC MACSec MIC in case of the MX10003 module chassis or at least one EX9253-6Q12C-M
MACSec Line Card in case of the EX9253 chassis passes all of its self-tests, and the other JNP-MIC1-
MACSEC MACSec MIC in the MX10003 module chassis or the other EX9253-6Q12C-M MACSec Line
Card in the EX9253 chassis fails one or more of its self-tests. In this mode, the module offers reduced
throughput MACsec services. The FIPS Reduced Throughput Mode supports the approved and
allowed algorithms, functions and protocols identified in Table 4 – 11. The services available in this
mode are described in Tables 14 and 16.
The FIPS Recovery Mode is automatically selected when the module is configured for FIPS mode, at
power-up, when one or more of the POST fail for each of the JNP-MIC1-MACSEC MACSec MICs in the
MX10003 module chassis or for each of the EX9253-6Q12C-M MACSec Line Cards in the EX9253 chassis,
and all of the RE POST pass successfully. In the FIPS Recovery Mode, the module does not allow MACsec
services and shuts down all data ports on each of the JNP-MIC1-MACSEC MACSec MICs in the MX10003
module chassis or on each of the EX9253-6Q12C-M MACSec Line Cards in the EX9253 chassis. The module
supports the OpenSSL, LibMD and Kernel algorithms in Table 4-6; the algorithms in Table 10, and the SSH
protocol in Table 11 when in the FIPS Recovery mode. The services available in the Recovery mode are
described in Table 15 and Table 17.
1.2.2 Non-Approved Mode
The cryptographic module supports a non-Approved mode of operation. When operated in the non-
Approved mode of operation, the module supports the algorithms identified in Section 2.2 as well as the
algorithms supported in the Approved mode of operation.
The Crypto-Officer can place the module into a non-approved mode of operation by following the
instructions in the cryptographic officer guidance (Section 6.1).
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1.3 Zeroization
The cryptographic module provides a non-Approved mode of operation in which non-Approved
cryptographic algorithms are supported. When transitioning between the non-Approved mode of
operation and the FIPS-Approved mode of operation, or vice-versa, the cryptographic officer shall
zeroize all keys and CSPs.
Zeroization completely erases all configuration information on the device. The Crypto Officer initiates
the zeroization process by entering the “request vmhost zeroize no-forwarding” (FIPS) operational
command from the CLI after enabling FIPS mode. Use of this command is restricted to the Crypto Officer
(The same command can be used to zeroize the system before enabling FIPS mode).
Use of the zeroize command is restricted to the Cryptographic Officer. The cryptographic officer shall
perform zeroization in the following situations:
1. Before FIPS Operation: To prepare the device for operation as a FIPS cryptographic module by
erasing all CSPs and other user-created data on a device before its operation as a FIPS
cryptographic module.
2. Before non-FIPS Operation: To conduct erasure of all CSPs and other user-created data on a
device in preparation for repurposing the device for non-FIPS operation.
CAUTION: Perform system zeroization with care. After the zeroization process is complete, no data is left
on the Routing Engine. The device is returned to the factory default state, without any configured users
or configuration files.
To zeroize the device:
1. From the CLI, enter
Crypto-officer@device> request vmhost zeroize no-forwarding
warning: System will be rebooted and may not boot without configuration
Erase all data, including configuration and log files? [yes, no] (no)
2. To initiate the zeroization process, type yes at the prompt:
Erase all data, including configuration and log files? [yes, no] (no)
yes
3. When the system finishes rebooting the system will be in a factory default state.
Note: The Cryptographic Officer must retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
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2 Cryptographic Functionality
2.1 Allowed Algorithms and Protocols
The module implements the FIPS Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed cryptographic functions listed
in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 below. Table 11 summarizes the high-level protocol algorithm support.
There are some algorithm modes that were tested but not implemented by the module. Only the
algorithms, modes, and key sizes that are implemented by the module are shown in this/these table(s).
Table 4 – Kernel Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
C1467 DRBG SP800-90A HMAC SHA-256 Random Bit Generation
C1467 HMAC PUB 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 96
Message Authentication,
DRBG Primitive
SHA-256
Key size: 256 bits, λ =
128, 256
C1467 SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation
Table 5 – LibMD Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert. Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
C1468 HMAC
PUB 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 96
Message Authentication
SHA-256
Key size: 256 bits,
λ = 128, 256
C1468 SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation
Table 6 – OpenSSL Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
C1469 AES1
PUB 197-38A
CBC, CTR,
ECB
Key Sizes: 128, 192, 256 Encrypt, Decrypt
N/A2
CKG SSH-PUB 133
Section 6.1
Section 6.2
Asymmetric key
generation using
unmodified DRBG
output
1
The AES-ECB mode was used for testing the AES-CTR mode.
2
Vendor Affirmed
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CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
N/A3
KAS-SSC
SP 800-
56Arev3
ECC DH
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
P-521 (SHA 512)
Key Agreement
Scheme - Shared
Secret Computation
(KAS-SSC) per SP 800-
56Arev3 and Key
Derivation per SP
800-135 (SSH KDF
CVL Cert. #C1469)
C1469 CVL SP 800-135 SSH SHA 1, 256, 384, 512 Key Derivation
C1469 DRBG SP 800-90A HMAC SHA-256
Random Number
Generation
C1469 ECDSA PUB 186-4
P-256 (SHA 256)
P-384 (SHA 384)
P-521 (SHA 512)
SigGen, KeyGen,
SigVer, PKV
C1469 HMAC PUB 198
SHA-1 Key size: 160 bits, λ = 160
Message
Authentication
SHA-224 Key size: 224 bits, λ = 192
SHA-512 Key size: 512 bits, λ = 512
SHA-256
Key size: 256, bits, λ =
256
Message
Authentication,
DRBG Primitive
C1469 KTS
AES Cert. #C1469 and HMAC Cert.
#C1469
key establishment
methodology
provides between
128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength
Triple-DES Cert. #C1469 and HMAC Cert.
#C1469
key establishment
methodology
provides 112 bits of
encryption strength
C1469 RSA PUB 186-4
n=2048 (SHA 256, 512)
n=3072 (SHA 256, 512)
n=4096 (SHA 256, 512)
KeyGen, SigGen,
SigVer4
C1469 SHS PUB 180-4
SHA-1
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Message Digest
Generation,
KDF Primitive
3
Vendor Affirmed as per IG D.1-rev3
4
RSA 4096 SigVer was not tested by the CAVP; however, it is Approved for use per CMVP guidance, because RSA
2048 SigVer was tested and testing for RSA 4096 SigVer is not available.
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CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm Standard Mode Description Functions
SHA-224
Message Digest
Generation
C1469 Triple-DES SP 800-67 TCBC Key Size: 192 Encrypt, Decrypt
Table 7 – QuickSec Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm
Standard
Mode Description Functions
C1470 HMAC PUB 198
SHA-256
Key size: 256, bits, λ = 256
C1470 SHS SP800- 180-4 SHA-256
Message Digest
Generation,
KDF Primitive
C1470 DRBG SP800-90A HMAC SHA-256
Random Bit
Generation
Table 8 – MACSec Approved Cryptographic Functions
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm
Standard
Mode Description Functions
C1471 AES
SP800- 197-
38A
ECB, CBC Key Sizes: 128, 256 AES CMAC
SP800-38D CMAC Key Sizes: 128,256
Key Derivation SP 800-
108: Used to generate
MACsec keys
SP800-35F KW Key Size: 128
Key Wrapping for
MACsec keys
C1471 KDF SP 800-108 Counter
CMAC AES128
CMAC AES256
KDF for MACsec keys
N/A KTS AES # C1471 Key Wrapping
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Table 9 – JNP-MIC1-MACSEC/EX9253-6Q12C-M BCM82391 Chip
CAVP
Cert.
Algorithm
Standard
Mode Description Functions
4545 AES
SP800-38D GCM Key Sizes: 128,256
Key Derivation SP 800-
108: Used to generate
MACsec keys
Table 10 – Allowed Cryptographic Functions
Algorithm Caveat Use
NDRNG IG 7.14 Scenario
1a
The module generates a minimum of
256 bits of entropy for key generation.
Seeding the DRBG
Table 11 – Protocols Allowed in FIPS Mode
Protocol Key Exchange Auth Cipher Integrity
MACsec
MKA
MACsec Key Agreement Shared secret
GCM-AES-128
GCM-AES-256
HMAC-SHA-256
SSHv25
EC Diffie-Hellman P-256, P-384, P-521
RSA 2048,4096
ECDSA P-256
Triple-DES CBC
AES CBC
128/192/256
AES CTR
128/192/256
HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-
256
HMAC-SHA2-
512
No part of these protocols, other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP. The
MACsec and SSH algorithms allow independent selection of key exchange, authentication, cipher
and integrity. In Table 11 above, each column of options for a given protocol is independent and
may be used in any viable combination.
The modules can take on the role of Peer or Authenticator in reference to the MACsec protocol. The
AES GCM IV construction is performed in compliance with IEEE 802.1AE and its amendments.
2.2 Disallowed Algorithms and Protocols
These algorithms and protocols are non-Approved algorithms and protocols that are disabled
when the module is operated in an Approved mode of operation. The algorithms are available as
part of the SSH connect service when the module is operated in the non-Approved mode.
5
RFC 4253 governs the generation of the Triple-DES encryption key for use with the SSHv2 protocol
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Algorithms
• RSA with key size less than 2048
• ECDSA with ed25519 curve
• ECDH with ed25519 curve
• ARCFOUR
• Blowfish
• CAST
• DSA (SigGen, SigVer; non-compliant)
• HMAC-MD5
• HMAC-RIPEMD160
• UMAC
• Diffie-Hellman
• Chacha20
• Poly
• OpenSSL AES-GCM
Protocols
• Finger
• ftp
• rlogin
• telnet
• tftp
• xnm-clear-text
2.3 Critical Security Parameters
All CSPs and public keys used by the module are described in this Section. The CSPs in Table 12 are used
in the FIPS Standard and FIPS Reduced Throughput Modes. The FIPS Recovery Mode uses a subset of the
CSPs found in Table 12. The MACsec CSPs are not available for use in FIPS Recovery Mode of operation.
Table 12 – Critical Security Parameters (CSPs)
Name Description and usage
DRBG_Seed Seed material used to seed or reseed the DRBG
DRBG_State Values V and Key which comprise the HMAC_DRBG state
Entropy Input
String
256 bits entropy (min) input used to instantiate the DRBG
ECDH Shared
Secret
The Diffie-Hellman shared secret used in EC Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) exchange. Created per
the EC Diffie-Hellman protocol. Provides between 128-256 bits of security.
SSH PHK
SSH Private host key. 1st time SSH is configured, the keys are generated. ECDSA P-256. RSA
2048
Used to identify the host.
SSH ECDH Ephemeral EC Diffie-Hellman private key used in SSH. ECDH P-256, P-384, or P-521
SSH-SEKs
SSH Session Keys: SSH Session Encryption Key: 3-Key Triple-DES or AES (128,192,256); SSH
Session Integrity Key: HMAC (SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA2-512).
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Name Description and usage
MACsec CAK
User-configured PSK entered when MACsec using static connectivity association key (CAK)
security mode is enabled (32 characters).
MACsec CKN User-configured PSK used to identify the CAK (64 characters).
MACsec SAK Security Association Key used to encrypt/decrypt traffic for a given session. Derived from
CAK using KDF SP 800-108. (128-bit AES).
MACsec KEK Key Encryption Key used to transmit SAK to other members of a MACSec connectivity
association. Derived from CAK using KDF SP 800-108. (128-bit AES).
MACsec ICK Integrity Check Key used to verify the integrity and authenticity of MPDUs. Derived from
CAK using KDF SP 800-108. (128/256-bit CMAC).
HMAC Key The LibMD HMAC keys: message digest for hashing password and critical function test.
User Password Passwords used to authenticate Users to the module.
CO Password Passwords used to authenticate COs to the module.
Table 13 – Public Keys
Name D Description and usage
SSH-PUB SSH Public Host Key used to identify the host. ECDSA P-256. RSA 2048, 4096.
SSH-ECDH-
PUB
Ephemeral EC Diffie-Hellman public key used in SSH key establishment. ECDH P-256, P-384, or
P-521
Auth-User Pub
User Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate users to the module. ECDSA P-256, P-
384, or P-521; RSA 2048, 4096
Auth-CO Pub
CO Authentication Public Keys. Used to authenticate CO to the module. ECDSA P-256, P-384,
or P-521; RSA 2048, 4096
Root CA
ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity of the Juniper Package CA at
software load and also at runtime for integrity.
Package CA
ECDSA P-256 X.509 Certificate; Used to verify the validity the Juniper Image at software load
and also at runtime for integrity.
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3 Roles, Authentication and Services
3.1 Roles and Authentication of Operators to Roles
The module supports two roles: Cryptographic Officer (CO) and User. The module supports concurrent
operators but does not support a maintenance role and/or bypass capability. The module enforces the
separation of roles using identity-based operator authentication.
The Cryptographic Officer role configures and monitors the module via a console or SSH connection. As
root or super-user, the Cryptographic Officer has permission to view and edit secrets within the module.
The User role monitors the router via the console or SSH. The User role cannot change the
configuration.
3.2 Authentication Methods
The module implements two forms of Identity-Based authentication, Username and password over the
Console and SSH as well as Username and ECDSA or RSA public key over SSH.
Password authentication: The module enforces 10-character passwords (at minimum) chosen from the
96 human readable ASCII characters. The maximum password length is 20-characters. Thus,
the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/9610
, which is less than 1/1 million.
The module enforces a timed access mechanism as follows: For the first two failed attempts (assuming
0 time to process), no timed access is enforced. Upon the third attempt, the module enforces a 5-
second delay. Each failed attempt thereafter results in an additional 5-second delay above the previous
(e.g. 4th
failed attempt = 10-second delay, 5th
failed attempt = 15-second delay, 6th
failed attempt = 20-
second delay, 7th
failed attempt = 25-second delay).
This leads to a maximum of 7 possible attempts in a one-minute period for each getty. The best
approachfor the attacker would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts and wait for a new getty to be
spawned. This would allow the attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per minute (576 attempts per
hour/60 mins); this would be rounded down to 9 per minute, because there is no such thing as 0.6
attempts. The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is
9/(9610
), which is less than 1/100,000.
ECDSA signature verification: SSH public-key authentication. The module supports ECDSA (P-256, P-384,
and P-521), which has a minimum equivalent computational resistance to attack of either 2128
, 2192
or
2256
depending on the curve. Thus, the probability of a successful random attempt is 1/ (2128
), which is
less than 1/1,000,000. Configurable SSH connection establishment rate limits the number of connection
attempts, and thus failed authentication attempts in a one-minute period to a maximum of 15,000
attempts. The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is
15,000/(2128
), which is less than 1/100,000.
RSA signature verification: SSH public-key authentication. The module supports RSA (2048, 4096), which
has a minimum equivalent computational resistance to attack of 2112
(2048). Thus, the probability of a
successful random attempt is 1/ (2112
), which is less than 1/1,000,000. Configurable SSH connection
establishment rate limits the number of connection attempts, and thus failed authentication attempts in
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a one-minute period to a maximum of 15,000 attempts. The probability of a success with multiple
consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 15,000/ (2112
), which is less than 1/100,000.
3.3 Approved and Allowed Services
All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables below. Table 18 lists the access to
CSPs by each service.
Table 14 – Authenticated Services in FIPS Standard and Reduced Throughput Modes
Service Description CO User
Configure security
Security relevant configuration x
Configure Non-security relevant configuration x
Secure Traffic MACsec encrypted transfer of data x
Status Show status x x
Zeroize Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
MACsec connect Initiate MACsec connection x
Console access Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset Software initiated reset, performs self-tests on demand. x
Load Image Verification and loading of a validated firmware image
into the switch.
x
Table 15 – Authenticated Services in FIPS Recovery Mode
Service Description CO User
Configure security
Security relevant configuration
x
Configure Non-security relevant configuration x
Status Show status x x
Zeroize Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
Console access Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset Software initiated reset, performs self-tests on demand. x
Load Image Verification and loading of a validated firmware image
into the switch.
x
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Table 16 – Unauthenticated Services in FIPS Standard and Reduced Throughput Modes
Service D Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services (e.g. OSPF, BGP)
LED Status Basic
Table 17 – Unauthenticated Services in Recovery Mode
Service D Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
LED Status Basic
Table 18 – CSP Access Rights within Services
Service
CSPs
DRBG_Seed
DRBG_State
Entropy
Input
String
ECDH
Shared
Secret
SSH
PHK
SSH
ECDH
SSH-SEK
MACsec
SAK
MACsec
CAK
MACsec
CKN
MACsec
KEK
MACsec
ICK
HMAC
Key
CO-PW
User-PW
Configur
e
security
-- E --
GW
R
GW
R
-- --
GW
R
W
R
W
R
G
W
G
W
G W W
Configur
e
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Secure
traffic
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- E -- -- E -- -- -- --
Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Zeroize Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
SSH
connect
-- E -- E E GE GE -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
MACsec
connect
-- E -- -- -- -- -- GE -- -- GE GE -- -- --
Console
access
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- E E
Remote
reset
GE
Z
GZ GZ Z -- Z Z Z -- -- -- Z -- -- --
Load
Image
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Local GE GZ GZ Z -- Z Z Z -- -- -- Z -- -- --
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Service
CSPs
DRBG_Seed
DRBG_State
Entropy
Input
String
ECDH
Shared
Secret
SSH
PHK
SSH
ECDH
SSH-SEK
MACsec
SAK
MACsec
CAK
MACsec
CKN
MACsec
KEK
MACsec
ICK
HMAC
Key
CO-PW
User-PW
reset Z
Traffic -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
G = Generate: The module generates the CSP
R = Read: The CSP is read from the module (e.g. the CSP is output)
E = Execute: The module executes using the CSP
W = Write: The CSP is updated or written to the module (persistent
storage) Z = Zeroize: The module zeroizes the CSP.
3.4 Non-Approved Services
The following services are available in the non-Approved mode of operation. The security functions
provided by the non-Approved services are identical to the Approved counterparts with the exception of
SSH Connect (non-compliant). SSH Connect (non-compliant) supports the security functions identified in
Section 2.2 and the SSHv2 row of Table 11.
Table 19 – Non-Approved Authenticated Services in FIPS Standard and Reduced Throughput Modes
Service Description CO User
Configure security
(non-compliant)
Security relevant configuration x
Configure (non-compliant)
(non-compliant)
Non-security relevant configuration x
Secure Traffic (non-compliant) MACsec encrypted transfer of data x
Status
(non-compliant)
Show status x x
Zeroize
(non-compliant)
Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect
(non-compliant)
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
MACsec connect (non-
compliant)
Initiate MACsec connection x
Console access
(non-compliant)
Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset
(non-compliant)
Software initiated reset, performs self-tests on
demand
x
Load Image
(non-compliant)
Verification and loading of a validated firmware image
into the switch.
x
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Table 20 – Non-Approved Authenticated Services in FIPS Recovery Mode
Service Description CO User
Configure security
(non-compliant)
Security relevant configuration x
Configure
(non-compliant)
Non-security relevant configuration x
Status
(non-compliant)
Show status x x
Zeroize
(non-compliant)
Destroy all CSPs x
SSH connect
(non-compliant)
Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and
control (CLI)
x x
Console access
(non-compliant)
Console monitoring and control (CLI) x x
Remote reset
(non-compliant)
Software initiated reset, performs self-tests on
demand
x
Load Image
(non-compliant)
Verification and loading of a validated firmware image
into the switch.
x
Table 21 – Non-Approved Unauthenticated Services
Service D Description
Local reset Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic Traffic requiring no cryptographic services (e.g. OSPF, BGP)
LED Status Basic
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4 Self-tests
Each time the module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly,
and that sensitive data have not been damaged. Power-up self–tests are available on demand by
power cycling the module (Remote reset service).
On power up or reset, the module performs the self-tests described below. All KATs must be
completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module in the FIPS Standard and
Reduced Throughput Modes of operation. If any one of the Routing Engine KATs fails, the module
enters the Error state. If all the RE KATs pass and at least one JNP-MIC1-MACSEC MACSec MIC in the
MX10003 module chassis or at least one EX9253-6Q12C-M MACSec Line Card in the EX9253 chassis
passes all of its self-tests, and at least one JNP-MIC1-MACSEC MACSec MIC in the MX10003 module
chassis or at least one EX9253-6Q12C-M MACSec Line Card in the EX9253 chassis fails one or more of its
self-tests, the module selects the FIPS Reduced Throughput Mode of operation and the module offers
reduced throughput MACsec services. If all the RE KATs pass and each of the JNP-MIC1-MACSEC
MACSec MICs in the MX10003 module chassis or each of the EX9253-6Q12C-M MACSec Line Cards in
the EX9253 chassis fails one or more of its KATs, the module selects the FIPS Recovery Mode of
operation and all JNP-MIC1-MACSEC algorithms for the MX10003 or all EX9253-6Q12C-M algorithms for
the EX9253 are prevented from being used.
The module performs the following power-up self-tests:
Routing Engine (RE)
• Firmware Integrity check: using ECDSA P-256 with SHA-256
• Kernel KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o SHA-384 KAT
o SHA-512 KAT
• OpenSSL KATs
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-CBC (128/192/256) Decrypt KAT
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o ECDSA P-256 Sign/Verify PCT
o HMAC-SHA-1 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-224 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
o SHA-384 KAT
o HMAC-SHA-512 KAT
o KAS-ECC KAT
o KDF-SSH KAT
o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Sign KAT
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o RSA 2048 w/ SHA-256 Verify KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Encrypt KAT
o Triple-DES-CBC Decrypt KAT
• LibMD KATs
o HMAC-SHA-1
o HMAC-SHA-256
o SHA-512
• QuickSec KATs
o SP 800-90A HMAC DRBG KAT
▪ Health-tests initialize, re-seed, and generate
o HMAC-SHA-256 KAT
• MacSec KATs
o AES128-CMAC KAT
o AES256-CMAC KAT
o AES-ECB (128/256) Encrypt KAT
o AES-ECB (128/256) Decrypt KAT
o AES-KEYWRAP KAT
o SP 800-108 KBKDF KAT
• JNP-MIC1-MACSEC/ EX9253-6Q12C-M
o BCM82391 Chip
▪ AES GCM KAT
• Critical Function Test
o The cryptographic module performs a verification of a limited operational
environment, and verification of optional non-critical packages.
The module also performs the following conditional self-tests:
• Continuous RNG Test on the SP 800-90A HMAC-DRBGs in the OpenSSL and Quicksec libraries.
• Continuous RNG test on the NDRNG.
• Pairwise consistency test when generating ECDSA, and RSA key pairs.
• Firmware Load Test (ECDSA signature verification).
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5 Physical Security Policy
The modules physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone device that meets Level 1 Physical
Security requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated,
cold rolled steel, plated steel and brushed aluminum enclosure. There are no ventilation holes, gaps,
slits, cracks, slots, or crevices that would allow for any sort of observation of any component
contained within the cryptographic boundary.
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6 Security Rules and Guidance
The module design corresponds to the security rules below. The term shall in this context
specifically refers to a requirement for correct usage of the module in the Approved mode; all
other statements indicate a security rule implemented by the module.
1. The module clears previous authentications on power cycle.
2. When the module has not been placed in a valid role, the operator does not have access to any
cryptographic services.
3. Power up self-tests do not require any operator action.
4. Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states.
5. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead
to a compromise of the module.
6. There are no restrictions on which keys or CSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
7. The module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
8. The module does not support manual key entry.
9. The module does not output intermediate key values.
10. The module requires two independent internal actions to be performed prior to outputting
plaintext CSPs.
11. The cryptographic officer shall verify that the firmware image to be loaded on the module is a FIPS
validated image. If any non-validated firmware image is loaded the module will no longer be a
FIPS validated module.
12. The cryptographic officer shall retain control of the module while zeroization is in process.
13. If the module loses power and then it is restored, then a new key shall be established for use with
the AES GCM encryption/decryption processes.
14. The operator shall ensure that the number of 64-bit blocks encrypted by the same key does not
exceed 2^20 with a single Triple-DES key when Triple-DES is the encryption algorithm for SSH.
15. Virtual Chassis is not supported in FIPS mode and shall not be configured on the modules.
16. RSA key generated shall only be 2048 bits or greater.
17. The module shall only be used with CMVP FIPS 140-2 validation modules when supporting the
MACsec protocol for providing Peer, Authenticator functionality.
18. The link between the Peer and Authenticator, used in the MACsec communication, shall be secure
to prevent the possibility for an attacker to introduce foreign equipment into the local area
network.
19. The module shall not be configured to use a radius server and the radius server capability shall be
disabled.
20. 3-key Triple-DES has been implemented in the module and is FIPS approved until December 31,
2023. Should the CMVP disallow the usage of Triple-DES post December 31, 2023, then users must
not configure Triple-DES.
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6.1 Cryptographic-Officer Guidance
The cryptographic officer must check to verify the firmware image on the device is the FIPS 140-2
validated image. If the image is the FIPS 140-2 validated image, then proceed to Section 6.1.2.
6.1.1 Installing the FIPS-Approved Firmware Image
Download the validated firmware image from the
https://www.juniper.net/support/downloads/junos.html. Log in to the Juniper Networks
authentication system using the username (generally your e-mail address) and password supplied by
Juniper Networks representatives. Select the validated firmware image. Download the firmware image
to a local host or to an internal software distribution site.
Connect to the console port on the device from your management device and log in to the Junos OS
CLI. Copy the firmware package to the device to the /var/tmp/ directory. Install the new package on the
device:
user@device> request vmhost software add /var/tmp/package.tgz.
NOTE: If you need to terminate the installation, do not reboot your device; instead, finish the
installation and then issue the request system software delete package.tgz command, where
package.tgz is, for example, junos-vmhost-install-mx-x86-64-19.3R1.8.tgz. This is your last chance to
stop the installation.
Reboot the device to load the installation and start the new firmware image:
user@device> request vmhost reboot
After the reboot has completed, log in and use the show version command to verify that the new
version of the firmware is successfully installed.
Also install the fips-mode package and jpfe-fips package needed for enabling FIPS mode and running
KATS respectively. The following are the commands used for installing these packages:
user@device >request system software add optional://fips-mode.tgz
user@device >request system software add optional://jpfe-fips.tgz
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6.1.2 Enabling FIPS-Approved Mode of Operation
The cryptographic officer is responsible for initializing the module in a FIPS-Approved mode of
operation. The FIPS-Approved mode of operation is not automatically enabled. The cryptographic
officer shall place the module in the FIPS-Approved mode by first zeroizing the device to delete all keys
and CSPs. The instructions for zeroizing the module are in Section 1.3 of this document. Next, the
cryptographic officer shall follow the steps found in the Junos OS FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide
for MX10003 and EX9253 Devices, Release 19.3R1 document Chapters 3 & 7 to place the module into a
FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The steps from the aforementioned document are repeated below:
The FIPS Modes are not automatically enabled once the firmware image is installed on the platform.
These steps are for putting the module into the FIPS Standard Mode, FIPS Reduced Throughput Mode
or FIPS Recovery Mode.
The FIPS Standard Mode will be selected automatically if all power-on self-tests pass successfully during
the reboot after committing the module to FIPS mode. The FIPS Reduced Throughput Mode of
operation is selected automatically if all the RE KATs pass and at least one JNP-MIC1-MACSEC MACSec
MIC in the MX10003 module chassis or at least one EX9253-6Q12C-M MACSec Line Card in the EX9253
chassis passes all of its self-tests, and the other JNP-MIC1-MACSEC MACSec MIC in the MX10003
module chassis or the other EX9253-6Q12C-M MACSec Line Card in the EX9253 chassis fails one or
more of its self-tests. The FIPS Recovery Mode is selected automatically if all the RE KATs pass and if
each of the JNP-MIC1-MACSEC MACSec MICs in the MX10003 module chassis or each of the EX9253-
6Q12C-M MACSec Line Cards in the EX9253 chassis fails one or more of its KATs.
To enable FIPS mode in Junos OS on the device:
1. Zeroize the device as explained in Section 1.3. Once device comes up in amnesiac mode post
zeroize, connect to device using console port with username “root”, enter the configuration
mode and configure the root-authentication password, then configure crypto-officer
credentials. The root authentication password can be configured as follows:
root@device> edit
Entering configuration mode
[edit]
root@device# set system root-authentication plain-text-password
New password:
Retype new password:
[edit]
crypto-officer@device# commit
configuration check succeeds
commit complete
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2. Login to the device with crypto-officer credentials and enter configuration mode:
crypto-officer@device> edit
Entering configuration mode
[edit]
crypto-officer@device#
3. Enable FIPS mode on the device by setting the FIPS level to 1, and verify the level:
[edit]
crypto-officer@device # set system fips chassis level 1
[edit]
crypto-officer@device # show system fips
chassis level 1;
4. Commit the configuration
[edit ]
crypto-officer@device# commit
configuration check succeeds
Generating RSA key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_key
Generating RSA2 key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_rsa_key
Generating ECDSA key /etc/ssh/fips_ssh_host_ecdsa_key
[edit]
'system'
reboot is required to transition to FIPS level 1
commit complete
5. Reboot the device:
[edit]
crypto-officer@device# run request vmhost reboot
Reboot the system ? [yes,no] (no) yes
During the reboot, the device runs Known Answer Tests (KATS). It returns a login
prompt:
crypto-officer@device:fips>
6. After the reboot has completed, log in and use the “show version” command to verify the
firmware version is the validated version.
crypto-officer@device:fips> show version
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6.1.3 Placing the Module in a Non-Approved Mode of Operation
As cryptographic officer, the operator needs to disable the FIPS-Approved mode of operation on the
device to return it to a non-Approved mode of operation. To disable FIPS-Approved mode on the
device, the device must be zeroized. Follow the steps found in Section 1.3 to zeroize the device.
6.2 User Guidance
The user should verify that the module is operating in the desired mode of operation (FIPS-Approved
mode or non-Approved mode) by observing the command prompt when logged into the device. If the
string “:fips” is present, then the device is operating in a FIPS-Approved mode. Otherwise it is operating
in a non-Approved mode.
All FIPS users, including the Crypto Officer, must observe security guidelines at all times.
All FIPS users must:
• Keep all passwords confidential.
• Store devices and documentation in a secure area.
• Deploy devices in secure areas.
• Check audit files periodically.
• Conform to all other FIPS 140-2 security rules.
• Follow these guidelines:
• Users are trusted.
• Users abide by all security guidelines.
• Users do not deliberately compromise security.
• Users behave responsibly at all times.
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7 References and Definitions
The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.
Table 22 – References
Abbreviation Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-2] Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001
[SP800-131A] Transitions: Recommendationfor Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms
and Key Lengths, January 2011
[IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation
Program
Table 23 – Acronyms and Definitions
Acronym Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CAK Connectivity Association Key
CKN Connectivity Association Key Name
DH Diffie-Hellman
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
ICV Integrity Check Value (i.e. Tag)
ICK Integrity Check Key
KEK Key Encrypting Key
MACsec Media Access Control Security
MD5 Message Digest 5
RE Routing Engine
RSA Public-key encryption technology developed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
SCB Switch Control Board
SHA Secure Hash Algorithms
SSH Secure Shell
Triple-DES Triple - Data Encryption Standard
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Table 24 – Datasheets
Model Title URL
MX10003 MX10003 5G UNIVERSAL
ROUTING PLATFORM
https://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datashee
ts/1000619-en.pdf
EX9253
EX9250 Ethernet Switch https://www.juniper.net/assets/us/en/local/pdf/datashee
ts/1000632-en.pdf