Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client
Cryptographic Module version 4.0
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 1.2
Last update: 2016-06-13
Prepared by:
atsec information security corporation
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Austin, TX 78759
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Table of Contents
1 Introduction...........................................................................................................................3
2 Cryptographic Module Specification......................................................................................4
2.1Module Overview...........................................................................................................4
2.2FIPS 140-2 validation.....................................................................................................5
2.3Modes of Operations......................................................................................................6
3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces...........................................................................7
4 Roles, Services and Authentication.......................................................................................8
4.1Roles..............................................................................................................................8
4.2Services.........................................................................................................................8
4.3Authentication...............................................................................................................9
5 Physical Security.................................................................................................................10
6 Operational Environment....................................................................................................11
6.1Applicability.................................................................................................................11
6.2Policy...........................................................................................................................11
7 Cryptographic Key Management.........................................................................................12
7.1Random Number Generation.......................................................................................12
7.2Key / CSP Storage........................................................................................................12
7.3Key / CSP Zeroization...................................................................................................12
8 EMI/EMC..............................................................................................................................13
9 Self-Tests.............................................................................................................................14
9.1Power-Up Self-Tests......................................................................................................14
9.1.1Integrity Tests.....................................................................................................14
9.1.2Cryptographic algorithm tests............................................................................14
10 Guidance...........................................................................................................................15
10.1Crypto Officer Guidance.............................................................................................15
10.1.1Configuration Changes and FIPS Approved Mode.............................................16
10.1.2OpenSSH and NSS............................................................................................16
10.1.3OpenSSH Configuration....................................................................................16
10.2User Guidance...........................................................................................................17
10.2.1Handling Self-Test Errors...................................................................................17
Appendix A Glossary and Abbreviations.................................................................................18
Appendix B References..........................................................................................................20
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
1 Introduction
This document is the non-proprietary Security Policy for the Red Hat Enterprise Linux
OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 4.0. It contains the security rules under which
the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified
in FIPS PUB 140-2 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2) for a Security
Level 1 module.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Module Overview
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module version 4.0 (hereafter
referred to as “the module”) is a software library implementing the cryptographic support for
the SSH protocol in the Red Hat Enterprise Linux user space.
The module is implemented as a set of binary files.
Figure 1: Cryptographic Module Logical Boundary
The module is aimed to run on a general purpose computer; the physical boundary is the
surface of the case of the target platform, as shown in the diagram below:
Figure 2: Cryptographic Module Physical Boundary
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
The module will use the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 OpenSSL Module (FIPS 140-2 Certificate
#2441) as a bound module which provides the underlying cryptographic algorithms
necessary for establishing and maintaining the SSH session. In addition the integrity check
uses the cryptographic services provided by the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 OpenSSL
Module as used by the utility application of fipscheck using the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm.
This requires a copy of a Cert. #2441 validated version of the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1
OpenSSL Module to be installed on the system for the current module to operate.
The cryptographic module combines a vertical stack of Linux components intended to limit
the external interface each separate component may provide. The following software need to
be installed for the module to operate:
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module with the version of the
OpenSSH Client RPM file 6.6.1p1-12.el7_1
• The bound module of OpenSSL with FIPS 140-2 Certificate #2441
• The contents of the fipscheck RPM package (version 1.4.1-5.el7)
• The contents of the fipscheck-lib RPM package (version 1.4.1-5.el7).
The OpenSSH client RPM package of the Module includes the binary files, integrity check
HMAC files and Man Pages. Any application other than the OpenSSH client application
delivered with the aforementioned OpenSSH RPM packet is not part of the Module The FIPS
certificate for this module will not be valid if any other application than the OpenSSH client
application is used.
The files comprising the module are the following:
• /usr/sbin/ssh
• /usr/bin/fipscheck
• /usr/lib64/fipscheck/ssh.hmac
• /usr/lib64/fipscheck/fipscheck.so.1.2.1.hmac
• /usr/lib64/fipscheck/fipscheck.hmac
• /usr/lib64/fipscheck/libfipscheck.so.1.2.1.hmac
• /usr/lib64/libfipscheck.so.1.2.1
2.2 FIPS 140-2 validation
For the purpose of the FIPS 140-2 validation, the module is a software-only, multi-chip
standalone cryptographic module validated at Security Level 1. The table below shows the
security level claimed for each of the eleven sections that comprise the FIPS 140-2 standard:
FIPS 140-2 Section Security
Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 1: Security Levels
The module has been tested on the following platforms with the following configuration:
Construct
or
Hardware Processor Operating
System
Tested
With
AES-NI
Without
AES-NI
With
CPACF
HP Proliant DL380p Gen8 Intel® Xeon®
E5-2600 v3
product family
Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 7.1
yes yes n/a
IBM POWER8 Little Endian
8286-41A
POWER8E Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 7.1
n/a n/a n/a
IBM z13 IBM/S390 Red Hat Enterprise
Linux 7.1
n/a n/a yes
Table 2: Tested Platforms
The physical boundary is the surface of the case of the target platform. The logical boundary
is depicted in Figure 1: Cryptographic Module Logical Boundary.
The module also includes algorithm implementations using Processor Algorithm Acceleration
(PAA) functions provided by the different processors supported, as shown in the following
table:
Processor Processor Algorithm Acceleration
(PAA) function
Algorithm
Intel x86 AES-NI AES
Table 3: PAA function implementations
2.3 Modes of Operations
The module supports two modes of operation: FIPS approved and non-approved modes.
The module turns to the FIPS approved mode after initialization and power-on self-tests
succeed.
The mode of operation in which the module is operating can be determined by invoking a non
FIPS-approved service: if the module is in the FIPS-mode, the service will fail. The user of the
module can also check the flags /proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled: if the value in this file is
non-zero, the module will start in FIPS mode.
The Module verifies the integrity of the runtime executable using a HMAC-SHA-256 digest
operation and compares the value with the build time pre-computed value. If the digests
match, the power-up self-tests are then performed. If the power-up self-tests are successful,
the FIPS_mode flag is set to TRUE and the Module is in the FIPS Approved mode.
The services available in FIPS mode can be found in section 4.2, Table 5.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
3 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
As a software-only module, the module does not have physical ports. For the purpose of the
FIPS 140-2 validation, the physical ports are interpreted to be the physical ports of the
hardware platform on which it runs.
The logical interfaces are the application program interface (API) through which applications
request services. The following table summarizes the four logical interfaces:
Logical
interfaces
Description Physical ports mapping the
logical interfaces
Command In Invocation of the ssh command on
the command line or via the
configuration file /etc/ssh/ssh_config
and ~./.ssh/config
Environment variable
SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
Keyboard, Ethernet port
Status Out Status messages returned after the
command execution
Display, Ethernet port
Data In Input parameters of the ssh
command on the command line with
configuration file
~/.ssh/known_hosts,
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, key files
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa*, ~/.ssh/id_rsa*,
data via SSHv2 channel, data via
local or remote port-forwarding port,
data via TUN device
Keyboard, Ethernet port
Data Out Output data returned by the ssh
command
Display, Ethernet port
Table 4: Ports and Logical Interfaces
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
4 Roles, Services and Authentication
4.1 Roles
The module supports the following roles:
⚫ User role: performs Key Derivation Function, Establish & Maintain SSH Session, Close
SSH Session and Show Status
⚫ Crypto Officer role: performs module installation and configuration, perform the
selftests and terminate SSH Application
The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing the module
services.
4.2 Services
The module supports services available to users in the available roles. All services are
described in detail in the user documentation.
The following table shows the available services, the roles allowed, the Critical Security
Parameters (CSPs) involved and how they are accessed in the FIPS mode.
'R' stands for Read permission, 'W' stands for write permission and 'EX' stands for executable
permission of the module:
Service Algo(s). Note(s) / Mode(s) CAVS
Cert(s).
Role CSPs Access
Key
Derivation
SP 800-135 Key
Derivation
Function (KDF) in
the SSH protocol
version 2
N/A CVL
Certs.
#700,
#701
and
#702
User Diffie-Hellman or EC
Diffie-Hellman
shared secret,
derived keys
R, W, EX
Establish &
Maintain
SSH
Session
SP 800-135 Key
Derivation
Function in the
SSH protocol
version 2
N/A CVL
Certs.
#700,
#701
and
#702
User RSA or ECDSA client
private key
Derived session
encryption keys and
derived data
authentication
(HMAC) keys
R, W, EX
Close SSH
Session
N/A Zeroize N/A User Derived session
encryption key and
derived data
authentication
(HMAC) keys
Shared secret
W
Terminate
SSH
Application
N/A Zeroize N/A Crypto
officer
Derived session
encryption key and
data authentication
(HMAC) keys
Shared secret
W
Self-Tests HMAC-SHA-256
(uses the
cryptographic
services provided
by the the bound
OpenSSL
Integrity test
invoked by
restarting the
module
N/A Crypto
officer
HMAC integrity key R, EX
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Service Algo(s). Note(s) / Mode(s) CAVS
Cert(s).
Role CSPs Access
module)
Show
Status
N/A Via verbose mode
and exit codes
N/A User N/A R, EX
Configure
SSH Client
N/A N/A N/A Crypto
officer
N/A R, EX
Installation N/A N/A N/A Crypto
officer
N/A R, EX
Table 5: Available Cryptographic Module's Services in FIPS mode
Note: The SSH protocol has not been reviewed or tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
Only the SP 800-135 Key Derivation Function has been validated by CAVP.
4.3 Authentication
The module is a Security Level 1 software-only cryptographic module and does not implement
authentication. The role is implicitly assumed based on the service requested.
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5 Physical Security
The module is comprised of software only and thus does not claim any physical security.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Applicability
The module operates in a modifiable operational environment per FIPS 140-2 Security Level 1
specifications. The module runs on a commercially available general-purpose operating
system executing on the hardware specified in section 2.2.
6.2 Policy
The operating system is restricted to a single operator (concurrent operators are explicitly
excluded). The application that requests cryptographic services is the single user of the
module, even when the application is serving multiple clients.
In FIPS Approved mode, the ptrace(2) system call, the debugger (gdb(1)), and strace(1) shall
be not used.
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7 Cryptographic Key Management
7.1 Random Number Generation
The module does not implement any random number generator nor provides key generation.
The module only provides key derivation through the implementation of the SP 800-135 KDF.
The module calls the bound OpenSSL module to obtain the shared secret which will be used
during the SSHv2 protocol initial handshake. The module derives keys from this shared secret
through the SP 800-135 KDF implementation. When the module requests
encryption/decryption services provided by the OpenSSL bound module, the resulting derived
symmetric key (i.e. the output of the SP 800-135 KDF) will be passed to the OpenSSL bound
module via API parameters.
Here are listed the CSPs/keys details concerning storage, input, output, generation and
zeroization:
Type Keys/CSPs Key Generation Key Storage Key Entry/Output Key Zeroization
Session
Encryption
Keys
Shared
secret
N/A Module's
memory
Entry via API
parameters
Output: N/A
Zeroized by the
ssh application
Derived
keys
N/A
(Derived from the
shared secret
through the SP
800-135 KDF)
Module's
memory
Entry: N/A
Output via API
parameters
Zeroized by the
ssh application
Client
Private
Keys
RSA private
keys
N/A Module's
memory
Via API parameters Zeroized by the
ssh application
ECDSA
private
keys
N/A Module's
memory
Via API parameters Zeroized by the
ssh application
Software
Integrity
Key
HMAC Key N/A Module's
binary file
N/A N/A
Table 6: Keys/CSPs
7.2 Key / CSP Storage
Public and private keys are provided to the module by the calling process, and are destroyed
when released. The module persistently stores public keys that are associated with a client
username via the use of the file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys which is stored for each user
individually in its home directory. This file is however not part of the module.
7.3 Key / CSP Zeroization
The destruction functions overwrite the memory occupied by keys with pre-defined values
and deallocates the memory with the free() call. In case of abnormal termination, or swap
in/out of a physical memory page of a process, the keys in physical memory are overwritten
before the physical memory is allocated to another process.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
8 EMI/EMC
Product Name and Model: HP ProLiant DL380p Gen8
Regulatory Model Number: HSTNS-5163
Product Options: All
EMC: Class A
Product Name and Model: IBM z13
Product Options: All
EMC: Class A
Product Name and Model: IBM Power8 Little Endian 8286-41A
Product Options: All
EMC: Class A
The HP Proliant DL380p Gen8, IBM z13 and IBM Power8 Little Endian 8286-41A test platforms
have “been tested and found to comply with the limits for a Class A digital device, pursuant
to Part 15 of the FCC Rules. These limits are designed to provide reasonable protection
against harmful interference when the equipment is operated in a commercial environment.
This equipment generates, uses, and can radiate radio frequency energy and, if not installed
and used in accordance with the instruction manual, may cause harmful interference to radio
communications. Operation of this equipment in a residential area is likely to cause harmful
interference, in which case the user will be required to correct the interference at his own
expense.”
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
9 Self-Tests
9.1 Power-Up Self-Tests
The module performs power-up self-tests at module initialization to ensure that the module is
not corrupted and that the cryptographic algorithms work as expected. The self-tests are
automatically triggered without any user intervention.
While the module is performing the power-up tests, services are not available, and input or
output data is not possible: the module is single-threaded and will not return to the calling
application until the self-tests are completed successfully.
9.1.1 Integrity Tests
The integrity check is performed by the fipscheck application using the HMAC-SHA-256
algorithm implemented by the bound Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 OpenSSL Module.
When the OpenSSH module starts, it triggers the power-on self-tests, including the software
integrity test. The software integrity test, using the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm, constitutes a
known answer test for the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm.
The user space integrity verification is performed as follows: the OpenSSH Client application
links with the library libfipscheck.so which is intended to execute fipscheck to verify the
integrity of the OpenSSH Client application file using the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm. Upon
calling the FIPSCHECK_verify() function provided with libfipscheck.so, fipscheck is loaded and
executed, and the following steps are performed:
1. OpenSSL, loaded by fipscheck, performs the integrity check of the OpenSSL library
files using the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm
2. fipscheck performs the integrity check of its application file using the HMAC-SHA-256
algorithm provided by the OpenSSL Module
3. fipscheck automatically verifies the integrity of libfipscheck.so before processing
requests of calling applications
4. The fipscheck application performs the integrity check of the OpenSSH Client
application file. The fipscheck computes the HMAC-SHA-256 checksum of that and
compares the computed value with the value stored inside the
/usr/lib64/fipscheck/<applicationfilename>.hmac checksum file. The fipscheck
application returns the appropriate exit value based on the comparison result: zero if
the checksum is OK, an error code otherwise (which brings the OpenSSH Module into
the error state). The libfipscheck.so library reports the result to the OpenSSH Client
application.
If any of those steps fail, an error code is returned and the OpenSSH Module enters the error
state.
9.1.2 Cryptographic algorithm tests
The power-up self tests for the SP 800-135 KDF is covered by the SHS Known-Answer-Tests
performed by the bound Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 OpenSSL Module.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
10 Guidance
The following guidance items are to be used for assistance in maintaining the module's
validated status while in use.
10.1 Crypto Officer Guidance
The version of the RPMs containing the FIPS validated Module is stated in section 2.1 above.
The Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.1 OpenSSL Module referenced in section 2.1 must be installed
according to its Security Policy.
The RPM package of the Module can be installed by standard tools recommended for the
installation of RPM packages on a Red Hat Enterprise Linux system (for example, yum, rpm,
and the RHN remote management tool).
For proper operation of the in-module integrity verification, the prelink has to be disabled.
This can be done by setting PRELINKING=no in the /etc/sysconfig/prelink configuration file. If
the libraries were already prelinked, the prelink should be undone on all the system files using
the 'prelink -u -a' command.
Only the cipher types listed in section 1.2 are allowed to be used.
To bring the Module into FIPS Approved mode, perform the following:
1. Install the dracut-fips package:
# yum install dracut-fips
2. Recreate the INITRAMFS image:
# dracut -f
After regenerating the initramfs, the Crypto Officer has to append the following string to the
kernel command line by changing the setting in the boot loader:
fips=1
If /boot or /boot/efi resides on a separate partition, the kernel parameter boot=<partition
of /boot or /boot/efi> must be supplied. The partition can be identified with the command
"df /boot"
or
"df /boot/efi"
respectively. For example:
$ df /boot
Filesystem 1K-blocks Used Available Use% Mounted on
/dev/sda1 233191 30454 190296 14% /boot
The partition of /boot is located on /dev/sda1 in this example. Therefore, the following string
needs to be appended to the kernel command line:
"boot=/dev/sda1"
Reboot to apply these settings.
Because FIPS 140-2 has certain restrictions on the use of cryptography which are not always
wanted, the Module needs to be put into FIPS Approved mode explicitly: if the file
/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled exists and contains a numeric value other than 0, the Module is
put into FIPS Approved mode at initialization time. This is the mechanism recommended for
ordinary use, activated by using the fips=1 option in the boot loader, as described above.
If an application that uses the Module for its cryptography is put into a chroot environment,
the Crypto Officer must ensure one of the above methods is available to the Module from
within the chroot environment to ensure entry into FIPS Approved mode. Failure to do so will
not allow the application to properly enter FIPS Approved mode.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Once the Module has been put into FIPS Approved mode, it is not possible to switch back to
standard mode without terminating the process first.
The version of the RPM containing the validated Module is the version listed in chapter 2.1.
The integrity of the RPM is automatically verified during the installation of the Module and the
Crypto Officer shall not install the RPM file if the RPM tool indicates an integrity error.
10.1.1 Configuration Changes and FIPS Approved Mode
Use care whenever making configuration changes that could potentially prevent access to the
/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled flag (fips=1) in the file/proc. If the module does not detect this
flag during initialization, it does not enable the FIPS approved mode. For example, executing
the module inside a chroot without the proc file system available, would instantiate the
module in non-approved mode.
All user space modules depend on this file for transitioning into FIPS approved mode.
10.1.2 OpenSSH and NSS
The OpenSSH client is able to store the RSA and ECDSA host / user keys when using the
UseNSS configuration option. When NSS is used to manage RSA / DSA keys, the signature
generation and verification of the host or user keys is performed by NSS as well.
The module of OpenSSH is defined to be bound to OpenSSL only as outlined in chapter 1. The
crypto officer can only use the UseNSS configuration option when the FIPS 140-2 validated
NSS library is installed and used by OpenSSH.
10.1.3 OpenSSH Configuration
The user must not use DSA keys for performing key-based authentication as OpenSSH only
allows DSA keys with 1024 bit size which are disallowed as per SP800-131A.
The user must not accept DSA host keys potentially offered during the first contact of an SSH
server as OpenSSH only allows DSA keys with 1024 bit size which are disallowed as per
SP800- 131A.
When re-generating RSA host keys, the crypto officer should generate RSA keys with a size of
2048 bit or higher according to [SP800-131A]. The crypto officer should inform the user base
to not use RSA keys with key sizes smaller than 2048 bits.
In FIPS 140-2 mode, the module enforces the following restrictions. When these restrictions
are violated by configuration options or command line options, the module will not be in the
FIPS mode of oepration:
• SSH protocol version 1 is not allowed
• GSSAPI is not allowed
• Only the following ciphers are allowed:
• aes128-ctr
• aes192-ctr
• aes256-ctr
• aes128-cbc
• aes192-cbc
• aes256-cbc
• 3des-cbc
• rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
Only the following message authentication codes are allowed:
• hmac-sha1
• hmac-sha2-256
• hmac-sha2-512
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
• hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
• hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
• hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
10.2 User Guidance
See the ssh(1) man page for general usage documentation of the ssh client.
When connecting to a previously unknown server, the user will be prompted to verify a
fingerprint of the server's public key. This must be done by consulting a trusted source.
10.2.1 Handling Self-Test Errors
OpenSSL's self tests failures may prevent OpenSSH from operating. See the Guidance section
in the OpenSSL Security Policy for instructions on handling OpenSSL self test failures.
The OpenSSH self test consists of the software integrity test. If the integrity test fails,
OpenSSH enters an error state. The only recovery from this type of failure is to reinstall the
OpenSSH module. If you downloaded the software, verify the package hash to confirm a
proper download.
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Appendix A Glossary and Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-NI Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
CFB Cipher Feedback
CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code
CMT Cryptographic Module Testing
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CPACF Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Functions
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CTR Counter Mode
CVT Component Verification Testing
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFT Derivation Function Test
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
ECB Electronic Code Book
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
FFC Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
FSM Finite State Model
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
ICM Integer Counter Mode
KAS Key Agreement Schema
KAT Known Answer Test
MAC Message Authentication Code
NDF No Derivation Function
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology
NDRNG Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator
OFB Output Feedback
O/S Operating System
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
PAA Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PR Prediction Resistance
PSS Probabilistic Signature Scheme
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Addleman
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SSH Secure Shell
TDES Triple DES
UI User Interface
XTS XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext Stealing
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Appendix B References
FIPS180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
March 2012
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips 180-4.pdf
FIPS186-4 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
July 2013
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
FIPS197 Advanced Encryption Standard
November 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
FIPS198-1 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
July 2008
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips198 1/FIPS-198 1_final.pdf
PKCS#1 Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.1
February 2003
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt
RFC3394 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm
September 2002
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt
RFC5649 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding
Algorithm
September 2009
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5649.txt
SP800-38A NIST Special Publication 800-38A - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques
December 2001
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
SP800-38B NIST Special Publication 800-38B - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication
May 2005
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38B/SP_800-38B.pdf
SP800-38C NIST Special Publication 800-38C - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and
Confidentiality
May 2004
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated
July20_2007.pdf
SP800-38D NIST Special Publication 800-38D - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC
November 2007
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
SP800-38E NIST Special Publication 800-38E - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS AES Mode for Confidentiality on
Storage Devices
January 2010
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf
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Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic ModuleFIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
SP800-38F NIST Special Publication 800-38F - Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping
December 2012
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
SP800-56A NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2 - Recommendation for
Pair Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography
May 2013
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800 56Ar2.pdf
SP800-56C Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-
Expansion
November 2011
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-56C/SP-800-56C.pdf
SP800-67 NIST Special Publication 800-67 Revision 1 - Recommendation for
the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher
January 2012
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-67-Rev1/SP-800-67-Rev1.pdf
SP800-90A NIST Special Publication 800-90A - Recommendation for Random
Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators
January 2012
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf
SP800-90B NIST Draft Special Publication 800-90B - Recommendation for the
Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation
August 2012
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-90/draft-sp800-90b.pdf
SP800-108 NIST Special Publication 800-108 - Recommendation for Key
Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions
October 2009
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-108/sp800-108.pdf
SP800-131A NIST Special Publication 800-131A - Transitions: Recommendation
for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key
Lengths
January 2011
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-131A/sp800-131A.pdf
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