``
2 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
Version: 2.0.3
Date: 07/08/2024
Copyright © 2020 nCipher Security Limited. All rights reserved.
Copyright in this document is property of nCipher Security Limited. This document may be reproduced and
distributed in whole (i.e., without modification) provided that the copyright notice and Entrust branding has
not been removed or altered. Words and logos marked with ® or ™ are trademarks of nCipher Security Limited
or its affiliates in the EU and other countries.
Mac and OS X are trademarks of Apple Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries.
Microsoft and Windows are either registered trademarks or trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United
States and/or other countries.
Linux® is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries.
Information in this document is subject to change without notice.
nCipher Security Limited makes no warranty of any kind with regard to this information, including, but not
limited to, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. nCipher Security
Limited shall not be liable for errors contained herein or for incidental or consequential damages concerned
with the furnishing, performance or use of this material.
Where translations have been made in this document English is the canonical language.
nCipher Security Limited
Registered Office: One Station Square,
Cambridge, CB1 2GA, United Kingdom
Registered in England No. 11673268
nCipher is an Entrust company.
Entrust, Datacard, and the Hexagon Logo are trademarks, registered trademarks, and/or service marks of
Entrust Corporation in the U.S. and/or other countries. All other brand or product names are the property of
their respective owners. Because we are continuously improving our products and services, Entrust
Corporation reserves the right to change specifications without prior notice. Entrust is an equal opportunity
employer.
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 3 of 44
Contents
1 General...............................................................................................................................................4
2 Cryptographic module specification..................................................................................................5
2.1 Scope..........................................................................................................................................5
2.2 Cryptographic module description ............................................................................................5
2.3 Supported cryptographic algorithms .........................................................................................6
3 Cryptographic module interfaces ....................................................................................................11
4 Roles, services and authentication..................................................................................................12
4.1 Roles.........................................................................................................................................12
4.2 Services ....................................................................................................................................13
5 Software/Firmware security............................................................................................................25
6 Operational environment................................................................................................................26
7 Physical security...............................................................................................................................27
8 Non-invasive security.......................................................................................................................28
9 Sensitive security parameters management ...................................................................................29
9.1 Keys and Sensitive Security Parameters ..................................................................................29
9.2 SSP zeroization methods..........................................................................................................35
9.3 Entropy sources........................................................................................................................35
10 Self tests...........................................................................................................................................36
10.1Pre-operational self tests.........................................................................................................36
10.2Conditional self tests................................................................................................................36
10.3Periodic self tests .....................................................................................................................38
11 Life-cycle assurance.........................................................................................................................39
11.1Delivery ....................................................................................................................................39
11.2Cryptographic module identification.......................................................................................39
11.3Approved mode of operation ..................................................................................................41
11.4End of life .................................................................................................................................41
12 Mitigation of other attacks..............................................................................................................42
Contact Us.............................................................................................................................................43
4 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
1 General
This document defines the non-proprietary Security Policy enforced by the nShield 5s Hardware
Security Module, i.e. the Cryptographic Module, to meet with the security requirements in FIPS 140-
3 and ISO/IEC 19790.
The Cryptographic Module meets overall FIPS 140-3 Security Level 3. The following table specifies
the security level in detail.
ISO/IEC 24759 Section 6.
[Number Below]
FIPS 140-3 Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic Module Specification 3
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 3
4 Roles, Services and Authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational Environment N/A
7 Physical Security 3
8 Non-invasive Security N/A
9 Sensitive Security Parameter Management 3
10 Self-Tests 3
11 Life-cycle Assurance 3
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 1 Security levels
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 5 of 44
2 Cryptographic module specification
2.1 Scope
The following product hardware variants and firmware version(s) are in scope of this Security Policy.
Model Hardware
[Part Number and
Version]
Firmware
Version
Distinguishing Features
nShield 5s F3
model number nC5536E
PCB Assembly Part
Number: PCA10005-01
PCB Assembly Revision:
03, 04
primary:
13.4.5
recovery:
13.2.4
uboot: 1.1.0
PCIe form factor
nShield 5s for nShield 5c
and for nShield HSMi
model number nC5536N
PCIe form factor identical to the nShield 5s F3 (nC5536E), embedded
inside the nShield 5c or the nShield HSMi network appliances.
Table 2 Cryptographic Module Tested Configuration
2.2 Cryptographic module description
The nShield 5s Hardware Security Module (HSM) is a multi-chip embedded hardware Cryptographic
Module as defined in FIPS 140-3, which comes in a PCI express board form factor protected by a
tamper resistant enclosure, and performs encryption, digital signing, and key management on behalf
of an extensive range of commercial and custom-built applications including public key
infrastructures (PKIs), identity management systems, application-level encryption and tokenization,
SSL/TLS, and code signing.
The nShield 5s HSM is also embedded inside the nShield 5c or the nShield HSMi, which are network-
attached appliances delivering cryptographic services as a shared network resource for distributed
applications and virtual machines, giving organizations a highly secure solution for establishing
physical and logical controls for server-based systems.
The table below shows the nShield 5s HSM (left, representative of the two hardware variants
nC5536E, nC5536N) and the nShield 5c appliance (right).
Table 3 nShield 5s (left) and nShield 5c (right)
The cryptographic boundary is delimited in red in the images in the table below. It is delimited by
the heat sink and the outer edge of the potting material on the top and bottom of the PCB.
6 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
Table 4 Cryptographic module boundary
The module enforces that only approved services are available and plaintext import/export of secret
or private keys is not allowed. Refer to Approved mode of operation.
2.3 Supported cryptographic algorithms
This section describes the cryptographic mechanisms and security functions provided and used by
the cryptographic module.
2.3.1 Approved algorithms
The following tables describe the approved cryptographic algorithms supported by the
Cryptographic Module.
2.3.1.1 nCore crypto
CAVP Cert Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
A3707 AES
[FIPS 197] [SP 800-
38A] [SP 800-38D]
ECB
CBC
GCM
128 bits
192 bits
256 bits
Data encryption/decryption
A3707 KTS (AES)
[SP 800-38F] [SP
800-38D]
KW
KWP
GCM
128 bits
192 bits
256 bits
(Key establishment methodology
provides
between 128 and 256 bits of
encryption strength)
Key wrapping/unwrapping
A3707 KTS-IFC KTS-OAEP-basic with
SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256,
SHA3-384, SHA3-512
2048 bits
3072 bits
4096 bits
(Key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 152 bits
of encryption strength)
Key transport (encapsulation,
un-encapsulation)
Vendor
affirmed
CKG
[SP 800-133rev2]
Section 4 “Using the Output of a
Random Bit Generator“
n/a Key generation
A3707 RSA
[FIPS 186-4]
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5
RSASSA-PSS
1024 bits (verification only)
2048 bits
Key generation
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 7 of 44
CAVP Cert Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
3072 bits
4096 bits
Signature generation and
verification
A3707 ECDSA
[FIPS 186-4]
n/a NIST P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
NIST K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571
NIST B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571
Key generation
Key verification
Signature generation and
verification
A3707 DSA
[FIPS 186-4]
n/a L = 1024 bits, N = 160 bits
(verification only)
L = 2048 bits, N = 224 bits
L = 2048 bits, N = 256 bits
L = 3072 bits, N = 256 bits
Key generation
Signature generation and
verification
Domain parameter
generation and verification
A3707 HMAC
[FIPS 198]
HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA2-224,
HMAC-SHA2-256, HMAC-SHA2-384,
HMAC-SHA2-512, HMAC-SHA3-224,
HMAC-SHA3-256, HMAC-SHA3-384,
HMAC-SHA3-512
≥ 112 bits MAC generation and
verification
A3707 AES
[SP 800-38B]
CMAC 128 bits
192 bits
256 bits
MAC generation and
verification
A3707 KMAC
[SP 800-185]
KMAC-128
KMAC-256
≥ 112 bits MAC generation and
verification
A3707 KAS-FFC
[SP 800-56Arev3]
DH MODP-2048
MODP-3072
MODP-4096
MODP-6144
MODP-8192
FB
FC
(Key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 200 bits
of encryption strength)
Key agreement
A3707 Safe Primes Key
Generation
[SP 800-56Arev3]
KeyGen for KAS-FFC Safe prime groups: MODP-2048,
MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-
6144, MODP-8192
(Provides between 112 and 200 bits
of encryption strength.)
KAS-FFC key generation
A3707 Safe Primes Key
Verification
[SP 800-56Arev3]
KeyVer for KAS-FFC Safe prime groups: MODP-2048,
MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-
6144, MODP-8192
KAS-FFC key verification
A3707 KAS-ECC
[SP 800-56Arev3]
ECDH
ECMQV
NIST P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
NIST K-233, K-283, K-409, K-571
NIST B-233, B-283, B-409, B-571
Key agreement
8 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
CAVP Cert Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
(Key establishment methodology
provides between 112 and 256 bits
of encryption strength)
A3707 KBKDF
[SP 800-108rev1]
counter mode
CMAC-AES256
n/a Key derivation
A3707 SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
SHA-1
SHA2-224
SHA2-256
SHA2-384
SHA2-512
n/a Message digest
A3707 SHA-3
[FIPS 202]
SHA3-224
SHA3-256
SHA3-384
SHA3-512
n/a Message digest
A3707 DRBG
[SP 800-90Arev1]
Hash_DRBG 256 bits of security strength Random bit generation
Table 5 nCore - Approved Algorithms
Note: For AES GCM, the 96-bit IV is internally generated using the approved DRBG as per IG C.H.
2.3.1.2 Bootloader crypto
CAVP Cert Algorithm and Standard Mode/Method Description / Key Size(s) / Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
A2404 RSA
[FIPS 186-4]
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 4096 bits Signature verification
A2404 SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
SHA2-256 n/a Message digest
Table 6 Bootloader - Approved Algorithms
2.3.1.3 SSH crypto
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key Size(s) /
Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
A3706 AES
[FIPS 197] [SP
800-38A] [SP
800-38D]
CTR
GCM
ECB
128 bits Data encryption/decryption
Vendor
affirmed
CKG
[SP 800-
133rev2]
Section 4 “Using the
Output of a Random Bit
Generator“
n/a Key generation
A3706 ECDSA
[FIPS 186-4]
n/a NIST P-256
NIST P-521
Signature generation and verification
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 9 of 44
CAVP
Cert
Algorithm and
Standard
Mode/Method Description / Key Size(s) /
Key
Strength(s)
Use / Function
A3706 HMAC
[FIPS 198]
HMAC-SHA2-256 ≥ 112 bits MAC generation and verification
A3706 KAS-ECC-SSC
[SP 800-
56Arev3]
ECDH NIST P-256
(Key establishment
methodology provides
between 128 bits of
encryption strength)
Key agreement
A3706 CVL - Secure
Shell (SSHv2)
KDF
[SP 800-
135rev1]
n/a n/a Key derivation
A3706 KAS-ECC
[SP 800-
56Arev3 [SP
800-135rev1]
ECDH NIST P-256
(Key establishment
methodology provides
between 128 bits of
encryption strength)
Key agreement, KAS-ECC-SSC (cert# A3707) in
conjunction with SSHv2 KDF of SP 800-135rev1
(cert# A3707), which is compliant with IG D.F.
Scenario 2, path 2.
A3706 SHS
[FIPS 180-4]
SHA2-256
SHA2-512
n/a Message digest
Table 7 SSH - Approved Algorithms
Note: As per IG D.C., no parts of this protocol, other than the approved cryptographic algorithms and
the KDFs, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
Note: For AES GCM, the module is compliant with RFCs 4252, 4253 and 5647, and the IV is generated
according to the SSHv2 protocol IV generation, as per IG C.H. In case the module’s power is lost and
then restored, a new key for use with the AES-GCM encryption/decryption is established.
2.3.2 Allowed algorithms
The following table describes the allowed cryptographic algorithms supported by the Cryptographic
Module.
2.3.2.1 nCore crypto
Algorithm Caveat Use/Function
ECDSA
[FIPS 186-4]
• brainpoolP224r1/P224t1 (112 bits of strength)
• brainpoolP256r1/P256t1 (128 bits of strength)
• brainpoolP320r1/P320t1 (160 bits of strength)
• brainpoolP384r1/P384t1 (192 bits of strength)
• brainpoolP512r1/P512t1 (256 bits of strength)
Key generation
Signature generation and verification
KAS-ECC
[SP 800-56Arev3]
• brainpoolP224r1/P224t1 (112 bits of strength)
• brainpoolP256r1/P256t1 (128 bits of strength)
• brainpoolP320r1/P320t1 (160 bits of strength)
Key agreement
10 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
Algorithm Caveat Use/Function
• brainpoolP384r1/P384t1 (192 bits of strength)
• brainpoolP512r1/P512t1 (256 bits of strength)
Table 8 nCore - Non-Approved Algorithms Allowed in the Approved Mode of Operation
2.3.3 Non-approved algorithms
Only approved and non-approved but allowed cryptographic algorithms are supported.
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 11 of 44
3 Cryptographic module interfaces
The Cryptographic Module provides the following physical ports:
• Status LED
• Recovery button
• Smartcard reader serial port
• Host interface PCIe bus
• Battery (including external backup battery power supply)
The following table maps the FIPS logical interfaces and physical ports to the module´s services
Physical port Logical interface Data that passes over
port/interface
PCIe bus Data input nCoreAPI, Updater, SSHAdmin, Launcher
Data output nCoreAPI, SSHAdmin, Launcher
Control input nCoreAPI, SSHAdmin, Setup, Monitor, Launcher, Discovery
Status output nCoreAPI, Updater, Setup, Monitor, Launcher, Discovery
Power n/a
Smartcard reader serial port Data input APDU commands
Data output APDU commands
Status LED Status output n/a
Recovery button Control input n/a
Battery Power n/a
Table 9 Ports and Interfaces
Note: Control output is omitted because the module does not implement it.
12 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
4 Roles, services and authentication
4.1 Roles
The Cryptographic Module supports the following roles:
• Platform Crypto Officer (PCO)
• nShield Security Officer (NSO)
• User Client (UC)
Platform Crypto Officer (PCO)
This role is responsible of administration tasks of the HSM platform.
To assume this role, an operator needs to open a session with the SSHAdmin, Updater, Setup,
Monitor or Launcher services, using its SSH private key for each service.
When the module is in factory state, the SSHAdmin client SSH keys are set to a default value. These
keys must be changed with the SSHAdmin set service before the module can be initialised and
used.
nShield Security Officer (NSO)
This role is represented by Administrator Card holders, which have access to KNSO and are
responsible for the overall management of a Security World.
To assume this role, an operator or group of operators need to present a quorum m of N of
smartcards, and the KNSO Key Blob. Each operator is identified by its individual smartcard, which
contains a unique logical token share.
User Client (UC)
This role is authorised to use the general purpose cryptographic services offered by the
cryptographic module.
To assume this role, a client application needs to open a session with the nCoreAPI service, using its
SSH private key.
Role Service Input Output
PCO SSHAdmin
Updater
Setup
Monitor
Launcher
Data
Control
Data
Status
UC nCoreAPI Data
Control
Data
Status
NSO nCoreAPI Data
Control
Data
Status
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 13 of 44
Table 10 Roles, Service Commands, Input and Output
Role Authentication Method Authentication Strength
PCO
UC
ECDSA P-256, P-521 client key
authentication as part of
establishing an SSH based
secure channel.
Identity-based and required.
The ciphersuites used are:
ecdh-sha2-nistp256 , ecdh-sha2-nistp521, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes128-
ctr@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
This results in a security strength of 128 bits. A random authentication attempt gives is a probability
of success of 2-128, which is less than one in 1,000,000.
The module can process around 220 commands per minute. This gives a probability of success in a
one minute period of 2-108, which is less than one in 100,000.
NSO smartcard authentication.
Identity-based and required.
A logical token share stored in a Smartcard or Softcard is encrypted and MAC'ed. An attacker would
need to guess the encrypted share value and the associated MAC in order to be able to load a valid
Logical token share into the module. This requires, as a minimum, guessing a 256-bit HMAC-SHA256
value, which gives a security strength of 256 bits. A random authentication attempt gives is a
probability of success of 2-256 , which is less than one in 1,000,000.
The module can process around 220 commands per minute. This gives a probability of success in a
one minute period of 2-236, which is less than 10-5, which is less than one in 100,000.
Table 11 Roles and Authentication
4.2 Services
The following table describes the services provided by the Cryptographic Module and the access
policy.
The Access column presents the access level given to the SSP
G = Generate: The module generates or derives the SSP.
R = Read: The SSP is read from the module (e.g. the SSP is output).
W = Write: The SSP is updated, imported, or written to the module.
E = Execute: The module uses the SSP in performing a cryptographic operation.
Z = Zeroise: The module zeroises the SSP
4.2.1 Setup service
Service Description Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access rights
to Keys
and/or SSPs
Indicator
info This is a Show Module's
Versioning Information service.
This command prints out the
contents of the board-id rom file
and a number of flags that
indicate which other setup
subcommands have been
previously executed as
determined by the existence or
non-existence of the relevant files
in long-term storage. It also
prints out the tag and value pairs
Data
encryption/decryption
(AES CTR, GCM)
MAC generation /
verification (HMAC)
KSESSION - SSH PCO E return
value 0
14 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
Service Description Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access rights
to Keys
and/or SSPs
Indicator
of any options set with the setopt
subcommand.
factorystate This is the Perform Zeroisation
service.
It zeroizes unprotected SSPs and
returns the module to factory
state. It then initiates a module
reboot.
Data
encryption/decryption
(AES CTR, GCM)
MAC generation /
verification (HMAC)
KRESET (note: any SSP
that is derived from
KRESET, or protected by
an SSP derived from
KRESET, will also be
effectively zeroised.)
KSESSION - SSH
KUSER_SSH,
KSSH_SETUP,
KSSH_SSHADMIN,
KSSH_MONITOR,
KSSH_UPDATER,
KCONTAINER,
KCONTAINERSSH,
KSSH_NCORE
PCO Z
E
G
(note: SSH server
authentication keys
are only generated on
first reboot after a
setup
factorystate
command)
return
value 0
settime This subcommand sets the system
date and time.
Data
encryption/decryption
(AES CTR, GCM)
MAC generation /
verification (HMAC)
KSESSION - SSH PCO E return
value 0
gettime This subcommand returns
the system date and time.
Data
encryption/decryption
(AES CTR, GCM)
MAC generation /
verification (HMAC)
KSESSION - SSH PCO E return
value 0
Table 12 Approved Services
The approved service indicator is the successful completion of these services (return value 0), as
they only use approved mechanisms.
4.2.2 SSHAdmin service
Service Description Approved Security Functions Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access
rights
to Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
set Loads the client public key in the module, that
will be used to authenticate the requester of a
particular service
Data encryption/decryption
(AES CTR, GCM)
MAC generation / verification
(HMAC)
KSSH_CLIENT pub
KSESSION - SSH
PCO W
E
return
value 0
list Obtains the client public key for the service
given by the 'role' parameter.
Data encryption/decryption
(AES CTR, GCM)
MAC generation / verification
(HMAC)
KSSH_CLIENT pub
KSESSION - SSH
PCO R
E
return
value 0
get-
serverkey
Obtains the server public key for the service
given by the 'role' parameter.
Data encryption/decryption
(AES CTR, GCM)
KSSH_NCORE pub PCO R
R
return
value 0
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 15 of 44
Service Description Approved Security Functions Keys and/or SSPs Roles Access
rights
to Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
MAC generation / verification
(HMAC)
KSSH_UPDATER
pub
KSSH_SETUP pub
KSSH_SSHADMIN
pub
KSSH_MONITOR
pub
KSESSION - SSH
R
E
Table 13 Approved Services
The approved service indicator is the successful completion of these services (return value 0), as
they only use approved mechanisms.
4.2.3 Updater service
Service Description Approved Security
Functions
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
info This is a Show Module's Versioning Information service.
Obtains the version number of the HSM firmware.
Data encryption/decryption
(AES)
MAC generation /
verification (HMAC)
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO E return
value 0
receive Transmits a file (intended to be an npkg upgrade file) to
the HSM.
Data encryption/decryption
(AES)
MAC generation /
verification (HMAC)
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO E return
value 0
load Verifies that a file on the HSM filesystem is a valid npkg
upgrade file and, if so loads the file onto its flash
partition.
Digital signature verification
(RSA, ECDSA)
Data encryption/decryption
(AES)
MAC generation /
verification (HMAC)
NSBIK pub
NPSK pub
NFIK pub
NLIK pub
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO E
E
E
E
E
return
value 0
setminvsn Sets the minimum VSN that the module will use to
check, when the 'load' command above is run, that the
firmware specified can be validly loaded onto this
module.
Data encryption/decryption
(AES)
MAC generation /
verification (HMAC)
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO E return
value 0
Table 14 Approved Services
The approved service indicator is the successful completion of these services (return value 0), as
they only use approved mechanisms.
16 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
4.2.4 Monitor service
Service Description Approved Security Functions Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
getlog This is the Show Status service.
Obtains the log of the system
Data encryption/decryption (AES
CTR, GCM)
MAC generation / verification
(HMAC)
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO E return value
0
clearlog Clears the log of the system Data encryption/decryption (AES
CTR, GCM)
MAC generation / verification
(HMAC)
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO E return value
0
getenvstats Obtains the environmental stats from
the system
Data encryption/decryption (AES
CTR, GCM)
MAC generation / verification
(HMAC)
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO E return value
0
Table 15 Approved Services
The approved service indicator is the successful completion of these services (return value 0), as
they only use approved mechanisms.
4.2.5 Launcher service
Service Description Approved Security Functions Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
receive Uploads a file to the launcher service
for temporary storage.
Data encryption/decryption
(AES CTR, GCM)
MAC generation / verification
(HMAC)
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO E return
value 0
machine
create
Creates a SEE machine container from a
received file, after successfully being validated.
Digital signature verification
(ECDSA)
Data encryption/decryption
(AES CTR, GCM)
MAC generation / verification
(HMAC)
DSK pub
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO E
E
return
value 0
machine list Lists SEE machines along with their current
states.
Data encryption/decryption
(AES CTR, GCM)
MAC generation / verification
(HMAC)
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO E return
value 0
start Starts a SEE machine after successfully being
validated.
Digital signature verification
(ECDSA)
Data encryption/decryption
(AES CTR, GCM)
MAC generation / verification
(HMAC)
DSK pub
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO E
E
return
value 0
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 17 of 44
Service Description Approved Security Functions Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
stop Stops a SEE machine. Data encryption/decryption
(AES CTR, GCM)
MAC generation / verification
(HMAC)
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO E return
value 0
destroy Deletes a SEE machine. Data encryption/decryption
(AES CTR, GCM)
MAC generation / verification
(HMAC)
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO E return
value 0
ids
commands
Management of the SEE machine signing
certificates.
Digital signature verification
(ECDSA)
Data encryption/decryption
(AES)
MAC generation / verification
(HMAC)
DSK pub
ESK pub
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO R, W, E
E
E
return
value 0
see-log
commands
Management of the SEE machine logs. Data encryption/decryption
(AES)
MAC generation / verification
(HMAC)
KSESSION -
SSH
PCO E return
value 0
Table 16 Approved Services
The approved service indicator is the successful completion of these services (return value 0), as
they only use approved mechanisms.
4.2.6 Discovery service
Service Description Approved
Security
Functions
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
python-
zeroconf
The (logical) network connection between host and HSM uses
TCP/IP protocols over the PCIe bus; however, for ease of
setup it needs to avoid requiring IP configuration by the user.
Therefore the HSM uses zeroconf: each end of the virtual
'network segment' has only a link-local (IPv4 and IPv6)
address. The HSM's address can be discovered by the host
using multicast DNS, responding to mDNS queries.
- - Unauthenticated - return
value 0
Table 17 Approved Services
The approved service indicator is the successful completion of these services (return value 0), as
they only use approved mechanisms.
18 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
4.2.7 nCoreAPI service
Service Description Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
Big number operation
Cmd_BignumOp
Performs an operation on a
large integer.
- - UC - return
status OK
Make Blob
Cmd_MakeBlob
Creates a Key blob containing
the key. Note that the key ACL
needs to authorize the
operation.
Key derivation (KBKDF)
Key wrapping (AES CBC
and HMAC, KTS-IFC)
KA,
KRE_BLOBKEY,
KR, KM, KNSO,
LTx
BLOBKE,
BLOBKM
UC R
E
return
status OK
Bulk channel
Cmd_ChannelOpen
Cmd_ChannelUpdate
Provides a bulk processing
channel for crypto operations
Encryption and
decryption (AES ECB,
CBC, GCM)
MAC generation and
verification (HMAC,
KMAC, AES CMAC)
Digital signature
generation and
verification (RSA,
ECDSA, DSA)
KA UC E return
status OK
Check User Action
Cmd_CheckUserAction
Determines whether the ACL
associated with a key allows a
specific operator defined
action.
- KNSO, KA UC R return
status OK
Clear Unit
Cmd_ClearUnit
This is the Perform Self-tests
service.
Zeroises all keys, tokens and
shares that are loaded in RAM.
Will cause the module to
reboot and perform self-tests.
- KA, KR,
IMPATHKE,
IMPATHKM,
RAKME, RAKMA
UC Z return
status OK
Set Module Key
Cmd_SetKM
Allows a key to be stored
internally as a Module key
(KM) value. The ACL needs to
authorize this operation.
Message digest (SHA-1) KM NSO W return
status OK
Remove Module Key
Cmd_RemoveKM
Deletes the KM with a given
KM hash value from non-
volatile memory.
- KM NSO Z return
status OK
Duplicate key handle
Cmd_Duplicate
Creates a second instance of a
Key with the same ACL and
returns a handle to the new
instance.
Note that the source key ACL
needs to authorize this
operation.
- KA UC R return
status OK
Enable feature
Cmd_StaticFeatureEnable
Enables the service. This
service requires a certificate
- - UC - return
status OK
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 19 of 44
Service Description Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
signed by the Master Feature
Enable key.
Encryption / decryption
Cmd_Encrypt
Cmd_Decrypt
Encryption and decryption
using the provided key handle.
Data encryption and
decryption (AES ECB,
CBC, GCM)
KA UC E return
status OK
Erase from smartcard /softcard
Cmd_EraseFile
Cmd_EraseShare
Removes a file or a share from
a smartcard or softcard
- - UC - return
status OK
Format Token
Cmd_FormatToken
Formats a smartcard or a
softcard.
- - UC - return
status OK
File operations
Cmd_FileCopy
Cmd_FileCreate
Cmd_FileErase
Cmd_FileOp
Performs file operations in the
module.
- - UC - return
status OK
Force module to fail
Cmd_Fail
Causes the module to enter a
failure state.
- - UC - return
status OK
Generate prime number
Cmd_GeneratePrime
Generates a random prime. Random bit generation
(DRBG)
DRBG entropy
input, seed,
internal state ('V'
and 'C')
UC E return
status OK
Generate random number
Cmd_GenerateRandom
Generates a random number
from the Approved DRBG.
Random bit generation
(DRBG)
DRBG entropy
input, seed,
internal state ('V'
and 'C')
UC E return
status OK
Get ACL
Cmd_GetACL
Get the ACL of a given key. - KA UC R return
status OK
Get key application data
Cmd_GetAppData
Get the application data field
from a key.
- KA UC R return
status OK
Get challenge
Cmd_GetChallenge
Get a random challenge that
can be used in fresh
certificates.
Random bit generation
(DRBG)
DRBG entropy
input, seed,
internal state ('V'
and 'C')
UC E return
status OK
Get KLF2
Cmd_GetKLF2
Get a handle to the Module
Long Term (KLF2) public key.
- - UC - return
status OK
Get Key Information
Cmd_GetKeyInfo
Cmd_GetKeyInfoEx
Get the type, length and hash
of a key.
Message digest (SHA-1) KA UC R return
status OK
20 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
Service Description Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
Get module signing key
Cmd_GetKML
Get a handle to the KML public
key.
- KML UC R return
status OK
Get list of slot in the module
Cmd_GetSlotList
Get the list of slots that are
available from the module.
- - UC - return
status OK
Get Logical Token Info
Cmd_GetLogicalTokenInfo
Cmd_GetLogicalTokenInfoEx
Get information about a
Logical Token: hash, state and
number of shares.
Message digest (SHA-1) LTx UC R return
status OK
Get list of module keys
Cmd_GetKMList
Get the list of the hashes of all
module keys and the KNSO.
Message digest (SHA-1) KM, KNSO UC R return
status OK
Get module state
Cmd_GetModuleState
Returns unsigned data about
the current state of the
module.
- - UC - return
status OK
Get real time clock
Cmd_GetRTC
Get the current time from the
module Real Time Clock.
- - UC - return
status OK
Get share access control list
Cmd_GetShareACL
Get the Share's ACL. - SHAREKEY UC R return
status OK
Get Slot Information
Cmd_GetSlotInfo
Get information about shares
and files on a Smartcard that
has been inserted in a module
slot.
- - UC - return
status OK
Get Ticket
Cmd_GetTicket
Get a ticket (an invariant
identifier) for a key. This can
be passed to another client or
to a SEE World which can
redeem it using Redeem Ticket
to obtain a new handle to the
object.
- - UC - return
status OK
Initialize Unit
Cmd_InitializeUnit
Cmd_InitializeUnitEx
Causes the nCore API service in
the pre-initialization state to
enter the initialization
state. When the module
enters the initialization state, it
erases all Module keys (KM),
the module's signing key
(KML), and the hash of the
Security Officer's keys, HKNSO.
It then generates a new KML
and KM.
Key generation (CKG,
RSA, DSA)
Message digest (SHA-1)
HKNSO
KA,
KRE_BLOBKEY,
KR, KM, KAL,
KML, KNSO,
HKNSO, LTx
UC Z, G return
status OK
Insert a Softcard
Cmd_InsertSoftToken
Allocates memory on the
module that is used to store
the logical token share and
other data objects.
- - UC - return
status OK
Remove a Softcard
Cmd_RemoveSoftToken
Removes a Softcard from the
module. It returns the updated
- - UC - return
status OK
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 21 of 44
Service Description Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
shares and deletes them from
the module’s memory.
Impath secure channel
Cmd_ImpathGetInfo
Cmd_ImpathKXBegin
Cmd_ImpathKXFinish
Cmd_ImpathReceive
Cmd_ImpathSend
Support for Impath secure
channel. Requires Feature
Enabled.
Key agreement (KAS-
FFC)
Key derivation (KBKDF)
Data encryption and
decryption (AES CBC,
GCM)
MAC generation and
verification (HMAC-
SHA256)
KML, IMPATHKE,
IMPATHKM
UC G, E return
status OK
Key generation
Cmd_GenerateKey
Cmd_GenerateKeyPair
Generates a cryptographic key
of a given type with a specified
ACL. It returns a handle to the
key. Optionally, it returns a
KML signed certificate with the
hash of the key and its ACL
information.
Key generation (CKG,
RSA, ECDSA, DSA)
Digital signature
generation (DSA)
KML, KA, DRBG
entropy input,
seed, internal
state ('V' and 'C')
UC G return
status OK
Key import
Cmd_Import
Loads a plain text key into the
module. If the module is
initialized in approved mode,
this service is available for
public keys only.
- KA UC W return
status OK
1Derive Key
Cmd_DeriveKey
Performs key wrapping,
unwrapping, transport,
exchange and derivation. The
ACL needs to authorize this
operation.
Key derivation (KBKDF)
Key
wrapping/unwrapping
(KTS-AES)
Key transport (KTS-IFC)
Key agreement (KAS-
FFC, KAS-ECC)
KA UC R, W return
status OK
Load Blob
Cmd_LoadBlob
Load a Key blob into the
module. It returns a handle to
the key suitable for use with
module services.
Key derivation (KBKDF)
Key unwrapping (AES
CBC and HMAC, KTS-IFC)
KA,
KRE_BLOBKEY,
KR, KM, KNSO
BLOBKE,
BLOBKM
UC W
E
return
status OK
Load Logical Token
Cmd_LoadLogicalToken
Initiates loading a Logical
Token from Shares, which can
be loaded with the Read Share
command.
Key unwrapping
Key derivation
- UC - return
status OK
Generate Logical Token
Cmd_GenerateLogicalToken
Creates a new Logical Token
with given properties and
secret sharing parameters.
Key generation (CKG) KM, LTx UC G, W return
status OK
Message digest
Cmd_Hash
Computes the cryptographic
hash of a given message.
Message digest (SHS,
SHA-3)
- UC - return
status OK
Modular Exponentiation Performs a modular
exponentiation (standard or
- - UC - return
status OK
22 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
Service Description Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
Cmd_ModExp
Cmd_ModExpCrt
Cmd_RSAImmedVerifyEncrypt
Cmd_RSAImmedSignDecrypt
CRT) on values supplied with
the command.
Module hardware information
Cmd_ModuleInfo
Reports detailed hardware
information.
- - UC - return
status OK
No Operation
Cmd_NoOp
No operation. - - UC - return
status OK
Change Share Passphrase
Cmd_ChangeSharePIN
Cmd_ChangeShareGroupPIN
Updates the passphrase of a
Share.
Key derivation (KBKDF)
Key
wrapping/unwrapping
(AES CBC and HMAC,
KTS-IFC)
SHAREKEY, LTx,
KM
UC G, E, R,
W
return
status OK
NVRAM Allocate
Cmd_NVMemAllocate
Allocation in NVRAM. - - NSO - return
status OK
NVRAM Free
Cmd_NVMemFree
Deallocation from NVRAM. - - UC - return
status OK
Operation on NVM list
Cmd_NVMemList
Returns a list of files in
NVRAM.
- - UC - return
status OK
Operation on NVM files
Cmd_NVMemOp
Operation on an NVRAM file. - - UC return
status OK
Key export
Cmd_Export
Exports a key in plain text.
Note: in approved mode, only
public keys can be exported.
- KA UC R return
status OK
Read file
Cmd_ReadFile
Reads data from a file on a
Smartcard or Softcard. The ACL
needs to authorize this
operation.
- - UC - return
status OK
Read share
Cmd_ReadShare
Reads a share from a
Smartcard or Softcard. Once a
quorum of shares have been
loaded, the module re-
assembles the Logical Token.
Key derivation (KBKDF)
Key unwrapping (AES
CBC and HMAC)
SHAREKEY, LTx,
KM
UC G, E, R return
status OK
Send share to remote slot
Cmd_SendShare
Reads a Share and encrypts it
with the Impath session keys
for transmission to the peer
module.
Data encryption(AES
CBC, GCM)
MAC generation
(HMAC-SHA256)
IMPATHKE,
IMPATHKM,
SHAREKEY
UC R, E return
status OK
Receive share from remote slot
Cmd_ReceiveShare
Receives a Share encrypted
with the Impath session keys
by a remote module.
Data decryption (AES
CBC, GCM)
IMPATHKE,
IMPATHKM,
SHAREKEY
UC R, E return
status OK
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 23 of 44
Service Description Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
MAC verification
(HMAC-SHA256)
Redeem Ticket
Cmd_RedeemTicket
Gets a handle in the current
name space for the object
referred to by a ticket created
by Get Ticket.
- - UC - return
status OK
Remote Administration
Cmd_DynamicSlotCreateAssociation
Cmd_DynamicSlotExchangeAPDUs
Cmd_DynamicSlotsConfigure
Cmd_DynamicSlotsConfigureQuery
Cmd_VerifyCertificate
Provides remote presentation
of Smartcards using a secure
channel between the module
and the Smartcard.
Key agreement (KAS-
ECC ECDH)
Key derivation (KBKDF)
Data encryption and
decryption (AES CBC)
MAC generation and
verification (AES CMAC)
Digital signature
verification (ECDSA)
RAKME, RAKMA,
KWARN_pub
UC G, E
E
return
status OK
Destroy
Cmd_Destroy
Remove handle to an object in
RAM. If the current handle is
the only one remaining, the
object is zeroised from RAM.
- KA, KNSO, LTx UC Z return
status OK
Report statistics
Cmd StatGetValues
Cmd_StatEnumTree
Reports the values of the
statistics tree.
- - UC - return
status OK
Show Status
Cmd_NewEnquiry
This is a Show Status and Show
Module's Versioning
Information service.
Report status information.
- - UC - return
status OK
Set ACL
Cmd_SetACL
Replaces the ACL of a given key
with a new ACL. The ACL needs
to authorize this operation.
- KA UC W return
status OK
Set key application data
Cmd_SetAppData
Writes the application
information field of a key.
- KA UC W return
status OK
Set NSO Permissions
Cmd_SetNSOPerms
Sets the NSO key hash and
which permissions require a
Delegation Certificate.
- - NSO - return
status OK
Signature generation
Cmd_Sign
Generate a digital signature or
MAC value.
MAC generation
(HMAC, KMAC, AES
CMAC)
Digital signature
generation (RSA, ECDSA,
DSA)
KA, KNSO UC E return
status OK
Sign Module State
Cmd_SignModuleState
Returns a signed certificate
that contains data about the
Digital signature
generation (DSA)
KML UC E return
status OK
24 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
Service Description Approved Security
Functions
Keys and/or
SSPs
Roles Access
rights
to
Keys
and/or
SSPs
Indicator
current configuration of the
module.
Signature verification
Cmd_Verify
Verifies a digital signature or
MAC value.
MAC verification
(HMAC, KMAC, AES
CMAC)
Digital signature
verification (RSA,
ECDSA, DSA)
KA UC E return
status OK
Write file
Cmd_WriteFile
Writes a file to a Smartcard or
Softcard.
- - NSO - return
status OK
Write share
Cmd_WriteShare
Writes a Share to a Smartcard
or Softcard.
Key derivation (KBKDF)
Key wrapping (AES CBC
and HMAC)
SHAREKEY, LTx,
KM
UC G, E, W return
status OK
SEE connection
Cmd_CreateSEEConnection
Opens a connection from the
nCoreAPI service to the SEE
machine
- - UC - return
status OK
Table 18 Approved Services
Non-approved services will fail with a return an error code indicator "StrictFIPS140".
All nCore API services are sent through the SSH channel, performing security functions Data
encryption/decryption, MAC generation / verification and access E (execute) of the session keys
KSESSION - SSH.
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 25 of 44
5 Software/Firmware security
The nShield 5s cryptographic module's executable code is delivered by Entrust as a single signed
firmware package (.npkg file). The firmware integrity is verified at start up using RSA with 4096 bit
key and SHA2-256. The Library Partition is an internal storage area that contains a number of
auxiliary files required for operation of the module. The integrity of the Library Partition is verified
using ECDSA with curve P-521 and SHA2-512.
Operators can initiate the integrity tests on demand by restarting the module.
26 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
6 Operational environment
Not applicable. The module has a limited operational environment, it is designed to accept only
controlled firmware changes that successfully pass the software/firmware load test.
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 27 of 44
7 Physical security
The product is a multi-chip embedded Cryptographic Module, as defined in FIPS 140-3. It is enclosed
in a hard and opaque epoxy resin which meets the physical security requirements of FIPS 140-3 level
3.
The cryptographic module implements Environmental Failure Protections (EFP) which detect out of
range voltage and temperature and shuts down the module.
Physical Security
Mechanism
Recommended
Frequency of
Inspection/Test
Inspection/Test Guidance Details
Hard and opaque
epoxy
Monthly The module should be inspected periodically for evidence of tamper attempts, including the
entire enclosure including the epoxy resin security coating for obvious signs of damage.
Table 19 Physical Security Inspection Guidelines
Temperature or voltage
measurement
Specify EFP or EFT Specify if this condition
results in a shutdown or
zeroisation
Low Temperature 2ºC EFP Shutdown
High Temperature 95ºC EFP Shutdown
Low Voltage 8V EFP Shutdown
High Voltage 14.08V EFP Shutdown
Table 20 EFP/EFT
Hardness tested temperature measurement
Low Temperature 0ºC
High Temperature 95ºC
Table 21 Hardness testing temperature ranges
28 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
8 Non-invasive security
Not applicable.
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 29 of 44
9 Sensitive security parameters management
9.1 Keys and Sensitive Security Parameters
This section defines the Sensitive Security Parameters (SSPs) managed by the cryptographic module.
9.1.1 Platform SSPs
Key/SSP/Name/Type Strength Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generation Import/Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related
keys
KRESET
(CSP)
256 bits Re-settable key
A3707
DRBG Never n/a MSP430
FRAM, in
plaintext
factorystate Key derivation
KUSER_SSH
(CSP)
256 bits Global SSH key
encryption key
AES-256
A3707
Derived at
start-up
using KBKDF
from KRESET
and other
fixed
parameters
Never n/a RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle Encryption of
all the service's
server
authentication
SSH keys
KSSH_SETUP
(CSP)
128 bits Server
authentication
SSH key for the
Setup service
ECDSA P-256
A3707
A3706
DRBG Private key:
never
Public key:
output via
SSHAdmin
service
n/a In Flash,
encrypted
with
KUSER_SSH
n/a
protected
SSH channel
session
KSSH_UPDATER
(CSP)
128 bits Server
authentication
SSH key for
the Updater
service
ECDSA P-256
A3707
A3706
DRBG Private key:
never
Public key:
output via
SSHAdmin
service
n/a In Flash,
encrypted
with
KUSER_SSH
n/a
protected
SSH channel
session
KSSH_SSHADMIN
(CSP)
128 bits Server
authentication
SSH key for
the SSH Admin
service
ECDSA P-256
A3707
A3706
DRBG Private key:
never
Public key:
output via
SSHAdmin
service
n/a In Flash,
encrypted
with
KUSER_SSH
n/a
protected
SSH channel
session
KSSH_MONITOR
(CSP)
128 bits Server
authentication
SSH key for the
Monitor service
ECDSA P-256
DRBG Private key:
never
Public key:
output via
n/a In Flash,
encrypted
with
KUSER_SSH
n/a
protected
SSH channel
session
30 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
Key/SSP/Name/Type Strength Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generation Import/Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related
keys
A3707
A3706
SSHAdmin
service
KSSH_LAUNCHER
(CSP)
128 bits Server
authentication
SSH key for the
Launcher
service
ECDSA P-256
A3707
A3706
DRBG Private key:
never
Public key:
output via
SSHAdmin
service
n/a In Flash,
encrypted
with
KUSER_SSH
n/a
protected
SSH channel
session
KSESSION - SSH
(CSP)
128 bits SSH channel
session keys
AES GCM or
AES CTR, HMAC
A3707
n/a Never ECDH RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle
or channel
closure
SSH channel
data
encryption and
integrity
NSBIK pub
(not an SSP)
128 bits Bootloader
public integrity
key
RSA 4096 bit
A2404
Entrust Import:
Firmware
update
Export: Never
n/a Flash, in
plaintext
n/a Firmware
integrity test
NFIK pub
(not an SSP)
128 bits Firmware public
signature
verification key
RSA 4096 bit
A2404
Entrust Import:
Firmware
update
Export: Never
n/a Flash, in
plaintext
n/a Firmware
integrity test
NLIK pub
(not an SSP)
256 bits Library public
integrity key
ECDSA P-521
A3707
Entrust Import:
Firmware
update
Export: Never
n/a Flash, in
plaintext
n/a Firmware
integrity test
NPSK pub
(PSP)
256 bits Package public
signature
verification key
ECDSA P-521
A3707
Entrust Import:
Firmware
update
Export: Never
n/a Flash, in
plaintext
n/a Firmware
loading test
ESK pub
(PSP)
256 bits Root Entrust
SEE public
signing key
ECDSA P-521
A3707
Entrust Import:
Firmware
update
Export: Never
n/a Flash n/a Signature
verification
DSK pub
(PSP)
256 bits Developer
public signing
key
ECDSA P-521
n/a Launcher
service ids
commands
n/a Flash n/a Signature
verification
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 31 of 44
Key/SSP/Name/Type Strength Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generation Import/Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use & related
keys
A3707
KSSH_CLIENT pub
(PSP)
128 bits Client
authentication
SSH key for
each of the
services
(Updater,
Setup,
SSHAdmin,
Launcher,
nCoreAPI)
ECDSA P-256, P-
521
A3707
Client side Through
SSHAdmin
service
n/a Flash, in
plaintext
factorystate SSH
authentication
credentials
DRBG entropy input
(CSP)
> 256
bits
Platform DRBG
A3707
520 bits
from the
approved
Entropy
Source.
Never n/a RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle Random
number
generation
DRBG seed
(CSP)
256 bits Platform DRBG
A3707
Generated
as per SP
800-90Arev1
with 696 bits
from the
approved
Entropy
Source:
520 bits
entropy
input
176 bits
random
nonce
Never n/a RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle Random
number
generation
DRBG internal state
('V' and 'C' values)
(CSP)
256 bits Platform DRBG
A3707
Generated
as per SP
800-
90Arev1.
Never n/a RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle Random
number
generation
Table 22 Platform SSP table
nCore API service SSPs
32 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
9.1.1.1 Service SSPs
The following SSPs are related to the nCore API service.
Key/SSP/Name/Type Strength Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generation Import/Export Establishment Storage Zeroisation Use &
related
keys
KCONTAINER
(CSP)
256 bits Master key for
container
A3707
Derived at
start-up using
KBKDF from
KRESET,
container-id
and other
fixed value.
Never n/a RAM, in plaintext Power
cycle
Key
derivation
KCONTAINERSSH
(CSP)
256 bits Encryption key
for
KSSH_NCORE
AES-256
A3707
Derived at
start-up using
KBKDF from
KCONTAINER,
and other
fixed value.
Never n/a RAM, in plaintext Power
cycle
Encryption
KSSH_NCORE
(CSP)
128 bits Server
authentication
ssh key for
the nCore API
service
ECDSA P-256
A3707
A3706
DRBG Private key:
Never
Public key
output via SSH
Admin service
n/a In Flash,
encrypted with
KCONTAINERSSH
n/a
protected
SSH
channel
session
Table 23 nCoreAPI SSP table
9.1.1.2 Security World SSPs
The following SSPs are related to the Security World in which the cryptographic module is enrolled
into.
Key/SSP/Name/Typ
e
Strengt
h
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generatio
n
Import/Expor
t
Establishmen
t
Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
KRE_BLOBKEY
(CSP)
128 bits Recovery
confidentialit
y key
RSA 3072 bit
A3707
DRBG Import: From
key blob,
decrypted
with LTRE
Export: in key
blob,
encrypted
with LTRE
n/a RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle
or
Cmd_Destro
y
Key used to protect
recovery keys (KR).
KR
(CSP)
256 bits Recovery key
AES 256
A3707
DRBG Import: From
key blob,
decrypted
with
KRE_BLOBKEY
Export: in key
blob,
encrypted
n/a RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle
or
Cmd_Destro
y
Key used to
derive (using SP 800-
108 KDF in counter
mode) the keys Ke
(AES 256-bit) and Km
(HMAC-SHA256) that
protect an archive
copy of an application
key.
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 33 of 44
Key/SSP/Name/Typ
e
Strengt
h
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generatio
n
Import/Expor
t
Establishmen
t
Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
with
KRE_BLOBKEY
IMPATHKE
IMPATHKM
(CSP)
256 bits Session keys
for impath
channel
A3707
n/a Never DH RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle
or channel
closure
Encryption and
decryption
MAC generation and
verification
KA
(CSP)
≥ 112
bits
Application
keys
A3707
DRBG Import: From
key blob,
decrypted
with LTA or KR
Export: in key
blob,
encrypted
with LTA or KR
n/a RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle
or
Cmd_Destro
y
Application keys used
for general purpose
cryptographic
services:
• Encryption
and
decryption
• Digital
signature
generation
and
verification
• MAC
generation
and
verification
• Key
derivation,
key
agreement
.
KM
(CSP)
256 bits Security
World
module key
AES 256
A3707
DRBG Import: From
key blob,
decrypted
with LTM
Export: in key
blob,
encrypted
with LTM
n/a Flash, in
plaintext
factorystate
or Initialize
Unit
Key used for key
derivation to protect
logical tokens and
associated module
Key Blobs.
KML
(CSP)
128 bits Module
Signing key
DSA 3072 bit
A3707
DRBG Never n/a Flash, in
plaintext
factorystate
or Initialize
Unit
Digital signature
generation for key
generation
certificates and
module state
certificates.
KNSO
(CSP)
128 bits NSO key
DSA 3072 bit
A3707
DRBG Import: From
key blob,
decrypted
with LTNSO
Export: in key
blob,
encrypted
with LTNSO
n/a RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle
or
Cmd_Destro
y
nShield Security
Officer key used for
NSO authorisation
and Security World
integrity
34 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
Key/SSP/Name/Typ
e
Strengt
h
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generatio
n
Import/Expor
t
Establishmen
t
Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
HKNSO
(PSP)
160 bits Hash of public
KNSO
A3707
n/a Never Security
World
creation
Flash, in
plaintext
factorystate
or Initialize
Unit
nShield Security
Officer key used for
NSO authorisation
and Security World
integrity
BLOBKE
BLOBKM
(CSP)
256 bits Key blob
encryption
and MAC key
AES 256
HMAC-
SHA256
A3707
n/a Never Derived from
LTx
RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle Key wrapping
LTx
(CSP)
256 bits Logical token
for key x
AES 256
A3707
DRBG Import: From
quorum of
encrypted
Shares using
Shamir Secret
Scheme
Export: To
encrypted
Shares using
Shamir Secret
Scheme
From Shares
using Shamir
Secret Schee
RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle
or
Cmd_Destro
y
Key derivation
SHAREKEY
(CSP)
256 bits Share
encryption
and MAC keys
AES 256
HMAC-
SHA256
A3707
n/a Never Derived from
KM and other
additional
data
RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle Protects a share when
written to a smartcard
or softcard. This key is
used to derive using
KBKDF the keys
Ke and Km used to
wrap the share.
RAKME
RAKMA
(CSP)
256 bits Session keys
for remote
admin
channel
AES 256
A3707
n/a Never ECDH RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle
or channel
closure
Encryption and
decryption
MAC generation and
verification
KAL
(CSP)
128 bits Audit logging
key
DSA 3072-bit
A3707
DRBG Never n/a Flash, in
plaintext
factorystate
or Initialize
Unit
Digital signature
generation of the
audit trail.
KWARN pub
(PSP)
256 bits Entrust root
warranting
public key for
Administrator
Cards and
Operator
Cards
ECDSA P-521
Entrust Import: fw
update
Export: never
n/a Flash, in
plaintext
, as part
of the
firmware
image
n/a
protected
Digital signature
verification to
authenticate remote
cards.
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 35 of 44
Key/SSP/Name/Typ
e
Strengt
h
Security
Function and
Cert. Number
Generatio
n
Import/Expor
t
Establishmen
t
Storage Zeroisation Use & related keys
A3707
DRBG entropy input
(CSP)
256 bits nCoreAPI
DRBG
A3707
520 bits
from
Platform
DRBG
Never n/a RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle Random number
generation
DRBG seed
(CSP)
256 bits nCoreAPI
DRBG
A3707
Generated
as per SP
800-
90Arev1
with 696
bits from
Platform
DRBG:
520 bits
entropy
input
176 bits
random
nonce
Never n/a RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle Random number
generation
DRBG internal state
('V' and 'C' values)
(CSP)
256 bits nCoreAPI
DRBG
A3707
Generated
as per SP
800-
90Arev1.
Never n/a RAM, in
plaintext
Power cycle Random number
generation
Table 24 Security World SSP table
As per IG 9.7.B, the zeroisation of SSPs is explicitly indicated by the successful return code of the
setup factorystate command. Temporary SSPs are zeroised implicitly.
9.2 SSP zeroization methods
Zeroization of all unprotected SSPs keys occurs immediately when the module is reset to the factory
state with the setup factorystate command.
9.3 Entropy sources
The cryptographic module has a hardware based true random number generator used to seed the
DRBGs.
Entropy sources Minimum number of bits of
entropy
Details
nShield 5s Physical True Random
Number Generator
ESV cert#38
0.89 bits per output bit
Minimum of 256 bits of entropy
for DRBG seed
(total seed size of 512 bits)
Hardware entropy source compliant with SP 800-90B.
As per the Public Use Document, no configuration of the
entropy source is required.
Table 25 Non-Deterministic Random Number Generation Specification
36 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
10 Self tests
The Cryptographic Module performs pre-operational, conditional and periodic self-tests. It also
supports pre-operational self-tests on demand by resetting the module.
In the event of a self-test failure, the module enters the error state. While in this state, the module
does not process any commands, and will indicate the error on the status LED and the error log,
which can be retrieved with the command monitor getlog.
10.1 Pre-operational self tests
10.1.1 Integrity tests
At start up, the following integrity tests are performed:
• Firmware integrity is verified using RSA with 4096 bit key and SHA2-256.
• Library partition integrity, is verified using ECDSA with curve P-521 and SHA2-512.
10.2 Conditional self tests
10.2.1 Crypto self tests
The following cryptographic algorithm self tests (CASTs) are run before the first use of any
cryptographic mechanism.
Algorithm Description
Bootloader crypto
SHA2-256 Known Answer Test
RSA Known Answer Test (verification only) with 4096 bit key
nCore crypto
AES ECB encrypt AES ECB Known Answer Test encryption with 128, 192 and 256-bit keys
AES ECB decrypt AES ECB Known Answer Test decryption with 128, 192 and 256-bit keys
AES CMAC Known Answer Test: 128-bit key
SHA-1 SHA-1 Known Answer Test, other size are tested along with KAT HMAC
SHA-3 SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512 Known Answer Test
HMAC with SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384,
SHA2-512
Known Answer Test
RSA Known Answer Test: sign/verify, encrypt/decrypt with 2048-bit key
Pair-Wise consistency test: sign/verify
DSA Known Answer Test: sign/verify with 2048-bit key
Pair-Wise consistency test: sign/verify
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 37 of 44
Algorithm Description
ECDSA KAT test: sign/verify with curves P-224 and B-233
Pair-Wise consistency test: sign/verify
KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation Known Answer Test DH
KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation Known Answer Test for ECDH with curves P-384
and B-233
One-step KDF Known Answer Test with SHA2-256 auxiliary function
Two-step KDF Known Answer Test with HMAC-SHA256 auxiliary function
KBKDF Known Answer Test
DRBG Health Tests according to SP 800-90Arev1 section 11.3
SSH crypto
AES GCM encrypt Known Answer Test encryption with 128 bit key
AES GCM decrypt Known Answer Test decryption with 128 bit key
AES CTR encrypt Known Answer Test encryption with 128 bit key
AES CTR decrypt Known Answer Test decryption with 128 bit key
HMAC with SHA2-256 and SHA2-512 Known Answer Test
KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation Known Answer Test for ECDH with curve P-256
ECDSA KAT test: sign/verify with curves P-256 and P-521
SSH KDF SSH KDF Known Answer Test
10.2.2 SP 800-90B health tests
At start up, the SP 800-90B Adaptive Proportion Test and Repetition Count Test are run on the
output bits of the entropy source.
These tests are also run continuously during operation of the entropy source.
10.2.3 Pair-wise consistency tests
The module performs a pair-wise consistency test when RSA, DSA, ECDSA, DH and ECDH keys are
generated.
10.2.4 Firmware load test
Prior to updating the firmware, the cryptographic module validates the integrity and authenticity of
the image update package.
The module performs the following actions before replacing the current image:
• Code signature verification with NPSK pub. The signature algorithm is ECDSA with SHA2-512
using the P-521 curve.
• Verification that the Version Security Number (VSN) of the new image is not less than the
VSN of the current image. This check is done for roll-back protection.
38 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
Note: A firmware image version loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate
is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
10.3 Periodic self tests
The following self tests are run periodically every 24 hours:
• nCore crypto and SSH crypto self tests
• SP 800-90B health tests
As per IG 10.3E Resolution #3 c), the bootloader is designed exclusively to launch the main firmware
for the module. In this architecture, as the module isn’t complete until the main firmware is
launched (replacing the bootloader in executable memory), it is redundant that the bootloader itself
implement a mechanism to run periodic tests.
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 39 of 44
11 Life-cycle assurance
This section provides specific FIPS-related guidance to Administrators and Operators. This guidance
is aimed to complement the product user and installation guides which are delivered with the
cryptographic module.
11.1 Delivery
The nShield cryptographic module is sent to the customers using a standard carrier service. After
accepting the delivery of the module, a physical inspection of the module shall be performed (refer
to Physical Security section). This inspection is done to ensure that the module has not been
tampered with during transit. If the inspection results indicate that the module has not been
tampered with, the Administrator can then proceed with installation and configuration of the
module.
The cryptographic module supports firmware upgrades in the field, which are provided by Entrust as
a single signed firmware package (.npkg file).
11.2 Cryptographic module identification
This section provides instructions to inspect the cryptographic module´s fw and hw version
information and ensure they correspond with the FIPS 140-3 validated versions.
11.2.1 FW identification
The cryptographic module provides the service updater info which provides firmware version
information in JSON format.
Entrust provides the hsmadmin status command-line utility which calls the service updater info
internally.
hsmadmin status --json
{
"D5DE-E1F8-D6E7": {
"succeeded": true,
"data": {
"mode": "primary",
"primary-version": "13.4.5-751-56c6f1db",
"recovery-version": "13.2.4-280-7f4f0c24",
"uboot-version": "1.1.0-1245-b9bedfa"
}
}
}
The following fields in the output must be checked:
40 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
Field Expected value
primary-version 13.4.5-751-56c6f1db
recovery-version 13.2.4-280-7f4f0c24
uboot-version 1.1.0-1245-b9bedfa
11.2.2 HW identification
The cryptographic module provides the command Cmd_NewEnquiry which reports hardware version
information.
Entrust provides the enquiry command-line utility which calls Cmd_NewEnquiry internally.
product name nC5536E
hardware part no PCA10005-01 revision 03
The following fields in the output must be checked:
Field Expected value
product name nC5536E or nC5536N
hardware part no PCA10005-01 revision 03 or revision 04
Alternatively, the cryptographic module also provides the service setup info which provides
hardware version information in JSON format.
Entrust provides the hsmadmin info command-line utility which calls the service setup info
internally.
hsmadmin info --json
{
"15C8-4387-C748": {
"eeprom": {
...
,
"buildpart":
{ "value": "PCA10005-01", "crc": xxxxx }
,
"buildrev":
{ "value": "03", "crc": xxxxx }
...
}
}
The following fields in the output must be checked:
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 41 of 44
Field Expected value
buildpart "value": "PCA10005-01"
buildrev "value": "03" or "value": "04"
11.3 Approved mode of operation
When the cryptographic module is in factory state, it first needs to be initialized with the command
line utility hsmadmin enroll.
To configure the cryptographic module in approved mode, create a FIPS 140-3 level 3 compliant
Security World using Entrust supplied utility new-world and setting the mode to fips-140-level-3.
An operator can verify that the module is configured in approved mode with the command line
utility enquiry, which reports the following active modes:
active modes UseFIPSApprovedInternalMechanisms AlwaysUseStrongPrimes
FIPSLevel3Enforcedv2 StrictSP80056Ar3
or
active modes UseFIPSApprovedInternalMechanisms FIPSLevel3Enforcedv2
StrictSP80056Ar3
Once a FIPS 140-3 level 3 Security World is created, it is not possible to switch into a non-compliant
mode without first zeroising the unprotected SSPs.
11.4 End of life
Per FIPS 140-3 section 7.11.8, in the event that the module is no longer deployed or intended for
further use, the Crypto Officer shall zeroize and destroy the module. The module shall be taken to an
electronics recycling facility that offers (and assures) the physical destruction of e-waste.
42 of 44 nShield 5s Hardware Security Module
12 Mitigation of other attacks
Not applicable.
nShield 5s Hardware Security Module 43 of 44
Contact Us
Web site https://www.entrust.com
Support https://nshieldsupport.entrust.com
Email Support nShield.support@entrust.com
Online documentation: Available from the Support site listed above.
You can also contact our Support teams by telephone, using the following numbers:
Europe, Middle East, and Africa
United Kingdom: +44 1223 622 444
One Station Square
Cambridge
CB1 2GA
UK
Americas
Toll Free: +1 833 425 1990
Fort Lauderdale: +1 954 953 5229
Sawgrass Commerce Center – A
Suite 130,
13800 NW 14 Street
Sunrise
FL 33323 USA
Asia Pacific
Australia: +61 9126 9070
World Trade Centre Northbank Wharf
Siddeley St
Melbourne VIC 3005
Australia
Japan: +81 50 3196 4994
Hong Kong: +852 3008 4994
31/F, Hysan Place
500 Hennessy Road
Causeway Bay
Hong Kong
Entrust keeps the world moving safely by enabling trusted identities, payments
and data protection. Today more than ever, people demand seamless, secure
experiences, whether they’re crossing borders, making a purchase, accessing e-
government services or logging into corporate networks. Entrust offers an
unmatched breadth of digital security and credential issuance solutions at the
very heart of all these interactions. With more than 2,500 colleagues, a
network of global partners, and customers in over 150 countries, it’s no
wonder the world’s most entrusted organizations trust us.
To get help with
Entrust nShield HSMs
nShield.support@entrust.com
nshieldsupport.entrust.com