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Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
Panorama 11.1/11.2 running on M-200, M-300, M-600 and M-700
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Page 2 of 80
Table of Contents
1 General....................................................................................................................................... 6
1.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 6
1.2 Security Levels................................................................................................................... 6
2 Cryptographic Module Specification ...................................................................................... 7
2.1 Description .......................................................................................................................... 7
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification................................ 9
2.3 Excluded Components.................................................................................................... 10
2.4 Modes of Operation......................................................................................................... 10
2.5 Algorithms ......................................................................................................................... 10
2.6 Security Function Implementations............................................................................... 13
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information....................................................................................... 19
2.8 RBG and Entropy............................................................................................................. 20
2.9 Key Generation ................................................................................................................ 21
2.10 Key Establishment......................................................................................................... 21
2.11 Industry Protocols.......................................................................................................... 22
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces ......................................................................................... 22
3.1 Ports and Interfaces ........................................................................................................ 22
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication.................................................................................... 22
4.1 Authentication Methods .................................................................................................. 22
4.2 Roles.................................................................................................................................. 23
4.3 Approved Services........................................................................................................... 24
4.4 Non-Approved Services.................................................................................................. 35
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded ............................................................................ 35
5 Software/Firmware Security.................................................................................................. 36
5.1 Integrity Techniques ........................................................................................................ 36
5.2 Initiate on Demand........................................................................................................... 36
6 Operational Environment....................................................................................................... 36
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements .................................................... 36
7 Physical Security..................................................................................................................... 36
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required .............................................................................. 36
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals ............................................................................................ 38
7.2.1 Panorama M-200 ...................................................................................................... 38
7.2.2 Panorama M-300 ...................................................................................................... 41
Page 3 of 80
7.2.3 Panorama M-600 ...................................................................................................... 45
7.2.4 Panorama M-700 ...................................................................................................... 50
8 Non-Invasive Security ............................................................................................................ 53
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management ..................................................................... 53
9.1 Storage Areas................................................................................................................... 53
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ............................................................................................ 53
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods............................................................................................... 54
9.4 SSPs .................................................................................................................................. 55
9.5 Transitions......................................................................................................................... 71
10 Self-Tests............................................................................................................................... 71
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests........................................................................................... 71
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests................................................................................................... 71
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ..................................................................................... 75
10.4 Error States..................................................................................................................... 77
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests................................................................................... 78
11 Life-Cycle Assurance ........................................................................................................... 78
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures ................................................... 78
11.2 Administrator Guidance ................................................................................................ 79
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance ....................................................................................... 79
11.4 Design and Rules .......................................................................................................... 79
11.5 End of Life....................................................................................................................... 80
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks.................................................................................................. 80
Page 4 of 80
List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels ................................................................................................................. 7
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware........................................................................ 9
Table 3: Modes List and Description............................................................................................ 10
Table 4: Approved Algorithms..................................................................................................... 12
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms......................................................................................... 12
Table 6: Security Function Implementations................................................................................ 19
Table 7: Entropy Certificates........................................................................................................ 20
Table 8: Entropy Sources.............................................................................................................. 21
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces......................................................................................................... 22
Table 10: Authentication Methods................................................................................................ 23
Table 11: Roles ............................................................................................................................. 24
Table 12: Approved Services........................................................................................................ 35
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required .............................................................................. 37
Table 14: Storage Areas................................................................................................................ 53
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods........................................................................................... 54
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods ............................................................................................. 55
Table 17: SSP Table 1................................................................................................................... 63
Table 18: SSP Table 2................................................................................................................... 71
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests............................................................................................ 71
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests .................................................................................................. 75
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information .......................................................................... 76
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information................................................................................. 77
Table 23: Error States ................................................................................................................... 78
List of Figures
Figure 1. M-200 Front..................................................................................................................... 7
Figure 2. M-200 Rear...................................................................................................................... 7
Figure 3. M-300 Front..................................................................................................................... 7
Figure 4. M-300 Rear...................................................................................................................... 7
Figure 5. M-600 Front..................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 6. M-600 Rear...................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 7. M-700 Front..................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 8. M-700 Rear...................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 9. Block Diagram................................................................................................................. 9
Figure 10. M-200: Top Cover Replacement................................................................................. 38
Figure 11. M-200: Side View Before Rail Installation................................................................. 39
Figure 12. M-200: Inner Rack Mount Rail Brackets .................................................................... 39
Figure 13. M-200: Replacing Front Rack-Mount Brackets.......................................................... 40
Figure 14. M-200: Attach Physical Kit Front Cover .................................................................... 40
Figure 15. M-200: Seal locations on Top and Right Side............................................................. 41
Figure 16. M-200: Seal Locations on Left Side and Rear ............................................................ 41
Figure 17. M-300: Top Cover Replacement................................................................................. 42
Page 5 of 80
Figure 18. M-300: Side View Before Rail Installation................................................................. 42
Figure 19. M-200: Inner Rack Mount Rail Brackets ................................................................... 43
Figure 20. M-300: Replacing Front Rack-Mount Brackets.......................................................... 43
Figure 21. M-300: Attach Physical Kit Front Cover .................................................................... 44
Figure 22. M-300: Seal locations on Top and Right Side............................................................. 44
Figure 23. M-300: Seal Locations on Left Side and Rear ............................................................ 45
Figure 24. M-600: Top Cover Replacement................................................................................. 46
Figure 25. M-600: Front Cover Bracket ....................................................................................... 46
Figure 26. M-600: Physical Kit Front Cover............................................................................... 47
Figure 27. M-600: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Rear).......................................................... 48
Figure 28. M-600: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Front) ........................................................ 48
Figure 29. M-600: Tamper Seals Location for Side Rails............................................................ 49
Figure 30. M-700: Top Cover Replacement................................................................................. 50
Figure 31. M-700: Front Cover Bracket ....................................................................................... 51
Figure 32. M-700: Physical Kit Front Cover................................................................................ 51
Figure 33. M-700: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Rear).......................................................... 52
Figure 34. M-700: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Front) ........................................................ 52
Figure 35. M-700: Tamper Seals Location for Side Rails............................................................ 53
Page 6 of 80
1 General
1.1 Overview
The Panorama 11.1/11.2 running on M-200, M-300, M-600 and M-700 from Palo Alto Networks
Inc., hereafter referred to as “Panorama M-Series”, “Panorama HW”, “modules”, or the
“cryptographic modules” are multi-chip standalone cryptographic modules designed to fulfill
FIPS 140-3 level 2 requirements.
Panorama M-Series management appliances provide centralized management and visibility of
Palo Alto Networks next generation firewalls. From a central location, you can gain insight into
applications, users, and content traversing the firewalls. The knowledge of what is on the
network, in conjunction with safe application enablement policies, maximizes protection and
control while minimizing administrative effort. Your security team can centrally perform analysis,
reporting, and forensics with the aggregated data over time, or on data stored on the local
firewall. The Panorama M-Series management appliances’ individual management and logging
components can be separated in a distributed manner to accommodate large volumes of log
data.
Panorama M-Series management appliances can be deployed in the following ways:
• Centralized: In this scenario, all Panorama management and logging functions are
combined into a single device.
• Distributed: Management and logging functions separated across multiple devices,
splitting the functions between managers and log collectors.
• Panorama: The Panorama manager is responsible for handling the tasks associated
with policy and device configuration across all managed devices. The manager analyzes
the data stored in managed log collectors for centralized reporting.
• Management-Only: Providing the ability to perform all functions of Panorama with the
exception of logging.
• Log Collector: Organizations with high logging volume and retention requirements can
deploy dedicated Panorama log collector devices that will aggregate log information from
multiple managed firewalls.
• PAN-DB: The PAN-DB deployment on M-600/M-700 allows administrators to perform
various URL filtering functions, which is suitable for organizations that prohibit or restrict
the use of the PAN-DB public cloud service.
This document may freely be reproduced and distributed in its entirety.
1.2 Security Levels
Section Title Security Level
1 General 2
2 Cryptographic module specification 2
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 2
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 2
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 2
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 2
Page 7 of 80
Section Title Security Level
10 Self-tests 2
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks N/A
Overall Level 2
Table 1: Security Levels
2 Cryptographic Module Specification
2.1 Description
Purpose and Use:
Panorama M-Series management appliances provide centralized management and visibility of
Palo Alto Networks next generation firewalls. From a central location, you can gain insight into
applications, users, and content traversing the firewalls. The knowledge of what is on the
network, in conjunction with safe application enablement policies, maximizes protection and
control while minimizing administrative effort. Your security team can centrally perform analysis,
reporting, and forensics with the aggregated data over time, or on data stored on the local
firewall.
Module Type: Hardware
Figure 1. M-200 Front
Figure 2. M-200 Rear
Figure 3. M-300 Front
Figure 4. M-300 Rear
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Figure 5. M-600 Front
Figure 6. M-600 Rear
Figure 7. M-700 Front
Figure 8. M-700 Rear
Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone
Module Characteristics:
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary consists of the physical perimeter of the hardware appliances with
the physical kits installed. Please refer to the Physical Security section of this document for
depictions of the modules with the physical kits installed.
Page 9 of 80
Figure 9. Block Diagram
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model
and/or Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware
Version
Processors Features
Panorama
M-200
910-000176 with
920-000208
11.1.3,
11.2.5
Intel Xeon E5-
2620 V4
RJ45 interfaces, USB
ports, LEDs
Panorama
M-300
910-000271 with
920-000319
11.1.3,
11.2.5
Intel Xeon
(Silver) 4310
RJ45 interfaces, USB
ports, LEDs
Panorama
M-600
910-000175 with
920-000209
11.1.3,
11.2.5
Intel Xeon E5-
2680 V4
RJ45 interfaces, USB
ports, LEDs, SFP+ ports
Panorama
M-700
910-000270 with
920-000318
11.1.3,
11.2.5
Intel Xeon
(Silver) 4316
RJ45 interfaces, USB
ports, LEDs, SFP+ ports
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
Page 10 of 80
N/A for this module.
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 Excluded Components
N/A
2.4 Modes of Operation
Modes List and Description:
The module only operates in an approved mode of operation and is in the approved mode when
installed, initialized and configured per section 11.1 of the Security Policy.
Mode
Name
Description Type Status Indicator
Approved
Mode
The module has one approved mode of
operation and is always in approved mode after
initialization
Approved Global indicator
("FIPS-CC")
Table 3: Modes List and Description
Mode Change Instructions and Status:
See Life-Cycle Assurance section.
2.5 Algorithms
Approved Algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
AES-CBC A3453 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CFB128 A3453 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-CTR A3453 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38A
AES-GCM A3453 Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt
IV Generation - Internal
IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1
Key Length - 128, 192, 256
SP 800-38D
Page 11 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
Counter DRBG A3453 Prediction Resistance - No, Yes
Mode - AES-256
Derivation Function Enabled - No, Yes
SP 800-90A
Rev. 1
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A3453 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Secret Generation Mode - Testing
Candidates
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyVer
(FIPS186-4)
A3453 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521 FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A3453 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256,
SHA2-384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A3453 Curve - P-256, P-384, P-521
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224,
SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
FIPS 186-4
HMAC-SHA-1 A3453 Key Length - Key Length: 256-2048
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224 A3453 Key Length - Key Length: 256-2048
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256 A3453 Key Length - Key Length: 256-2048
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384 A3453 Key Length - Key Length: 256-2048
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512 A3453 Key Length - Key Length: 256-2048
Increment 8
FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A3453 Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-
256, P-384, P-521
Scheme -
ephemeralUnified -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
A3453 Domain Parameter Generation Methods -
MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096
Scheme -
dhEphem -
KAS Role - initiator, responder
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
KDF SNMP (CVL) A3453 Password Length - Password Length: 64,
2048
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
KDF SSH (CVL) A3453 Cipher - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256
Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-256,
SHA2-512
SP 800-135
Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
A3453 Key Generation Mode - B.3.6
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
Primality Tests - Table C.2
Private Key Format - Standard
FIPS 186-4
Page 12 of 80
Algorithm CAVP
Cert
Properties Reference
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
A3453 Signature Type - ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5,
PKCSPSS
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
A3453 Signature Type - ANSI X9.31, PKCS 1.5,
PKCSPSS
Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096
FIPS 186-4
Safe Primes Key
Generation
A3453 Safe Prime Groups - MODP-2048, MODP-
3072, MODP-4096
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
Safe Primes Key
Verification
A3453 Safe Prime Groups - MODP-2048, MODP-
3072, MODP-4096
SP 800-56A
Rev. 3
SHA-1 A3453 Message Length - Message Length: 8-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224 A3453 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256 A3453 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384 A3453 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512 A3453 Message Length - Message Length: 0-
65536 Increment 8
FIPS 180-4
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627 (CVL)
A3453 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-256, SHA2-384 SP 800-135
Rev. 1
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Note: Only the algorithms specified in the table above are supported by the module in approved
mode of operation.
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key Type:Symmetric
and Asymmetric
N/A Cryptographic Key Generation; SP 800-
133rev2 and IG D.H (symmetric keys and
asymmetric seeds) from Section 4
Example 1
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
Page 13 of 80
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6 Security Function Implementations
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
CKG CKG Symmetric key
generation for
AES
AES-CBC:
(A3453)
AES-CTR:
(A3453)
AES-GCM:
(A3453)
Counter
DRBG:
(A3453)
DRBG Function DRBG Used for
DRBG
generation
Counter
DRBG:
(A3453)
Firmware Load Test DigSig-SigVer Signature
verification for
firmware load
test
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A3453)
Modulus: RSA
2048 with
SHA2-256
SHA2-256:
(A3453)
KAS-ECC (SSH) KAS-Full Full KAS-
ECC Key
Agreement
used for
SSHv2 service
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2 Path
2, split
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat: Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128 and
256 bits of
KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3:
(A3453)
KDF SSH:
(A3453)
Page 14 of 80
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
encryption
strength
KAS-ECC (TLSv1.2) KAS-Full Full KAS-
ECC Key
Agreement
used for
TLSv1.2
service
IG:G D.F
Scenario 2 Path
2, split
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat: Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128 and
256 bits of
encryption
strength
KAS-ECC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3:
(A3453)
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A3453)
KAS-ECC-KeyGen
(SSH)
KAS-KeyGen KAS ECC
keygen used in
SSHv2 service
Counter
DRBG:
(A3453)
KAS-ECC-KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
KAS-KeyGen KAS ECC
keygen used in
TLSv1.2
service
Counter
DRBG:
(A3453)
KAS-FFC (SSH) KAS-Full Full KAS-FFC
Key
Agreement
used for
SSHv2 service
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2 Path
2, split
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat: Key
establishment
methodology
provides 112 bits
of encryption
strength
KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3:
(A3453)
KDF SSH:
(A3453)
KAS-FFC (TLSv1.2) KAS-Full Full KAS-FFC
Key
Agreement
used for
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2 Path
2, split
Key
KAS-FFC-
SSC Sp800-
56Ar3:
(A3453)
Page 15 of 80
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
TLSv1.2
service
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat: Key
establishment
methodology
provides 112 bits
of encryption
strength
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A3453)
Safe Primes
Key
Generation:
(A3453)
Safe Primes
Key
Verification:
(A3453)
KAS-FFC-KeyGen
(SSH)
KAS-KeyGen KAS FFC
keygen used in
SSHv2 service
Counter
DRBG:
(A3453)
KAS-FFC-KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
KAS-Full KAS FFC
keygen used in
TLSv1.2
service
Counter
DRBG:
(A3453)
KTS (SSHv2 with
AES and HMAC)
KTS-Wrap KTS via
SSHv2 service
by using AES
and HMAC
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2 Path
2, split
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128 and
256 bits of
security strength
AES-CBC:
(A3453)
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(A3453)
HMAC-
SHA2-384:
(A3453)
SHA2-256:
(A3453)
SHA2-384:
(A3453)
KTS (SSHv2 with
AES-GCM)
KTS-Wrap KTS via
SSHv2 service
by using AES-
GCM
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2 Path
2, split
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat:Key
establishment
AES-GCM:
(A3453)
Page 16 of 80
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
methodology
provides
between 128 and
256 bits of
security strength
KTS (TLSv1.2 with
AES and HMAC)
KTS-Wrap KTS via
TLSv1.2
service by
using AES and
HMAC
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2 Path
2, split
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128 and
256 bits of
security strength
AES-CBC:
(A3453)
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(A3453)
HMAC-
SHA2-384:
(A3453)
SHA2-256:
(A3453)
SHA2-384:
(A3453)
AES-GCM:
(A3453)
KTS (TLSv1.2 with
AES-GCM)
KTS-Wrap KTS via
TLSv1.2
service by
using AES-
GCM
IG:IG D.F
Scenario 2 Path
2, split
Key
Confirmation:No
Key
Derivation:IG
2.4.B SP 800-
135rev1 CVL
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides
between 128 and
256 bits of
security strength
AES-GCM:
(A3453)
Session
Authentication
(SMPv3)
MAC SNMPv3
session
authentication
HMAC-SHA-
1: (A3453)
HMAC-
SHA2-224:
(A3453)
SHA-1:
(A3453)
Page 17 of 80
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
SHA2-224:
(A3453)
Session
Authentication
(SSHv2)
MAC SSHv2 session
authentication
HMAC-SHA-
1: (A3453)
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(A3453)
HMAC-
SHA2-512:
(A3453)
SHA-1:
(A3453)
SHA2-256:
(A3453)
SHA2-512:
(A3453)
Session
Authentication
(TLSv1.2)
MAC TLSv1.2
session
authentication
HMAC-
SHA2-256:
(A3453)
HMAC-
SHA2-384:
(A3453)
SHA2-256:
(A3453)
SHA2-384:
(A3453)
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(SNMPv3)
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
SNMPv3
session
protection
AES-CFB1:
(A3453)
AES-CFB8:
(A3453)
AES-CFB128:
(A3453)
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(SSH)
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
SSHv2 session
protection
AES-CBC:
(A3453)
AES-CTR:
(A3453)
AES-GCM:
(A3453)
Session
Encryption/Decryption
(TLSv1.2)
BC-Auth
BC-UnAuth
TLSv1.2
session
protection
AES-CBC:
(A3453)
AES-GCM:
(A3453)
SNMPv3 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF SNMPv3
session keying
materials, used
KDF SNMP:
(A3453)
Page 18 of 80
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
to derive
SNMPv3
session keys
SSH ECDSA KeyGen AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
ECDSA
KeyGen for
SSHv2
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3453)
Counter
DRBG:
(A3453)
SSH ECDSA SigGen DigSig-
SigGen
ECDSA
SigGen for
SSHv2
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3453)
SSH ECDSA SigVer DigSig-SigVer ECDSA
SigVer for
SSHv2
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A3453)
ECDSA
KeyVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A3453)
SSH RSA KeyGen AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
ECDSA
KeyGen for
SSHv2
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3453)
Counter
DRBG:
(A3453)
SSH RSA SigGen DigSig-
SigGen
ECDSA
SigGen for
SSHv2
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3453)
SSH RSA SigVer DigSig-SigVer RSA SigVer
for SSHv2
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A3453)
SSHv2 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF SSHv2 session
keying
materials, used
to derive
SSHv2 session
keys.
KDF SSH:
(A3453)
TLS ECDSA KeyGen AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
ECDSA
KeyGen for
TLSv1.2
ECDSA
KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3453)
Counter
Page 19 of 80
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
DRBG:
(A3453)
TLS ECDSA SigGen DigSig-
SigGen
ECDSA
SigGen for
TLSv1.2
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3453)
TLS ECDSA SigVer DigSig-SigVer ECDSA
SigVer for
TLSv1.2
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A3453)
TLS RSA KeyGen AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
RSA KeyGen
for TLSv1.2
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3453)
Counter
DRBG:
(A3453)
TLS RSA SigGen DigSig-
SigGen
RSA SigGen
for TLSv1.2
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3453)
TLS RSA SigVer DigSig-SigVer RSA SigVer
for TLSv1.2
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A3453)
TLSv1.2 Keying
Materials
Development
KAS-135KDF TLSv1.2
session keying
materials, used
to derive
TLSv1.2
session keys
TLS v1.2 KDF
RFC7627:
(A3453)
Table 6: Security Function Implementations
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information
The module is compliant to IG C.H: GCM is used in the context of TLS, SSH:
● For TLS, The GCM implementation meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H: it is used in a
manner compliant with SP 800-52rev2 and in accordance with Section 4 of
RFC 5288 for TLS key establishment, and ensures when the nonce_explicit
part of the IV exhausts all possible values for a given session key, that a new
TLS handshake is initiated per sections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2 of RFC 5246.
During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent
version of TLS and found to behave correctly
o From this RFC, the GCM cipher suites in use are
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
Page 20 of 80
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, and
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.
● For SSH, the module meets Scenario 1 of IG C.H. The module conforms to
RFCs 4252, 4253, and 5647. The fixed field is 32 bits in length and is derived
using the SSH KDF; this ensures the fixed field is unique for any given GCM
session. The invocation field is 64 bits in length and is incremented for each
invocation of GCM; this prevents the IV from repeating until the entire
invocation field space of 264 is exhausted. (It would take hundreds of years for
this to occur.)
In all of the above cases, the none explicit is always generated deterministically. AES
GCM keys are zeroized when the module is power-cycled. For each new TLS or SSH
session, a new AES GCM key is established.
The module is compliant to IG C.F:
The module utilizes Approved modulus sizes 2048, 3072, and 4096 bits for RSA
signatures. This functionality has been CAVP tested as noted above. The minimum
number of Miller Rabin tests for each modulus size is implemented according to Table
C.2 of FIPS 186-4. For modulus size 4096, the module implements the largest number
of Miller-Rabin tests shown in Table C.2. RSA SigVer is CAVP tested for all three
supported modulus sizes as noted above. The module does not perform FIPS 186-2
SigVer. All supported modulus sizes are CAVP testable and tested as noted above. The
module does not implement RSA key transport in the approved mode.
The module is compliant to IG C.K:
The CAVP testing for Cert. #A3453 was performed prior to the transition date for this IG.
Additionally, The FIPS 186-4 CAVP implemented in this module tests are mathematically
identical to FIPS 186-5 tests.
2.8 RBG and Entropy
Cert
Number
Vendor Name
E64 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
E65 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
E66 Palo Alto Networks, Inc.
Table 7: Entropy Certificates
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
Palo Alto Networks
DRNG Entropy
Source - Broadwell
EP 10-Core Die
Physical Intel Corporation
Intel(R) Core(R),
Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Broadwell-EP-10
128 128 A2165 (AES-
CBC-MAC)
Page 21 of 80
Name Type Operational
Environment
Sample
Size
Entropy
per
Sample
Conditioning
Component
with FCLGA2011
Package
FCLGA2011 Intel(R)
Xeon(R) E5-2620 V4
Processor
Palo Alto Networks
DRNG Entropy
Source - Broadwell
EP 15-Core Die
with FCLGA2011
Package
Physical Intel Corporation
Intel(R) Xeon(R)
Broadwell-EP-15
FCLGA2011 Intel(R)
Xeon(R) E5-2690 V4
Processor
128 128 A2165 (AES-
CBC-MAC)
Palo Alto Networks
DRNG Entropy
Source - Ice Lake
28-Core Die with
FCLGA4189
Package
Physical Intel Corporation
Intel(R) Xeon(R) Ice
Lake-28 FCLGA4189
Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold
5315Y Processor
128 128 A2518 (AES-
CBC-MAC)
Table 8: Entropy Sources
The Intel DRNG utilizes a vetted conditioner (AES-CBC-MAC) that outputs full entropy (128-bits
per 128-bits of output). Upon boot, the AES-256 Counter DRBG (security strength of 256-bits)
requests 384-bits from the Intel DRNG entropy source. Therefore, it is fully seeded with 384 bits
of entropy.
2.9 Key Generation
The module implements CKG where symmetric keys and seeds used for asymmetric key pair
generation are produced using the unmodified/direct output of the DRBG
2.10 Key Establishment
The module provides the following key/SSP establishment services in the approved mode of
operation:
• KAS-ECC Shared Secret Computation
o The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to
FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (1) with KAS-ECC shared secret
computation. The shared secret computation provides between 128 and 256 bits
of encryption strength.
• KAS-FFC Shared Secret Computation
o The module provides SP800-56Arev3 compliant key establishment according to
FIPS 140-3 IG D.F scenario 2 path (1) with KAS-FFC shared secret computation.
The shared secret computation provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption
strength.
Page 22 of 80
2.11 Industry Protocols
• TLS 1.2
• SSHv2
• SNMPv3
No parts of the SSH, TLS and SNMP protocols other than the KDFs, have been tested by the
CAVP/CMVP.
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces
The modules are multi-chip standalone modules with ports and interfaces as shown below. The
modules do not implement a control output interface.
3.1 Ports and Interfaces
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
LED Status Output Module status via LED indicators
Power Power N/A
RJ45 Console Status Output Self-test output
RJ45 Ethernet Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
TLS, SSH
SFP+ (M-600, M-700) Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status Output
TLS
Table 9: Ports and Interfaces
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication
4.1 Authentication Methods
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
RSA-
Based
Certificate
The modules
support RSA
public-key
based
Single-Factor
Cryptographic
Software
With a
minimum
modulus size
of 2048, the
The probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within a one
Page 23 of 80
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
authentication
mechanism
using a
minimum of
RSA 2048 bits
probability
that a random
attempt will
succeed is
1/(2^112).
minute period is
288,000,000/(2^112).
The module supports at
most 4,800,000 new
sessions per second.
ECDSA-
Based
Certificate
The modules
support
ECDSA
public-key
based
authentication
mechanism
using a
minimum
ECDSA curve
of P-256
Single-Factor
Cryptographic
Software
With a
minimum
curve of P-
256, the
probability
that a random
attempt will
succeed is
1/(2^128).
The probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within a one
minute period is
288,000,000/(2^112).
The module supports at
most 4,800,000 new
sessions per second.
Password Password
based
authentication
Memorized Secret
(Unique
Username/password)
The
minimum
length is
eight (8)
characters
(95 possible
characters).
The
probability
that a random
attempt will
succeed or a
false
acceptance
will occur is
1/(958).
The probability of
successfully
authenticating to the
module within one
minute is 10/(95^8).
The firewall's
configuration supports
at most ten failed
attempts to authenticate
in a one-minute period.
Table 10: Authentication Methods
4.2 Roles
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Crypto Officer Identity CO RSA-Based Certificate
ECDSA-Based Certificate
Password
Page 24 of 80
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
User Identity User RSA-Based Certificate
ECDSA-Based Certificate
Password
Table 11: Roles
4.3 Approved Services
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Firmwar
e Update
Provides a
method to
update the
firmware of
the module
Configuration/
System Logs
Uploadin
g new
firmware
Status of
the
updated
firmware
installati
on
Firmware
Load Test
Crypto
Officer
- Public
key for
firmware
content
load test:
E
Other
Configur
ation
Networkin
g parameter
configurati
on, logging
configurati
on, and
other non-
security
relevant
configurati
on
Configuration/
System Logs
Input
configura
tions for
other
setup
functions
Module
uses
configur
ation
DRBG
Function
KAS-ECC
(SSH)
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
KAS-ECC-
KeyGen (SSH)
KAS-ECC-
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
KAS-FFC
(SSH)
KAS-FFC
(TLSv1.2)
KAS-FFC-
KeyGen (SSH)
KAS-FFC-
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
KTS (SSHv2
with AES and
HMAC)
KTS (SSHv2
with AES-
GCM)
KTS (TLSv1.2
Crypto
Officer
- CO,
User, RA
VPN
Password:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key: G,E
- DRBG
Seed : G,E
- DRBG
V: G,E
- ECDSA
Private
Keys :
G,W,E
- Entropy
Input
String:
G,E
- RSA
Private
Keys:
G,W,E
- SSH
Client
Page 25 of 80
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
with AES and
HMAC)
KTS (TLSv1.2
with AES-
GCM)
Session
Authentication
(SMPv3)
Session
Authentication
(SSHv2)
Session
Authentication
(TLSv1.2)
Session
Encryption/De
cryption
(SNMPv3)
Session
Encryption/De
cryption (SSH)
Session
Encryption/De
cryption
(TLSv1.2)
SNMPv3
Keying
Materials
Development
SSH ECDSA
KeyGen
SSH ECDSA
SigGen
SSH ECDSA
SigVer
SSH RSA
KeyGen
SSH RSA
SigGen
SSH RSA
SigVer
SSHv2 Keying
Materials
Development
Public
Key: W,E
- SSH
DHE/ECD
HE
Private
Componen
ts: G,E,Z
- SSH
DHE/ECD
HE Public
Componen
ts:
G,R,W,E,
Z
- SSH
Host
Public
Key:
G,R,W,E
- SSH
Session
Authentica
tion Keys:
G,E,Z
- SSH
Session
Encryptio
n Keys:
G,E,Z
- TLS
DHE/ECD
HE
Private
Componen
ts: G,E,Z
- TLS
DHE/ECD
HE Public
Componen
ts:
G,R,W,E,
Z
- TLS
Page 26 of 80
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
TLS ECDSA
KeyGen
TLS ECDSA
SigGen
TLS ECDSA
SigVer
TLS RSA
KeyGen
TLS RSA
SigGen
TLS RSA
SigVer
TLSv1.2
Keying
Materials
Development
CKG
Encryptio
n Keys:
G,E,Z
- TLS
HMAC
Keys:
G,E,Z
- TLS
Master
Secret:
G,E,Z
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret:
G,E,Z
Security
Configur
ation
Manage
ment
Configurin
g and
managing
cryptograp
hic
parameters
and
setting/mod
ifying
security
policy,
including
creating
User
accounts
and
additional
CO
accounts
Configuration/
System Logs
Input
configura
tion for
various
cryptogra
phic
functions
Module
uses the
configur
ation for
cryptogr
aphic
purposes
DRBG
Function
KAS-ECC
(SSH)
KAS-ECC
(TLSv1.2)
KAS-ECC-
KeyGen (SSH)
KAS-ECC-
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
KAS-FFC
(SSH)
KAS-FFC
(TLSv1.2)
KAS-FFC-
KeyGen (SSH)
KAS-FFC-
KeyGen
(TLSv1.2)
KTS (SSHv2
with AES and
HMAC)
KTS (SSHv2
with AES-
GCM)
KTS (TLSv1.2
Crypto
Officer
- CA
Certificate
s:
G,R,W,E
- CO,
User, RA
VPN
Password:
G,W,E
- DRBG
Key: G,E
- DRBG
Seed : G,E
- DRBG
V: G,E
- ECDSA
Private
Keys :
G,W,E
- ECDSA
Public
Keys:
G,R,W,E
- Entropy
Input
Page 27 of 80
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
with AES and
HMAC)
KTS (TLSv1.2
with AES-
GCM)
Session
Authentication
(SMPv3)
Session
Authentication
(SSHv2)
Session
Authentication
(TLSv1.2)
Session
Encryption/De
cryption
(SNMPv3)
Session
Encryption/De
cryption (SSH)
Session
Encryption/De
cryption
(TLSv1.2)
SNMPv3
Keying
Materials
Development
SSH ECDSA
KeyGen
SSH ECDSA
SigGen
SSH ECDSA
SigVer
SSH RSA
KeyGen
SSH RSA
SigGen
SSH RSA
SigVer
SSHv2 Keying
Materials
Development
String:
G,E
- Protocol
Secrets:
W,E
- Public
key for
firmware
content
load test:
W,E
- RSA
Private
Keys:
G,W,E
- RSA
Public
Keys:
G,R,W,E
- SNMPv3
Authentica
tion Key:
G,E,Z
- SNMPv3
Authentica
tion
Secret:
W,E
- SNMPv3
Privacy
Secret:
G,E,Z
- SNMPv3
Session
Key:
G,E,Z
- SSH
Client
Public
Key: W,E
- SSH
DHE/ECD
HE
Private
Page 28 of 80
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
TLS ECDSA
KeyGen
TLS ECDSA
SigGen
TLS ECDSA
SigVer
TLS RSA
KeyGen
TLS RSA
SigGen
TLS RSA
SigVer
CKG
Componen
ts: G,E,Z
- SSH
DHE/ECD
HE Public
Componen
ts:
G,R,W,E,
Z
- SSH
Host
Public
Key: W,E
- SSH
Session
Authentica
tion Keys:
G,E,Z
- SSH
Session
Encryptio
n Keys:
G,E,Z
- TLS
DHE/ECD
HE
Private
Componen
ts: G,E,Z
- TLS
DHE/ECD
HE Public
Componen
ts:
G,R,W,E,
Z
- TLS
Encryptio
n Keys:
G,E,Z
- TLS
HMAC
Keys:
G,E,Z
Page 29 of 80
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
- TLS
Master
Secret:
G,E,Z
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret:
G,E,Z
Self-
Tests
Initiates
self-tests
and
integrity
test
System Logs Self-test
comman
d or
rebooting
the
module
Status of
the self-
tests
None Crypto
Officer
- Public
key for
firmware
content
load test:
E
Show
Status
Provides
status
information
of the
module
Configuration/
System Logs
Initiate
show
status
comman
d
Module
provides
status
output of
module
None Crypto
Officer
- CO,
User, RA
VPN
Password:
E
- DRBG
Key: G,E
- DRBG
Seed : G,E
- DRBG
V: G,E
- ECDSA
Private
Keys : E
- Entropy
Input
String:
G,E
- RSA
Private
Keys: E
- SSH
DHE/ECD
HE
Private
Componen
Page 30 of 80
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
ts: G,E,Z
- SSH
DHE/ECD
HE Public
Componen
ts:
G,R,W,E,
Z
- SSH
Session
Authentica
tion Keys:
G,E,Z
- SSH
Session
Encryptio
n Keys:
G,E,Z
- TLS
DHE/ECD
HE
Private
Componen
ts: G,E,Z
- TLS
DHE/ECD
HE Public
Componen
ts:
G,R,W,E,
Z
- TLS
Encryptio
n Keys:
G,E,Z
- TLS
HMAC
Keys:
G,E,Z
- TLS
Master
Secret:
G,E,Z
- TLS Pre-
Page 31 of 80
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Master
Secret:
G,E,Z
Unauthent
icated
User
- CO,
User, RA
VPN
Password:
E
- DRBG
Key: G,E
- DRBG
Seed : G,E
- DRBG
V: G,E
- ECDSA
Private
Keys : E
- Entropy
Input
String:
G,E
- RSA
Private
Keys: E
- SSH
DHE/ECD
HE
Private
Componen
ts: G,E,Z
- SSH
DHE/ECD
HE Public
Componen
ts:
G,R,W,E,
Z
- SSH
Session
Authentica
tion Keys:
Page 32 of 80
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
G,E,Z
- SSH
Session
Encryptio
n Keys:
G,E,Z
- TLS
DHE/ECD
HE
Private
Componen
ts: G,E,Z
- TLS
DHE/ECD
HE Public
Componen
ts:
G,R,W,E,
Z
- TLS
Encryptio
n Keys:
G,E,Z
- TLS
HMAC
Keys:
G,E,Z
- TLS
Master
Secret:
G,E,Z
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret:
G,E,Z
Show
Status
(LEDs)
Provides
status of
the module
LEDs N/A Status of
the
module
via
LEDs
None Crypto
Officer
Show
Version
Shows the
version of
the module
Version
displayed via
System Logs /
CLI / UI
Input
comman
d for
version
Module
displays
version
None Crypto
Officer
Page 33 of 80
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
informati
on
View
Other
Configur
ation
Read-only
of non-
security
relevant
configurati
on
Configuration/
System Logs
Initiate
comman
d to read
configura
tion
Module
provides
configur
ation
details
Crypto
Officer
- CO,
User, RA
VPN
Password:
W,E
Zeroize Destroys
(zeroizes)
all keys in
the module
Zeroization
indicator
Initiating
zeroizati
on
comman
d
Status of
the
zeroizati
on
process
None Crypto
Officer
- CA
Certificate
s: Z
- CO,
User, RA
VPN
Password:
Z
- DRBG
Key: Z
- DRBG
Seed : Z
- DRBG
V: Z
- ECDSA
Private
Keys : Z
- ECDSA
Public
Keys: Z
- Entropy
Input
String: Z
-
Firmware
integrity
verificatio
n key : Z
- Protocol
Secrets: Z
- Public
key for
firmware
Page 34 of 80
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
content
load test:
Z
- RSA
Private
Keys: Z
- RSA
Public
Keys: Z
- SNMPv3
Authentica
tion Key:
Z
- SNMPv3
Authentica
tion
Secret: Z
- SNMPv3
Privacy
Secret: Z
- SNMPv3
Session
Key: Z
- SSH
Client
Public
Key: Z
- SSH
DHE/ECD
HE
Private
Componen
ts: Z
- SSH
DHE/ECD
HE Public
Componen
ts: Z
- SSH
Host
Public
Key: Z
- SSH
Session
Page 35 of 80
Name Descriptio
n
Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP
Access
Authentica
tion Keys:
Z
- SSH
Session
Encryptio
n Keys: Z
- TLS
DHE/ECD
HE
Private
Componen
ts: Z
- TLS
DHE/ECD
HE Public
Componen
ts: Z
- TLS
Encryptio
n Keys: Z
- TLS
HMAC
Keys: Z
- TLS
Master
Secret: Z
- TLS Pre-
Master
Secret: Z
Table 12: Approved Services
4.4 Non-Approved Services
N/A for this module.
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded
The module supports the firmware load test by using RSA 2048 bits with SHA2-256 (RSA Cert.
#A3453) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. A Firmware Load Test
Key was preloaded to the module’s binary at the factory and used for firmware load test. In
order to load new firmware, the Crypto Officer must authenticate into the module before loading
any firmware. This ensures that unauthorized access and use of the module is not
Page 36 of 80
performed. The module will load the new update upon reboot. The update attempt will be
rejected if the verification fails.
5 Software/Firmware Security
5.1 Integrity Techniques
The module performs the Firmware Integrity test by using HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA
signature verification (HMAC and ECDSA Cert. #A3453) during the Pre-Operational Self-Test.
In addition, the module also conducts the firmware load test by using RSA 2048 with SHA-256
(Cert. #A3453) for the new validated firmware to be uploaded into the module. The pre-
operational self-tests can be initiated by power cycling the module. When this is performed, the
module automatically runs the cryptographic algorithm self-tests in addition to the pre-
operational firmware integrity test.
The module’s executable code is in the form of the compiled firmware image loaded onto the
module
5.2 Initiate on Demand
The pre-operational self-tests can be initiated by power cycling the module. When this is
performed, the module automatically runs the cryptographic algorithm self-tests in addition to
the pre-operational firmware integrity test.
6 Operational Environment
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements
The FIPS 140-3 Area 5 Operational Environment requirements are not applicable because the
module contains a limited operational environment. The operational environment is limited since
the module includes a firmware load service to support necessary updates. New firmware
versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-3 CMVP.
Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a
separate FIPS 140-3 validation.
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
7 Physical Security
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required
The multi-chip standalone modules are production quality containing standard passivation. Chip
components are protected by an opaque enclosure. There are tamper-evident seals that are
applied on the modules by the Crypto-Officer. There are fifteen (15) for the M-200, fifteen (15)
for the M-300, twenty-one (21) for the M-600, and twenty-one (21) for the M-700. All unused
seals are to be controlled by the Crypto-Officer. The seals prevent removal of the opaque
Page 37 of 80
enclosure without evidence. The Crypto-Officer must ensure that the module surface is clean
and dry. Tamper evident seals must be pressed firmly onto the adhering surfaces during
installation and once applied, the Crypto-Officer shall permit 24 hours of cure time for all tamper
evident seals. The seals prevent removal of the opaque enclosure without evidence. The
Crypto-Officer should inspect the seals and shields for evidence of tamper every 30 days. If the
seals show evidence of tamper, the Crypto-Officer should assume that the modules have been
compromised and contact support.
Mechanism Inspection
Frequency
Inspection Guidance
Tamper-Evident
Seals
30 days (M-200, M-300) Verify integrity of tamper-evident seals
in the locations identified in Section 7 of this Security
Policy.
Front and Rear
Opacity Shields Side
Rails
30 days (M-200, M-300) Verify that opacity shields and side rails
have not been loosened or deformed from their original
shape, thereby reducing their effectiveness.
Top Overlays 30 days (M-200, M-300) Verify top overlays have not been
removed or deformed. All edges should maintain strong
adhesion characteristics.
Tamper Evident
Seals
30 days (M-600, M-700) Verify integrity of tamper-evident seals
in the locations specified in Section 7 of this Security
Policy.
Front and Rear
Opacity Shields
30 days (M-600, M-700) Verify that the front and rear opacity
shields have not been deformed from their original shape,
thereby reducing their effectiveness
Vent Overlays 30 days (M-600, M-700) Verify that the vent overlays have not
been removed or deformed. All edges should maintain
strong adhesion characteristics
Table 13: Mechanisms and Actions Required
Page 38 of 80
7.2 User Placed Tamper Seals
7.2.1 Panorama M-200
Number: Panorama M-200 requires 15 Tamper Seals
Placement: M-200 Tamper Seal Installation (15 Seals)
1. Replace the top cover with the physical top cover.
a. Remove the VOID WARRANTY label and cover screws (replacement label included in the
kit).
M-200 appliance—Remove the Void Warranty label that covers the left top cover screw then
use a Phillips-head screwdriver to remove both screws as indicated in the illustration.
b. Simultaneously depress the two (2) release buttons on top of the cover and slide the cover
toward the back of the appliance to remove it.
a. c. Slide the top cover (does not have vents) on the appliance until the release
buttons click. Reinsert and slide cover into position and secure with the two (2)
screws.
Figure 10. M-200: Top Cover Replacement
Page 39 of 80
2. On the left side of the M-200, firmly apply seven (7) tamper-evident seals as indicated in the
illustration.
Figure 11. M-200: Side View Before Rail Installation
Install the inner rack mount rail brackets as described in the “M-200 and M-600 Appliance
Hardware Reference”. The front rack bracket that you replace in the next step is located on the
front inner rails.
Figure 12. M-200: Inner Rack Mount Rail Brackets
Page 40 of 80
3. Attach the front cover brackets.
Replace the front rack-mount brackets (one bracket on each side) that are part of the inner-rack
rails with the rack-mount brackets by removing and then reinstalling two screws on each
bracket. The handles have standoffs that are used to secure the front cover.
Figure 13. M-200: Replacing Front Rack-Mount Brackets
4. Attach the physical kit front cover to the front of the appliance.
Slide the M-200 physical kit front cover over the brackets and secure the cover by turning the
thumb screws clockwise (one thumb screw on each side).
Figure 14. M-200: Attach Physical Kit Front Cover
5. Attach the physical kit back cover to the back of the appliance. Slide the back cover onto the
back of the appliance, insert two M4 x 0.7 x 8mm (one (1) screw on each side), and turn the
screws clockwise to secure the cover.
6. Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following M-200 illustrations.
Ensure you apply two
(2) tamper-evident seals on the power supplies (see seals #14 and #15 on the rear illustration).
Before you apply the tamper-evident seals, ensure that the appliance and physical kit surfaces
are clean and dry. Firmly press one (1) seal on to each of the locations shown in the
Page 41 of 80
illustrations. Avoid touching the seals for at least 24 hours to allow time for the seals to properly
adhere to the appliance and physical kit surfaces.
Figure 15. M-200: Seal locations on Top and Right Side
Figure 16. M-200: Seal Locations on Left Side and Rear
Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper
evident seals
Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Crypto Officer
Part Numbers: 920-000208
7.2.2 Panorama M-300
Number: Panorama M-300 requires 15 Tamper Seals
Placement: M-300 Tamper Seal Installation (15 Seals)
Replace the top cover with the FIPS top cover.
a. Remove the VOID WARRANTY label and cover screws (replacement label included in the
kit).
Page 42 of 80
M-300 appliance—Remove the Void Warranty label that covers the left top cover screw then
use a Phillips-head screwdriver to remove both screws as indicated in the illustration.
b. Simultaneously depress the two (2) release buttons on top of the cover and slide the cover
toward the back of the appliance to remove it.
c. Slide the physical kit top cover (does not have vents) on the appliance until the release
buttons click. Reinsert and slide cover into position and secure with the two (2) screws.
Figure 17. M-300: Top Cover Replacement
On the left side of the M-300, firmly apply seven (7) tamper-evident seals as indicated in the
illustration.
Figure 18. M-300: Side View Before Rail Installation
Install the inner rack mount rail brackets as described in the “M-300 and M-700 Appliance
Hardware Reference”. The front rack bracket that you replace in the next step is located on the
front inner rails.
Page 43 of 80
Figure 19. M-200: Inner Rack Mount Rail Brackets
Attach the physical kit front cover brackets.
Replace the front rack-mount brackets (one bracket on each side) that are part of the inner-rack
rails with the physical kit rack-mount brackets by removing and then reinstalling two screws on
each bracket. The physical kit handles have standoffs that are used to secure the front cover.
Figure 20. M-300: Replacing Front Rack-Mount Brackets
Page 44 of 80
Attach the physical kit front cover to the front of the appliance.
Slide the M-300 physical kit front cover over the physical kit brackets and secure the cover by
turning the thumb screws clockwise (one thumb screw on each side).
Figure 21. M-300: Attach Physical Kit Front Cover
Attach the physical kit back cover to the back of the appliance.
Slide the back cover onto the back of the appliance, insert two M4 x 0.7 x 8mm (one (1) screw
on each side), and turn the screws clockwise to secure the cover.
Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following M-300 illustrations.
Ensure you apply two (2) tamper-evident seals on the power supplies (see seals #14 and #15
on the rear illustration).
Note: Before you apply the tamper-evident seals, ensure that the appliance and physical kit
surfaces are clean and dry. Firmly press one (1) seal on to each of the locations shown in the
illustrations. Avoid touching the seals for at least 24 hours to allow time for the seals to properly
adhere to the appliance and physical kit surfaces.
Figure 22. M-300: Seal locations on Top and Right Side
Page 45 of 80
Figure 23. M-300: Seal Locations on Left Side and Rear
Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper
evident seals.
Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Crypto Officer
Part Numbers: 920-000319
7.2.3 Panorama M-600
Number: Panorama M-600 requires 21 Tamper Seals
Placement: M-600 Tamper Seal Installation (21 Seals)
Replace the top cover with the FIPS top cover.
Remove the VOID WARRANTY label and cover screws (replacement label included in the kit).
Remove the Void Warranty label that covers the left side cover screw then use a Phillips-head
screwdriver to remove both screws as indicated in the illustration.
b. Simultaneously depress the two (2) release buttons on top of the cover and slide the
cover toward the back of the appliance to remove it.
c. Slide the physical kit top cover (does not have vents) on the appliance until the release
buttons click. Replace the two screws that you removed from the old cover
Page 46 of 80
Figure 24. M-600: Top Cover Replacement
Attach the physical front cover brackets.
Remove the front pull handles by removing two (2) screws from each handle (one (1) handle on
each side), insert the M-600 physical kit front-cover brackets under each handle, and then
replace the handles and secure them using the screws that you removed. The physical kit
handles have standoffs that are used to secure the front cover.
Figure 25. M-600: Front Cover Bracket
Attach the physical kit front cover to the front of the appliance.
Slide the M-600 physical kit front cover over the physical kit pull handle brackets and secure the
cover by turning the thumb screws clockwise (one thumb screw on each side).
Page 47 of 80
Figure 26. M-600: Physical Kit Front Cover
4. Install a tamper-evident seal on the back of the appliance. This is seal #13 in the M-600. You
need to install this seal before you install the M-600 physical kit back cover. 5. Attach the
physical kit back cover to the back of the appliance. a. Slide the back cover onto the back of the
appliance and turn the two (2) thumb screws clockwise until tight (one (1) screw on each side)
to secure the cover. 6. Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following M-
600 illustrations below. Also install the overlay stickers to cover vent openings (two (2) stickers
on each side). You then install tamper-evident seals over the overlay stickers. Apply two (2)
tamper-evident seals on the back side of the right rack handle (see seals #18 and #19 on the
left side). Apply two (2) tamper-evident seals on the power supplies (see seals #11 and #12 with
rear inset). Note: Before you apply the tamper-evident seals, ensure that the appliance and
physical kit surfaces are clean and dry. Firmly press one (1) seal on to each of the locations
shown in the illustrations. Avoid touching the seals for at least 24 hours to allow time for the
seals to properly adhere to the appliance and physical kit surfaces.
Page 48 of 80
M-600 Seal Placement (21 Seals)
Figure 27. M-600: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Rear)
Figure 28. M-600: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Front)
Page 49 of 80
Figure 29. M-600: Tamper Seals Location for Side Rails
Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper
evident seals.
Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Crypto Officer
Part Numbers: 920-000209
Page 50 of 80
7.2.4 Panorama M-700
Number: Panorama M-700 requires 21 Tamper Seals
Placement: M-700 Tamper Seal Installation (21 Seals)
1. Replace the top cover with the physical kit top cover.
a. Remove the VOID WARRANTY label and cover screws (replacement label included in the
kit). Remove the Void Warranty label that covers the left side cover screw then use a Phillips-
head screwdriver to remove both screws as indicated in the illustration.
b. Simultaneously depress the two (2) release buttons on top of the cover and slide the cover
toward the back of the appliance to remove it.
c. Slide the physical kit top cover (does not have vents) on the appliance until the release
buttons click. Replace the two screws that you removed from the old cover
Figure 30. M-700: Top Cover Replacement
2. Attach the physical kit front cover brackets.
Remove the front pull handles by removing two (2) screws from each handle (one (1) handle on
each side), insert the M-700 physical kit front-cover brackets under each handle, and then
replace the handles and secure them using the screws that you removed. The physical kit
handles have standoffs that are used to secure the front cover.
Page 51 of 80
Figure 31. M-700: Front Cover Bracket
Attach the physical kit front cover to the front of the appliance. Slide the M-700 physical front
cover over the physical kit pull handle brackets and secure the cover by turning the thumb
screws clockwise (one thumb screw on each side).
Figure 32. M-700: Physical Kit Front Cover
Install a tamper-evident seal on the back of the appliance. This is seal #13 in the M-700. You
need to install this seal before you install the M-700 physical kit back cover.
5. Attach the physical kit back cover to the back of the appliance.
a. Slide the back cover onto the back of the appliance and turn the two (2) thumb screws
clockwise until tight (one (1) screw on each side) to secure the cover.
6. Apply a tamper-evident seal to each location shown in the following M-700 illustrations below.
Also install the overlay stickers to cover vent openings (two (2) stickers on each side). You then
install tamper-evident seals over the overlay stickers. Apply two (2) tamper-evident seals on the
back side of the right rack handle (see seals #18 and #19 on the left side). Apply two (2)
tamper-evident seals on the power supplies (see seals #11 and #12 with rear inset).
Page 52 of 80
Note: Before you apply the tamper-evident seals, ensure that the appliance and physical kit
surfaces are clean and dry. Firmly press one (1) seal on to each of the locations shown in the
illustrations. Avoid touching the seals for at least 24 hours to allow time for the seals to properly
adhere to the appliance and physical kit surfaces.
M-700 Seal Placement (21 Seals)
Figure 33. M-700: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Rear)
Figure 34. M-700: Tamper Seal Locations (Top and Front)
Page 53 of 80
Figure 35. M-700: Tamper Seals Location for Side Rails
Surface Preparation: Clean the chassis of any grease, dirt, or oil before applying the tamper
evident seals.
Operator Responsible for Securing Unused Seals: Crypto Officer
Part Numbers: 920-000318
8 Non-Invasive Security
N/A
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management
9.1 Storage Areas
Storage
Area
Name
Description Persistence
Type
HDD Non-Volatile Memory Static
RAM Volatile Memory Dynamic
Table 14: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods
Page 54 of 80
Name From To Format
Type
Distributio
n Type
Entry
Type
SFI or
Algorith
m
Module Public
Key Output
HDD External
(outside
of
module's
boundary
)
Plaintext Automated Electroni
c
Password/Secre
t Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
External
(outside
of
module's
boundary
)
HDD Encrypte
d
Automated Electroni
c
KTS
(SSHv2
with AES
and
HMAC)
Password/Secre
t Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
External
(outside
of
module's
boundary
)
HDD Encrypte
d
Automated Electroni
c
KTS
(SSHv2
with AES-
GCM)
Password/Secre
t Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
External
(outside
of
module's
boundary
)
HDD Encrypte
d
Automated Electroni
c
KTS
(TLSv1.2
with AES
and
HMAC)
Password/Secre
t Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
External
(outside
of
module's
boundary
)
HDD Encrypte
d
Automated Electroni
c
KTS
(TLSv1.2
with AES-
GCM)
Peer Public Key
Input
External
(outside
of
module's
boundary
)
HDD Plaintext Automated Electroni
c
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods
Page 55 of 80
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Power Cycle /
Session
Termination
Operator powers
the module off or
session terminates
Powering off the module or
terminating the session will
erase all SSPs stored in the
RAM of the module.
Command via CLI or
WebUI or by
unplugging module
Zeroization
Command
CO issues
zeroization service
The zeroization command
will erase all SSPs stored in
the RAM or in the Flash of
the module.
Entering into
maintenance mode
and selecting Factory
Reset
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods
The following procedure will zeroize the module and must be performed under the control of the
operator:
● Access the module’s CLI via SSH and command the module to enter maintenance mode
(“debug system maintenance-mode”); the module will reboot
● Note: Establish a serial connection to the console port
● After reboot, select “Continue.”
● Select “Factory Reset”
● The module will perform a zeroization, and provide the following message once complete:
● “Factory Reset Status: Success”
Once the module is rebooted and zeroization is initiated, the module cannot be accessed in any
way and the zeroization process cannot be stopped, thus the SSPs would not be compromised
during the time of zeroization. The Crypto Officer shall be in control of the module until the
zeroization process is complete.
9.4 SSPs
Name Description Size -
Streng
th
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
CA
Certificate
s
ECDSA/RSA
Public key -
Used to trust a
root CA
intermediate
CA and leaf
/end entity
certificates
(RSA 2048,
3072, and
4096 bits)
(ECDSA P-
2048
bits -
4096
bits
128 -
256
bits -
112
bits,12
8 bits,
150
bits;
128
Public Key
- PSP
DRBG
Functio
n
TLS RSA
SigGen
TLS RSA SigVer
Page 56 of 80
Name Description Size -
Streng
th
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
256, P-384,
and P-521)
bits,19
2 bits,
256
bits
CO, User,
RA VPN
Password
Authenticatio
n string with a
minimum
length of eight
(8) characters.
8
charact
ers
minimu
m -
Authentica
tion Data -
CSP -
CSP
DRBG
Key
AES 256 CTR
DRBG state
Key used in
the generation
of a random
values
256
bits -
256
bits
DRBG
Key - CSP
- CSP
Entropy
as per
SP 800-
90B
DRBG Function
DRBG
Seed
DRBG seed
coming from
the entropy
source Seed
length = 384
bits
384
bits -
256
bits
DRBG
Seed - CSP
- CSP
Entropy
as per
SP 800-
90B
DRBG Function
DRBG V AES 256 CTR
DRBG state V
used in the
generation of
a random
values
128
bits -
128
bits
DRBG
Internal
State V
value -
CSP - CSP
Entropy
as per
SP 800-
90B
DRBG Function
ECDSA
Private
Keys
ECDSA
Private key
for generation
of signatures
and
authentication
(P-256, P-384,
or P-521)
128 -
256
bits -
128
bits,
192
bits,
256
bits
Private
Key - CSP
DRBG
Functio
n
TLS ECDSA
SigGen
ECDSA
Public
Keys
ECDSA
public keys
managed as
certificates for
the
verification of
signatures,
128 -
256
bits -
128
bits,
192
bits,
Public Key
- PSP
DRBG
Functio
n
TLS ECDSA
SigVer
Page 57 of 80
Name Description Size -
Streng
th
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
establishment
of TLS,
operator
authentication
and peer
authentication
. (ECDSA P-
256, P-384, or
P-521)
256
bits
Entropy
Input
String
Entropy input
string coming
from the
entropy
source Input
length = 384
bits
384
bits -
256
bits
DRBG
CSP - CSP
Entropy
as per
SP 800-
90B
DRBG Function
Firmware
integrity
verificatio
n key
Used to check
the integrity
of all software
code
(HMAC-
SHA-256 and
ECDSA P-
256) (Note:
This is not
considered an
SSP)
128
bits -
128
bits
Neither -
PSP
Pre-
Loaded
Protocol
Secrets
Secrets used
by RADIUS
or TACACS+
(8 characters
minimum)
8
charact
ers
minimu
m -
Authentica
tion Data -
CSP - CSP
Public key
for
firmware
content
load test
Used to
authenticate
software/firm
ware and
content to be
installed on
the firewall
(RSA 2048
with SHA-
256)
112
bits -
112
bits
Public Key
- PSP -
PSP
Pre-
Loaded
Firmware Load
Test
Page 58 of 80
Name Description Size -
Streng
th
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
RSA
Private
Keys
RSA Private
keys for
generation of
signatures,
authentication
or key
establishment.
(RSA 2048,
3072, or
4096-bit)
2048 -
4096
bits -
112
bits,12
8 bits,
150
bits
Private
Key - CSP
DRBG
Functio
n
TLS RSA
SigGen
RSA
Public
Keys
RSA public
keys managed
as certificates
for the
verification of
signatures,
establishment
of TLS,
operator
authentication
and peer
authentication
. (RSA 2048,
3072, or
4096-bit)
2048 -
4096
bits -
112
bits,12
8 bits,
150
bits
Public Key
- PSP
DRBG
Functio
n
TLS RSA SigVer
SNMPv3
Authentica
tion Key
HMAC-SHA-
1/224/256/384
/512
Authenticatio
n protocol key
(160 bits)
160 -
512
bits -
160
bits,
224
bits,
256
bits,
384
bits, or
512
bits
Session
Key - CSP
- CSP
KDF
SNMP
(A3453)
Session
Authentication
(SMPv3)
SNMPv3
Authentica
tion Secret
Used to
support
SNMPv3
services
8
charact
ers
minimu
Authentica
tion Key -
CSP - CSP
SNMPv3 Keying
Materials
Development
Page 59 of 80
Name Description Size -
Streng
th
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
(Minimum 8
characters)
m -
N/A
SNMPv3
Privacy
Secret
Used to
support
SNMPv3
services
(Minimum 8
characters)
8
charact
ers
minimu
m -
N/A
Authentica
tion Key -
CSP - CSP
SNMPv3 Keying
Materials
Development
SNMPv3
Session
Key
Privacy
protocol
encryption
key (AES
128/192/256
CFB)
128 -
256
bits -
128
bits,
256
bits
Session
Key - CSP
- CSP
KDF
SNMP
(A3453)
Session
Encryption/Decr
yption
(SNMPv3)
SSH Client
Public Key
Public RSA
key used to
authenticate
client. (RSA
2048, 3072,
and 4096 bits)
2048 -
4096
bits -
112
bits,12
8 bits,
150
bits;
128
bits,19
2 bits,
256
bits
Public Key
- PSP -
PSP
SSH RSA SigVer
SSH
DHE/ECD
HE Private
Componen
ts
Diffie
Hellman or
EC Diffie-
Hellman
private (DH
Group 14,
ECDH P-256,
ECDH P-384,
ECDH P-521)
2048
bits;
128 -
256
bits -
112
bits;12
8
bits,19
2 bits,
256
bits
Private
Key - CSP
- CSP
DRBG
Functio
n
KAS-
ECC
(SSH)
KAS-
FFC
(SSH)
SSHv2 Keying
Materials
Development
SSH
DHE/ECD
HE Public
Diffie
Hellman or
EC Diffie-
2048
bits;
128 -
Public Key
- PSP -
PSP
DRBG
Functio
n
KAS-
ECC
(SSH)
SSHv2 Keying
Materials
Development
Page 60 of 80
Name Description Size -
Streng
th
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
Componen
ts
Hellman
public
component
(DH Group
14, ECDH P-
256, ECDH P-
384, ECDH P-
521)
256
bits -
112
bits;12
8
bits,19
2 bits,
256
bits
KAS-
FFC
(SSH)
SSH Host
Public Key
SSH Host
Public Key
(RSA 2048,
RSA 3072,
RSA 4096,
ECDSA P-
256, P-384, or
P-521)
2048 -
4096
bits;
128 -
256
bits -
112
bits,12
8 bits,
150
bits;
128
bits,19
2 bits,
256
bits
Public Key
- PSP -
PSP
DRBG
Functio
n
SSH ECDSA
SigVer
SSH RSA SigVer
SSH
Session
Authentica
tion Keys
Authenticatio
n keys used in
all SSH
connections to
the security
module's
command line
interface
(HMAC-
SHA-1,
HMAC-
SHA2-256,
HMAC-
SHA2-512)
(160, 256, 512
bits)
160,
256, or
512
bits -
160
bits,
256
bits, or
512
bits
Session
Key - CSP
- CSP
KDF
SSH
(A3453)
KAS-
ECC
(SSH)
KAS-
FFC
(SSH)
Session
Authentication
(SSHv2)
Page 61 of 80
Name Description Size -
Streng
th
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
SSH
Session
Encryption
Keys
Used in all
SSH
connections to
the security
module's
command line
interface.
(128, 192, or
256 bits: AES
CBC or CTR)
(128 or 256
bits: AES
GCM)
128 -
256
bits -
128
bits,
256
bits
Session
Key - CSP
- CSP
KDF
SSH
(A3453)
KAS-
ECC
(SSH)
KAS-
FFC
(SSH)
Session
Encryption/Decr
yption (SSH)
TLS
DHE/ECD
HE Private
Componen
ts
Ephemeral
Diffie-
Hellman
private FFC
or EC
component
used in TLS
(DHE 2048,
ECDHE P-
256, P-384, P-
521)
2048
bits -
4096
bits
128 -
256
bits -
112
bits,12
8 bits,
150
bits;
128
bits,19
2 bits,
256
bits
Private
Key - CSP
DRBG
Functio
n
KAS-
ECC-
KeyGen
(TLSv1.
2)
KAS-
FFC-
KeyGen
(TLSv1.
2)
TLSv1.2 Keying
Materials
Development
TLS
DHE/ECD
HE Public
Componen
ts
Diffie_Hellma
n or EC
Diffie-
Hellman
Ephemeral
values used in
key agreement
(DHE 2048,
ECDHE P-
256, P-384, P-
521)
2048
bits -
4096
bits
128 -
256
bits -
112
bits,12
8 bits,
150
bits;
128
Public Key
- PSP
DRBG
Functio
n
KAS-
ECC
(TLSv1.
2)
KAS-
FFC
(TLSv1.
2)
TLSv1.2 Keying
Materials
Development
Page 62 of 80
Name Description Size -
Streng
th
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
bits,19
2 bits,
256
bits
TLS
Encryption
Keys
AES (128 or
256 bit) keys
used in TLS
connections
(GCM; CBC)
128 -
256
bits -
128
bits,
256
bits
Session
Key - CSP
- CSP
TLS
v1.2
KDF
RFC762
7
(A3453)
KAS-
ECC
(TLSv1.
2)
Session
Encryption/Decr
yption (TLSv1.2)
TLS
HMAC
Keys
HMAC keys
used in TLS
connections
(HMAC-
SHA2-
256/384) (
256, 384 bits)
256 -
384
bits -
256
bits,
384
bits
Session
Key - CSP
- CSP
TLS
v1.2
KDF
RFC762
7
(A3453)
KAS-
ECC-
KeyGen
(TLSv1.
2)
KAS-
FFC-
KeyGen
(TLSv1.
2)
KAS-
ECC
(TLSv1.
2)
Session
Authentication
(TLSv1.2)
TLS
Master
Secret
Secret value
used to derive
the TLS
session keys
384
bits -
384
bits
Master
Secret -
CSP - CSP
TLS
v1.2
KDF
RFC762
7
(A3453)
KAS-
ECC
(TLSv1.
2)
KAS-
FFC
(TLSv1.
2)
TLSv1.2 Keying
Materials
Development
TLS Pre-
Master
Secret
Secret value
used to derive
the TLS
Master Secret
along with
client and
server random
nonces
2048
bits;
256
bits,
384
bits,
521
bits -
112
bits;
Shared
Secret -
CSP
TLS
v1.2
KDF
RFC762
7
(A3453)
KAS-
ECC
(TLSv1.
2)
KAS-
FFC
(TLSv1.
2)
TLSv1.2 Keying
Materials
Development
Page 63 of 80
Name Description Size -
Streng
th
Type -
Category
Genera
ted By
Establis
hed By
Used By
256
bits,
384
bits,
521
bits
Table 17: SSP Table 1
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
CA
Certificates
Peer Public
Key Input
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
RAM:Plaintext
HDD:Plaintext
Duratio
n of use
Zeroizatio
n
Command
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
CO, User,
RA VPN
Password
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
HDD:Obfuscat
ed
Zeroizatio
n
Command
Page 64 of 80
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
DRBG Key RAM:Plaintext Duratio
n of use
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
Entropy Input
String:Paired With
DRBG Key:Paired
With
DRBG Seed RAM:Plaintext Duratio
n of use
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
Entropy Input
String:Paired With
DRBG V:Paired
With
DRBG V RAM:Plaintext Duratio
n of use
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
ECDSA
Private Keys
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
RAM:Plaintext
HDD:Plaintext
Duratio
n of use
Zeroizatio
n
Command
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
ECDSA Public
Keys:Paired With
Page 65 of 80
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
ECDSA
Public Keys
Peer Public
Key Input
Module Public
Key Output
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
RAM:Plaintext
HDD:Plaintext
Duratio
n of use
Zeroizatio
n
Command
ECDSA Private
Keys :Paired With
Entropy
Input String
RAM:Plaintext Duratio
n of use
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
Entropy Input
String:Paired With
DRBG V:Paired
With
DRBG Key:Paired
With
Firmware
integrity
HDD:Plaintext
Page 66 of 80
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
verification
key
Protocol
Secrets
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
HDD:Plaintext
RAM:Plaintext
Duratio
n of use
Zeroizatio
n
Command
DRBG Seed
:Paired With
DRBG Key:Paired
With
DRBG V:Paired
With
Public key
for firmware
content load
test
HDD:Plaintext
RSA Private
Keys
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
RAM:Plaintext
HDD:Plaintext
Duratio
n of use
Zeroizatio
n
Command
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
RSA Public
Keys:Paired With
Page 67 of 80
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
RSA Public
Keys
Peer Public
Key Input
Module Public
Key Output
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
RAM:Plaintext
HDD:Plaintext
Duratio
n of use
Zeroizatio
n
Command
SNMPv3
Authenticati
on Key
RAM:Plaintext
HDD:Plaintext
Duratio
n of use
Zeroizatio
n
Command
SNMPv3
Authentication
Secret:Derived
From
SNMPv3 Privacy
Secret:Derived
From
SNMPv3
Authenticati
on Secret
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
RAM:Plaintext
HDD:Plaintext
Duratio
n of use
Zeroizatio
n
Command
Page 68 of 80
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
SNMPv3
Privacy
Secret
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
RAM:Plaintext
HDD:Plaintext
Duratio
n of use
Zeroizatio
n
Command
Page 69 of 80
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
SNMPv3
Session Key
RAM:Plaintext
HDD:Plaintext
Duratio
n of use
Zeroizatio
n
Command
SNMPv3
Authentication
Secret:Derived
From
SNMPv3 Privacy
Secret:Derived
From
SSH Client
Public Key
Peer Public
Key Input
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
TLSv1.2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES and
HMAC
Password/Secr
et Input via
SSHv2
encrypted by
AES-GCM
RAM:Plaintext
HDD:Plaintext
Duratio
n of use
Zeroizatio
n
Command
SSH
DHE/ECDH
E Private
Components
RAM:Plaintext Duratio
n of use
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
TLS DHE/ECDHE
Public
Components:Paire
d With
SSH
DHE/ECDH
E Public
Components
Peer Public
Key Input
Module Public
Key Output
RAM:Plaintext Duratio
n of use
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
SSH DHE/ECDHE
Private
Components:Paire
d With
Page 70 of 80
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
SSH Host
Public Key
RAM:Plaintext
HDD:Plaintext
Duratio
n of use
Zeroizatio
n
Command
SSH Session
Authenticati
on Keys
RAM:Plaintext Duratio
n of use
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
SSH DHE/ECDHE
Public
Components:Deriv
ed From
SSH DHE/ECDHE
Private
Components:Deriv
ed From
SSH Session
Encryption
Keys
RAM:Plaintext Duratio
n of use
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
SSH DHE/ECDHE
Private
Components:Deriv
ed From
SSH DHE/ECDHE
Public
Components:Deriv
ed From
TLS
DHE/ECDH
E Private
Components
RAM:Plaintext Duratio
n of use
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
TLS DHE/ECDHE
Public
Components:Paire
d With
TLS
DHE/ECDH
E Public
Components
Peer Public
Key Input
Module Public
Key Output
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
TLS DHE/ECDHE
Private
Components:Paire
d With
TLS
Encryption
Keys
RAM:Plaintext Duratio
n of use
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
TLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
TLS HMAC
Keys
RAM:Plaintext Duratio
n of use
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
TLS Master
Secret:Derived
From
TLS Master
Secret
RAM:Plaintext Duratio
n of use
Power
Cycle /
Session
TLS Pre-Master
Secret:Derived
From
Page 71 of 80
Name Input -
Output
Storage Storage
Duratio
n
Zeroizatio
n
Related SSPs
Terminatio
n
TLS Pre-
Master
Secret
RAM:Plaintext Duratio
n of use
Power
Cycle /
Session
Terminatio
n
Table 18: SSP Table 2
9.5 Transitions
Key Sizes
• Key sizes with a security strength less than 128-bits will be non-Approved for all uses
starting January 1, 2031.
SHA-1
• The module implements SHA-1 for use in non-digital signature applications. This
implementation will be non-Approved for all uses starting January 1, 2031.
10 Self-Tests
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Algorithm or Test Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) (A3453)
P-256 KAT SW/FW
Integrity
Self-Test
successful
Signature
Verification
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A3453)
SHA2-256 KAT SW/FW
Integrity
Self-Test
successful
Keyed
Checksum
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
Verified with HMAC-SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256
Note: the ECDSA and HMAC-SHA-256 KATs are performed prior to the Software integrity test
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properti
es
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicato
r
Details Conditio
ns
AES-
CCM
Decrypt
(A3453)
192 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Decrypt After each
power-on
or via
Page 72 of 80
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properti
es
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicato
r
Details Conditio
ns
self-test
command
AES-
CCM
Encrypt
(A3453)
192 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Encrypt After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
AES-
ECB
Decrypt
(A3453)
128 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Decrypt After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
AES-
ECB
Encrypt
(A3453)
128 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Encrypt After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
AES-
GCM
Decrypt
(A3453)
256 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Decrypt After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
AES-
GCM
Encrypt
(A3453)
256 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Encrypt After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
Counter
DRBG
(A3453)
N/A KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
SP 800-90Arev1
Instantiate/Generate/Res
eed Known Answer
Tests
After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
ECDSA /
KAS-
ECC
256 Bit
Minimu
m
PCT PCT System
log
message
s
ECDSA / KAS-ECC
pairwise consistency test
On
session
ECDSA
SigGen
(FIPS186
-4)
(A3453)
256 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Sign After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
Page 73 of 80
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properti
es
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicato
r
Details Conditio
ns
ECDSA
SigVer
(FIPS186
-4)
(A3453)
256 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Verify After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
Firmware
Load
Test
2048 Bit FW
Load
Test
SW/F
W
Load
System
log
message
s
Firmware load test on
content load
On
session
HMAC-
SHA-1
(A3453)
160 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Keyed Hash After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
HMAC-
SHA2-
224
(A3453)
224 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Keyed Hash After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
HMAC-
SHA2-
256
(A3453)
256 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Keyed Hash After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
HMAC-
SHA2-
384
(A3453)
384 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Keyed Hash After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
HMAC-
SHA2-
512
(A3453)
512 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Keyed Hash After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
KAS-
ECC-
SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A3453)
256 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
KAS Computation After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
KAS-
FFC
2048 Bits
Minimu
m
PCT PCT System
log
KAS-FCC pairwise
consistency test
On
session
Page 74 of 80
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properti
es
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicato
r
Details Conditio
ns
message
s
KAS-
FFC-SSC
Sp800-
56Ar3
(A3453)
2048 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
KAS Computation After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
RSA 2048 Bits
Minimu
m
PCT PCT System
log
message
s
RSA pairwise
consistency test
On
session
RSA
SigGen
(FIPS186
-4)
(A3453)
2048 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Sign After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
RSA
SigVer
(FIPS186
-4)
(A3453)
2048 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Verify After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
SHA-1
(A3453)
160 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Hash After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
SHA2-
256
(A3453)
256 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Hash After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
SHA2-
384
(A3453)
384 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Hash After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
SHA2-
512
(A3453)
512 Bits KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
Hash After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
Page 75 of 80
Algorith
m or
Test
Test
Properti
es
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicato
r
Details Conditio
ns
SP 800-
90B
RCT/AP
T Health
Tests on
Entropy
Source
N/A Fault-
Detectio
n
CAST Self-test
output
message
Health tests done on
entropy source
After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
SP 800-
135rev1
IKEv2
KDF
with
SHA-256
N/A KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
IKEv2 with SHA-256 After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
SP 800-
135rev1
SSH
KDF
with
SHA-256
N/A KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
SSHv2 with SHA-256 After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
SP 800-
135rev1
TLS 1.2
with
SHA-256
KDF
N/A KAT CAST Self-test
output
message
TLSv1.2 with SHA-256 After each
power-on
or via
self-test
command
SP 800-
56A Rev
3
Assuranc
e Tests
N/A Critical
Functio
ns
Critical
Functio
n
System
log
message
s
Assurance tests for SP
800-56A Rev3
On
session
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3453)
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
Page 76 of 80
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A3453)
KAT SW/FW
Integrity
On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
AES-CCM
Decrypt (A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
AES-CCM
Encrypt (A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
AES-ECB
Decrypt (A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
AES-ECB
Encrypt (A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
AES-GCM
Decrypt (A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
AES-GCM
Encrypt (A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
Counter DRBG
(A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
ECDSA / KAS-
ECC
PCT PCT On session On session
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
Firmware Load
Test
FW Load Test SW/FW Load On session On session
HMAC-SHA-1
(A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
HMAC-SHA2-
224 (A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
HMAC-SHA2-
384 (A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
HMAC-SHA2-
512 (A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
KAS-ECC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
Page 77 of 80
Algorithm or
Test
Test Method Test Type Period Periodic
Method
KAS-FFC PCT PCT On session On session
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
RSA PCT PCT On session On session
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
SHA-1 (A3453) KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
SHA2-256
(A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
SHA2-384
(A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
SHA2-512
(A3453)
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
SP 800-90B
RCT/APT
Health Tests on
Entropy Source
Fault-Detection CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
SP 800-135rev1
IKEv2 KDF
with SHA-256
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
SP 800-135rev1
SSH KDF with
SHA-256
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
SP 800-135rev1
TLS 1.2 with
SHA-256 KDF
KAT CAST On Demand Manually or
Scheduled
SP 800-56A Rev
3 Assurance
Tests
Critical
Functions
Critical Function On session On session
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 Error States
Page 78 of 80
Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Conditional
Firmware Load Test
Failure
Signature
verification fails
on firmware load
Signature
verification
failure
N/A System prints
Invalid image
message.
Conditional Pairwise
Consistency or
Critical Functions
Test Failure
Module fails a
PCT or critical
functions test
PCT / Critical
functions test
Reset session System log prints
an error message.
Self-Test / Integrity
Test Failure
Module fails a
self-test or
integrity test
Self-test or
Integrity Test
failure
Reboot
Module or
Factory
Reset
FIPS-CC mode
failure.
<Algorithm test>
failed.
Table 23: Error States
Data output shall be inhibited during self-tests and error states.
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests
Perform a power cycle or via the ‘Self-Tests’ service by entering CLI command “request restart
system”
11 Life-Cycle Assurance
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures
The following procedure will put the modules into the Approved mode of operation:
• Install physical kit opacity shields and tamper evidence seals according to the Physical
Security Policy section. Physical kits must be correctly installed to operate in the
Approved mode of operation. The tamper evidence seals and opacity shields shall be
installed for the module to operate in the Approved mode of operation.
• During initial boot up, break the boot sequence via the console port connection (by
pressing the maint button when instructed to do so) to access the main menu.
• Select “Continue.”
• Select the “Set FIPS-CC Mode” option to enter the Approved mode.
• Select “Enable FIPS-CC Mode”.
• When prompted, select “Reboot” and the module will re-initialize and continue into
“FIPS-CC” mode (Approved mode).
• The module will reboot.
• In “FIPS-CC” mode, the console port is available as a status output port.
• Once the module has finished booting, the Crypto Officer can authenticate using the
default credentials that come with the module
• Once authenticated, the module will automatically require the operator to change
their password; and the default credential is overwritten
The module will automatically indicate the Approved mode of operation in the following manner:
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• Status output interface will indicate “**** FIPS-CC MODE ENABLED ****” via the CLI
session.
• Status output interface will indicate “FIPS-CC mode enabled successfully” via the
console port.
• The module will display “FIPS-CC” at all times in the status bar at the bottom of the web
interface.
Should one or more power-up self-tests fail, the Approved mode of operation will not be
achieved. Feedback will consist of:
• The module will output “FIPS-CC failure”
• The module will reboot and enter a state in which the reason for the reboot can be
determined.
• To determine which self-test caused the system to reboot into the error state, connect
the console cable and follow the on-screen instructions to view the self-test output.
Note: Disabling FIPS-CC mode causes a complete factory reset, which is described in section
11.6.
Non-Compliant State
Failure to follow the directions in the Approved Mode of Operation above or rules noted in
Section 11 will result in the module operating in a non-compliant state, which is considered out
of scope of this validation.
11.2 Administrator Guidance
The Administrator Guidance can be obtained from Palo Alto Network’s public site:
https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/panorama/11-1/panorama-admin
https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/content/dam/techdocs/en_US/pdf/advanced-url-
filtering/advanced-url-filtering-administration.pdf
To place the module in a configuration that supports logging capabilities or URL categorization
(PAN-DB), refer to the Administrator Guidance documents noted above.
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance
N/A
11.4 Design and Rules
In FIPS-CC mode, the following rules shall apply:
1. The operator should not enable or use TLSv1.3
- Checked via CLI using “show profiles” command
2. If using RADIUS, it must be configured using TLS.
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- Checked via CLI using “show shared” command
3. If using TACACS+, configure the service route via an IPSec tunnel, and ensure the
TACACS+ server is configured for a minimum password length of eight (8) characters or
greater.
- Checked via CLI using “show deviceconfig” command
11.5 End of Life
The following procedure will zeroize the module:
• Access the module’s CLI via SSH, and command the module to enter maintenance
mode; the module will reboot
• Note: Establish a serial connection to the console port
• After reboot, select “Continue.”
• Select “Factory Reset”
• The module will perform a zeroization, and provide the following message once
complete:
• “Factory Reset Status: Success”
Note: Following the completion of this procedure, the module will be placed back into an
uninitialized state.
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks
N/A