Non-Proprietary Security Policy for FP InovoLabs, Postal xRevenector US 2023
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FP InovoLabs GmbH
Postal xRevenector US 2023
FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
Version 1.0
Non-Proprietary Security Policy for FP InovoLabs, Postal xRevenector US 2023
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 General .................................................................................................................................................................6
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................................................6
1.2 Security Levels..............................................................................................................................................6
2 Cryptographic Module Specification.....................................................................................................................7
2.1 Description...................................................................................................................................................7
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification................................................................8
2.3 Excluded Components..................................................................................................................................9
2.4 Modes of Operation.....................................................................................................................................9
2.5 Algorithms..................................................................................................................................................10
2.6 Security Function Implementations...........................................................................................................11
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information ..................................................................................................................15
2.8 RBG and Entropy........................................................................................................................................15
2.9 Key Generation...........................................................................................................................................16
2.10 Key Establishment......................................................................................................................................16
2.11 Industry Protocols......................................................................................................................................16
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces.......................................................................................................................17
3.1 Ports and Interfaces...................................................................................................................................17
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication....................................................................................................................18
4.1 Authentication Methods............................................................................................................................18
4.2 Roles...........................................................................................................................................................18
4.3 Approved Services......................................................................................................................................19
4.4 Non-Approved Services..............................................................................................................................30
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded .........................................................................................................31
5 Software/Firmware Security...............................................................................................................................31
5.1 Integrity Techniques...................................................................................................................................31
5.2 Initiate on Demand ....................................................................................................................................31
6 Operational Environment ...................................................................................................................................31
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements ...................................................................................31
7 Physical Security .................................................................................................................................................32
7.1 Mechanisms and Actions Required............................................................................................................32
7.2 EFP/EFT Information ..................................................................................................................................32
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7.3 Hardness Testing Temperature Ranges .....................................................................................................32
8 Non-Invasive Security .........................................................................................................................................33
8.1 Mitigation Techniques ...............................................................................................................................33
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management......................................................................................................33
9.1 Storage Areas.............................................................................................................................................33
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods ........................................................................................................................33
9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods ...........................................................................................................................34
9.4 SSPs ............................................................................................................................................................35
10 Self-Tests ........................................................................................................................................................42
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests .........................................................................................................................42
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests.................................................................................................................................42
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information ...................................................................................................................44
10.4 Error States.................................................................................................................................................45
10.5 Operator Initiation of Self-Tests.................................................................................................................46
11 Life-Cycle Assurance.......................................................................................................................................46
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures....................................................................................46
11.2 Administrator Guidance.............................................................................................................................46
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance.....................................................................................................................46
11.4 Design and Rules........................................................................................................................................46
11.5 End of Life...................................................................................................................................................47
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks............................................................................................................................47
12.1 Attack List...................................................................................................................................................47
12.2 Mitigation Effectiveness.............................................................................................................................47
12.3 Guidance and Constraints..........................................................................................................................47
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List of Tables
Table 1: Security Levels..................................................................................................................................................6
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware.......................................................................................................9
Table 3: Modes List and Description..............................................................................................................................9
Table 4: Approved Algorithms.....................................................................................................................................10
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms .........................................................................................................................10
Table 6: Security Function Implementations...............................................................................................................14
Table 7: Ports and Interfaces.......................................................................................................................................17
Table 8: Authentication Methods................................................................................................................................18
Table 9: Roles...............................................................................................................................................................18
Table 10: Approved Services .......................................................................................................................................30
Table 11: Mechanisms and Actions Required..............................................................................................................32
Table 12: EFP/EFT Information....................................................................................................................................32
Table 13: Hardness Testing Temperatures..................................................................................................................32
Table 14: Storage Areas...............................................................................................................................................33
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods..........................................................................................................................33
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods .............................................................................................................................34
Table 17: SSP Table 1...................................................................................................................................................37
Table 18: SSP Table 2...................................................................................................................................................41
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests...........................................................................................................................42
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests ..................................................................................................................................44
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information .........................................................................................................44
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information.................................................................................................................45
Table 23: Error States ..................................................................................................................................................46
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List of Figures
Figure 1 – Postal xRevenector US 2023 .........................................................................................................................7
Figure 2: Block Diagram.................................................................................................................................................8
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1 GENERAL
1.1 OVERVIEW
This document forms a Cryptographic Module Security Policy for Francotyp Postalia’s Postal xRevenector US 2023
Postal Security Device (PSD) under the terms of NIST FIPS 140-3.
The Postal xRevenector US 2023 is a Postal Security Device (PSD) designed and manufactured by FP InovoLabs
GmbH for use in Postage Evidencing Systems (PES) produced by the Francotyp-Postalia group. PSDs perform the
cryptographic and postal security functions required by the postage evidencing systems and protect both Sensitive
Security Parameters (SSPs) and Postal Relevant Data Items (PRDIs) from unauthorized access.
This Security Policy specifies the security rules under which this device operates. It covers both the operation of
the device’s bootloader and its postal application, which has been designed to meet the requirements of the
corresponding postal authority.
1.2 SECURITY LEVELS
The module meets the overall requirements of FIPS 140-3 Security Level 3.
Section Title Security Level
1 General 3
2 Cryptographic module specification 3
3 Cryptographic module interfaces 3
4 Roles, services, and authentication 3
5 Software/Firmware security 3
6 Operational environment N/A
7 Physical security 3
8 Non-invasive security N/A
9 Sensitive security parameter management 3
10 Self-tests 3
11 Life-cycle assurance 3
12 Mitigation of other attacks 3
Overall Level 3
Table 1: Security Levels
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2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE SPECIFICATION
2.1 DESCRIPTION
The Postal xRevenector US 2023 is illustrated in Figure 1 below. The device’s cryptographic boundary is designated
by the extent of the potted area.
Figure 1 – Postal xRevenector US 2023
The Postal xRevenector US 2023 is a multiple chip embedded cryptographic module, based around a cryptographic
integrated circuit, together with a small number of support components. The components, mounted on a PCB, are
covered by hard opaque potting material. The extent of the potting forms the cryptographic boundary of the
module. The module has a proprietary electrical connector forming the interface to it. The module does not
contain a modifiable operational environment. A block diagram of the module is shown in Figure 2 below.
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Figure 2: Block Diagram
Purpose and Use:
The module acts as the core security module with Postage Evidencing Systems (PES). It is responsible for producing
digitally signed postage evidence in the form of an indicium. It secures financial registers and facilitates secure
postal transactions.
Module Type: Hardware
The Postal xRevenector US 2023 is defined as hardware module (refer to ISO/IEC 19790, Section 7.2.2).
Module Embodiment: MultiChipEmbed
The Postal xRevenector US 2023 is a multiple chip embedded cryptographic module, based upon the Maxim
Integrated MAX32590 DeepCover Secure Microcontroller together with a small number of other components.
Module Characteristics:
The critical components within the module are encapsulated inside a hard, opaque, production grade epoxy.
Cryptographic Boundary:
The cryptographic boundary is defined as the perimeter of the epoxy that encapsulates all the module’s
components on both sides of the printed circuit board (PCB).
2.2 TESTED AND VENDOR AFFIRMED MODULE VERSION AND IDENTIFICATION
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The Postal xRevenector US 2023 cryptographic module is designed to meet the requirements of FIPS 140-3
Security Level 3 (refer to Table 1). The module is available in the following configuration:
Tested Module Identification – Hardware:
Model and/or Part
Number
Hardware
Version
Firmware Version Processors Features
Postal xRevenector US
2023
(58.0036.0301.00)
1 90.0036.0616.00/2023.32.5.003 Maxim Integrated
MAX32590 DeepCover
Secure Microcontroller
Includes PCIe
Interface
only
Postal xRevenector US
2023
(58.0036.0302.00)
2 90.0036.0616.00/2023.32.5.003 Maxim Integrated
MAX32590 DeepCover
Secure Microcontroller
Includes USB
and PCIe
Interfaces
Table 2: Tested Module Identification – Hardware
Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets):
N/A for this module.
Tested Module Identification – Hybrid Disjoint Hardware:
N/A for this module.
Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:
N/A for this module.
2.3 EXCLUDED COMPONENTS
The module does not exclude any components from the requirements of FIPS 140-3.
2.4 MODES OF OPERATION
Modes List and Description:
The module supports a single, approved mode of operation with only approved services. There are no non-
approved modes, degraded modes, or non-approved services available to the module. Upon successful completion
of the pre-operational and conditional self-tests on power-up, the module provides an indicator of the approved
mode output to LEDs. Upon completion of each service an explicit, separate indicator is written to the module's
event log (accessible via the module's 'Get Log Information' service) that indicates success or failure of each
approved service.
Mode Name Description Type Status
Indicator
Approved Mode The module incorporates a single, Approved mode of operation Approved LED
Table 3: Modes List and Description
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The device will not respond to service calls before it has entered its approved mode of operation.
2.5 ALGORITHMS
The Postal xRevenector US 2023 cryptographic module supports the approved cryptographic algorithms shown in
Table 4.
Approved Algorithms:
The module supports the following approved cryptographic algorithms.
Algorithm CAVP Cert Properties Reference
AES-CBC A3256 - SP 800-38A
AES-CTR AES 5662 - SP 800-38A
AES-ECB A3256 - SP 800-38A
AES-KW A3257 - SP 800-38F
Counter DRBG A3939 - SP 800-90A Rev. 1
DSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) A3259 - FIPS 186-4
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) A3260 - FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) A3260 - FIPS 186-4
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A3260 - FIPS 186-4
HMAC-SHA2-256 A3262 - FIPS 198-1
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-56Ar3 A3263 - SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KDA OneStep Sp800-56Cr1 A3264 - SP 800-56C Rev. 2
KDF SP800-108 A3938 - SP 800-108 Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) A3265 - FIPS 186-4
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) A3265 - FIPS 186-4
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-4) A3265 - FIPS 186-4
SHA2-256 A3267 - FIPS 180-4
Table 4: Approved Algorithms
Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:
The module supports the following vendor affirmed algorithms.
Name Properties Implementation Reference
CKG Key Type:Symmetric and
Asymmetric
N/A NIST SP 800-133r2 and IG D.G per Section 4 example
1, Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 6.1.
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:
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N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:
N/A for this module.
Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:
N/A for this module.
2.6 SECURITY FUNCTION IMPLEMENTATIONS
Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
CSP Decryption BC-UnAuth CSP Decryption in
NVRAM
Key:128
Direction:Decrypt
AES-CTR: (AES
5662)
Key Size: 128
CSP Encryption BC-UnAuth CSP encryption in
NVRAM
Key:128
Direction:Encrypt
AES-CTR: (AES
5662)
Key Size: 128
Data Decryption BC-UnAuth AES CBC Data
Decryption
Key:128
Direction:Decrypt
AES-CBC: (A3256)
Direction: Encrypt,
Decrypt
Key Size: 128
Data Encryption BC-UnAuth AES CBC Data
Encryption
Key:128
Direction:Encrypt
AES-CBC: (A3256)
Direction: Encrypt,
Decrypt
Key Size: 128
DRBG Generate
Function
DRBG NIST SP 800-90A
CTR_DRBG
generate function
for delivering
random bits on
demand
Returned Bits:2048 Counter DRBG:
(A3939)
Mode: AES 128
Derivation
Function: Enabled
Prediction
Resistance:
Disabled
AES-ECB: (A3256)
Key Size: 128-bit
DSA Key Generation AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
DH Key Generation
during KAS
L:2048
N:224
DSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3259)
L: 2048
N: 224
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
ECDSA Key
Generation
AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
FIPS 186-4 ECDSA P-
224 Key Generation
Curve:P-224 ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3260)
Curves: P-224, P256
Secret Generation
Mode: Testing
Candidates
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
ECDSA Signature
Generation
DigSig-SigGen FIPS 186-4 ECDSA P-
224 digital
signature
generation of postal
relevant data
Curve:P-224 ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3260)
Curves: P-224, P-
256
SHA2-256: (A3267)
ECDSA Signature
Verification
DigSig-SigVer FIPS 186-4 ECDSA P-
224 digital
signature
verification
Curve:P-224 ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A3260)
Curves: P-224, P256
SHA2-256: (A3267)
Hash Function SHA SHA-256 data
integrity for digital
signatures
SHA:SHA-256 SHA2-256: (A3267)
Message Length
Min: 8 bits
Message Length
Max: 51200 bits
KAS (dhEphem
C(2e, 0s, FFC DH))
KAS-Full NIST SP 800-
56Arev3. KAS-FFC
per IG D.F Scenario
2 path (2)
IG:IG D.F Scenario
2, path 2, split
Key
confirmation:No
Key derivation:KDA
(separately tested)
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 112 bits of
security strength
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3: (A3263)
Scheme: Ephemeral
Diffie Hellman
KAS Role:
Responder
KDA OneStep
Sp800-56Cr1:
(A3264)
Derived Key Length:
2048
Shared Secret
Length: 2048
Key Based Key
Derivation
KBKDF NIST SP 800-108
Key Based Key
Derivation used to
derive
authentication keys
to authenticate
KDF SP800-108:
(A3938)
KDF Mode: Counter
Min Length: 128
Max Length: 4096
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
Cryptographic
Officer (Local) role
Key Transport KTS-Wrap Key Transport using
AES KW
Standard:SP800-38F
IG D.G:Approved
method from IG D.G
Caveat:Key
establishment
methodology
provides 112 bits of
security strength
AES-KW: (A3257)
Direction: Wrap,
Unwrap
Key Size: 128
Message
Authentication
MAC HMAC-SHA-256
used for
authentication for
secure sessions
Key:128 HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A3262)
Key Length Min:
128 bit
Key Length Max:
512-bit
Seed DRBG DRBG Instantiate the
DRBG
Entropy Input:256
bits
Nonce:256 bits
Personalization
String:256 bits
Counter DRBG:
(A3939)
Prediction
Resistance:
Disabled
Derivation
Function: Enabled
Mode: AES 128
SSP Encryption BC-UnAuth SSP encryption in
NVRAM
Key:128 AES-CBC: (A3256)
Key Size: 128-bit
RSA Key Generation AsymKeyPair-
KeyGen
CKG
FIPS 186-4 RSA
2048 Key
Generation
Key:2048 RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3265)
Key Generation
Mode: B.3.3
Modulo: 2048
Hash Algorithm:
SHA-256
Primality Tests:
Table C.3
Private Key Format:
Standard
CKG: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
RSA Signature
Generation
DigSig-SigGen FIPS 186-4 RSA
2048 Digital
Signature
Generation
Modulus:2048 RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4):
(A3265)
Signature Type:
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Name Type Description Properties Algorithms
PKCS1 v1.5
Modulo: 2048
SHA2-256: (A3267)
RSA Signature
Verification (Auth)
DigSig-SigVer FIPS 186-4 RSA
2048 digital
signature
verification used for
authentication of
the Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
Key:2048 RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A3265)
Signature Type:
PKCS1 v1.5
Modulo: 2048
SHA2-256: (A3267)
RSA Sig Ver (FW
Integrity - App)
DigSig-SigVer FIPS 186-4 RSA
2048 digital
signature
verification used to
verify the firmware
integrity
Key:2048 RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A3265)
Signature Type:
PKCS1 v1.5
Modulo: 2048
SHA2-256: (A3267)
RSA Sig Ver (FW
Integrity - BL)
DigSig-SigVer FIPS 186-4 RSA
2048 digital
signature
verification used to
verify the firmware
integrity
Signature Type:RSA
PSS
Key:2048
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A3265)
Signature Type: RSA
PSS
Modulo: 2048
SHA2-256: (A3267)
RSA Sig Ver (FW
Load Test)
DigSig-SigVer FIPS 186-4 RSA
2048 digital
signature
verification used to
verify the firmware
during FW load
Key:2048
Signature
Type:PKCS1 v1.5
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4):
(A3265)
Signature Type:
PKCS1 v1.5
Modulo: 2048
SHA2-256: (A3267)
SSP Authentication MAC Message
authentication code
applied to stored
SSPs
Key:128 HMAC-SHA2-256:
(A3262)
Key Length: 128-bit
SSP Decryption BC-UnAuth SSP Decryption in
NVRAM
Key:128 AES-CBC: (A3256)
Key Size: 128-bit
Symmetric Key
Generation
CKG Symmetric Key
Generation
Key:256 bit CKG: ()
Key Type:
Symmetric and
Asymmetric
Table 6: Security Function Implementations
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2.7 ALGORITHM SPECIFIC INFORMATION
The module utilizes only approved algorithms that are tested and validated under the Cryptographic Algorithm
Validation Program (CAVP).
The module complies with IG D.L Comment 2. A derivation function is used during a Counter DRBG (Cert. #A3939)
instantiation. No reseeding is supported. The module does not contain an entropy source.
The module complies with IG D.M. All of the key derivation keys generated through KDF SP800-108 (Cert. #A3938)
(i.e., Local Session Authentication Key (LSAK), Local Session Encryption Key (LSEK), Local Session Wrapping Key
(LSWK)) are derived from the Local User Key (LUK), which in turn has been generated using an approved method,
namely, Counter DRBG (Cert. #A3939) or CKG per NIST SP 800-133r2, in the approved mode. The encoding of the
data fields (i.e., Label, Context, and Length L) is complaint to Section 6.4 of NIST SP 800-133r1. No asymmetric keys
are generated through KBKDF.
The module complies with IG C.K. DSA KeyGen (Cert. #A3259) is used exclusively for KAS-FFC-SSC SP800-56Ar3
(Cert. #A3263). This usage is allowed per IG C.K Resolution 3. The strength of the DSA key pairs thus generated is
112 per NIST SP 800-57Part1r5, Section 5.6.1.1, Table 2. These DSA keys are ephemeral keys. No DSA static keys
are generated.
For ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS 186-4) (Cert. #A3260), ECDSA SigGen (FIPS 186-4) (Cert. #A3260), ECDSA SigVer (FIPS 186-
4) (Cert. #A3260), RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-4) (Cert. #A3265), RSA SigGen (FIPS186-4) (Cert. #A3265), and RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) (Cert. #A3265), IG C.K Additional Comment 3 is applicable. Specifically, the validation date of January
30, 2023 preceded February 5, 2024. The CAVP tests conducted for the said certificates are mathematically
identical to the FIPS 186-5 CAVP tests.
Compliance to SP 800-56Ar3 assurances:
For KAS-FFC, the module satisfies IG D.F Scenario 2 path (2). The key derivation functions comply with NIST SP 800-
56Cr2 (i.e., KDA NIST SP 800-56Cr2 (Cert. #A3264)). Furthermore, the module obtained the appropriate assurances,
as required in Sections 5.6.2 of NIST SP 800-56Ar3. Full public key validation (NIST SP 800-56Ar3 Section 5.6.2.3.1)
is implemented. No key confirmation is implemented.
2.8 RBG AND ENTROPY
The module incorporates a NIST SP 800-90A CTR-DRBG (Cert. #A3939) that is seeded during manufacturing with an
Entropy String, a nonce, and a personalization string of length 256 bits each. Entropy of 112 bits is claimed of only
the Entropy String. The unmodified output of the DRBG is used for generating cryptographic key material or
random nonces. The module’s source of randomness corresponds to IG 9.3.A scenario 2(a), i.e., the module is a
hardware module that passively receives the entropy from an entropy source outside the TOEPP.
The claimed minimum number of bits of loaded entropy is 112. The entropy source is provided by FP InovoLabs
infrastructure during device manufacturing. The caller of the module shall ensure that the entropy input provided
has a minimum of 112 bits of entropy.
Given that the entropy is imported from outside the device, there is no assurance of the minimum strength of
generated SSPs.
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2.9 KEY GENERATION
The module generates symmetric cryptographic keys in conformance with NIST SP 800-133r2 using a NIST SP 800-
90A conforming DRBG (Cert. #A3939) for the encryption and protection of data and cryptographic keys. The
module generates asymmetric cryptographic key pairs in conformance with FIPS 186-4 for the generation or
verification of digital signature, or for the facilitation of key agreement in conformance with NIST SP 800-56ar3.
2.10 KEY ESTABLISHMENT
The module supports the establishment of cryptographic keys using Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) ephemeral
Diffie Hellman (DH) in conformance with NIST SP 800-56ar3. The module implements KAS-FFC-SSC per NIST SP 800-
56A Rev3 (Cert. #A3263) Model C (2e, 0s, FFC DH) using DSA KeyGen (Cert. #A3259), used in conjunction with KDA
per NIST SP 800-56Cr2 (Cert. #A3264). Key establishment methodology provides at least 112 bits of encryption
strength. This is used to establish secure communication sessions.
2.11 INDUSTRY PROTOCOLS
The module relies upon the standard USB and other serial protocols for communication with general purpose
computer (GPC) systems.
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3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE INTERFACES
3.1 PORTS AND INTERFACES
The module incorporates physical ports and logical interfaces. The physical ports are defined within Table 7 below
and include the primary communication serial ports:
− 36-Pin Serial I/O card edge connector (PCIe x1)
− USB (micro-USB)
There is also an optical interface leading from the module to LEDs that provides operational state of the module.
Physical Port Logical
Interface(s)
Data That Passes
36-pin Serial I/O card edge connector
(PCIe)
Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status
Output
Power
Primary (PCIe) serial interface for communicating with
module.
USB Data Input
Data Output
Control Input
Status
Output
Power
Alternate interface for communicating with module.
LED Interface Status
Output
Module status
Battery Power Additional power
Table 7: Ports and Interfaces
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4 ROLES, SERVICES, AND AUTHENTICATION
4.1 AUTHENTICATION METHODS
The module supports authentication methods for the Cryptographic Officer roles. These roles have separate
authentication methods as indicated in Table 8.
Method
Name
Description Security
Mechanism
Strength
Each
Attempt
Strength per Minute
Local
Login
Identity-based. Allows the
Cryptographic Officer
(Local) to authenticate to
the module. Sets up a local
session with host.
Challenge
response
mechanism.
128 bits A delay of 1 second is added after any
failed login attempt, resulting in a
maximum of 60 attempts per minute.
The probability of a successful random
attempt per minute is therefore
60/2^128, which is less than
1/1,000,000.
Remote
Login
Identity-based. Allows the
Cryptographic Officer
(Remote) to authenticate
themselves. Sets up a
remote session with CO.
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3265)
112 bits A delay of 1 second is added after any
failed login attempt, resulting in a
maximum of 60 attempts per minute.
The probability of a successful random
attempt per minute is therefore
60/2^112, which is less than 1/100,000.
Table 8: Authentication Methods
4.2 ROLES
Name Type Operator Type Authentication Methods
Cryptographic Officer (Remote) Identity Cryptographic
Officer
Remote Login
Cryptographic Officer (Local) Identity Cryptographic
Officer
Local Login
User Role Unauthenticated None
Table 9: Roles
The module does not support concurrent operators. Only one operator is allowed to access the device at any time.
Operator authentication does not persist beyond power-cycling the module. The selection of roles is implicit.
UNCLASSIFIED / NON CLASSIFIÉ//TLP:AMBER+STRICT
4.3 APPROVED SERVICES
Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Accounting Debits the postal funds and
returns indicia content.
Event Log Postal data to be
digitally signed
Digitally signed data
stream
ECDSA Signature
Generation
Hash Function
CSP Decryption
SSP Decryption
SSP
Authentication
Cryptographic
Officer (Local)
- Indicia Signing Key
: E
- Local Session
Authentication Key
(LSAK): E
- Local Session
Encryption Key
(LSEK): E
- Master Key
Encryption Key
(MKEK): E
- Data Encryption
Key (NVDEK): E
- Data
Authentication Key
(NVDAK): E
Dump Memory Dumps memory contents to
a log file.
Event Log Memory parameters Memory data None User
Echo Echoes back data payload Service
response
Input pattern Output pattern None User
Generate
Indicia Keypair
Generating the Indicia
Signing Key and Indicia
Verifying Key
Event Log Key ID, Key Expiration Key Version #, Public
Key
ECDSA Key
Generation
DRBG Generate
Function
CSP Decryption
SSP Encryption
Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- Indicia Signing Key
: G
- Indicia Verifying
Key: G
- Remote Session
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
SSP
Authentication
Authentication Key
(RSAK): E
- DRBG State: G,E
- Data Encryption
Key (NVDEK): E
- Data
Authentication Key
(NVDAK): E
- Master Key
Encryption Key
(MKEK): E
Generate PSV
Keypair
Generating PSV Keypair Event Log Key ID, Key Expiration Key Version #, Public
Key
ECDSA Key
Generation
DRBG Generate
Function
CSP Decryption
SSP Encryption
SSP
Authentication
Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- PSV Signing Key: G
- PSV Verifying Key:
G
- Remote Session
Authentication Key
(RSAK): E
- DRBG State: G,E
- Data Encryption
Key (NVDEK): E
- Data
Authentication Key
(NVDAK): E
- Master Key
Encryption Key
(MKEK): E
Get Device
Status
Gets module status
information
Service
response
Required status data Module information,
status and versioning
None User
Get Certificate
Information
Retrieves certificate data Service
response
Required certificate
data
Certificate data (X509
format)
None User
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Get Log
Information
Reads log data Service
response
Log Information Log record data None User
Instantiate
DRBG
Loads entropy and seeds
DRBG
Event Log Entropy string Entropy size Seed DRBG Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- Entropy String: W
- DRBG State: G
- DRBG Seed: G
- Master Key
Encryption Key
(MKEK): E
- Data Encryption
Key (NVDEK): G
- Data
Authentication Key
(NVDAK): G
Load Firmware Receives firmware from an
external source and
programs it into the
cryptographic module's
FLASH memory
Event Log Digitally signed
firmware
Status Message
Authentication
RSA Sig Ver (FW
Load Test)
Cryptographic
Officer (Local)
- Local Session
Authentication Key
(LSAK): E
- Firmware
Verification Key: E
Local Login Authenticates the
Cryptographic Officer (Local)
using a challenge-response
protocol
Event Log User ID, Response to
challenge
Device Info, Nonce,
Role ID
DRBG Generate
Function
Key Based Key
Derivation
Message
Authentication
CSP Decryption
Cryptographic
Officer (Local)
- Local Session
Authentication Key
(LSAK): G
- Local Session
Encryption Key
(LSEK): G
- Local Session
Wrapping Key
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
(LSWK): G,E
- Local User Key
(LUK): E
- Master Key
Encryption Key
(MKEK): E
Lockout Changes the state in the
postage lifecycle
Event Log None Status None User
Logoff Logout function for CO RFU LED,
Event Log
None Status None Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- Remote Session
Authentication Key
(RSAK): Z
- Remote Session
Encryption Key
(RSEK): Z
- Remote Session
Wrapping Key
(RSWK): Z
Cryptographic
Officer (Local)
- Local Session
Authentication Key
(LSAK): Z
- Local Session
Encryption Key
(LSEK): Z
- Local Session
Wrapping Key
(LSWK): Z
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Postage Value
Download
(PVD)
Finance service required to
load funds
Event Log,
Postal
Registers
Postage value data Postage value
response data
RSA Signature
Generation
Message
Authentication
RSA Signature
Verification
(Auth)
Data Encryption
CSP Decryption
Data Decryption
SSP Decryption
SSP
Authentication
Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- Remote Session
Authentication Key
(RSAK): E
- Remote Session
Encryption Key
(RSEK): E
- Master Key
Encryption Key
(MKEK): E
- Data Encryption
Key (NVDEK): E
- Data
Authentication Key
(NVDAK): E
- PKMCert: E
- PSD Private Key: E
Postage Value
Refund
Finance service managing
postal funds
Event Log,
Postal
Registers
Postage refund data Postage refund
response data
RSA Signature
Generation
Message
Authentication
RSA Signature
Verification
(Auth)
Data Encryption
CSP Decryption
Data Decryption
SSP Decryption
SSP
Authentication
Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- Remote Session
Authentication Key
(RSAK): E
- Remote Session
Encryption Key
(RSEK): E
- Master Key
Encryption Key
(MKEK): E
- Data Encryption
Key (NVDEK): E
- Data
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Authentication Key
(NVDAK): E
- PSD Private Key: E
- PKMCert: E
Postal
Authorization
Authorize the device
according to the USPS -
Intelligent Mail Indicia -
Performance Criteria
requirements
Event Log Postal data Postal data Message
Authentication
Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- Remote Session
Authentication Key
(RSAK): E
Postal
Initialization
Initialize the device
according to the USPS -
Intelligent Mail Indicia -
Performance Criteria
requirements
Event Log Signed certificate Certificate request DRBG Generate
Function
RSA Key
Generation
Message
Authentication
CSP Encryption
SSP Encryption
SSP
Authentication
Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- PSD Private Key: G
- Remote Session
Authentication Key
(RSAK): E
- DRBG State: G,E
- Data Encryption
Key (NVDEK): E
- Transport Signing
Key: E
- Transport Verifying
Key: E
- Data
Authentication Key
(NVDAK): E
- Master Key
Encryption Key
(MKEK): E
Re-
Authorization
Updates customer
configuration data
Event Log Postal data Status Message
Authentication
Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- Remote Session
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Authentication Key
(RSAK): E
Reboot Device Reboots the module Event Log None Status None Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
Cryptographic
Officer (Local)
User
ReKey Local
User Key
Sets up an individual key
between the module and
host
Event Log Encrypted local user
key
Encrypted local user
key, Nonce
DRBG Generate
Function
Symmetric Key
Generation
Message
Authentication
Key Transport
CSP Encryption
Cryptographic
Officer (Local)
- Local User Key
(LUK): G,Z
- Local Session
Authentication Key
(LSAK): E
- Local Session
Wrapping Key
(LSWK): E
- Master Key
Encryption Key
(MKEK): E
Rekey PSD Key Generation of a new PSD Key
Pair and exchange with
infrastructure
Event Log Signed Certificate Certificate Request DRBG Generate
Function
RSA Key
Generation
Message
Authentication
CSP Decryption
SSP Encryption
SSP
Authentication
Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- PSD Private Key:
G,Z
- PSD Public Key: G,Z
- Remote Session
Authentication Key
(RSAK): E
- DRBG State: G,E
- Data Encryption
Key (NVDEK): E
- Data
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Authentication Key
(NVDAK): E
- Master Key
Encryption Key
(MKEK): E
Remote Login Cryptographic Officer
(Remote) login service
Event Log PSD-Name, Random
Bits, Domain
parameters, CO-DH-
public-key, Signature
CO-Name, Random
Bits, Domain
parameters, Module-
DH-public-key,
Signature
KAS (dhEphem
C(2e, 0s, FFC
DH))
DRBG Generate
Function
Hash Function
RSA Signature
Generation
DSA Key
Generation
RSA Signature
Verification
(Auth)
CSP Decryption
SSP Decryption
SSP
Authentication
Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman Client
(Private) Key: G,Z
- Transport Signing
Key: E
- PSD Private Key: E
- Remote Session
Authentication Key
(RSAK): G
- Remote Session
Encryption Key
(RSEK): G
- Remote Session
Wrapping Key
(RSWK): G
- DRBG State: G,E
- Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman Client
(Public) Key: G,R,Z
- Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman Server
(Public) Key: W,E,Z
- PKMCert: E
- Shared Secret: G,E
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Renew PKM Key Load signed PKM certificate Event Log Signed certificate Certificate Request RSA Signature
Verification
(Auth)
Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- PKMCert: W,E,Z
Scrap Zeroizes all plaintext CSPs Event Log None Status None Cryptographic
Officer (Local)
- Master Key
Encryption Key
(MKEK): Z
- Data Encryption
Key (NVDEK): Z
- Data
Authentication Key
(NVDAK): Z
- DRBG State: Z
- Local User Key
(LUK): Z
User
- Master Key
Encryption Key
(MKEK): Z
- Data Encryption
Key (NVDEK): Z
- Data
Authentication Key
(NVDAK): Z
- DRBG State: Z
- Local User Key
(LUK): Z
Secure Echo Echoes back data payload
within a secure session
Event Log Encrypted data, MAC Encrypted data, MAC Message
Authentication
Data Encryption
Data Decryption
Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- Remote Session
Authentication Key
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
(RSAK): E
- Remote Session
Encryption Key
(RSEK): E
Cryptographic
Officer (Local)
- Local Session
Authentication Key
(LSAK): E
- Local Session
Encryption Key
(LSEK): E
Secure Get
Status
Provides status within a
secure session
Event Log Status data Module information,
status and versioning
Message
Authentication
Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- Remote Session
Authentication Key
(RSAK): E
Secure Set Time Synchronizes the RTC within
a secure session
Event Log Time data Status Message
Authentication
Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- Remote Session
Authentication Key
(RSAK): E
Self-Test Runs all self-tests (Pre-
operational and Conditional)
Event Log None Status RSA Sig Ver (FW
Integrity - App)
RSA Sig Ver (FW
Integrity - BL)
User
Set Meter
Parameter
Enters postal config data Event Log Postal configuration
data
Status None User
Sign PMD Data Sign postal related items and
communication data
Event Log Postal data Digital signature Hash Function
RSA Signature
Generation
Cryptographic
Officer (Local)
- Local Session
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Message
Authentication
Data Encryption
CSP Decryption
Data Decryption
SSP Decryption
SSP
Authentication
Authentication Key
(LSAK): E
- Local Session
Encryption Key
(LSEK): E
- PMD Signing Key: E
- Master Key
Encryption Key
(MKEK): E
- Data Encryption
Key (NVDEK): E
- Data
Authentication Key
(NVDAK): E
Sign PSV Data Signs postal related data for
storage in hosts PSD Secured
Vault
Event Log Postal data Digital signature ECDSA Signature
Generation
Hash Function
Message
Authentication
CSP Decryption
SSP Decryption
SSP
Authentication
Cryptographic
Officer (Local)
- PSV Signing Key: E
- Local Session
Authentication Key
(LSAK): E
- DRBG State: G,E
Setup
Parameters
Enters other postal-related
data
Event Log Postal data Status None Cryptographic
Officer (Local)
- Local Session
Authentication Key
(LSAK): E
User
Verify PSV Data Verify postal related items
stored (using Public PSV Key)
Event Log Postal data, digital
signature
Status (true or false) Hash Function
ECDSA Signature
Verification
Cryptographic
Officer (Local)
- PSV Verifying Key:
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Name Description Indicator Inputs Outputs Security
Functions
SSP Access
Message
Authentication
CSP Decryption
SSP Decryption
SSP
Authentication
E
- Local Session
Authentication Key
(LSAK): E
Re-Initialization Initialize the device
according to the USPS -
Intelligent Mail Indicia -
Performance Criteria
requirements
Event Log Postal data Status Message
Authentication
Cryptographic
Officer (Remote)
- Remote Session
Authentication Key
(RSAK): E
Table 10: Approved Services
4.4 NON-APPROVED SERVICES
N/A for this module.
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4.5 EXTERNAL SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE LOADED
There is no complete image replacement process. New firmware may be downloaded by the FP Bootloader for the
country-specific postal application.
The postal application firmware is signed by FP, with a signature of form RSA-2048-SHA-256-PKCS #1 V1.5. On
downloading, the device verifies the firmware, including: the type, version, CRC and signature of the new firmware
package. On loading the firmware for execution, the signature is verified again by the FP Bootloader.
5 SOFTWARE/FIRMWARE SECURITY
5.1 INTEGRITY TECHNIQUES
The module includes the following two firmware components that include separate firmware integrity tests:
− Bootloader - RSA 2048 RSA-PSS digital signature verification using an FP Customer Root Key
− Postal Application - RSA 2048 PKCS1 v1.5 digital signature verification using the Firmware Verification Key
The module will transition to its error state upon the failure of either firmware integrity test. Both public
verification keys are non-SSP. The pre-calculated digital signatures for the Bootloader and the Postal Application
are stored in the FLASH memory within the cryptographic module boundary.
5.2 INITIATE ON DEMAND
The module’s pre-operational FW integrity tests can be initiated on demand via the ‘Self-Test’ service.
6 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
6.1 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT TYPE AND REQUIREMENTS
Type of Operational Environment: Limited
How Requirements are Satisfied:
The module operational environment is defined as limited. The module has the ability to load its firmware from
Flash memory. Only the firmware versions identified on the module’s validation certificate are included in the
scope of this validation. Any other firmware loaded onto the module is not validated and would require a separate
FIPS 140-3 validation.
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7 PHYSICAL SECURITY
All the components within the cryptographic boundary of the device are covered with a hard, tamper-evident
potting material, which is tamper evident and opaque within the visible spectrum, deterring direct observation,
probing, and manipulation. The module is inspected for tamper evidence each time it is retrieved from the field.
Because of the potting material it is not possible to physically access any internal components without seriously
damaging the module or causing zeroization. Hardness testing has been performed at ambient temperature and at
the extremes of the module’s operating, storage and distribution temperature ranges.
7.1 MECHANISMS AND ACTIONS REQUIRED
The device includes automatic tamper detection and response. CSPs are zeroized automatically and immediately
upon a tamper event being detected. On detection of a tamper event, the device is to be returned to FP.
Mechanism Inspection Frequency Inspection Guidance
Tamper
Evidence
During installation, re-installation,
decommissioning, and servicing.
Inspect device for obvious damage or other
evidence of tamper.
Table 11: Mechanisms and Actions Required
7.2 EFP/EFT INFORMATION
The module supports Environmental Failure Protection (EFP) mechanisms for high/low voltage and temperature
extremes (refer to Table 12).
Temp/Voltage
Type
Temperature
or Voltage
EFP
or
EFT
Result
LowTemperature -35°C EFP Zeroization
HighTemperature 70°C EFP The module shuts down
LowVoltage 3.7V EFP The module shuts down
HighVoltage 6.1V EFP The module shuts down
Table 12: EFP/EFT Information
7.3 HARDNESS TESTING TEMPERATURE RANGES
The module supports and has been tested at the operation, storage and distribution temperatures listed in Table
13. The module’s epoxy hardness is assured within these ranges.
Temperature
Type
Temperature
LowTemperature -25°C
HighTemperature 70°C
Table 13: Hardness Testing Temperatures
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8 NON-INVASIVE SECURITY
8.1 MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
The module does not provide protections against non-invasive security methods.
9 SENSITIVE SECURITY PARAMETERS MANAGEMENT
9.1 STORAGE AREAS
The Data Encryption Key is encrypted with the Data Encryption Master Key and is rendered inaccessible when this
is zeroized. All other stored CSPs are encrypted with the Data Encryption Key and are rendered inaccessible when
this is zeroized.
The AES-KW key-wrapping algorithm is used to protect any CSPs that are input or output. Only a single CSP, the
Local User Key, is input or output and this is wrapped for transport using the AES-KW key-wrapping algorithm with
the Local Session Wrapping Key (LSWK).
Storage Area Name Description Persistence
Type
Battery Protected Key Storage (BPKS) On-chip memory that is zeroized on tamper detection. Static
Battery Backed RAM (BBRAM) Plaintext and encrypted Static
FLASH Plaintext Static
NVRAM Plaintext and encrypted Static
SRAM Plaintext Static
Table 14: Storage Areas
9.2 SSP INPUT-OUTPUT METHODS
Name From To Format
Type
Distribution
Type
Entry
Type
SFI or Algorithm
Manufacturing Manufacturing SRAM Plaintext N/A Electronic
Output
(Encrypted)
NVRAM Outside the
Module
Encrypted Automated Electronic Key Transport
Input (Plaintext) Outside the
Module
SRAM Plaintext Automated Electronic KAS (dhEphem
C(2e, 0s, FFC DH))
Output
(Plaintext)
SRAM Outside the
Module
Plaintext Automated Electronic KAS (dhEphem
C(2e, 0s, FFC DH))
Table 15: SSP Input-Output Methods
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9.3 SSP ZEROIZATION METHODS
The zeroization methods described within Table 16 are supported by the module. Zeroization services explicitly
overwrite SSPs with zero values.
Zeroization
Method
Description Rationale Operator Initiation
Scrap Service Forces a zeroisation of the Master Key Encryption
Key (MKEK) and NVRAM memory components.
N.B. This process is irreversible.
Host device calls the
service
End of session Automatic Firmware programmed zeroization of ephemeral
SSPs used in secure session
N/A
Removal of
Battery/Tamper
Physical Forces a zeroisation of the Master Key Encryption
Key and removal of power from battery-backed
memory
Removal of battery
power or a tamper
event
Automatically Automatic Immediately after use N/A
Table 16: SSP Zeroization Methods
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9.4 SSPS
The following two tables list the SSPs used in the module. The tables include a non-SSP, namely Firmware Verification Key, used for integrity verification of the
Postal Application.
Name Description Size -
Strength
Type - Category Generated By Established By Used By
Data Authentication
Key (NVDAK)
Authenticate internally stored
CSPs
128-bit -
112-bit
Symmetric Key -
CSP
DRBG Generate
Function
Symmetric Key
Generation
SSP Authentication
Data Encryption Key
(NVDEK)
Encrypt and decrypt internally
stored CSPs
128-bit -
112-bit
Symmetric Key -
CSP
DRBG Generate
Function
Symmetric Key
Generation
SSP Encryption
SSP Decryption
DRBG Seed Instantiate the DRBG 768-bit -
112-bit
Entropy - CSP Seed DRBG Seed DRBG
DRBG State Key and V N/A - N/A N/A - CSP DRBG Generate
Function
DRBG Generate
Function
Entropy String Instantiate the DRBG 256-bit -
112-bit
Entropy - CSP Externally Seed DRBG
Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman Client
(Private) Key
Private DH Key used during KAS 224-bit -
112-bit
Asymmetric
Private Key - CSP
DSA Key
Generation
KAS (dhEphem
C(2e, 0s, FFC DH))
Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman Client (Public)
Key
Public DH Key used during KAS 2048 -
112-bit
Asymmetric
Public Key - PSP
DSA Key
Generation
KAS (dhEphem
C(2e, 0s, FFC DH))
Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman Server (Public)
Key
Server's Public DH Key imported
during KAS
2048 -
112-bit
Asymmetric
Public Key - PSP
Externally KAS (dhEphem
C(2e, 0s, FFC DH))
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type - Category Generated By Established By Used By
Firmware Verification
Key
Firmware verification key for
RSA PKCS#1 V1.5 signature
verification (Non-SSP)
2048-bit -
112-bit
Asymmetric
Public Key - PSP
Externally RSA Sig Ver (FW
Load Test)
Indicia Signing Key Indicia Signing Key P-224 -
112-bit
Asymmetric
Private Key - CSP
ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Signature
Generation
Indicia Verifying Key Indicia Verifying Key P-224 -
112-bit
Asymmetric
Public Key - PSP
ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Signature
Verification
Local Session
Authentication Key
(LSAK)
Authentication of data transfer
in a local secure session
128-bit -
112-bit
Symmetric Key -
CSP
Externally Key Based Key
Derivation
Message
Authentication
Local Session
Encryption Key (LSEK)
Authentication of data transfer
in a local secure session (User
role)
128-bit -
112-bit
Symmetric Key -
CSP
Externally Key Based Key
Derivation
Data Encryption
Local Session Wrapping
Key (LSWK)
Securing CSP data transfer in a
local secure session (User role)
128-bit -
112-bit
Symmetric Key -
CSP
Externally Key Based Key
Derivation
Key Transport
Local User Key (LUK) Cryptographic Officer (Local)
authentication key
256-bit -
112-bit
Symmetric Key -
CSP
DRBG Generate
Function
Symmetric Key
Generation
Key Based Key
Derivation
Master Key Encryption
Key (MKEK)
Encrypt and decrypt CSPs 128-bit -
112-bit
Symmetric Key -
CSP
DRBG Generate
Function
Symmetric Key
Generation
CSP Encryption
CSP Decryption
PKMCert PKMCert 2048-bit -
112-bit
Asymmetric
Public Key - PSP
Externally RSA Signature
Verification (Auth)
PMD Signing Key RSA PKCS#1 V1.5 2048-bit -
112-bit
Asymmetric
Private Key - CSP
RSA Key
Generation
RSA Key Generation
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Name Description Size -
Strength
Type - Category Generated By Established By Used By
PSD Private Key RSA PKCS#1 V1.5 2048-bit -
112-bit
Asymmetric
Private Key - CSP
RSA Key
Generation
RSA Signature
Generation
PSD Public Key RSA PKCS#1 V1.5 2048-bit -
112-bit
Asymmetric
Public Key - PSP
RSA Key
Generation
RSA Signature
Verification (Auth)
PSV Signing Key PSV Signing Key P-224 -
112-bit
Asymmetric
Private Key - CSP
ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Signature
Generation
PSV Verifying Key PSV Verifying Key P-224 -
112-bit
Asymmetric
Public Key - PSP
ECDSA Key
Generation
ECDSA Signature
Verification
Remote Session
Authentication Key
(RSAK)
Encryption of data transfer in a
remote secure session
128-bit -
112-bit
Symmetric Key -
CSP
Externally KAS (dhEphem
C(2e, 0s, FFC DH))
Message
Authentication
Remote Session
Encryption Key (RSEK)
Encryption of data transfer in a
remote secure session
128-bit -
112-bit
Symmetric Key -
CSP
Externally KAS (dhEphem
C(2e, 0s, FFC DH))
Data Encryption
Remote Session
Wrapping Key (RSWK)
Securing CSP data transfer in a
remote secure session
128-bit -
112-bit
Symmetric Key -
CSP
Externally KAS (dhEphem
C(2e, 0s, FFC DH))
Key Transport
Shared Secret Shared Secret 2048-bit -
112-bit
Shared Secret -
CSP
KAS (dhEphem
C(2e, 0s, FFC
DH))
KAS (dhEphem
C(2e, 0s, FFC DH))
Transport Signing Key RSA PKCS#1 V1.5 2048-bit -
112-bit
Asymmetric
Private - CSP
RSA Key
Generation
RSA Signature
Generation
Transport Verifying Key RSA PKCS#1 V1.5 2048-bit -
112-bit
Asymmetric
Public Key - PSP
RSA Key
Generation
RSA Signature
Verification (Auth)
Table 17: SSP Table 1
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Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
Data Authentication
Key (NVDAK)
Battery Backed RAM
(BBRAM):Encrypted
Scrap
Removal of
Battery/Tamper
Data Encryption Key
(NVDEK):Used With
Master Key Encryption Key
(MKEK):Encrypted By
Data Encryption Key
(NVDEK)
Battery Backed RAM
(BBRAM):Encrypted
Scrap
Removal of
Battery/Tamper
Transport Signing
Key:Encrypts
Transport Verifying
Key:Encrypts
PMD Signing Key:Encrypts
PSD Private Key:Encrypts
PSD Public Key:Encrypts
Indicia Signing Key :Encrypts
Indicia Verifying
Key:Encrypts
PSV Signing Key:Encrypts
PSV Verifying Key:Encrypts
Master Key Encryption Key
(MKEK):Encrypted By
DRBG Seed Battery Backed RAM
(BBRAM):Encrypted
Automatically Entropy String:Derived From
DRBG State Battery Backed RAM
(BBRAM):Encrypted
Scrap
Removal of
Battery/Tamper
DRBG Seed:Derived From
Master Key Encryption Key
(MKEK):Encrypted By
Entropy String Manufacturing SRAM:Plaintext Automatically DRBG Seed:Derives
Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman Client
(Private) Key
SRAM:Plaintext Persists only for the life of
the Key Agreement process
End of session Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
Client (Public) Key:Paired
With
Shared Secret:Derives
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Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman Client
(Public) Key
Output
(Plaintext)
SRAM:Plaintext Persists only for the life of
the Key Agreement process
End of session Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
Client (Private) Key:Paired
With
Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman Server
(Public) Key
Input
(Plaintext)
SRAM:Plaintext Persists only for the life of
the Key Agreement process
End of session Shared Secret:Derives
Firmware Verification
Key
Manufacturing FLASH:Plaintext Automatically
Indicia Signing Key NVRAM:Encrypted Automatically Indicia Verifying Key:Paired
With
Data Encryption Key
(NVDEK):Encrypted By
Indicia Verifying Key NVRAM:Encrypted Automatically Indicia Signing Key :Paired
With
Data Encryption Key
(NVDEK):Encrypted By
Local Session
Authentication Key
(LSAK)
SRAM:Plaintext Persists only for the life of
the active Cryptographic
Officer (Local) session
End of session Local User Key (LUK):Derived
From
Local Session
Encryption Key (LSEK)
SRAM:Plaintext Persists only for the life of
the active Cryptographic
Officer (Local) session
End of session Local User Key (LUK):Derived
From
Local Session
Wrapping Key (LSWK)
SRAM:Plaintext Persists only for the life of
the active Cryptographic
Officer (Local) session
End of session Local User Key (LUK):Derived
From
Local User Key (LUK) Manufacturing
Output
(Encrypted)
Battery Backed RAM
(BBRAM):Encrypted
Automatically Local Session Authentication
Key (LSAK):Derives
Local Session Encryption Key
(LSEK):Derives
Local Session Wrapping Key
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Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
(LSWK):Derives
Master Key Encryption Key
(MKEK):Encrypted By
Master Key
Encryption Key
(MKEK)
Battery Protected Key
Storage (BPKS):Plaintext
Scrap
Removal of
Battery/Tamper
Data Encryption Key
(NVDEK):Encrypts
Data Authentication Key
(NVDAK):Encrypts
DRBG State:Encrypts
Local User Key
(LUK):Encrypts
PKMCert Manufacturing
Input
(Plaintext)
NVRAM:Plaintext Automatically Data Encryption Key
(NVDEK):Encrypted By
PMD Signing Key NVRAM:Encrypted Automatically Data Encryption Key
(NVDEK):Encrypted By
PSD Private Key NVRAM:Encrypted Automatically PSD Public Key:Paired With
Data Encryption Key
(NVDEK):Encrypted By
PSD Public Key NVRAM:Encrypted Automatically PSD Private Key:Paired With
Data Encryption Key
(NVDEK):Encrypted By
PSV Signing Key NVRAM:Encrypted Automatically PSV Verifying Key:Paired
With
Data Encryption Key
(NVDEK):Encrypted By
PSV Verifying Key NVRAM:Encrypted Automatically PSV Signing Key:Paired With
Data Encryption Key
(NVDEK):Encrypted By
Remote Session
Authentication Key
(RSAK)
SRAM:Plaintext Persists only for the life of
the active Cryptographic
Officer (Remote) session
End of session Shared Secret:Derived From
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Name Input - Output Storage Storage Duration Zeroization Related SSPs
Remote Session
Encryption Key (RSEK)
SRAM:Plaintext Persists only for the life of
the active Cryptographic
Officer (Remote) session
End of session Shared Secret:Derived From
Remote Session
Wrapping Key (RSWK)
SRAM:Plaintext Persists only for the life of
the active Cryptographic
Officer (Remote) session
End of session Shared Secret:Derived From
Shared Secret SRAM:Plaintext Automatically Remote Session
Authentication Key
(RSAK):Derives
Remote Session Encryption
Key (RSEK):Derives
Remote Session Wrapping
Key (RSWK):Derives
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
Client (Private) Key:Derived
From
Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
Server (Public) Key:Derived
From
Transport Signing Key NVRAM:Encrypted Automatically Transport Verifying
Key:Paired With
Data Encryption Key
(NVDEK):Encrypted By
Transport Verifying
Key
NVRAM:Plaintext Automatically Transport Signing Key:Paired
With
Data Encryption Key
(NVDEK):Encrypted By
Table 18: SSP Table 2
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10 SELF-TESTS
10.1 PRE-OPERATIONAL SELF-TESTS
The following pre-operational tests are performed upon power-up, on-demand and periodically. Prior to the Pre-
Operational self-tests being performed, the module performs the required known answer test (KAT) on the RSA
implementation.
Algorithm or Test Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test Type Indicator Details
Application Firmware
Integrity Test
2048 bits KAT SW/FW
Integrity
LED RSA-PKCS1 v1.5 Signature
Verification
Bootloader Firmware
Integrity Test
2048 bits KAT SW/FW
Integrity
LED RSA-PSS Signature
Verification
Table 19: Pre-Operational Self-Tests
10.2 CONDITIONAL SELF-TESTS
The following conditional tests are performed upon power-up, on-demand and periodically.
Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-CBC
Encrypt
(A3256)
128-bit KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
Encrypt KAT Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
AES-CBC
Decrypt
(A3256)
128-bit KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
Decrypt KAT Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
AES-ECB
Encrypt
(A3256)
128-bit KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
Encrypt KAT Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
AES-ECB
Decrypt
(A3256)
128-bit KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
Decrypt KAT Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
AES-KW
Encrypt
(A3257)
128-bit KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
Encrypt KAT Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
AES-KW
Decrypt
(A3257)
128-bit KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
Decrypt KAT Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
Counter DRBG
(A3939)
N/A KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
Instantiate and
Generate KAT
Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
DSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3259)
2048-bit PCT PCT Success or Failure
written to Event Log
PCT DH Key
Generation
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3260)
P-224 KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
Signature
Generation KAT
Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3260)
P-224 KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
Signature
Verification
KAT
Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3260)
P-224 PCT PCT Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
PCT ECDSA Key
Generation
HMAC-SHA2-
256 (A3262)
256-bit KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
HMAC
Generation KAT
Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
KDF SP800-108
(A3938)
256-bit KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
Key Based KDF
Generation KAT
Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
KDA OneStep
Sp800-56Cr1
(A3264)
2048-bit KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
KDA KAT Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
KAS-FFC-SSC
Sp800-56Ar3
(A3263)
2048-bit KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
KAS-SSC KAT Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3265)
2048 bits PCT PCT Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
RSA Key Gen RSA Key
Generation
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Algorithm or
Test
Test
Properties
Test
Method
Test
Type
Indicator Details Conditions
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4)
(A3265)
2048 bits KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
RSA Signature
Generation KAT
Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4)
(A3265)
2048 bits KAT CAST Success or Failure
written to Event Log.
ERR LED illuminates on
error.
RSA Signature
Verification
KAT
Power-up,
Periodically &
on-demand
Table 20: Conditional Self-Tests
Note:
− The ‘Get Device Status’ service provides self-test status.
− Conditional tests are performed at power up, on-demand (via the ‘Self-Test’ service) and periodically.
10.3 PERIODIC SELF-TEST INFORMATION
The running of a periodic self-test is indicated by an extended response time for the first message when running
the Local- or Remote Login services. This can be confirmed later by a self-test timestamp available via the ‘Get
Device Status’ service.
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
Application
Firmware Integrity
Test
KAT SW/FW Integrity <=90 days Automatically
Bootloader
Firmware Integrity
Test
KAT SW/FW Integrity On demand On Demand -
Conforms with IG
10.3.E Resolution
3C.
Table 21: Pre-Operational Periodic Information
Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-CBC Encrypt
(A3256)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
AES-CBC Decrypt
(A3256)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
AES-ECB Encrypt
(A3256)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
AES-ECB Decrypt
(A3256)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
AES-KW Encrypt
(A3257)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
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Algorithm or Test Test Method Test Type Period Periodic Method
AES-KW Decrypt
(A3257)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
Counter DRBG
(A3939)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
DSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4) (A3259)
PCT PCT N/A Programmatically -
Upon Key
Generation
ECDSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4) (A3260)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
ECDSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) (A3260)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
ECDSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4) (A3260)
PCT PCT N/A Programmatically -
Upon Key
Generation
HMAC-SHA2-256
(A3262)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
KDF SP800-108
(A3938)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
KDA OneStep
Sp800-56Cr1
(A3264)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
KAS-FFC-SSC Sp800-
56Ar3 (A3263)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
RSA KeyGen
(FIPS186-4) (A3265)
PCT PCT N/A Programmatically -
Upon Key
Generation
RSA SigGen
(FIPS186-4) (A3265)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
RSA SigVer
(FIPS186-4) (A3265)
KAT CAST <=90 days Automatically
Table 22: Conditional Periodic Information
10.4 ERROR STATES
On entering an error state, the module will output a signal to illuminate the ERR LED (Status Output). The reason
for the error is obtainable using the ‘Get Device Status’ service. All data via the data output interface is inhibited
whilst within an error state. No cryptographic functions are available whilst the module is in an error state.
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Name Description Conditions Recovery
Method
Indicator
Defect (Hard
Error)
Non recoverable
error
Fatal error caused by self-test failure
Fatal error caused by physical tamper
e.g. removal of battery
Non recoverable
error
LED (Red)
Soft Error Recoverable Error General Application errors Power-cycle LED
(Yellow)
Table 23: Error States
10.5 OPERATOR INITIATION OF SELF-TESTS
Self-tests may be triggered by the user using the ‘Self-Test’ service, which allows either individual or all tests to be
run.
11 LIFE-CYCLE ASSURANCE
There are no specific maintenance requirements. Care should be taken to ensure that the device is not left without
an external source of power for more than 10 years.
11.1 INSTALLATION, INITIALIZATION, AND STARTUP PROCEDURES
The module is initialized within FP manufacturing and installed into an FP manufactured PES. The PES is authorized
and shipped to an end customer.
11.2 ADMINISTRATOR GUIDANCE
The device will only be provided to or retrieved from FP customers as part of a postage evidencing system.
Administration guidance, in the form of API definitions, exists for FP engineers involved in the development of PES
equipment.
11.3 NON-ADMINISTRATOR GUIDANCE
The device will only be provided to customers as part of a postage meter. Any user guidance will be provided as
part of that equipment.
11.4 DESIGN AND RULES
The following security rules are enforced by the cryptographic module to ensure the FIPS 140-3 security
requirements are met.
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1. Supports only an Approved mode of operation. The Approved mode indicator is returned via the ‘Get
Device Status’ service or by examining the module status LEDs.
2. Does not allow unauthenticated operators to have any access to the module’s cryptographic services.
3. Inhibits data output during self-tests, firmware load, zeroization and error states.
4. Logically disconnects data output from the processes performing zeroization and key generation.
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5. Excludes the overwriting of an unprotected SSP with another unprotected SSP for zeroization.
6. Enforces identity-based authentication for roles that access approved algorithms and CSPs.
7. Does not retain the authentication of an operator following power-off or reboot.
8. Supports the following roles: Cryptographic Officer (Remote), Cryptographic Officer (Local) and User.
9. Does not permit the input or output of plaintext cryptographic keys or other CSPs.
10. Does not support a bypass mode or maintenance mode.
11. Supports the following logically distinct interfaces:
− Data input interface
− Data output interface
− Control input interface
− Status output interface
− Power interface
12. Implements all firmware using a high-level language, except the limited use of low-level languages to
enhance performance.
13. Protects critical security parameters from unauthorized disclosure, modification and substitution.
14. Provides means to ensure that a key entered into or stored within the module is associated with the
correct entities to which the key is assigned.
15. Supports an approved deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) as specified in NIST SP 800-90A section
10.2.1.
16. Performs self-tests as listed in Section 10 during power-on and on-demand when the corresponding
service is used.
17. Stores an error indication whenever an error state is entered.
18. Does not perform any cryptographic functions while in an error state.
19. Does not support multiple concurrent operators.
11.5 END OF LIFE
Upon end of life, the module is withdrawn from service and returned to FP manufacturing for decommissioning,
redeployment or scrapping. At the end of the device’s life, the Scrap service should be run.
12 MITIGATION OF OTHER ATTACKS
12.1 ATTACK LIST
The module incorporates additional protections against removing the module’s epoxy to gain access to the
underlying components via a tamper detection and response mechanism. The module zeroizes all plaintext SSPs
upon tamper detection.
12.2 MITIGATION EFFECTIVENESS
The module will zeroize all SSPs upon the removal of its epoxy. The module will transition to a permanent error
state.
12.3 GUIDANCE AND CONSTRAINTS
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Upon a physical tamper event, the module will zeroize all SSPs and will transition to a permanent error state.