7705 Series FIPS-140-2 Security Policy
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Corporation
7705 SAR-OS SAR-18/8/X/Ax/Wx/W/H/Hc
Control Plane Cryptographic Module (SARCM)
FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy
FIPS Security Level:1
Document Version: 3.5
December 8th
, 2023
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
GLOSSARY .................................................................................................................................................................3
1. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................................5
1.1 PURPOSE......................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 VERSIONS AVAILABLE FOR FIPS.................................................................................................................5
2. SAR-OS CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE OVERVIEW ................................................................................6
2.1 SARCM CHARACTERISTICS........................................................................................................................6
2.2 SARCM APPROVED ALGORITHMS..............................................................................................................8
2.3 SARCM NON-APPROVED BUT ALLOWED ALGORITHMS .............................................................................9
2.4 SARCM INTERFACES..................................................................................................................................9
3. SARCM ROLES AND SERVICES................................................................................................................11
4. PHYSICAL SECURITY .................................................................................................................................12
5. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ..............................................................................................................13
6. KEY TABLE ....................................................................................................................................................14
6.1 KEYS/CSPS ALGORITHMS IN FIPS-140-2 MODE ......................................................................................14
7. EMC/EMI (FCC COMPLIANCE).................................................................................................................18
8. SELF TESTS ....................................................................................................................................................19
8.1 SELF TESTS ON THE CSM..........................................................................................................................19
8.1.1 Cryptographic DRBG Startup Test......................................................................................................19
8.1.2 RSA Startup test ...................................................................................................................................20
8.2 CONDITIONAL TEST ON THE CSM .............................................................................................................20
9. FIPS-140 USER GUIDANCE .........................................................................................................................22
9.1 FIPS-140-2 MODE CONFIGURATION .........................................................................................................22
9.2 CONFIGURATIONS NOT ALLOWED WHEN RUNNING IN FIPS-140-2 MODE ................................................22
9.3 NON-FIPS-140-2 MODE............................................................................................................................23
10. REFERENCES ...............................................................................................................................................24
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2-1: SARCM Diagram of Logical and Physical Boundaries...................................6
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GLOSSARY
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
BGP Border Gateway Protocol
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CFM Control / Forwarding Module
CLI Command Line Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSM Control Switch Module
CSP Critical Security Parameter
CVL Component Validation List
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GRE Generic Routing Encapsulation
HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
ICV Integrity Check Value
IGMP Internet Group Management Protocol
IP Internet Protocol
IPSec IP Security
LDP Label Distribution Protocol
LSP Label Switched Path
MPLS Multi-protocol label switching
NDRNG Non-Deterministic RNG
NGE Network Group Encryption
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OSPF Open Shortest Path First
PFS Perfect Forward Secrecy
RNG Random Number Generator
SA Security Association
SAM Service Aware Manager
SFM Switch Fabric Module
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SSH Secure Shell
SPI Security Parameter Index
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TLS Transport Layer Security
TM Traffic Management
VPLS Virtual Private LAN Service
Table 1 - Glossary
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
This document describes the non-proprietary SAR-OS (Service Aggregation Router Operating
System) Cryptographic Module (SARCM 3.1) Security Policy for the 7705 Service Aggregation
Router (SAR) product family. These are referenced in the document as either 7705 or SAR.
This security policy provides the details for configuring and running the 7705 products in a
FIPS-140-2 mode of operation and describes how the module meets the level 1 requirements of
FIPS 140-2. Please see the references section for a full list of FIPS 140-2 requirements.
Section Section Title Level
1 Cryptographic Module Specification 1
2 Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces 1
3 Roles, Services, and Authentication 1
4 Finite State Model 1
5 Physical Security N/A
6 Operational Environment 1
7 Cryptographic Key Management 1
8 EMI/EMC 1
9 Self-Tests 1
10 Design Assurance 1
11 Mitigation of Other Attacks N/A
Table 2 - Security Level per FIPS 140-2 Section
1.2 Versions Available for FIPS
The following platforms of the 7705 products that implement the module are either tested or
compatible for running SARCM in a FIPS approved mode:
Platform Model(s)
7705 Service Aggregation Router (SAR) SAR-8, SAR-18, SAR Ax, SAR-H,
SAR-Hc, SAR-W, SAR-Wx, SAR-X
Table 3 - FIPS Capable Platforms and Models
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2. SAR-OS CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE OVERVIEW
The section provides an overview of the SAR-OS Cryptographic Module (SARCM) and the
FIPS validated cryptographic algorithms used by services requiring those algorithms. The
SARCM doesn’t implement any services or protocols directly. Instead, it provides the
cryptographic algorithm functions needed to allow SAR-OS to implement cryptography for those
services and protocols that require it.
2.1 SARCM Characteristics
Figure 2-1: SARCM Diagram of Logical and Physical Boundaries
The SARCM logical and physical properties and boundary considerations is illustrated in Figure
2-1. The solid blue line represents the physical boundary of the cryptographic module that
represents the hardware system on which SAR-OS is running and hence where SARCM is also
running. The dashed blue line indicates the logical cryptographic boundary of the SARCM
within SAR-OS. The SARCM is available as a cryptographic service for any SAR-OS services
or protocols that require cryptographic operations.
The SARCM provides the cryptographic services required for the control plane (ie routing
protocols etc). On the 7705 SAR-18/8 and SAR-X/Ax/Wx/W/H/Hc, all the control plane
functionality is part of the Control and Switching Module (CSM), while the data plane is
managed by the Winpath network processor. It should be noted on SAR-X/Ax/Wx/W/H/Hc
platforms the CSM and line cards are physically on the same hardware, but logically separate.
The Winpath network processor on these platforms is encryption capable. Also on SAR-18/8, all
the control plane functionality is part of the Control and Switching Module (CSM) while the data
plane is managed by the Winpath network processor which is present on all interface cards.
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The SARCM is part of two SAR-OS binary files (both.tim and support.tim) that are used to run
the full SAR-OS application. SARCM is classified as a multi-chip standalone software module
and SARCM is statically included within the SAR-OS application code. SARCM has been
validated on each CSM used by the hardware platforms listed in the following table. Note that
the CSM is integrated into the chassis of 7705 SAR-X/Ax/Wx/W/H/Hc variants while the CSM
is a separate hardware module on the SAR-8/18 systems and integrated into the chassis on all
other 7705 variants.
Platform Cavium Control
Processor
SAR-8 6 core @ 800 MHz, on
CSMv2 module
SAR-18 8 core @ 600 MHz on
SAR-18 CSM module
SAR-H 2 core @ 600 MHz on
chassis
SAR-Hc 2 core @ 600 MHz on
chassis
SAR-X 8 core @ 800 MHz on
chassis
SAR-W 1 core @ 500 MHz on
chassis
SAR-Wx 2 core @ 600 MHz on
chassis
SAR-Ax 2 core @600 Mhz on
chassis
Table 4 – Validated Hardware and FIPS Compatible Platforms
The Software version used to validate version 3.1 of the SARCM was SAR-OS 21.10R5.
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2.2 SARCM Approved Algorithms
The SARCM uses the following FIPS approved algorithms:
Algorithm CAVP Cert
(21.10R5)
AES CBC (e/d; 128, 192, 256); CFB128 (e/d;128); CTR (e only; 128,
192, 256)
C2023 C2024
Triple-DES (TCBC) (e/d; keying option 1) C2023 C2024
CKG Vendor Affirmed
RSA
FIPS186-4: ANSI X9.31 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature Generation
FIPS186-4:PKCS v1.5 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature Generation
FIPS186-4:PKCSPSS 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature Generation
FIPS186-2:ANSI X9.31 1024-bit & 1536-bit& 2048-bit & 3072-bit &
4096-bit signature verification
FIPS186-2:PKCS v1.5 1024-bit & 1536-bit& 2048-bit & 3072-
bit Signature Verification
FIPS186-2:PKCSPSS 1024-bit & 1536-bit& 2048-bit & 3072-bit &
4096-bit Signature Verification
FIPS186-4: ANSI X9.31 1024-bit & 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature
Verification
FIPS186-4:PKCS v1.5 1024-bit & 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature
Verification
FIPS186-4:PKCSPSS 1024-bit & 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature
Verification
FIPS186-4: 2048-bit Key Pair Generation [FIPS186-4_Fixed_e
(10001);
C2023 C2024
HMAC (HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA2-224, HMAC-SHA2-256,
HMAC-SHA2-384, HMAC-SHA2-512)
C2023 C2024
CMAC AES-128 Generation
o Capabilities:
▪ Direction: Generation
▪ Key Length: 128
▪ MAC: 64, 96, 128
▪ Message Length: 0, 128, 320, 480,
512, 524288
o Capabilities:
▪ Direction: Verification
▪ Key Length: 128
▪ MAC: 64, 96, 128
▪ Message Length: 0, 128, 320, 480,
512, 524288
C2023 C2024
SHS (SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512) C2023 C2024
DRBG CTR_DRBG (AES-256) C2023 C2024
DSA C2023 C2024
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FIPS186-4: 1024-bit PQG Verification; 2048-bit & 3072-bit PQG
Generation & Verification
FIPS186-4: 2048-bit Key Pair Generation [(2048,256)]
2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature Generation
1024-bit, 2048-bit & 3072-bit Signature Verification
CVL
KDF IKEv1: (SHA-2) SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
CVL
KDF IKEv2: (SHA-2) SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512
C2023 C2024
KAS-SSC
SP 800-56Arev3
FFC: dhEphem scheme per Section 6.1.2.1 in SP 800-56Arev3
A3133 A3134)
KAS
KAS-SSC per SP 800-56Arev3
(Cert. #A3133 and #A3134)
FFC: dhEphem scheme per Section 6.1.2.1 in SP 800-56Arev3.
CVL per SP 800-135:
IKEv1 KDF (Certs. C2023 and C2024)
IKEv2 KDF (Certs. C2023 and C2024)
KAS-SSC (Certs.
A3133 and #A3134)
with CVL (Certs.
C2023 and C2024)
Table 5 – Approved Algorithm Implementations
2.3 SARCM non-Approved but Allowed Algorithms
The module supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms which are:
• NDRNG seeded with 256 bits of entropy.
2.4 SARCM Interfaces
The physical ports used by SARCM within SAR-OS are the same as those available on the
system which is running SAR-OS per the platforms specified in the previous section. The
logical interface is a C-language application program interface (API).
The Data Input interface consists of the input parameters of the API procedures and includes
plaintext and/or cipher text data.
The Data Output interface consists of the output parameters of the API procedures and includes
plaintext and/or cipher text data.
The Control Input interface consists of API functions that specify commands and control data
used to control the operation of the module. The API may specify other functions or procedures
as control input data.
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The Status Output includes the return status, data and values associated with the status of the
module.
The module provides logical interfaces to the other services within SAR-OS and those other
SAR-OS services use the following logical interfaces for cryptographic functions: data input,
data output, control input, and status output.
Interface Description
Data Input API input parameters including plaintext and/or cipher text data
Data Output API output parameters including plaintext and/or cipher text data
Control Input API procedure calls that may include other function calls as input, or
input arguments that specify commands and control data used to control
the operation of the module.
Status Output API return code describing the status of SARCM
Table 6 – FIPS 140-2 Logical Interface Mappings
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3. SARCM ROLES AND SERVICES
The SARCM meets all FIPS 140-2 level 1 requirements for Roles and Services, implementing
support for both the Crypto Officer and User roles within the SARCM. The support for both
Crypto Officer and User roles within the SARCM is classed as a process. As allowed by FIPS
140-2, the SARCM does not support user authentication for these roles. Only one role may be
using the SARCM at a time and the module does not allow concurrent operators to access the
SARCM.
The User and Crypto Officer roles are implicitly assumed by the entity accessing the services
implemented by the SARCM:
• Installation and initialization of the SARCM which is embedded in the SAR-OS image
and installed on the SAR-OS platforms is assumed implicitly as the Crypto Officer when
installation and initialization occurs.
The services available by the SARCM in FIPS mode to the Crypto Officer and User roles consist
of the following:
Services Access Critical Security Parameters Crypto
Officer
User
Encryption Execute Symmetric keys AES, Triple-DES X X
Decryption Execute Symmetric keys AES, Triple-DES X X
Hash (HMAC) Execute HMAC SHA keys X X
Key generation Write/execute Symmetric key AES, Triple-DES,
Asymmetric RSA, DSA, Diffie-Hellman
public and private keys
X X
Key agreement Execute DH public/private key X X
Perform Self-Tests Execute/read NA X X
DRBG Execute Seed input X X
Show Status Execute NA X X
Signature signing Execute Asymmetric private key DSA, RSA X X
Signature verification Execute Asymmetric public key DSA, RSA, X X
Zeroization Execute Symmetric key, asymmetric key, HMAC-
SHA keys, seed key, seed
X X
Module Initialization Execute All CSPs X
Table 7 – Module Services
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4. PHYSICAL SECURITY
The module obtains its physical security from any platform running SAR-OS with production
grade components and standard passivation as allowed by FIPS 140-2 level 1.
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5. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The SARCM was tested on the following platforms that represent the required HW components
that runs SAR-OS and the SARCM.
Platform used for
testing/validation
Hardware running SAR-OS Processor
SAR-8 6 core @ 800 MHz, on CSMv2
module
Cavium Octeon II
SAR-18 8 core @ 600 MHz on SAR-18
CSM module
Cavium Octeon Plus
SAR-H 2 core @ 600 MHz on chassis Cavium Octeon Plus
SAR-Hc 2 core @ 600 MHz on chassis Cavium Octeon II
SAR-X 8 core @ 800 MHz on chassis Cavium Octeon II
SAR-W 1 core @ 500 MHz on chassis Cavium Octeon Plus
SAR-Wx 2 core @ 600 MHz on chassis Cavium Octeon II
SAR-Ax 2 core @ 600 MHz on chassis Cavium Octeon II
Table 8 – Hardware and Platforms Used to Test Module
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6. KEY TABLE
6.1 Keys/CSPs Algorithms In FIPS-140-2 Mode
The following keys and CSPs are available when running in FIPS-140-2 mode for the SARCM:
Key or CSP Usage
(Service)
Storage Generation/Input Zeroization Access
Role
(R,W,X)
Triple DES-CBC IKE DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-128-CFB SNMPv3 Non-Volatile memory
(Encrypted*)
Operator –
Manually
Command R, W
AES-128-CBC SSHv2,
Secure
Copy, SFTP
DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-128-CBC IKE DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-192-CBC SSHv2,
Secure
Copy, SFTP
DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-192-CBC IKE DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-256-CBC SSHv2,
Secure Copy
DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-256-CBC IKE DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-128-CTR SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-192-CTR SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-256-CTR SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
Triple DES-CBC SSHv2, AA
Local List
File
DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
AES-CMAC SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
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Key or CSP Usage
(Service)
Storage Generation/Input Zeroization Access
Role
(R,W,X)
HMAC-SHA-1 OSPF, IS-IS,
RSVP,
Software
Integrity
DRAM
(plaintext)
Operator –
Manually
Command R, W
HMAC-SHA-1 SSHv2, DRAM
(plaintext)
Operator –
Manually
Command R, W, X
HMAC-SHA-256 SSHv2, DRAM
(plaintext)
Operator –
Manually
Command R, W, X
HMAC-SHA-512 SSHv2, DRAM
(plaintext)
Operator –
Manually
Command R, W, X
HMAC-SHA-1 SNMPv3 DRAM
(plaintext)
Operator –
Manually
Command R, W
HMAC-SHA-1 IKE, PKI DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
HMAC-SHA-224 PKI DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
HMAC-SHA-256 OSPF, IS-IS,
SSHv2,
RSVP
DRAM
(plaintext)
Operator –
Manually
Command R, W
HMAC-SHA-256 IKE DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
HMAC-SHA-256 PKI DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
HMAC-SHA-384 IKE DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
HMAC-SHA-384 PKI DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
HMAC-SHA-512 IKE DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
HMAC-SHA-512 PKI, SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
DSA Public Key Certificate
Signing
Request,
CMPv2
DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
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Key or CSP Usage
(Service)
Storage Generation/Input Zeroization Access
Role
(R,W,X)
DSA Private Key Certificate
Signing
Request
generation,
CMPv2
DRAM (plaintext) Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
RSA Public Key SSHv2,
Certificate
Signing
Request
generation,
CMPv2
DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
RSA Private Key SSHv2,
Certificate
Signing
Request
Generation,
CMPv2
DRAM (plaintext) Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
Diffie-Hellman Public Key
Group 14 (P=>2K prime
numbers, q>224)
SSHv2 DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
Diffie-Hellman Private Key
Group 14 (p=>2K prime
numbers, q>224)
SSHv2 DRAM (plaintext) Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
Diffie-Hellman Public Key
Group 14, 15 (P=>2K prime
numbers, q>224)
IKE DRAM
(plaintext)
Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
Diffie-Hellman Private Key
Group 14, 15 (P=>2k prime
numbers, q>224)
IKE DRAM (plaintext) Approved DRBG,
API parameter
Reboot,
Command
R, W, X
DRBG Seed Key
generation
DRAM
(plaintext)
Internally
Generated
Reboot R, W
DRBG Entropy Key
generation
DRAM
(plaintext)
Internally
Generated
Reboot R, W
DRBG ‘V’ Value Key
generation
DRAM
(plaintext)
Internally
Generated
Reboot R, W
DRBG ‘Key’ Value Key
generation
DRAM
(plaintext)
Internally
Generated
Reboot R, W
IKEv1/IKEv2 KDF IPsec DRAM (plaintext) Internally
Generated
Reboot R, W
Table 9 – Cryptographic Keys and CSPs
* Encrypted via AES-128-CBC
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Access roles include “R”- Read, “W” – Write, and “X” – Execute.
No network protocols including SNMP, SSH, or IKE have been reviewed or tested by the CAVP
or CMVP. SSH and IKE KDF were tested.
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7. EMC/EMI (FCC COMPLIANCE)
The SAR chassis where the CSM, SAR-OS and SARCM runs were tested and found conformant
to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B,
Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class A (business use).
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8. SELF TESTS
8.1 Self Tests on the CSM
When FIPS-140-2 mode is enabled the node performs the following startup tests:
• Software integrity check on startup using HMAC-SHA-256
• DRBG KAT and health test
• Triple-DES CBC encrypt KAT
• Triple-DES CBC decrypt KAT
• AES encrypt 128, 192,256 KAT
• AES decrypt 128, 192,256 KAT
• AES CBC 128, 192, 256 KAT
• AES CFB128 KAT
• AES CTR 128, 192, 256 KAT
• AES GCM 256 KAT
• AES GMAC 256 KAT
• AES CMAC 128 KAT
• HMAC SHA-1 KAT, HMAC SHA-224 KAT, HMAC-SHA-256 KAT, HMAC SHA-384
KAT, HMAC SHA-512 KAT
• SHA-1 KAT, SHA-224 KAT, SHA-256 KAT, SHA-384 KAT, SHA-512 KAT
• RSA sign and verify
• A DSA pairwise consistency test
• KAS-FFC-SSC KAT
• IKEv1 KDF
• IKEv2 KDF
Should any of these tests fail, the SARCM does not allow the node to continue booting the
image. An error is displayed on the console port that indicates the failed test and the SARCM
forces a reboot to attempt the self-tests again.
8.1.1 Cryptographic DRBG Startup Test
A known answer test is used by the DRBG on startup (by using a known seed). If the startup test
fails, then an error message is printed on the console and the node will attempt the boot sequence
again.
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8.1.2 RSA Startup test
SARCM performs an initial startup test with a known public key, a known digital signature and a
test that verifies it can perform a proper verification of the known signature with the known
public key. If the SARCM fails to successfully perform this startup test, then a message is
printed on the console, the SARCM causes the node to reboot and tries to perform all the startup
tests successfully again from the beginning.
8.2 Conditional Test on the CSM
When FIPS-140-2 mode is enabled the node performs the following conditional self tests during
normal operation of the node:
• Manual Key Entry Tests
• Pairwise Consistency Test for RSA / DSA
• DRBG Continuous Random Number Generator Test (CRNGT)
• NDRNG Continuous Random Number Generator Test (CRNGT)
Descriptions of the tests are described in the following sections.
SARCM Failure
When a Conditional Test (e.g. the pairwise consistency tests or the CRNGT test) fails, then the
SARCM is considered as failed. The node will print a message on the console that indicates that
the SARCM has failed.
Manual Key Entry Tests
Cryptographic key or key components manually entered into the cryptographic
module are entered using duplicate entries. If the duplicate entries do not match, the test shall
fail.
Pairwise Consistency Test for RSA and DSA
The Pairwise Consistency Test is performed whenever public or private keys are generated. The
consistency of RSA/DSA keys is tested by the calculation and verification of a digital signature.
If the digital signature cannot be verified, the test shall fail.
An additional test is performed on RSA key pairs. A plaintext value is encrypted by the RSA
public key. The resulting ciphertext value is compared to the original plaintext value. If the two
values are equal, then the test shall fail. If the two values differ, then the private key is used to
decrypt the ciphertext and the resulting value are compared to the original plaintext value. If the
two values are not equal, the test shall fail.
Continuous Random Number Generator Test (CRNGT)
The CRNGT is performed for every RNG call. Each call to a RNG produces blocks of 128 bits.
The first 128-bit block generated after power-up, initialization, or reset is not used, but is saved
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for comparison with the next 128-bit block to be generated. Each subsequent generation
of an 128-bit block is compared with the previously generated block. The test shall fail if any
two compared 128-bit blocks are equal.
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9. FIPS-140 USER GUIDANCE
The following sections described the SAR-OS user guidance for configuring the SAR systems
where the SARCM is embedded and accessed by SAR-OS.
9.1 FIPS-140-2 Mode Configuration
To enable FIPS-140-2 on the 7705 a configurable parameter is available in the bof.cfg file.
When configured in the bof.cfg, the node boots in FIPS-140-2 mode and the following behaviors
are enabled on the node:
• Only FIPS-140-2 approved algorithms are available for encryption and authentication for
any cryptographic function on the CSM where SAR-OS and the SARCM reside
• Diffie-Hellman with non-compliant key sizes must not be used in FIPS mode; otherwise
the module will enter a non-FIPS mode.
• Startup tests are executed on the CSM when the node boots
• Conditional tests are executed when required during normal operation (e.g. manual key
entry test, pairwise consistency checks and RNG tests)
The current state of the bof and the parameters used for booting can be verified with the
following CLI commands:
*A:bkvm12>show bof
*A:bkvm12>show bof booted
The output of "show bof booted" would show "fips-140-2" instead of "no fips-140-2".
Note the FIPS-140-2 parameter in the bof.cfg does not take effect until the node has been
rebooted. When running in FIPS mode the system will display a value in the system command
that indicates this is the case.
9.2 Configurations Not Allowed when running in FIPS-140-2 Mode
When the node is configured in FIPS-140-2 mode the following disallowed algorithms are
visible in CLI but not available. The User must not configure the following algorithms and
functions when running in FIPS-140-2 mode or reverse the configuration steps in Section 9.1:
• MD5
o SNMP, OSPF, BGP, LDP, NTP authentication, multi-chassis redundancy
• HMAC-MD5
SNMP, IS-IS, RSVP
• HMAC-MD5-96
o SNMP
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• HMAC-SHA-1-96
o SNMP, OSPF, BGP, LDP
• AES-128-CMAC-96
o BGP, LDP
9.3 Non-FIPS-140-2 Mode
The module supports the Crypto Officer and User roles while in the non-Approved mode of
operation.
To disable FIPS-140-2 on the SAR-8/18/H/Hc/X/W/Wx/Ax, the User must configure the bof
with “no fips-140-2” and reboot the system to transition to the non FIPS-140-2 mode. The User
must delete persistent keys before switching mode.
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10.REFERENCES
[FIPS 140-2] FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May
25, 2001, CHANGE NOTICES (12-03-2002).
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf
[FIPS 140-2 DTR] Derived Test Requirements for FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements
for Cryptographic Modules, January 4, 2011 Draft.
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-
2/FIPS1402DTR.pdf
[FIPS 140-2 IG] Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-2 and the Cryptographic
Module Validation Program, December 3, 2019.
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/fips140-
2/FIPS1402IG.pdf