EUCC-3087-2025-12-0001
Administration ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V6-2025
for
Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh,
IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h,
IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah,
IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the design step
G12
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-11
Certification Report V1.0 EUCC-Zert-327 EUCC V6.8
Certification Report
EUCC-3087-2025-12-0001 BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V6-2025
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................4
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................4
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................4
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................5
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................5
5. Publication...................................................................................................................7
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................8
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................9
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................10
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................15
6. Supplementary Cybersecurity Information.................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................26
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................27
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................27
13. Bibliography.............................................................................................................28
C. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 32
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Certification Report
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A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
The Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 31 January 2024 [EUCC-VO] establishes a Union-wide cybersecurity
certification scheme for TOEs and Protection Profiles for conformity assessments using
the requirements of Common Criteria.
By implementing the Cybersecurity Act1
, certification activities at assurance level ‘high’ and
in duly justified cases at assurance level ‘substantial’ are reserved to the National
Cybersecurity Certification Agency of a Member State.
In accordance to BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) issues
certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out at the request of a developer, vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the applicant.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria referenced in the above mentioned Implementing Regulation (EU)
2024/482 as well as relevant application notes and interpretations published by the
certification body of the BSI.
Evaluation facilities notified by the German National Cybersecurity Certification Authority
carry out the evaluation.
This Certification Report is the result of the certification activities carried out by the
certification body of the BSI in conclusion of the technical evaluation. This report contains
among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification
Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body carries out its activities according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 31 January 2024 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of
the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European
Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC) [EUCC-VO]
● EUCC state-of-the-art documents of relevance to the TOE [EUCC_SOTA]
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
1
Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA
(the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology
cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act)
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 2 December 2025, BGBl. 2025
I No. 301, p. 2
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● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior and Community)
● ISO/IEC 15408 as published on the day of issuance of this certificate and as mirrored by
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version CC:2022 [CC]
● ISO/IEC 18045 as published on the day of issuance of this certificate and as mirrored by
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version CEM:2022 [CEM]
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● EUCC programme: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (EUCC)
[EUCC_PROG]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certifications of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates – as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC – under certain conditions was agreed
3.1. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 5 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
● The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
application and interpretation of the criteria as well as uniform ratings.
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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Certification Report
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● The TOE Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h,
IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h,
IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the design step G12 has
been certificied by the certification body of the Federal Federal Office for Information
Security (BSI) based on administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V5-2024. Specific results
from the evaluation process were re-used.
● The evaluation of the product Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh,
IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h,
IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the
design step G12 was carried out by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation
was completed on 18 December 2025. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH located at
Unternehmensgruppe TÜV NORD
Am TÜV 1
45307 Essen
is a notified evaluation facility (ITSEF) .
● This certification was applied for: Infineon Technologies AG.
● The assessed TOE was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
● The certification activities are concluded with the comparability check and the production
of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the certification body of the BSI.
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the TOE as identified in this
document. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all statements and indications regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in an environment as specified in the following report and in the
Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The issued Certificate confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
[ST] on certificate’s issuance day. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of
the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be reassessed.
Therefore, the holder of the certificate should involve the assurance continuity program of
the EUCC Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification) in its
obligations to monitor the certified product. Specifically, if certification results should be
used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration
process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended
to perform a reassessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to prevent an indefinite certificate usage where evolving attack methods justify a
recent reassessment of the product’s resistance, the maximum validity period of the
certificate is limited. The certificate issued on 19 December 2025 is valid until 18
December 2030 and its validity can be renewed by certifying the TOE.
The holder of this certificate is obliged:
1. to meet the obligations from the Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482, in
particular but not exclusively to respect the rules for certificate usage, to monitor the
conformity of the certified TOE, to inform the certification body about subsequently
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detected vulnerabilities or irregularities with relevance to the security of the TOE
and to maintain vulnerability management and disclosure procedures.
Should changes be introduced into the certified version of the TOE, the validity period of its
related certificate can be extended in order to cover the changed TOE, provided the holder
of the certificate applies for measures under EUCC scheme’s assurance continuity (i.e.
recertification or maintenance) and the changed TOE then meets the assurance
requirements.
5. Publication
The TOE Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h,
IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h,
IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the design step G12, has
been notified to ENISA for publication on the website on European cybersecurity
certification schemes and has also been included in BSI’s list of certified products [or
Protection Profiles], which is published regularly (see [EUCC_CERT]). Further information
can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
This holder of the certificate5
has to publish on its website this Certification Report and
supplementary information. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic
form at the internet address stated above.
5
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
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Certification Report
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B. Certification Results
The following chapters summarise the assessment results of the
● the applicant’s Security Target specified for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes, statements and indications from the certification body.
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1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Technologies AG security controller
(integrated circuit IC), IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h,
IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah,
IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch Design Step G12, including optional software
libraries and dedicated firmware.
Please refer to Section 2 for an identification of the hardware, firmware, and software
components, including the corresponding version identifier.
The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251
architecture. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central
Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit), and the MED (Memory
Encryption/Decryption Unit). The dual interface controller is able to communicate using
either the contact based or the contactless interface.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particular security relevant applications
and as a developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term smartcard
embedded software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications
stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the smartcard embedded
software.
The product Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h,
IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h,
IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the design step G12 has
been certified under the EUCC scheme in accordance to the provisions of the
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482. This is a certification based on BSI
administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V5-2024. Specific results from the evaluation process
BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V5-2024 were re-used. The TOE deliverables are listed in table 1.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh,
IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h,
IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the
design step G12 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 18 December 2025. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is a notified
evaluation facility (ITSEF).
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [ETR] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [CC], the Methodology [CEM], the requirements of the Scheme [EUCC-
VO], [EUCC_PROG].
The evaluation has confirmed:
● CC Version and Release: see [CC] and [CEM]
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation
Packages Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-
2014 [PP]
● Assurance Level: EUCC [High] with component AVA_VAN.5
● Assurance Package: Global Assurance EAL 5
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● Augmentation: Global Assurance: ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.3, ADV_TDS.5,
ALC_CMC.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.3, ALC_TAT.3,
ATE_FUN.2, ATE_COV.3, AVA_VAN.5 sub-TSF assurance level
EAL6 augmented with ALC_FLR.3
The Security Target [ST] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [PP].
A detailed description of the security functionality, addressed threats, organisational
security policies and the operational environment can be found in the Security Target [ST].
Depending on the blocking configuration, an IFX_CCI_00000Fh G12 product can have
e.g. different user available memory sizes and can come with or without individual
accessible cryptographic coprocessors. All products are identical in regard to module
design, layout, and footprint. All possible configuration options are described in Section 2..
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results stated in this certificate do not express an appraisal
of the strength and suitability of the cryptographic algorithms implemented in the TOE (see
BSIG Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results apply only to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the statements and indications are kept as detailed in this
Certification Report. Neither the BSI nor any other organisation that recognises or gives
effect to this certificate implicitly or explicitly guarantee or endorse the certified TOE.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h,
IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah,
IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the design step G12
Holder of the certificate: Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
https://www.infineon.com/product-information/cybersecurity-information
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW IFX_CCI_00000Fh,
IFX_CCI_000010h,
IFX_CCI_000026h,
IFX_CCI_000027h,
IFX_CCI_000028h,
IFX_CCI_000029h,
IFX_CCI_00002Ah,
IFX_CCI_00002Bh,
IFX_CCI_00002Ch
G12 Customer chooses delivery
method for complete modules,
with or without inlay mounting,
with or without inlay antenna
mounting, in form of plain
wafers, in any IC case (for
example TSSOP28, VQFN32,
VQFN40, CCS-modules, etc.),
in no IC case or package,
simply as bare dies, or in
whatever type of package.
(refer to [ST, 2.2.5]).
2 FW Boot Software (BOS) 80.102.06.0 or
80.102.06.1
Stored on the delivered
hardware.
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
3 FW Flash Loader (FL) -
Optional; depending on
order
80.102.06.0 or
80.102.06.1
Stored on the delivered
hardware.
4 FW NRG ROM part - NRG is not
part of the TOE Security
Functionality (TSF)
80.102.06.0 or
80.102.06.1
Stored on the delivered
hardware.
5 FW Radio Frequency Application
Interface (RFAPI) - The
RFAPI functions are not part
of the TOE Security
Functionality (TSF)
80.102.06.0 or
80.102.06.1
Stored on the delivered
hardware.
6 FW Resource Management
System (RMS)
80.102.06.0 or
80.102.06.1
Stored on the delivered
hardware.
7 SW RSA2048 Libraries -
Optional; depending on
order
v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, or
v2.09.002
Secure download (precompiled
object code – L251 file) via
ishare.
8 SW RSA4096 Libraries -
Optional; depending on
order
v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, or
v2.09.002
Secure download (precompiled
object code – L251 file) via
ishare.
9 SW EC Libraries - Optional;
depending on order
v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, or
v2.09.002
Secure download (precompiled
object code – L251 file) via
ishare.
10 SW Toolbox Libraries - None of
the Toolbox libraries is part
of the TOE Security
Functionality (TSF) -
Optional; depending on
order
v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, or
v2.09.002
Secure download (precompiled
object code – L251 file) via
ishare.
11 SW Base Libraries - Optional;
depending on presence of
RSA, EC, and Toolbox
v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, or
v2.09.002
Secure download (precompiled
object code – L251 file) via
ishare.
12 SW Symmetric Cryptographic
Libraries (SCL) - Optional;
depending on order
v2.04.002 or
v2.13.001
Secure download (precompiled
object code – L251 file) via
ishare.
13 SW Hash Cryptographic Library
(HCL) - Optional; depending
on order
v1.12.001 Secure download (precompiled
object code – L251 file) via
ishare.
14 SW CIPURSE™ library (CCL) -
Optional; depending on
order
v02.00.0004 Secure download (precompiled
object code – L251 file) via
ishare.
15 SW Hardware Support Libraries
(HSL) - Optional; depending
on order
v03.11.8339 or
v03.12.8812
Secure download (precompiled
object code – L251 file) via
ishare.
16 SW NRG Software Library
(NRGS) - Optional;
depending on order
v02.03.3446 Secure download (precompiled
object code – L251 file) via
ishare.
17 DOC 16-bit Security Controller
Family – V05, Hardware
Reference Manual
5.0 / 2019-06-14 Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
18 DOC Production and
Personalization, 16-bit
Security Controller
3.6 / 2019-06-24 Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
19 DOC 16-bit Security Controller,
65nm-Technology,
Programmer’s Reference
Manual
9.14 / 2019-12-
03
Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
20 DOC 16-bit Security Controller –
V05, Security Guidelines
1.01-3119 /
2025-09-02
Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
21 DOC 16-bit Security Controller –
V05, Errata Sheet
10.0 / 2021-02-
25
Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
22 DOC CL52 Asymmetric Crypto
Library for Crypto@2304T,
RSA/ECC/Toolbox, 16-bit
Security Controller, User
Interface, Version 2.07.003 -
Optional; delivered if RSA,
EC, or Toolbox library
version v2.07.003 is
ordered.
2.07.003 / 2025-
09-15
Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
23 DOC ACL52-Crypto2304T-C65
Asymmetric Crypto Library,
RSA / ECC / Toolbox, 16-bit
Security Controller, User
Interface, Version 2.08.007 -
Optional; delivered if RSA,
EC, or Toolbox library
version v2.08.007 is
ordered.
2.08.007 / 2025-
09-15
Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
24 DOC ACL52-Crypto2304T-C65
Asymmetric Crypto Library,
RSA / ECC / Toolbox, 16-bit
Security Controller, User
Interface, Version 2.09.002 -
Optional; delivered if RSA,
EC, or Toolbox library
version v2.09.002 is
ordered.
2.09.002 / 2024-
06-27
Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
25 DOC Hardware Support Library
for SLCx2 Version
03.12.8812 - Optional;
delivered if HSL is ordered
1.1 / 2019-07-08 Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
26 DOC Hardware Support Library
for SLCx2 Version
03.11.8339 - Optional;
delivered if HSL is ordered
1.0 / 2018-07-12 Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
27 DOC SCL52-SCP-v4-C65
Symmetric Crypto Library for
SCP-v4 DES / AES 16-bit
Security Controller, User
Interface, Version 2.04.002 -
Optional; delivered if SCL
version v2.04.002 is
ordered.
2.04.002 / 2018-
05-22
Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
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No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
28 DOC SCL52-SCP-v4-C65
Symmetric Cryptographic
Library for SCP-v4
AES/DES/MAC, 16-bit
Security Controller, User
Interface, Version 2.13.001 -
Optional; delivered if SCL
version v2.13.001 is
ordered.
2.13.001 / 2020-
11-05
Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
29 DOC HCL52-CPU-C65 Hash
Crypto Library for CPU SHA
16-bit Security Controller,
User interface manual -
Optional; delivered if HCL is
ordered.
1.12.001 / 2020-
01-14
Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
30 DOC CIPURSE™ Crypto Library,
CCLX2xCIP v02.00.0004,
CIPURSE™ V2, Compliant
to OSPT™ Alliance
CIPURSE™ V2
Cryptographic Protocol,
User Interface Optional;
delivered if CCL is ordered.
1.6 / 2018-02-02 Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
31 DOC 16-bit Security Controller,
Crypto@2304T V3, User
Manual - Optional; delivered
if the Crypto2304T is
available on the TOE.
2.0 / 2024-06-21 Secured download
(personalized PDF) via ishare
or on demand via encrypted
email.
Table 1: Deliverables of the TOE
3. Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data
by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a different
random number generators.
The RSA library is used to provide a high-level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto@2304T and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA, and DFA attacks. The EC library is used to provide a
high-level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware
component Crypto@2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA
attacks. The optional Hash Crypto Library provides a high-level interface for performing
cryptographic hash functions and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA, and DFA
attacks.
Furthermore, the TOE also contains the optional CIPURSE Cryptographic Library (CCL),
which can be used to implement a CIPURSE V2 conformant protocol in the IC embedded
software.
Besides that, the TOE can come with the optional Hardware Support Library (HSL), which
provides a simplified interface for NVM management and provides the possibility to write
tearing safe into the NVM.
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As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA and EC cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence, the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE, and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
Specific details concerning the above-mentioned security policies can be found in Chapter
7 and 8 of the Security Target [ST].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled and measures to be taken by the IT environment,
the user or the risk manager. The following topics are of relevance:
The ST includes the following security objective for the IC embedded software developer:
OE.Resp-Appl.
The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC embedded software developer shall treat
user data (especially keys) of the composite product appropriately. The IC embedded
software developer gets sufficient information on how to protect user data adequately in
the security guidelines [SEC].
The ST includes the following security objectives for the operational environment, which
are relevant for the Composite Product Manufacturer: OE.Process-Sec-IC,
OE.Lim_Block_Loader, OE.Loader_Usage, OE.TOE_Auth, and OE.Secure_Delivery.
The objective OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the protection of the TOE, as well as of its
manu-facturing and test data up to the delivery to the end-consumer. As defined in [ST,
2.2.5], the TOE can be delivered to the composite product manufacturer after phase 3 or
after phase 4. However, the single chips are identical in all cases. This means that the test
mode is deactivated and the TOE is locked in the user mode. Therefore, it is not necessary
to distinguish between these forms of delivery. Since Infineon has no information about the
security requirements of the implemented IC embedded software, it is not possible to
define any concrete security requirements for the environment of the composite product
manufacturer.
The objective OE.TOE_Auth requires that the environment has to support the
authentication and verification mechanism and has to know the corresponding
authentication reference data. The composite product manufacturer receives sufficient
information with regard to the authentication mechanism in [PPUM, 3.2.2].
The objective OE.Loader_Usage requires that the authorised user has to support the
trusted communication with the TOE by protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the
loaded data and he has to meet the access conditions defined by the flash loader. [PPUM,
3] provides sufficient information regarding this topic.
The objective OE.Lim_Block_Loader requires the composite product manufacturer to
protect the loader against misuse, to limit the capability of the loader, and to terminate the
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loader irreversibly after the intended usage. The permanent deactivation of the flash loader
is de-scribed in [PPUM, 3.5.3]. This objective for the environment originates from the
“Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only”. However, this TOE
also implements “Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only” and
thus the flash loader can also be used in an unsecure environment and is able to protect
itself against misuse if the authentication and download keys are handled appropriately.
The objective OE.Secure_Delivery complements the second item of the previous OE in
case the TOE is ordered with a (temporarily) deactivated Flash Loader but already flashed
cus-tomer software. In this case, the customer is required to implement mechanisms to
prevent attacks during TOE transport as required by the security needs of the loaded IC
Embedded Software. This requirement is provided to the user as part of [PPUM, 3]
describing the relevant scenario:
Scenario 2: The customer orders Flash Loader chips and asks Infineon to fill the
NVM with the appropriate application code and data. […] On delivery, the customer
application is active and responsible for transport protection.
As Infineon has no information about the security requirements of the implemented IC em-
bedded software, it is not possible for the guidance to define any concrete security
requirements for the environment of the IC Embedded Software Developer or Composite
Product Manufacturer.
Details can be found in the Security Target [ST].
5. Architectural Information
This ETR abbreviates the TOE as IFX_CCI_00000Fh for the sake of a better readability.
The TOE provides a real 16-bit CPU-architecture and is compatible to the Intel 80251
architecture. The major components of the core system are the two CPUs (Central
Processing Units), the MMU (Memory Management Unit), and the MED (Memory
Encryption/Decryption Unit). The dual interface controller is able to communicate using
either the contact based or the contactless interface.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particular security relevant applications
and as a developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term smartcard
embedded software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications
stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the smartcard embedded
software.
Further, more detailed information is readily available in the Security Target [ST].
6. Supplementary Cybersecurity Information
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 1 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
The developers website as stated in chapter 2 provides the following supplementary
information:
● the period during which support is offered (esp. security related updates)
● contact information of the manufacturer or provider and accepted methods for receiving
vulnerability information from end users and security researchers
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● a reference to online repositories listing publicly disclosed vulnerabilities related to the
TOE/ICT product, ICT service or ICT process and to any relevant cybersecurity
advisories
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
All tests have been carried out by ITSEF: TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
Unternehmensgruppe TÜV NORD
Am TÜV 1
45307 Essen
under the responsibility of certification Body
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87
Postfach 20 03 63
D-53175 Bonn.
Please refer to chapter 1 for details on assurance levels or packages involved into testing.
The developer performed five categories of tests:
● Simulation Tests (Design Verification),
● Qualification Tests,
● Verification Tests,
● Security Evaluation Test,
● Production Tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluator was able to repeat the tests of the developer by using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developer’s
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment, and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. For the developer tests, repeated by the evaluators, other test
parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE
realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during
layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing, the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks that do not modify the TOE physically.
The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack
potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
Please refer to chapter 8 for complete and precise information on settings and
configuration of the TOE during the evaluation, including relevant operational notes and
observations.
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8. Evaluated Configuration
This certificate covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h, IFX_CCI_000026h,
IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h, IFX_CCI_00002Ah,
IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch G12 (Tainan).
Depending on the blocking configuration a product can have different user available
configuration by order or by BPU (please refer to [ST] section 1.1, for an identification of
the components, which can be blocked via BPU).
As stated and detailed in the ETR [ETR], developer and evaluator tested the TOE in those
configurations/identifiers in which the TOE is delivered and which are described in the
Security Target [ST].
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The ITSEF produced and provided the Evaluation Technical Reports (ETR) [ETR]
according to the the requirements of the Scheme [EUCC-VO],[EUCC_PROG], the
Common Criteria [CC], the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM], and all relevant
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [AIS].
For the evaluation from component level AVA_VAN.4 onwards the following state-of-the-art
documents and supporting documents were applied:
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 1,
Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers,
Version 14, 2017-10-11,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14,
Anforderungenan Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nachCC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 19,
Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation
Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9, 2014-
11-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
20,Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministischeZufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 4, 2025-04-11, Herausgeber:
Zertifizierungsstelle des BSI im Rahmen des Zertifizierungsschemas,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
23,Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler, Version 4, 2017-03-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 26,
Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, Version 10,
2017-07-03,
● Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.5, 2022-05, Joint
Interpretation Working Group (confidential),
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● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 4, 2025-04-11
● Developer evidence for the evaluation of a physical true random number generator,
Version 0.8, 2013-02-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Evaluation Report as part of the Evaluation Technical Report, Part B – ETR-Part
True Physical and Hybrid Random Number Generator, Template-Version 0.7, 2013-
02-28, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 34, Evaluation
Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CC v2.3 & v3.1) and EAL6 (CC
v3.1), Version 3, 2009-09-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 35, Öffentliche
Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 2007-11-12
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
36,Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 5, 2017-03-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 37,
Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen, Version 3, 2010-05-
17,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 38, Reuse of
evaluation results, Version 2, 2007-09-28,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 39, Formal
Methods, Version 3, 2008-10-24, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 41, Guidelines for
Pps and STs, Version 2, 2011-01-31,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 46,
Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende
Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-12-04,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 47,
Regelungen zu Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04
are considered.
Additionally the CC Supporting Mandatory Technical Documents
● Joint Interpretation Library – Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version
3.2.1, 2024-02 and
● Joint Interpretation Library – ETR template for composite evaluation of Smart Cards
and similar devices, Version 1.1, August 2015
● Transition Policy to CC:2022 and CEM:2022, 2023-04-20, Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement Management Committee, CCMC-2023-04-001.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Security Architecture requirements
(ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar devices extended to Secure Sub Systems
in SoCs, Version 1.1, 2023-10, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Application of Attack Potential to
Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 1.2, 2023-08, ENISA.
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● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Application of Attack Potential to
Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.0 (DRAFT), 2025-02, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Composite product evaluation and
certification for CC: 2022, Version 1.0 (DRAFT), 2025-02, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme Guideline on Cryptography, Version 2, 2025-05, ENISA.
● COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024
laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European
Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common
Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC), 2024-01-31, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - The Application of CC to Integrated
Circuits, Version 1.1, 2023-10, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - The Application of CC to Integrated
Circuits, Version 2.0 (DRAFT), 2024-12, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Minimum ITSEF requirements for
security evaluations of Smart Cards and similar devices, Version 1.1, 2023-10,
ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Minimum Site Security Requirements,
Version 1.1, 2023-10, ENISA.
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - Minimum Site Security Requirements,
Version 2.0 (DRAFT), 2025-02, ENISA.
● EU Commission Implementing Regulation 2024/482, 2024-01-31, EU
● EUCC Scheme State-of-The-Art Document - STAR methodology, Version 1.0
(DRAFT), 2025-02, ENISA.
● Remaining Strength of Asymmetric Cryptographic Mechanisms after Partial Key
Leakage, Version 1.0 (confidential), 2020-06, Joint Interpretation Working Group.
● Joint Interpretation Library – Assurance Continuity - Practical Cases for Smart
Cards and similar devices, Version 1.1, 2024-04, Joint Interpretation Working
Group.
● ETR for composite evaluation TD SC & SD, Version 1.2, 2024-04, Joint
Interpretation Working Group.
● ADV_SPM.1 interpretation for [CC:2022] transition, Joint Interpretation Library,
Version 1.0, 2024-05
are considered.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20/31 was used (see [AIS]).
To support composite evaluations according to the State of the Art document the document
ETR for composite evaluation [ETRRfCOMP] was provided and approved. This document
provides details of this platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a
composite evaluation on top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is confirmed for the assurance components
that are identified in chapter 1 of this report and claimed by the Security Target [ST] for the
corresponding TOE. The corresponding TOE is identified in chapter 2 of this report.
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The certificate
● is uniquely identified by: EUCC-3087-2025-12-0001,
administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V6-2025
● was issued on: 19 December 2025
● is valid until: 18 December 2030
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 1 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with
a security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 120 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 120 Bits (in general context)
only.
Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementatio
n
Key Size in Bits Category
according to
[EUCC-
Crypto]
Security Level above
120 Bits
Key Agreement ECDH
(ACL v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, and
v2.09.002)
[ANS X9.63],
[IEEE_P1363],
[ISO_11770-3]
The used elliptic
curves
NIST: P-{256,
384, 521}
[FIPS186-5];
brainpool: P{256,
384, 512}r1
[RFC5639]
RecommendedKey size
< 250: No
Key sizes >=250: Yes
The used elliptic
curves
NIST: P-{192,
224}, K-{163,
233, 283, 409},
B-{233, 283, 409}
[FIPS186-4];
brainpool: P{160,
192, 224, 256,
320, 384, 512}t1,
P{160, 192, 224,
320}r1
[RFC5639]
NONE
CIPURSE™
Session Key
Agreement
(using AES)
(CCL v02.00.0004)
[CIPURSE-1,
5.3],
[FIPS197],
[NIST SP800-
38A]
|k| = 128 NONE --
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Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementatio
n
Key Size in Bits Category
according to
[EUCC-
Crypto]
Security Level above
120 Bits
Cryptographic
Primitive
TDES in modes
ECB, CBC (SCP,
SCL v2.04.002,
v2.13.001)
CTR, CFB (SCL
v2.04.002,
v2.13.001)
CBC-MAC,
CBC-MAC-ELB
(SCP)
PCBC (SCL
v2.04.002,
v2.13.001)
BLD (blinding) and
Recrypt (SCP)
CMAC (SCL
v2.04.002,
v2.13.001)
Retail-MAC (SCL
v2.13.001)
[NIST SP800-
67],
[ISO_18033-3]
[NIST SP800-
38A]
[ISO_9797-1]
[ISO_9797-1]
[PCBC]
proprietary
implementation
[NIST SP800-
38B]
[ISO_9797-1]
|k| = 112, 168
|k| = 112, 168
|k| = 112, 168
|k| = 112, 168
|k| = 112, 168
|k| = 112, 168
|k| = 112, 168
|k| = 112
Legacy for |k| =
168
NONE for |k| =
112
No
RSA encryption /
decryption /
signature
generation /
verification (only
modular
exponentiation
part)
(ACL v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, and
v2.09.002)
[PKCS #1],
[IEEE_P1363]
Modulus length6
=
1976 – 4224
RSA encryption
is only in the
scope of the
evaluation up to
2112 bits.
Legacy for n ≥
1900 and
log2(e) > 16
Recommended
for n ≥ 3000
and log2(e) >
16
Yes for
>= 2800 bit only.
ECDSA signature
generation
(ACL v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, and
v2.09.002)
[ANS X9.62],
[IEEE_P1363],
[ISO_14888-3]
The used elliptic
curves
NIST: P-{256,
384, 521}
[FIPS186-5];
brainpool: P{256,
384, 512}r1
[RFC5639]
RecommendedKey size < 250: No
Key sizes >=250: Yes
6
Please note that the RSA library supports key lengths from 65 to 4224 bits; however, key lengths below 1976 bits are
not included in the certificate.
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Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementatio
n
Key Size in Bits Category
according to
[EUCC-
Crypto]
Security Level above
120 Bits
The used elliptic
curves
NIST: P-{192,
224}, K-{163,
233, 283, 409},
B-{233, 283, 409}
[FIPS186-4];
brainpool: P{160,
192, 224, 256,
320, 384, 512}t1,
P{160, 192, 224,
320}r1
[RFC5639]
NONE
ECDSA signature
verification
(ACL v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, and
v2.09.002)
[ANS X9.62],
[IEEE_P1363],
[ISO_14888-3]
The used elliptic
curves
NIST: P-{256,
384, 521}
[FIPS186-5];
brainpool: P{256,
384, 512}r1
[RFC5639]
RecommendedKey size < 250: No
Key sizes >=250: Yes
The used elliptic
curves
NIST: P-{192,
224}, K-{163,
233, 283, 409},
B-{233, 283,
409} [FIPS186-
4];
brainpool: P{160,
192, 224, 256,
320, 384, 512}t1,
P{160, 192, 224,
320}r1
[RFC5639]
NONE
Random
Number
Generator
Physical True
RNG PTG.2
[AIS31] N/A [EUCC-
Crypto]: Note
67-
NoDirectRando
mSource.
Since true
random
sources may
produce
outputs with
statistical
defects, their
use should be
limited to
providing
(re)seed
material or
additional input
for
deterministic
--
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Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementatio
n
Key Size in Bits Category
according to
[EUCC-
Crypto]
Security Level above
120 Bits
random bit
generators.
The direct use
of a pure true
random
generator is
not agreed.
Hybrid Random
Number
Generator PTG.3
[AIS31] N/A NONE --
Deterministic
Random Number
Generation DRG.2
[AIS31] N/A NONE --
Deterministic
Random Number
Generation DRG.3
[AIS31] N/A NONE --
Key Generation RSA key
Generation using
CryptoGeneratePr
ime
(ACL v2.09.002)
Proprietary
The generated
keys meet
[PKCS #1, 3.1 /
3.2] and
[IEEE_P1363,
8.1.3.1]
1976 - 4096 NONE Yes >= 2800 bit only.
EC key generation
using
ECC_ECDSAKey
Gen
(ACL v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, and
v2.09.002)
[ISO_14888-3,
6.4.2]
[IEEE_P1363,
A.16.9]
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curves
NIST: P-{192,
224, 256, 384,
521}, K-{163,
233, 283, 409},
B-{233, 283,
409} [FIPS186-
4];
brainpool: P{160,
192, 224, 256,
320, 384, 512}t1,
P{160, 192, 224,
256, 320, 384,
512}r1
[RFC5639]
RecommendedKey size < 250: No
Key sizes >=250: Yes
EC key generation
using
ECC_ECDSAKey
GenMask
(ACL v2.07.003,
v2.08.007, and
v2.09.002)
[ANS X9.62, A
4.3]
[ISO_14888-3,
6.4.2]
[IEEE_P1363,
A.16.9]
Key sizes
corresponding to
the used elliptic
curves
NIST: P-{192,
224, 256, 384,
521}, K-{163,
233, 283, 409},
B-{233, 283,
409} [FIPS186-
4];
RecommendedKey size < 250: No
Key sizes >=250: Yes
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Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementatio
n
Key Size in Bits Category
according to
[EUCC-
Crypto]
Security Level above
120 Bits
brainpool: P{160,
192, 224, 256,
320, 384, 512}t1,
P{160, 192, 224,
256, 320, 384,
512}r1
[RFC5639]
Authentication CIPURSE™
Authentication
(using AES)
(CCL
v02.00.0004)
[CIPURSE-1,
5.3 / 6.3],
[FIPS197],
[NIST SP800-
38A]
|k| = 128 NONE --
Confidential
communication
CIPURSE™
Secure Messaging
for Confidentiality
(using AES)
(CCL
v02.00.0004)
[CIPURSE-1,
6.4],
[FIPS197],
[NIST SP800-
38A]
|k| = 128 NONE --
Integrity
protected
communication
CIPURSE™
Secure Messaging
for Integrity
(using AES)
(CCL
v02.00.0004)
[CIPURSE-1,
6.3],
[CIPURSE-2, P.
2],
[FIPS197],
[NIST SP800-
38A]
|k| = 128 NONE --
Digest
computation
SHA-1 and SHA-2
hash digest
computation
(HCL v1.12.001)
[FIPS180-4] N/A NONE for
SHA1
Recommended
for SHA2 with |
digest| ≥ 256
bits
Legacy for
SHA2 with |
digest| < 256
bits
Table 2: TOE cryptographic functionality
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The Flash Loader's cryptographic strength was not assessed by BSI. However, the evaluation
according to the TOE's Evaluation Assurance Level did not reveal any implementation
weaknesses.
Please note, that this holds true also for those algorithms, where no cryptographic 120-Bit-
Level assessment was given. Consequently, the targeted Evaluation Assurance Level has
been achieved for those functionalities as well. Detailed results on conformance have been
compiled into the report [CSCV].
Reference of Legislatives and Standards quoted above:
[NIST SP800-67] NIST Special Publication 800-67 – Revision 2, Recommendation for the
Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, November 2017,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST SP 800-38B] NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for BlockCipher
Modes of Operation: the CMAC Mode for Authentication, 2005-05,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, ADVANCED
ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), November 2001,U.S. department of
Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[ANS X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services ANS X9.62-2005,
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), November 16, 2005,
American National Standards Institute.
[ANS X9.63] American National Standard for Financial Services X9.63-2011, Public
Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement
and key transport using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 2011-12-21,
American National Standards Institute.
[IEEE_P1363] IEEE P1363. Standard specifications for public key cryptography.IEEE,
2000.
[ISO_11770-3] International Standard ISO/IEC 11770-3: 2008, Technical Corrigendum 1,
Information technology - Security techniques – Key management Part 3:
Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques, 2009-09-15.
[CIPURSE-1] CIPURSETM
V2 Cryptographic Protocol issued by OSPTTM
Alliance,2012-
09-28
[CIPURSE-2] CIPURSETM
V2 Cryptographic Protocol issued by OSPTTM
Alliance, 2014-
09-18 (with errata and precision list)
[ISO_18033-3] ISO/IEC 18033-3: Information technology -- Security techniques --
Encryption algorithms -- Part 3: Block ciphers, 2005.
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[ISO_9797-1] Information technology – Security techniques – Message Authentication
Codes (MACs), Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, 2011-03-01,
ISO/IEC.
[Schneier] Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, B. Schneier, John Wiley & Sons,
1996
[PKCS-1] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.2, 2012-10-27, RSA
Cryptographic Standard, RSA Laboratories.
[ISO_14888-3] International Standard ISO/IEC 14888-3: 2006, Technical Corrigendum 2:
Information technology – Security techniques – Digital signatures with
appendix – Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms, 2009-02-15.
[ANS X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services ANS X9.62-2005,
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), November 16, 2005,
American National Standards Institute.
[ANS X9.63] American National Standard for Financial Services X9.63-2011, Public
Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement
and key transport using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 2011-12-21,
American National Standards Institute.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
Table 1: Deliverables of the TOE outlines the documents that contain necessary
information on the intended use of the TOE including all security related information,
conditions and instructions to be taken into account by the user. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target and not covered by the
TOE itself need to be met by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the TOE shall take the statements of this certificate into account in
its system risk management process. The user should define measures in its risk
management that respond to emerging and new attack methods and techniques to the
TOE until the TOE has been reassessed.
The user also has to consider in its risk management the limited validity for the usage of
cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE
includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains obligations and guidelines
for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and
which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
"ETR for composite evaluation" [ETRfCOMP].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
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The TOE is delivered to the composite product manufacturer and to the security IC
embedded software developer. The actual end-consumer obtains the TOE from the
composite product issuer together with the application that runs on the TOE.
The security IC embedded software developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in the delivered documents [SEC], [HRM], [PRM],
[Crypto_UM], [ES], [SCL-1], [SCL-2], [ACL-1], [ACL-2], [ACL-3], [HCL], [HSL-1],
[HSL-2], and [CCL] have to be considered.
The composite product manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to
develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [PPUM] have to be considered.
In addition, the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect
has to be considered:
● The security IC embedded software developer can deliver his software either to
Infineon to let them implement it in the TOE (in the Flash memory) or to the
composite product manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash
memory.
The delivery procedure from the security IC embedded software developer to the
composite product manufacturer is not part of this evaluation and a secure delivery is
required.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
● OE.Secure_Delivery - Secure Delivery of the TOE in case of deactivated flash loader
When the TOE is ordered with a disabled Flash Loader, it does not provide full transport
protection. Therefore, technical and / or organisational security procedures (e.g. a custom
mutual authentication mechanism or a security transport) should be put in place by the
customer to secure the personalized TOE during delivery as required by the security
needs of the loaded IC Embedded Software.
As Infineon has no information about the security requirements of the implemented IC em-
bedded software, it is not possible for the guidance to define any concrete security
requirements for the environment of the IC Embedded Software Developer or Composite
Product Manufacturer.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [ST] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the provisions of the EUCC certification
scheme policy (see Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482, Annex V, V.2).
SHA256 hash of the ST:
e100b350a75dc6986be6e4919732628f44e93d625a20409877fd15fa5b5672c7
SHA256 hash of the ST lite:
603eb7c8e8096bfea2964fc3fbf9cb0e5e34cfab1693dec890ee5aa2cec54526
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [ST] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
12.1. Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ICT Information and Communications Technologies
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
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Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[EUCC-VO] Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 31 January 2024 laying down rules for the
application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament
and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common
Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC)
and
Implementation Regulation (EU) 2025/2462 of 8 December 2025
amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 as regards
definitions, ICT product series certification, assurance continuity and
state-of-the-art document
[CC] ISO 15408:2022, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and
activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
https://www.iso.org/standard/72891.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72892.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72906.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72913.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72917.html
as mirrored by CCRA’s edition:
CC:2022 R1, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and
activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[CEM] ISO 18045:2022: Information technology Security techniques
Methodology for IT security evaluation
https://www.iso.org/standard/72889.html
as mirrored by CCRA’s edition:
CEM:2022 R1, Common Methodology for Information Technology
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Security Evaluation
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[EUCC_SOTA] EUCC state-of-the-art documents
https://certification.enisa.europa.eu/publications/eucc-state-art-
documents_en
[EUCC_PROG] EUCC program of the BSI: Scheme documentation describing the
certification process (EUCC), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[EUCC_CERT] EUCC Certificates, periodically updated list published on ENISA’s
website on European cybersecurity certification schemes
(https://certification.enisa.europa.eu/) but also on BSI’s website
(https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte)
[AIS] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant
for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[ST] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V6-2025, Version 3.7, 2025-11-28,
Confidential Security Target IFX_CCI_00000Fh IFX_CCI_000010h
IFX_CCI_000026h IFX_CCI_000027h IFX_CCI_000028h
IFX_CCI_000029h IFX_CCI_00002Ah IFX_CCI_00002Bh
IFX_CCI_00002Ch G12, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential
document)
Security Target lite, Version 3.7, 2025-11-28, Public Security Target
IFX_CCI_00000Fh IFX_CCI_000010h IFX_CCI_000026h
IFX_CCI_000027h IFX_CCI_000028h IFX_CCI_000029h
IFX_CCI_00002Ah IFX_CCI_00002Bh IFX_CCI_00002Ch G12,
Infineon Technologies AG
[PP] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 4, 2025-12-18, EVALUATION
TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY) Common Criteria
CC:2022 (Multi-Assurance with global assurance level EAL5
augmented with ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.3, ADV_TDS.5, ALC_CMC.5,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_FLR.3, ALC_TAT.3, ATE_FUN.2, ATE_COV.3,
AVA_VAN.5 and sub-TSF assurance level EAL6 augmented with
ALC_FLR.3), TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
[ETRfCOMP] ETR for composite evaluation for the Product IFX_CCI_00000Fh
IFX_CCI_000010h IFX_CCI_000026h IFX_CCI_000027h
IFX_CCI_000028h IFX_CCI_000029h IFX_CCI_00002Ah
IFX_CCI_00002Bh IFX_CCI_00002Ch G12, Version 4, 2025-12-18,
Evaluation Technical for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP) for the
IFX_CCI_00000Fh G12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
[ConfList] Life Cycle Support Configuration Management for Common Criteria with
Evaluation Assur-ance Level EAL6 augmented (EAL6+)
IFX_CCI_00000Fh with options Including op-tional Software Libraries
Flash Loader – 3x ACL – 2xHSL –2x SCL HCL - – CCL – NRG, Version
1.0, 2025-09-18, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[HRM] 16-bit Security Controller Family – V05, Hardware Reference Manual,
Version 5.0, 2019-06-14, Infineon Technologies AG
[PPUM] Production and Personalization, 16-bit Security Controller, Version 3.6,
2019-06-24, Infineon Technologies AG
7
See section 9.1 for detailed list of used AIS
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[PRM] 16-bit Security Controller, 65nm-Technology, Programmer’s Reference
Manual,Version 9.14, 2019-12-03, Infineon Technologies AG
[SEC] 16-bit Security Controller – V05, Security Guidelines, Version 1.01-
3119, 2025-09-02, Infineon Technologies AG
[ES] 16-bit Security Controller – V05, Errata Sheet, Version 10.0, 2021-02-
25, Infineon Technologies AG
[ACL-1] ACL52 Asymmetric Crypto Library for Crypto@2304T,
RSA/ECC/Toolbox, 16-bit Security Controller, User Interface, Version
2.07.003, 2025-09-15, Infineon Technologies AG
[ACL-2] ACL52-Crypto2304T-C65 Asymmetric Crypto Library, RSA / ECC /
Toolbox, 16-bit Security Controller, User Interface, Version 2.08.007,
2025-09-15, Infineon Technologies AG
[ACL-3] ACL52-Crypto2304T-C65 Asymmetric Crypto Library, RSA / ECC /
Toolbox, 16-bit Security Controller, User Interface, Version 2.09.002,
2024-06-27, Infineon Technologies AG
[HSL-1] Hardware Support Library for SLCx2 Version 03.12.8812, 2019-07-08,
Version 1.1, Infineon Technologies AG
[HSL-2] Hardware Support Library for SLCx2 Version 03.11.8339, Version
1.0,2018-07-12, Version 1.0, Infineon Technologies AG
[SCL-1] SCL52-SCP-v4-C65 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCP-v4 DES / AES
16-bit Security Controller, User Interface, Version 2.04.002, 2018-05-22,
InfineonTechnologies AG
[SCL-2] SCL52-SCP-v4-C65 Symmetric Cryptographic Library for SCP-v4
AES/DES/MAC, 16-bit Security Controller, User Interface, Version
2.13.001, 2020-11-05, Infineon Technologies AG
[HCL] HCL52-CPU-C65 Hash Crypto Library for CPU SHA 16-bit Security
Controller, User interface manual, Version 1.12.001, 2020-01-14,
Infineon Technologies AG
[CCL] CIPURSETM
Crypto Library, CCLX2xCIP v02.00.0004, CIPURSETM
V2,Compliant to OSPTTM
Alliance CIPURSETM
V2 Cryptographic
Protocol, User Interface, Version 1.6, 2018-02-02, Infineon
Technologies AG
[Crypto_UM] 16-bit Security Controller, Crypto@2304T V3, User Manual, Version 2,
2024-06-21, Infineon Technologies AG
[CSCV] Cryptographic Standards Compliance Verification, Version 1, 2024-09-
12, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[STAR Dresden] „Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies GmbH & Co.
KG, Dresden“, Version 2, 2025-12-15, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
(confidential document)
[STAR München] „Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies AG, Munich“,
Version 5, 2025-06-04, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential
document)
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C. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1079-V6-2025
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00000Fh, IFX_CCI_000010h,
IFX_CCI_000026h, IFX_CCI_000027h, IFX_CCI_000028h, IFX_CCI_000029h,
IFX_CCI_00002Ah, IFX_CCI_00002Bh, IFX_CCI_00002Ch in the design step G12 (Target
of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM) [CEM].
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 19 December 2025, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support as claimed by the ST [ST] and that are
stated in chapter 1 of this report are fulfilled for the development and production sites of
the TOE listed below are the Distribution Centres:
Site ID Company name and address
DHL Singapore DHL Supply Chain Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced Regional Center
Tampines LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
K&N
Großostheim
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10
63762 Großostheim
Germany
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
P.R. China
The Site Technical Audit Reports (STAR) ([STAR München], [STAR Dresden]) are part of
this certification procedure.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [ST]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [ST]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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