TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
eucc@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/eucc/
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
® TrustCB is a registered trademark. Any use or application requires prior approval.
EUCC Certification Report
Huawei ATN Series Routers, version V800R022C00SPC600
Sponsor and developer: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Administration Building, Headquarters of Huawei
Technologies Co., Ltd., Bantian, Longgang District,
Shenzhen, 518129, People's Republic of China
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: EUCC-3110-2025-11-2500051-01 Certification Report
Report version: 1
Project number: EUCC-2500051-01
Author(s): Andy Brown, TrustCB B.V.
contact: eucc@trustcb.com
Date: 14 November 2025
Number of pages: 14
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
1 Executive Summary 4
2 Certification Results 5
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 5
2.2 Security Services 5
2.3 Vulnerability handling and Assurance Continuity Policies 6
2.4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.4.1 Assumptions 6
2.4.2 Clarification of scope 7
2.5 Architectural Information 7
2.6 Supplementary Cybersecurity Information 7
2.7 Lifecycle Management processes and production facilities 8
2.8 ICT Product Testing 8
2.8.1 Identification of CAB and ITSEF 8
2.8.2 Identification of used assurance components 8
2.8.3 EUCC State of the Art documents and Protect Profiles 8
2.8.4 Testing approach and depth 8
2.8.5 Independent penetration testing 8
2.8.6 Test configuration 9
2.8.7 Test results 9
2.8.8 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8.9 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Results of the evaluation 9
2.9.1 Assessment against each assurance requirement 9
2.9.2 Overall result of evaluation 11
2.10 Certificate information and scheme label 11
2.11 Comments/Recommendations 12
3 Security Target 13
4 Definitions 13
5 Bibliography 14
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Foreword
The Common Criteria-based European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme (EUCC) is a certification
scheme created under the Cybersecurity Act (CSA), Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of 17 April 2019.
The EUCC is described by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024,
laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of
the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity
certification scheme (EUCC).
The Dutch implementation of the CSA is regulated in Dutch law in the ‘Uitvoeringswet
cyberbeveiligingsverordening’ (UITVW). In this law the role of NCCA is assigned to the Dutch Authority
for Digital Infrastructure (RDI), which is part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
TrustCB B.V. has been licensed by the RDI as a Certification Body (CB) for the task of ISO/IEC 17065
Certification Activities up to and including CSA assurance level high for ICT security products, as well
as for protection profiles. Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the
product, protection profile according to the NP002 EUCC processes published by the Dutch NCCA.
Evaluations of ICT products are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) licensed by
the Dutch NCCA as a CAB for ISO/IEC 17025 Evaluation Activities, with scope aligning to the
requested Evaluation Assurance Level of the Object for the evaluation, referred to as the Target of
Evaluation (TOE) in this report.
By awarding an EUCC certificate as a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the ICT
product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target, or that the
protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A security target is a requirements specification document
that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification
report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the ICT product's
intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation
assurance level) that the ICT product satisfies the security requirements stated in the security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if it is reproduced in its entirety.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Huawei
ATN Series Routers, version V800R022C00SPC600.
The developer of the Huawei ATN Series Routers, version V800R022C00SPC600 is Huawei
Technologies Co., Ltd located in Shenzhen, People's Republic of China and they also act as the
sponsor of the evaluation and certification.
A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT
security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a series of network infrastructure routers including both hardware and software. It is
defined as the software running on the hardware corresponding to the following routers: ATN 910C-M,
ATN 910C-K and ATN 910D-B. These routers consist of both hardware and software.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 10 October 2025 with the issuance of the evaluation technical report
[ETR]. The certification procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the EUCC
as described in Commission implementing regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024, amended by
(EU) 2024/3144 of 18 December 2024
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Huawei ATN Series Routers, version
V800R022C00SPC600, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance
level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements.
Consumers of the Huawei ATN Series Routers, version V800R022C00SPC600 are advised to verify
that their own environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations and recommendations in this certification report.
As per the [ST] conformance claim rationale, all the assumptions defined in the [ST] are taken with no
exceptions. See section 2.4 for details.
The evaluation concluded that there are no special configuration requirements for the TOE besides
the requirements defined in the user guidance. All users shall read these requirements and install the
TOE in the operational environment accordingly.
The summary of the threats and security policies which [ST] defines:
- The Threats that are presented in Section 3.2 of [ST] include the threats addressed by the
TOE and the IT. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all identified threats is
Basic
- One Organizational Security Policy (OSPs) has been defined for this TOE
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL2 augmented (EAL2+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.2 “Flaw Reporting
Procedures”. This assurance level is recognised by article 52 of [CSA] as ‘substantial’
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, CC:2022, Revision 1 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022 Revision 1 [CC] (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
TrustCB B.V., as Certification Assessment Body licensed by the Dutch Authority for Digital
Infrastructure (RDI) for EUCC high certification activities, declares that the product will be listed on the
ENISA EU Cybersecurity Certificates list and that the evaluation meets all the conditions for
international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates. Note that the certification results apply only
to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the ICT product Huawei ATN Series Routers,
version V800R022C00SPC600 from Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd located in Shenzhen, People's
Republic of China.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware ATN 910C-M n/a
ATN 910C-K n/a
ATN 910D-B n/a
Software Huawei ATN Series Router Software V800R022C00SPC600
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Huawei ATN
Series Routers, version V800R022C00SPC600. For details, see section 2.6 of this report,
“Supplementary Cybersecurity Information.
The name and contact information provided for the holder of the issued Certificate associated with this
Certification Report are as follows:
Organisation name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Address:
Administration Building, Headquarters of Huawei Technologies
Co., Ltd., Bantian, Longgang District, Shenzhen, 518129,
People’s Republic of China
Certified product contact support@huawei.com
Website link for supplementary
cybersecurity information
associated with the TOE, in
accordance with Article 55 of [EU-
EUCC]
https://carrier.huawei.com/en/products/fixed-network/data-
communication/router/atn1
2.2 Security Services
The major security features provided by the TOE are summarised as follows:
• Security audit
o The log module of the host software records operations on a device and events that
occur to a device. The recorded operations and events are log messages. Log
messages provide evidence for diagnosing and maintaining a system. Log messages
reflect the operating status of a device and are used to analyze the conditions of a
network and to find out the causes of network failure or faults.
o Key elements of log messages include timestamp, host name, Huawei identity,
version, module name, severity, brief description, etc.
• Cryptographic support
o The TOE provides cryptography in support of secure connections that includes remote
administrative management.
• Identification and authentication
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o The authentication functionality provides validation by user’s account name and
password. Public key authentication is supported for SSH users. Detailed
functionalities, for example max idle-timeout period, max log-in attempts, UI lock, user
kick out, can be applied by administrator
• Secure Management
o The TOE restricts the ability to determine the behaviour of and modify the behaviour
of the functions transmission of audit data to the security administrator. Only the
security administrator can manage the cryptographic keys. Only the security
administrator has the right of opening/closing the security services and
creation/deletion/modification of the user accounts.
• Protection of the TSF
o The TOE protects the pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys from
reading them by an unauthorized entity. The TOE stores the users or administrator
passwords in non-plaintext form preventing them from reading. The TOE verifies the
packet before their installation and uses the digital signature.
• TOE access through user authentication
o The TOE provides communication security by implementing SSH protocol.
o To protect the TOE from eavesdrop and to ensure data transmission security and
confidentiality, SSH implements:
▪ authentication by password or by public-key;
▪ AES encryption algorithms;
▪ secure cryptographic key exchange;
▪ Besides default TCP port 22, manually specifying a listening port is also
implemented since it can effectively reduce attacks.
• Trusted path and channels for device authentication
o The TOE supports the trusted connections using TLS for the communication with the
audit server. The TOE protects communications between the TOE and all authorized
remote administrators with SSH.
2.3 Vulnerability handling and Assurance Continuity Policies
The following vulnerability policy has been identified as applicable to the Huawei ATN Series Routers,
version V800R022C00SPC600
Document reference: Huawei ATN Series Routers Flaw Remediation, Version 1.1
This is a new product certification. An assurance continuity policy was not provided.
2.4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.4.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see 4.2 of the [ST].
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.6 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and its configuration in the environment to fulfil all Assumptions described in the [ST]. Certain
aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend
on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE.
There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user
guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against
certain attacks.
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2.4.2 Clarification of scope
Considering all Assumptions above, the evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not
countered by the evaluated security functions of the product.
2.5 Architectural Information
The Huawei ATN Series Routers TOE are used to satisfy the requirements for networks of various
scales. They are deployed at the edge of MANs or at access sites that process heavy traffic to
implement multi-service access.
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as
follows:
The TOE hardware is identified as the following: ATN 910C-M, ATN 910C-K and ATN 910D-B which
all have fixed physical interfaces. TSF relevant functions depend on software implementation.
2.6 Supplementary Cybersecurity Information
The contact information of the Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd was provided as support@huawei.com
The following website link was provided for Huawei ATN Series Routers, version
V800R022C00SPC600 supplementary cybersecurity information as referred to in Article 55 of
Regulation (EU) 2019/881:
https://carrier.huawei.com/en/products/fixed-network/data-communication/router/atn1
A “Learn more” link in the Product Supplementary Cybersecurity Information (EUCC) section of this
page provides further details and links for:
- Guidelines to assist end users with the secure configuration, installation, deployment,
operation and maintenance of the Huawei ATN Series Routers, version
V800R022C00SPC600.
- The period during which the Huawei ATN Series Routers, version V800R022C00SPC600
security support will be offered to end users, in particular as regards the availability of
cybersecurity related updates, is stated as aligned with the validity of the EUCC certificate (5
years).
- Contact information and accepted method for receiving vulnerability information from end
users and security researchers for the Huawei ATN Series Routers, version
V800R022C00SPC600.
- the online repository listing publicly disclosed vulnerabilities related to the Huawei ATN Series
Routers, version V800R022C00SPC600 and to any relevant cybersecurity advisories.
The following documentation, guidance and recommendations, is provided with the product by the
developer to the customer to assist end users with the secure configuration, installation, deployment,
operation and maintenance of the Huawei ATN Series Routers, version V800R022C00SPC600:
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Identifier Version
Huawei ATN Series Routers Operational User Guidance 1.2
Huawei ATN Series Routers Preparative Procedures 1.3
ATN 980C, 980B, 950D, 950C, 950B, 910C, 910D, 905
V800R022C00SPC600 Upgrade Guide
1.1
ATN 980C, 980B, 950D, 950C, 950B, 910D 910C and 905 V800R022C00
Product Documentation
1.0
2.7 Lifecycle Management processes and production facilities
Not applicable to this evaluation,
2.8 ICT Product Testing
2.8.1 Identification of CAB and ITSEF
TrustCB is the Certification Assessment Body, licensed by the Dutch Authority for Digital Infrastructure
(RDI) for EUCC high certification activities.
TrustCB point of contact: EUCC@trustcb.com
Testing was performed by following ITSEF: SGS Brightsight B.V.
2.8.2 Identification of used assurance components
The assurance components used in the product testing were:
• EAL 2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2
as defined by, and detailed in, [CC] and [CEM].
2.8.3 EUCC State of the Art documents and Protect Profiles
EUCC state-of-the-art documents [SotA Documents] were applied as referenced in the Bibliography.
No conformance to any production profile was claimed in this evaluation.
2.8.4 Testing approach and depth
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples of the TOE and host
hardware. The evaluators performed defined tests from the source documentation used to derive the
ST. During the evaluator analysis phase, no additional independent tests were identified as required to
assess the assurance package.
2.8.5 Independent penetration testing
To identify potential vulnerabilities the evaluator performed the following activities:
• SFR design analysis: SFR implementation details were examined in the SFR design analysis.
During this examination several potential vulnerabilities were identified.
• CWE vulnerability focus: Using the CWE weaknesses collection, the evaluator collected a list
of security questions and related answers. This approach ensured that the evaluator was
forced to think in terms of vulnerabilities from all different angles and improved completeness
in the vulnerability analysis. Also, during this examination several potential vulnerabilities
were identified.
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• Use of Scanning tools: The evaluator runs vulnerability scanning tools to identify potential
vulnerabilities
• Public vulnerability search: Several additional potential vulnerabilities were identified during a
search in the public domain.
A judgment was made on whether potential vulnerabilities were exploitable. It was concluded that
some potential vulnerabilities were not applicable or were covered by guidance. When a potential
vulnerability was deemed feasible to be exploited, a penetration test was defined. The evaluator also
executed a number of tests using scanning tools to verify if any potential vulnerabilities could impact
any of the services running on the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
2.8.6 Test configuration
The TOE sample used for the majority of the testing was the Huawei ATN Series Router Software
V800R022C00SPC600 running on hardware ATN 910-K. One test was performed on ATN 910C-M
There are different hardware versions supported by the TOE, however the difference between the
various versions is the number of the same type of interfaces each offers. Therefore, the evaluation
concluded that the testing of the TOE was considered valid for all hardware versions.
2.8.7 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
2.8.8 Reused Evaluation Results
This was a new certification under EUCC however documentary evaluation results of an earlier
version of the TOE certified under the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
(NSCIB-CC-23-0653316-CR) have been partially reused. Vulnerability analysis and penetration testing
has been renewed
2.8.9 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Huawei ATN Series Routers, version
V800R022C00SPC600.
2.9 Results of the evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report, other evaluator documents and developer documentation [DEV_DOCS].
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
2.9.1 Assessment against each assurance requirement
ASE
ASE
ST introduction ASE_INT.1
Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1
Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1
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Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1
Security requirements ASE.REQ.2
TOE summary specification ASE.TSS.1
Consistency of Composite product ST ASE.COMP.1
The findings are well-documented and internally consistent, demonstrating a thorough understanding
of the Security Target [ST] and its components. The TOE introduction, conformance claim, security
problems, security objectives, security requirements, TOE summary specification are appropriately
addressed, and the TOE description is accurate and adequate for the evaluation level. Consequently,
the ASE activities fulfil the assurance requirements of according EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2
ADV
ADV
Security architecture ADV_ARC.1
Functional specification ADV_FSP.2
TOE Design ADV_TDS.1
The evaluation has demonstrated that the developer’s evidence meets ADV specified requirements.
The TOE model is complete, clearly showing all interfaces (TSFI/non-TSFI), user roles, and relations,
with explanations on completeness and tracing requirements met. The subsystem/module level model
is sensible, useful, and shows TSFIs and subsystem/module decomposition. The security architecture
is thoroughly explained, design compliance rationale is complete and coherent, and necessary
evidence is extracted per alternative approach. The evaluator confirmed why the TSF is well-
structured. SFRs were inspected, with findings mapped to the implementation representation in both
evaluation meetings. Accordingly, the ADV activities meet the assurance requirements for EAL2
augmented with ALC_FLR.2, with no issues or deviations identified.
AGD
AGD
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1
The evaluation has demonstrated that the guidance documentation is clear, complete, and sufficient to
support the secure acceptance, installation, configuration, and operation of the TOE within its intended
environment by its user roles. The guidance effectively helps prevent common misconfigurations and
promotes correct usage. Therefore, the AGD activities fulfil the assurance requirements for EAL2
augmented with ALC_FLR.2, with no issues or deviations identified.
ALC
ALC
CM capabilities ALC_CMC.2
CM Scope ALC_CMS.2
Delivery ALC_DEL.1
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2
The evaluation has demonstrated that the developer’s evidence meets ALC specified. The CI-list was
comprehensive and uniquely identified all configuration items, with clear identification of the developer.
The CM documentation effectively described unique identification methods, a CM plan for
development, procedures for accepting modified or new CIs, and the CM system was operated in
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accordance with the CM plan to maintain all configuration items by automated means. Delivery
procedures were well-documented, ensuring security during TOE distribution. Flaw remediation
procedures were comprehensive, including methods for receiving reports, tracking flaws, providing
corrective actions, and updating users. Accordingly, the ALC activities satisfy the assurance
requirements for EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2, with no issues or deviations identified.
ATE
ATE
Coverage ATE_COV.1
Functional tests ATE_FUN.1
Independent testing ATE_IND.2
The evaluation has demonstrated that the developer’s evidence for ATE requirements meets all
specified requirements. The testing approach used by the developer effectively covered the TSFIs.
The developer’s rationale for testing all TSFIs was presented and verified. For the evaluator’s
independent testing, the overall approach for test selection and independent test plan were clearly
outlined. Repeated and independent tests were undertaken directly by the evaluators. The evaluator’s
testing results showed that all sampled tests were passed. Accordingly, the ATE activities satisfy the
assurance requirements for EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2, with no issues or deviations identified.
AVA
AVA
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.2
Potential vulnerabilities were identified by the evaluator through conducting public domain vulnerability
searches, SFR design analysis, applying known hardware and software vulnerability categories and
use of scanning tools. The evaluator assessed the potential vulnerabilities and devised and executed
testing for those that were judged feasible. Additionally, the evaluator re-executed a number of tests
using scanning tools to verify if any new potential vulnerabilities could impact any of the services
running on the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
Consequently, the AVA activities were performed in full compliance with the assurance requirements
EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2, providing a substantial level of confidence in the TOE’s resistance
to exploitation.
2.9.2 Overall result of evaluation
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Huawei ATN Series Routers,
version V800R022C00SPC600, to be CC:2022 revision 1 Part 2 extended, CC:2022 revision 1 Part
3 conformant, at an assurance level recognised by article 52 of [CSA] as ‘substantial’, and to meet
the requirements of EAL 2 augmented ALC_FLR.2. This implies that the product satisfies the security
requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
2.10 Certificate information and scheme label
A Certificate has been issued recognising this evaluation result as follows:
Unique identifier: EUCC-3110-2025-11-2500051-01
Date of issuance: 14-11-2025 and with a validity period of 5 years.
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2.11 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.6 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from
following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the
resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
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3 Security Target
The Huawei ATN Series Routers Security Target, Version 2.5, 14 July 2025 [ST] is included here by
reference.
This [ST] is summarised in the [ETR] as follows:
The Huawei ATN Series Routers TOE are used to satisfy the requirements for networks of various
scales. They are deployed at the edge of MANs or at access sites that process heavy traffic to
implement multi-service access.
Section 1.2 of [ST] describes the evaluated IT product. The security functionality of the evaluated IC
product is represented by the implementation of the selected components of [CC] (Part 2) and are
listed in section 6 of the [ST], TOE Security Functional Requirements.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the [CC] or
[CEM]:
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
EUCC European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme [EU-EUCC], created under the
Cybersecurity Act [EU-CSA] and detailed in Commission Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2024/482
IT Information and communication technologies product as defined by [EUCC]
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
OS Operating System
SotA EUCC State-of-the-Art document
TOE Target of Evaluation; the object of the certification activity described by this
report
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022 Parts
1, 2, 3, 4 and 4, Revision 1, November 2022
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM:2022
Revision 1, November 2022
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report Huawei ATN Series Routers V800R022C00SPC600
– EAL2+, 25-RPT-866, Version 2.0, 10 October 2025
[EU-CSA] REGULATION (EU) 2019/881 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for
Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity
certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act)
[EU-EUCC] COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January
2024 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the
European Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European
Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC)
[ST] Huawei ATN Series Routers Security Target, Version 2.5, 14 July 2025
(This is the end of this report.)