EUCC-3087-2026-0013
Administration ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-1156-V5-2026
for
IFX_CCI_00004Fh, IFX_CCI_000050h -
IFX_CCI_000058h, IFX_CCI_00005Ch design step S11
with firmware 80.310.03.0 & 80.310.03.1, optional NRG™
SW 05.03.4097, opt. HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib
v01.30.0564, opt.SCL v2.15.000 and v2.11.003, opt. ACL
v3.33.003, and v3.35.001 and v3.02.000, opt. RCL
v1.10.007, opt. HCL v1.13.002
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-11
Certification Report V1.0 EUCC-Zert-327_V6.9
Certification Report
EUCC-3087-2026-0013 BSI-DSZ-CC-1156-V5-2026
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................4
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................4
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................4
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................5
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................5
5. Publication...................................................................................................................7
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................8
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................9
2. Identification of the TOE............................................................................................10
3. Security Policy...........................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................15
6. Supplementary Cybersecurity Information.................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................16
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................17
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................27
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................29
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................29
13. Bibliography.............................................................................................................31
C. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 35
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A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
The Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 31 January 2024 [EUCC-VO] establishes a Union-wide cybersecurity
certification scheme for TOEs and Protection Profiles for conformity assessments using
the requirements of Common Criteria.
By implementing the Cybersecurity Act1
, certification activities at assurance level ‘high’ and
in duly justified cases at assurance level ‘substantial’ are reserved to the National
Cybersecurity Certification Agency of a Member State.
In accordance to BSIG2
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) issues
certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out at the request of a developer, vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the applicant.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria referenced in the above mentioned Implementing Regulation (EU)
2024/482 as well as relevant application notes and interpretations published by the
certification body of the BSI.
Evaluation facilities notified by the German National Cybersecurity Certification Authority
carry out the evaluation.
This Certification Report is the result of the certification activities carried out by the
certification body of the BSI in conclusion of the technical evaluation. This report contains
among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification
Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body carries out its activities according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 31 January 2024 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of
the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European
Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC) [EUCC-VO]
● EUCC state-of-the-art documents of relevance to the TOE [EUCC_SOTA]
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
1
Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA
(the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology
cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act)
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 2 December 2025, BGBl. 2025
Nr. 301, S. 2
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Certification Report
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● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior and Community)
● ISO/IEC 15408 as published on the day of issuance of this certificate and as mirrored by
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version CC:2022 R1 [CC]
● ISO/IEC 18045 as published on the day of issuance of this certificate and as mirrored by
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version CEM:2022 R1
[CEM]
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● EUCC programme: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (EUCC)
[EUCC_PROG]
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [AIS]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certifications of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates – as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC – under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 5 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
● The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
application and interpretation of the criteria as well as uniform ratings.
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung – BSIZertV) of 02 December
2025, Bundesgesetzblatt 2025, no. 301
4
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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Certification Report
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● The TOE IFX_CCI_00004Fh, IFX_CCI_000050h - IFX_CCI_000058h,
IFX_CCI_00005Ch design step S11 with firmware 80.310.03.0 & 80.310.03.1, optional
NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, opt. HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0564, opt.SCL
v2.15.000 and v2.11.003, opt. ACL v3.33.003, and v3.35.001 and v3.02.000, opt. RCL
v1.10.007, opt. HCL v1.13.002 (short Version of the TOE identifier: IFX_CCI_00004Fh
S11)has been certified by the certification body of the Federal Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) based on administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1156-V4-2024-
MA-01. Specific results from the corresponding the evaluation process were re-used.
● The present evaluation of the product IFX_CCI_00004Fh, IFX_CCI_000050h -
IFX_CCI_000058h, IFX_CCI_00005Ch design step S11 with firmware 80.310.03.0 &
80.310.03.1, optional NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, opt. HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib
v01.30.0564, opt.SCL v2.15.000 and v2.11.003, opt. ACL v3.33.003, and v3.35.001 and
v3.02.000, opt. RCL v1.10.007, opt. HCL v1.13.002 was carried out by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, located at
Unternehmensgruppe TÜV NORD
Am TÜV 1
45307 Essen.
● The evaluation was completed on 20 July 2026. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is a
notified evaluation facility (ITSEF) .
● This certification was applied for: Infineon Technologies AG.
● The assessed TOE was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG.
● The certification activities are concluded with the comparability check and the production
of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the certification body of the BSI.
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the TOE as identified in this
document. The confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all statements and indications regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in an environment as specified in the following report and in the
Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
[CC] itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The issued Certificate confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
[ST] on certificate’s issuance day. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of
the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be reassessed.
Therefore, the holder of the certificate should involve the assurance continuity program of
the EUCC Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification) in its
obligations to monitor the certified product. Specifically, if certification results should be
used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration
process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended
to perform a reassessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to prevent an indefinite certificate usage where evolving attack methods justify a
recent re-assessment of the product’s resistance, the maximum validity period of the
certificate is limited. The certificate issued on 24 July 2026 is valid until 23 July 2031 and
its validity can be renewed by certifying the TOE again.
The holder of this certificate is obliged:
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1. to meet the obligations from the Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482, in
particular but not exclusively to respect the rules for certificate usage, to monitor the
conformity of the certified TOE, to inform the certification body about subsequently
detected vulnerabilities or irregularities with relevance to the security of the TOE
and to maintain vulnerability management and disclosure procedures.
Should changes be introduced into the certified version of the TOE, the validity period of its
related certificate can be extended in order to cover the changed TOE, provided the holder
of the certificate applies for measures under EUCC scheme’s assurance continuity (i.e.
recertification or maintenance) and the changed TOE then meets the assurance
requirements.
5. Publication
The TOE IFX_CCI_00004Fh, IFX_CCI_000050h - IFX_CCI_000058h, IFX_CCI_00005Ch
design step S11 with firmware 80.310.03.0 & 80.310.03.1, optional NRG™ SW
05.03.4097, opt. HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0564, opt.SCL v2.15.000 and
v2.11.003, opt. ACL v3.33.003, and v3.35.001 and v3.02.000, opt. RCL v1.10.007, opt.
HCL v1.13.002 has been notified to ENISA for publication on the website on European
cybersecurity certification schemes and has also been included in BSI’s list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see [EUCC_CERT]). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
This holder of the certificate5
has to publish on its website this Certification Report and
supplementary information. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic
form at the internet address stated above.
5
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
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Certification Report
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B. Certification Results
The following chapters summarise the assessment results of
● the applicant’s Security Target specified for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes, statements and indications from the certification body.
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1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Security Controller IFX_CCI_00004Fh,
IFX_CCI_000050h, IFX_CCI_000051h, IFX_CCI_000052h, IFX_CCI_000053h,
IFX_CCI_000054h, IFX_CCI_000055h, IFX_CCI_000056h, IFX_CCI_000057h,
IFX_CCI_000058h, IFX_CCI_00005Ch design step S11 with firmware 80.310.03.0 and
80.310.03.1, optional NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, optional HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib
v01.30.0564, optional SCL v2.11.003 and v2.15.000, optional ACL v3.02.000, v3.33.003,
and v3.35.001, optional RCL v1.10.007, optional HCL v1.13.002 and user guidance.
Please refer to chapter 2 for an identification of the hardware, firmware, and software
components, including the corresponding version identifier.
The TOE provides a 32-bit ARMv7-M CPU-architecture. The major components of the core
system are the CPU (Central Processing Unit), an MPU (Memory Protection Unit), a
Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller (NVIC), and an Instruction Stream Signature (ISS).
The dual interface controller can communicate using either the contact based or the
contactless inter-face.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particular security relevant applications
and as a developing platform for smart card operating systems. The term smartcard
embedded software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications
stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the smartcard embedded
software.
The product IFX_CCI_00004Fh, IFX_CCI_000050h - IFX_CCI_000058h,
IFX_CCI_00005Ch design step S11 with firmware 80.310.03.0 & 80.310.03.1, optional
NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, opt. HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0564, opt.SCL v2.15.000
and v2.11.003, opt. ACL v3.33.003, and v3.35.001 and v3.02.000, opt. RCL v1.10.007,
opt. HCL v1.13.002 has been certified under the EUCC scheme in accordance to the
provisions of the Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482. This is a certification, based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-1156-V4-2024-MA-01. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-
CC-1156-V4-2024 and BSI-DSZ-CC-1156-V4-2024-MA-01 were re-used. The TOE
deliverables are listed in table 1.
The evaluation of the product IFX_CCI_00004Fh, IFX_CCI_000050h - IFX_CCI_000058h,
IFX_CCI_00005Ch design step S11 with firmware 80.310.03.0 & 80.310.03.1, optional
NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, opt. HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0564, opt.SCL v2.15.000
and v2.11.003, opt. ACL v3.33.003, and v3.35.001 and v3.02.000, opt. RCL v1.10.007,
opt. HCL v1.13.002 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation
was completed on 20 July 2026. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is a notified
evaluation facility (ITSEF).
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [ETR] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [CC] and the Methodology [CEM], the requirements of the Scheme
[EUCC-VO],[EUCC_PROG].
The evaluation has confirmed:
● CC Version and Release: see [CC], and [CEM]
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile with
Augmentation Packages Version 1.0, 13 January
2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [PP]
● Assurance Level: EUCC High with component AVA_VAN.5
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● Assurance Package: EAL 6
● Augmentation: ALC_FLR.3
The Security Target [ST] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014 [PP].
A detailed description of the security functionality, addressed threats, organisational
security policies and the operational environment can be found in the Security Target [ST].
Depending on the blocking configuration, an IFX_CCI_00004Fh S11 product can have e.g.
different user available memory sizes and can come with or without individual accessible
cryptographic coprocessors. All products are identical regarding module design, layout,
and footprint. All possible configuration options are achieved by blocking only and are
described in the security target [ST] section 1.4.7.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results stated in this certificate do not express an appraisal
of the strength and suitability of the cryptographic algorithms implemented in the TOE (see
BSIG section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results apply only to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the statements and indications are kept as detailed in this
Certification Report. Neither the BSI nor any other organisation that recognises or gives
effect to this certificate implicitly or explicitly guarantee or endorse the certified TOE.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Information and communications technology product is identified as follows:
IFX_CCI_00004Fh, IFX_CCI_000050h - IFX_CCI_000058h, IFX_CCI_00005Ch design
step S11 with firmware 80.310.03.0 & 80.310.03.1, optional NRG™ SW 05.03.4097,
opt. HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0564, opt.SCL v2.15.000 and v2.11.003, opt.
ACL v3.33.003, and v3.35.001 and v3.02.000, opt. RCL v1.10.007, opt. HCL v1.13.002
Holder of the certificate: Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-15
85579 Neubiberg
https://www.infineon.com/product-information/cybersecurity-
information
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No. Type Item / Identifier Release / Version Form of Delivery
1. HW IFX_CCI_00004Fh,
IFX_CCI_000050h,
IFX_CCI_000051h,
IFX_CCI_000052h,
IFX_CCI_000053h,
IFX_CCI_000054h,
IFX_CCI_000055h,
IFX_CCI_000056h,
IFX_CCI_000057h,
IFX_CCI_000058h,
IFX_CCI_00005Ch
S11 (design step) The customer chooses
delivery method (the ST
describes under which
circumstances transport
protection is provided by
the TOE).
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No. Type Item / Identifier Release / Version Form of Delivery
2. FW BOS & POWS 80.310.03.0 and
80.310.03.1
Stored on the delivered
hardware.
3. FW Flash Loader 09.12.0003 Stored on the delivered
hardware.
4. SW NRG™ SW (optional) 05.03.4097 Secure download (L251
Library File) via ishare.
5. SW HSL (optional) v3.52.9708 Secure download (L251
Library File) via ishare.
6. SW UMSLC v01.30.0564 Secure download (L251
Library File) via ishare.
7. SW SCL (optional) v2.11.003 and v2.15.000 Secure download (L251
Library File) via ishare.
8. SW ACL (optional) v3.02.000, v3.33.003,
and v3.35.001
Secure download (L251
Library File) via ishare.
9. SW RCL (optional) v1.10.007 Secure download (L251
Library File) via ishare.
10. SW HCL (optional) v1.13.002 Secure download (L251
Library File) via ishare.
11. DOC SLC36 32-bit Security
Controller – V16, Hardware
Reference Manual
5.2 / 2020-12-21 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
12. DOC Security Controllers,
SLx1/SLx3 Controller Family,
Programmer’s Reference
Manual
5.8 / 2024-05-24 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
13. DOC SLC36 32-bit Security
Controller – V16, Security
Guidelines
1.00-3157 / 2026-02-17 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
14. DOC Production and
Personalization Manual, 32-bit
security controller
09.12 / 2023-03-02 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
15. DOC 32-bit Security Controller,
Crypto2304T V3, User Manual
(optional)
3.0 / 2024-06-21 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
16. DOC HSL for SLCx7V16, Hardware
Support Library
(optional)
03.52.9708 / 2021-01-25 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
17. DOC UMSLC library for SLCx7 in
40nm, User Mode Security Life
Control
01.30.0564 / 20219-08-
30
Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
18. DOC SCL37-SCP-v440-C40
Symmetric Crypto Library for
SCP-v440 AES/DES/MAC
(optional, SCL v2.11.003)
2.11.003 / 2021-06-16 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
19. DOC SCL37-SCP-v440-C40
Symmetric Crypto Library for
SCP-v440 AES/DES/MAC
(optional, SCL v2.15.000)
2.15.000 / 2023-07-20 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
20. DOC ACL37-Crypto2304T-C40
Asymmetric Crypto Library for
Crypto2304T
RSA/ECC/Toolbox
(optional, ACL v3.02.000)
3.02.000 / 2026-04-23 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
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No. Type Item / Identifier Release / Version Form of Delivery
21. DOC ACL37-Crypto2304T-C40,
Asymmetric Crypto Library for
Crypto2304T
RSA/ECC/Toolbox
(optional, ACL v3.33.003)
3.33.003 / 2026-04-23 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
22. DOC ACL37-Crypto2304T-C40,
Asymmetric Crypto Library for
Crypto2304T
RSA/ECC/Toolbox
(optional, ACL v3.35.001)
3.35.001 / 2026-04-23 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
23. DOC RCL37-X-C40 Random Crypto
Library for SCP-v440 & RNG-
v3 DRBG/HWRNG 32-bit
Security Controller, User
interface manual
(optional)
1.10.007 / 2020-06-16 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
24. DOC HCL37-CPU-C40 Hash Crypto
Library for CPU SHA 32-bit
Security Controller, User
interface manual
(optional)
1.13.002 / 2020-05-07 Personalized PDF via
secure iShare server
Table 1: Deliverables of the TOE
Please note that NRGTM
and the toolbox are out of scope of this evaluation, hence no
evaluated TOE guidance documentation applies. Except for the function listed in the ST
[ST] section 6.1.6. However, see respective developer provided documentation is
available.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures that are necessary to maintain
security when distributing versions of the TOE or parts of it to the user’s site including the
necessary intermediate delivery procedures.
Furthermore, the delivery documentation describes in a sufficient manner how the various
procedures and technical measures provide for the detection of modifications and any
discrepancies between the TOE respective parts of it sent by the TOE Manufacturer and
the version received by the Composite Product Manufacturer.
Three different delivery procedures have to be taken into consideration:
● Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the
TOE Manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
● Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (ROM / Flash data, initialisation and pre-
personalisation data) from the IC Embedded Software Developer to the TOE
Manufacturer.
● Delivery of the final TOE from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite Product
Manufacturer. After phase 3 the TOE is delivered in form of wafers or sawn wafers, after
phase 4 in form of modules (with or without inlay antenna) or any other packaging form
as offered.
Respective distribution centers are listed in Appendix B (see end of document).
The individual TOE hardware is uniquely identified by its identification data. Each individual
TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus assigned to the entire development
and production process.
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The hardware part of the TOE is identified by IFX_CCI_00004Fh, IFX_CCI_000050h,
IFX_CCI_000051h, IFX_CCI_000052h, IFX_CCI_000053h, IFX_CCI_000054h,
IFX_CCI_000055h, IFX_CCI_000056h, IFX_CCI_000057h, IFX_CCI_000058h,
IFX_CCI_00005Ch design step S11.
Another characteristic of the TOE are the chip identification data. These chip identification
data are accessible via the Generic Chip Identification Mode (GCIM) (see [AGD_HRM],
section 5.6).
At TOE start-up the so called GCIM can be chosen by applying special signalling in
contactless or contact based communication and the TOE outputs then the generic chip
identification data (unless another configuration option is chosen). This data contains the
firmware identifier accompanied with the certification identifier, the design step and even
more tracking information. In combination with [AGD_HRM] (section 5.6) the user can
identify the data, interpret it and retrieve the TOE versioning information. This information
includes also the required mapping of firmware identifier and certification identifier.
The optional software libraries can be identified by their unique version numbers and by
calculating a hash value (e.g. SHA-256) over the delivered lib-files (.lib) and comparing the
calculated values to the values stated in Security Target [ST], chapters 9 - 15.
3. Security Policy
The security policy enforced is defined by the selected set of security functional
requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application, thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithms (Triple-DES and AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text
data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide
different random number generators.
The RSA library is used to provide a high-level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman)
cryptography implemented on the hardware component Crypto2304T and includes
counter-measures against SPA, DPA, and DFA attacks. The EC library is used to provide a
high-level interface to Elliptic Curve cryptography implemented on the hardware
component Crypto2304T and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA, and DFA
attacks. The optional Hash Crypto Library provides a high-level interface for performing
cryptographic hash functions and includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA, and DFA
attacks. The RCL provides a high-level interface for obtaining random data. This can be
deterministic data from an AES CTR_DRBG or non-deterministic data that is provided by
the underlying hardware. The RCL includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA, and DFA
attacks.
Besides that, the TOE can come with the optional Hardware Support Library (HSL)
providing a simplified interface for NVM management and provides the possibility to write
tearing safe into the NVM.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA, and EC cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations, and against abuse of functionality. Hence, the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE, and
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● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
Specific details concerning the above-mentioned security policies can be found in [ST]
chapter 6 / 7.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These uncovered
aspects need to be provided for by specific security objectives that have to be met by the
TOE environment. They are in particular:
The objective OE.Resp-Appl states that the IC embedded software developer shall treat
user data (especially keys) of the composite product appropriately. The IC embedded
software developer gets sufficient information on how to protect user data adequately in
the guidance documents listed in Table 4.
The ST includes the following security objectives for the operational environment, which
are relevant for the Composite Product Manufacturer: OE.Process-Sec-IC,
OE.Lim_Block_Loader, OE.Loader_Usage, OE.TOE_Auth, OE.Prevent_Masquerade, and
OE.Secure_Delivery.
The objective OE.Process-Sec-IC requires the protection of the TOE, as well as of its
manufacturing and test data, up to the delivery to the end-consumer. As defined in [ST]
section 1.4.5, the TOE can be delivered to the composite product manufacturer after
phase 3 or after phase 4. However, the single chips are identical in all cases. This means
that the test mode is deactivated, and the TOE is locked in the user mode. Therefore, it is
not necessary to distinguish between these forms of delivery. Since Infineon has no
information about the security requirements of the implemented IC embedded software, it
is not possible to define any concrete security requirements for the environment of the
composite product manufacturer.
The objective OE.TOE_Auth requires that the environment must support the authentication
and verification mechanism and must know the corresponding authentication reference
data. The composite product manufacturer receives sufficient information about the
authentication mechanism in [AGD_PPUM] chapter 4. Please note that this objective is
only valid in case the Flash Loader is active and the TOE is ordered with mutual
authentication (i.e., option External Authentication is unavailable).
The objective OE.Prevent_Masquerade is valid in case the Flash Loader is active and the
Flash Loader is ordered with External Authentication (EA) instead of mutual authentication.
It addresses two aspects:
● the support of a trusted communication channel identical to OE.Loader_Usage,
however, with reference to the one-way authentication (external authentication), and
● the user is required to implement mechanisms to prevent masquerading attacks as
no mutual authentication is enforced by the TOE itself.
The first item is addressed in [AGD_PPUM] chapter 4 just as OE.Loader_Usage. The
second item is addressed in [AGD_PPUM] section 2.1.5 with a description of the External
Authentication. Note that this objective replaces OE.TOE_Auth when the TOE is ordered
with EA available.
The objective OE.Secure_Delivery complements the second item of the previous OE in
case the TOE is ordered with a (temporarily) deactivated Flash Loader. In this case, the
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customer is required to implement mechanisms to prevent attacks during TOE transport as
required by the security needs of the loaded IC Embedded Software. This requirement is
provided to the user as part of [AGD_PPUM] chapter 4:
On delivery, if the application is active, then the application is responsible for
transport protection.
The objective OE.Loader_Usage requires that the authorised user must support the
trusted communication with the TOE by protecting the confidentiality and integrity of the
loaded data and he has to meet the access conditions defined by the flash loader.
[AGD_PPUM] section 4 provides sufficient information regarding this topic.
The objective OE.Lim_Block_Loader requires the composite product manufacturer to
protect the loader against misuse, to limit the capability of the loader and to terminate the
loader irreversibly after the intended usage. The permanent deactivation of the Flash
Loader is de-scribed in [AGD_PPUM] section 2.1.2.2. This objective for the environment
originates from the “Package 1: Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only”.
However, the TOE also implements “Package 2: Loader dedicated for usage by authorised
users only” and thus the Flash Loader can also be used in insecure environments before
phase 7 and is able to protect itself against misuse if the authentication and download
keys are handled appropriately.
Details can be found in the Security Target [ST], chapter 3 and 4.
5. Architectural Information
For further information on the TOE architecture, see Security Target [ST], chapter 1
(especially sections 1.3 and 1.4).
6. Supplementary Cybersecurity Information
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 1 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target [ST].
The developers website as stated in chapter 2 provides the following supplementary
information:
● the period during which support is offered (esp. security related updates)
● contact information of the manufacturer or provider and accepted methods for receiving
vulnerability information from end users and security researchers
● a reference to online repositories listing publicly disclosed vulnerabilities related to the
TOE/ICT, ICT service or ICT process and to any relevant cybersecurity advisories
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
All tests have been carried out by ITSEF:
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
Unternehmensgruppe TÜV NORD
Am TÜV 1
45307 Essen
under the responsibility of certification Body
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Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 87
Postfach 20 03 63
D-53175 Bonn
Please refer to chapter 1 of this report for details on assurance levels or packages
involved into testing.
The tests performed by the developer were divided into the following categories:
● Simulation tests (design verification),
● Qualification/verification tests, and
● Production Tests.
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer by using the library of
programs, tools, and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluators or at the
developer’s site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment, and to verify
the tests performed by the developer. For the developer tests repeated by the evaluators,
other test parameters were used, and the test equipment was varied. Security features of
the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators
during layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing, the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
In-tensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks, which do not modify the TOE
physically. The penetration test results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with
high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
Please refer to chapter 8 for complete and precise information on settings and
configuration of the TOE during the evaluation, including relevant operational notes and
observations.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certificate covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● Smartcard IC IFX_CCI_00004Fh, IFX_CCI_000050h, IFX_CCI_000051h,
IFX_CCI_000052h, IFX_CCI_000053h, IFX_CCI_000054h, IFX_CCI_000055h,
IFX_CCI_000056h, IFX_CCI_000057h, IFX_CCI_000058h, IFX_CCI_00005Ch S11 (Global
Foundries Fab 7).
Depending on the blocking configuration a product can have different user available
configuration: they can be choosen by order or by BPU (please refer to [ST] section 1.1 for
an identification of the components which can be blocked via BPU).
As stated and detailed in the ETR [ETR], developer and evaluator tested the TOE in those
configurations in which the TOE is delivered and which are described in the Security
Target [ST].
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9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The ITSEF produced and provided the Evaluation Technical Reports (ETR) [ETR]
according to the requirements of the Scheme [EUCC-VO],[EUCC_PROG], the Common
Criteria [CC], the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM], and all relevant interpretations
and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [AIS].
For the evaluation from component level AVA_VAN.4 onwards the following state-of-the-art
documents and supporting documents were applied:
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 1, Durchführung
der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers, Version 14, 2017-
10-11,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 14, Anforderungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der ETR-Teile (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach
CC (Common Criteria), Version 7, 2010-08-03, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 19, Anforderungen
an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für
Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria), Version 9, 2014-11-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 4, 2013-05-15, Herausgeber: Zertifizierungsstelle des
BSI im Rahmen des Zertifizierungsschemas,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 20,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
● A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, W. Killmann, W.
Schindler, Version 2.0, 2011-09-18, T-Systems GEI GmbH and Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik.
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 23,
Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler, Version 4, 2017-03-15
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 25, Anwendungen der
CC auf integrierte Schaltungen, Version 9, 2017-03-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 26,
Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware Integrierte Schaltungen, Version 10, 2017-07-
03,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 27, Transition from
ITSEC to CC, Version 5, 2010-08-17,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 31,
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 32, CC-
Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, Version 7, 2011-06-08,
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● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 34, Evaluation
Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CC v2.3 & v3.1) and EAL6 (CC
v3.1), Version 3, 2009-09-03,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 35, Öffentliche
Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), Version 2, 2007-11-12,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 36,
Kompositionsevaluierung, Version 5, 2017-03-15,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 37, Terminologie
und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierun-gen, Version 3, 2010-05-17,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 38, Reuse of evaluation
results, Version 2, 2007-09-28,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 39, Formal Methods,
Version 3, 2008-10-24,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 41, Guidelines for PPs
and STs, Version 2, 2011-01-31,
● Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) – AIS 42, Guidelines for the
Developer Documentation, Version 1, 2008-05-21,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 46, Informationen
zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende Hinweise für die
Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-12-04,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 47, Regelungen zu
Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04,
● Guidance for Site Certification, Version 1.1, 2013-12-04,
● Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS 48, Anforderungen
an die Prüfung von Sicherheitsetiketten, Version 1.0, 2015-04-30,
are considered.
Additionally the EUCC Supporting Mandatory Technical Documents are considered.
On advise by the Certification Body and consent by the certificate holder the following
guidance further specific for the technology of the product [AIS] (AIS 34) was applied:
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20/31 was used (see [AIS]).
To support composite evaluations according to the State of the Art document the document
ETR for composite evaluation [ETRRfCOMP] was provided and approved. This document
provides details of this platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a
composite evaluation on top.
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is confirmed for the assurance components
that are identified in chapter 1 of this report and claimed by the Security Target [ST] for the
corresponding TOE which is identified in chapter 2 of this report.
The certificate
● is uniquely identified by: EUCC-3087-2026-0013,
administration ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1156-V5-2026
● was issued on: 24 July 2026
● is valid until: 23 July 2031
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The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 1, 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG section 52, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with
a security level of lower than 120 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view. Any
Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 120 Bits' of the
following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 120 Bits (in general context)
only.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
|k| in
Bits
Comments Security
Level above
120 Bits
Symmetric Coprocessor (SCP)
1 Cryptographic
primitive
TDES [NIST SP800-67],
[ISO_18033-3]
112, 168 - -
2 Cryptographic
primitive
AES [FIPS197],
[ISO_18033-3]
128, 192,
256
- -
3 Confidentiality #1 in ECB mode
for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112, 168 - No
4 Confidentiality #1 in CBC mode
for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112, 168 - No
5 Confidentiality #2 in ECB mode
for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128, 192,
256
- No
6 Confidentiality #2 in CBC mode
for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128, 192,
256
- No
Symmetric Cryptographic Libraries (both SCLs)
7 Cryptographic
primitive
TDES [NIST SP800-67] 112, 168 - -
8 Cryptographic
primitive
AES [FIPS197] 128, 192,
256
- -
9 Confidentiality #7 in ECB mode
for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112, 168 - No
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
|k| in
Bits
Comments Security
Level above
120 Bits
10 Confidentiality #7 in CBC mode
for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112, 168 - No
11 Confidentiality #7 in CTR mode
for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112, 168 - No
12 Confidentiality #7 in CFB mode
for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 112, 168 - No
13 Integrity
protection
#7 in CMAC
mode for MAC
generation
[NIST SP800-38B] 112, 168 - No
14 Integrity
protection
#7 in Retail
MAC (Algorithm
3) for MAC
generation
[ISO9797-1] 112 - No
15 Confidentiality #8 in ECB mode
for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128, 192,
256
- No
16 Confidentiality #8 in CBC mode
for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128, 192,
256
- Yes
17 Confidentiality #8 in CTR mode
for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128, 192,
256
- Yes
18 Confidentiality #8 in CFB mode
for encryption
and decryption
[NIST SP800-38A] 128, 192,
256
- Yes
19
Integrity
protection
#8 in CMAC
mode for MAC
generation
[NIST SP800-38B] 128, 192,
256
- Yes
Asymmetric Cryptographic Library (ACL) v3.02.000
20 Confidentiality encryption [PKCS #1, 5.1.1],
[IEEE_P1363, 8.2.2]
1024 –
2112
- No
21 Confidentiality decryption [PKCS #1, 5.1.2],
[IEEE_P1363, 8.2.1
(I) / 8.2.3]
1024 –
2112
- No
22 Confidentiality decryption with
CRT
[PKCS #1, 5.1.2],
[IEEE_P1363, 8.2.1
(II) / 8.2.3]
1024 –
4224
- Yes
>= 2800 bit
23 Authenticity signature
generation
[PKCS #1, 5.2.1],
[IEEE_P1363, 8.2.1
(I) / 8.2.4]
1024 –
2112
- No
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
|k| in
Bits
Comments Security
Level above
120 Bits
24 Authenticity signature
generation with
CRT
[PKCS #1, 5.2.1],
[IEEE_P1363, 8.2.1
(II) / 8.2.4]
1024 –
4224
- Yes
>= 2800 bit
25 Authenticity signature
verification
[PKCS #1, 5.2.2],
[IEEE_P1363, 8.2.5]
1024 –
4224
- Yes
>= 2800 bit
26 Key generation RSA key
generation
returning CRT
key components
dp, dq and qinv
(prime
generation not
included)
[PKCS #1, 3.1 / 3.2],
[IEEE_P1363,
8.1.3.1]
1024 –
4224
Method CRT Yes
>= 2800 bit
27 Key generation RSA key
generation
returning key
representation n
and d (prime
generation not
included)
[PKCS #1, 3.1 / 3.2],
[IEEE_P1363,
8.1.3.1]
1024 –
2112
Method n_d No
28 Key generation RSA key
generation
returning key
representation
p, q and d
(prime
generation
included)
[IEEE_P1363,
8.1.3.1]
1024 –
2047
Method p_q_d;
Prime generation
method follows
[FIPS186-4, B.3.3]
but due to key size
considered
proprietary.
No
29 Key generation RSA key
generation
returning key
representation
p, q and d
(prime
generation
included)
[IEEE_P1363,
8.1.3.1]
[FIPS186-4, B.3.3]
2048 –
2112
Method p_q_d No
30 Cryptographic
primitive
Primality test - length of
prime:
512 –
2112 Bits
Method
PRIME_CHECK;
Proprietary
primality test
N/A
31 Cryptographic
primitive
Primality test [FIPS186-4, C.3.1 /
C.3.2]
length of
prime:
512 –
2064 Bits
Method
PRIME_CHECK_
MASK
N/A
32 N/A Supported
elliptic curves:
- All curves in
[FIPS186-4]
[RFC5639]
N/A – N/A
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
|k| in
Bits
Comments Security
Level above
120 Bits
[FIPS186-4],
- All curves in
[RFC5639].
33 Authenticity ECDSA
signature
generation on
curves listed in
#32
[ANS X9.62, 7.3],
[IEEE_P1363, 7.2.7]
160 –
521
hash calculation of
ECDSA is not
implemented by
the library and lies
in the
responsibility of
the user.
Key sizes
160, 163,
192, 224:No
Key sizes
>= 250: Yes
34 Authenticity ECDSA
signature
verification on
curves listed in
#32
[ANS X9.62, 7.4.1]
[IEEE_P1363, 7.2.8]
160 –
521
hash calculation of
ECDSA is not
implemented by
the library and lies
in the
responsibility of
the user.
Key sizes
160, 163,
192,224 : No
Key sizes
>= 250: Yes
35 Key agreement Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) key
agreement on
curves listed in
#32
[ANS X9.63, 5.4.1]
[ISO_11770-3, D.6]
[IEEE_P1363, 7.2.1]
160 –
521
– Key sizes
160, 163,
192, 224: No
Key sizes
>= 250: Yes
36 Key generation Elliptic Curve
key generation
on curves listed
in #32
[ANS X9.62, A.4.3]
[IEEE_P1363,
A.16.9]
160 –
521
– Key sizes
160, 163,
192, 224: No
Key sizes
>= 250: Yes
Asymmetric Cryptographic Libraries (ACLs) v3.33.003 and v3.35.001
37 Confidentiality RSA encryption [PKCS #1, 5.1.1]
[IEEE_P1363, 8.2.2]
1024 –
4224
– Yes
>= 2800 bit
38 Confidentiality RSA decryption [PKCS #1, 5.1.2]
[IEEE_P1363, 8.2.1
(I) / 8.2.3]
1024 –
2112
– No
39 Confidentiality RSA decryption
with CRT
[PKCS #1, 5.1.2]
[IEEE_P1363, 8.2.1
(II) / 8.2.3]
1024 –
4224
– Yes
>= 2800 bit
40 Authenticity RSA signature
generation
[PKCS #1, 5.2.1]
[IEEE_P1363, 8.2.1
(I) / 8.2.4]
1024 –
2112
– No
41 Authenticity RSA signature
generation with
CRT
[PKCS #1, 5.2.1]
[IEEE_P1363, 8.2.1
1024 –
4224
– Yes
>= 2800 bit
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
|k| in
Bits
Comments Security
Level above
120 Bits
(II) / 8.2.4]
42 Authenticity RSA signature
verification
[PKCS #1, 5.2.2]
[IEEE_P1363, 8.2.5]
1024 –
4224
– Yes
>= 2800 bit
43 Key agreement Diffie-Hellman
(DH) key
agreement
[FIPS186-4, 5.5]
[PKCS #1, 5.1.2 /
5.2.1]
[IEEE_P1363,
8.2.3 / 8.2.4]
1024 –
4224
– Yes
>= 2800 bit
44 Key generation RSA key
generation
returning CRT
key components
dp, dq and qinv
(prime
generation not
included)
[PKCS #1, 3.1 / 3.2]
[IEEE_P1363,
8.1.3.1]
1024 –
4224
Method CRT Yes
>= 2800 bit
45 Key generation RSA key
generation
returning key
representation n
and d (prime
generation not
included)
[PKCS #1, 3.1 / 3.2]
[IEEE_P1363,
8.1.3.1]
1024 –
2112
Method n_d No
46 Key generation RSA key
generation
returning key
representation
p, q and d
(prime
generation
included)
[IEEE_P1363,
8.1.3.1]
1024 –
2047
Method p_q_d;
Prime generation
method follows
[FIPS186-4, B.3.3]
but due to key size
considered
proprietary.
No
47 Key generation RSA key
generation
returning key
representation
p, q and d
(prime
generation
included)
[IEEE_P1363,
8.1.3.1]
[FIPS186-4, B.3.3]
2048 –
2112
Method p_q_d No
48 Cryptographic
primitive
Generation of
probable
primes,
Miller Rabin test
[FIPS186-4, B.3.3 /
C.3.1]
length of
prime:
512 –
2064 Bits
Method
2PRIME_GEN
N/A
49 Cryptographic
primitive
Primality test – length of
prime:
512 –
2112 Bits
Method
PRIME_CHECK;
Proprietary
primality test
N/A
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
|k| in
Bits
Comments Security
Level above
120 Bits
50 Cryptographic
primitive
Primality test [FIPS186-4, C.3.1 /
C.3.2]
length of
prime:
512 –
2064 Bits
Method
PRIME_CHECK_
MASK
N/A
51 N/A Supported
elliptic curves:
- All curves in
[FIPS186-4],
- All curves in
[RFC5639].
[FIPS186-4],
[RFC5639]
N/A – N/A
52 Authenticity ECDSA
signature
generation on
curves listed in
#51
[ANS X9.62, 7.3]
[IEEE_P1363, 7.2.7]
160 –
521
hash calculation of
ECDSA is not
implemented by
the library and lies
in the
responsibility of
the user.
N/A
53 Authenticity ECDSA
signature
verification on
curves listed in
#51
[ANS X9.62, 7.4.1]
[IEEE_P1363, 7.2.8]
160 –
521
hash calculation of
ECDSA is not
implemented by
the library and lies
in the
responsibility of
the user.
Key sizes
160, 163,
192, 224: No
Key sizes
>= 250: Yes
54 Key agreement Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) key
agreement on
curves listed in
#51
[ANS X9.63, 5.4.1]
[ISO_11770-3, D.6]
[IEEE_P1363, 7.2.1]
160 –
521
– Key sizes
160, 163,
192, 224: No
Key sizes
>= 250: Yes
55 Key generation Elliptic Curve
key generation
on curves listed
in #51
[ANS X9.62, A.4.3]
[IEEE_P1363,
A.16.9]
160 –
521
– Key sizes
160, 163,
192, 224: No
Key sizes
>= 250: Yes
56 PACE
integrated
mapping
Point encoding
for the ECDH-
integrated
mapping on
curves listed in
#51
[ICAO_11, B.2] 160 –
521
– Key sizes
160, 163,
192, 224: No
Key sizes
>= 250: Yes
Additionally only for Asymmetric Cryptographic Library (ACL) v3.35.001
57 Cryptographic
primitive
Prime number
generation
– length of
prime:
512 –
2112 Bits
Method
PRIME_GEN;
Proprietary prime
number generation
N/A
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
|k| in
Bits
Comments Security
Level above
120 Bits
method, which
follows [PrimeGen]
Flash Loader
58 Confidentiality #2 in CCM
mode for
encryption and
decryption
[NIST SP800-38C] 128 – Not rated
59 Authenticity #2 in CCM
mode for MAC
verification
[NIST SP800-38C] 128 – Not rated
60 Authentication Mutual
authentication
protocol based
on #59
[AGD_PPUM, 2.1.5] 128 – Not rated
61 Authentication External
authentication
protocol based
on #5
[AGD_PPUM, 2.1.5] 128 – Not rated
Random Number generation (Hardware)
62 RNG Physical RNG PTG.2 in [AIS31] N/A – N/A
63 RNG Hybrid RNG corresponds to
PTG.3 in [AIS31]
N/A – N/A
64 RNG Deterministic
RNG
corresponds to
DRG.3 in [AIS20]
N/A – N/A
65 RNG Deterministic
RNG
corresponds to
DRG.4 in [AIS31]
N/A – N/A
Random Crypto Library (RCL) v1.10.007
66 RNG Physical RNG PTG.2 in [AIS31] N/A The RCL acts as
interface to the
PTG.2 hardware
RNG
N/A
67 RNG Deterministic
RNG
corresponds to
DRG.3 in [AIS20]
[NIST SP800-90A]
128, 256 CTR_DRBG N/A
68 RNG Deterministic
RNG
corresponds to
DRG.4 in [AIS31]
[NIST SP800-90A]
128, 256 CTR_DRBG N/A
Hash Crypto Library (HCL) v1.13.002
69 Hash SHA-1 [FIPS180-4] N/A – N/A
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
|k| in
Bits
Comments Security
Level above
120 Bits
calculation
70 Hash
calculation
SHA-224 [FIPS180-4] N/A – N/A
71 Hash
calculation
SHA-256 [FIPS180-4] N/A – N/A
72 Hash
calculation
SHA-384 [FIPS180-4] N/A – N/A
73 Hash
calculation
SHA-512 [FIPS180-4] N/A – N/A
74 Hash
calculation
SHA-512/224 [FIPS180-4] N/A – N/A
75 Hash
calculation
SHA-512/256 [FIPS180-4] N/A – N/A
Table 2: TOE cryptographic functionality
The TOE’s memory encryption, named ICS (“ICS-C8”) and not separately listed above,
was successfully evaluated according to BSI’s “Methodology for cryptographic rating of
memory encryption schemes used in smartcards and similar devices” (Version 1.0, 2013-
10-31).
Where no cryptographic 120-Bit-Level assessment was given at all (i.e where ”N/A” was
stated), nevertheless the targeted CC Evaluation Assurance Level has been achieved for
those functionalities as well.
Further conformance evaluation and assessment to claimed cryptographic functionality
standards is documented in the confidential report “Cryptographic Standards Compliance
Verification” [27].
Reference of Legislatives and Standards quoted above:
[AIS20] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
20, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[ANS X9.62] American National Standard for Financial Services ANS X9.62-2005,
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), November 16,
2005, American National Standards Institute.
[ANS X9.63] American National Standard for Financial Services X9.63-2011,
Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - Key
Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
December 21, 2011, American National Standards Institute
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[AGD_PPUM] see reference [AGD_PPUM] in bibliography (chapter 14)
[FIPS186-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB
186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department
of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST)
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197,
Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES),
2001-11-26, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[IEEE_P1363] IEEE P1363. Standard specifications for public key cryptography.
IEEE, 2000
[ISO_9797-1] Information technology - Security techniques - Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block
cipher, 1999-12, ISO/IEC
[ISO_11770-3] ISO 11770-3: Information technology - Security techniques – Key
management Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques,
ISO/IEC 11770-3:2008
[ISO_18033-3] ISO 18033-3: Information technology - Security techniques –
Encryption algorithms – Part 3: Block ciphers, ISO/IEC 18033-3:2005
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)
[NIST SP800-38B] NIST SP800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, The CMAC Mode for Authentication, 2005-05, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[NIST SP800-38C] NIST SP800-38C, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality,
2004-05 with updates as of 2007-07-20, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST)
[NIST SP800-67] NIST Special Publication 800-67 – Revision 2, Recommendation for
the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher – Revised
November 2017, National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
[PKCS-1] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.2, October 27,
2012, RSA Laboratories
[RFC5639] RFC 5639 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard
Curves and Curve Generation, IETF Trust and the persons identified
as the document authors, March 2010
(http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt)
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
Table 1: Deliverables of the TOE outlines the documents that contain necessary
information on the intended use of the TOE including all security related information,
conditions and instructions to be taken into account by the user. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target and not covered by the
TOE itself need to be met by the operational environment of the TOE.
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The customer or user of the TOE shall take the statements of this certificate into account in
its system risk management process. The user should define measures in its risk
management that respond to emerging and new attack methods and techniques to the
TOE until the TOE has been reassessed.
The user also has to consider in its risk management the limited validity for the usage of
cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software using the TOE. For this reason the TOE
includes guidance documentation (see table 1) which contains obligations and guidelines
for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this certified TOE and
which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the security requirements of the
Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or
system it must be examined if the required measures have been correctly and effectively
implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the evaluation of the composite
product or system must also consider the evaluation results as outlined in the document
"ETR for composite evaluation" [ETRfCOMP].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, re-certifications or maintenance result available for the product.
Furthermore:
The TOE is delivered to the composite product manufacturer and to the security IC
embedded software developer. The actual end-consumer obtains the TOE from the
composite product issuer together with the application which runs on the TOE.
The security IC embedded software developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in the delivered documents in [AGD_ACL], [AGD_SCL],
[AGD_RCL], [AGD_HCL], [AGD_SG], [AGD_HSL], [AGD_PPUM], [AGD_PRM], [AGD_HRM],
[AGD_UMSLC], and [AGD_CryptoUM]
● have to be considered.
The composite product manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to
develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
● All security hints described in [AGD_PPUM] have to be considered.
In addition the following hint resulting from the evaluation of the ALC evaluation aspect has
to be considered:
● The security IC embedded software developer can deliver his software either to Infineon
to let them implement it in the TOE (in the Flash memory) or to the composite product
manufacturer to let him download the software in the Flash memory.
● The delivery procedure from the TOE manufacturer (Infineon) to the composite product
manufacturer is not part of this evaluation. However, for security reasons, a form of
transport protection might be required depending on the order option (see section 2.1 for
details). The applied transport protection mechanisms must be considered during the
composite evaluation considering the security needs of any pre-loaded IC Embedded
Software that is active during delivery.
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● The TOE can come with a pre-loaded image called Performance Flash Loader, which is
a non-TOE component. Using the PFL results in a non-certified product.
● The TOE does not implement key generation (FCS_CKM.1), key derivation
(FCS_CKM.5), or key insertion (FDP_ITC.1/2) as required by the FCS_COP.1 and
FCS_CKM.6 iterations (dependency) used in the ST for the symmetric cryptography.
The IC Embedded Software must provide this functionality instead. The same applies to
the key destruction required by the FCS_COP.1 and FCS_CKM.1 iterators used in the
ST for the asymmetric cryptography.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [ST] of the Information and
communications technology (TOE) product is provided within a separate document as
Annex A of this report. t is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target used for the
evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the
provisions of the EUCC certification scheme policy (see Implementing Regulation (EU)
2024/482, Annex V, V.2).
SHA256 hash of the ST:
b23aff95311c5d5a4f82d8d6bc94f9c359054c845e5c43f3d6e638860bdf967f
SHA256 hash of the ST lite:
e75061583160e46ca0ae54dac657ea3be10be16bcd40824df1c3c53e6cc5f5e2
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [ST] of the TOE / Information and
communications technology (ICT) product is provided within a separate document as
Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
12.1. Acronyms
BPU Bill per use
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
DPA Differential Power Analysis
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
ICT Information and communications technology
IFX Infineon
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IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NVM None Volatile Memory
PFL Performance Flash Loader
PP Protection Profile
RCL Random Crypto Library
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SPA Simple Power Analysis
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - Named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[EUCC-VO] Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 31 January 2024 laying down rules for the
application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament
and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common
Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC)
and
Implementation Regulation (EU) 2025/2462 of 8 December 2025
amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 as regards
definitions, ICT product series certification, assurance continuity and
state-of-the-art document
[CC] ISO 15408:2022, Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and
activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
https://www.iso.org/standard/72891.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72892.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72906.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72913.html
https://www.iso.org/standard/72917.html
as mirrored by CCRA’s edition:
CC:2022 R1, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
- Part 1: Introduction and general model
- Part 2: Security functional components
- Part 3: Security assurance components
- Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and
activities
- Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
amended by:
CCMB Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and
CEM:2022 (Release 1), Version 1.2, 15 October 2025, CCRA
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[CEM] ISO 18045:2022: Information technology Security techniques
Methodology for IT security evaluation
https://www.iso.org/standard/72889.html
as mirrored by CCRA’s edition:
CEM:2022 R1, Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
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[EUCC_SOTA] EUCC state-of-the-art documents:
https://certification.enisa.europa.eu/publications/eucc-state-art-
documents_en
[EUCC_PROG] EUCC program of the BSI: Scheme documentation describing the
certification process (EUCC), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[EUCC_CERT] EUCC Certificates, periodically updated list published on ENISA’s
website on European cybersecurity certification schemes
(https://certification.enisa.europa.eu/) but also on BSI’s website
(https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte)
[AIS] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as
relevant for the TOE6
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[ST] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1156-V5-2026, Version 7.2, 2026-05-
04, IFX_CCI_00004Fh, IFX_CCI_000050h, IFX_CCI_000051h,
IFX_CCI_000052h, IFX_CCI_000053h, IFX_CCI_000054h,
IFX_CCI_000055h, IFX_CCI_000056h, IFX_CCI_000057h,
IFX_CCI_000058h, IFX_CCI_00005Ch, S11 Security Target,
Developer Name
Security Target lite, Version 7.2, 2026-05-04, IFX_CCI_00004Fh,
IFX_CCI_000050h, IFX_CCI_000051h, IFX_CCI_000052h,
IFX_CCI_000053h, IFX_CCI_000054h, IFX_CCI_000055h,
IFX_CCI_000056h, IFX_CCI_000057h, IFX_CCI_000058h,
IFX_CCI_00005Ch, S11 Security Target Lite, Infineon Technologies
AG
[PP] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
Version 1.0, 13 January 2014, BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 2026-06-29, EVALUATION
TECHNICAL REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, (confidential document)
[ETRfCOMP] ETR for composite evaluation for the Product BSI-DSZ-CC-1156-V5-
2026, Version 2, 2026-06-29, EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT
FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR COMP), TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[ALC] Evaluation Documentation Life Cycle Sup-port M5283, Version 2.0,
2021-04-19, Infineon Technologies AG (confidential document)
[AGD_HRM] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 5.2, 2020-12-21,
SLC36 32-bit Security Con-troller – V16, Hardware Reference
Manual, Infineon Technologies AG
[AGD_PRM] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 5.8, 2024-05-24,
SLx1/SLx3 (40nm) security controllers Programmer’s Reference
Manual, Infineon Technologies AG
[AGD_SG] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.00-3157, 2026-02-
17, SLC36 32-bit Security Controller – V16 Security Guidelines,
Infineon Technologies AG
[AGD_PPUM] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 9.12, 2023-03-02,
Production and personalization 32-bit security controller, Infineon
Technologies AG
6
specifically
• see section 9.1.
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[AGD_CryptoUM] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 3.0, 2024-06-21, 32-
bit Security Controller Crypto2304T V3 User Manual, Infineon
Technologies AG
[AGD_HSL] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 03.52.9708, 2021-01-
25, HSL for SLCx7V16 Hardware Support Library, Infineon
Technologies AG
[AGD_UMSLC] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 01.30.0564, 2019-08-
30, UMSLC library for SLCx7 in 40nm User Mode Security Life
Control, Infineon Technologies AG
[AGD_SCL_211003] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version, Date, SCL37-SCP-
v440-C40 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCP-v440 AES/DES/MAC
32-bit Security Controller User interface manual, Version 2.11.003,
2021-06-16, Infineon Technologies AG
[AGD_SCL_215000] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 2.15.000, 2023-07-
20 , SCL37-SCP-v440-C40 Symmetric Crypto Library for SCP-v440
AES/DES/MAC 32-bit Security Controller User interface manual,
Infineon Technologies AG
[AGD_ACL_302000] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 3.02.000, 2026-04-23,
ACL37-Crypto2304T-C40 Asymmetric Crypto Library for
Crypto2304T RSA/ECC/Toolbox 32-bit Security Controller User
interface manual, Infineon Technologies AG
[AGD_ACL_333003] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 3.33.003, 2026-04-
23, ACL37-Crypto2304T-C40 Asymmetric Crypto Library for
Crypto2304T RSA/ECC/Toolbox 32-bit Security Controller User
interface manual, Infineon Technologies AG
[AGD_ACL_335001] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 3.35.001, 2026-04-
23, ACL37-Crypto2304T-C40 Asymmetric Crypto Library for
Crypto2304T RSA/ECC/Toolbox 32-bit Security Controller User
interface manual, Infineon Technologies AG
[AGD_RCL] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.10.007, 2020-06-16,
RCL37-X-C40 Random Crypto Library for SCP-v440 & RNG-v3
DRBG/HWRNG 32-bit Security Controller User interface manual,
Infineon Technologies AG
[AGD_HCL] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.13.002, 2020-05-07,
HCL37-CPU-C40 Hash Crypto Library for CPU SHA 32-bit Security
Controller User interface manual , Infineon Technologies AG
[IFX_DHL_SIN] SITE TECHNICAL AUDIT REPORT (STAR) DHL Supply Chain
Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced Regional Center, Version 1, 2026-02-
23, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
SHA256-hash:
654c0a3e193e351985fa8566f610d5e0c98b7f369fb44e9730ce50096
ee42f7a
[IFX_RGB] Site Technical Audit Report (STAR) Infineon Technologies AG,
Regensburg, Germany, Infineon Technologies AG, Version 1, 2026-
02-18, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
SHA256-hash:
61aa1612ab916794ce5aaff0ea21dff76b668c1e113633098b13d4c99f
b8ce7c
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[IFX_SIN] SITE TECHNICAL AUDIT REPORT (STAR) Infineon Technologies
Asia Pacific Pte Ltd., Singapore, Version 2, 2026-03-10,TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH
SHA256-hash:
cb34c35883212be675d6604ff6cb83a42139d0fac274af0d87c3b6e39
2e993e9
[PACT_NAU] SITE TECHNICAL AUDIT REPORT (STAR) PacTech - Packaging
Technologies GmbH, Version 1, 2026-02-18, TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH
SHA256-hash:
43f9ba890210b51a653377e8f6f9ba098595a709b19ffa54eed17cedb
0fdf084
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C. Annexes
List of annexes of this Certification Report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1156-V5-2026
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product IFX_CCI_00004Fh, IFX_CCI_000050h - IFX_CCI_000058h,
IFX_CCI_00005Ch design step S11 with firmware 80.310.03.0 & 80.310.03.1, optional
NRG™ SW 05.03.4097, opt. HSL v3.52.9708, UMSLC lib v01.30.0564, opt.SCL v2.15.000
and v2.11.003, opt. ACL v3.33.003, and v3.35.001 and v3.02.000, opt. RCL v1.10.007,
opt. HCL v1.13.002 (Target of Evaluation, TOE, also named as ICT product) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM) [CEM].
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 24 July 2026, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support as claimed by the ST [ST] and that are stated in
chapter 1 of this report are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE
listed below:
Distribution Center name Address
DHL Singapore DHL Exel Supply Chain
Singapore Pte Ltd., Advanced Regional Center
Tampines LogisPark
1 Greenwich Drive
Singapore 533865
KWE Shanghai KWE Kintetsu World Express (China) Co., Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Airport Pilot Free Trade Zone
No. 530 Zheng Ding Road
Shanghai,
P.R. China
K&N Großostheim Infineon Technology AG
Distribution Center Europe (DCE)
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 – Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Also in this Certification the STAR [IFX_DHL_SIN], [IFX_RGB], [IFX_SIN], [PACT_NAU]
has been approved.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [ST]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [ST]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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