TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
eucc@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/eucc/
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
1.0
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EUCC Certification Report
Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance 1.0.9 with IMM Fabric 4.3
UCS X-Series Servers and UCS C-Series Servers
Sponsor and developer: Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive
95134 San Jose, CA
USA
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: EUCC-3110-2025-09-2500093-01-CR
Report version: 1.0
Project number: EUCC-2500093-01
Author(s): Alireza Rohani, TrustCB B.V.
contact: EUCC@trustcb.com
Date: 4 September 2025
Number of pages: 17
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
1 Executive Summary 4
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Services 7
2.3 Vulnerability handling and Assurance Continuity Policies 7
2.4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
2.4.1 Assumptions 8
2.4.2 Clarification of scope 8
2.5 Architectural Information 8
2.6 Supplementary Cybersecurity Information 9
2.7 Lifecycle Management processes and production facilities 9
2.8 ICT Product Testing 9
2.8.1 Identification of CAB and ITSEF 9
2.8.2 Identification of used assurance components 9
2.8.3 EUCC State of the Art documents and Protect Profiles 10
2.8.4 Testing approach and depth 10
2.8.5 Independent penetration testing 10
2.8.6 Test configuration 10
2.8.7 Test results 11
2.8.8 Reused Evaluation Results 11
2.8.9 Evaluated Configuration 11
2.9 Results of the evaluation 11
2.9.1 Assessment against each assurance requirement 11
2.9.2 Overall result of evaluation 13
2.10 Certificate information and scheme label 13
2.11 Comments/Recommendations 14
3 Summary of the Security Target 15
4 Definitions 16
5 Bibliography 17
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Foreword
The Common Criteria-based European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme (EUCC) is a certification
scheme created under the Cybersecurity Act (CSA), Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of 17 April 2019.
The EUCC is described by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024,
laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of
the Council as regards the adoption of the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity
certification scheme (EUCC).
The Dutch implementation of the CSA is regulated in Dutch law in the ‘Uitvoeringswet
cyberbeveiligingsverordening’ (UITVW). In this law the role of NCCA is assigned to the Dutch Authority
for Digital Infrastructure (RDI), which is part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
TrustCB B.V. has been licensed by the RDI as a Certification Body (CB) for the task of ISO/IEC 17065
Certification Activities up to and including CSA assurance level high for ICT security products, as well
as for protection profiles. Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the
product, protection profile according to the NP002 EUCC processes published by the Dutch NCCA.
Evaluations of ICT products are performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) licensed by
the Dutch NCCA as a CAB for ISO/IEC 17025 Evaluation Activities, with scope aligning to the
requested Evaluation Assurance Level of the Object for the evaluation, referred to as the Target of
Evaluation (TOE) in this report.
By awarding an EUCC certificate as a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the ICT
product complies with the security requirements specified in the associated security target, or that the
protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A security target is a requirements specification document
that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the security target or protection profile, in addition to this certification
report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the ICT product's
intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation
assurance level) that the ICT product satisfies the security requirements stated in the security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if it is reproduced in its entirety.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Cisco
Intersight Virtual Appliance 1.0.9 with IMM Fabric 4.3 UCS X-Series Servers and UCS C-Series
Servers.
The developer of the Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance 1.0.9 with IMM Fabric 4.3 UCS X-Series
Servers and UCS C-Series Servers is Cisco Systems, Inc located in San Jose, USA and they also act
as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist
prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their
particular requirements.
A Certification Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT
security properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE is a network device that The TOE consists of hardware and software components that
support Cisco's unified fabric, which carries multiple types of datacenter traffic over a dedicated fabric
hardware (in the form of stand-alone appliances, chassis-integrated modules, and converged network
adapters). Cisco Intersight provides a role-based access control (RBAC) policy to control the
separation of administrative duties and provide a security log of all changes made.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 04 September 2025 with the approval of the [ETR]1. The certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the EUCC as described in
Commission implementing regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024, amended by (EU)
2024/3144 of 18 December 2024.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance 1.0.9 with
IMM Fabric 4.3 UCS X-Series Servers and UCS C-Series Servers, the security requirements, and the
level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security
requirements.
Consumers of the Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance 1.0.9 with IMM Fabric 4.3 UCS X-Series Servers
and UCS C-Series Servers are advised to verify that their own environment is consistent with the
security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in
this certification report.
There are no special configuration requirements for the TOE besides the requirements defined in the
user guidance. All users shall read these requirements and install the TOE in the operational
environment accordingly.
The summary of the threats and security policies which [ST] defines:
- The Threats that are presented in Section 3 of [ST] as the threats addressed by the TOE and
the IT environment. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all identified threats is
Basic.
- No Organizational Security Polices (OSPs) have been defined for this TOE.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL2 augmented assurance requirements for the evaluated security
functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.2. This assurance level is recognised
by article 52 of [CSA] as ‘substantial’
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, CC:2022, Revision 1 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022 Revision 1 [CC] (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
TrustCB B.V., as the Dutch NCCA (RDI) licensed Certification Assessment Body for EUCC
certification activities, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions for international recognition
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the EUCC Certified Products list.
Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the ICT product Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance
1.0.9 with IMM Fabric 4.3 UCS X-Series Servers and UCS C-Series Servers from Cisco Systems, Inc
located in San Jose, USA.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
Cisco UCS X-Series:
Chassis: UCSX-9508
M6 Compute Nodes (servers): UCSX-210C-M6
VIC in M6 compute nodes: UCSX-V4-Q25GME, UCSX-V4-
PCIME, or UCSX-V4-PCIME
M7 Compute Nodes (servers): UCSX-210C-M7, UCSX-410C-M7
VIC in M7 compute nodes: UCSX-ME-V5Q50G-D, UCSX-ML-
V5Q50G-D, UCSX-ML-V5D200G-D, or UCSX-V4-PCIME
Cisco UCS C-Series Servers and Virtual Interface Cards (VIC):
M6 Servers: UCSC-C220-M6, UCSC-C225-M6, UCSC-C240-M6,
UCSC-C245-M6
VIC for M6 C-Series servers: UCSC-PCIE-C25Q-04, UCSC-PCIE-
C100-04, UCSC-P-V5Q50G, UCSC-P-V5D200G, UCSC-M-V25-
04, UCSC-M-V5Q50G, UCSC-M-V100-04, UCSC-M-V5D200G
M7 Servers: UCSC-C220-M7, UCSC-C240-M7
VIC for M7 C-Series servers: Same as for M6 C-Series servers.
Cisco Fabric Interconnect (FI):
UCS-FI-6454, UCS-FI-64108, and/or UCS-FI-6536
Cisco Intelligent Fabric Modules (IFM):
For M6 compute nodes: UCSX-I-9108-25G, UCSX-I-9108-100G
For M7 compute nodes: UCSX-I-9108-25G-D, UCSX-I-9108-
100G-D
N/A
Software
Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance (PVA) 1.0.9-677
Cisco Intersight Managed Mode (IMM)
4.3(4.240074)
Cisco UCS C-Series Server Firmware
4.3(4.240152)
Cisco UCS X-Series Server Firmware 5.2(0.230127)
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Cisco Intersight
Virtual Appliance 1.0.9 with IMM Fabric 4.3 UCS X-Series Servers and UCS C-Series Servers. For
details, see section 2.5 of this report, “Supplementary Cybersecurity Information.
The name and contact information provided for the holder of the issued Certificate associated with this
Certification Report are as follows:
Organisation name: Cisco Systems, Inc.
Address: 170 West Tasman Drive, 95134 San Jose, CA USA
Certified product contact certteam@cisco.com
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The following website link has been provided for supplementary cybersecurity information associated
with the TOE, in accordance with Article 55 of [EU-EUCC]:
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/industries/government/global-government-
certifications/common-criteria.html
2.2 Security Services
The major security features provided by the TOE are summarized as follows:
Cisco Intersight stores audit information to assist the administrator in monitoring the security state of
the TOE as well as troubleshooting various problems that arise throughout the operation of the
system. Intersight may be configured to send records to an external syslog server. The remote audit
server is outside the TOE boundary. The TOE provides the ability to audit the actions taken by
authorized administrators. Audited events include start-up and shutdown, configuration changes,
administrative authentication, and administrative log-off. The TOE provides the capability for
authorized administrators to review the audit records stored within the TOE.
VLANs enable efficient traffic separation, provide better bandwidth utilization, and alleviate scaling
issues by logically segmenting the physical local-area network (LAN) infrastructure into different
subnets so that Ethernet frames are presented to interfaces within the same VLAN.
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is a method of restricting or authorizing system access for users
based on user roles and Organizations. A role defines the privileges of a user in the system and the
Organization defines the domains that a user is allowed access. Because users are not directly
assigned privileges, management of individual user privileges is simply a matter of assigning the
appropriate roles and Organizations.
The TOE supports two methods of authenticating administrator logins to Intersight: a local user
database; or a remote authentication server accessed either via LDAPS. Remote authentication may
be used to centralize user account management to an external authentication server. The system has
a default user account, “admin”, which cannot be modified or deleted. This account is the system
administrator account and has full privileges. Each local user account must have a unique username
that does not start with a number.
The TOE can be managed via Intersight via graphical user interface (over TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3), or
command line (over SSHv2) or via virtual console to access Intersight via ESXi). Any of these
administrative interfaces can be used in the evaluated configuration of the TOE. For all management
channels, users have a default read-only authorization to access non-sensitive management objects
(keys and passwords are never exposed to an external management interface). Additional user
privileges each grant access to modify specific management objects. An administrator can use the
Intersight GUI to perform management tasks for all physical and virtual devices within the TOE.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time is used as the timestamp that is
applied to audit records generated by the TOE and in validating service requests.
The TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over for CLI
access (SSH) or HTTPS for web UI access.
2.3 Vulnerability handling and Assurance Continuity Policies
The following vulnerability policy has been identified as applicable to the Cisco Intersight Virtual
Appliance 1.0.9 with IMM Fabric 4.3 UCS X-Series Servers and UCS C-Series Servers
Document reference:
CISCO Intersight Virtual Appliance with IMM Fabric and UCS Servers Life-Cycle Support Vulnerability
Management and Disclosure (EUCC), v0.1, 08 May 2025
This is a new product certification. An assurance continuity policy was not provided.
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2.4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.4.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 3.1 of the [ST].
The user guidance as outlined in section 4 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and its configuration in the environment to fulfil all Assumptions described in the [ST]. Certain
aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend
on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE.
There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user
guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against
certain attacks.
2.4.2 Clarification of scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 3.1 of the [ST].
2.5 Architectural Information
The TOE, Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance with IMM Fabric and UCS Servers, hereafter referred to
as Cisco Intersight, is a unified computing solution, which provides access layer networking and
servers.
The logical architecture can be depicted as follows:
Figure 1 TOE Architecture
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2.6 Supplementary Cybersecurity Information
The contact information for the Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance 1.0.9 with IMM Fabric 4.3 UCS X-
Series Servers and UCS C-Series Servers was provided as: certteam@cisco.com
The following website link was provided for supplementary cybersecurity information referred to in
Article 55 of Regulation (EU) 2019/881:
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/industries/government/global-government-
certifications/common-criteria.html
This link provides further details and links for:
- Guidance and recommendations to assist end users with the secure configuration, installation,
deployment, operation and maintenance of the Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance 1.0.9 with
IMM Fabric 4.3 UCS X-Series Servers and UCS C-Series Servers;
- The period during which Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance 1.0.9 with IMM Fabric 4.3 UCS X-
Series Servers and UCS C-Series Servers security support will be offered to end users; stated
as 5 years aligning with the validity of the issued EUCC certificate.
- Contact information and accepted method for receiving vulnerability information from end
users and security researchers for the Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance 1.0.9 with IMM Fabric
4.3 UCS X-Series Servers and UCS C-Series Servers:
- the online repository listing publicly disclosed vulnerabilities related to the Cisco Intersight
Virtual Appliance 1.0.9 with IMM Fabric 4.3 UCS X-Series Servers and UCS C-Series Servers
and to any relevant cybersecurity advisories:
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer for the
Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance 1.0.9 with IMM Fabric 4.3 UCS X-Series Servers and UCS C-Series
Servers:
Identifier Revision Date
Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance with IMM Fabric and UCS Servers
Security target
Rev. 0.3 2025-05-14
Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance with IMM Fabric and UCS Servers,
Common Criteria Operational User Guidance and Preparative
Procedures, EDCS-24888933
Rev. 0.7 2025-02-10
2.7 Lifecycle Management processes and production facilities
Not applicable to this evaluation.
2.8 ICT Product Testing
2.8.1 Identification of CAB and ITSEF
TrustCB is the Certification Assessment Body, licensed by the Dutch Authority for Digital Infrastructure
(RDI) for EUCC high certification activities.
TrustCB point of contact: EUCC@trustcb.com
Testing was performed by following ITSEF: SGS Brightsight B.V.
2.8.2 Identification of used assurance components
The assurance component(s) used in the product testing were EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2,
as defined by, and detailed in, [CC] and [CEM].
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2.8.3 EUCC State of the Art documents and Protect Profiles
EUCC state-of-the-art documents [SotA Documents] were applied as referenced in the Bibliography.
No conformance to any production profile was claimed in this evaluation.
2.8.4 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-enforcing
module level. The evaluators examined the developer’s testing activities documentation and verified
that the developer has met their testing responsibilities.
All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested
explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing
was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used
extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The security mechanisms that aren’t covered by the developer tests are covered through independent
testing:
• Verify preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared securely for operation
• Verify account protection
• Verify whether the log may leak sensitive information such as password
• Verify the LDAPS functionality
• Perform public domain vulnerability scan and verify no additional ports open
• Verify no access during TOE initialization process
• Verify the REST API authentication
In addition to the developer tests, the evaluator derived and executed 6 additional functional tests.
2.8.5 Independent penetration testing
To identify potential vulnerabilities the evaluator performed the following activities:
• SFR design analysis: SFR implementation details were examined in the SFR design analysis.
During this examination several potential vulnerabilities were identified.
• CWE vulnerability focus: Using the CWE weaknesses collection, the evaluator collected a list
of security questions and related answers. This approach ensured that the evaluator was forced
to think in terms of vulnerabilities from all different angles and improved completeness in the
vulnerability analysis. Also, during this examination several potential vulnerabilities were
identified.
• Use of Scanning tools: The evaluator runs vulnerability scanning tools to identify potential
vulnerabilities
• Public vulnerability search: Several additional potential vulnerabilities were identified during a
search in the public domain
The evaluator conducted a public domain vulnerability search up until August 28th 2025 to check
whether any new vulnerabilities are published since the previous TOE certification was performed.
Additionally, the evaluator re-executed a number of tests using scanning tools to verify if any new
potential vulnerabilities could impact any of the services running on the TOE in the evaluated
configuration.
The total test effort expended by the evaluators was two weeks. All of the test effort was on the logical
tests.
2.8.6 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was:
• Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance (PVA) v1.0.9-677 (running on UCS C220 M7S)
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• Fabric Interconnect UCS-FI-6464 with IMM 4.3 (4.240074)
• UCS C220 M6N v4.3(4.240152)
The ITSEF assessed the differences between the above configuration and the possible configurations
of the TOE (all the configurations of the TOE are stated in [ST] table 4), and concluded that they do
not negatively impact security. All the test results obtained on the tested configuration are fully
applicable to the TOE configurations stated in the [ST].
2.8.7 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
2.8.8 Reused Evaluation Results
This was a new certification under EUCC however documentary evaluation results of an earlier
version of the TOE certified under the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT security
(NSCIB-CC-2400020-01) have been partially reused. Vulnerability analysis and penetration testing
has been renewed.
No sites have been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8.9 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance 1.0.9
with IMM Fabric 4.3 UCS X-Series Servers and UCS C-Series Servers.
2.9 Results of the evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report, other evaluator documents and developer documentation [DEV_DOCS].
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
2.9.1 Assessment against each assurance requirement
ASE
ASE
ST introduction ASE_INT.1
Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1
Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1
Security requirements ASE.REQ.2
TOE summary specification ASE.TSS.1
The findings are well-documented and internally consistent, demonstrating a thorough understanding
of the Security Target [ST] and its components. The TOE introduction, conformance claim, security
problems, security objectives, security requirements, TOE summary specification are appropriately
addressed, and the TOE description is accurate and adequate for the evaluation level. Consequently,
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the ASE activities fulfil the assurance requirements EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2. No issues or
deviations were identified.
ADV
ADV
Security architecture ADV_ARC.1
Functional specification ADV_FSP.2
TOE design ADV_TDS.1
The evaluation has demonstrated that the developer’s evidence meets ADV specified requirements.
The TOE model is complete, clearly showing all interfaces (TSFI/non-TSFI), user roles, and relations,
with explanations on completeness and tracing requirements met. The subsystem/module level model
is sensible, useful, and shows TSFIs and subsystem/module decomposition. The security architecture
is thoroughly explained, design compliance rationale is complete and coherent, and necessary
evidence is extracted per alternative approach. The evaluator confirmed why the TSF is well-
structured. SFRs were inspected, with findings mapped to the implementation representation in both
evaluation meetings. Accordingly, the ADV activities meet the assurance requirements for EAL2
augmented with ALC_FLR.2, with no issues or deviations identified.
AGD
AGD
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1
The evaluation has demonstrated that the guidance documentation is clear, complete, and sufficient to
support the secure acceptance, installation, configuration, and operation of the TOE within its intended
environment by its user roles. The guidance effectively helps prevent common misconfigurations and
promotes correct usage. Therefore, the AGD activities fulfil the assurance requirements for EAL2
augmented with ALC_FLR.2, with no issues or deviations identified.
ALC
ALC
CM capabilities ALC_CMC.2
CM Scope ALC_CMS.2
Delivery ALC_DEL.1
Flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2
The evaluation has demonstrated that the developer’s evidence meets ALC specified. The CI-list was
comprehensive and uniquely identified all configuration items, with clear identification of the developer.
The CM documentation effectively described unique identification methods, a CM plan for
development, procedures for accepting modified or new CIs, and the CM system was operated in
accordance with the CM plan to maintain all configuration items by automated means. Delivery
procedures were well-documented, ensuring security during TOE distribution. Flaw remediation
procedures were comprehensive, including methods for receiving reports, tracking flaws, providing
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corrective actions, and updating users. Accordingly, the ALC activities satisfy the assurance
requirements for EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2, with no issues or deviations identified.
ATE
ATE
Coverage ATE_COV.1
Functional tests ATE_FUN.1
Independent testing ATE_IND.2
The evaluation has demonstrated that the developer’s evidence for ATE requirements meets all
specified requirements. The testing approach used by the developer effectively covered the TSFIs.
The developer’s rationale for testing all TSFIs was presented and verified. The developer test results
show that for all tests either the result was pass or a proper rationale was given why the test failed.
For the evaluator’s independent testing, the overall approach for test selection, goals for the
witnessing session, and independent test plan were clearly outlined. The evaluator’s testing results
showed that all sampled tests were passed. Accordingly, the ATE activities satisfy the assurance
requirements for EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2, with no issues or deviations identified.
AVA
AVA
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.2
The evaluator conducted a public domain vulnerability search up until 28 August 2025 to check
whether any new vulnerabilities are published since the previous TOE certification was performed.
Additionally, the evaluator re-executed a number of tests using scanning tools to verify if any new
potential vulnerabilities could impact any of the services running on the TOE in the evaluated
configuration.
Consequently, the AVA activities were performed in full compliance with the assurance requirements
EAL2 augmented with ALC_FLR.2, providing a substantial level of confidence in the TOE’s resistance
to exploitation.
2.9.2 Overall result of evaluation
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Cisco Intersight Virtual
Appliance 1.0.9 with IMM Fabric 4.3 UCS X-Series Servers and UCS C-Series Servers, to be
CC:2022 revision 1 Part 2 conformant, CC:2022 revision 1 Part 3 conformant, at an assurance
level recognised by article 52 of [CSA] as ‘substantial’, and to meet the requirements of EAL2
augmented with ALC_FLR.2. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements
specified in Security Target [ST].
2.10 Certificate information and scheme label
A Certificate has been issued recognising this evaluation result as follows:
Unique identifier: EUCC-3110-2025-09-2500093-01
Date of issuance: 04-09-2025 and with a validity period of 5 years.
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2025
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
2.11 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the countermeasures against
attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the software and the hardware
part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations for the user apart from
following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant details concerning the
resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: None.
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2025
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
3 Summary of the Security Target
The Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance with IMM Fabric and UCS Servers, v0.3, 14 May 2025 [ST] is
included here by reference.
The TOE, Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance with IMM Fabric and UCS Servers, is a unified computing
solution, which provides access layer networking and servers.
Section 1.3 of the [ST] describes the evaluated ICT product. The security functionality of the evaluated
ICT product is represented by the implementation of the selected components of [CC](Part2) and are
listed in section 5.2 of the [ST], TOE Security Functional Requirements.
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2025
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
IT Information and communication technologies product as defined by [EUCC]
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
EUCC European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme [EU-EUCC], created under the
Cybersecurity Act [EU-CSA] and detailed in Commission Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2024/482
PP Protection Profile
SotA EUCC State-of-the-Art document
TOE Target of Evaluation; the object of the certification activity described by this
report
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2025
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022 Parts
1, 2, 3, 4 and 4, Revision 1, November 2022
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM:2022
Revision 1, November 2022
[DEV_DOCS] For developer documentation used in the evaluation effort, see [ETR]
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance 1.0.9 with IMM
Fabric 4.3 and UCS X-Series and UCS C-Series Server” – EAL2 augmented, 25-
RPT-744, version 1.0, 28 August 2025
[EU-CSA] REGULATION (EU) 2019/881 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for
Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity
certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act)
[EU-EUCC] COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January
2024 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the
European Parliament and of the Council as regards the adoption of the European
Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC)
[ST] Cisco Intersight Virtual Appliance with IMM Fabric and UCS Servers, v0.3, 14 May
2025
(This is the end of this report.)