SGS Brightsight B.V. Brassersplein 2 2612 CT Delft The Netherlands t (+31) 15 269 2500 brs.info@sgs.com www.brightsightcb.com coc 30105045 ###### EUCC-3100-2026-7001701-1 Enisa Website Certificate ID: EUCC-3100-2026-000001-R-01 ###### Certification Report - Reassessment NXP MF0AES(H)x0, NT2H2xy1G and NT2H2xy1S, release B0 26-CB-050 Page 1 of 33 Version and Approval | Version | Date | Author | Reviewed | |-----------|------------|------------------|-----------------| | 1.0 | 2026-07-01 | Miquel Hernandez | Thomas Ribbrock | | 2.0 | 2026-08-06 | Miquel Hernandez | | | 3.0 | 2026-08-24 | Rob Kemper | | | 4.0 | 2026-08-25 | Rob Kemper | | | Approved by: | Rob Kemper | |----------------|--------------| August 25, 2026 2 / 33 ####### Table Of Contents ####### Contents | 1 | Executive Summary .................................................................................................... 4 | |-------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1.1 | Required information ..................................................................................................... 4 | | 1.1.1 | Assurance continuity and certificate review .................................................................. 4 | | 1.2 | Brief description of the certification report results ......................................................... 5 | | 1.3 | International 6 | | 1.4 | recognition of the certificate ..................................................................... Disclaimer(s) ................................................................................................................. 6 | | 2 | Identification of the ICT product................................................................................ 7 | | 2.1 | Unique identification ...................................................................................................... 7 | | 2.2 | Product components ..................................................................................................... 7 | | 2.3 | Additional requirements to the operating environment of the ICT product ................... 8 | | 3 | Contact information related to the evaluation of the ICT product ....................... 10 | | 4 | Security Policies ....................................................................................................... 11 | | 4.1 | Security services ......................................................................................................... 11 | | 4.2 | Vulnerability handling policy........................................................................................ 11 | | 4.2.1 | Reference.................................................................................................................... 11 | | 4.2.2 | Description .................................................................................................................. 12 | | 4.3 | Assurance continuity policy ......................................................................................... 12 | | 4.4 | Patch management procedure.................................................................................... 12 | | 5 | Assumptions and clarification of scope ................................................................. 13 | | 5.1 | Assumptions on usage and deployment ..................................................................... 13 | | 5.2 | Assumptions on the environment for compliant operation .......................................... 13 | | 5.3 | Threats to the ICT product not countered by its security functions ............................ 14 | | 6 | Architectural information ......................................................................................... 16 | | 7 | Supplementary cybersecurity information ............................................................. 18 | | 8 | ICT product evaluation summary and evaluated configuration ........................... 19 | | 8.1 | Required information ................................................................................................... 19 | | 8.2 | Product settings and configuration ............................................................................. 19 | | 9 | Results of the evaluation and information regarding the certificate ................... 20 | | 9.1 | Required information ................................................................................................... 20 | | 9.2 | Assurance requirements ............................................................................................. 20 | | 9.3 | Testing approach and results...................................................................................... 20 | | 9.3.1 | Testing approach and depth ....................................................................................... 20 | | 9.3.2 | Penetration testing ...................................................................................................... 20 | | 9.3.3 | Test results.................................................................................................................. 20 | August 25, 2026 3 / 33 | 10 | Comments and recommendations .......................................................................... 21 | |--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 10.1 | Comments ................................................................................................................... 21 | | 10.2 | Recommendations ...................................................................................................... 21 | | 11 | Security Target .......................................................................................................... 22 | | 12 | Mark or label associated to the scheme ................................................................. 23 | | 13 | Glossary ..................................................................................................................... 24 | | 14 | Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 25 | | 14.1.1 | Evaluation criteria ....................................................................................................... 25 | | 14.1.2 | Evaluation technical report .......................................................................................... 25 | | 14.1.3 | Technical reference documentation ............................................................................ 25 | | 14.1.4 | Developer documentation ........................................................................................... 26 | | 14.1.5 | ITSEF documentation ................................................................................................. 26 | | A | Mapping of evaluator actions and verdicts ............................................................ 27 | | A.1 | ASE ............................................................................................................................. 27 | | A.2 | ADV ............................................................................................................................. 29 | | A.3 | AGD ............................................................................................................................ 30 | | A.4 | ALC ............................................................................................................................. 31 | | A.5 | ATE ............................................................................................................................. 32 | | A.6 | AVA ............................................................................................................................. 33 | August 25, 2026 4 / 33 ####### 1 Executive Summary ## 1.1 Required information | Name of the evaluated ICT product | MF0AES(H)x0, NT2H2xy1G and NT2H2xy1S, release B0 | |--------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Name of the ITSEF which performed the evaluation | SGS Brightsight B.V. (referred to as Brightsight ITSEF) | | Completion date of evaluation | 2026-06-26 | | Date of issuance of the certificate | 2026-08-06 | | Date of issuance of the initial certificate | 2026-04-10 | | Validity period | 5 years | | Unique identification of the certificate | EUCC-3100-2026-7001701-1 Enisa Website Certificate ID: EUCC-3100-2026- 000001-R-01 | | CC Version | ISO/IEC 15408, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC), CC:2022 Revision 1 | | CC assurance package and security assurance components | EAL3, augmented with ALC_FLR.2 | | Assurance level as per Regulation (EU) 2019/881 | Substantial, at AVA_VAN.2 | | Protection Profile(s) | N/A | | Security Policy of the evaluated ICT product | Refer to chapter 4 of this report | ### 1.1.1 Assurance continuity and certificate review | Assurance continuity Scope | Re-assessment | |----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | Impact of changes | • Unchanged ICT product that still meets its security requirements; • Minor editorial changes due to additional review; • Validity of site audit results was reviewed, resulting in a reference to updated STARs | | Source certification | EUCC-3100-2026-7001701 | | Source Certification Report | 26-CB-026 - EUCC-3100-2026-7001701 - Certification Report, version 1.0 | | Updated ETR | [ETR] | | Certified ETR | [ETR-non-CCRA] | | Status of initial certificate | To be withdrawn, as per Articles 13 1 & 14 2 of 2024/482 | | Completion date of certification | 2026-08-06 | August 25, 2026 5 / 33 | CC Version | ISO/IEC 15408, Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC), CC:2022 Revision 1 | |--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | CC assurance package and security assurance components | EAL3, augmented with ALC_FLR.2 | | Assurance level as per Regulation (EU) 2019/881 | Substantial | Please note that the contents of this section together with the remaining contents of the report serve as re-assessment report as per Annex IV of (EU) 2024/482. The intent of this re-assessment is to certify the ICT product under CCRA compliance. ## 1.2 Brief description of the certification report results This Certification Report presents the results of the Common Criteria security evaluation of NXP MF0AES(H)x0, NT2H2xy1G and NT2H2xy1S. The TOE was developed by NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, who also sponsored the evaluation and certification. The purpose is also to inform potential buyers about the conditions required for the product's proper use, so they can ensure it complies with the requirements under which it was evaluated and certified. Therefore, users should review the certification report alongside the relevant usage and administration guides, as well as the security target [ST], which outlines assumed threats, environmental factors, and usage conditions. This helps users decide if the product aligns with their security goals. The TOE is primarily designed for secure applications such as public transportation, access, event ticketing, loyalty, smart packaging, and brand protection. TOE functionality is defined by the requirements in the [ST]. Additional information on TOE features is provided in chapter 2. Brightsight ITSEF performed the evaluation. The evaluation was completed on June 26, 2026, resulting in the evaluation technical report [ETR]. The certification procedure was conducted in accordance with the EUCC, as set out in Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 of 31 January 2024, and its amendments. The scope of the evaluation is defined in the [ST]. The [ST] sets out the evaluation assumptions, the intended operating environment for the TOE, the security requirements, and evaluation assurance level at which the product is intended to meet those requirements. A subset of terms and definitions from [PP] have been included in the certification scope, but it should be noted that no claims to the PP are made due to the claim to the assurance package EAL3, below the minimum required by the PP. Consumers are advised to confirm that their own environment is consistent with the [ST] and to take into account the comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report. The evaluation concluded that the TOE has no special configuration requirements beyond those specified in the user guidance. Users shall review these requirements and install the TOE in the operational environment accordingly. August 25, 2026 6 / 33 The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] provide sufficient evidence that the TOE meets the EAL3 augmented assurance requirements for the evaluated security functionality. The assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.2 and is recognised according to Article 52 of [CSA] as 'Substantial'. The evaluation was performed using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022, R1 [CEM] and assessed conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CC:2022 R1 [CC] (Parts 1-5). This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. ## 1.3 International recognition of the certificate The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of published certificates based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org. ## 1.4 Disclaimer(s) The certification does not guarantee a product is completely free of exploitable vulnerabilities. August 25, 2026 7 / 33 ####### 2 Identification of the ICT product ## 2.1 Unique identification This certification considers the following product: NXP MF0AES(H)x0, NT2H2xy1G and NT2H2xy1S, release B0 ## 2.2 Product components The TOE consists of the following three configurations: - [ ] (© MFOAES(H)x0 — MIFARE Ultralight AES - [ ] (©) NT2H2xy1G — NTAG 22x DNA - © NT2H2xy1S — NTAG 22x DNA StatusDetect The list of guidance documents to use with the product in its certified configuration is as follows and is unique for each listed-above configuration. For the MIFARE Ultralight AES, the following guidance components are delivered. | [DS-MFU-20] | MFOAES(H)20, MIFARE Ultralight AES contactless limited-use IC, Product data sheet | 6 February 2026 | |---------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------| | [DS-MFU-30] | MFOAES(H)30, MIFARE Ultralight AES contactless limited-use IC, Objective data sheet | 4 February 2022 | | [UG-MFU] | MIFARE Ultralight AES, Information on Guidance and Operation, Guidance and operation manual | 12 December 2025 | For the NTAG 22x DNA, the following guidance components are delivered. | [DS-NTAG-223] | NT2H2331G0, NTAG 223 DNA - NFC T2T compliant IC, Product data sheet | 16 December 2025 | |-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------| | [DS-NTAG-224] | NT2H2421G0, NTAG 224 DNA - NFC T2T compliant IC, Product data sheet | 16 December 2025 | | | (UG-NTAG] | | NTAG 22x DNA, Guidance and operation manual | | 12 December 2025 December | 12 December 2025 | 8 / 33 August 25, 2026 For the NTAG 22x DNA StatusDetect, the following guidance components are delivered. | [DS-NTAG-223- SD] | NT2H2331S0, NTAG 223 DNA StatusDetect - NFC T2T compliant IC with StatusDetect feature, Product data sheet | SS December 2025 | |---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------| | [DS-NTAG-224- SD] | NT2H2421S0, NTAG 224 DNA StatusDetect - NFC T2T compliant IC with StatusDetect feature, Product data sheet | 16 December 2025 | | [UG-NTAG-SD] | NTAG 22x DNA StatusDetect, Guidance and operation manual | 12 December 2025 | ## 2.3 Additional requirements to the operating environment of the ICT product As described in the [ST] section 4.2 in order to ensure compliant operation, the product's environment must ensure the following objectives for the environment. OE.Process-Sec-IC is taken from [PP], whereas others have been defined in the [ST]: | Name | Title | |---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | OE.Process-Sec-IC | Protection during composite product manufacturing | | Name | Title | | OE.Secure-Values | Generation of secure values | | OE.Terminal-Support | Terminal support to ensure integrity, confidentiality and use of random numbers | The TOE provides specific functionality that requires the TOE Manufacturer to implement measures for the unique identification of the TOE. Therefore, OE.Secure-Values is defined to allow a TOE specific implementation (refer also to A.Secure-Values). OE.Secure-Values ####### Generation of Secure Values The environment shall generate confidential and cryptographically strong keys for authentication purpose. These values are generated outside the TOE and are August 25, 2026 9 / 33 downloaded to the TOE during the personalisation or usage in phase 5 to 7. The TOE provides specific functionality to protect the transaction with the terminal. Therefore, OE.Terminal-Support is defined to indicate that this also requires certain actions from the terminal. | OE.Terminal-Support | Terminal support to ensure integrity, confidentiality and use of random numbers | |-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | The terminal shall verify information sent by the TOE in order to ensure integrity of the communication. This involves checking of MAC values, verification of redundancy information according to the cryptographic protocol and secure closing of the communication session. Furthermore the terminal shall provide random numbers according to AlS20/31 [1] for the authentication. | August 25, 2026 10 / 33 - 3 Contact information related to the evaluation of the ICT product | Developer Name | NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH | |------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | EUCC certificate holder name and contact information | NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH Beiersdorfstraße 12, 22529 Hamburg, Germany Contact: Holger Matz www.nxp.com holger.matz@nxp.com +49 (0) 40 5613 - 5103 | | Certification Body | SGS Brightsight B.V. (referred to as Brightsight CB) Brassersplein 2 2612 CT Delft The Netherlands Contact: Rob Kemper www.brightsightcb.com rob.kemper@sgs.com +31 15 269 25 44 | | National Cybersecurity Certification Authority | Dutch Authority for Digital Infrastructure - Ministry of Economic Affairs Contact: eucc@dutchncca.nl | | ITSEF | SGS Brightsight B.V. (referred to as Brightsight ITSEF) Brassersplein 2 2612 CT Delft The Netherlands Contact: Magdalena Siwko www.brightsight.com/security-evaluations magdalena.siwko@sgs.com +31 15 203 09 13 | | Subcontractors | N/A | August 25, 2026 11 / 33 ####### 4 Security Policies ## 4.1 Security services The ICT product has the following features: | TSF portion | Title | Description | |---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | TSF.Service | Service functionality | This portion of the TSF comprises internal services like random number generation and provides mechanisms to store initialization, prepersonalization, and/or other data on the TOE. | | TSF.Protection | General security measures | to protect the TSF | This portion of the TSF comprises physical and logical protection to avoid information leakage and detect fault injection. | | TSF.Control | Operating conditions, memory and hardware access control | This portion of the TSF controls the operating conditions. | | TSF.Authentication | Mutual Authentication | This portion of the TSF provides a mutual authentication mechanism to separate authorized subjects from unauthorized subjects. | | TSF.Access-Control | | Access Control | This portion of the TSF provides an access control mechanism to the subjects, objects, operations and attributes defined by the TOE Access Control Policy. | | TSF.MAC | Message Authentication —_ Code | This portion of the TSF allows both the TOE and the terminal to detect integrity violations, replay or man-in-the-middle attacks. | | TSF.Monotonic-Count | | Monotonic Counters | This portion of the TSF ensures that certain counter objects can only be incremented, but never decremented. | | TSF.OTP | One-Time Programmable _ Memory | This portion of the TSF ensures that certain memory areas can only be written once, i.e. once a bit is set it cannot be unset anymore. | | TSF.No-Trace | Preventing Traceability | This portion of the TSF prevents tracing of the TOE by e.g. simply retrieving its UID. | | TSF.Tag-Tamper | Tag Tamper Detection | This portion of the TSF provides a mechanism for detection and permanent storage of the status of the tag tamper wire. | ## 4.2 Vulnerability handling policy ### 4.2.1 Reference [Incident-Resp] Product Security Incident Response Process, NXPOMS-1719007347-4179, 14 Mar 2024, NXP Semiconductors August 25, 2026 12 / 33 ### 4.2.2 Description The vulnerability management process mandated by (EU) 2024/482 Chapter VI and the supplemented information required by (EU) 2024/482 Article 11 paragraph 4 bullet (c) has been provided in [Incident-Resp], and ALC_FLR.2 aspects have been assessed by the evaluator. The result was reported in [ALC PRES]. The ITSEF has established that [Incident-Resp] has been provided to the Certification Body in order to meet (EU) 2024/482 regulation and has also verified that email-address psirt@nxp.com and NXP website www.nxp.com/psirt exist. All evaluator analysis with respect to vulnerability handling has been made within the ITSEF accreditations, such as ISO17025, leaving the developer responsibilities with NXP. The developer has explicitly been made aware of these (EU) 2024/482 responsibilities for a certificate holder. ## 4.3 Assurance continuity policy Due to the nature of the re-assessment, where the certified ICT product is unchanged, an assurance continuity policy was not provided. ## 4.4 Patch management procedure N/A August 25, 2026 13 / 33 ####### 5 Assumptions and clarification of scope ## 5.1 Assumptions on usage and deployment Assumptions about the operating environment are described in the [ST] section 3.4. One assumption from [PP] has been included in the [ST]: | Name | Title | | |------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------| | A.Process-Sec-IC | Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation | | In addition to those, the developer has defined the following assumptions: | [Name | Title | |---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | |A.Secure-Values | Usage of secure values | | |A. Terminal-Support | Terminal Support | | A.Secure-Values | Usage of secure values Only confidential and secure cryptographically strong keys shall be used to set up the authentication. These values are generated outside the TOE and they are downloaded to the TOE. | | A.Terminal-Support | Terminal Support The terminal verifies information sent by the TOE in order to ensure integrity and confidentiality of the communication. Furthermore the terminal shall provide random numbers according to AlS20/31 [1] for the authentication. | ## 5.2 Assumptions on the environment for compliant operation As described in the [ST] section 4.2, in order to ensure compliant operation, the product's environment must ensure the following objectives for the environment. OE.Process-Sec-IC is taken from [PP], whereas others have been defined in the [ST]: Name Title OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing August 25, 2026 | Name | Title | |---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | OE.Secure-Values | Generation of secure values | | OE.Terminal-Support | Terminal support to ensure integrity, confidentiality and use of random numbers | 14 / 33 The TOE provides specific functionality that requires the TOE Manufacturer to implement measures for the unique identification of the TOE. Therefore, OE.Secure-Values is defined to allow a TOE specific implementation (refer also to A.Secure-Values). ##### OE.Secure-Values ####### Generation of Secure Values The environment shall generate confidential and cryptographically strong keys for authentication purpose. These values are generated outside the TOE and are downloaded to the TOE during the personalisation or usage in phase 5 to 7. The TOE provides specific functionality to protect the transaction with the terminal. Therefore, OE.Terminal-Support is defined to indicate that this also requires certain actions from the terminal. | OE.Terminal-Support | Terminal support to ensure integrity, confidentiality and use of random numbers | |-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | | The terminal shall verify information sent by the TOE in order to ensure integrity of the communication. This involves checking of MAC values, verification of redundancy information according to the cryptographic protocol and secure closing of the communication session. Furthermore the terminal shall provide random numbers according to AlS20/31 [1] for the authentication. | ## 5.3 Threats to the ICT product not countered by its security functions Threats described in the [ST] section 3.2 have been considered in the evaluation, mostly defined in [PP]. | Name | Title | |---------------------|-----------------------------------------| | T.Leak-Inherent | Inherent Information Leakage | | T.Phys-Probing | Physical Probing | | T.Malfunction | Malfunction due to Environmental Stress | | T.Phys-Manipulation | Physical Manipulation | | T.Leak-Forced | Forced Information Leakage | | T.Abuse-Func | Abuse of Functionality | | T.RND | Deficiency of Random Numbers | In addition to those, the developer has defined the following threats: | | Title | |---------------------|------------------------------------------------------| | T.Data-Modification | Unauthorised Data Modification | | T.Impersonate | Impersonating authorised users during authentication | | T.Cloning | Cloning | August 25, 2026 15 / 33 | T.Data-Modification | Unauthorised Data Modification User data stored by the TOE may be modified by unauthorised subjects. This threat applies to the processing of modification commands received by the | |-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | T.Impersonate | TOE, it is not concerned with verification of authenticity. Impersonating authorised users during authentication An unauthorised subject may try to impersonate an authorised subject during the authentication sequence, e.g. by a man-in-the-middle or replay attack. | | T.Cloning | Cloning User and TSF data stored on the TOE (including keys) may be read out by an unauthorised subject in order to create a duplicate. | All threats are countered by its security functions. However, the threat T.Data-Modification is also countered by the environment through OE.Terminal-Support, as outlined in the [ST] section 4.3: This objective requires that the terminal must support this by checking the TOE responses. August 25, 2026 16 / 33 - 6 Architectural information August 25, 2026 17 / 33 The TOE design is divided into three main subsystems: ## Analog ### Digital EEPROM August 25, 2026 18 / 33 ####### 7 Supplementary cybersecurity information In relation with information to be made available by the certificate holder according to (EU) 2024/482 Chapter VII, https://www.nxp.com/products/nxp-product-information/eucc-certified-products:EUCCCERTIFIED and www.nxp.com/psirt is stated to contain guidance and information needed by the user, provide information up to 5 years after the certificate validity, and to describe the process of responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities. August 25, 2026 19 / 33 ####### 8 ICT product evaluation summary and evaluated configuration - 8.1 Required information - 8.2 Product settings and configuration | Assurance Components used | • EAL3 augmented by ALC_FLR.2 | |----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | State of the Art documents and other criteria used | • 'Minimum Site Security Requirements', version 2, February 2025 • 'Application of CC to Integrated Circuits', version 2, December 2024 • 'Security Architecture Requirements for Smart Cards and Similar Devices', version 1.1, 31 January 2024 • 'Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards', version 2, 19 December 2025 • 'STAR methodology', version 1, 25 March 2025 • 'ISO/IEC 14443-1:2016- Identification cards - Contactless integrated circuit cards - Proximity cards Part 1: Physical characteristics', March 2016 • 'ISO/IEC 14443-2:2016 - Identification cards - Contactless integrated circuit cards - Proximity cards Part 2: Radio frequency power and signal interface', July 2016 • 'ISO/IEC 14443-3:2016 - dentification cards - Contactless integrated circuit cards - Proximity cards Part 3: Initialization and anticollision', September 2016 • Methodology used for vulnerability analysis: ITSEF proprietary method | | Protection profile details: | N/A | As stated in the [ST] section 1.4.1.1 the product has the following possible configurations: | Configuration | Description | |---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | MIFARE Ultralight AES | The MIFARE Ultralight AES (MF0AES(H)x0) variant of the TOE has a commercial type naming convention with the format MF0AES(H)xyffDpp. | | NTAG 22x DNA (with or without StatusDetect) | The NTAG 22x DNA and NTAG 22x DNA StatusDetect variants of the TOE share the same commercial type naming convention which has the following format: NT2H2xy1vwDzz. | The TOE was tested in the following configurations:  MF0AES(H)x0 - MIFARE Ultralight AES  NT2H2xy1S - NTAG 223 DNA StatusDetect  NT2H2xy1G - NTAG 224 DNA Testing is performed on sample format that does not have the antenna built in, which is acceptable since none of the security functionality is implemented by the antenna. An adapter board with antenna is provided by developer to allow for testing in penetration test setup. August 25, 2026 20 / 33 ####### 9 Results of the evaluation and information regarding the certificate ## 9.1 Required information | Certificate identifier | EUCC-3100-2026-7001701-1 | |-------------------------------------|--------------------------------| | Certificate date of issuance | 2026-08-06 | | Certificate period of validity | 5 years | | Assurance level | Substantial | | Assurance requirements that are met | EAL3, augmented with ALC_FLR.2 | | AVA_VAN level | AVA_VAN.2 | ## 9.2 Assurance requirements The chosen assurance level is EAL 3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2. A detailed decomposition of the evaluation results can be found in Appendix A. ## 9.3 Testing approach and results ### 9.3.1 Testing approach and depth The developer performed extensive testing on interface and subsystem level. The evaluators examined developer's testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities. All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested explicitly. The evaluators reproduced a sample of the developer tests by means of a remote witnessing session, due to the complexity of setting up the testing environment. For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples that were used for penetration testing. ### 9.3.2 Penetration testing The vulnerability analysis was performed according to the AVA_VAN.2 requirements in line with the methodologies mandated by the technical domain, resulting in a test plan reported in the [ETR]. ### 9.3.3 Test results The testing activities, including configurations, test cases and results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details. The developer's tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in [ST] and functional specification. No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the penetration test plan devised by the evaluator. The test results reveal that the TOE is resistant to a basic attack potential associated to the attack rating in the scope of AVA_VAN.2. The 2026 test results from EUCC-3100-2026-7001701 are considered still valid, as the test plan did not change (only additional referencing was added) and testing is sufficiently fresh. August 25, 2026 21 / 33 ####### 10 Comments and recommendations ## 10.1 Comments None. ## 10.2 Recommendations None. August 25, 2026 22 / 33 ####### 11 Security Target | The certification refers to the following security target: | The certification refers to the following security target: | |--------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | ST reference | MF0AES(H)x0, NT2H2xy1G and NT2H2xy1S Security Target Lite, Version 2.4, NXP Semiconductors, 07 April 2026. | Please note that the version published together with this certification report has been sanitized in line with [CCDB-2006-04-004], resulting in [ST-lite]. August 25, 2026 23 / 33 ####### 12 Mark or label associated to the scheme August 25, 2026 24 / 33 ####### 13 Glossary No terms have been used that are not already defined by the CC or CEM. August 25, 2026 25 / 33 ####### 14 Bibliography ### 14.1.1 Evaluation criteria [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, CC:2022 Revision 1 [CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation methodology, CC:2022 Revision 1 [CCMB-2024-002] Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and CEM:2022 (Release 1), Version 1.2 [NI002] Content and presentation of evaluation review meeting version 1 [MSSR] ENISA, Minimum Site Security Requirements, v1.1, October 2023 [CC_IC] ENISA, Application of Common Criteria to Integrated Circuits v2 (draft), March 2025 [SC_ARC] ENISA, Security Architecture Requirements for Smart Cards and Similar Devices, v1.1, April 2024 [SC_OPEN] ENISA, Certification of 'open' Smart Card products, v1.1, October 2023 [AT_POT] ENISA, Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, v2 (draft), February 2025 [JIL-AM] JIL, Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices (controlled distribution), Version 2.5 (Release 5), May 2022 [CCDB-2006-04-004] ST sanitizing for publication, April 2006 ### 14.1.2 Evaluation technical report [ETR] 26-RPT-457 - Evaluation Technical Report 'MF0AES(H)x0, NT2H2xy1G and NT2H2xy1S' - EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2, v4.0 [ETR-non-CCRA] 25-RPT-1567 - Evaluation Technical Report 'MF0AES(H)x0, NT2H2xy1G and NT2H2xy1S' - EAL3 augmented with ALC_FLR.2, v4.0 - 14.1.3 Technical reference documentation | [PP] | Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Registered and Certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, 13 January 2014 | |---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | [ISO 14443-1] | ISO/IEC 14443-1:2016- Identification cards - Contactless integrated circuit cards - Proximity cards Part 1: Physical characteristics', March 2016 | | [ISO 14443-2] | ISO/IEC 14443-2:2016 - Identification cards - Contactless integrated circuit cards - Proximity cards Part 2: Radio frequency power and signal interface', July 2016 | | [ISO 14443-3] | ISO/IEC 14443-3:2016 - dentification cards - Contactless integrated circuit cards - Proximity cards Part 3: Initialization and anticollision', | August 25, 2026 26 / 33 ### 14.1.4 Developer documentation [ST] Security Target, MF0AES(H)x0, NT2H2xy1G and NT2H2xy1S, Rev. 2.4, 07 April 2026, NXP Semiconductors [ST-lite] Security Target Lite, MF0AES(H)x0, NT2H2xy1G and NT2H2xy1S, Rev. 2.4, 07 April 2026, NXP Semiconductors [UG-MFU] MIFARE Ultralight AES, Information on Guidance and Operation, Rev. 2.0, 12 December 2025, NXP Semiconductors [UG-NTAG] NTAG 22x DNA, Information on Guidance and Operation, Rev. 2.0, 12 December 2025, NXP Semiconductors [UG-NTAG-SD] NTAG 22x DNA StatusDetect, Information on Guidance and Operation, Rev. 2.0, 12 December 2025, NXP Semiconductors [DS-MFU-20] MF0AES(H)20, Objective data sheet, Rev. 3.3, 6 February 2026, NXP [DS-MFU-30] MF0AES(H)30, Objective data sheet, Rev. 2.0, 4 February 2022, NXP [DS-NTAG-223] NT2H2331G0, NTAG 223 DNA - NFC T2T compliant IC, Product data sheet, Rev. 3.2, 16 December 2025, NXP Semiconductors [DS-NTAG-223-SD] NT2H2331S0, NTAG 223 DNA StatusDetect - NFC T2T compliant IC with StatusDetect feature, Product data sheet Rev. 3.2, 16 December 2025, NXP Semiconductors [DS-NTAG-224] NT2H2421G0, NTAG 224 DNA - NFC T2T compliant IC, Product data sheet, Rev. 3.3, 16 December 2025, NXP Semiconductors [DS-NTAG-224-SD] NT2H2421S0, NTAG 224 DNA StatusDetect - NFC T2T compliant IC with StatusDetect Feature, Product data sheet, Rev. 3.3, 16 December 2025, NXP Semiconductors ### 14.1.5 ITSEF documentation [IR-ASE] 26-RPT-447 - IR-ASE for MF0AES(H)x0, NT2H2xy1G and NT2H2xy1S, v3.0 [ADV PRES] 26-RPT-448 - NTAG22x - ADV Presentation, v2.0 [ADV_AGD_MFU] 26-RPT-450 - NTAG22x - AGD-ADV Reference Document -MFU, v1.0 [ADV_AGD_NTAG] 26-RPT-451 - NTAG22x - AGD-ADV Reference Document -NTAG, v2.0 [ALC PRES] 26-RPT-452 - NTAG22x - ALC Presentation, v2.0 [AVA PRES] 26-RPT-453 - NTAG22x - AVA Presentation, v2.0 [ATE PRES] 26-RPT-454 - NTAG22x - ATE Presentation v2.0 [TP] 26-RPT-455 - NTAG22x - Test Plan, v3.0 [TR] 26-RPT-456 - NTAG22x - AVA Test Report v2.0 August 25, 2026 27 / 33 #### A Mapping of evaluator actions and verdicts #### A.1 ASE | Evaluator action | Content (CEM ID) | Report reference, including slide# or section # | ITSEF verdict | CB verdict | TR | |----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------| | ST introduction ASE_INT | ST introduction ASE_INT | ST introduction ASE_INT | ST introduction ASE_INT | ST introduction ASE_INT | ST introduction ASE_INT | | 1.1E | 1.1C (CEM:1-1) | [IR-ASE] section 2.1 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.2C (1-2) | [IR-ASE] section 2.1 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.3C (1-3/4) | [IR-ASE] section 2.1 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.4C (1-5) | [IR-ASE] section 2.1 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.5C (1-6/7) | [IR-ASE] section 2.1 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.6C (1-8) | [IR-ASE] section 2.1 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.7C (1-9) | [IR-ASE] section 2.1 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.8C (1-10) | [IR-ASE] section 2.1 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.9C (1-11) | [IR-ASE] section 2.1 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.2E | - (1-12) | [IR-ASE] section 2.1 | Pass | Pass | | | Conformance claims ASE_CCL | Conformance claims ASE_CCL | Conformance claims ASE_CCL | Conformance claims ASE_CCL | Conformance claims ASE_CCL | Conformance claims ASE_CCL | | 1.1E | 1.1C (1-1) | [IR-ASE] section 2.2 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.2C (1-2) | [IR-ASE] section 2.2 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.3C (1-3) | [IR-ASE] section 2.2 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.4C (1-4/5) | [IR-ASE] section 2.2 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.5C (1-6/7/8/9 /10/11/12) | [IR-ASE] section 2.2 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.6C (1-13, 1-14) | [IR-ASE] section 2.2 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.7C (1-15) | [IR-ASE] section 2.2 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.8C (1-16) | [IR-ASE] section 2.2 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.9C (1-17) | [IR-ASE] section 2.2 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.10C (1-18) | [IR-ASE] section 2.2 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.11C (1-19) | [IR-ASE] section 2.2 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.12C (1-20) | [IR-ASE] section 2.2 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.13C (1-21) | [IR-ASE] section 2.2 | Pass | Pass | | August 25, 2026 28 / 33 | Evaluator action | Content (CEM ID) | Report reference, including slide# or section # | ITSEF verdict | CB verdict | TR | |------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------| | Security problem definition ASE_SPD | Security problem definition ASE_SPD | Security problem definition ASE_SPD | Security problem definition ASE_SPD | Security problem definition ASE_SPD | Security problem definition ASE_SPD | | 1.1E | 1.1C (1-1) | [IR-ASE] section 2.3 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.2C (1-2) | [IR-ASE] section 2.3 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.3C (1-3) | [IR-ASE] section 2.3 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.4C (1-4) | [IR-ASE] section 2.3 | Pass | Pass | | | Security objectives ASE_OBJ | Security objectives ASE_OBJ | Security objectives ASE_OBJ | Security objectives ASE_OBJ | Security objectives ASE_OBJ | Security objectives ASE_OBJ | | 2.1E | 2.1C (2-1) | [IR-ASE] section 2.4 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.1E | 2.2C (2-2) | [IR-ASE] section 2.4 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.1E | 2.3C (2-3) | [IR-ASE] section 2.4 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.1E | 2.4C (2-4) | [IR-ASE] section 2.4 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.1E | 2.5C (2-5) | [IR-ASE] section 2.4 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.1E | 2.6C (2-6) | [IR-ASE] section 2.4 | Pass | Pass | | | Extended components definition (ASE_ECD) | Extended components definition (ASE_ECD) | Extended components definition (ASE_ECD) | Extended components definition (ASE_ECD) | Extended components definition (ASE_ECD) | Extended components definition (ASE_ECD) | | 1.1E | 1.1C (1-1) | [IR-ASE] section 2.5 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.2C (1-2) | [IR-ASE] section 2.5 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.3C (1-3/4) | [IR-ASE] section 2.5 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.4C (1-5/6/7/8 /9/10/11) | [IR-ASE] section 2.5 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.1E | 1.5C (1-12) | [IR-ASE] section 2.5 | Pass | Pass | | | 1.2E | - (1-13) | [IR-ASE] section 2.5 | Pass | Pass | | | Security requirements (ASE_REQ) | Security requirements (ASE_REQ) | Security requirements (ASE_REQ) | Security requirements (ASE_REQ) | Security requirements (ASE_REQ) | Security requirements (ASE_REQ) | | 2.1E | 2.1C (2-1/2) | [IR-ASE] section 2.6 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.1E | 2.2C (2-3/4) | [IR-ASE] section 2.6 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.1E | 2.3C (2-5/6/7/8) | [IR-ASE] section 2.6 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.1E | 2.4C (2-9) | [IR-ASE] section 2.6 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.1E | 2.5C (2-10) | [IR-ASE] section 2.6 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.1E | 2.6C (2-11/12/13/14) | [IR-ASE] section 2.6 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.1E | 2.7C (2-15) | [IR-ASE] section 2.6 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.1E | 2.8C (2-16) 2.9C (2-17) | [IR-ASE] section 2.6 [IR-ASE] section 2.6 | Pass Pass | Pass Pass | | August 25, 2026 29 / 33 | Evaluator action | Content (CEM ID) | Report reference, including slide# or section # | ITSEF verdict | CB TR verdict | |-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------| | | 2.10C (2-18) | [IR-ASE] section 2.6 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.11C (2-19) | [IR-ASE] section 2.6 | Pass | Pass | | TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) | TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) | TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) | TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) | TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) | | 1.1E | 1.1C (1-1) | [IR-ASE] section 2.7 | Pass | Pass | | 1.2E | - (1-2) | [IR-ASE] section 2.7 | Pass | Pass | #### A.2 ADV | | | Report reference, slide# section # | including | or ITSEF verdict | CB verdict | TR | |----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------| | Security architecture (ADV_ARC) | Security architecture (ADV_ARC) | Security architecture (ADV_ARC) | Security architecture (ADV_ARC) | Security architecture (ADV_ARC) | Security architecture (ADV_ARC) | Security architecture (ADV_ARC) | | ADV_ARC.1.1E | 1.1C | [ADV PRES] Part 4 | | Pass | Pass | | | ADV_ARC.1.1E | 1.2C | [ADV PRES] Part 4 | | Pass | Pass | | | ADV_ARC.1.1E | 1.3C | [ADV PRES] Part 4 | | Pass | Pass | | | ADV_ARC.1.1E | 1.4C | [ADV PRES] Part 4 | | Pass | Pass | | | ADV_ARC.1.1E | 1.5C | [ADV PRES] Part 4 | | Pass | Pass | | | Functional specification ADV_FSP | Functional specification ADV_FSP | Functional specification ADV_FSP | Functional specification ADV_FSP | Functional specification ADV_FSP | Functional specification ADV_FSP | Functional specification ADV_FSP | | ADV_FSP.3.1E | 3.1C | [ADV PRES] Part 1 | | Pass | Pass | | | ADV_FSP.3.1E | 3.2C | [ADV PRES] Part 1 | | Pass | Pass | | | ADV_FSP.3.1E | 3.3C | [ADV_AGD_MFU] and [ADV_AGD_NTAG] section 3.1 | | Pass | Pass | | | ADV_FSP.3.1E | 3.4C | [ADV_AGD_MFU] and [ADV_AGD_NTAG] section 3.1 | | Pass | Pass | | | ADV_FSP.3.1E | 3.5C | [ADV_AGD_MFU] and [ADV_AGD_NTAG] section 3.1 | | Pass | Pass | | | ADV_FSP.3.1E | 3.6C | [ADV_AGD_MFU] and [ADV_AGD_NTAG] section 3.1 | | Pass | Pass | | | ADV_FSP.3.1E | 3.7C | [ADV PRES] Part 3 | | Pass | Pass | | | ADV_FSP.3.2E | - | [ADV PRES] Part 3 | | Pass | Pass | | | TOE design ADV_TDS | TOE design ADV_TDS | TOE design ADV_TDS | TOE design ADV_TDS | TOE design ADV_TDS | TOE design ADV_TDS | TOE design ADV_TDS | | ADV_TDS.2.1E | 2.1C | [ADV PRES] Part 2 | | Pass | Pass | | August 25, 2026 30 / 33 | | | Report reference, including slide# or section # | ITSEF verdict | CB TR verdict | |--------------|------|---------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------| | | 2.2C | [ADV PRES] Part 2 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.3C | [ADV PRES] Part 2 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.4C | [ADV PRES] Part 2 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.5C | [ADV PRES] Part 2 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.6C | [ADV PRES] Part 2 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.7C | [ADV PRES] Part 2 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.8C | [ADV PRES] Part 2 | Pass | Pass | | ADV_TDS.2.2E | - | [ADV PRES] Part 3 | Pass | Pass | - A.3 AGD | | | Report reference, including slide# or section # | ITSEF verdict | CB TR verdict | |-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------| | Operational user guidance AGD_OPE | Operational user guidance AGD_OPE | Operational user guidance AGD_OPE | Operational user guidance AGD_OPE | Operational user guidance AGD_OPE | | AGD_OPE.1.1E | 1.1C | [ADV_AGD_MFU] and [ADV_AGD_NTAG] chapter 4 | Pass | Pass | | AGD_OPE.1.1E | 1.2C | [ADV_AGD_MFU] and [ADV_AGD_NTAG] chapter 4 | Pass | Pass | | AGD_OPE.1.1E | 1.3C | [ADV_AGD_MFU] and [ADV_AGD_NTAG] chapter 4 | Pass | Pass | | AGD_OPE.1.1E | 1.4C | [ADV_AGD_MFU] and [ADV_AGD_NTAG] chapter 4 | Pass | Pass | | AGD_OPE.1.1E | 1.5C | [ADV_AGD_MFU] and [ADV_AGD_NTAG] chapter 5 | Pass | Pass | | AGD_OPE.1.1E | 1.6C | [ADV_AGD_MFU] and [ADV_AGD_NTAG] chapter 6 | Pass | Pass | | AGD_OPE.1.1E | 1.7C | [ADV_AGD_MFU] and [ADV_AGD_NTAG] chapter 4-8 | Pass | Pass | | Preparative procedures AGD_PRE. | Preparative procedures AGD_PRE. | Preparative procedures AGD_PRE. | Preparative procedures AGD_PRE. | Preparative procedures AGD_PRE. | | AGD_PRE.1.1E | 1.1C | [ADV_AGD_MFU] and [ADV_AGD_NTAG] chapter 7 | Pass | Pass | | AGD_PRE.1.1E | 1.2C | [ADV_AGD_MFU] and [ADV_AGD_NTAG] chapter 6 and 8 | Pass | Pass | | AGD_PRE.1.2E | | [ATE PRES] Part 5 | Pass | Pass | August 25, 2026 31 / 33 #### A.4 ALC | | | Report reference, section # | including | slide# or ITSEF verdict | CB TR verdict | |-------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------| | CM capabilities ALC_CMC | CM capabilities ALC_CMC | CM capabilities ALC_CMC | CM capabilities ALC_CMC | CM capabilities ALC_CMC | CM capabilities ALC_CMC | | ALC_CMC.3.1E | 3.1C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. | ALC_CMC | Pass | Pass | | ALC_CMC.3.1E | 3.2C | [ALC PRES] 1st meeting. | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_CMC.3.1E | 3.3C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_CMC | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_CMC.3.1E | 3.4C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_CMC | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_CMC.3.1E | 3.5C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_CMC | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_CMC.3.1E | 3.6C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_CMC | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_CMC.3.1E | 3.7C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_CMC | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_CMC.3.1E | 3.8C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_CMC | | Pass | Pass | | CM Scope ALC_CMS | CM Scope ALC_CMS | CM Scope ALC_CMS | CM Scope ALC_CMS | CM Scope ALC_CMS | CM Scope ALC_CMS | | ALC_CMS.3.1E | 3.1C | [ALC PRES] 1st meeting. | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_CMS.3.1E | 3.2C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_CMS | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_CMS.3.1E | 3.3C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_CMS | | Pass | Pass | | Delivery ALC_DEL | Delivery ALC_DEL | Delivery ALC_DEL | Delivery ALC_DEL | Delivery ALC_DEL | Delivery ALC_DEL | | ALC_DEL.1.1E | 1.1C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_DEL | | Pass | Pass | | Development security ALC_DVS | Development security ALC_DVS | Development security ALC_DVS | Development security ALC_DVS | Development security ALC_DVS | Development security ALC_DVS | | ALC_DVS.1.1E | 1.1C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_DVS | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_DVS.1.2E | | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_DVS | | Pass | Pass | | Life cycle definition ALC_LCD | Life cycle definition ALC_LCD | Life cycle definition ALC_LCD | Life cycle definition ALC_LCD | Life cycle definition ALC_LCD | Life cycle definition ALC_LCD | | ALC_LCD.1.1E | 1.1C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_LCD | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_LCD.1.1E | 1.2C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_LCD | | Pass | Pass | | Flaw remediation ALC_FLR | Flaw remediation ALC_FLR | Flaw remediation ALC_FLR | Flaw remediation ALC_FLR | Flaw remediation ALC_FLR | Flaw remediation ALC_FLR | | ALC_FLR.2.1E | 2.1C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_FLR | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_FLR.2.1E | 2.2C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_FLR | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_FLR.2.1E | 2.3C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_FLR | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_FLR.2.1E | 2.4C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_FLR | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_FLR.2.1E | 2.5C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_FLR | | Pass | Pass | | ALC_FLR.2.1E | 2.6C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_FLR | | Pass | Pass | August 25, 2026 32 / 33 | | Report reference, including slide# section # | or ITSEF verdict | CB TR verdict | |------|------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------| | 2.7C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_FLR | Pass | Pass | | 2.8C | [ALC PRES] 2nd meeting. ALC_FLR | Pass | Pass | - A.5 ATE | | | Report reference, section # | including | slide# | or | ITSEF verdict | CB verdict | TR | |-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------| | Coverage ATE_COV | Coverage ATE_COV | Coverage ATE_COV | Coverage ATE_COV | Coverage ATE_COV | Coverage ATE_COV | Coverage ATE_COV | Coverage ATE_COV | Coverage ATE_COV | | ATE_COV.2.1E | 2.1C | [ATE PRES] Part 2 | | | | Pass | Pass | | | ATE_COV.2.1E | 2.2C | [ATE PRES] Part 2 | | | | Pass | Pass | | | Depth ATE_DPT | Depth ATE_DPT | Depth ATE_DPT | Depth ATE_DPT | Depth ATE_DPT | Depth ATE_DPT | Depth ATE_DPT | Depth ATE_DPT | Depth ATE_DPT | | ATE_DPT.1.1E | 1.1C | [ATE PRES] Part 2 | | | | Pass | Pass | | | ATE_DPT.1.1E | 1.2C | [ATE PRES] Part 2 | | | | Pass | Pass | | | Functional tests ATE_FUN | Functional tests ATE_FUN | Functional tests ATE_FUN | Functional tests ATE_FUN | Functional tests ATE_FUN | Functional tests ATE_FUN | Functional tests ATE_FUN | Functional tests ATE_FUN | Functional tests ATE_FUN | | ATE_FUN.1 | 1.1C | [ATE PRES] Part 1 | | | | Pass | Pass | | | ATE_FUN.1 | 1.2C | [ATE PRES] Part 1 | | | | Pass | Pass | | | ATE_FUN.1 | 1.3C | [ATE PRES] Part 1 | | | | Pass | Pass | | | ATE_FUN.1 | 1.4C | [ATE PRES] Part 1 | | | | Pass | Pass | | | Independent testing ATE_IND | Independent testing ATE_IND | Independent testing ATE_IND | Independent testing ATE_IND | Independent testing ATE_IND | Independent testing ATE_IND | Independent testing ATE_IND | Independent testing ATE_IND | Independent testing ATE_IND | | ATE_IND.2.1E | 2.1C | [ATE PRES] Part 4 | | | | Pass | Pass | | | ATE_IND.2.1E | 2.2C | [ATE PRES] Part 3 and 4 | | | | Pass | Pass | | | ATE_IND.2.2E | | [ATE PRES] Part 3 and 4 | | | | Pass | Pass | | | ATE_IND.2-3E | | [ATE PRES] Part 3 and 4 | | | | Pass | Pass | | August 25, 2026 - A.6 AVA | | | Report reference, including slide# section # | or ITSEF verdict | CB TR verdict | |--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------| | Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN | Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN | Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN | Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN | Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN | | AVA_VAN.2.1E | 2.1C | [AVA PRES] Part 2 | Pass | Pass | | | 2.2C | [AVA PRES] Part 2 | Pass | Pass | | AVA_VAN.2.2E | | [AVA PRES] Part 1 | Pass | Pass | | AVA_VAN.2.3E | | [AVA PRES] Part 1 | Pass | Pass | | AVA_VAN.2.4E | | [AVA PRES] Part 2 | Pass | Pass | 33 / 33