TrustCB B.V.
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nscib@trustcb.com
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Certification Report
Security Chip MH1701 with IC Dedicated Software, V05
Sponsor and developer: Beijing Megahunt Technologies Inc.
4th Floor, YinFeng Building, No.20, Suzhou Road
Haidian district, Beijing
China
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2400070-01-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2400070-01
Author(s): Haico Haak
Date: 21 November 2025
Number of pages: 13
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 6
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 6
2.2 Security Policy 6
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 6
2.3.1 Assumptions 6
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 6
2.4 Architectural Information 7
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 8
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 8
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 9
2.6.3 Test configuration 9
2.6.4 Test results 9
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 9
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 9
2.9 Evaluation Results 10
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 13
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the Security
Chip MH1701 with IC Dedicated Software, V05. The developer of the Security Chip MH1701 with IC
Dedicated Software, V05 is Beijing Megahunt Technologies Inc. located in Beijing, China and they
also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification Report is intended to assist
prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security properties of the product for their
particular requirements.
The TOE implements a dedicated security 32-bit RISC CPU designed on the basis of the
ARMv6_Marchitecture designed in 40 nm technology. The TOE offer a wide range of peripherals,
including ISO interface, two timers, one watchdog, a CRC module, a true random number generator
(TRNG) and a deterministic random number generator (DRNG), coprocessors for symmetric and
asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. Additionally, a range of communication interfaces, such as
GPIO, NFC.
The TOE comprises the MEGAHUNT security chip MH1701 and IC dedicated software which includes
the firmware SBL stored in ROM and software such as Cryptographic libraries (CL). The TOE can be
configured as either permanently disabled for the downloader or enabled for the downloader.
The TOE offer all functions that are both required and useful in security systems, and integrated
peripherals that are typically needed in chip card applications, such as information security,
identification, access control, electronic banking, digital signature and multi-application cards, ID
cards, transportation and e-purse applications.
This TOE is critically dependent on the operational environment to provide countermeasures against
specific attacks as described in [AGD_OPE] chapter 3.3, 3.6, and 4, and [AGD_CL] chapter 3.9 and
4.4. As such it is vital that meticulous adherence to the user guidance of both the software and the
hardware part of the TOE is maintained.
The TOE has been evaluated by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The
evaluation was completed on 21-11-2025 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in
the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the Security Chip MH1701 with IC Dedicated
Software, V05, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at
which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the Security Chip
MH1701 with IC Dedicated Software, V05 are advised to verify that their own environment is
consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments, observations and
recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the Security Chip MH1701 with IC Dedicated
Software, V05 from Beijing Megahunt Technologies Inc. located in Beijing, China.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware Security chip MH1701 V05
Software
Security IC Dedicated Software 03
Security IC Dedicated
Software consisting of
Security Boot Loader V0.7
Cryptographic library and header files V3.0
Security API library and header files V3.0
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the Security Chip
MH1701 with IC Dedicated Software, V05. For details, see section 2.5, Documentation.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a single chip microcontroller with IC Dedicated Software with large amount of memory and
special peripheral devices with improved performance, optimized power consumption, at minimal chip
size. The TOE with its integrated security features meets the security requirements of a variety of
applications (see chapter1). The security functionality is described as follows: The TOE maintains:
• The integrity and confidentiality of code and data stored in its memories
• The different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and memory access
• The integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functionality provided by
the TOE This is ensured by the construction of the TOE and its security functionality.
The TOE provides crypto functionality like
• TDES, AES, RSA, Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptography
• A True Random Number Generator
In addition, several security mechanisms are implemented to ensure proper operation as well as
integrity and confidentiality of stored data.
The user of the TOE is the developer of the Embedded Software.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.3 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
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2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is a smart card IC with memory and peripheral devices, optimized power consumption, at
minimal chip size while implementing high security. The TOE with its integrated security features
meets the security requirements of all smart card applications such as information integrity protection,
access control, (U)SIM of the mobile telephone and identification card, as well as electronic funds
transfer and healthcare systems. The security functionality is described as follows:
• The major components of the core system are the 32-bit CPU as a variant of the ARM Secure
Core with security mechanisms supporting two modes: unprivileged and privilege
• Bus polarity switching
• The TOE provides a robust set of sensors for the purpose of monitoring proper chip operating
conditions and detecting fault attacks including temperature sensor, internal frequency sensor,
voltage sensor, glitch sensor and light sensor
• AES with countermeasures against SPA, DPA, EMA, DEMA and DFA attacks
• Triple-DES with countermeasures against SPA, DPA, EMA, DEMA and DFA attacks
• RSA cryptography with countermeasures against SPA, DPA, EMA, DEMA and DFA attacks
• Elliptic Curve (EC) cryptography with countermeasures against SPA, DPA, EMA, DEMA and
DFA attacks
• The TOE provides True Random Number Generator (TRNG) specially designed for smart
card applications are implemented. The TRNG fulfills the requirements from the functionality
class PTG.2 of AIS31
• The TOE provides Deterministic Random Number Generator (DRNG), which compliant with
DRG.3 class of AIS31
• Memory access control and the enhanced Memory Protection Unit (eMPU)
• Specific active shielding that against probing and physical manipulation attacks
• Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit provides encryption of all memories inside the chip (RAM,
CRAM, NVM and OTP)
• Parity check for RAM, CRAM, NVM/OTP and some critical registers
• Test mode and downloader blocking protection
• Downloader disabling and protection (only for downloader is valid)
The TOE contains the following functions, but these security functions are not claimed:
• Chinese domestic cryptographic function
• Single DES cryptographic function
• Hash functions for the SHA-1 and SHA-2 family
• Checksum module (CRC)
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Figure 1 Logical architecture of the TOE
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Identifier Version
MH1701 Security Chip V05 Cryptographic Library Interface Manual V1.0
MH1701 Security Chip V05 Security API Library Interface Manual V1.0
MH1701 Security Chip V05 Bootloader User Guidance specification V1.0
The datasheet of MH1701 Security Chip V05 V1.0
MH1701 Security Chip V05 User Operational Guidance V1.0
MH1701 Security Chip V05 Preparative Procedures V1.0
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module
level. The testing has been performed in four categories:
• Hardware: simulation tests, sample tests, wafer tests, qualification and characterization tests.
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• Secure Boot Loader: simulation tests, sample tests, wafer tests.
• Cryptographic library: simulation tests, sample tests, wafer tests.
• Security API library: simulation tests, sample tests, wafer tests.
All TSFIs, subsystems and modules are tested.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations, as
the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples which are identical with
the TOE. The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a number of test
cases designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The total test effort expended was 50 man weeks in total for testing and reporting. During that test
campaign, 5% of the total time was spent on the physical attack, 25% of the total time was spent on
perturbation attacks, 15% on retrieving keys with FA, 45% on side-channel attacks, 10% on attacks on
RNG, 0% on exploitation of test features and 0% on software attack.
2.6.3 Test configuration
The configuration of the sample used for independent evaluator testing and penetration testing was
the same as described in the [ST]. Several versions of Test OS were developed by the developer
according to the evaluators test requirements and update requests.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength for satisfying the
AVA_VAN.5 “high attack potential”. The TOE supports a wider range of key sizes (see [ST]), including
those with sufficient algorithmic security level to exceed 100 bits as required for high attack potential
(AVA_VAN.5).
The strength of the implementation of the cryptographic functionality has been assessed in the
evaluation, as part of the AVA_VAN activities.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the development and
production of the TOE, by use of three site certificates and one Site Technical Audit Report.
One site has been visited as part of this evaluation.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number Security Chip MH1701 with IC
Dedicated Software, V05. In [AGD_OPE] section 2 the method of TOE identification is described.
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2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents, and Site Technical Audit Report for the site
[STAR] 2. To support composite evaluations according to [COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was
provided and approved. This document provides details of the TOE evaluation that must be
considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the Security Chip MH1701 with IC
Dedicated Software, V05, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the
requirements of EAL 6 augmented with ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product satisfies the
security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ’strict’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
” contains necessary information about the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security
functionality, in particular the countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to
the user guidance of both the software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular
obligations or recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that
the documents contain relevant details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
This TOE is critically dependent on the operational environment to provide countermeasures against
specific attacks as described in [AGD_OPE] chapter 3.3, 3.6, and 4, and [AGD_CL] chapter 3.9 and
4.4.. As such it is vital that meticulous adherence to the user guidance of both the software and the
hardware part of the TOE is maintained.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
2 The Site Technical Audit Report contains information necessary to an evaluation lab and
certification body for the reuse of the site audit report in a TOE evaluation.
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3 Security Target
The Security Target of Security Chip MH1701 V05 with IC Dedicated Software, Version 1.7, August 7,
2025 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CRAM Compressed Random Access Memory
DEMA Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
EC Elliptic Curve
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block-cipher mode of operation)
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECIES Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme
EMA Electromagnetic Analysis
eMPU enhanced Memory Protection Unit
IC Integrated Circuit
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the area of IT Security
NVM Non-Volatile Memory
OPT One-Time Programmable
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
SPA/DPA Simple/Differential Power Analysis
TDES Triple DES
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TOE Target of Evaluation
TRNG True Random Number Generator
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “Security Chip MH1701 with IC Dedicated
Software, V05” – EAL6+, 25-RPT-1000, Version 5.0, 31 October 2025
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition “Security Chip MH1701 with IC
Dedicated Software, V05” – EAL6+, 25-RPT-018, Version 3.0, 31 October 2025
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2.1, February 2024
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.5, May 2022
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PP_0084] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, registered
under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, 13 January 2014
[ST] Security Target of Security Chip MH1701 V05 with IC Dedicated Software,
Version 1.7, August 7, 2025
[STlite] Security Target Lite of Security Chip MH1701 V05 with IC Dedicated Software,
Version V1.1, August 7, 2025
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
[STAR] Site Technical Audit Report Megahunt Beijing Site, 25-RPT-960, Version V1.0,
31 July 2025
(This is the end of this report.)