BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018
for
Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.8 V03.50
from
intellic Germany GmbH
sponsored by
Intellic GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.21
BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018 (*)
Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.8 V03.50
from intellic Germany GmbH
sponsored by Intellic GmbH
PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version
1.0, 13 July 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 und AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification
Report for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045 and
according to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1360/2002 Annex 1(B) adapting to Council
Regulation (EC) No. 3821/85 amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 432/2004 of 5
March 2004, Council Regulation (EC) No 1791/2006 of 20 November 2006 and
Commission Regulation (EC) No 68/2009 of 23 January 2009, Commission Regulation
(EU) No 1266/2009 of 16 December 2009 on recording equipment in road transport.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 14 August 2018
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber L.S.
Head of Branch
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks.....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure................................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements...............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification.................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result..................................................................................8
6. Publication.....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results........................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE..............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy.............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope......................................................................13
5. Architectural Information..............................................................................................14
6. Documentation............................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing........................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration..............................................................................................15
9. Results of the Evaluation.............................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE......................................................17
11. Security Target...........................................................................................................18
12. Definitions..................................................................................................................18
13. Bibliography...............................................................................................................19
C. Excerpts from the Criteria...............................................................................................21
D. Annexes..........................................................................................................................22
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task
of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in
the following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance3
● BSI Schedule of Costs4
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of
the Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation
Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal
Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV)
of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt
I p. 519
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018 Certification Report
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15
[1] also published
as ISO/IEC 15408.
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also
published as ISO/IEC 18045.
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a
mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based
on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became
effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a
basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products
related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance
Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical
Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical
Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles
based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogisportal.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under
the terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A
disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components
selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified
on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection
Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to
and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC
certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be
seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate
indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by
the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates
the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014 i. e. up to and
including CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.8, V03.50 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017.
Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.8, V03.50 was conducted
by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on
31 July 2018. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor is: Intellic GmbH.
The applicant of the certification and the developer of the product is: intellic
Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of
this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the
following report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer
to CC itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the
Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the
resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs
to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product
being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification
Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or re-certification). Specifically, if results of the
certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a
system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated
results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods
would require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack
methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate
issued on 14 August 2018 is valid until 13 August 2023. Validity can be re-newed
by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to
refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report,
the Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018 Certification Report
any customer of the product for the application and usage of the certified
product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of
the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party
after issuance of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security
relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and
production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation
and information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from
the evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the
product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any
longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation
and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and
certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to
the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules
have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be
extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for
assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product,
in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.8, V03.50 has been included in the BSI list
of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-
Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7
of
the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the
internet address stated above.
7
intellic Germany GmbH
Innungsstraße 40
13509 Berlin
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Digital Tachograph “EFAS-4.8 V03.50” is a
vehicle unit (VU) in the sense of Annex I B [9] intended to be installed in road
transport vehicles and which is designed in accordance with the Tachograph
Specification [9]. Its purpose is to record, store, display, print and output data
related to driver activities. The VU records and stores user activities data in its
internal data memory, it also records user activities data in tachograph cards. The
VU outputs data to display, printer and external devices. It is connected to a motion
sensor with which it exchanges vehicle’s motion data. Users identify themselves to
the VU using tachograph cards.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 13 July
2010, BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the
assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1],
Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation
Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 und AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are
outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 7.1. They are all selected from Common
Criteria Part 2. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 conformant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.ACS Security Attribute Based Access Control
SF.SECAUDIT Audit
SF.EX_CONF Confidentiality of Data Exchange
SF.EX_INT Integrity and Authenticity of Data Exchange
SF.GEN_SKEYS Generation of Session Keys
SF.GEN_DIGSIG Generation of Digital Signatures optionally with Encryption
SF.VER_DIGSIG Verification of Digital Signatures optionally with Decryption
SF.DATA_INT Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
SF.IA_KEY Key Based User / TOE Authentication
SF.INF_PROT Residual Information Protection
SF.FAIL_PROT Failure and Tampering Protection
SF.SELFTEST Self Test
SF.UPDATE VU Software Upgrade
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 8.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 4.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms
of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in
the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include
a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this
Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by
BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.8, V03.50
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 HW/
SW
EFAS-4.8 V03.50 EFAS-4.8
Hardware version 80
Software version V03.50
The VU is delivered as entire
device (packed together with
its accessories and the
Operating Manual [12]).
The possible variants of the
VU are a combination of non-
security relevant options as
described below.
2 DOC Operating Manual
[12]
(“Bedienungsanleit-
ung Digitaler
Tachograph EFAS-
4.8”)
German version document
number: 1030-130-SEC-DE05
file name:
1030-130-SEC-BDA_E4_8.pdf
The Operating Manual is
delivered in paper form
(together with the VU) or in
electronic pdf-form.
3 DOC Service and Installa-
tion Manual [13]
(“Werkstatt-
Handbuch Digitaler
Tachograph EFAS-
4.8” for workshop
personnel)
German version document
number: 1030-131-SEC-
DE15_WHB_E4_8
file name:
1030-131-SEC-
DE15_WHB_E4_8.pdf
The Service and Installation
Manual is delivered in paper
form or in electronic pdf-form.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The delivery of the TOE from the production facility to the customer which is a
distributor or a workshop is described briefly in the following: At delivery the TOE is
completely assembled and the TOE's case is leaded. The TOE is packed together
with its accessories and the Operating Manual [12]. The Service and Instruction
Manual [13] will be delivered usually in electronic form as pdf-file embedded into a
pgp-encrypted file secured by password via download from the intellic-website
portal. The TOE is marked with a machine readable label which shows the TOE’s
reference, the serial number and the configuration. The serial number is also fixed
within the TOE and can be read out from outside. The firmware of the Security
Controller and the Main Controller cannot be modified anymore except by means of
an update procedure based on VU specific and EU secrets (loaded into the
Security Controller during personalisation). The TOE software version (V 03.50) is
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018 Certification Report
stored within the Security Controller, can be read out from outside and is readable
on the print outs. The customer orders the TOE from the intellic GmbH. In case of
an order the customer is informed about the delivery process by fax or by email.
The information about the delivery process contains the serial numbers of the
Vehicle Units sent to the consumer. Furthermore, the consumer is informed that he
has to compare the serial numbers after receipt.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements
and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The data to be measured (the physical data measurement is performed by the
motion sensor which is not part of this TOE) and recorded and then to be checked
by control authorities must be available and reflect fully and accurately the activities
of controlled drivers and vehicles in terms of driving, work, availability and rest
periods and in terms of vehicle speed.
It concretely means that security of the VU aims to protect
a) the data recorded and stored in such a way as to prevent unauthorized
access to and manipulation of the data and detecting any such attempts,
b) the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the motion sensor
and the vehicle unit,
c) the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the recording
equipment and the tachograph cards, and
d) the integrity and authenticity of data downloaded (locally and remotely).
The main security feature stated above is provided by the following major security
services:
a) Identification and authentication of motion sensor und tachograph cards,
b) Access control to functions and stored data,
c) Accountability of users,
d) Audit of events and faults,
e) Object reuse for secret data,
f) Accuracy of recorded and stored data,
g) Reliability of services,
h) Data exchange with motion sensor, tachograph cards and external media
(download function).
‘Identification and Authentication’ as well as ‘data exchange’ directly require
cryptographic support according to [6], sec. 7.1.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects
lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The
following topics are of relevance:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018
Secure development and manufacturing environment, secure data generation and
cryptographically strong security data, secure transport procedures, secure delivery
processes, secure upgrade process, removal of test points in final TOE, availability
and traceability of tachograph cards, law enforcement controls and regular
inspections, faithful drivers that possess only one driver card and type approval of
motion sensors. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed of the Security Controller
hardware including crypto library provided by INFINEON (Subsystem SC-HW), the
software of the Security Controller developed by intellic Germany GmbH
(Subsystem SC-SW), and all other components of the TOE (Subsystem VU
Platform) as Main Controller (MC) including its software, MC-Flash ROM as well as
MC-RAM, power supply, Case Open Supervision (COS) and Real Time Clock
(RTC).
More detailed information can be found in the Security Target [6], chapters 2.1 to
2.3.
For details concerning the CC evaluation of the INFINEON Security Controller (SC-
HW) see the evaluation documentation under the certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-
0891-V3.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the
product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for
secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter
10 of this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. Developer Testing
The test configuration is based on the TOE as described in [6]. For testing the
developer provided the release version R003. The tests conducted are based on
R003. The TOE’s software version V03.50 is identical to the actual and proved
release version R003.
There are three different kinds of test procedures used by the developer. The first
procedure is to test the TOE through a python script which automatically starts the
tachograph card simulator and triggers all operations. The second procedure is to
prove the behaviour of the TOE by conducting a code review. The third type of
tests is debug-testing. They are conducted with a special version of the TOE
software where the developer can use breakpoints and hooks.
The evaluators have verified that all descriptions and interactions are tested. All
SFR-enforcing descriptions and interactions are mapped to appropriate tests. By
mapping each subsystem and module to at least one test case every subsystem
except of SC-HW is covered. The subsystem SC-HW is tested implicitly because it
comprises the utilised Security Controller which is tested functionally by all tests.
The tests covered all TSFIs as well as each subsystem and module.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018 Certification Report
All test results were as expected.
7.2. Independent Evaluator Testing
The evaluators repeated a wide range of the developer tests in the lab of the
ITSEF and defined some additional independent tests, which were executed by the
developer because they required the debug test environment.
The evaluators centred their test activities with tests on
• commands and operations / sequences according to the identification and
authentication process,
• access control according to rights to functions,
• accountability by holding identification data permanent available,
• audit capabilities in case of security breaches,
• object re-use of temporary storage objects,
• reliability on the availability of data,
• cryptographic support.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and
the actual test results.
7.3. Penetration Testing
On the basis of the methodical vulnerability analysis some potential vulnerabilities
have been identified by the evaluator. These potential vulnerabilities have been
analysed, if they are exploitable in the planned operational environment. For every
potential vulnerability which was identified to be a candidate to be exploitable in the
planned operational environment the evaluator devised and conducted penetration
tests.
The test results showed that the TOE in its operational environment is resistant
against attackers with high attack potential
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE EFAS-4.8 V03.50 is an electronic device, consisting of hardware and
software, and additionally of documentations.
The hardware components include the Main Controller (STM32F429) with Flash
and RAM, the Security Controller (SLE78CFX3000P), the Real Time Clock
(PCF2127T), the Case Open Supervision, the Card Readers #1 and #2 (C702
10M008 925 4), the Printer (ELM208-V10-LV), the Display, the Keypad, LED and
Buzzer, the Power Supply hardware and the battery as well as the metal case.
The TOE software V03.50 is divided into the following four parts:
• EUApplication, identifier "V3.50_00003"
• EUBootcode, identifier "V3.50_00003"
• LangEu, identifier "V3.50_00002"
• EUSC, identifier "V3.50_00002"
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to
the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3]
and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the
TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5, [4]
(AIS 34), and guidance specific for the technology of the product.
The following guidance specific for the technology was used regarding the
composite aspect:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii) The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) JIL Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see
AIS 36). According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the
underlying platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the
platform evaluations (i.e. on hardware [14, 15]) have been applied in the
TOE evaluation.
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36)).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following
assurance components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the
CC (see also part C of this report)
● The components ATE_DPT.2 und AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as
a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0980-2017, re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the new main
controller, the STM32F429 with Cortex-M4 core by STMicroelectronics.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0,
13 July 2010, BSI-CC-PP-0057-2010 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 und AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2
and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic
functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018 Certification Report
as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these
functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are
appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be
derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the
TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines the standard of application where
its specific appropriateness is stated.
Purpose Cryptographi
c Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Standard
of
Applicatio
n
Validity
Period
Decryption
and data
integrity
protection
AES in CBC
and COUN-
TER mode
and CMAC
[FIPS 197] (AES),
[NIST SP800-38A]
(AES CBC mode),
[NIST SP800-38B]
(AES CMAC), [NIST
SP800-38D]
(COUNTER)
128 bits TR-02102-
1
The related
commission
regulation [9]
does not make
any
restrictions
Encryption,
decryption,
Retail-MAC
Triple DES in
CBC and
ECB modes
[ISO16844] for the
Mo-tion Sensor and
[CSM] for the
Tachograph Cards
112 bits [9] See above
Decryption,
verifying for
the
Tachograph
Cards
authen-
tication and
signing for
downloading
to external
media
RSA [CSM], CSM_020 for
the Tachograph
Cards authentication
and [CSM], CSM_034
for down-loading to
external media
1024 bits [9] See above
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of
this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition
all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target
not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of
the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification
within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack
methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a
re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the
certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter
9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a
re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using
the TOE should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates
and patches or take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office
for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMAC Cipher-Based Message Authentication Code
COS Case Open Supervsion
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CSM Common Security Mechanism
DES Data Encryption Standard
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB Electronic Code Book (an operation mode of a block cipher)
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MC Main Controller
PP Protection Profile
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
RTC Real Time Clock
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SC Security Controller
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TR Technische Richtlinie / Technical Guideline
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018 Certification Report
TSF TOE Security Functionality
VU Vehicle Unit
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed
by an International Technical Community endorsed by the Management
Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained
in CC part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based
on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance
requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an
implementation independent set of security requirements for a category of IT
Products that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a
specific identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software,
and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
SFRs.
13. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process
(CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the
Evaluation Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen),
https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the
TOE8
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website,
https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018, Version 35, 30.05.2018, Security
Target EFAS-4.8, intellic Germany GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.8, 26.07.2018, SRC Security
Research & Consulting GmbH, (confidential document)
[8] Digital Tachograph - Vehicle Unit (VU PP) Version 1.0, 13 July 2010, BSI-
CC-PP-0057-2010
[9] Annex I B of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1360/2002 ‘Requirements for
construction, testing, installation and inspection’, 05.08.2002 and last
amended by CR (EC) No. 432/2004 and corrigendum dated as of
13.03.2004 (OJ L 77)
[10] Appendix 11 of Annex I B of Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 1360/2002 –
Common Security Mechanisms
[11] EFAS-4.8 V03.50 Konfigurationsliste, Version 07, 03.04.2018 file name:
1220-111-SEC-DE07_APPR_Konfigurationsliste.docx, intellic Germany
GmbH (confidential document)
[12] Bedienungsanleitung Digitaler Tachograph EFAS-4.8, Copyright 2017 Intellic
GmbH, Hausmannstätten, Österreich, file name: 1030-130-SEC-
BDA_E4_8.pdf
[13] Werkstatt-Handbuch Digitaler Tachograph EFAS-4.8, Copyright 2011-2017
Intellic GmbH, Hausmannstätten, Österreich file name: 1030-131-SEC-
DE15_WHB_E4_8.pdf
[14] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V3-2018 for Infineon Security
Controller, M7892 Design Steps D11 and G12, with specific IC dedi-cated
firmware and optional software, BSI, 09.01.2018
[15] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP) - M7892
G12 and D11 - BSI-DSZ-CC-0891-V3, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
Version 1, 2017-11-29 (confidential document)
8
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document
and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3
& CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting
Document
• AIS 38, Version 2.9, Reuse of evaluation results
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018 Certification Report
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references
to the Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1
chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC
Part 3 chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL)
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part
3 chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE
evaluation refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018 Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1055-2018
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Digital Tachograph EFAS-4.8, V03.50 (Target of Evaluation, TOE)
has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme
Interpretations and by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL
5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 14 August 2018, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common
Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4,
ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) intellic Germany GmbH, Innungsstraße 40, 13509 Berlin (Tegel),
Germany (Development)
b) BAŞARI TEKNOLOJİK SİSTEMLER SAN. VE TİC. A.Ş. Alcı (OSB)
Mahallesi 2030. Cadde No:8 06930 Sincan Ankara TÜRKİYE
(Production, Delivery)
c) Bosch Car Multimedia Portugal S.A. Rua Max Grundig, 35 Lomar,
Apartado 2458, 4705 820 Braga PORTUGAL (Production, Delivery)
d) For the development and production sites of the underlying HW
platform SLE78CFX3000P please see Annex B of the Certification
Report BSI-DSZ-CC- 0891-V3-2018 for Infineon Security Controller [14]
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats,
security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery
(as stated in the Security Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
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