Certification Report Page 1
KECS-CR-17-47
KT Secure Vault V1.0
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-0811-2017
2017. 7.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2017.7.26 -
Certification report for KT Secure Vault V1.0
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for KT Secure Vault V1.0 of KT Corp.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary ............................................................................................ 5
2. Identification........................................................................................................ 9
3. Security Policy................................................................................................... 10
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ......................................................... 10
5. Architectural Information.................................................................................. 10
6. Documentation .................................................................................................. 12
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................ 12
8. Evaluated Configuration ................................................................................... 13
9. Results of the Evaluation.................................................................................. 13
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE) .................................................................. 13
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)............................................................. 14
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD) ....................................................... 14
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)..................................................................... 14
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).................................................................................... 15
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) .................................................................... 15
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary.......................................................................... 15
10. Recommendations ............................................................................................ 17
11. Security Target................................................................................................... 18
12. Acronyms and Glossary ................................................................................... 19
13. Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 20
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the evaluation result drawn by the certification body on the results
of the EAL1 evaluation of KT Secure Vault V1.0 developed by KT Corp with reference to
the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (hereinafter “CC”)
[1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness as well as conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (“TOE” hereinafter) is an information security product that offers
encryption/decryption and Access Control Functions for securing files stored in the user
PC. The TOE offers encryption/decryption and Access Control Functions to secure files
saved on a user PC
TOE consists of KT Secure Vault Client (hereinafter “KClient”) and KT Secure Vault
Server (hereinafter “KServer”). KClient is installed on the group user and group
administrator’s PCs, and the KServer is installed in the server. TOE communicates
between components through the IPv4 network to provide security functions.
The major security features offered by TOE are as follows
- User file encryption and decryption: Perform file extension-based encryption and
decryption
- Volt file access control: Authority level and team id based access control
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
and completed on July 4th, 2017. This report grounds on the evaluation technical report
(ETR) [3] that KOSYAS had submitted and the Security Target (ST) [4].
The ST has no conformance claim to the Protection Profile (PP). All Security Assurance
Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component in CC Part
3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL1. Therefore the
ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) are based upon functional components in CC Part 2 and one SFR
(FCS_RBG.1) is newly defined in the chapter of Extended Component of ST. The TOE
satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2
conformant.
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[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the TOE. The server administrator only
has access from the allowed IP address by using a web browser from the local network
where the KT Secure Vault Server is located. HTTPS protocols are used for
communication between the server administrator’s PC and the KT Secure Vault Server
in order to secure any transmitted data. Moreover, communication must operate in a TLS
1.2 communication operating environment to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of
data between TOE components.
Mail servers are used when sending mail to the group administrator or group users, and
the NTP server is used to synchronize the time in the KT Secure Vault Server. TOE is
operated by communicating with components in the ipv4 wired internet network
environment.
[Figure 1] TOE Operational Environment
Hardware and software requirements for operating KT Secure Vault Server and KT Secure
Vault Client are shown in [Table 1] and [Table 2].
TOE
Components
Category Minimum Requirements
KServer
(KT Secure
Vault Server)
CPU Intel® Core™ i7, 4 Core 2.5 Ghz or higher
RAM 2 GB or higher
HDD 2 TB or higher
NIC Ethernet 10/100/1000 * 1 port
OS CentOS 7.3 (Kernel 3.10.0, 64 bit)
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TOE
Components
Category Minimum Requirements
SW
Apache-tomcat 8.5.15
httpd 2.4.25
jdk-8u131
PostgreSQL 9.6.3
Library
glibc 2.17
openssl 1.0.2l
[Table 1] Non-TOE hardware and software of the KT Secure Vault Server
TOE
Components
Category Minimum requirements
KT Secure Vault
Client
CPU Intel® Core2™ duo 2.2 GHz or higher
RAM 1 GB or higher
HDD 500 GB or higher
NIC Ethernet 10/100/1000 * 1 port
OS Windows 7 Professional (64bit)
SW
Microsoft Visual C++ 2013 Redistributable
(x86) 12.0.30501
[Table 2] Non-TOE hardware and software of the KT Secure Vault Client
Server administrator uses the PC that can operate web browser to use the security
management. The minimum requirements for Server administrator PC are shown in
[Table 3].
Category Minimum requirements
CPU Intel® Core2™ duo 2.2 GHz or higher
RAM 1 GB or higher
NIC Ethernet 10/100/1000 * 1 port
HDD 500 GB or higher
OS Windows 7 Professional (64bit)
SW Firefox 54.0
[Table 3] Non-TOE Hardware and Software of the KT Secure Vault Client
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[Table 4] shows external IT entity that is interacted for TOE operation.
Category Contents
Mail Server(SMTP)
Server for sending e-mails
NTP Server
Server for time synchronization
[Table 4] External IT entities
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2. Identification
The TOE reference is identified as follows.
[Table 5] TOE identification
[Table 6] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation,
facility, certification body, etc.
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(2016.06.27)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security
(2017.06.26)
TOE KT Secure Vault V1.0
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~
CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
EAL EAL1
Protection Profile ST does not claim conformance to PP
Developer KT Corp.
Sponsor KT Corp.
Evaluation Facility Korea System Assurance (KOSYAS)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
July 4th, 2017
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 6] Additional identification information
TOE KT Secure Vault V1.0
Version V1.0.022
TOE
Components
KT Secure Vault Server V1.0.B-022.017
(KT_Secure_Vault_Server_V1.0.B-022.017.tar)
KT Secure Vault Client V1.0.B-017.019
(KT Secure Vault Client V1.0.B-017.019.exe)
Guidance
Documents
KT Secure Vault V1.0 Users Guidance V1.0.009
(KT Secure Vault V1.0-USR-V1.0.009.pdf)
KT Secure Vault V1.0 Preparation V1.0.009
(KT Secure Vault V1.0-PRE-V1.0.009.pdf)
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3. Security Policy
The TOE complies security policies defined in the ST [4] by security objectives and security
requirements. The TOE implements policies pertaining to the following security functional
classes :
- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- User Data Protection
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- TOE Access
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security
Target (ST) [4].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
There are no Assumptions in the Security Problem Definition in the ST. The scope of this
evaluation is limited to the functionality and assurance covered in the Security Target. The
TOE includes the KT Secure Vault Server that is distributed through a CD and the KT
Secure Vault Client that is installed after being downloaded rom the KT Secure Vault Server.
It also includes the KT Secure Vault V1.0 Preparation Procedures and the KT Secure Vault
V1.0 User Manual that are distributed to end users in the form of a manual so that the TOE
can be safely installed and operated.
5. Architectural Information
The physical scope of the TOE consists of KT Secure Vault Server and KT Secure Vault
Client, which are distributed as software, and manuals such as user Guidance and
preparation procedure documents.
Category Identification Type
SW
KT Secure Vault Server V1.0.B-022.017
(file: KT_Secure_Vault_Server_V1.0.B-022.017.tar)
SW (CD)
KT Secure Vault Client V1.0.B-017.019
(file: KT Secure Vault Client V1.0.B-017.019.exe)
SW
(Download)
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Guidance
Documents
KT Secure Vault V1.0 User Guidance V1.0.009
(file: KT Secure Vault V1.0-USR-V1.0.009.pdf)
PDF(CD)
KT Secure Vault V1.0 Preparation V1.0.009
(file: KT Secure Vault V1.0-PRE-V1.0.009.pdf)
[Table 7] Physical scope and boundary
Logical scope and boundary of TOE is shown in [Figure 2].
[Figure 2] TOE Logical scope and boundary
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6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
[Table 8] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The evaluator performed independent testing listed in ETR [3], based upon test cases
devised by the evaluator. The evaluator took a testing approach based on the security
services provided by each TOE components based on the operational environment of the
TOE. Each test case includes the following information:
 Test no. and conductor: Identifier of each test case and its conductor
 Test Purpose: Includes the security functions and modules to be tested
 Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
 Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
 Expected result: Result expected from testing
 Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
 Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the expected and
actual result
The evaluator set up the test configuration and testing environment consistent with the ST
[4]. In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases devised
by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities. These
tests cover weakness analysis of privilege check of executable code, bypassing security
functionality, invalid inputs for interfaces, vulnerability scanning using commercial tools,
disclosure of secrets, and so on. No exploitable vulnerabilities by attackers possessing
basic attack potential were found from penetration testing. The evaluator confirmed that all
the actual testing results correspond to the expected testing results. The evaluator testing
effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and results are summarized in the ETR
[3].
Identifier Version Date
KT Secure Vault V1.0 User Guidance V1.0.009
(KT Secure Vault V1.0-USR-V1.0.009.pdf)
V1.0.009 June 9th, 2017
KT Secure Vault V1.0 Preparation V1.0.009
(KT Secure Vault V1.0-PRE-V1.0.009.pdf)
V1.0.009 June 9th, 2017
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8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is software and firmware consisting of the following components::
 KT Secure Vault Server V1.0.B-022.017
 KT Secure Vault Client V1.0.B-017.019
The Administrator can identify the complete TOE reference after installation using the
product’s Info check menu. And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6
were evaluated with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [3] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all
assurance components of EAL1.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Objectives for the operational environment are clearly defined. Therefore
the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.1.
Extended Components have been clearly and unambiguously defined, and whether
they are necessary, i.e. they may not be clearly expressed using existing CC Part 2
or CC Part 3 components. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The SFRs and SARs are clear, unambiguous and well-defined and whether they are
internally consistent. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.1.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
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narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis for
the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has clearly identified the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned
to ALC_CMC.1.
The developer performs configuration management on the TOE and the evaluation
evidence. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.1.
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include life-cycle model used
by developer, the configuration management, the security measures used throughout
TOE development, and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The developer has provided a high-level description of at least the SFR-enforcing
TSFIs, in terms of descriptions of their parameters. Therefore the verdict PASS is
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assigned to ADV_FSP.1.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
By independently testing a subset of the TSFI, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the functional specification and guidance documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.1.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.1.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t
allow attackers possessing basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.1 ASE_OBJ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.1 ASE_REQ.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMS.1 ALC_CMS.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMC.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_FSP.1 ADV_FSP.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.1.2E PASS
ATE ATE_IND.1 ATE_IND.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_IND.1.2E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.1 AVA_VAN.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.1.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.1.3E PASS
[Table 8] Evaluation Result Summary
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10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The administrator should periodically check the free space of the audit data
storage in preparation for the loss of the audit records, and perform backups of the
audit records so that the audit records are not exhausted.
 The KT Secure Vault Server must be installed and operated in a physically secure
environment that is accessible only to authorized administrators and should not
allow remote administration from outside.
 If the group administrator's group key is lost, users may not be able to decrypt the
encrypted file stored on the user's PC, so administrator has to be careful with key
management
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11. Security Target
KT Secure Vault V1.0 Security Target v1.0.023 [4] is included in this report for reference.
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12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
Authorized Administrator A user who was authenticated by the server
administrator or group administrator and can perform
security management functions
Server administrator Adds, views, revises, deletes group members and group
administrators through the server management UI
Group administrator A group user who uses the administrator functions of the
KT Secure Vault Client in the TOE client area. Adds,
views users in the group, views, revises information,
deletes, etc. within the group. They manage the group
user’s permissions and are able to set target files for
encryption. The group administrator can use all the
functions available to group users, hence all
explanations regarding group users are applicable to the
group administrator without requiring further
descriptions
Group user A user who uses the KT Secure Vault Client in the TOE
client area
Authentication Key A unique symmetric key that is generated for each group
user, and used to log by sharing with the server
Group key A unique group key that is generated when the group is
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registered as a member. It is shared with all users in the
group and triggers an encryption key from the encryption
key seed that was received from the server
Server key A unique group key that is generated when a group
becomes registered as a member. The identifier is
decrypted to verify the file’s permissions, the encryption
key seed is generated according to the permissions,
then sent to the client
PIN When a group user inputs the pin with their ID upon
logging in, a unique authentication key is generated to
trigger the authentication process
Vault file The final file type that is created through the TOE from
the original file according to an encryption request.
Identifiers are included after the original file is encrypted
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~ CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004, September 2012
[3] KT Secure Vault V1.0 Evaluation Technical Report(ETR) V3.00, July 11, 2017
[4] KT Secure Vault V1.0 Security Target V1.0.023, June 27, 2017