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© 2017 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple
iOS 11.2
Security Target
Version 0.6
February 11, 2019
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Table of Contents
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION..............................................................................7
1.1 ST and TOE Reference.................................................................................................. 7
1.2 TOE Overview .............................................................................................................. 7
1.2.1 TOE Product Type..................................................................................................... 7
1.2.2 Required non-TOE Hardware and Software ............................................................. 8
1.3 TOE DESCRIPTION .................................................................................................... 8
1.4 TOE Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................... 9
1.5 Physical Scope of the TOE............................................................................................ 9
1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE........................................................................................... 10
1.6.1 Cryptographic support............................................................................................. 10
1.6.2 User Data Protection ............................................................................................... 10
1.6.3 Identification and Authentication............................................................................ 10
1.6.4 Security Management.............................................................................................. 10
1.6.5 Protection of the TSF .............................................................................................. 11
1.6.6 Trusted Channels..................................................................................................... 11
1.7 Excluded Functionality................................................................................................ 11
2 Conformance Claims .............................................................................................................12
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim ....................................................................... 12
2.2 Protection Profile Conformance.................................................................................. 12
2.3 Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale....................................................... 12
2.3.1 Appropriateness....................................................................................................... 12
2.3.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency ...................................................... 12
2.3.3 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency................................................... 13
3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................................14
3.1 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 14
3.2 Threats......................................................................................................................... 14
4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................15
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ................................................................................. 15
4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment .................................................................... 16
5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................17
5.1 Conventions................................................................................................................. 17
5.2 Security Functional Requirements .............................................................................. 17
5.3 SFRs Drawn from VPNv1.4........................................................................................ 18
5.3.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS) ................................................................................. 18
5.3.2 User data protection (FDP)...................................................................................... 21
5.3.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)................................................................... 22
5.3.4 Security management (FMT) .................................................................................. 22
5.3.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT).................................................................................... 23
5.3.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP) .................................................................................. 24
5.4 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs Found in VPNv1.4............................... 24
5.5 Security Assurance Requirements............................................................................... 24
5.5.1 SAR Requirements.................................................................................................. 24
5.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale .......................................................... 24
5.5.3 Assurance Measures................................................................................................ 24
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6 TOE Summary Specification.................................................................................................26
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures....................................................... 26
7 Annex A: References.............................................................................................................34
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List of Tables
TABLE 1 ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
TABLE 2: ST AND TOE IDENTIFICATION ...................................................................................................................................................... 7
TABLE 3: REQUIRED IT ENVIRONMENT COMPONENTS............................................................................................................................... 8
TABLE 4: EXCLUDED FUNCTIONALITY.........................................................................................................................................................11
TABLE 5: PROTECTION PROFILES .................................................................................................................................................................12
TABLE 6 TOE ASSUMPTIONS.........................................................................................................................................................................14
TABLE 7 THREATS...........................................................................................................................................................................................14
TABLE 8 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE...........................................................................................................................................15
TABLE 9 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................................................................16
TABLE 10 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................................................................17
TABLE 11: ASSURANCE MEASURES ..............................................................................................................................................................24
TABLE 12: ASSURANCE MEASURES ..............................................................................................................................................................25
TABLE 13 HOW TOE SFRS MEASURES.......................................................................................................................................................26
TABLE 14: REFERENCES.................................................................................................................................................................................34
List of Figures
FIGURE 1 TOE DEPLOYMENT ......................................................................................................................................................................... 9
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List of Acronyms
The following acronyms and abbreviations are common and may be used in this Security
Target:
Table 1 Acronyms
Acronyms /
Abbreviations
Definition
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
CM Configuration Management
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EC-DH Elliptic Curve-Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
GCM Galois Counter Mode
HMAC Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IPsec Internet Protocol Security
IT Information Technology
NGE Next Generation Encryption
OS Operating System
PP Protection Profile
PRF Pseudo-Random Functions
RFC Request For Comment
SHS Secure Hash Standard
SPD Security Policy Database
ST Security Target
TCP Transport Control Protocol
TIMA TrustZone Integrity Measurement Architecture
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Function
TSP TOE Security Policy
UDP User datagram protocol
VPN Virtual Private Network
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DOCUMENT INTRODUCTION
Prepared By:
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Dr.
San Jose, CA 95134
This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE),
the Cisco AnyConnect Desktop (TOE). This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions
about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of
security objectives, a set of security requirements, and the IT security functions provided by the
TOE which meet the set of requirements. Administrators of the TOE will be referred to as
administrators, Authorized Administrators, TOE administrators, semi-privileged, privileged
administrators, and security administrators in this document. The Common Criteria Functional
Specification is met through the description of interfaces in this Security Target and the
parameters described within the Common Criteria Guidance Documentation as well as the
Cisco documentation for TOE.
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1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
The Security Target contains the following sections:
 Security Target Introduction [Section 1]
 Conformance Claims [Section 2]
 Security Problem Definition [Section 3]
 Security Objectives [Section 4]
 IT Security Requirements [Section 5]
 TOE Summary Specification [Section 6]
 References [Section 7]
The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common
Criteria (CC), Part 1, Annex A, and Part 2.
1.1 ST and TOE Reference
This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its TOE.
Table 2: ST and TOE Identification
Name Description
ST Title AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2
ST Version 0.6
Publication Date February 11, 2019
Vendor and ST Author Cisco Systems, Inc.
TOE Reference AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS
TOE Software Version 4.7
Keywords IPsec, VPN Client
1.2 TOE Overview
The TOE is the Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS (herein after referred
to as the VPN client, or the TOE). The TOE provides remote users with secure IPsec (IKEv2)
VPN connections to the Cisco 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) VPN Gateway
allowing installed applications to communicate as though connected directly to the enterprise
network.
1.2.1 TOE Product Type
The TOE product type is a VPN client. A VPN client provides protection of data in transit
across a public network. The VPN client implements IPsec to establish a cryptographic tunnel
protecting the transmission of data between IPsec peers. The VPN client is intended to be
located outside an organization’s private network, protecting data flows between a host and the
Cisco 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) VPN Gateway.
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1.2.2 Required non-TOE Hardware and Software
The TOE requires the following IT Environment Components when the TOE is configured in its
evaluated configuration:
Table 3: Required IT Environment Components
Component Usage/Purpose Description
Certificate Authority A Certificate Authority is used to provide valid digital certificates.
Mobile Platform The TOE relies on any of the following CC validated Apple mobile device
platforms:
• Apple iPhone 7/7 Plus running iOS 11.2
ASA 5500-X series
VPN Gateway
The Cisco ASA 5500-X with software version 9.1 through 9.6 functions as
the head-end VPN Gateway.
ASDM Management
Platform
The ASDM 7.6 operates from any of the following operating systems:
• Windows 7, 8
• Apple OS X 10.4 or later
• Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (GNOME or KDE)
Note that that ASDM software is installed on the ASA appliance and the
management platform is used to connect to the ASA and run the ASDM.
The only software installed on the management platform is a Cisco ASDM
Launcher.
1.3 TOE DESCRIPTION
This section provides an overview of the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The TOE is a remote
access application that execute on a mobile platform and provides a VPN tunnel to protect data
in transit on both IPv4 and IPv6 networks.
The TOE provides IPsec to authenticate and encrypt network traffic travelling across an
unprotected public network. By protecting the communication from unauthorized disclosure or
modification, remote users can securely connect to an organization’s network resources and
applications.
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The following figure provides a visual depiction of a TOE deployment.
Figure 1 TOE Deployment
1.4 TOE Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is a mobile VPN client application executing on an iPhone mobile device platform. It
requires one of the following Common Criteria certified mobile platforms:
• Apple iPhone 7/7 Plus running iOS 11.2
Refer to the Apple iOS on iPhone and iPad Devices Security Target1
for information regarding
the evaluated configuration requirements.
1.5 Physical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is a software-only VPN client application. The underlying mobile platform on which
the TOE resides is considered part of the IT environment.
The underlying platform provides some of the security functionality required in the VPNv1.4
Client PP, which is denoted with the phrase “TOE Platform” in this Security Target.
1
https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid10851-st.pdf
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1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified
above consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.
1. Cryptographic Support
2. User Data Protection
3. Identification and Authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. Trusted Channels
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below.
1.6.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of IPsec with ESP symmetric cryptography for bulk
AES encryption/decryption and SHA-2 algorithm for hashing. In addition the TOE provides
the cryptography to support Diffie-Hellman key exchange and derivation function used in the
IKEv2 and ESP protocols. The cryptographic algorithm implementation has been validated for
CAVP conformance. See Table 13 in section 6 for certificate references.
The TOE platform provides asymmetric cryptography, which is used by the TOE for IKE peer
authentication using digital signature and hashing services. In addition the TOE platform
provides a DRBG.
1.6.2 User Data Protection
The TOE platform ensures that residual information from previously sent network packets
processed through the platform are protected from being passed into subsequent network
packets.
1.6.3 Identification and Authentication
The TOE and TOE platform perform device-level X.509 certificate-based authentication of the
VPN Gateway during IKE v2 key exchange. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to
establish a secure channel with a trusted VPN Gateway. The secure channel is established only
after each endpoint successfully authenticates each other.
1.6.4 Security Management
The TOE, TOE platform, and VPN Gateway provide the management functions to configure the
security functionality provided by the TOE.
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1.6.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE performs a suite of self-tests during initial start-up to verify correct operation of its
CAVP tested algorithms. Upon execution, the integrity of the TOEs software executables is
also verified.
The TOE Platform provides for verification of TOE software updates prior installation.
1.6.6 Trusted Channels
The TOE’s implementation of IPsec provides a trusted channel ensuring sensitive data is
protected from unauthorized disclosure or modification when transmitted from the host to a
VPN gateway.
1.7 Excluded Functionality
The following functionality is excluded from the evaluation.
Table 4: Excluded Functionality
Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale
Non-FIPS 140-2 mode of operation on the TOE This mode of operation allows cryptographic
operations that are not FIPS-approved.
SSL Tunnel with DLTS tunneling options VPNv1.4 Client PP only permits an IPsec VPN
tunnel.
These services will be disabled by configuration. The exclusion of this functionality does not
affect conformance to the Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients.
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2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim
The ST is compliant with the Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
The ST is CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant.
2.2 Protection Profile Conformance
This ST is conformant to the following NIAP-approved Common Criteria validated Protection
Profile:
Table 5: Protection Profiles
Protection Profile Version Date
Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients 1.4 12 October 2013
This ST applies the following NIAP Technical Decisions:
• TD0014: Satisfying FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 in VPN GW EP
• TD0037: IPsec Requirement_DN Verification
• TD0042: Removal of Low-level Crypto Failure Audit from PPs
• TD0053: Removal of FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12 Test 5 from VPN IPSEC Client v1.4
• TD0079: RBG Cryptographic Transitions per NIST SP 800-131A Revision 1
• TD0097: VPN Gateway selection for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14
• TD0107: FCS_CKM - ANSI X9.31-1998, Section 4.1.for Cryptographic Key
Generation
• TD0124: Auditable Events in VPN IPSEC Client PP
• TD0138: IPsec VPN Client Testing of SPD Rules
• TD0140: FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12, Test 1 - Importing of Private Key and Certificate
2.3 Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale
2.3.1 Appropriateness
The ST provides all of the functionality at a level of security commensurate with that identified
in the U.S. Government Protection Profile:
• Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients v1.4, dated 12
October 2013 (VPNv1.4).
2.3.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency
The Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies included in the Security Target
represent the Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies specified in the
VPNv1.4 for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection
Profile Security Problem Definition are included in the Security Target Statement of Security
Objectives Consistency.
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The Security Objectives included in the Security Target represent the Security Objectives
specified in the VPNv1.4 for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in
the Protection Profile’s Statement of Security Objectives are included in the Security Target.
2.3.3 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency
The Security Functional Requirements included in the Security Target represent the Security
Functional Requirements specified in the VPNv1.4 for which conformance is claimed verbatim.
All concepts covered in the Protection Profile’s Statement of Security Requirements are
included in this Security Target. Additionally, the Security Assurance Requirements included
in this Security Target are identical to the Security Assurance Requirements included in section
4.3 of the VPNv1.4.
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3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
This section identifies the following:
 Significant assumptions about the TOE’s operational environment.
 IT related threats to the organization countered by the TOE.
 Environmental threats requiring controls to provide sufficient protection.
 Organizational security policies for the TOE as appropriate.
This document identifies assumptions as A.assumption with “assumption” specifying a unique
name. Threats are identified as T.threat with “threat” specifying a unique name.
3.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s
environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE
security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Table 6 TOE Assumptions
3.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is unsophisticated.
Table 7 Threats
Threat Threat Definition
T.TSF_CONFIGURATION Failure to allow configuration of the TSF may prevent its users from being
able to adequately implement their particular security policy, leading to a
compromise of user information.
T.TSF_FAILURE Security mechanisms of the TOE may fail, leading to a compromise of the
TSF.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data. A malicious user,
process, or external IT entity may masquerade as an authorized entity in order
to gain unauthorized access to data or TOE resources. A malicious user,
process, or external IT entity may misrepresent itself as the TOE to obtain
identification and authentication data.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE A malicious party attempts to supply the end user with an update to the
product that may compromise the security features of the TOE.
T.USER_DATA_REUSE User data may be inadvertently sent to a destination not intended by the
original sender because it is not rendered inaccessible after it is done being
used.
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN client's host
is connected without passing through the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data
it contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment will
follow the applicable security configuration guidance.
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4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and the IT Environment. The security
objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and the TOE’s IT environment in meeting the
security needs.
 This document identifies objectives of the TOE as O.objective with objective specifying
a unique name. Objectives that apply to the IT environment are designated as
OE.objective with objective specifying a unique name.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
The following table, Security Objectives for the TOE, identifies the security objectives of the
TOE. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to counter identified threats and/or
comply with any security policies identified. An explanation of the relationship between the
objectives and the threats/policies is provided in the rationale section of this document.
Table 8 Security Objectives for the TOE
TOE Objective TOE Security Objective Definition
O.VPN_TUNNEL The TOE will provide a network communication channel
protected by encryption that ensures that the VPN client
communicates with an authenticated VPN gateway.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_CLEARING The TOE will ensure that any data contained in a protected
resource is not available when the resource is reallocated.
O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION The TOE will provide mechanisms to allow administrators to
be able to configure the TOE.
O.TSF_SELF_TEST The TOE will provide the capability to test some subset of its
security functionality to ensure it is operating properly.
O.VERIFIABLE_UPDATES The TOE will provide the capability to help ensure that any
updates to the TOE can be verified by the administrator to be
unaltered and (optionally) from a trusted source.
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4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment
All of the assumptions stated in section 3.1 are considered to be security objectives for the
environment. The following are the Protection Profile non-IT security objectives, which, in
addition to those assumptions, are to be satisfied without imposing technical requirements on
the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE software.
Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative
measures.
Table 9 Security Objectives for the Environment
Environment Security Objective IT Environment Security Objective Definition
OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN
client's host is connected without passing through the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the
data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the operational
environment.
OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment
will follow the applicable security configuration guidance.
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5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The Security
Functional Requirements included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4, dated:
September 2012 and all international interpretations.
5.1 Conventions
The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections,
assignments within selections and refinements. This document uses the following font
conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC:
• Where operations were completed in the VPNv1.4 itself, the formatting used in the
VPNv1.4 has been retained;
• Assignment: Indicated with italicized text, which may or may not be bracketed;
• Refinement made by PP author: Indicated with bold text; may have Refinement: at the
beginning of the element for further clarification.
• Selection: Indicated with underlined text, which may or may not be bracketed;
• Iteration: Indicated by appending the iteration number in parenthesis, e.g., (1), (2), (3).
Explicitly stated SFRs are identified by having a label ‘EXT’ after the requirement name for
TOE SFRs.
5.2 Security Functional Requirements
This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE/TOE platform. The
Security Functional Requirements that appear in the following table are described in more detail
in the following subsections.
Table 10 Security Functional Requirements
Class Name Component
Identification
Component Name
FCS: Cryptographic support FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric
keys)
FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric
keys)
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation (for data
encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic
signature)
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic
hashing)
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Explicit: IPSEC
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FDP: User data protection FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection
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Class Name Component
Identification
Component Name
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1 Extended: X.509 Certificates
FMT: Security management FMT_SMF.1(1) Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1(2) Specification of Management Functions
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Extended: Trusted Update
FTP: Trusted path/channels FTP_ITC.1 Trusted Channel
5.3 SFRs Drawn from VPNv1.4
5.3.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
FCS_CKM.1.1(1) Refinement: The TOE shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used
for key establishment in accordance with:
• NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” for finite field-based key
establishment schemes;
• NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” for elliptic curve-based key
establishment schemes and implementing “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [no other
curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”)
• NIST Special Publication 800-56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment
Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography” for RSA-based key establishment
schemes
and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of
112 bits. See NIST Special Publication 800-57, “Recommendation for Key Management” for
information about equivalent key strengths.
FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
FCS_CKM.1.2(2) Refinement: The TOE platform shall generate asymmetric cryptographic
keys used for IKE peer authentication in accordance with a:
[
• FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for RSA schemes;
• FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4 for ECDSA
schemes and implementing “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [no other curves]
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]
and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of
112 bits. (TD0107 applied)
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_CKM_EXT.2.1 The TOE platform shall store persistent secrets and private keys when
not in use in platform-provided key storage.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TOE and TOE platform shall zeroize all plaintext secret and private
cryptographic keys and CSPs when no longer required.
FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1.1(1) Refinement: The TOE shall perform [encryption and decryption] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES operating in GCM and CBC mode
with cryptographic key sizes 128-bits and 256-bits that meets the following:
• FIPS PUB 197, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”
• NIST SP 800-38D, NIST SP 800-38A.
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature)
FCS_COP.1.1(2) Refinement: The TOE platform shall perform cryptographic signature
services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm:
• FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for RSA
scheme
• FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4 for ECDSA
schemes and implementing “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [no other curve]
and cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112
bits.
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing)
FCS_COP.1.1(3) Refinement: The TOE and TOE platform shall perform [cryptographic
hashing services] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-256, SHA-384]
and message digest sizes 256, 384 bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-4, “Secure Hash
Standard.”
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FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
FCS_COP.1.1(4) Refinement: The TOE shall perform keyed-hash message authentication
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC- SHA-256, SHA-384, key size
[256, 384 bits], and message digest size of 256, 384 bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub
198-1, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code”, and FIPS Pub 180-4, “Secure
Hash Standard.”
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Explicit: IPSEC
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TOE and TOE Platform shall implement the IPsec architecture as
specified in RFC 4301.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TOE shall implement tunnel mode.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TOE Platform shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that
matches anything that is otherwise unmatched, and discards it.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TOE shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC
4303 using the cryptographic algorithms AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC
4106, [AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 (both specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure
Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TOE shall implement the protocol IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996
(with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in section 2.23), 4307, and [no other
RFCs for hash functions].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TOE shall ensure the encrypted payload in the IKEv2 protocol uses
the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 6379 and
[AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 5282].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TOE shall ensure that IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges use only main
mode.
Application Note: The TOE implements IKEv2 and does not support IKEv1. This is
permitted in [VPNv1.4].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TOE shall ensure that IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be configured by
VPN Gateway based on length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24 hours for
Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TOE shall generate the secret value x used in the IKE Diffie-
Hellman key exchange (“x” in gx
mod p) using the random bit generator specified in
FCS_RBG_EXT.1, and having a length of at least 320 (for DH Group 14), 256 (for DH Group
19), 256 (for DH Group 24), 384 (for DH Group 20) bits.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2 Security Target
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FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TOE shall generate nonces used in IKE exchanges in a manner
such that the probability that a specific nonce value will be repeated during the life a specific
IPsec SA is less than 1 in 2^[256].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 The TOE shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH Groups 14
(2048-bit MODP), 19 (256-bit Random ECP), and 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 20
(384-bit Random ECP).
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12 The TOE shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform peer
authentication using a RSA, ECDSA that use X.509v3 certificates that conform to RFC 4945
and no other method.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 The TOE shall support peer identifiers of the following types: IP
address, Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) and [no other reference identifier type].
(TD0037 applied)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 The TOE shall not establish an SA if the presented identifier does not
match the configured reference identifier of the peer. (TD0037 applied)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.15 The VPN Gateway shall be able to ensure by default that the strength
of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the
IKEv2 IKE_SA connection is greater than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm
(in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the IKEv2 CHILD_SA
connection. (TD0097 Applied and renumbered per TD0037)
FCS_RBG_(EXT).1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TOE platform shall perform all deterministic random bit generation
(RBG) services in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [CTR_DRBG
(AES)].
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that
accumulates entropy from a platform-based RBG with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy at least
equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes
that it will generate.
5.3.2 User data protection (FDP)
FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection
FDP_RIP.2.1 The TOE platform shall enforce that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to all objects.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2 Security Target
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5.3.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)
FIA_X509_EXT.1 Extended: X.509 Certificates
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 The TOE platform shall validate certificates in accordance with the
following rules:
• Perform RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
• Validate the revocation status of the certificate using the Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 2560.
• Validate the certificate path by ensuring the basicConstraints extension is present
and the cA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates.
• Validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for no other purpose shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-
kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3).
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The TOE platform shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the
following is met: the basicConstraints extension is present and the cA flag is set to TRUE.
FIA_X509_EXT.2 Extended: X.509 Certificate Use and Management
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support
authentication for IPsec exchanges, and no additional uses.
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When a connection to determine the validity of a certificate cannot be
established, the TOE shall not accept the certificate.
FIA_X509_EXT.2.3 The TOE shall not establish an SA if a certificate or certificate path is
deemed invalid.
5.3.4 Security management (FMT)
FMT_SMF.1(1) Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1(1) The TOE shall be capable of performing the following management
functions:
• Specify VPN gateways to use for connections,
• Specify client credentials to be used for connections,
• Configuring certificate revocation check,
• Configuring the reference identifier for the peer,
• Allowing the administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate when a
connection to determine the validity of a certificate cannot be established.
• [no additional management functions].
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2 Security Target
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FMT_SMF.1(2) Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1(2) The TOE, TOE platform, and VPN Gateway shall be capable of performing
the following management functions:
• Configuration of IKE protocol version(s) used,
• Configure IKE authentication techniques used,
• Configure the cryptoperiod for the established session keys. The unit of measure
for configuring the cryptoperiod shall be no greater than an hour,
• Configure certificate revocation check,
• Configure the reference identifier for the peer,
• Specify the algorithm suites that may be proposed and accepted during the IPsec
exchanges,
• load X.509v3 certificates used by the security functions in this PP,
• ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates,
• ability to configure all security management functions identified in other sections
of this PP,
• allow the administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate when a
connection to determine the validity of a certificate cannot be established, no
other actions.
5.3.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TOE shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up (on power on)
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST_EXT.1.2 The TOE platform shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code when it is loaded for execution through the use of the
[cryptographic signature verification].
FPT_TUD_(EXT).1 Extended: Trusted Update
FPT_TUD_(EXT).1.1 The TOE shall provide the ability to query the current version of the
TOE firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_(EXT).1.2 The TOE platform shall provide the ability to initiate updates to TOE
firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_(EXT).1.3 The TOE platform shall provide a means to verify firmware/software
updates to the TOE using a digital signature mechanism and [no other functions] prior to
installing those updates.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2 Security Target
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5.3.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 Refinement: The TOE shall use IPsec to provide a trusted communication
channel between itself and a VPN Gateway that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data
from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TOE shall permit the TSF to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ ITC.1.3 The TOE shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for all traffic
traversing that connection.
5.4 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs Found in VPNv1.4
The VPNv1.4 contains all the requirements claimed in this Security Target. As such the
dependencies are not applicable since the PP itself has been approved.
5.5 Security Assurance Requirements
5.5.1 SAR Requirements
The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from the Common Criteria
Version 3.1, Revision 4. The assurance requirements are summarized in the table below.
Table 11: Assurance Measures
Assurance Class Components Components Description
Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic Functional Specification
Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative User guidance
Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1 Labeling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
Test ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability analysis
5.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in this Security Target represent the SARs
identified in the VPNv1.4 PP. As such, the VPNv1.4 SAR rationale is deemed acceptable since
the PP itself has been validated.
5.5.3 Assurance Measures
The TOE satisfies the identified assurance requirements. This section identifies the Assurance
Measures applied by Cisco to satisfy the assurance requirements. The table below lists the
details.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2 Security Target
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Table 12: Assurance Measures
Component How requirement will be met
ADV_FSP.1 The functional specification is comprised of the information contained in the AGD_OPR and
AGD_PRE documentation, coupled with the information provided in the TSS of the ST.
AGD_OPE.1 The Administrative Guide provides operational user guidance.
AGD_PRE.1 The preparative procedures describes all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE
and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security
objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
ALC_CMC.1
ALC_CMS.1
Cisco will provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ATE_IND.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1 Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2 Security Target
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6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures
Table 13 identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified in
section 5 of this ST are met.
Table 13 How TOE SFRs Measures
TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
Security Functional Requirements Drawn from VPNv1.4
FCS_CKM.1 (1)
FCS_CKM.1 (2)
When the TOE needs cryptographic services to support key establishment for
IKEv2/IPsec, the TOE generates asymmetric keys using RSA and ECDSA-based key
establishment schemes keys as specified in NIST SP 800-56A Revision 2
“Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
Cryptography”.
The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed below:
Algorithm Mode NIST CAVP Cert #
CVL ECC, FFC 1895
Key Derivation DSA, ECDSA 1402, 1452
The TOE fulfills all of the NIST SP 800-56A and 800-56B requirements without
extensions.
To support IKE authentication for IPsec the TOE platform generates asymmetric keys
using RSA and ECDSA-based key establishment schemes keys.
The key generation function is invoked by the mobile platform Administrator using the
iOS Configuration Profile which creates keys and certificates used by the TOE for IKE
authentication.
Refer to the Apple iOS on iPhone and iPad Devices Security Target2
for information
regarding CAVP certificates and iOS Configuration Profiles.
FCS_CKM_EXT.2 The mobile device platform stores ECDSA, and RSA private keys and X.509v3
certificates used by the TOE for IKE peer authentication. Certificates are stored in the
iOS Keychain on the mobile device platform.
The TOE does not use pre-shared keys for IPsec.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4 The TOE ensures volatile memory areas containing the following keys it manipulates are
zeroized as follows:
Key, Secret, or CSP Purpose Zeroization Method
SK_ei IKE SA Initiator
Encryption Key
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
SK_er IKE SA Responder
Encryption Key
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
2
https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid10851-st.pdf
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2 Security Target
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
SK_ai IKE SA Initiator Integrity
Key
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
SK_ar IKE SA Responder
Integrity Key
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
Diffie-Hellman Shared
Secret
IKE v2 SA setup Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
SK_d IKEv2 SA key from
which child IPsec keys
are derived.
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
Initiator encryption and
integrity key
IPsec child SA key that
encrypts and authenticates
outgoing ESP traffic.
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
Responder encryption
and integrity key
IPsec child SA key that
decrypts and authenticates
incoming ESP traffic.
Overwritten with zeros
when no longer in use
by the IPsec VPN
trusted channel.
The TOE platform zeroizes private keys it manipulates and stores on the TOE platform:
Key, Secret, or CSP Purpose Zeroization Method
Asymmetric ECDSA
Private Key stored on the
mobile device platform
ECDSA digital signature
generation
Performed exclusively
by the TOE Platform.
Asymmetric RSA Private
Key stored on the mobile
device platform
RSA digital signature
generation
Performed exclusively
by the TOE Platform.
FCS_COP.1(1) The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES in CBC
and GCM mode (128, 256 bits) as described in NIST SP 800-38A and NIST SP 800-
38D.
The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed below:
Cryptographic Operation Mode NIST CAVP Cert #
AES CBC (128, 256)
GCM (128, 256)
5434
FCS_COP.1(2) The TOE platform provides cryptographic signature services for the TOE to verify the
X.509 certificate of the VPN Gateway during the IKEv2 authentication phase of IPsec.
The TOE also relies upon the TOE platform to provide cryptographic signature
verification services for the TOE software during the trusted update process.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2 Security Target
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
On iOS platforms, the TOE calls the SecTrustEvaluate API for Cert Validation
https://developer.apple.com/library/prerelease/mac/documentation/Security/Reference/ce
rtifkeytrustservices/#//apple_ref/c/func/SecTrustEvaluate
Refer to the Apple iOS on iPhone and iPad Devices Security Target3
for information
regarding CAVP certificate information.
FCS_COP.1(3) When IPsec is used in AES-CBC mode, the TOE provides cryptographic hashing to
ensure data integrity using SHA-256 and SHA-384 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-4
“Secure Hash Standard.” The TSF hashing functions are implemented in byte-oriented
mode.
The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed below:
Cryptographic Operation NIST CAVP Cert #
SHS 4357
The TOE platform provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-256, and SHA-
384 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-4 “Secure Hash Standard.” The TOE relies upon the
TOE platform for cryptographic hash functions required to verify the integrity of a
certificate during the IKEv2 authentication phase of IPsec.
Refer to the Apple iOS on iPhone and iPad Devices Security Target for information
regarding CAVP certificate information.
FCS_COP.1(4) To verify the data integrity and authentication of ESP traffic the TOE provides keyed-
hashing message authentication services within the encryption of IKEv2 payloads.
Additionally, the TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services for
Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) in IKEv2. Both use HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-
SHA-384 as specified in FIPS Pub 198-1," The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code,” and FIPS 180-4, “Secure Hash Standard.” HMAC-SHA2-256 has a key size of
256 bits and a message digest size of 256 bits. HMAC-SHA2-256 uses a 512 bit block
size. HMAC-SHA2-384 has a key size of 384 bits and a message digest size of 384 bits.
HMAC-SHA2-384 uses a 1024 bit block size.
The TOE does not implement any truncation of the hash for data integrity and
authentication. Truncation does not apply to Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) in
IKEv2.
The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed below:
Algorithm NIST CAVP Cert #
HMAC 3608
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 The TOE’s implementation of the IPsec standard (in accordance with RFC 4301) uses the
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol to provide authentication, encryption and
anti-replay services. By default ESP operates in tunnel mode. No configuration is
required by the user or administrator for the TOE to operate in tunnel mode.
3
https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid10851-st.pdf
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2 Security Target
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
Remote access policies on the ASA VPN Gateway provide an interface for the
administrator to create ACL(s), defining network segment(s) requiring IPsec protection.
An XML format of the policy on client defines the remote access policy the TOE will
use.
After successful client authentication to the ASA VPN Gateway, a “Cisco AnyConnect
Secure Mobility Client” virtual interface is created and assigned an IP address from the
Gateway’s VPN address pool.
The Security Policy Database (SPD) is implemented by the underlying TOE Platform.
The TOE interacts with the TOE Platform by invoking APIs which instruct the platform
what network routes to include or exclude from the SPD. This enforces what traffic it
protected with IPsec by the TOE and what traffic is not. When a packet requires IPsec,
the TOE platform calls the TOE. The TOE encrypts the packet with IPsec and sends it to
the remote ASA VPN gateway. Packets received from the ASA VPN Gateway are
decrypted by the TOE and sent to the OS via APIs.
The default behavior of the remote access policy on the VPN Gateway is for the TOE to
protect all traffic with IPsec. When all traffic is tunneled, a new default route is added to
the mobile platform with a lower metric directing all traffic to be protected with IPsec by
the TOE. The TOE uses active SA settings or creates new SAs for initial connections
with the ASA VPN Gateway peer. All ESP processing to authenticate, encrypt, and
tunnel the traffic is performed by the TOE.
If an organization explicitly permits use of split-tunneling, a remote access policy on the
ASA VPN Gateway allows the administrator to define IPsec protection for the
organization’s network(s) but bypass protection for other traffic. When a portion of
traffic is tunneled, a route is added to the mobile platform corresponding to the network
segment requiring IPsec protection by the TOE. Network(s) not subjected to the remote
access policy, but reachable from the mobile platform, such as Internet traffic, travels
without being protected with IPsec by the TOE. SPD discard rules are performed
exclusively by the TOE platform.
The TOE implements IKEv2 and does not support IKEv1.
IPsec Internet Key Exchange is the negotiation protocol that lets the TOE and a VPN
Gateway agree on how to build an IPsec Security Association (SA). IKE separates
negotiation into two phases: phase 1 and phase 2.
During IKE Phase 1, the TOE authenticates the remote VPN Gateway using device-level
authentication with ECDSA or RSA X.509v3 certificates provided by the TOE platform.
The TOE compares its reference identifier to the identifier presented by the VPN
Gateway peer. The TOE supports reference identifiers as configured by the
Administrator to be either FQDN or IP address and compares it to the Subject Alternative
Name (SAN) or the Common Name (CN) fields in the certificate of the peer. The order
of comparison is SAN followed by CN. If the TOE successfully matches the reference
identifier to the presented identifier, IKE Phase 1 authentication will succeed. Otherwise
it will fail if it does not match.
Phase 1 creates the first tunnel, which protects later IKE negotiation messages. The key
negotiated in phase 1 enables IKE to communicate securely in phase 2.
The TOE supports only IKEv2 session establishment. As part of this support, the TOE by
default does not support aggressive mode used in IKEv1 exchanges.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2 Security Target
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
The TOE supports Diffie-Hellman Group 14 (2048-bit keys), 19 (256-bit Random ECP),
24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), and 20 (384-bit Random ECP) in support of IKE
Key Establishment negotiated in phase 1. These keys are generated using the DRBG
specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 having 256 bits of entropy.
The administrator is instructed in the AGD to select a supported DH group using one of
the following corresponding key sizes (in bits): 320 (for DH Group 14), 256 (for DH
Group 19), 256 (for DH Group 24), and 384 (for DH Group 20) bits.
For each DH Group, the TOE generates the secret value 'x' used in the IKEv2 Diffie-
Hellman key exchange ('x' in gx
mod p) using its DH private key, the IPsec peer’s public
key and a nonce. When a random number is needed for a nonce, the probability that a
specific nonce value will be repeated during the life a specific IPsec SA is less than 1 in
2256
. The nonce is likewise generated using the DRBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
During Phase 2, IKE negotiates the IPsec SA and includes:
• The negotiation of mutually acceptable IPsec SA parameters;
• The Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) is used for the construction of keying
material for cryptographic algorithms used in the SA.
• The establishment of IPsec Security Associations to protect packet flows using
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).
The resulting potential strength of the symmetric key will be 128 or 256 bits of security
depending on the algorithms negotiated between the two IPsec peers.
The VPN Gateway ensures by default the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms
of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the IKEv2 IKE_SA connection is
greater than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number
of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the IKEv2 CHILD_SA connection.
After IKE phase 2 completes, the IPsec SA is established, providing a secure tunnel to a
remote VPN Gateway. The TOE performs IKEv2 payload encryption using AES-GCM-
128, AES_GCM-256, AES-CBC-128, or AES-CBC-256 algorithms. The VPN Gateway
allows the administrator to configure AES-GCM-128, AES_GCM-256, AES-CBC-128,
and AES-CBC-256 encryption algorithms.
The TOE supports administratively configured lifetimes for both Phase 1 SAs and Phase
2 SAs. The default time value for Phase 1 SAs is 24 hours. The value for Phase 2 SAs is
configurable to 8 hours. Both values are configurable using management functions
provided by the VPN Gateway.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1 The TOE obtains entropy via the /dev/random interface provided by the TOE platform.
The minimum strength of DRBG seed is 256 bits.
FDP_RIP.2 The TOE platform transmits packets over WiFi or cellular radio and therefore is
responsible for clearing residual information. Refer to the Apple iOS on iPhone and iPad
Devices Security Target4
for information regarding CAVP certificate information.
FIA_X509_EXT.1
FIA_X509_EXT.2
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 for device level
authentication of the VPN Gateway.
The user is provided with an X.509v3 certificate which is loaded into the iPhone mobile
device. Upon initiation of an IPsec connection, the TOE relies upon the mobile device
platform to validate the VPN Gateway certificate and CA issued certificate as follows:
4
https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid10851-st.pdf
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2 Security Target
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
• The Basic Constraint is checked to ensure the CA for the certificate of VPN
Gateway is an issuer for certificates (cA flag is TRUE). The VPN Gateway
certificate is checked to determine it is an end-certificate.
• The issuer field of the VPN Gateway certificate is checked to determine it
matches that of the CA certificate, as well as any intermediate CAs that are
identified in the chain below the root.
• The revocation status of the VPN Gateway certificate is checked to determine if
it has been revoked.
On iOS platforms, the TOE calls the SecTrustEvaluate API for Cert Validation
https://developer.apple.com/library/prerelease/mac/documentation/Security/Reference/ce
rtifkeytrustservices/#//apple_ref/c/func/SecTrustEvaluate
The checks described above ensure certificate validation results in a trusted root
certificate.
At any point if a certificate cannot be successfully validated, the AGD guidance instructs
the administrator to configure the TOE to not allow the user an option for continuing the
connection. In all cases, if a certificate or certificate path cannot be validated, the TOE
will not establish an IPsec connection to an untrusted VPN Gateway.
FMT_SMF.1(1) Security management functions are provided by the TOE as specified below:
• The TOE is capable of specifying VPN gateways to use for connections,
• The TOE is capable of prompting the user to select the authentication certificate
to use as well as specifying the location to search. Certificates are used for
device-level authentication of the VPN Gateway.
• The TOE is capable of specifying Username/password credentials used to
authenticate remote VPN users to an authentication server.
• The TOE is capable of configuring certificate revocation check.
• The TOE is capable of configuring the reference identifier for the peer.
• The TOE is capable of allowing the administrator to choose whether to accept
the certificate when a connection to determine the validity of a certificate cannot
be established.
FMT_SMF.1(2) Security management functions are provided by the TOE, the TOE platform, or the VPN
Gateway as specified below:
• The VPN Gateway is capable of configuring IKEv2 IPsec proposals
• The VPN Gateway is capable of configuring IKEv2 authentication
• The VPN Gateway is capable of configuring the cryptoperiod for the
established session keys. The unit of measure for configuring the cryptoperiod
shall be no greater than an hour,
• The TOE is capable of configuring the reference identifier for the peer,
• The TOE is capable of configuring certificate revocation check,
• The VPN Gateway is capable of specifying the algorithm suites that may be
proposed and accepted during the IPsec exchanges,
• The TOE platform is capable of loading an X.509v3 certificate used by the
TOE to authenticate the VPN gateway during IPsec authentication.
• The TOE platform is capable of updating the TOE, and capable of verifying
the updates,
• The TOE is capable of configuring all security management functions identified
in FMT_SMF.1(1),
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2 Security Target
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
• The TOE is capable of allowing the administrator to choose whether to accept
the certificate when a connection to determine the validity of a certificate cannot
be established.
FPT_TST_EXT.1 As a software product incorporating a cryptographic module, the TOE runs a suite of
self-tests during start-up to verify its correct operation.
These tests include:
• AES Known Answer Test - For the encrypt test, a known key is used to encrypt
a known plain text value resulting in an encrypted value. This encrypted value is
compared to a known encrypted value to ensure that the encrypt operation is
working correctly. The decrypt test is just the opposite. In this test a known key
is used to decrypt a known encrypted value. The resulting plaintext value is
compared to a known plaintext value to ensure that the decrypt operation is
working correctly.
• RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification) - This test
takes a known plaintext value and Private/Public key pair and used the public
key to encrypt the data. This value is compared to a known encrypted value to
verify that encrypt operation is working properly. The encrypted data is then
decrypted using the private key. This value is compared to the original plaintext
value to ensure the decrypt operation is working properly.
• HMAC Known Answer Test - For each of the hash values listed, the HMAC
implementation is fed known plaintext data and a known key. These values are
used to generate a MAC. This MAC is compared to a known MAC to verify that
the HMAC and hash operations are operating correctly.
• DRBG Known Answer Test - For this test, known seed values are provided to
the DRBG implementation. The DRBG uses these values to generate random
bits. These random bits are compared to known random bits to ensure that the
DRBG is operating correctly.
• SHA-1/256/512 Known Answer Test – For each of the values listed, the SHA
implementation is fed known data and key. These values are used to generate a
hash. This hash is compared to a known value to verify they match and the hash
operations are operating correctly.
• Software Integrity Test
If any self-test fails subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls is
prevented. If all components of the power-up self-test are successful then the product is
in FIPS mode.
Upon launch, the TOE platform performs an executable code integrity verification check,
invoking the TOE platform to perform digital signature verification operations on
executable files.
These tests are sufficient to verify that the TOE software is operating correctly as well as
the cryptographic operations are all performing as expected.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1 TOE versioning can be queried by the user by Navigating to Settings and then tapping
About. The version information will be displayed.
The iOS App Store on the mobile platform is used to initiate TOE updates. If there is an
update to the TOE software, the app store will indicate a new version is available. The
process to update is the same as a new installation that is described in the Common
Criteria Configuration Guide.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2 Security Target
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TOE SFRs How the SFR is Met
Upon installation a digital signature verification check will automatically be performed
by the mobile platform to ensure the TOE update has not been modified since
distribution. The authorized source for the digitally signed TOE updates is "Cisco
Systems, Inc."
If an invalid TOE update is attempted to be installed, the TOE platform will display an
error and will reject it as invalid or corrupt. If this happens, the user is instructed to
contact Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC).
FTP_ITC.1 The TOE implements IPsec to protect all communication transmitted from the host
destined for a VPN gateway. FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 describes the cryptographic protocol
details.
Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2 Security Target
34
7 ANNEX A: REFERENCES
The following documentation was used to prepare this ST:
Table 14: References
Identifier Description
[CC_PART1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and
general model, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-20012-09-001
[CC_PART2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
functional components, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-002
[CC_PART3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
assurance components, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-20012-09-003
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation
Methodology, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004
[VPNv1.4] Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, 1.4, 12 October 2013