



Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2

Security Target

Version 0.6

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Table of Contents

1	SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION	7
1.1	ST and TOE Reference.....	7
1.2	TOE Overview	7
1.2.1	TOE Product Type.....	7
1.2.2	Required non-TOE Hardware and Software	8
1.3	TOE DESCRIPTION	8
1.4	TOE Evaluated Configuration.....	9
1.5	Physical Scope of the TOE.....	9
1.6	Logical Scope of the TOE.....	10
1.6.1	Cryptographic support.....	10
1.6.2	User Data Protection	10
1.6.3	Identification and Authentication.....	10
1.6.4	Security Management.....	10
1.6.5	Protection of the TSF	11
1.6.6	Trusted Channels.....	11
1.7	Excluded Functionality.....	11
2	Conformance Claims.....	12
2.1	Common Criteria Conformance Claim	12
2.2	Protection Profile Conformance.....	12
2.3	Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale.....	12
2.3.1	Appropriateness.....	12
2.3.2	TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency	12
2.3.3	Statement of Security Requirements Consistency.....	13
3	SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION	14
3.1	Assumptions	14
3.2	Threats	14
4	SECURITY OBJECTIVES	15
4.1	Security Objectives for the TOE	15
4.2	Security Objectives for the Environment	16
5	SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.....	17
5.1	Conventions.....	17
5.2	Security Functional Requirements	17
5.3	SFRs Drawn from VPNv1.4.....	18
5.3.1	Cryptographic Support (FCS)	18
5.3.2	User data protection (FDP).....	21
5.3.3	Identification and authentication (FIA).....	22
5.3.4	Security management (FMT)	22
5.3.5	Protection of the TSF (FPT).....	23
5.3.6	Trusted Path/Channels (FTP).....	24
5.4	TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs Found in VPNv1.4.....	24
5.5	Security Assurance Requirements.....	24
5.5.1	SAR Requirements	24
5.5.2	Security Assurance Requirements Rationale	24
5.5.3	Assurance Measures	24

6 TOE Summary Specification.....26
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures..... 26
7 Annex A: References.....34

List of Tables

TABLE 1 ACRONYMS	5
TABLE 2: ST AND TOE IDENTIFICATION	7
TABLE 3: REQUIRED IT ENVIRONMENT COMPONENTS.....	8
TABLE 4: EXCLUDED FUNCTIONALITY.....	11
TABLE 5: PROTECTION PROFILES	12
TABLE 6 TOE ASSUMPTIONS.....	14
TABLE 7 THREATS.....	14
TABLE 8 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE.....	15
TABLE 9 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT	16
TABLE 10 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS	17
TABLE 11: ASSURANCE MEASURES	24
TABLE 12: ASSURANCE MEASURES	25
TABLE 13 HOW TOE SFRS MEASURES.....	26
TABLE 14: REFERENCES.....	34

List of Figures

FIGURE 1 TOE DEPLOYMENT	9
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List of Acronyms

The following acronyms and abbreviations are common and may be used in this Security Target:

Table 1 Acronyms

Acronyms / Abbreviations	Definition
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CC	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security
CM	Configuration Management
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EC-DH	Elliptic Curve-Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESP	Encapsulating Security Payload
GCM	Galois Counter Mode
HMAC	Hash Message Authentication Code
IKE	Internet Key Exchange
IPsec	Internet Protocol Security
IT	Information Technology
NGE	Next Generation Encryption
OS	Operating System
PP	Protection Profile
PRF	Pseudo-Random Functions
RFC	Request For Comment
SHS	Secure Hash Standard
SPD	Security Policy Database
ST	Security Target
TCP	Transport Control Protocol
TIMA	TrustZone Integrity Measurement Architecture
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSC	TSF Scope of Control
TSF	TOE Security Function
TSP	TOE Security Policy
UDP	User datagram protocol
VPN	Virtual Private Network

DOCUMENT INTRODUCTION

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This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), the Cisco AnyConnect Desktop (TOE). This Security Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements, and the IT security functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of requirements. Administrators of the TOE will be referred to as administrators, Authorized Administrators, TOE administrators, semi-privileged, privileged administrators, and security administrators in this document. The Common Criteria Functional Specification is met through the description of interfaces in this Security Target and the parameters described within the Common Criteria Guidance Documentation as well as the Cisco documentation for TOE.

1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION

The Security Target contains the following sections:

- ◆ Security Target Introduction [Section 1]
- ◆ Conformance Claims [Section 2]
- ◆ Security Problem Definition [Section 3]
- ◆ Security Objectives [Section 4]
- ◆ IT Security Requirements [Section 5]
- ◆ TOE Summary Specification [Section 6]
- ◆ References [Section 7]

The structure and content of this ST comply with the requirements specified in the Common Criteria (CC), Part 1, Annex A, and Part 2.

1.1 ST and TOE Reference

This section provides information needed to identify and control this ST and its TOE.

Table 2: ST and TOE Identification

Name	Description
ST Title	AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS 11.2
ST Version	0.6
Publication Date	February 11, 2019
Vendor and ST Author	Cisco Systems, Inc.
TOE Reference	AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS
TOE Software Version	4.7
Keywords	IPsec, VPN Client

1.2 TOE Overview

The TOE is the Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Apple iOS (herein after referred to as the VPN client, or the TOE). The TOE provides remote users with secure IPsec (IKEv2) VPN connections to the Cisco 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) VPN Gateway allowing installed applications to communicate as though connected directly to the enterprise network.

1.2.1 TOE Product Type

The TOE product type is a VPN client. A VPN client provides protection of data in transit across a public network. The VPN client implements IPsec to establish a cryptographic tunnel protecting the transmission of data between IPsec peers. The VPN client is intended to be located outside an organization's private network, protecting data flows between a host and the Cisco 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) VPN Gateway.

1.2.2 Required non-TOE Hardware and Software

The TOE requires the following IT Environment Components when the TOE is configured in its evaluated configuration:

Table 3: Required IT Environment Components

Component	Usage/Purpose Description
Certificate Authority	A Certificate Authority is used to provide valid digital certificates.
Mobile Platform	The TOE relies on any of the following CC validated Apple mobile device platforms: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Apple iPhone 7/7 Plus running iOS 11.2
ASA 5500-X series VPN Gateway	The Cisco ASA 5500-X with software version 9.1 through 9.6 functions as the head-end VPN Gateway.
ASDM Management Platform	The ASDM 7.6 operates from any of the following operating systems: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Windows 7, 8 Apple OS X 10.4 or later Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 (GNOME or KDE) <p>Note that that ASDM software is installed on the ASA appliance and the management platform is used to connect to the ASA and run the ASDM. The only software installed on the management platform is a Cisco ASDM Launcher.</p>

1.3 TOE DESCRIPTION

This section provides an overview of the Target of Evaluation (TOE). The TOE is a remote access application that execute on a mobile platform and provides a VPN tunnel to protect data in transit on both IPv4 and IPv6 networks.

The TOE provides IPsec to authenticate and encrypt network traffic travelling across an unprotected public network. By protecting the communication from unauthorized disclosure or modification, remote users can securely connect to an organization's network resources and applications.

The following figure provides a visual depiction of a TOE deployment.




Figure 1 TOE Deployment

1.4 TOE Evaluated Configuration

The TOE is a mobile VPN client application executing on an iPhone mobile device platform. It requires one of the following Common Criteria certified mobile platforms:

- Apple iPhone 7/7 Plus running iOS 11.2

Refer to the Apple iOS on iPhone and iPad Devices Security Target¹ for information regarding the evaluated configuration requirements.

1.5 Physical Scope of the TOE

The TOE is a software-only VPN client application. The underlying mobile platform on which the TOE resides is considered part of the IT environment.

The underlying platform provides some of the security functionality required in the VPNv1.4 Client PP, which is denoted with the phrase “TOE Platform” in this Security Target.

¹ https://www.niap-ccavs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid10851-st.pdf

1.6 Logical Scope of the TOE

The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified above consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.

1. Cryptographic Support
2. User Data Protection
3. Identification and Authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. Trusted Channels

These features are described in more detail in the subsections below.

1.6.1 Cryptographic support

The TOE provides cryptography in support of IPsec with ESP symmetric cryptography for bulk AES encryption/decryption and SHA-2 algorithm for hashing. In addition the TOE provides the cryptography to support Diffie-Hellman key exchange and derivation function used in the IKEv2 and ESP protocols. The cryptographic algorithm implementation has been validated for CAVP conformance. See Table 13 in section 6 for certificate references.

The TOE platform provides asymmetric cryptography, which is used by the TOE for IKE peer authentication using digital signature and hashing services. In addition the TOE platform provides a DRBG.

1.6.2 User Data Protection

The TOE platform ensures that residual information from previously sent network packets processed through the platform are protected from being passed into subsequent network packets.

1.6.3 Identification and Authentication

The TOE and TOE platform perform device-level X.509 certificate-based authentication of the VPN Gateway during IKE v2 key exchange. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted VPN Gateway. The secure channel is established only after each endpoint successfully authenticates each other.

1.6.4 Security Management

The TOE, TOE platform, and VPN Gateway provide the management functions to configure the security functionality provided by the TOE.

1.6.5 Protection of the TSF

The TOE performs a suite of self-tests during initial start-up to verify correct operation of its CAVP tested algorithms. Upon execution, the integrity of the TOEs software executables is also verified.

The TOE Platform provides for verification of TOE software updates prior installation.

1.6.6 Trusted Channels

The TOE's implementation of IPsec provides a trusted channel ensuring sensitive data is protected from unauthorized disclosure or modification when transmitted from the host to a VPN gateway.

1.7 Excluded Functionality

The following functionality is excluded from the evaluation.

Table 4: Excluded Functionality

Excluded Functionality	Exclusion Rationale
Non-FIPS 140-2 mode of operation on the TOE	This mode of operation allows cryptographic operations that are not FIPS-approved.
SSL Tunnel with DLTS tunneling options	VPNv1.4 Client PP only permits an IPsec VPN tunnel.

These services will be disabled by configuration. The exclusion of this functionality does not affect conformance to the Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients.

2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS

2.1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim

The ST is compliant with the Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012. The ST is CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant.

2.2 Protection Profile Conformance

This ST is conformant to the following NIAP-approved Common Criteria validated Protection Profile:

Table 5: Protection Profiles

Protection Profile	Version	Date
Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients	1.4	12 October 2013

This ST applies the following NIAP Technical Decisions:

- TD0014: Satisfying FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 in VPN GW EP
- TD0037: IPsec Requirement_DN Verification
- TD0042: Removal of Low-level Crypto Failure Audit from PPs
- TD0053: Removal of FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12 Test 5 from VPN IPSEC Client v1.4
- TD0079: RBG Cryptographic Transitions per NIST SP 800-131A Revision 1
- TD0097: VPN Gateway selection for FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14
- TD0107: FCS_CKM - ANSI X9.31-1998, Section 4.1.for Cryptographic Key Generation
- TD0124: Auditable Events in VPN IPSEC Client PP
- TD0138: IPsec VPN Client Testing of SPD Rules
- TD0140: FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12, Test 1 - Importing of Private Key and Certificate

2.3 Protection Profile Conformance Claim Rationale

2.3.1 Appropriateness

The ST provides all of the functionality at a level of security commensurate with that identified in the U.S. Government Protection Profile:

- Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients v1.4, dated 12 October 2013 (VPNv1.4).

2.3.2 TOE Security Problem Definition Consistency

The Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies included in the Security Target represent the Assumptions, Threats, and Organization Security Policies specified in the VPNv1.4 for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile Security Problem Definition are included in the Security Target Statement of Security Objectives Consistency.

The Security Objectives included in the Security Target represent the Security Objectives specified in the VPNv1.4 for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile's Statement of Security Objectives are included in the Security Target.

2.3.3 Statement of Security Requirements Consistency

The Security Functional Requirements included in the Security Target represent the Security Functional Requirements specified in the VPNv1.4 for which conformance is claimed verbatim. All concepts covered in the Protection Profile's Statement of Security Requirements are included in this Security Target. Additionally, the Security Assurance Requirements included in this Security Target are identical to the Security Assurance Requirements included in section 4.3 of the VPNv1.4.

3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION

This section identifies the following:

- ◆ Significant assumptions about the TOE’s operational environment.
- ◆ IT related threats to the organization countered by the TOE.
- ◆ Environmental threats requiring controls to provide sufficient protection.
- ◆ Organizational security policies for the TOE as appropriate.

This document identifies assumptions as A.assumption with “assumption” specifying a unique name. Threats are identified as T.threat with “threat” specifying a unique name.

3.1 Assumptions

The specific conditions listed in the following subsections are assumed to exist in the TOE’s environment. These assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.

Table 6 TOE Assumptions

Assumption	Assumption Definition
A.NO_TOE_BYPASS	Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN client's host is connected without passing through the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL	Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the environment.
A.TRUSTED_CONFIG	Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment will follow the applicable security configuration guidance.

3.2 Threats

The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is unsophisticated.

Table 7 Threats

Threat	Threat Definition
T.TSF_CONFIGURATION	Failure to allow configuration of the TSF may prevent its users from being able to adequately implement their particular security policy, leading to a compromise of user information.
T.TSF_FAILURE	Security mechanisms of the TOE may fail, leading to a compromise of the TSF.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS	A user may gain unauthorized access to the TOE data. A malicious user, process, or external IT entity may masquerade as an authorized entity in order to gain unauthorized access to data or TOE resources. A malicious user, process, or external IT entity may misrepresent itself as the TOE to obtain identification and authentication data.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_UPDATE	A malicious party attempts to supply the end user with an update to the product that may compromise the security features of the TOE.
T.USER_DATA_REUSE	User data may be inadvertently sent to a destination not intended by the original sender because it is not rendered inaccessible after it is done being used.

4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES

This section identifies the security objectives of the TOE and the IT Environment. The security objectives identify the responsibilities of the TOE and the TOE's IT environment in meeting the security needs.

- ◆ This document identifies objectives of the TOE as O.objective with objective specifying a unique name. Objectives that apply to the IT environment are designated as OE.objective with objective specifying a unique name.

4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

The following table, Security Objectives for the TOE, identifies the security objectives of the TOE. These security objectives reflect the stated intent to counter identified threats and/or comply with any security policies identified. An explanation of the relationship between the objectives and the threats/policies is provided in the rationale section of this document.

Table 8 Security Objectives for the TOE

TOE Objective	TOE Security Objective Definition
O.VPN_TUNNEL	The TOE will provide a network communication channel protected by encryption that ensures that the VPN client communicates with an authenticated VPN gateway.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_CLEARING	The TOE will ensure that any data contained in a protected resource is not available when the resource is reallocated.
O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION	The TOE will provide mechanisms to allow administrators to be able to configure the TOE.
O.TSF_SELF_TEST	The TOE will provide the capability to test some subset of its security functionality to ensure it is operating properly.
O.VERIFIABLE_UPDATES	The TOE will provide the capability to help ensure that any updates to the TOE can be verified by the administrator to be unaltered and (optionally) from a trusted source.

4.2 Security Objectives for the Environment

All of the assumptions stated in section 3.1 are considered to be security objectives for the environment. The following are the Protection Profile non-IT security objectives, which, in addition to those assumptions, are to be satisfied without imposing technical requirements on the TOE. That is, they will not require the implementation of functions in the TOE software. Thus, they will be satisfied largely through application of procedural or administrative measures.

Table 9 Security Objectives for the Environment

Environment Security Objective	IT Environment Security Objective Definition
OE.NO_TOE_BYPASS	Information cannot flow onto the network to which the VPN client's host is connected without passing through the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL	Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is assumed to be provided by the operational environment.
OE.TRUSTED_CONFIG	Personnel configuring the TOE and its operational environment will follow the applicable security configuration guidance.

5 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE. The Security Functional Requirements included in this section are derived from Part 2 of the *Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4, dated: September 2012* and all international interpretations.

5.1 Conventions

The CC defines operations on Security Functional Requirements: assignments, selections, assignments within selections and refinements. This document uses the following font conventions to identify the operations defined by the CC:

- Where operations were completed in the VPNv1.4 itself, the formatting used in the VPNv1.4 has been retained;
- Assignment: Indicated with *italicized* text, which may or may not be bracketed;
- Refinement made by PP author: Indicated with **bold** text; may have **Refinement:** at the beginning of the element for further clarification.
- Selection: Indicated with underlined text, which may or may not be bracketed;
- Iteration: Indicated by appending the iteration number in parenthesis, e.g., (1), (2), (3).

Explicitly stated SFRs are identified by having a label ‘EXT’ after the requirement name for TOE SFRs.

5.2 Security Functional Requirements

This section identifies the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE/TOE platform. The Security Functional Requirements that appear in the following table are described in more detail in the following subsections.

Table 10 Security Functional Requirements

Class Name	Component Identification	Component Name
FCS: Cryptographic support	FCS_CKM.1(1)	Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
	FCS_CKM.1(2)	Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
	FCS_CKM_EXT.2	Cryptographic Key Storage
	FCS_CKM_EXT.4	Cryptographic Key Zeroization
	FCS_COP.1(1)	Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption)
	FCS_COP.1(2)	Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature)
	FCS_COP.1(3)	Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing)
	FCS_COP.1(4)	Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
	FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1	Explicit: IPSEC
	FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FDP: User data protection	FDP_RIP.2	Full Residual Information Protection

Class Name	Component Identification	Component Name
FIA: Identification and authentication	FIA_X509_EXT.1	Extended: X.509 Certificates
FMT: Security management	FMT_SMF.1(1)	Specification of Management Functions
	FMT_SMF.1(2)	Specification of Management Functions
FPT: Protection of the TSF	FPT_TST_EXT.1	TSF Testing
	FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Extended: Trusted Update
FTP: Trusted path/channels	FTP_ITC.1	Trusted Channel

5.3 SFRs Drawn from VPNv1.4

5.3.1 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

5.3.1.1 FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)

FCS_CKM.1.1(1) Refinement: The TOE shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys **used for key establishment** in accordance with:

- *NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” for finite field-based key establishment schemes;*
- *NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” for elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes and implementing “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [no other curves] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard”)*
- NIST Special Publication 800-56B, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography” for RSA-based key establishment schemes

and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112 bits. See NIST Special Publication 800-57, “Recommendation for Key Management” for information about equivalent key strengths.

5.3.1.2 FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)

FCS_CKM.1.2(2) Refinement: The TOE platform shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys **used for IKE peer authentication** in accordance with a:

- [
- FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for RSA schemes;
 - FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4 for ECDSA schemes and implementing “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [no other curves]

]

and specified cryptographic key sizes *equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112 bits.* (TD0107 applied)

5.3.1.3 FCS_CKM_EXT.2 Cryptographic Key Storage

FCS_CKM_EXT.2.1 The TOE platform shall store persistent secrets and private keys when not in use in platform-provided key storage.

5.3.1.4 FCS_CKM_EXT.4 Cryptographic Key Zeroization

FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TOE and TOE platform shall zeroize all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs when no longer required.

5.3.1.5 FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption)

FCS_COP.1.1(1) Refinement: The TOE shall perform [*encryption and decryption*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm *AES operating in GCM and CBC mode* with cryptographic key sizes 128-bits and 256-bits that meets the following:

- **FIPS PUB 197, “Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)”**
- **NIST SP 800-38D, NIST SP 800-38A.**

5.3.1.6 FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature)

FCS_COP.1.1(2) Refinement: The TOE platform shall perform **cryptographic signature services** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm:

- **FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for RSA scheme**
- **FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4 for ECDSA schemes and implementing “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [no other curve]**

and cryptographic key sizes *equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112 bits.*

5.3.1.7 FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing)

FCS_COP.1.1(3) Refinement: The TOE and TOE platform shall perform [*cryptographic hashing services*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **SHA-256, SHA-384** and message digest sizes **256, 384 bits** that meet the following: *FIPS Pub 180-4, “Secure Hash Standard.”*

5.3.1.8 FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)

FCS_COP.1.1(4) Refinement: The TOE shall perform **keyed-hash message authentication** in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm **HMAC- SHA-256, SHA-384, key size [256, 384 bits], and message digest size of 256, 384 bits** that meet the following: **FIPS Pub 198-1, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code", and FIPS Pub 180-4, "Secure Hash Standard."**

5.3.1.9 FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Explicit: IPSEC

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TOE and TOE Platform shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TOE shall implement tunnel mode.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TOE Platform shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is otherwise unmatched, and discards it.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TOE shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using the cryptographic algorithms AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106, [AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 (both specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TOE shall implement the protocol IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996 (with mandatory support for NAT traversal as specified in section 2.23), 4307, and [no other RFCs for hash functions].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TOE shall ensure the encrypted payload in the IKEv2 protocol uses the cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 6379 and [AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 5282].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TOE shall ensure that IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges use only main mode.

***Application Note:** The TOE implements IKEv2 and does not support IKEv1. This is permitted in [VPNv1.4].*

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TOE shall ensure that IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be configured by VPN Gateway based on length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TOE shall generate the secret value x used in the IKE Diffie-Hellman key exchange (" x " in $g^x \text{ mod } p$) using the random bit generator specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1, and having a length of at least 320 (for DH Group 14), 256 (for DH Group 19), 256 (for DH Group 24), 384 (for DH Group 20) bits.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TOE shall generate nonces used in IKE exchanges in a manner such that the probability that a specific nonce value will be repeated during the life a specific IPsec SA is less than 1 in 2^{256} .

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.11 The TOE shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH Groups 14 (2048-bit MODP), 19 (256-bit Random ECP), and 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 20 (384-bit Random ECP).

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.12 The TOE shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform peer authentication using a RSA, ECDSA that use X.509v3 certificates that conform to RFC 4945 and no other method.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.13 The TOE shall support peer identifiers of the following types: IP address, Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) and [no other reference identifier type]. (TD0037 applied)

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.14 The TOE shall not establish an SA if the presented identifier does not match the configured reference identifier of the peer. (TD0037 applied)

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.15 The VPN Gateway shall be able to ensure by default that the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the IKEv2 IKE_SA connection is greater than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the IKEv2 CHILD_SA connection. (TD0097 Applied and renumbered per TD0037)

5.3.1.10 FCS_RBG_(EXT).1 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TOE platform shall perform all deterministic random bit generation (RBG) services in accordance with *NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [CTR_DRBG (AES)].*

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from a platform-based RBG with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

5.3.2 User data protection (FDP)

5.3.2.1 FDP_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection

FDP_RIP.2.1 The TOE platform shall enforce that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to all objects.

5.3.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)

5.3.3.1 FIA_X509_EXT.1 Extended: X.509 Certificates

FIA_X509_EXT.1.1 The TOE platform shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- Perform RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
- Validate the revocation status of the certificate using the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 2560.
- Validate the certificate path by ensuring the basicConstraints extension is present and the cA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates.
- Validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
 - Certificates used for no other purpose shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3).

FIA_X509_EXT.1.2 The TOE platform shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the following is met: the basicConstraints extension is present and the cA flag is set to TRUE.

5.3.3.2 FIA_X509_EXT.2 Extended: X.509 Certificate Use and Management

FIA_X509_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec exchanges, and no additional uses.

FIA_X509_EXT.2.2 When a connection to determine the validity of a certificate cannot be established, the TOE shall not accept the certificate.

FIA_X509_EXT.2.3 The TOE shall not establish an SA if a certificate or certificate path is deemed invalid.

5.3.4 Security management (FMT)

5.3.4.1 FMT_SMF.1(1) Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1(1) The TOE shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- Specify VPN gateways to use for connections,
- Specify client credentials to be used for connections,
- *Configuring certificate revocation check,*
- *Configuring the reference identifier for the peer,*
- *Allowing the administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate when a connection to determine the validity of a certificate cannot be established.*
- *[no additional management functions].*

5.3.4.2 FMT_SMF.1(2) Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMF.1.1(2) The TOE, TOE platform, and VPN Gateway shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- Configuration of IKE protocol version(s) used,
- Configure IKE authentication techniques used,
- Configure the cryptoperiod for the established session keys. The unit of measure for configuring the cryptoperiod shall be no greater than an hour,
- Configure certificate revocation check,
- Configure the reference identifier for the peer,
- Specify the algorithm suites that may be proposed and accepted during the IPsec exchanges,
- load X.509v3 certificates used by the security functions in this PP,
- ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates,
- ability to configure all security management functions identified in other sections of this PP,
- allow the administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate when a connection to determine the validity of a certificate cannot be established, no other actions.

5.3.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

5.3.5.1 FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing

FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TOE shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.

FPT_TST_EXT.1.2 The TOE platform shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code when it is loaded for execution through the use of the [*cryptographic signature verification*].

5.3.5.2 FPT_TUD_(EXT).1 Extended: Trusted Update

FPT_TUD_(EXT).1.1 The TOE shall provide the ability to query the current version of the TOE firmware/software.

FPT_TUD_(EXT).1.2 The TOE platform shall provide the ability to initiate updates to TOE firmware/software.

FPT_TUD_(EXT).1.3 The TOE platform shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE using a digital signature mechanism and [no other functions] prior to installing those updates.

5.3.6 Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)

5.3.6.1 FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

FTP_ITC.1.1 Refinement: The TOE shall **use IPsec** to provide a **trusted** communication channel between itself and a **VPN Gateway** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data **from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.**

FTP_ITC.1.2 The TOE shall permit *the TSF* to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3 The TOE shall initiate communication via the trusted channel *for all traffic traversing that connection.*

5.4 TOE SFR Dependencies Rationale for SFRs Found in VPNv1.4

The VPNv1.4 contains all the requirements claimed in this Security Target. As such the dependencies are not applicable since the PP itself has been approved.

5.5 Security Assurance Requirements

5.5.1 SAR Requirements

The TOE assurance requirements for this ST are taken directly from the Common Criteria Version 3.1, Revision 4. The assurance requirements are summarized in the table below.

Table 11: Assurance Measures

Assurance Class	Components	Components Description
Development	ADV_FSP.1	Basic Functional Specification
Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative User guidance
Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.1	Labeling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.1	TOE CM coverage
Test	ATE_IND.1	Independent testing - conformance
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1	Vulnerability analysis

5.5.2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale

The Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in this Security Target represent the SARs identified in the VPNv1.4 PP. As such, the VPNv1.4 SAR rationale is deemed acceptable since the PP itself has been validated.

5.5.3 Assurance Measures

The TOE satisfies the identified assurance requirements. This section identifies the Assurance Measures applied by Cisco to satisfy the assurance requirements. The table below lists the details.

Table 12: Assurance Measures

Component	How requirement will be met
ADV_FSP.1	The functional specification is comprised of the information contained in the AGD_OPR and AGD_PRE documentation, coupled with the information provided in the TSS of the ST.
AGD_OPE.1	The Administrative Guide provides operational user guidance.
AGD_PRE.1	The preparative procedures describes all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
ALC_CMC.1 ALC_CMS.1	Cisco will provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ATE_IND.1	Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1	Cisco will provide the TOE for testing.

6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION

6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirement Measures

Table 13 identifies and describes how the Security Functional Requirements identified in section 5 of this ST are met.

Table 13 How TOE SFRs Measures

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met									
Security Functional Requirements Drawn from VPNv1.4										
FCS_CKM.1 (1) FCS_CKM.1 (2)	<p>When the TOE needs cryptographic services to support key establishment for IKEv2/IPsec, the TOE generates asymmetric keys using RSA and ECDSA-based key establishment schemes keys as specified in NIST SP 800-56A Revision 2 “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”.</p> <p>The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed below:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="480 737 1349 833"> <thead> <tr> <th>Algorithm</th> <th>Mode</th> <th>NIST CAVP Cert #</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>CVL</td> <td>ECC, FFC</td> <td>1895</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Key Derivation</td> <td>DSA, ECDSA</td> <td>1402, 1452</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>The TOE fulfills all of the NIST SP 800-56A and 800-56B requirements without extensions.</p> <p>To support IKE authentication for IPsec the TOE platform generates asymmetric keys using RSA and ECDSA-based key establishment schemes keys.</p> <p>The key generation function is invoked by the mobile platform Administrator using the iOS Configuration Profile which creates keys and certificates used by the TOE for IKE authentication.</p> <p>Refer to the Apple iOS on iPhone and iPad Devices Security Target² for information regarding CAVP certificates and iOS Configuration Profiles.</p>	Algorithm	Mode	NIST CAVP Cert #	CVL	ECC, FFC	1895	Key Derivation	DSA, ECDSA	1402, 1452
Algorithm	Mode	NIST CAVP Cert #								
CVL	ECC, FFC	1895								
Key Derivation	DSA, ECDSA	1402, 1452								
FCS_CKM_EXT.2	<p>The mobile device platform stores ECDSA, and RSA private keys and X.509v3 certificates used by the TOE for IKE peer authentication. Certificates are stored in the iOS Keychain on the mobile device platform.</p> <p>The TOE does not use pre-shared keys for IPsec.</p>									
FCS_CKM_EXT.4	<p>The TOE ensures volatile memory areas containing the following keys it manipulates are zeroized as follows:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="480 1476 1382 1751"> <thead> <tr> <th>Key, Secret, or CSP</th> <th>Purpose</th> <th>Zeroization Method</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>SK_ei</td> <td>IKE SA Initiator Encryption Key</td> <td>Overwritten with zeros when no longer in use by the IPsec VPN trusted channel.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SK_er</td> <td>IKE SA Responder Encryption Key</td> <td>Overwritten with zeros when no longer in use by the IPsec VPN trusted channel.</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Key, Secret, or CSP	Purpose	Zeroization Method	SK_ei	IKE SA Initiator Encryption Key	Overwritten with zeros when no longer in use by the IPsec VPN trusted channel.	SK_er	IKE SA Responder Encryption Key	Overwritten with zeros when no longer in use by the IPsec VPN trusted channel.
Key, Secret, or CSP	Purpose	Zeroization Method								
SK_ei	IKE SA Initiator Encryption Key	Overwritten with zeros when no longer in use by the IPsec VPN trusted channel.								
SK_er	IKE SA Responder Encryption Key	Overwritten with zeros when no longer in use by the IPsec VPN trusted channel.								

² https://www.niap-ccvcs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid10851-st.pdf

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met											
	SK_ai	IKE SA Initiator Integrity Key	Overwritten with zeros when no longer in use by the IPsec VPN trusted channel.									
	SK_ar	IKE SA Responder Integrity Key	Overwritten with zeros when no longer in use by the IPsec VPN trusted channel.									
	Diffie-Hellman Shared Secret	IKE v2 SA setup	Overwritten with zeros when no longer in use by the IPsec VPN trusted channel.									
	SK_d	IKEv2 SA key from which child IPsec keys are derived.	Overwritten with zeros when no longer in use by the IPsec VPN trusted channel.									
	Initiator encryption and integrity key	IPsec child SA key that encrypts and authenticates outgoing ESP traffic.	Overwritten with zeros when no longer in use by the IPsec VPN trusted channel.									
	Responder encryption and integrity key	IPsec child SA key that decrypts and authenticates incoming ESP traffic.	Overwritten with zeros when no longer in use by the IPsec VPN trusted channel.									
<p>The TOE platform zeroizes private keys it manipulates and stores on the TOE platform:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="480 1119 1380 1335"> <thead> <tr> <th>Key, Secret, or CSP</th> <th>Purpose</th> <th>Zeroization Method</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Asymmetric ECDSA Private Key stored on the mobile device platform</td> <td>ECDSA digital signature generation</td> <td>Performed exclusively by the TOE Platform.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Asymmetric RSA Private Key stored on the mobile device platform</td> <td>RSA digital signature generation</td> <td>Performed exclusively by the TOE Platform.</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>				Key, Secret, or CSP	Purpose	Zeroization Method	Asymmetric ECDSA Private Key stored on the mobile device platform	ECDSA digital signature generation	Performed exclusively by the TOE Platform.	Asymmetric RSA Private Key stored on the mobile device platform	RSA digital signature generation	Performed exclusively by the TOE Platform.
Key, Secret, or CSP	Purpose	Zeroization Method										
Asymmetric ECDSA Private Key stored on the mobile device platform	ECDSA digital signature generation	Performed exclusively by the TOE Platform.										
Asymmetric RSA Private Key stored on the mobile device platform	RSA digital signature generation	Performed exclusively by the TOE Platform.										
FCS_COP.1(1)	<p>The TOE provides symmetric encryption and decryption capabilities using AES in CBC and GCM mode (128, 256 bits) as described in NIST SP 800-38A and NIST SP 800-38D.</p> <p>The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed below:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="480 1581 1380 1675"> <thead> <tr> <th>Cryptographic Operation</th> <th>Mode</th> <th>NIST CAVP Cert #</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>AES</td> <td>CBC (128, 256) GCM (128, 256)</td> <td>5434</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			Cryptographic Operation	Mode	NIST CAVP Cert #	AES	CBC (128, 256) GCM (128, 256)	5434			
Cryptographic Operation	Mode	NIST CAVP Cert #										
AES	CBC (128, 256) GCM (128, 256)	5434										
FCS_COP.1(2)	<p>The TOE platform provides cryptographic signature services for the TOE to verify the X.509 certificate of the VPN Gateway during the IKEv2 authentication phase of IPsec.</p> <p>The TOE also relies upon the TOE platform to provide cryptographic signature verification services for the TOE software during the trusted update process.</p>											

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met				
	<p>On iOS platforms, the TOE calls the SecTrustEvaluate API for Cert Validation https://developer.apple.com/library/prerelease/mac/documentation/Security/Reference/certifkeytrustservices/#//apple_ref/c/func/SecTrustEvaluate</p> <p>Refer to the Apple iOS on iPhone and iPad Devices Security Target³ for information regarding CAVP certificate information.</p>				
FCS_COP.1(3)	<p>When IPsec is used in AES-CBC mode, the TOE provides cryptographic hashing to ensure data integrity using SHA-256 and SHA-384 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-4 “Secure Hash Standard.” The TSF hashing functions are implemented in byte-oriented mode.</p> <p>The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed below:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="480 722 1110 785"> <thead> <tr> <th>Cryptographic Operation</th> <th>NIST CAVP Cert #</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>SHS</td> <td>4357</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>The TOE platform provides cryptographic hashing services using SHA-256, and SHA-384 as specified in FIPS Pub 180-4 “Secure Hash Standard.” The TOE relies upon the TOE platform for cryptographic hash functions required to verify the integrity of a certificate during the IKEv2 authentication phase of IPsec.</p> <p>Refer to the Apple iOS on iPhone and iPad Devices Security Target for information regarding CAVP certificate information.</p>	Cryptographic Operation	NIST CAVP Cert #	SHS	4357
Cryptographic Operation	NIST CAVP Cert #				
SHS	4357				
FCS_COP.1(4)	<p>To verify the data integrity and authentication of ESP traffic the TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services within the encryption of IKEv2 payloads. Additionally, the TOE provides keyed-hashing message authentication services for Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) in IKEv2. Both use HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-384 as specified in FIPS Pub 198-1, "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code," and FIPS 180-4, “Secure Hash Standard.” HMAC-SHA2-256 has a key size of 256 bits and a message digest size of 256 bits. HMAC-SHA2-256 uses a 512 bit block size. HMAC-SHA2-384 has a key size of 384 bits and a message digest size of 384 bits. HMAC-SHA2-384 uses a 1024 bit block size.</p> <p>The TOE does not implement any truncation of the hash for data integrity and authentication. Truncation does not apply to Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs) in IKEv2.</p> <p>The relevant CAVP certificate numbers are listed below:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="480 1520 1045 1583"> <thead> <tr> <th>Algorithm</th> <th>NIST CAVP Cert #</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>HMAC</td> <td>3608</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Algorithm	NIST CAVP Cert #	HMAC	3608
Algorithm	NIST CAVP Cert #				
HMAC	3608				
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1	<p>The TOE’s implementation of the IPsec standard (in accordance with RFC 4301) uses the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol to provide authentication, encryption and anti-replay services. By default ESP operates in tunnel mode. No configuration is required by the user or administrator for the TOE to operate in tunnel mode.</p>				

³ https://www.niap-ccvcs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid10851-st.pdf

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>Remote access policies on the ASA VPN Gateway provide an interface for the administrator to create ACL(s), defining network segment(s) requiring IPsec protection. An XML format of the policy on client defines the remote access policy the TOE will use.</p> <p>After successful client authentication to the ASA VPN Gateway, a “Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client” virtual interface is created and assigned an IP address from the Gateway’s VPN address pool.</p> <p>The Security Policy Database (SPD) is implemented by the underlying TOE Platform. The TOE interacts with the TOE Platform by invoking APIs which instruct the platform what network routes to include or exclude from the SPD. This enforces what traffic it protected with IPsec by the TOE and what traffic is not. When a packet requires IPsec, the TOE platform calls the TOE. The TOE encrypts the packet with IPsec and sends it to the remote ASA VPN gateway. Packets received from the ASA VPN Gateway are decrypted by the TOE and sent to the OS via APIs.</p> <p>The default behavior of the remote access policy on the VPN Gateway is for the TOE to protect all traffic with IPsec. When all traffic is tunneled, a new default route is added to the mobile platform with a lower metric directing all traffic to be protected with IPsec by the TOE. The TOE uses active SA settings or creates new SAs for initial connections with the ASA VPN Gateway peer. All ESP processing to authenticate, encrypt, and tunnel the traffic is performed by the TOE.</p> <p>If an organization explicitly permits use of split-tunneling, a remote access policy on the ASA VPN Gateway allows the administrator to define IPsec protection for the organization’s network(s) but bypass protection for other traffic. When a portion of traffic is tunneled, a route is added to the mobile platform corresponding to the network segment requiring IPsec protection by the TOE. Network(s) not subjected to the remote access policy, but reachable from the mobile platform, such as Internet traffic, travels without being protected with IPsec by the TOE. SPD discard rules are performed exclusively by the TOE platform.</p> <p>The TOE implements IKEv2 and does not support IKEv1.</p> <p>IPsec Internet Key Exchange is the negotiation protocol that lets the TOE and a VPN Gateway agree on how to build an IPsec Security Association (SA). IKE separates negotiation into two phases: phase 1 and phase 2.</p> <p>During IKE Phase 1, the TOE authenticates the remote VPN Gateway using device-level authentication with ECDSA or RSA X.509v3 certificates provided by the TOE platform.</p> <p>The TOE compares its reference identifier to the identifier presented by the VPN Gateway peer. The TOE supports reference identifiers as configured by the Administrator to be either FQDN or IP address and compares it to the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) or the Common Name (CN) fields in the certificate of the peer. The order of comparison is SAN followed by CN. If the TOE successfully matches the reference identifier to the presented identifier, IKE Phase 1 authentication will succeed. Otherwise it will fail if it does not match.</p> <p>Phase 1 creates the first tunnel, which protects later IKE negotiation messages. The key negotiated in phase 1 enables IKE to communicate securely in phase 2.</p> <p>The TOE supports only IKEv2 session establishment. As part of this support, the TOE by default does not support aggressive mode used in IKEv1 exchanges.</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>The TOE supports Diffie-Hellman Group 14 (2048-bit keys), 19 (256-bit Random ECP), 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), and 20 (384-bit Random ECP) in support of IKE Key Establishment negotiated in phase 1. These keys are generated using the DRBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 having 256 bits of entropy.</p> <p>The administrator is instructed in the AGD to select a supported DH group using one of the following corresponding key sizes (in bits): 320 (for DH Group 14), 256 (for DH Group 19), 256 (for DH Group 24), and 384 (for DH Group 20) bits.</p> <p>For each DH Group, the TOE generates the secret value 'x' used in the IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman key exchange ('x' in $g^x \text{ mod } p$) using its DH private key, the IPsec peer's public key and a nonce. When a random number is needed for a nonce, the probability that a specific nonce value will be repeated during the life a specific IPsec SA is less than 1 in 2^{256}. The nonce is likewise generated using the DRBG specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1.</p> <p>During Phase 2, IKE negotiates the IPsec SA and includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The negotiation of mutually acceptable IPsec SA parameters; • The Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) is used for the construction of keying material for cryptographic algorithms used in the SA. • The establishment of IPsec Security Associations to protect packet flows using Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). <p>The resulting potential strength of the symmetric key will be 128 or 256 bits of security depending on the algorithms negotiated between the two IPsec peers.</p> <p>The VPN Gateway ensures by default the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the IKEv2 IKE_SA connection is greater than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the IKEv2 CHILD_SA connection.</p> <p>After IKE phase 2 completes, the IPsec SA is established, providing a secure tunnel to a remote VPN Gateway. The TOE performs IKEv2 payload encryption using AES-GCM-128, AES_GCM-256, AES-CBC-128, or AES-CBC-256 algorithms. The VPN Gateway allows the administrator to configure AES-GCM-128, AES_GCM-256, AES-CBC-128, and AES-CBC-256 encryption algorithms.</p> <p>The TOE supports administratively configured lifetimes for both Phase 1 SAs and Phase 2 SAs. The default time value for Phase 1 SAs is 24 hours. The value for Phase 2 SAs is configurable to 8 hours. Both values are configurable using management functions provided by the VPN Gateway.</p>
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	<p>The TOE obtains entropy via the /dev/random interface provided by the TOE platform. The minimum strength of DRBG seed is 256 bits.</p>
FDP_RIP.2	<p>The TOE platform transmits packets over WiFi or cellular radio and therefore is responsible for clearing residual information. Refer to the Apple iOS on iPhone and iPad Devices Security Target⁴ for information regarding CAVP certificate information.</p>
FIA_X509_EXT.1 FIA_X509_EXT.2	<p>The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 for device level authentication of the VPN Gateway.</p> <p>The user is provided with an X.509v3 certificate which is loaded into the iPhone mobile device. Upon initiation of an IPsec connection, the TOE relies upon the mobile device platform to validate the VPN Gateway certificate and CA issued certificate as follows:</p>

⁴ https://www.niap-ccvcs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid10851-st.pdf

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Basic Constraint is checked to ensure the CA for the certificate of VPN Gateway is an issuer for certificates (cA flag is TRUE). The VPN Gateway certificate is checked to determine it is an end-certificate. • The issuer field of the VPN Gateway certificate is checked to determine it matches that of the CA certificate, as well as any intermediate CAs that are identified in the chain below the root. • The revocation status of the VPN Gateway certificate is checked to determine if it has been revoked. <p>On iOS platforms, the TOE calls the SecTrustEvaluate API for Cert Validation https://developer.apple.com/library/prerelease/mac/documentation/Security/Reference/certifkeytrustservices/#//apple_ref/c/func/SecTrustEvaluate</p> <p>The checks described above ensure certificate validation results in a trusted root certificate.</p> <p>At any point if a certificate cannot be successfully validated, the AGD guidance instructs the administrator to configure the TOE to not allow the user an option for continuing the connection. In all cases, if a certificate or certificate path cannot be validated, the TOE will not establish an IPsec connection to an untrusted VPN Gateway.</p>
FMT_SMF.1(1)	<p>Security management functions are provided by the TOE as specified below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The TOE is capable of specifying VPN gateways to use for connections, • The TOE is capable of prompting the user to select the authentication certificate to use as well as specifying the location to search. Certificates are used for device-level authentication of the VPN Gateway. • The TOE is capable of specifying Username/password credentials used to authenticate remote VPN users to an authentication server. • The TOE is capable of configuring certificate revocation check. • The TOE is capable of configuring the reference identifier for the peer. • The TOE is capable of allowing the administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate when a connection to determine the validity of a certificate cannot be established.
FMT_SMF.1(2)	<p>Security management functions are provided by the TOE, the TOE platform, or the VPN Gateway as specified below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The VPN Gateway is capable of configuring IKEv2 IPsec proposals • The VPN Gateway is capable of configuring IKEv2 authentication • The VPN Gateway is capable of configuring the cryptoperiod for the established session keys. The unit of measure for configuring the cryptoperiod shall be no greater than an hour, • The TOE is capable of configuring the reference identifier for the peer, • The TOE is capable of configuring certificate revocation check, • The VPN Gateway is capable of specifying the algorithm suites that may be proposed and accepted during the IPsec exchanges, • The TOE platform is capable of loading an X.509v3 certificate used by the TOE to authenticate the VPN gateway during IPsec authentication. • The TOE platform is capable of updating the TOE, and capable of verifying the updates, • The TOE is capable of configuring all security management functions identified in FMT_SMF.1(1),

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The TOE is capable of allowing the administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate when a connection to determine the validity of a certificate cannot be established.
FPT_TST_EXT.1	<p>As a software product incorporating a cryptographic module, the TOE runs a suite of self-tests during start-up to verify its correct operation.</p> <p>These tests include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> AES Known Answer Test - For the encrypt test, a known key is used to encrypt a known plain text value resulting in an encrypted value. This encrypted value is compared to a known encrypted value to ensure that the encrypt operation is working correctly. The decrypt test is just the opposite. In this test a known key is used to decrypt a known encrypted value. The resulting plaintext value is compared to a known plaintext value to ensure that the decrypt operation is working correctly. RSA Signature Known Answer Test (both signature/verification) - This test takes a known plaintext value and Private/Public key pair and used the public key to encrypt the data. This value is compared to a known encrypted value to verify that encrypt operation is working properly. The encrypted data is then decrypted using the private key. This value is compared to the original plaintext value to ensure the decrypt operation is working properly. HMAC Known Answer Test - For each of the hash values listed, the HMAC implementation is fed known plaintext data and a known key. These values are used to generate a MAC. This MAC is compared to a known MAC to verify that the HMAC and hash operations are operating correctly. DRBG Known Answer Test - For this test, known seed values are provided to the DRBG implementation. The DRBG uses these values to generate random bits. These random bits are compared to known random bits to ensure that the DRBG is operating correctly. SHA-1/256/512 Known Answer Test – For each of the values listed, the SHA implementation is fed known data and key. These values are used to generate a hash. This hash is compared to a known value to verify they match and the hash operations are operating correctly. Software Integrity Test <p>If any self-test fails subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls is prevented. If all components of the power-up self-test are successful then the product is in FIPS mode.</p> <p>Upon launch, the TOE platform performs an executable code integrity verification check, invoking the TOE platform to perform digital signature verification operations on executable files.</p> <p>These tests are sufficient to verify that the TOE software is operating correctly as well as the cryptographic operations are all performing as expected.</p>
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	<p>TOE versioning can be queried by the user by Navigating to Settings and then tapping About. The version information will be displayed.</p> <p>The iOS App Store on the mobile platform is used to initiate TOE updates. If there is an update to the TOE software, the app store will indicate a new version is available. The process to update is the same as a new installation that is described in the Common Criteria Configuration Guide.</p>

TOE SFRs	How the SFR is Met
	<p>Upon installation a digital signature verification check will automatically be performed by the mobile platform to ensure the TOE update has not been modified since distribution. The authorized source for the digitally signed TOE updates is "Cisco Systems, Inc."</p> <p>If an invalid TOE update is attempted to be installed, the TOE platform will display an error and will reject it as invalid or corrupt. If this happens, the user is instructed to contact Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC).</p>
FTP_ITC.1	<p>The TOE implements IPsec to protect all communication transmitted from the host destined for a VPN gateway. FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 describes the cryptographic protocol details.</p>

7 ANNEX A: REFERENCES

The following documentation was used to prepare this ST:

Table 14: References

Identifier	Description
[CC_PART1]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-20012-09-001
[CC_PART2]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security functional components, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-002
[CC_PART3]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security assurance components, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-20012-09-003
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Evaluation Methodology, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004
[VPNv1.4]	Protection Profile for IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients, 1.4, 12 October 2013