TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V.
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Version
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Certification Report
HongMeng v1.2
Sponsor and developer: Huawei Technologies, Co., Ltd
Headquarters of Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Bantian,
Longgang District, Shenzhen, 518129
P.R.C.
Evaluation facility: Brightsight
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-217235-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: 217235
Author(s): Wouter Slegers
Date: 5 September 2019
Number of pages: 12
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS:
Foreword 4
Recognition of the certificate 5
International recognition 5
European recognition 5
1 Executive Summary 6
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 7
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 8
2.6 IT Product Testing 9
2.7 Evaluated Configuration 10
2.8 Results of the Evaluation 10
2.9 Comments/Recommendations 10
3 Security Target 11
4 Definitions 11
5 Bibliography 12
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. has the task of issuing
certificates for IT security products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TÜV Rheinland
Nederland B.V. to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a license is
accreditation to the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation
of calibration and testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. asserts that the product or
site complies with the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that
the protection profile (PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common
Criteria for Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification
document that defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation,
the IT product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorized provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement and SOG-IS logos on the certificate
indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and the SOG-IS
agreement and will be recognised by the participating nations.
International recognition
The CCRA has been signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC. Starting September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide mutual
recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance components
up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification
schemes can be found on: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) version 3 effective from April
2010 provides mutual recognition of Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation
level for all products. A higher recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (resp. E3-basic) is
provided for products related to specific technical domains. This agreement was initially signed by
Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy
joined the SOGIS-MRA in December 2010. The current list of signatory nations, approved certification
schemes and the list of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies can be found on:
http://www.sogisportal.eu.eIDAS-Regulation
TÜV Rheinland Nederland BV, operating the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT
Security (NSCIB), has been notified as a Designated Certification Body from The Netherlands under
Article 30(2) and 39(2) of Regulation 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL of 23 July 2014.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the
HongMeng v1.2. The developer of the HongMeng v1.2 is Huawei Technologies, Co., Ltd located in
Shenzhen, P.R.C. and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification
Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security
properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE (HongMeng) is a micro-kernel that provides fine-grained resource management for
applications running on top of it.
By providing confidentiality and availability, HongMeng enforces secure access control and isolation
for system resources. Thus it is a desired micro kernel for security scenarios.
HongMeng is supposed to run on a real mobile device (e.g., mobile phone) with hardware support for
ARM TrustZone. Since TEE is not the only zone on mobile devices, it is common to see multiple
unconstrained applications running on the non-TEE side. However even in that case, those
unconstrained applications cannot interfere with TOE, neither the applications running on top of TOE.
The TOE has been evaluated by Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands. The evaluation
was completed on 4 September 2019 with the approval of the ETR. The certification procedure has
been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the
Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the HongMeng v1.2, the security requirements,
and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the
security requirements. Consumers of the HongMeng v1.2 are advised to verify that their own
environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments,
observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR]
1
for this product provides sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL5 augmented (EAL5+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ALC_FLR.1 (Basic Flaw Remediation).
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC].
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets
all the conditions for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will
be listed on the NSCIB Certified Products list. It should be noted that the certification results only apply
to the specific version of the product as evaluated.
1
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the HongMeng v1.2 from Huawei Technologies,
Co., Ltd located in Shenzhen, P.R.C..
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Software
Internal Product Name: OS Kernel TD
External Product Name: HongMeng
Format:
hm release.tar.gz
Info:
User can login the Version Management Platform (VMP) to
download the software binary archive in accordance to the
version of the TOE.
User can verify the software by digital signature.
The digital signature is also published on the VMP website.
Internal
Version
Number:
V100R00
1C00SPC
900B006
External
Version
Number:
v1.2
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided together with the HongMeng v1.2.
Details can be found in section ”Documentation” of this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle refer to the [ST], chapter 1.4.5.
2.2 Security Policy
The TOE has the following features:
•Identification and Authentication: The TOE does not identify physical users, only processes
are identified by the TOE. Processes can be viewed as the users and subjects at the same
time.
•Capability-based Access Control: The TOE enforces capability-based access control as the
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) mechanism to protect the confidentiality of the kernel
objects. The owner and the supervised visitor of a kernel objects manages the security
attributes. When a kernel object is created, the owner and the supervised visitor specifies the
initial rights to access it. The initial rights cannot be modified afterwards, and the rights
granted to other processes must be less than the initial rights.
•Information Flow Control and Residual Information Removal: The TOE implements IPC
Information Control Policy to control information flows associated with inter process
communications, namely EBBCall and Async IPC. The other kernel objects do not have a
dedicated memory region. In such cases, the object data is initialized with the corresponding
default values, thus the kernel objects do not contain any trace of residual information.
•Memory Management: TOE uses kernel objects to record physical memory regions and virtual
memory spaces. Access and privileges to this kernel objects are managed using capability-
based access control system.
•Thread Management: A priority-based FIFO scheduling, ready threads with the same priority are
linked in a queue which is sorted by the enqueue order. The scheduler is constructed with
multiple queues where each queue stands for a given priority. Upon scheduling, the scheduler
finds a non-empty queue with the highest priority, then chooses the thread in the head of the
queue to run. Each thread has a timeslice to keep track of the current remaining time on the
CPU, which will be decreased by 1 upon each timer tick.
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•Platform attestation: The TOE stores unique platform attestation data to be used in its
operational state. Specifically, platform identification and allowed configuration values are
stored in the kernel object.
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. Detailed information on these
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment can be found in section 4.2 of the
[ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The TOE is a software microkernel that relies on the underlying hardware to fulfil the objective
OE.ENVIRONMENT as described to [ST] section 4.2:
The environment ensures the following properties:
•The bootloader initializes the hardware so the TOE starts in a safe and secure state.
•The memory managed by the TOE, and the Kirin 970/980 SoC required by the TOE are
protected in confidentiality and integrity from the outside of the TOE.
•The bootloader and ARM Trusted Firmware are protected in integrity from the outside of the
TOE.
2.4 Architectural Information
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST] of the TOE can be depicted as
follows:
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
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Identifier Version
Huawei HongMeng Common Criteria Evaluation AGD OPE: Operational
User Guidance [OPE]
Format:
HongMeng AGD OPE-v2.0.pdf
Info:
The document is delivered on VMP website in accordance to the version of
the TOE.
2.0
Huawei HongMeng Common Criteria Evaluation
AGD PRE: Preparative Procedures [PRE]
Format:
HongMeng AGD PRE-v1.4.pdf
Info:
The document is delivered on VMP website in accordance to the version of
the TOE.
1.4
2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer has performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and SFR-
enforcing module level. All parameter choices have been addressed at least once. All boundary cases
identified have been tested explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions have been
covered probabilistically. The testing was largely automated using and proprietary test suites. Test
scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected values.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer has provided samples and a test
environment. The evaluators have reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small
number of test cases designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent Penetration Testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
•When evaluating the evidence in the classes ADV potential vulnerabilities were identified from
generating questions to the type of TOE and the specified behaviour. From the ASE and AGD
classes, no potential vulnerabilities were identified.
•For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack oriented analysis, the protection against the attack scenarios was analysed
using the knowledge gained from all previous evaluation classes. This resulted in the
identification of additional potential vulnerabilities. This analysis was performed according to
the public sources and software related attack list.
•All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation classes
and the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these potential
vulnerabilities are not exploitable. For the potential vulnerabilities relevant for the TOE a
penetration test was defined. Several potential vulnerabilities were found to be not exploitable
due to an impractical attack path.
The penetration tests that were distributed as follows:
Penetration test category % of total number of penetration tests
Public interfaces penetration tests 50%
Memory management 30%
TOE functional features 20%
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Total 100%
2.6.3 Test Configuration
The TOE (HongMeng version v1.2 (V100R001C00SPC900B006)) in release version and with debug
enabled, was tested on the Huawei Kirin 970 SoC (Huawei MATE 10 smart phone) and Huawei Kirin
980 SoC (Huawei MATE 20 smart phone).
2.6.4 Testing Results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
2.7 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number HongMeng v1.2, running on the Huawei
Kirin 970 SoC or Huawei Kirin 980 SoC.
2.8 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR]
2
which references a ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the HongMeng v1.2, to be CC
Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to meet the requirements of EAL 5 augmented with
ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security
Target [ST].
2.9 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 contains necessary information about the usage of the
TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the access control, depend on
accurate conformance to the user guidance of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or
recommendations for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents
contain relevant details with respect to the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he
should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from
the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation, as there are no cryptographic algorithms and protocols implemented.
2
The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not releasable for public review.
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3 Security Target
The Huawei HongMeng Common Criteria Evaluation ST: Security Target for Specified Hardware,
version 2.8 [ST] is included here by reference.
4 Definitions
This list of Acronyms and the glossary of terms contains elements that are not already defined by the
CC or CEM:
IT Information Technology
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
TOE Target of Evaluation
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report:
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and III,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, April 2017.
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report “Huawei Hongmeng” – EAL5+, document reference
19-RPT-602, version 3.0, dated 3 September 2019.
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.5, April
12019.
[ST] Huawei HongMeng Common Criteria Evaluation ST: Security Target for Specified
Hardware, version 2.8.
(This is the end of this report).