KECS-CR-17-19
Application Security Solution V1.0 for LG webOS TV
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-0783-2017
2017. 4. 19.
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2017.04.19. -
Certification report for Application Security Solution
V1.0 for LG webOS TV
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for Application Security
Solution V1.0 for LG webOS TV of LG Electronics, Inc..
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................6
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................8
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope............................................................8
5. Architectural Information ....................................................................................9
6. Documentation.....................................................................................................9
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................10
8. Evaluated Configuration.................................................................................... 11
9. Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................. 11
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................ 11
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................12
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................12
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ..............................................................13
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................13
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................14
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................14
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................15
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................16
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................16
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................18
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL2 evaluation of Application Security Solution V1.0 for LG webOS TV
of LG Electronics, Inc. with reference to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result
and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is smart TV security solutions consisting of software
libraries to provide security features to install and use applications (“app” hereinafter)
securely on the webOS based LG smart TV.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Telecommunications Technology
Association (TTA) and completed on April 7th
, 2017. This report grounds on the
evaluation technical report (ETR) TTA had submitted [5] and the Security Target (ST)
[6][7].
The ST does not claim conformance to a Protection Profile. All Security Assurance
Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component in CC Part
3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL2. Therefore the
ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, and
the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC
Part 2 conformant.
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the TOE.
[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE
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The TOE is composed of 5 components: SAM which manages installation and
execution of apps, WAM which manages secure execution of Web Apps, Security
Manager which manages app DRMs and verifies digital signatures, Jailer which
provide sandboxing execution environments for the Native Apps, and OpenSSL for
encryption and decryption.
The TOE operates on the webOS based smart TV. The LG App Store server is required
to register apps in the LG Contents Store and download them to the LG smart TV. CDN
server is necessary to download application package files (IPK) to be installed on the
LG smart TV. DRM server is used to manage DRM ROs (Right Objects) for the apps
installed on the LG smart TV.
The TOE implements security features such as app installation, execution, and
contents protection. For more details refer to the ST [6][7].
[Table 1] shows minimum hardware and software requirements necessary for
installation and operation of the TOE.
Category Contents
Hardware CPU ARMv7 Cortex A9
DDR Memory DDR3 1GB
Flash Memory eMMC 2GB
NIC Gbit MAC + 100Mbps PHY
SoC M16P
Software Web browser Chromium 38
OS webOS Dreadlocks (v3.5) / Linux kernel 4.4.3
[Table 1] Hardware and software requirements for the TOE
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is software libraries consisting of the following components and related
guidance documents.
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TOE Application Security Solution V1.0 for LG webOS TV
Version V1.0
Build Number drd4tv#504
TOE
Components
SAM sam_1.0.0-192.drd4tv.93-r9_m16p.ipk
appinstalld_1.0.0-96.drd4tv.24-r7_m16p.ipk
WAM wam_1.0.0-87-r1starfish3_m16p.ipk
webappmgr3-pluggable_1.0.0-39.drd4tv.67-r11_m16p.ipk
Security
Manager
securitymanager_1.0.59-102-r24.0_m16p.ipk
Jailer webos-jail_2.1.2-145.drd4tv.28-r6_m16p.ipk
OpenSSL libcrypto1.0.0_1.0.2k0webos17-r0webos17_m16p.ipk
libssl1.0.0_1.0.2k0webos17-r0webos17_m16p.ipk
openssl_1.0.2k0webos17-r0webos17_m16p.ipk
Guidance
Document
Application Security Solution V1.0 for LG webOS TV user guidance
V1.4.pdf
[Table 2] TOE identification
Note that the TOE is delivered in a file format through a distribution site where only the
developers of LG Electronics can access.
[Table 3] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(June 27, 2016)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(November 1, 2012)
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~ CCMB-2012-09-
003, September 2012
EAL EAL2
Developer LG Electronics, Inc.
Sponsor LG Electronics, Inc.
Evaluation
Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Completion Date April 7, 2017
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of Evaluation
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 3] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The TOE complies security policies defined in the ST [6][7] by security objectives and
security requirements. Thus the TOE provides following security features.
 The TOE provides app installation protection which blocks the installation of
unauthorized apps through digital signature verification when the smart TV
user installs an app on the smart TV that is connected to Internet. The digital
signature generation process for the app takes place from the LG App Store
server side, and this enables only the apps that are downloaded from the LG
App Store server to be installable on the smart TV.
 The TOE provides app execution protection based on the types of apps. For
Native Apps, the TOE creates a sandboxed app execution environment based
on Native App’s security attributes and executes an app, which will block the
app from accessing to unauthorized system directories/files, device files, or
other apps’ space. For Web Apps, the TOE allows them to be able to use only
approved APIs, and blocks the apps from directly accessing to the webOS file
system. Web Apps can access to the allowed directories that are defined in
white-list only according to trust level.
 The TOE provides app contents protection based on the DRM. To verify the
app content files, the TOE verifies the DRM license. The TOE allows the
encrypted app contents to be decrypted only in RAM and always stores them
in the encrypted state in the flash memory to protect the app contents.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the operational
environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used (for the detailed
and precise definition of the assumption refer to the ST [6][7], chapter 3.3):
 For secure operation of the TOE, LG App Store server, CDN server, DRM
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server which exist in the operating environment are operated securely.
 All system service binaries and library files that are included in the smart TV
firmware are installed in the read-only file system to be protected from
unauthorized modification attempts.
 The TOE developer does not have any malicious intentions, has been properly
trained for use of the TOE, and performs its obligations adequately in
accordance with the developer guidance. In addition, smart TV developers who
develop services in smart TVs that interoperate with the TOE should not
implement to include any malicious behaviors intentionally in the smart TV
services.
 LG Electronics must assign unique MAC addresses to each smart TV device in
order to manage smart TV devices securely. This MAC address should be
unique because it is used to identify the smart TV device uniquely in LG App
Store server.
Furthermore, some aspects of organisational security policies are not covered by the
TOE itself, thus these aspects are addressed by the TOE environment: Secure key
operation management and Secure smart TV update. Details can be found in the ST
[6][7], chapter 3.2 and 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is software libraries consisting of the following components.
 SAM manages the app lifecycle including app installation, execution, and
uninstallation.
 WAM manages the secure execution of Web Apps.
 Security Manager performs app security checks such as an App DRM
functions and digital signature verification.
 Jailer provides the sandboxed execution environment for Native Apps.
 OpenSSL provides cryptographic operations.
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
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Identifier Release Date
Application Security Solution V1.0 for LG webOS TV
user guidance V1.4.pdf
V1.4 March 30, 2017
[Table 4] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the APIs and security services
provided by each TOE components based on the operational environment of the TOE.
Each test case includes the following information:
 Test no. and conductor: Identifier of each test case and its conductor
 Test Purpose: Includes the security functions and modules to be tested
 Test Configuration: Details about the test configuration
 Test Procedure detail: Detailed procedures for testing each security function
 Expected result: Result expected from testing
 Actual result: Result obtained by performing testing
 Test result compared to the expected result: Comparison between the
expected and actual result
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results according to the
assurance component ATE_COV.1. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined for SFR-enforcing of the TOE, and demonstrated that the TSFI behaves as
described in the functional specification.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator performed all tests provided by developer and conducted independent
testing based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The TOE and test
configuration are identical to the developer’s tests. The evaluator determined that the
preparative procedures are not applicable to the TOE which is software libraries, thus
the tests do not cover preparative procedures.
Also, the evaluator conducted vulnerability analysis and penetration testing based upon
test cases devised by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential
vulnerabilities.
The evaluator’s testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth, and results
are summarized in the ETR [5].
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8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is Application Security Solution V1.0 for LG webOS TV (Build Number:
drd4tv#504). See table 2 for detailed information on the TOE components.
The TOE can be downloaded by any authorized developers of LG Electronics from the
TOE distribution system. After installing the TOE, the developer can verify the TOE
version by command. And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 5,
[Table 4] was evaluated with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components of EAL2.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security problem
definition and the division of this problem between the TOE and its operational
environment is clearly defined. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.2.
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The ST does not define any extended component. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer uses a CM system that uniquely identifies all configuration items.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.2.
The configuration list includes the TOE, the parts that comprise the TOE, and the
evaluation evidence. These configuration items are controlled in accordance with CM
capabilities. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.2.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_DEL.1.
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the configuration
management used throughout TOE development and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
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Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The TOE design provides a description of the TOE in terms of subsystems sufficient to
determine the TSF boundary. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_TDS.1.
The developer has provided a description of the TSFIs in terms of their purpose,
method of use, and parameters. In addition, for the SFR-enforcing TSFIs the developer
has described the SFR-enforcing actions and direct error messages. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.2.
The TSF is structured such that it cannot be tampered with or bypassed, and TSFs that
provide security domains isolate those domains from each other. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ADV_ARC.1.
Thus, the design documentation is adequate to understand how the TSF meets the
SFRs and how the implementation of these SFRs cannot be tampered with or
bypassed. Design documentation consists of a functional specification (which
describes the interfaces of the TSF), a TOE design description (which describes the
architecture of the TSF in terms of how it works in order to perform the functions
related to the SFRs being claimed). In addition, there is a security architecture
description (which describes the architectural properties of the TSF to explain how its
security enforcement cannot be compromised or bypassed).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested TSFIs, and that the developer's test coverage evidence
shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation and the
TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned
to ATE_COV.1.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
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By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the design documentation, and had confidence in the
developer's test results by performing all of the developer's tests. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.2.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE, don’t allow attackers possessing basic attack
potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_CMC.2 ALC_CMC.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.2 ALC_CMS.2.1E PASS PASS
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1.1E PASS PASS
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_TDS.1 ADV_TDS.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_TDS.1.2E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.2 ADV_FSP.2.1E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.2.2E PASS
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE ATE_COV.1 ATE_COV.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E PASS
ATE_IND.2.3E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.2 AVA_VAN.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.2.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.2.3E PASS
AVA_VAN.2.4E PASS
[Table 5] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The generation, storage, access control, and destruction of the cryptographic
keys (the private key used for app digital signatures, the CEK (Content
Encryption Key) used for encrypting app contents files and the RODB
encryption key), which are performed securely in accordance with LG
Electronics regulations and policies.
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 After shipment of smart TVs, the smart TV software which includes the TOE
must be updated through network service update (NSU), TV firmware update
via broadcasting signal (OTA), or USB update by customer service center.
 LG Electronics must assign unique MAC addresses to each smart TV device in
order to manage smart TV devices securely.
 LG App Store server, CDN server, DRM server which exist in the operating
environment are operated securely.
11. Security Target
Application Security Solution V1.0 for LG webOS TV Security Target V1.5 [6] is
included in this report for reference. For the purpose of publication, it is provided as
sanitized version [7] according to the CCRA supporting document ST sanitizing for
publication [8].
12. Acronyms and Glossary
API Application Programming Interface
CC Common Criteria
CDN Content Delivery Network
CEK Content Encryption Key
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IPK Itsy Package
MAC Medium Access Control
PP Protection Profile
RO Rights Object
RODB Rights Object Database
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
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App An app refers to apps that can be installed on a smart
TV and perform various functions. It is used to expand
functions according to the user's requirement.
App Content The contents of the app correspond to the contents
which compose the app and they include the app’s
source code files and various resource files referenced
by source codes. When referring to ‘content’ without
the ‘app’ in front of it, it not only refers to apps but also
includes other content such as movies, TV series, music
videos, and music that are available for use on the smart
TV.
App Package File An app package file refers to various control files that
are required for installing an app and data files which
compose an app that are packaged in the ipk format.
Web App Web App is implemented using HTML, CSS, JavaScript,
and image resources. In webOS, it runs on WAM.
Native App Native Apps are implemented based on C/C++ using
webOS NDK (Native Development Kit) and system call
APIs.
LG App Store The LG App Store provides apps and content and users
can download apps that they wish to install on the smart
TV. LG App Store service is provided through LG App
Store server and CDN server.
DRM Server The DRM Server refers to a server that performs DRM
encryption and decryption of an app installation file and
generates an encryption key to protect an app
installation file when downloading an app to install on the
smart TV.
DRM DRM (Digital Right Management) refers to the copyright
management technology for digital contents. The DRM
technology is based on protecting contents through
encryption, and includes a technology for managing
rights data to enable only a trusted user to decrypt
content for use.
App DRM It provides DRM function to ensure secure distribution of
apps to be installed on the smart TV and to prevent
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unauthorized app distribution.
CEK CEK (Contents Encryption Key) refers to a key used to
encrypt app content files for App DRM packaging. When
an app is registered on the LG App Store server, a
unique CEK is generated for each app, and stored in the
DRM server. When the app is installed, RO download
request is made from the TV to the DRM server, and
CEK, which is included in the RO, is downloaded to the
TV.
RO It is an abbreviation of Rights Object and is defined as
‘a set of permissions related to the protected contents
and other attributes ’ (Defined in the OMA DRM
standard). ROs include contents data including CID,
CEK, and xml data including permissions,
outputprotection information. Currently, only CID and
CEK are being used on the LG webOS Smart TV.
RODB RODB refers to the file DB which stores RO data.
Encrypted RO data is stored in this RODB.
Sandboxing Sandboxing refers to a security function to prevent apps
from accessing unauthorized smart TV resources
including files and devices.
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~ CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004, September 2012
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (August 8, 2013)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (November 1, 2012)
[5] TTA-CCE-16-027 Application Security Solution V1.0 for LG webOS TV
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Evaluation Technical Report V1.5, April 7th
, 2017
[6] Application Security Solution V1.0 for LG webOS TV Security Target v1.5, May
30th
, 2017 (Confidential Version)
[7] Application Security Solution V1.0 for LG webOS TV Security Target Lite v1.5,
May 30th
, 2017 (Sanitized Version)
[8] ST sanitising for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006