August 2016 Issue 1.0 Page 1 of 22
0122
Common Criteria
Certification Report
No. CRP297
SkySIM CX Virgo
Version 1.0
running on Broadcom BCM_SPS02 C0
Issue 1.0
August 2016
© Crown Copyright 2016 – All Rights Reserved
Reproduction is authorised, provided
that this report is copied in its entirety
CESG Certification Body
Industry Enabling Services, CESG
Hubble Road, Cheltenham
Gloucestershire, GL51 0EX
United Kingdom
CRP297 – SkySIM CX Virgo V1.0
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CERTIFICATION STATEMENT
The product detailed below has been evaluated under the terms of the UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme (‘the
Scheme’) and has met the specified Common Criteria (CC) requirements. The scope of the evaluation and the assumed usage
environment are specified in the body of this Certification Report.
Sponsor Giesecke & Devrient GmbH Developer Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Product Name, Version SkySIM CX Virgo Version 1.0
Platform/Integrated Circuit Broadcom BCM_SPS02 C0
Description Embedded Secure Element with Java Card Open Platform
CC Version Version 3.1 Release 4
CC Part 2 Conformant CC Part 3 Conformant
PP(s) or (c)PP Conformance Java Card Protection Profile, Open Configuration, Version 3.0, May 2012 [PP]
EAL CC EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
CLEF UL Transaction Security
CC Certificate P297 Date Certified 3 August 2016
The evaluation was performed in accordance with the requirements of the UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme as
described in UK Scheme Publication 01 [UKSP01] and 02 [UKSP01]. The Scheme has established the CESG Certification Body, which
is managed by CESG on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government.
The purpose of the evaluation was to provide assurance about the effectiveness of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) in meeting its
Security Target [ST], which prospective consumers are advised to read. To ensure that the ST gave an appropriate baseline for a CC
evaluation, it was first itself evaluated. The TOE was then evaluated against that baseline. Both parts of the evaluation were performed
in accordance with Protection Profile [PP] and supporting documents [JIL], CC Parts 1, 2 and 3 [CC], the Common Evaluation
Methodology [CEM] and relevant Interpretations.
The issuing of a Certification Report is a confirmation that the evaluation process has been performed properly and that no exploitable
vulnerabilities have been found in the evaluated configuration of the TOE. It is not an endorsement of the product.
1
All judgements contained in this Certification Report are covered by the CCRA [CCRA] recognition for components up to
EAL 2 only, i.e. the augmentations ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 are not covered by the CCRA. All judgements in this
Certification Report are covered by the SOGIS MRA [MRA].
ARRANGEMENT ON THE RECOGNITION OF COMMON CRITERIA CERTIFICATES
IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY (CCRA)
The CESG Certification Body of the UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme is a member of the above Arrangement
[CCRA] and, as such, this confirms that the Common Criteria certificate has been issued by or under the authority of a Party to this
Arrangement and is the Party’s claim that the certificate has been issued in accordance with the terms of this Arrangement.
The judgements1
contained in the certificate and in this Certification Report are those of the Qualified Certification Body which issued
them and of the Evaluation Facility which performed the evaluation. There is no implication of acceptance by other Members of the
Arrangement Group of liability in respect of those judgements or for loss sustained as a result of reliance placed by a third party upon
those judgements.
SENIOR OFFICIALS GROUP – INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY (SOGIS)
MUTUAL RECOGNITION AGREEMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY EVALUATION CERTIFICATES (MRA)
The SOGIS MRA logo which appears below confirms that the conformant certificate has been authorised by a Participant to the
above Agreement [MRA] and it is the Participant’s statement that the certificate has been issued in accordance with the terms of this
Agreement.
The judgments1
contained in the certificate and this Certification Report are those of the compliant Certification Body which issued
them and of the Evaluation Facility which performed the evaluation. Use of the logo does not imply acceptance by other Participants
of liability in respect of those judgments or for loss sustained as a result of reliance placed upon those judgments by a third party.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATION STATEMENT ................................................................................................2
TABLE OF CONTENTS..............................................................................................................3
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...................................................................................................4
Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 4
Evaluated Product and TOE Scope.................................................................................................... 4
Protection Profile Conformance......................................................................................................... 4
Security Target................................................................................................................................... 5
Evaluation Conduct............................................................................................................................ 5
Evaluated Configuration .................................................................................................................... 5
Conclusions........................................................................................................................................ 6
Recommendations.............................................................................................................................. 6
Disclaimers......................................................................................................................................... 6
II. TOE SECURITY GUIDANCE ...........................................................................................8
Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 8
Delivery and Installation.................................................................................................................... 8
Guidance Documents......................................................................................................................... 8
Recommendations.............................................................................................................................. 9
III. EVALUATED CONFIGURATION ..................................................................................10
TOE Identification ........................................................................................................................... 10
TOE Documentation ........................................................................................................................ 10
TOE Scope....................................................................................................................................... 10
TOE Configuration .......................................................................................................................... 10
Environmental Requirements........................................................................................................... 10
Test Configurations.......................................................................................................................... 10
IV. TOE ARCHITECTURE.....................................................................................................11
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 11
TOE Description and Architecture................................................................................................... 11
TOE Design Subsystems.................................................................................................................. 12
TOE Dependencies .......................................................................................................................... 13
TOE Security Functionality Interface .............................................................................................. 13
V. TOE TESTING...................................................................................................................14
Developer Testing............................................................................................................................ 14
Evaluator Testing............................................................................................................................. 14
Vulnerability Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 14
Platform Issues................................................................................................................................. 14
VI. REFERENCES..................................................................................................................15
VII. ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................19
VIII. CERTIFICATE...................................................................................................................20
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
1. This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria (CC)
security evaluation of the above product at the stated version, to the Sponsor as
summarised on Page 2 ‘Certification Statement’ of this report, and is intended to
assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security of
the product for their particular requirements.
2. Prospective consumers of the above product at the stated version should
understand the specific scope of the certification by reading this report in
conjunction with the Security Target [ST]/[ST-Lite], which specifies the
functional, environmental and assurance requirements.
Evaluated Product and TOE Scope
3. The following product completed evaluation to CC EAL4 assurance level
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 on 3 August 2016:
SkySIM CX Virgo Version 1.0 running on Broadcom BCM_SPS02 C0
4. The Developer was Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
5. The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is an embedded Secure Element (eSE)
intended to be soldered in a mobile phone or other mobile device. The TOE
consists of the related embedded software and firmware in combination with the
underlying hardware. Further details are provided in Chapter IV ‘TOE
Architecture’.
6. The evaluated configuration of this product is described in this report as the
TOE. Details of the TOE Scope, its assumed environment and the evaluated
configuration are given in Chapter III ‘Evaluation Configuration’ of this report.
7. An overview of the TOE and its product architecture can be found in Chapter IV
‘TOE Architecture’ of this report. Configuration requirements are specified in
Section 1.4 of the Security Target [ST]/[ST-Lite].
Protection Profile Conformance
8. The Security Target [ST]/[ST-Lite] is certified as achieving conformance to the
following protection profile:
 Java Card Protection Profile, Open Configuration, Version 3.0, May 2012
[PP].
9. The ST also includes security objectives, security assurance requirements and
Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) from [USIM_PP], additional to those
of the [PP].
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Security Target
10. The Security Target [ST]/[ST-Lite] fully specifies the TOE’s Security Objectives,
the Threats which these Objectives counter, the Organisational Security
Policies (OSPs) which these Objectives counter or meet and the Security
Functional Requirements (SFRs) that refine the Objectives. Most of the SFRs
are taken from [PP] which in turn takes them from CC Part 2 [CC2]; use of this
standard facilitates comparison with other evaluated products.
11. The assurance requirements are taken from CC Part 3 [CC3].
12. The OSPs that must be met are specified in Section 5.3.2 of [ST]/[ST-Lite].
13. The environmental objectives and assumptions related to the operating
environment are detailed in Chapter III (in ‘Environmental Requirements’) of this
report.
14. The cryptographic algorithms are specified in Section 6 of [ST]/[ST-LITE].
Evaluation Conduct
15. The evaluation used the following documents as appropriate: the CCRA
supporting documents, the SOGIS supporting documents defined in [JIL],
international interpretations and relevant UK interpretations.
16. The platform source code was reviewed in G&D’s premises in Barcelona
(Spain) and in UL’s premises in Basingstoke (UK).
17. The Evaluator’s independent security functional tests, and the repeat of a
sample of the Developer’s tests overseen by the Evaluator, were performed in
G&D’s premises in Barcelona.
18. Penetration testing of the TOE was performed entirely at UL Transaction
Security’s premises in Basingstoke, UK, using final samples of the TOE.
19. The site visit results from previous evaluations were reused, as detailed in the
Evaluation Technical Report [ETR].
20. The CESG Certification Body monitored the evaluation, which was performed
by the UL Transaction Security Commercial Evaluation Facility (CLEF), and
witnessed a sample of Evaluator tests. The evaluation addressed the
requirements specified in the Security Target [ST]/[ST-Lite]. The results of this
work, completed in July 2016, were reported in the Evaluation Technical Report
[ETR].
Evaluated Configuration
21. The TOE should be used in accordance with the environmental assumptions
specified in the Security Target [ST]/[ST-Lite]. Prospective consumers are
advised to check that the SFRs and the evaluated configuration match their
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identified requirements, and to give due consideration to the recommendations
and caveats of this report.
22. The TOE should be used in accordance with its supporting guidance
documentation included in the evaluated configuration.
Conclusions
23. The conclusions of the CESG Certification Body are summarised on page 2
‘Certification Statement’ of this report.
Recommendations
24. Chapter II ‘TOE Security Guidance’ of this report includes a number of
recommendations regarding the secure delivery, receipt, installation,
configuration and operation of the TOE.
25. The TOE relies on the already certified underlying IC for Crypto libraries and
Security Mechanisms. System integrators and risk owners using the TOE
should therefore make suitable arrangements to satisfy themselves that they
have appropriate confidence in the mechanisms of that underlying platform, in
particular any patches or updates.
26. Any further recommendations are included in the TOE Security Guidance in
Chapter II, Paragraph 40.
Disclaimers
27. This Certification Report and associated Certificate applies only to the specific
version of the product in its evaluated configuration (i.e. the TOE). This is
specified in Chapter III ‘Evaluation Configuration’ of this report. The ETR on
which this Certification Report is based relates only to the specific items tested.
28. Certification is not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities. There
remains a small probability that exploitable vulnerabilities may be discovered
after the Evaluators’ penetration tests were completed. This report reflects the
CESG Certification Body’s view on that date (see Chapter V, Paragraph 64).
29. Existing and prospective consumers should check regularly for themselves
whether any security vulnerabilities have been discovered since the date of the
penetration tests (as detailed in Chapter V) and, if appropriate, should check
with the Vendor to see if any patches exist for the product and whether those
patches have further assurance.
30. The installation of patches for security vulnerabilities, whether or not those
patches have further assurance, should improve the security of the TOE but
should only be applied in accordance with a consumer’s risk management
policy. However, note that unevaluated patching will invalidate the certification
of the TOE, unless the TOE has undergone a formal re-certification or is
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covered under an approved Assurance Continuity process by a CCRA
certificate-authorising Scheme.
31. All product or company names used in this report are for identification purposes
only and may be trademarks of their respective owners.
32. Note that the opinions and interpretations stated in this report under
‘Recommendations’ and ‘TOE Security Guidance’ are based on the experience
of the CESG Certification Body in performing similar work under the Scheme.
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II. TOE SECURITY GUIDANCE
Introduction
33. The following sections provide guidance that is of particular relevance to
consumers of the TOE.
Delivery and Installation
34. On receipt of the TOE, the consumer should check that the evaluated version
has been supplied and that the security of the TOE has not been compromised
during delivery. Specific advice on delivery and installation is provided in the
TOE document detailed below:
 Sections 2 and 3 of [AG].
Guidance Documents
35. Specific configuration advice is included in the smart card guidance documents
listed in this section.
36. The User Guide and Administration Guide documentation is in the smart card
guidance listed below.
37. The guidance documentation for the Pre-personalization phase is as follows:
 [AG] Preparative Procedures.
38. The guidance documentation for the Personalization phase is as follows:
 [UG_PERSO] Operational User Guidance for the Personaliser;
 [UG_COMMON] Operational User Guidance Common Document.
39. The guidance documentation for the Operational phase is as follows:
 [UG_COMMON] Operational User Guidance Common Document;
 [UG_AD] Operational User Guidance for the Application Developer;
 [UG_AP] Operational User Guidance for the Application Provider;
 [UG_CA] Operational User Guidance for the Controlling Authority;
 [UG_ISSUER] Operational User Guidance for the Issuer;
 [UG_VA] Operational User Guidance for the Verification Authority.
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Recommendations
40. To maintain secure operation, the consumer is recommended to follow the
smart card guidance detailed in the documentation listed above.
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III. EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
TOE Identification
41. The TOE is SkySIM CX Virgo Version 1.0, which consists of a Java Card
Platform in Open Configuration in composition with the certified underlying IC
platform BCM_SPS02 C0.
TOE Documentation
42. The relevant guidance documents for the evaluated configuration are identified
in Chapter II (in ‘Guidance Documents') of this report.
TOE Scope
43. The TOE Scope is defined in the Security Target ([ST]/[ST-Lite]) Section 1.4.
Functionality that is outside the TOE Scope is defined in Sections 1.4.8, 1.4.9
and 1.4.10. The TOE boundaries are shown in Figure 1 below.
TOE Configuration
44. The evaluated configuration of the TOE is defined in the Security Target Section
1.4.1 and specific configuration advice is provided in the guidance [UG].
45. The evaluated TOE configuration is composed of:
 SkySIM CX Virgo Java Card Open Platform, Code v0.8.9;
 BCM_SPS02 C0, Firmware/Bootloader v001.010.
Environmental Requirements
46. The environmental objectives for the TOE are stated in Section 5.2 of [ST]/[ST-
Lite].
47. The environmental assumptions for the TOE are stated in Section 4.5 of
[ST]/[ST-Lite].
Test Configurations
48. The Developers and Evaluators used this configuration for their testing:
 The TOE configuration as defined in Paragraph 45 above.
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IV. TOE ARCHITECTURE
Introduction
49. This Chapter gives an overview of the product and the TOE’s main architectural
features. Other details of the scope of evaluation are given in Chapter III
‘Evaluated Configuration’ of this report.
TOE Description and Architecture
50. The TOE is an embedded Secure Element (eSE), a composite product made of
the SkySIM CX Virgo V1.0 Java Card Platform in Open Configuration in
composition with the already certified BCM_SPS02 C0 security IC from
Broadcom [CR_IC], as described in Section 1.4.1 of [ST]/[ST-Lite].
51. The TOE is comprised of the following:
 A Java Card System as defined in the [PP], including all the native code,
which manages and executes applications called applets. It provides APIs
for developing applets in accordance with the Java Card specification.
 GlobalPlatform (GP) packages providing a common interface to
communicate with a smart card and to manage applications in a secure
way according to the GP specifications.
 The Smart Card Platform (SCP), comprising the Integrated Circuit (IC) and
the Operating System (OS).
TOE of the PP SkySIM CX Virgo TOE
 The SCP is a combination of the
security IC and the native OS.
BCM_SPS02 C0 and SkySIM CX
Virgo OS
 Java Card System (JCRE, JCVM,
JCAPI)
Java Card Platform 3.0.4 classic
implementation
 Additional native code, proprietary
applications
Native Applications
 Applets The TOE does not include applets.
Table 1: Correspondence of TOE building blocks in [PP] and [ST]
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Figure 1: SkySIM Virgo V1.0 TOE boundaries defined in [PP]
52. Since post-issuance installation of applets is possible, the TOE corresponds to
an open configuration, as defined in [PP].
53. The TOE offers the following security features:
 Security services to Applets through the available APIs;
 Confidentiality and integrity of Application secrets, data and code;
 Card content management as from the GlobalPlatform specification.
54. The TOE supports the cryptographic algorithms AES, TDES, MAC Algorithm 3;
Secure Channel Protocols (SCP02 and SCP03) provide confidentiality and
integrity. The TOE implements the Single Wire Protocol (SWP) for contactless
communication. The TOE also applies masking operations to keys and sensitive
data.
TOE Design Subsystems
55. The high-level TOE subsystems, and their security features/functionality, are:
 APDU: this subsystem is the entry point of APDU commands sent to the
TOE. It implements the APDU handling (SWP, logical channels) and the
Issuer Security Domain.
 API: this subsystem implements the Java Card APIs [JCAPI304] and
GlobalPlatform APIs [GP221] that are available to applets.
 VM: this subsystem implements the Java Card Virtual Machine, the
bytecode interpreter in charge of interpreting the bytecodes according to
[JCVM304], handling java exceptions and performing the firewall checks. It
also implements Memory Management functions according to [JCRE304]
needed by the JCVM.
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 HW: this subsystem represents the TOE hardware platform, the Broadcom
BCM_SPS02 C0 security IC, which is certified to CC EAL5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 [CR_IC].
TOE Dependencies
56. The TOE has no dependencies.
TOE Security Functionality Interface
57. The external TOE Security Functionality Interface (TSFI) is:
 APDU commands;
 APIs (Java Card, GlobalPlatform and proprietary APIs);
 Bytecodes (interface with the Java Card Virtual Machine);
 Electrical interface (reset, power supply).
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V. TOE TESTING
Developer Testing
58. The Developer’s security tests covered:
 all SFRs;
 all TOE high-level subsystems, as identified in Chapter IV (in ‘TOE Design
Subsystems’) of this report;
 all TOE Security Functionality;
 the TSFI, as identified in Chapter IV (in ‘TOE Security Functionality
Interface’) of this report.
59. The Developer’s security tests also included those TOE interfaces which are
internal to the product and thus had to be exercised indirectly. The Evaluators
witnessed the Developer repeating a sample of Developer security tests.
60. The Developer security tests were run on the configuration defined in Chapter
III ‘Test Configurations’.
Evaluator Testing
61. The Evaluators devised and ran a total of 6 independent security functional
tests, different from those performed by the Developer. No anomalies were
found.
62. The Evaluators also devised and ran a total of 24 penetration tests to address
potential vulnerabilities considered during the evaluation. No exploitable
vulnerabilities or errors were detected.
63. The Evaluators ran their tests on the configuration defined in Chapter III ‘Test
Configurations’.
64. The Evaluators completed their penetration tests on 13 April 2016.
Vulnerability Analysis
65. The Evaluators’ vulnerability analysis, which preceded penetration testing and
was reported in [ETR], was based on public domain sources and the visibility of
the TOE provided by the evaluation deliverables. The analysis of the evaluation
deliverables followed the SOGIS guidance provided in the [JIL] documentation.
Platform Issues
66. The TOE is an Embedded Secure Element and no platform issues were
identified.
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VI. REFERENCES
[AG] Administration Guide:
Preparative Procedures SkySIM CX Virgo V1.0,
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,
Issue 1.4, 2016-04-26.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation
(comprising Parts 1, 2, 3: [CC1], [CC2] and [CC3]).
[CC1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation,
Part 1, Introduction and General Model,
Common Criteria Maintenance Board,
CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
[CC2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation,
Part 2, Security Functional Components,
Common Criteria Maintenance Board,
CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
[CC3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation,
Part 3, Security Assurance Components,
Common Criteria Maintenance Board,
CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
[CCRA] Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria
Certificates in the Field of Information Technology
Security,
Participants in the Arrangement Group,
2nd
July 2014.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology,
Common Criteria Maintenance Board,
CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1 R4, September 2012.
[CR_IC] BSI-DSZ-CC-0915-2016 for BCM_SPS02 Secure
Processing System with IC Dedicated Software, Version
1.0 from Broadcom,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI),
BSI-DSZ-CC-0915-2016, Issue 1.0, 25 February 2016.
[ETR] SkySIM CX Virgo V1.1 Evaluation Technical Report,
UL Transaction Security,
LFU/T019/ETR, Issue 1.2, 2 August 2016.
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[GP221] GlobalPlatform Card Specification,
GlobalPlatform Inc,
Version 2.2.1, January 2011.
[JCAPI304] Java Card API, Classic Edition,
Oracle,
Version 3.0.4, September 2011.
[JCRE304] Java Card 3 Platform – Runtime Environment
Specification, Classic Edition,
Oracle,
E18985-01, Version 3.0.4, September 2011.
[JCVM304] Java Card 3 Platform – Virtual Machine
Specification, Classic Edition,
Oracle,
E25256-01, Version 3.0.4, September 2011.
[JIL] Joint Interpretation Library
(comprising [JIL_AM], [JIL_AP], [JIL_ARC], [JIL_COMP]
and [JIL_OPEN]).
[JIL_AM] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices,
Joint Interpretation Library,
Version 2.2, January 2013.
[JIL_AP] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards,
Joint Interpretation Library,
Version 2.9, January 2013.
[JIL_ARC] Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for
smart cards and similar devices,
Joint Interpretation Library,
Version 2.0, January 2012.
[JIL_COMP] Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices,
Joint Interpretation Library,
Version 1.4, August 2015.
[JIL_OPEN] Certification of "open" smart card products,
Joint Interpretation Library,
Version 1.1 (for trial use), 4 February 2013.
[MRA] Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information
Technology Security Evaluation Certificates,
Management Committee,
Senior Officials Group – Information Systems Security
(SOGIS),
Version 3.0, 8 January 2010.
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[PP] Java Card Protection Profile, Open Configuration,
Oracle Corporation,
Version 3.0, May 2012.
[ST] SkySIM CX Virgo V1.0 Security Target,
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,
Issue 2.2, 2016-08-01.
[ST-Lite] SkySIM CX Virgo V1.0 Security Target Lite,
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,
Issue 2.2, 2016-08-01.
[UG] User Guides:
[UG_COMMON] Operational User Guidance Common
Document - SkySIM CX Virgo V1.0,
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,
Issue 1.5, 2016-04-26.
[UG_AD] Operational User Guidance for the Application
Developer - SkySIM CX Virgo V1.0,
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,
Issue 1.8, 2016-05-04.
[UG_AP] Operational User Guidance for the Application
Provider - SkySIM CX Virgo V1.0,
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,
Issue 1.4, 2016-04-26.
[UG_CA] Operational User Guidance for the Controlling
Authority - SkySIM CX Virgo V1.0,
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,
Issue 1.3, 2016-04-26.
[UG_ISSUER] Operational User Guidance for the Issuer
- SkySIM CX Virgo V1.0,
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,
Issue 1.6, 2016-04-26.
[UG_PERSO] Operational User Guidance for the
Personaliser - SkySIM CX Virgo V1.0,
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,
Issue 1.5, 2016-04-26.
[UG_VA] Operational User Guidance for the Verification
Authority - SkySIM CX Virgo V1.0,
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,
Issue 1.4, 2016-04-26.
[UKSP00] Abbreviations and References,
UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme,
UKSP 00, Issue 1.8, August 2013.
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[UKSP01] Description of the Scheme,
UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme,
UKSP 01, Issue 6.6, August 2014.
[UKSP02P1] CLEF Requirements - Startup and Operations,
UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme,
UKSP 02: Part I, Issue 4.5, August 2013.
[UKSP02P2] CLEF Requirements - Conduct of an Evaluation,
UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme,
UKSP 02: Part II, Issue 3.1, August 2013.
[USIM_PP] (U)SIM Java Card Platform Protection Profile – Basic
and SCWS Configurations,
SFR S.A.,
Issue 2.0.2, 17 June 2010.
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VII. ABBREVIATIONS
This list of abbreviations is specific to the TOE. Standard CC abbreviations are
detailed in CC Part 1 [CC1] and UK Scheme abbreviations and acronyms are
detailed in [UKSP00].
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APDU Application Protocol Data Unit
API Application Programming Interface
DES Data Encryption Standard
eSE Embedded Secure Element
GP GlobalPlatform
IC Integrated Circuit
JCAPI Java Card Application Programming Interface
JCRE Java Card Runtime Environment
JCS Java Card System
JCVM Java Card Virtual Machine
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
OS Operating System
SCP Smart Card Platform
SWP Single Wire Protocol
TDES Triple DES
VM Virtual Machine
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VIII. CERTIFICATE
The final two pages of this document contain the Certificate (front and back) for the
TOE.
August 2016 Issue 1.0 Page 21 of 22
Common Criteria
P297
This is to certify that
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
SkySIM CX Virgo
Version 1.0
Running on Broadcom BCM_SPS02 C0
has been evaluated under the terms of the
Common Criteria Scheme
and complies with the requirements for
Java Card Protection Profile Open Configuration
Version 3.0
AUTHORISED BY
DIRECTOR GENERAL
FOR GOVERNMENT
AND INDUSTRY CYBER SECURITY
THIS PRODUCT WAS EVALUATED BY
UL Transaction Security
DATE AWARDED
3 August 2016
The CESG Certification Body of the UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme is accredited by
the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) to ISO/IEC17065:2012 to provide product conformity
certification as follows:
Category: Type Testing Product Certification of IT Products and Systems.
Standards: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC) EAL1 - EAL7.
Details are provided on the UKAS Website (www.ukas.org).
Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the Field of
Information Technology Security (CCRA)
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and approved Evaluation
Facility of the United Kingdom using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1
and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the Common
Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1. This certificate applies only to the specific version and
release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification
Report. The Evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the UK IT Security
Evaluation and Certification Scheme and the conclusions of the Evaluation Facility in the Evaluation
Technical Report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the
IT Product by CESG or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT Product by CESG or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
All judgements contained in this certificate, and in the associated Certification Report, are
covered by CCRA recognition for components up to EAL 2 only, i.e. the augmentations
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 are not covered by the Arrangement.
Senior Officials Group - Information Systems Security (SOGIS)
Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security Evaluation Certificates
(SOGIS MRA), Version 3.0
The CESG Certification Body is a Participant to the above Agreement. The current
Participants to the above Agreement are detailed on the SOGIS Portal (www.sogisportal.eu).
The mark (left) confirms that this conformant certificate has been authorised by a
Participant to the above Agreement and it is the Participant’s statement that this certificate
has been issued in accordance with the terms of the above Agreement. The judgements
contained in this certificate and in the associated Certification Report are those of the
compliant Certification Body which issues them and of the Evaluation Facility which
performed the evaluation. Use of the mark does not imply acceptance by other Participants
of liability in respect of those judgements or for loss sustained as a result of reliance upon
those judgements by a third party.
All judgements contained in this certificate, and in the associated Certification Report, are
covered by the agreement.
In conformance with the requirements of ISO/IEC17065:2012, the CCRA and the SOGIS MRA, the CESG
Certification Body’s website (www.commoncriteriaportal.org) provides additional information as follows:
 Type of product (i.e. product category); and
 Details of product manufacturer (i.e. as appropriate: vendor/developer name, postal address, website,
point of contact, telephone number, fax number, email address).
All IT product names and company names used in this certificate are for identification purposes only and may
not be trademarks of their respective owners.