Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale
Schema nazionale per la valutazione e la certificazione della sicurezza nel settore della tecnologia
dell'informazione (DPCM del 30 ottobre 2003 - G.U. n. 93 del 27 aprile 2004)
Il prodotto identificato in questo certificato è risultato conforme ai requisiti
ISO/IEC 15408 Common Criteria (CC) ver .3.1 rel. 5
Certificato n.
(Certificate No.)
02/2026
Rapporto di Certificazione
(Certification Report)
OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC, v 1.1
Decorrenza
(Date of 1st
Issue)
23 gennaio 2026
Nome e Versione del Prodotto
(Product Name and Version)
Primus HSM Firmware 2.8.22 Series E, Series X
Sviluppatore
(Developer)
Securosys SA
Tipo di Prodotto
(Type of Product)
Prodotti per firme digitali (Products for Digital Signatures)
Livello di Garanzia
(Assurance Level)
EAL4+ (AVA_VAN.5) conforme a CC Parte 3
Conformità a PP
(PP Conformance)
EN 419221-5:2018, Protection Profiles for TSP
Cryptographic Modules - Part 5: Cryptographic Module for
Trust Services
Funzionalità di sicurezza
(Conformance of Functionality)
Funzionalità conformi a PP, CC Parte 2 estesa
Riconoscimento CCRA per componenti
fino a EAL2 e solo ALC_FLR
(CCRA recognition for components up to
EAL2 and ALC_FLR only)
Riconoscimento SOGIS MRA
per componenti fino a EAL4
(SOGIS MRA recognition
for components up to EAL4)
Roma, 27 gennaio 2026
Il Capo Servizio
Certificazione e Vigilanza
(A. Billet)
[ORIGINAL SIGNED]
Page 2 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
Il prodotto IT (Information Technology) identificato nel presente certificato è stato valutato
presso un LVS (Laboratorio per la Valutazione della Sicurezza) accreditato e
abilitato/approvato utilizzando Metodologia Comune per la Valutazione di Sicurezza della
tecnologia dell’Informazione versione 3.1 revisione 5 per la conformità ai Criteri Comuni
per la Valutazione di Sicurezza della Tecnologia dell’Informazione versione 3.1 revisione
5. Questo certificato si applica solo alla versione e al rilascio specifici del prodotto nella sua
configurazione valutata e unitamente al Rapporto di certificazione completo. La valutazione
è stata condotta in conformità alle disposizioni dello Schema nazionale per la valutazione e
la certificazione della sicurezza nel settore della tecnologia dell'informazione (DPCM del
30 ottobre 2003 - G.U. n. 93 del 27 aprile 2004) e le conclusioni dell’LVS nel Rapporto di
Fine Valutazione sono coerenti con le evidenze addotte. Il presente Certificato non
costituisce un sostegno o promozione del prodotto IT da parte della Agenzia per la
Cybersicurezza Nazionale o di qualsiasi altra organizzazione che riconosca o dia effetto a
questo certificato, e nessuna garanzia del prodotto IT, da parte della Agenzia per la
Cybersicurezza Nazionale o di qualsiasi altra organizzazione che riconosce o dà effetto a
questo certificato, è espressa o implicita.
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and
licensed/approved evaluation facility using Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation version 3.1 release 5 for conformance to Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation version 3.1 release 5. This certificate applies only to the specific
version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete
Certification report. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
National scheme for the evaluation and certification of the security in the sector of information
technology (Prime Ministerial Decree of 30 October 2003 - Official Journal no. 93 of 27 April 2004)
and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with
the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by Agenzia per la
Cybersicurezza Nazionale or by any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product, by Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale or by
any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or
implied.
Page 1 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale
Servizio Certificazione e Vigilanza
Certification Report
Primus HSM Firmware 2.8.22
Series E, Series X
OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC
Version 1.1
27 January 2026
Page 2 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
Courtesy translation
Disclaimer: This English language translation is provided for informational purposes only. It is not
intended to substitute the official document and has no legal value. The original Italian language
version of the document is the only approved and official version.
Page 3 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
1 Document revisions
Version Author Information Date
1.0 OCSI First issue 23/01/2026
1.1 OCSI Editorial revision 27/01/2026
Page 4 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
2 Table of contents
1 Document revisions ....................................................................................................................3
2 Table of contents ........................................................................................................................4
3 Acronyms....................................................................................................................................6
3.1 National scheme.................................................................................................................6
3.2 CC and CEM......................................................................................................................6
3.3 Other acronyms..................................................................................................................6
4 References ..................................................................................................................................8
4.1 Normative references and national Scheme documents ....................................................8
4.2 Technical documents .........................................................................................................9
5 Recognition of the certificate ...................................................................................................10
5.1 European recognition of CC certificates (SOGIS-MRA)................................................10
5.2 International recognition of CC certificates (CCRA)......................................................10
6 Statement of certification..........................................................................................................11
7 Summary of the evaluation.......................................................................................................12
7.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................12
7.2 Executive summary .........................................................................................................12
7.3 Evaluated product ............................................................................................................12
7.3.1 TOE architecture ........................................................................................................13
7.3.2 TOE security features.................................................................................................14
7.4 Documentation.................................................................................................................19
7.5 Protection Profile conformance claims............................................................................19
7.6 Functional and assurance requirements...........................................................................19
7.7 Evaluation conduct ..........................................................................................................19
7.8 General considerations about the certification validity ...................................................20
8 Evaluation outcome..................................................................................................................21
8.1 Evaluation results.............................................................................................................21
8.2 Recommendations............................................................................................................22
9 Annex A – Guidelines for the secure usage of the product......................................................23
9.1 TOE delivery ...................................................................................................................23
9.1.1 Scope of TOE supply .................................................................................................23
9.1.2 Delivery procedure.....................................................................................................23
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9.2 Identification of the TOE by the user ..............................................................................24
9.3 Installation, configuration and secure usage of the TOE.................................................24
10 Annex B – Evaluated configuration .........................................................................................25
10.1 TOE operational environment .........................................................................................25
11 Annex C – Test activity............................................................................................................26
11.1 Test configuration............................................................................................................26
11.2 Functional tests performed by the Developer..................................................................26
11.3 Functional and independent tests performed by the Evaluators ......................................26
11.3.1 Test approach .............................................................................................................26
11.3.2 Test results..................................................................................................................26
11.4 Vulnerability analysis and penetration tests ....................................................................26
Page 6 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
3 Acronyms
3.1 National scheme
DPCM Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri
LGP Linea Guida Provvisoria
LVS Laboratorio per la Valutazione della Sicurezza
NIS Nota Informativa dello Schema
OCSI Organismo di Certificazione della Sicurezza Informatica
3.2 CC and CEM
CC Common Criteria
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
cPP collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOGIS-MRA Senior Officials Group Information Systems Security – Mutual Recognition
Agreement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
TSFI TSF Interface
3.3 Other acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-GCM Advanced Encryption Standard - Galois/Counter Mode
CAD Computer Aided Design
Page 7 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
CNG Cryptography API: Next Generation
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSP Critical Security Parameter
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EMS Electronic manufacturing service
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
HSM Hardware Security Module
JCA/JCE Java Cryptography Architecture / Java Cryptography Extension
KAS Key Agreement Scheme
KDF Key Derivation Function
KEK Key Encryption Key
MS CSP Microsoft Cloud Solution Provider
NTP Network Time Protocol
PCB Printed Circuit Board
PIN Personal Identification Number
PKCS Public-Key Cryptography Standards
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SAM Signature Activation Module
SKA Smart Key Attributes
SO Security Officer
Page 8 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
4 References
4.1 Normative references and national Scheme documents
[CC1] CCMB-2017-04-001, “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 1 – Introduction and general model”, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017
[CC2] CCMB-2017-04-002, “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 2 – Security functional components”, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017
[CC3] CCMB-2017-04-003, “Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 3 – Security assurance components”, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April
2017
[CCRA] Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates In the field of
Information Technology Security, July 2014
[CEM] CCMB-2017-04-004, “Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation – Evaluation methodology”, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017
[LGP1] Schema nazionale per la valutazione e certificazione della sicurezza di sistemi e
prodotti nel settore della tecnologia dell’informazione - Descrizione Generale dello
Schema Nazionale - Linee Guida Provvisorie - parte 1 – LGP1 versione 1.0,
dicembre 2004
[LGP2] Schema nazionale per la valutazione e certificazione della sicurezza di sistemi e
prodotti nel settore della tecnologia dell’informazione - Accreditamento degli LVS e
abilitazione degli Assistenti - Linee Guida Provvisorie - parte 2 – LGP2 versione 1.0,
dicembre 2004
[LGP3] Schema nazionale per la valutazione e certificazione della sicurezza di sistemi e
prodotti nel settore della tecnologia dell’informazione - Procedure di valutazione -
Linee Guida Provvisorie - parte 3 – LGP3, versione 1.0, dicembre 2004
[NIS1] Organismo di certificazione della sicurezza informatica, Nota Informativa dello
Schema N. 1/23 – Modifiche alla LGP1, versione 1.1, 21 agosto 2023
[NIS2] Organismo di certificazione della sicurezza informatica, Nota Informativa dello
Schema N. 2/23 – Modifiche alla LGP2, versione 1.1, 21 agosto 2023
[NIS3] Organismo di certificazione della sicurezza informatica, Nota Informativa dello
Schema N. 3/23 – Modifiche alla LGP3, versione 1.1, 21 agosto 2023
[NIS5] Organismo di certificazione della sicurezza informatica, Nota Informativa dello
Schema N. 3/23 - Condizioni per lo svolgimento di test da remoto in valutazioni
Common Criteria, versione 1.1, 21 agosto 2023
[SOGIS] Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security Evaluation
Certificates, Version 3, January 2010
Page 9 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
4.2 Technical documents
[CCGUIDE] Primus HSM User Guide, Version 2.8, Edition 08.6, September 2025.
[CR] Certification Report for Primus HSM FW 2.8.21 series E, series X, April 14th
2021.
[ETRv1] Final Evaluation Technical Report Re-evaluation of PRIMUS HSM FW 2.8.22
Series E, Series X Assurance Level EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5, v1, 21st
October 2025.
[ETRv2] Final Evaluation Technical Report Re-evaluation of PRIMUS HSM FW 2.8.22
Series E, Series X Assurance Level EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5, v2, 4th
December 2025.
[LC] Primus HSM Life-Cycle support, version 2.0, 8th
October 2025.
[PP 419221-5] Protection profiles for TSP Cryptographic modules - Part 5 Cryptographic Module
for Trust Services, EN 419221-5:2018
[ST] Securosys SA Primus HSM Security Target version 2.0, 10th
October 2025.
Page 10 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
5 Recognition of the certificate
5.1 European recognition of CC certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The European SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA, version 3 [SOGIS]) became
effective in April 2010 and provides mutual recognition of certificates based on the Common Criteria
(CC) Evaluation Assurance Level up to and including EAL4 for all IT -Products. A higher recognition
level for evaluations beyond EAL4 is provided for IT -Products related to specific Technical Domains
only.
The current list of signatory nations and of technical domains for which the higher recognition applies
and other details can be found on https://www.sogis.eu/.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by signatory nations.
This certificate is recognised under SOGIS-MRA for all claimed assurance components up to EAL4.
5.2 International recognition of CC certificates (CCRA)
The current version of the international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based
on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, [CCRA] was ratified on 8 September 2014.
It covers CC certificates compliant with collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP), up to and including
EAL4, or certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL2, with the possible
augmentation of Flaw Remediation family (ALC_FLR).
The current list of signatory nations and of collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) and other details
can be found on https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/.
The CCRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this
agreement by signatory nations.
This certificate is recognised under CCRA for all claimed assurance components up to EAL2.
Page 11 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
6 Statement of certification
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product named “PRIMUS Hardware Security Module with
Firmware 2.8.22 Series E, Series X” (also referred in this document as “Primus HSM FW 2.8.22”),
developed by Securosys SA.
The TOE is a hardware security module (HSM) which is a physical computing device that creates,
safeguards, and manages digital keys for digital signatures and other cryptographic operations. The
TOE performs a variety of authentication and encryption tasks supporting symmetric (AES,
Camellia), asymmetric (RSA, DSA, ECC, Diffie-Hellman), and hashing (SHA-2, SHA-3)
cryptographic algorithms provided over multiple APIs (PKCS11, JCE, CNG). The TOE includes the
“E” series models 20, 60 250 and the “X” series models 200, 400, 700. 1000 of the Primus HSM.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the requirements established by the Italian
Scheme for the evaluation and certification of security systems and products in the field of
information technology and expressed in the Provisional Guidelines [LGP1, LGP2, LGP3] and
Scheme Information Notes [NIS1, NIS2, NIS3, NIS5]. The Scheme is operated by the Italian
Certification Body “Organismo di Certificazione della Sicurezza Informatica (OCSI)”, established
by the Prime Minister Decree (DPCM) of 30 October 2003 (O.J. n.98 of 27 April 2004).
This Certification Report was issued at the conclusion of the re-certification of an earlier version of
the same TOE (Primus HSM FW 2.8.21 series E and series X), already certified by OCSI (Certificate
no. 01/2021 of April 21, 2021 [CR]).
The TOE had minor changes in the root key storage with a zeroization of the communication key
required to talk to the IC and of the root key store. There are no changes to the environment of the
TOE with respect to the previous certification.
The objective of the evaluation is to provide assurance that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated Security Target [ST]; the potential consumers of the product
should review also the Security Target, in addition to the present Certification Report, in order to gain
a complete understanding of the security problem addressed. The evaluation activities have been
carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Part 3 [CC3] and the Common Evaluation
Methodology [CEM].
The TOE resulted compliant with the requirements of Part 3 of the CC version 3.1 Revision 5 for the
assurance level EAL4, augmented with AVA_VAN.5, and with the Protection Profile (PP)
“Protection profiles for TSP Cryptographic modules - Part 5 Cryptographic Module for Trust
Services, EN 419221-5:2018 [PP 419221-5]” according to the information provided in the Security
Target [ST] and in the configuration shown in “Annex B – Evaluated configuration” of this
Certification Report.
The publication of the Certification Report is the confirmation that the evaluation process has been
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the evaluation criteria Common Criteria - ISO/IEC
15408 ([CC1], [CC2], [CC3]) and the procedures indicated by the Common Criteria Recognition
Arrangement [CCRA] and that no exploitable vulnerability was found. However, the Certification
Body with such a document does not express any kind of support or promotion of the TOE.
Page 12 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
7 Summary of the evaluation
7.1 Introduction
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria evaluation of the product named
“Primus HSM FW 2.8.22” to provide assurance to the potential consumers that TOE security features
comply with its security requirements.
In addition to the present Certification Report, the potential consumers of the product should also
review the Security Target [ST], specifying the functional and assurance requirements and the
intended operational environment.
7.2 Executive summary
TOE name Primus HSM FW 2.8.22
Security Target Securosys SA Primus HSM Security Target, Version: 2.0,
v.2.0 October 10th
, 2025
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5
Developer Securosys SA
Sponsor Securosys SA
LVS CCLab Software Laboratory, Debrecen site
CC version 3.1 Rev. 5
PP conformance claim Protection profiles for TSP Cryptographic modules - Part 5
Cryptographic Module for Trust Services, EN 419221-
5:2018
Evaluation starting date December 11th
2023
Evaluation ending date October 22nd
2025
The certification results apply only to the version of the product shown in this Certification Report
and only if the operational environment assumptions described in the Security Target [ST] are
fulfilled and, in the configuration, shown in “Annex B – Evaluated configuration” of this Certification
Report.
7.3 Evaluated product
This section summarizes the main functional and security requirements of the TOE. For a detailed
description refer to the Security Target [ST].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Primus HSM FW 2.8.22 with the software components as
described in Table 2, sect. 9.1.1.
The TOE is a hardware security module (HSM) which is a physical computing device that creates,
safeguards, and manages digital keys for digital signatures and other cryptographic operations. the
TOE performs a variety of authentication and encryption tasks supporting symmetric (AES,
Camellia), asymmetric (RSA, DSA, ECC, Diffie-Hellman), and hashing (SHA-2, SHA-3)
cryptographic algorithms provided over multiple APIs (PKCS11, JCE, CNG). The TOE includes the
“E” series models 20, 60 250 and the “X” series models 200, 400, 700. 1000 of the Primus HSM.
Page 13 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
The TOE generates cryptographic keys, stores these keys, and manages the distribution of these keys.
The TOE also contains a secure vault implemented inside a dedicated security chip and also offers
FIPS-140-2 Level3 compliant tamper protection.
For a more detailed description of the TOE, please refer to sect. “TOE description” of the Security
Target [ST].
7.3.1 TOE architecture
The physical forms of the Module are depicted in Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4. The
boundary of the module includes the chassis and everything within. However, this does not include
the removable power supplies on the X-Module – they are outside the boundary and may be removed,
or replaced. The X-Module also relies on Smart Cards as external input/output devices, for the
purposes of operator authentication.
Figure 1 - E-Module front with cryptographic boundary in red.
Figure 2 - E-Module back with cryptographic boundary in red.
Figure 3 - X-Module Front with cryptographic boundary in red.
Page 14 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
Figure 4 - X-Module back with cryptographic boundary in red.
The logical scope of the TOE is the represented in Figure 5 based on [ST]:
Figure 5 - TOE Architecture.
Primus HSM includes the cloning and clustering functions. Nevertheless, there are no requirements
for cloning and clustering use of the TOE in [PP 419221-5]; these functions are not part of the
TOE and out of the scope of the evaluation.
7.3.2 TOE security features
The primary security features of the TOE are:
• Authorisation
• Key Management
• Cryptographic functions
• Audit/administration
• Secure Channels/Data Protection
7.3.2.1 Authorisation
The TOE requires identification and authentication before giving access to any security relevant
function. There are four different roles in Primus HSM: Genesis, Security Officer, Partition Security
Officer and User (client application). Genesis, Security Officer (SO) and Partition Security Officer
Page 15 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
(Partition SO) are considered the Administrators of the TOE. Users represent the remote client
applications accessing the TOE via its API.
Administrators
The Administrators (Genesis, SO and Partition SO) authenticate themselves using their smart cards
and PINs. In the E-Series) TOE the Administrators are using their “virtual” cards, but the
authentication/authorisation process is the same. The operator inserts a Card and provides a PIN. The
module retrieves and decrypts the correct PIN from the Card and compares it with the PIN entered
by the operator. The dimension of the PIN is 8-digits.
This method of authentication is impossible without possession of a valid Card. As such, false
authentication would require a Card to be spoofed. Card integrity is provided by a 32-bit CRC across
the internal data; both are stored encrypted with one of the Smart Card Keys. After four wrong tries
of entering the PIN, the smart card becomes locked along with its Administrator account and there is
no way of unblocking it.
Users
Security Officers can create new users (partitions). At creation, an identity belonging to this role is
given the User Setup Password. User Setup Password is a temporary password. It consists of 25
alphanumeric characters, each of which can be any of 36 values (A-Z, 0-9). This password expires
after three days by default.
After the first-time use with the User Setup Password, a User Secret is exchanged between the TOE
and the User. This is a random 256-bit value for machine-to-machine authentication. This User Secret
along with the user name is used to derive the trusted path for the Users in operational use. By default,
after 100 failed login attempts to the TOE within 5 minutes the User becomes locked for 5 minutes.
These values are configurable by Administrators. Also, the failed attempts are logged.
Key Owner
In case of SKA key, the key owner is identified by its digital signature. The public keys of the people
who can authorise the keys are stored within the key attributes. This can be different for block,
unblock, use and modify authorisation settings. On each request for the usage of the SKA key, the
client application forwards the authorisation (signature). If the authorisation signature cannot be
verified successfully for the selected operations the authoriser will be blocked for 5 minutes.
Therefore, the authoriser is not able to authorise any key in the TOE during this time.
Whenever a User tries to use one of its private keys a re-authentication is needed.
7.3.2.2 Key Management
The TOE supports the secure management of cryptographic keys necessary for its implemented
cryptographic functions, including:
• key establishment (including key generation);
• protection of keys held within the TOE and held externally (for use by the TOE);
• control of access and use of keys by the cryptographic functions within the TOE;
• deletion of keys within the TOE.
The TOE handles System keys and User keys.
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System keys
System keys are supporting the operation of the TOE. Encrypting keystore, backups, supports
authentication. Some system keys are generated in setup wizard and cannot be changed (KEK,
Keystore Key, Genesis PIN, SO Card Keys, Backup Key). SO PINs are created when creating new
SO. API keys are created when a new User (client application) is created. User keys are created by
the client applications in operational state. Partition SO keys are generated by Security Officers during
creating new users (new partitions). All those keys have their predefined format and size.
Administrators can create backup of the keystore therefore the keys as well.
They can restore the backup on the same device or on other devices as well. The keys can be exported
for external storage as well but there is no way any key can leave the TOE in plain format. Both
backups or wrapped keys leave the TOE only in encrypted format and protected by integrity and
confidentiality. The backup and restore operation always need at least two Security Officers to be
performed due to dual control.
User Keys
User keys are generated by the Users (client application) and they can be used for different purposes
as the User wants to use them controlled by API commands. User keys can be generated, used and
deleted by the Users. The supported algorithms key sizes and operations can be found in Table 7:
Cryptographic Algorithms table in the [ST].
User keys have many attributes and capabilities stored along with the keys. The capabilities and
attributes store all information of the keys. For example: whether the key can be exported or not,
whether the key is modifiable or deletable. Whether it is a private or public key etc… Capabilities
define what can be done with the keys. For example, the key can be used for encrypt, decrypt, and
sign.
The different types of keys have their default values for all capabilities and flags but some of the
values can be changed on creation. Not all of them as there are rules, for example an assigned key is
never extractable.
Keys are destroyed according to FIPS 140-2 Level 3 zeroisation method.
SKA Keys
SKA Keys are special user keys implemented by Securosys. Smart Key Attributes feature allows for
a fine-grained authorization of private key usage.
They have additional authorisation properties defining who can authorise the keys for different
purposes. It can be defined who can block/unblock the key, who can use it and who can change the
authorisation rules. With SKA Keys it is possible to identify the Signer (key owner not the client
application).
7.3.2.3 Cryptographic functions
The TOE provides the following cryptographic functions:
• digital signature generation and verification;
• message digest generation;
• message authentication code generation and verification;
• encryption and decryption (symmetric and asymmetric);
• key generation;
Page 17 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
• key agreement and distribution;
• key derivation;
• generation of shared secret values;
• cryptographic support for one-time password and other non-PKI based authentication
mechanisms;
• random number generation.
The TOE implements the approved and allowed cryptographic functions listed in sect. 3.4.2.3
(Cryptographic Algorithms) of the Security Target [ST].
Crypto API
The Primus HSM provides a wide selection of application programming interfaces (PKCS#11,
JCA/JCE, MS CSP) so that it can be used with almost any business application ranging from simple
data encryption to identity management, PKI, strong authentication, and digital-signature generation
and verification.
Cryptographic operations are available through the above mentioned APIs for the Users (client
application). The User role is accessed over the API (e.g., by business applications or clients) and
serves to manage and use the User Keys. The User role may generate, load, and perform cryptographic
operations with these keys.
User Keys, private, secret and public can only be accessed if the user (client application or in case of
SKA keys the key owner) is authenticated. This includes listing of available keys or any other
operation with keys.
Keys are destroyed according to FIPS 140-2 Level 3 zeroisation method
Random number generation
The random number generator used by the TOE is composed of two main blocks:
• PTG.3 compliant entropy source, block_cipher_df (based on AES256), SP800-90Ar1
• DRG.4 compliant Random number generator seeded by the above entropy source. This is
HMAC-DRBG SP800-90Ar1 with SHA256.
The RNG provides forward secrecy, backward secrecy, enhanced forward secrecy as defined in
DRG.4 class
7.3.2.4 Audit/Administration
The TOE maintains the following roles: Administrator (Genesis, SO, Partition SO), User (External
client application).
Key Users (key owner) are identified by a certified SAM (Signature Activation Module) according
to [PP 419221-5] outside the TOE or can be identified by the TOE if the client application uses SKA
keys. SKA keys allow the TOE to identify the key owner itself, not only the client application.
SO can block User (client application) accounts by making them offline and unblocking them online.
Also, a SKA key can be blocked/unblocked if the User (key owner) has the block/unblock rules
configured on the specific key, but this operation is handled by the client application, the TOE only
provides API for it.
TOE logs each security relevant actions such as startup, shutdown, user authentication, all
cryptographic operations and many more. Each error (if there are any) is audited during any security
Page 18 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
relevant functions. Each audit record contains a proper timestamp (NTP configuration available), the
user id who caused the event and the event type.
Audit data is stored securely in a ring buffer. There is no deletion operation, but the oldest records
are overwritten when the storage of audit records is full. Audit records can be deleted only by factory
reset which is restricted to Administrator role. There is no way to modify any audit records.
Administrators can export the audit logs to USB so they can back up the logs any time. Also, they
can configure an external audit server (eg. syslog).
The TOE can forward the audit records to the external server. This channel is only for outgoing
communication. The external server has no access to the TOE.
The timestamps for the audit logs are reliable. The TOE supports connection to multiple NTP servers
and verifies the received timestamp.
7.3.2.5 Secure Channels/Data Protection
Secure Channels
The TOE uses a special protocol for securing the communication with the external client applications
and also with Decanus remote terminal. This protocol ensures the authentication and Diffie-Hellmann
key agreement between the TOE and external entities. The encryption algorithm for securing the
communication uses different algorithms for securing the channel. KAS for key agreement, KDF to
derive the session key and AES-CGM to encrypt the messages.
Integrity Protection
The integrity of TSF data is protected by a checksum (64 Bit Hash), which is verified before each use
of the key. The Keyfiles include the standard attributes (flags and capabilities) and the extended SKA
Attributes (Authorizations). In case the hash doesn’t match the operation cannot be processed and the
user (client application) is notified that its data is corrupted.
Whenever a key is deleted, it is deleted with all its attributes. Whenever a User (client application
with its partition) is deleted, it is deleted with all its keys and configuration data.
Self-tests
Each time the Module is powered up it tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly,
and that sensitive data have not been damaged (integrity). Power up self–tests are available on
demand by power cycling the module.
On power up, the Module performs many self-tests. It tests all the supported cryptographic algorithms
(e.g. encryption/decryption/key generation/signature verification). Power up test also runs an
integrity check on the firmware. All tests must be completed successfully prior to any other use of
cryptography by the Module. If one of the tests fails, the Module enters the error state. The system
uses simple memory comparison to test the value of a test against its expected value. In cases where
the comparison operation could be used for side channel attacks, the memory compare function is
expanded in a way to compare all bytes instead of just until the first mismatch. Only after successful
self-test and power up, the Ethernet goes up and the HSM is available to the user (client application).
Additionally, conditional tests are also available on the TOE. These tests run each time when a
condition occurs.
Physical protection
All critical CSPs are encrypted with KEK in the HSM. There are factory mounted tamper-evident
seals on Primus HSM, and a tamper-response mechanism is implemented which can zeroise KEK
Page 19 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
and the digital seal in the event of physical breach therefore none of the keys can be used in the HSM
because. The TOE also has multiple sensors for detecting different types of tamper attacks. The TOE
is protected against removing the cover, light detection or freeze attack with low or high temperature
as well. The protection is FIPS 140-2 Level compliant.
7.4 Documentation
The guidance documentation specified in “Annex A – Guidelines for the secure usage of the product”
is delivered to the customer together with the product.
The guidance documentation contains all the information for secure initialization, configuration, and
secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the requirements of the Security Target [ST].
Customers should also follow the recommendations for the secure usage of the TOE contained in
section 9 of this report.
7.5 Protection Profile conformance claims
The Security Target [ST] does claims strict conformance to the following Protection Profile:
EN 419221-5:2018, Protection profiles for TSP Cryptographic modules - Part 5: Cryptographic
Module for Trust Services [PP 419221-5].
7.6 Functional and assurance requirements
All Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) have been selected or derived from CC Part 3 [CC3].
This includes ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1 - Timely Security Updates, as defined in [VPP].
All the SFRs have been selected or derived by extension from CC Part 2 [CC2]. In particular,
considering that the Security Target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile EN 419221-
5:2018 [PP 419221-5], all the SFRs from such PP are also included
It is possible to refer to the Security Target [ST] for the description of all security objectives, the
threats that these objectives should address, the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and the
security functions that realize the same objectives.
7.7 Evaluation conduct
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the requirements established by the Italian
Scheme for the evaluation and certification of security systems and products in the field of
information technology and expressed in the Provisional Guideline [LGP3] and the Scheme
Information Note [NIS3] and [NIS5] and in accordance with the requirements of the Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement [CCRA].
The purpose of the evaluation is to provide assurance on the effectiveness of the TOE to meet the
requirements stated in the relevant Security Target [ST]. Initially the Security Target has been
evaluated to ensure that constitutes a solid basis for an evaluation in accordance with the requirements
expressed by the standard CC. Then, the TOE has been evaluated on the basis of the statements
contained in such a Security Target. Both phases of the evaluation have been conducted in accordance
with the CC Part 3 [CC3] and the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM].
The Certification Body OCSI has supervised the conduct of the evaluation performed by the
evaluation facility (LVS) CCLab Software Laboratory (Debrecen site).
The evaluation was completed on October 22nd
, 2025 with the issuance by LVS of the Evaluation
Technical Report [ETRv1] that has been approved by the Certification Body on 20 November 2025.
On 5 December, the LVS has provided an updated version of the ETR [ETRv2] to apply some minor
changes. Then, the Certification Body issued this Certification Report.
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7.8 General considerations about the certification validity
The evaluation focused on the security features declared in the Security Target [ST], with reference
to the operational environment specified therein. The evaluation has been performed on the TOE
configured as described in “Annex B – Evaluated configuration”.
Potential customers are advised to check that this corresponds to their own requirements and to pay
attention to the recommendations contained in this Certification Report.
The certification is not a guarantee that no vulnerabilities exist; there is a probability that exploitable
vulnerabilities can be discovered after the issuance of the certificate.
This Certification Report reflects the conclusions of the certification at the time of issuance. Potential
customers are invited to regularly check the arising of any new vulnerability after the issuance of this
Certification Report, and if the vulnerability can be exploited in the operational environment of the
TOE, check with the Developer if security updates have been developed and if those updates have
been evaluated and certified.
Page 21 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
8 Evaluation outcome
8.1 Evaluation results
Following the analysis of the Evaluation Technical Report v.2 [ETRv2] issued by CCLab Software
Laboratory (Debrecen Site) and documents required for the certification, and considering the
evaluation activities carried out, the Certification Body OCSI concluded that TOE named “PRIMUS
HSM FW 2.8.22” meets the requirements of Part 3 of the Common Criteria [CC3] provided for the
evaluation assurance level EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 with respect to the security features
described in the Security Target [ST] and the evaluated configuration, shown in “Annex B –
Evaluated configuration”.
Table 1 summarizes the final verdict of each activity carried out by the LVS in accordance with the
assurance requirements established in [CC3] for the evaluation assurance components reported in the
assurance level EAL4 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 (In Italics are reported the augmented assurance
components).
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation Class ASE Pass
Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 Pass
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 Pass
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 Pass
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 Pass
Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Pass
Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1 Pass
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 Pass
Development Class ADV Pass
Security architecture descriptio ADV_ARC.1 Pass
Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.4 Pass
Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 Pass
Basic modular design ADV_TDS.3 Pass
Guidance documents Class AGD Pass
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 Pass
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 Pass
Life cycle support Class ALC Pass
Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMC.4 Pass
Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 Pass
Delivery procedures ALC_DEL.1 Pass
Identification of security measure ALC_DVS.1 Pass
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Developer defined life-cycle mode ALC_LCS.1 Pass
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 Pass
Test Class ATE Pass
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 Pass
Testing: modular design ATE_DPT.1 Pass
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 Pass
Independent testing - Conformance ATE_IND.2 Pass
Vulnerability assessment Class AVA Pass
Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 Pass
Table 1 Final verdicts for assurance requirements
8.2 Recommendations
The conclusions of the Certification Body (OCSI) are summarized in section 6 (Statement of
Certification).
Potential customers of the product “PRIMUS HSM FW 2.8.22” are suggested to properly understand
the specific purpose of the certification by reading this Certification Report together with the Security
Target [ST].
The TOE must be used according to the “Objectives for the Operational Environment” specified in
section 5.2 of the Security Target [ST]. It is assumed that, in the operational environment of the TOE,
all the organizational security policies and assumptions described, respectively, in section 4.4 and 4.5
of the Security Target [ST] shall be satisfied.
This Certification Report is valid for the TOE in its evaluated configuration; in particular, “Annex A
– Guidelines for the secure usage of the product” includes a number of recommendations relating to
delivery, installation, configuration and secure usage of the product, according to the guidance
documentation provided together with the TOE.
Page 23 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
9 Annex A – Guidelines for the secure usage of the product
This annex provides considerations particularly relevant to the potential customers of the product.
9.1 TOE delivery
9.1.1 Scope of TOE supply
The following table contains the item that comprise the different elements of the TOE.
No Type Descritpion Release/Version Form of
Delivery
1 HSM
module
HSM module Both E and X series and
accessories (Genesis Card, Security Officer
Card)
FW 2.8.22 Courier
2 Guidance QuickStart guide (PDF format) Courier
3 Guidance User Guide (PDF format) [CCGUIDE]] Version 2.8,
Edition 08.6
Web
Downloa
d
4 Firmware Primus HSM Firmware 2.8.22 (.hsm -
encrypted file format)
2.8.22 Courier
(pre-
installed)
or Web
Downloa
d
Table 2 - TOE Deliverables
9.1.2 Delivery procedure
The delivery steps and the procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing the
TOE to the customer are described in sect. 7 of the Life-cycle support document [LC].
The TOE Products are designed by Securosys SA. Hardware products are manufactured by an
electronic manufacturing service (EMS) partner. The EMS receives the design documentation CAD
files for the mechanics, PCB (Printed Circuit Board) design and bill of material for production. The
EMS responsibility is to source the parts, produce and assemble the PCB, assemble the mechanics
and ensure quality. Partially assembled products are transported by the means of a trusted logistics
provider from the EMS in a bulk package to the staging facility in the Securosys SA headquarters
where the final assembly, verification and mating with secure software is performed.
In the staging process the initial setup with security critical software is done. The process is performed
with background checked, security cleared personnel as it is critical for the security of the device.
This is when the final assembly happens.
Page 24 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
After purchasing a Primus HSM module from Securosys SA, the customer receives the TOE
deliverable items described in Table 2.
9.2 Identification of the TOE by the user
To ensure integrity of the device the customer must follow the steps described in sect. 3 of the user
guide [CCGUIDE] (Setup). Identifying the TOE can be done with the following measures:
The TOE is physically labelled so the type of the TOE (Primus HSM E/X) can be read.
The TOE is secured by tamper detection during the whole delivery. Tamper detection can be checked
upon receiving by visual inspection of the tamper proof sticker seals and validation of the digital seal
on the Securosys Support Portal.
TOE Firmware can be downloaded from Securosys Portal. After installation the FW version can be
verified via console (hsm_diagnostics frw command) or front panel/Decanus under the menu
System/Diagnostic/Firmware.
The customer can validate the digital seal as described in sect. 3.1.4 of [CCGUIDE]. This ensures the
device has not been tampered with in transport. After the digital seal has been examined on the TOE
the user has to rise a ticket on the Securosys Support Portal, containing the serial number and code
on individual lines for several devices, to validate the digital seal(s).
9.3 Installation, configuration and secure usage of the TOE
TOE installation, configuration and secure usage should be done by following the instructions in the
appropriate sections of the guidance documentation [CCGUIDE] provided with the product to the
customer.
Page 25 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
10 Annex B – Evaluated configuration
The Target of Evaluation is “PRIMUS HSM FW 2.8.22 Series E, Series X”, developed by Securosys
SA. The TOE is accompanied by guidance documentation. The items listed in Table 2 represent the
TOE.
The TOE name and version number uniquely identify the TOE and its components, which constitute
the evaluated configuration of the TOE verified by the Evaluator at the time they perform the tests
and to which the evaluation results apply.
10.1 TOE operational environment
The assumptions about the technical environment in which the TOE is intended to be used are
reported in section 5.2 of [ST].
Page 26 of 27 OCSI/CERT/CCL/07/2023/RC Ver. 1.1
11 Annex C – Test activity
This annex describes the task of both the Evaluators and the Developer in testing activities.
11.1 Test configuration
The test systems were running PRIMUS HSM FW 2.8.22 in the evaluated configuration.
All testing activities have been carried out remotely at the LVS premises on samples of the TOE
provided by the Developers to the evaluator.
The Evaluators examined the TOE and determined that it was consistent with the configuration under
evaluation as specified in the Security Target [ST] and in [CCGUIDE]. The Evaluators created the
test environment according to the description in the Security Target [ST] and the Developer’s test
documentation.
11.2 Functional tests performed by the Developer
The Developer prepared a program that automatically tested the correct operation of the TSFI.
The tests were performed on both devices, which the manufacturer used to distinguish between "X"
and "E".
11.3 Functional and independent tests performed by the Evaluators
11.3.1 Test approach
The Evaluators performed the all the automated test on the E series E20 while some of them were
performed manually to validate the results of the automated tests.
In addition to the Developer’s test, the Evaluators devised and performed 4 more independent test
cases to test the TSF more in depth.
11.3.2 Test results
All test cases devised by the Evaluators were run successfully and all the test results were consistent
to the expected test results.
11.4 Vulnerability analysis and penetration tests
For the execution of these activities, the Evaluators worked on the test environment and TOE already
used for the functional test activities, verifying that the TOE and the test environment were properly
configured.
The Evaluator analysed the Security Target [ST], design documentation, and test results for potential
vulnerabilities. In addition, the Evaluators performed a search on public sources for known or claimed
potential vulnerabilities of the TOE or components of the TOE.
Twelve potential vulnerabilities have been investigated: after the exclusion of the ones mitigated by
the environment, remaining vulnerabilities the Evaluators devised an attack method and calculated
the respective attack potential. These where related to buffer overflows exploitations, command
injections, memory exploitations (write/read in arbitrary locations), logging exploitation, user
enumerations, keys modifications, unencrypted application data disclosure, privilege escalation,
exploitation in weakenesses in Generic Key lifecycle.
No attack resulted in a vulnerability.
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The Evaluators could then conclude that the TOE is resistant to an attack potential High in its intended
operating environment. No exploitable or residual vulnerabilities have been identified.