Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 18FMV7159-36
Dokument ID CSEC2018008
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2023-04-13
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report
Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1 and
Entrust Certificate Authority Administration 10.1
Issue: 1.0, 2023-apr-13
Authorisation: Jerry Johansson, Lead certifier , CSEC
Ärendetyp: 6 Diarienummer: 18FMV7159-36
Dokument ID CSEC2018008
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
3.1 Security Audit 6
3.2 Identification and Authentication 6
3.3 Security Management 6
3.4 Remote Data Entry and Export 6
3.5 Certificate Management 7
3.6 Certificate Revocation 7
3.7 Key Management 7
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
4.1 Assumptions 8
4.2 Clarification of Scope 8
5 Architectural Information 10
6 Documentation 11
7 IT Product Testing 12
7.1 Developer Testing 12
7.2 Evaluator Testing 12
7.3 Penetration Testing 13
8 Evaluated Configuration 14
8.1 Tested configurations of the TOE 14
8.2 Functionality excluded from the evaluated configuration 15
9 Results of the Evaluation 17
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 18
11 Glossary 19
12 Bibliography 20
Appendix A Scheme Versions 22
A.1 Quality Management System 22
A.2 Applicable Scheme Notes 22
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1 Executive Summary
The TOE is:
- Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1 and
- Entrust Certificate Authority Administration 10.1,
which are the two central components of an X.509 certificate/ePassport authoring pub-
lic key infrastructure system. The TOE is software only.
During the evaluation, the operational environment has provided necessary support for
the TOE, as outlined in chapter 8 of this document. Notably, Hardware Security Mod-
ules (HSMs) in the operational environment have been used.
The ST does not claim conformance to any PP.
The Security Target contains eight threats, two Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) and seven assumptions, which have been considered during the evaluation.
The evaluation has been performed by Combitech AB in their premises in Växjö and
Stockholm, Sweden, with the assistance of EWA Canada Ltd. in their premises in Ot-
tawa, Canada. The evaluation was completed on the 29th of March 2023.
The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Crite-
ria, version 3.1, revision 5.
Combitech AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria under the Swe-
dish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. Combitech AB is also
accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC according to ISO/IEC 17025
for Common Criteria evaluation. EWA-Canada Ltd. operates as a Foreign location for
Combitech AB within scope of the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certifi-
cation Scheme.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target [ST], and have been reached in
agreement with the requirements of the Common Criteria and the Common Methodol-
ogy for evaluation assurance level: EAL 4 + ALC_FLR.2
The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target (ST) provided
by the developer and the Final Evaluation Report (FER) produced by Combitech AB.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the cer-
tificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other organ-
isation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
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As specified in the security target of this evaluation, the invocation of certain crypto-
graphic primitives has been included in the TOE, while the implementation of these
primitives is located in TOE environment. Therefore the invocation of these crypto-
graphic primitives has been in the scope of this evaluation, while correctness of the
implementation of these cryptographic primitives has been excluded. Users of this
product are advised to select cryptographic modules for the operational environment
where the implementation of the cryptographic primitives has been verified by a
trusted third party.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2018008
Name and version of the
certified IT product
Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1 and
Entrust Certificate Authority Administration 10.1
Security Target Identification Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1 and Entrust
Certificate Authority Administration 10.1
Security Target
EAL EAL 4 + ALC_FLR.2
Sponsor Entrust Corporation
Developer Entrust Corporation
ITSEF Combitech AB and EWA-Canada Ltd.
Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5
CEM version 3.1 release 5
QMS version 2.3
Scheme Notes Release 20.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, SOGIS, and EA/MLA
Certification date 2023-04-13
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3 Security Policy
- Security Audit
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Remote Data Entry and Export
- Certificate Management
- Certificate Revocation
- Key Management
3.1 Security Audit
The ECA component of the TOE generates audit records for all security-relevant
events. ECA can be configured to select which audit records are generated based on
various attributes. For each event, the TOE records the date and time, the type of
event, the subject identity, and the outcome of the event. The audit trail is protected
from unauthorized modification and will detect changes to the audit records. The TOE
also implements timestamps to ensure reliable audit information produced.
3.2 Identification and Authentication
Before any action, each user is identified with a login name or subject identity, and au-
thenticated with either (a) a password or (b) a certificate and the associated private
key. Each authorized user is associated with a subject identity, assigned role and spe-
cific permissions that determine access to TOE features.
3.3 Security Management
The ECAA component of the TOE provides GUI-based remote administration, sepa-
rate from the command line interface.
The TOE implements roles that are used to control what operations users are allowed
to perform on the TOE. All of the management functions are restricted according to
the role assigned to the user or administrator.
The security management functions provided by the TOE include the ability to man-
age user accounts and roles, administer system configuration, view the audit records,
configure the security audit functionality, certificate registration, certificate status
change, PKI configuration, Certificate profile management, Revocation profile man-
agement, and Certificate Revocation List management.
ECA also enforces an access control policy on the ECA system data associated with
the key and certificate functions performed by the ECA.
3.4 Remote Data Entry and Export
The TOE provides the ability to assure the identity of parties exchanging data using
digitally signed certificates and revocation lists. This includes generating and verify-
ing evidence of the identity of the originator of information.
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The operational environment is configured to provide a TLS tunnel to protect commu-
nications between the TOE components (the ECA and ECAA) using the ASH proto-
col. Communications with the database are over TLS provided by the ODBC driver,
where the ODBC driver is part of the operational environment.
The TOE implements CMP to protect the transfer of keys and certificates between its
own components and between the TOE and the trusted external entities, such as ad-
ministrative client applications and end entity client applications. To protect commu-
nications from modification and disclosure, the TOE also implements TLS v1.2 be-
tween:
• ECA and directory (LDAP over TLS)
• ECAA and directory (LDAP over TLS)
• ECA and XAP clients (XAP, a protocol which transfers information over HTTPS)
3.5 Certificate Management
The TOE generates certificates and establishes proof of possession before providing
the certificate to the end user. The TOE is able to implement certificate definitions that
comply with the specification provided by an Administrator.
3.6 Certificate Revocation
ECA generates and issues X.509 version 2 Certificate Revocation Lists. ECA can also
publish certificate and certificate revocation information to an Online Certificate
Status Protocol (OCSP) responder.
3.7 Key Management
The ECA component of the TOE makes use of the Cryptographic Module (CM) to
perform the following cryptographic functionality:
• Key generation
• Encryption, decryption, hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, random
number generation, signature generation and verification
• Entropy is collected and used to support seeding
• Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) are protected so that they are not directly
viewable in plaintext and stored internally.
• CSPs are cleared when no longer in use
The CM also protects all private and secret key material using cryptographic mecha-
nisms. The ECA protects public keys stored in the database against unauthorized mod-
ification.
The ECA component of the TOE uses that same CM to manage CSPs and implements
deletion procedures to mitigate the possibility of disclosure or modification of CSPs.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes seven assumptions on the TOE environment:
A.Administrators Review Audit Logs
Audit logs are required for security-relevant events and must be reviewed by the Ad-
ministrators.
A.Authentication Data Management
An authentication data management policy is enforced to ensure that users change
their authentication data at appropriate intervals and to appropriate values (e.g., proper
lengths, histories, variations, etc.) (Note: this assumption is not applicable to biometric
authentication data.)
A.Competent Administrators
Competent administrative users will be assigned to manage the TOE and the security
of the information it contains.
A.CPS
All administrative users are familiar with the certificate policy (CP) and certification
practices statement (CPS) under which the TOE is operated.
A.Operating System
The operating system has been selected to provide the following functions required by
this PKI to counter the perceived threats as identified in this ST: identification and au-
thentication, process isolation and separation, reliable time stamps, file system access
controls, enforcement of a TLS tunnel for ASH protocol communications.
A.Tunnel
The operational environment will protect the ASH protocol communications between
ECA and ECAA from modification and disclosure. The operational environment will
also protect the ODBC communications between ECA and the database from modifi-
cation and disclosure.
A.Physical Protection
The TOE hardware, software, and firmware critical to security policy enforcement
will be protected from unauthorized physical access.
4.2 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains eight threats, which have been considered during the
evaluation:
T.Administrators commit errors or hostile actions
An administrative user commits errors that change the intended security policy of the
system or application or maliciously modify the system’s configuration to allow secu-
rity violations to occur.
T.User abuses authorization to collect and/or send data
User abuses granted authorizations to improperly collect and/or send sensitive or secu-
rity-critical data.
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T.Critical system component fails
Failure of one or more system components results in the loss of system critical func-
tionality.
T.Message content modification
A hacker modifies information that is intercepted from a communications link be-
tween two unsuspecting entities before passing it on to the intended recipient.
T.Disclosure of private and secret keys
A private or secret key is improperly disclosed. The threat agent is an authorized user
or erroneous protocol. An adverse action can be compromise of the security of the PKI
and/or relying party systems that rely on PKI objects such as certificates or CRLs.
T.Modification of private/secret keys
A secret/private key is modified. The threat agent is an authorized user or erroneous
protocol. An adverse action can be compromise of the security of the PKI and/or rely-
ing party systems that rely on PKI objects such as certificates or CRLs.
T.Hacker gains access
A hacker masquerades as an authorized user to perform operations that will be at-
tributed to the authorized user or a system process or gains undetected access to a sys-
tem due to missing, weak and/or incorrectly implemented access control causing po-
tential violations of integrity, confidentiality, or availability.
T.Social engineering
A hacker uses social engineering techniques to gain information about system entry,
system use, system design, or system operation.
The Security Target contains two Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which have
been considered during the evaluation:
P.Authorized use of information
Information shall be used only for its authorized purpose(s).
P.Cryptography
The TSF shall exclusively rely on verified cryptographic primitives to perform all
cryptographic operations.
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5 Architectural Information
The TOE architecture is described in detail in the [ST] sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.4.
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6 Documentation
For proper installation and configuration into the evaluated configuration, the follow-
ing guidance documents are available:
Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1, Operations Guide, v3.0
Entrust Certificate Authority Administration 10.1, User Guide, v2.0
Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1, Installation Guide, v2.0
Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1 Deployment Guide, v2.0
Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1 Database Configuration Guide, v 3.0
Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1 Directory Configuration Guide, v2.0
Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1 Common Criteria Supplemental Guide, v1.0
Entrust ePassport Solutions Guide 4.10, v3.0
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
The developer has tested the TOE in 5 test configurations, composed using the follow-
ing IT products in the operational environment:
ECA operating systems
- Microsoft Windows Server 2019
- Microsoft Windows Server 2022
- RedHat Enterprise Linux 7.9
- RedHat Enterprise Linux 8.5
ECAA operating systems
- Microsoft Windows Server 2019
- Microsoft Windows Server 2022
- Microsoft Windows 10, 64 bit
- Microsoft Windows 11, 64 bit
HSMs/Clients
- Entrust nShield Connect XC 12.60.15 with Security World Client 12.81.2)
- Thales Luna K7 Network HSM (firmware 7.3.3) with
Thales Luna HSM Universal Client 10.4
Databases
- PostgreSQL 14
- EDB Postgres Advanced Server 14
- Oracle 19c
- Microsoft SQL Server 2019
Directories
- Synchronoss Directory Server 8.1.0
- Active Directory Domain Services (Windows Server 2019)
- Active Directory Lightweight Directory Services (Windows Server 2022)
OCSP responder
- Entrust KeyOne Validation Authority 4.0
Smartcard/token
- Thales SafeNet eToken 5110 CC/FIPS with
Thales SafeNet Authentication Client v10.8 (R6)
Each of the 5 configurations was tested with good coverage/depth of the security func-
tionality. The testing was performed in April-June 2022. All results were as expected.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The evaluators used a variant of the developer's configurations for the repeated devel-
oper testing, the independent testing and for the penetration testing.
The evaluators performed a substantial amount of developer tests, as well as comple-
mentary independent tests. The testing was performed in August-September 2022. All
results were as expected.
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7.3 Penetration Testing
The evaluators used a variant of the developer's configurations for the penetration test-
ing. The evaluators performed a vulnerability scan with Nessus.
The testing was performed in October 2022. All results were as expected.
The vulnerability database search was last performed on the 24th of March 2022.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
8.1 Tested configurations of the TOE
The tested configurations of the TOE are:
- Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1 (ECA) and
- Entrust Certificate Authority Administration 10.1 (ECAA)
has been installed with the following license codes:
- Enterprise (X.509)
- CVCA for Foreign DVs (EAC / ePassport)
- CVCA for Domestic DVs (EAC / ePassport)
- DV for Inspection Systems (EAC / ePassport)
and with support from the operational environment by:
ECA operating systems
- Microsoft Windows Server 2019
- Microsoft Windows Server 2022
- RedHat Enterprise Linux 7.9
- RedHat Enterprise Linux 8.5
ECAA operating systems
- Microsoft Windows Server 2019
- Microsoft Windows Server 2022
- Microsoft Windows 10, 64 bit
- Microsoft Windows 11, 64 bit
HSMs/Clients
- Entrust nShield Connect XC (firmware 12.60.15) with
Security World Client 12.81.2
- Thales Luna K7 Network HSM (firmware 7.3.3) with
Thales Luna HSM Universal Client 10.4
Databases
- PostgreSQL 14
- EDB Postgres Advanced Server 14
- Oracle 19c
- Microsoft SQL Server 2019
Directories
- Synchronoss Directory Server 8.1.0
- Active Directory Domain Services (Windows Server 2019)
- Active Directory Lightweight Directory Services (Windows Server 2022)
OCSP responder
- Entrust KeyOne Validation Authority 4.0
Smartcard/token
- Thales SafeNet eToken 5110 CC/FIPS with
Thales SafeNet Authentication Client v10.8 (R6)
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8.2 Functionality excluded from the evaluated configuration
The following TOE functionality is excluded and not enabled/utilized in the evaluated
configuration:
- Proto-PKIX (SEP) - a proprietary protocol that handles certificate requests from
legacy applications
- Autologin
- Database backup, which is only available with the embedded database that is not
included in the evaluated configuration
- Cross-certification and subordinate CAs when using an Active Directory Domain
Services
Administrative guidance will instruct administrators to not use the following features
of the TOE. Use of the following TOE functionality is not permitted in the evaluated
configuration and must not be used by administrators:
- CA migration functionality – provides the ability to migrate an existing CA from
non-TOE software. This includes importing private keys and revocation lists.
- Move user functionality - allows for end-users to be moved from one TOE CA to a
different TOE CA. This includes importing and exporting of private keys.
- Archive user functionality - allows archiving end-users that are not currently being
used from the ECA database to an archive file.
- Smart Energy Profile 2 CAs
- Constructs used to store and protect the digital identities and certificates created by
ECA (such as Entrust profiles)
- Online cross-certification is excluded from the evaluated configuration. (Note:
Offline cross-certification is included in the evaluated configuration.)
- Online subordinate CA creation is excluded from the evaluated configuration.
(Note: Offline subordinate CA creation is included in the evaluated configuration.)
- XAP user registration password functionality is excluded from the evaluated
configuration. (This functionality allows a 'registration password' to be specified for
a user. XAP provides an operation for matching a user-specified password against
the known registration password that is stored in the database.)
- Use of an Entrust-supplied embedded PostgreSQL database is excluded from the
evaluated configuration.
- Use of the ASH protocol by client systems other than ECAA
- Use of entropy in certificate validity dates
- Ability to view pre-10.0 audits
- Ability to archive audits from the DB
- Ability to repair revocation lists and user reference numbers
- Use of User attribute certificates
- Use of ECAA bulk commands
- Use of Entrust profiles for administrative users (.epf)
- In the evaluated configuration, administrators must not use ECAA to create
Entrust profiles for administrative users or for end users. Instead,
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administrators should use ECAA to create all such credentials on a PKCS #11
tokens.
The following TOE functionality is allowed, but does not interfere with the security
functionality and was not tested during the CC certification:
- entDerEncoder utility
- High Availability (support for multiple CA nodes, also known as an Entrust CA
cluster) and Listener Service
- Use of ECAA with multiple ECAs
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Enhanced-Basic.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the respective assurance classes and components are summarised in
the following table:
Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Security Architecture ADV_ARC.1 PASS
Functional Specification ADV_FSP.4 PASS
TOE Design ADV_TDS.3 PASS
Implementation Representation ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Guidance Documents AGD PASS
Operational User Guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative Procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Life-cycle Support ALC PASS
CM Capabilities ALC_CMC.4 PASS
CM Scope ALC_CMS.4 PASS
Delivery ALC_DEL.1 PASS
Development Security ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Life-cycle Definition ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Flaw Remediation ALC_FLR.2 PASS
Tools and Techniques ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance Claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
Security Objectives ASE_OBJ.2 PASS
Extended Components Definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Security Requirements ASE_REQ.2 PASS
TOE Summary Specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Depth ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional Tests ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent Testing ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability Assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability Analysis AVA_VAN.3 PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
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11 Glossary
ASH Administration Service Handler
CA Certification Authority
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
CM Cryptographic Module
CMP IETF PKIX Certificate Management Protocol
CP Certificate Policy
CPS Certification Practice Statement
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CSCA Country Signing Certification Authority
CV Card Verifiable
CR Change Request
DV Document Verifier
ECA Entrust Certificate Authority
ECAA Entrust Certificate Authority Administration
FER Final Evaluation Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
HSM Hardware Security Module
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
OR Observation Reports
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirements
SER Single Evaluation Report
SFR Security Functional Requirements
ST Security Target, document containing security requirements and
specifications , used as the basis of a TOE evaluation
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
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12 Bibliography
ST Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1 and Entrust Certificate Authority
Administration 10.1 Security Target, Entrust Corporation,
2023-Jan-25, document version 1.1, FMV ID 18FMV7159-24
OP Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1, Operations Guide, Entrust
Corporation, May 2022, document version 3.0,
FMV ID 18FMV7159-17
UG Entrust Certificate Authority Administration 10.1, User Guide,
Entrust Corporation, May 2022, document version 2.0,
FMV ID 18FMV7159-17
INST Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1, Installation Guide, Entrust
Corporation, May 2022, document version 2.0,
FMV ID 18FMV7159-17
DEP Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1 Deployment Guide, Entrust
Corporation, May 2022, document version 2.0,
FMV ID 18FMV7159-21
DB Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1 Database Configuration Guide,
Entrust Corporation, May 2022, document version 3.0,
FMV ID 18FMV7159-21
DIR Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1 Directory Configuration Guide,
Entrust Corporation, May 2022, document version 2.0,
FMV ID 18FMV7159-21
CCSup Entrust Certificate Authority 10.1 Common Criteria Supplemental
Guide, Entrust Corporation, 2022-Nov-02, document version 1.0,
FMV ID 18FMV7159-17
ePASS Entrust ePassport Solutions Guide 4.10, Entrust Corporation,
May 2022, document version 3.0, FMV ID 18FMV7159-17
CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002
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CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003
CC CCpart1 + CCPart2 + CCPart3
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-004
EP-002 EP-002 Evaluation and Certification, CSEC, 2021-10-26,
document version 34.0
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Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Quality Management System
During the certification project, the following versions of the quality management
system (QMS) have been applicable since the certification application was
registered 2018-10-09:
QMS 1.21.4 valid from 2018-09-13
QMS 1.21.5 valid from 2018-11-19
QMS 1.22 valid from 2019-02-01
QMS 1.22.1 valid from 2019-03-08
QMS 1.22.2 valid from 2019-05-02
QMS 1.22.3 valid from 2019-05-20
QMS 1.23 valid from 2019-10-14
QMS 1.23.1 valid from 2020-03-06
QMS 1.23.2 valid from 2020-05-11
QMS 1.24 valid from 2020-11-19
QMS 1.24.1 valid from 2020-12-03
QMS 1.25 valid from 2021-06-17
QMS 2.0 valid from 2021-11-24
QMS 2.1 valid from 2022-01-18
QMS 2.1.1 valid from 2022-03-09
QMS 2.2 valid from 2022-06-27
QMS 2.3 valid from 2023-01-26
In order to ensure consistency in the outcome of the certification, the certifier has
examined the changes introduced in each update of the quality management system.
The changes between consecutive versions are outlined in “Ändringslista CSEC
QMS 2.3”.
The certifier concluded that, from QMS 1.21.4 to the current QMS 2.3, there are no
changes with impact on the result of the certification.
A.2 Applicable Scheme Notes
SN-15 Testing
SN-18 Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target
SN-22 Vulnerability assessment
SN-25 Use of CAVP-tests in CC evaluations
SN-27 ST requirements at the time of application for certification
SN-28 Updated procedures for application, evaluation and certification
SN-31 New procedures for site visit oversight and testing oversight