National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
for the
Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches running IOS-
XE 16.9, Version 1.0
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10940-2019
Dated: March 14, 2019
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Paul Bicknell, Senior
Jenn Dotson
Sheldon Durrant
Linda Morrison
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Kenneth Lasoski
Zalman Kuperman
Kevin Zhang
Acumen Security, LLC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................... 5
3 Architectural Information .................................................................................................... 6
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms..............................................................................................................................6
3.2 Excluded Functionality ..................................................................................................................................7
3.3 Physical Boundaries .......................................................................................................................................7
4 Security Policy........................................................................................................................ 8
4.1 Security Audit .................................................................................................................................................8
4.2 Cryptographic Support..................................................................................................................................9
4.3 Identification and authentication................................................................................................................11
4.4 Security Management ..................................................................................................................................12
4.5 Protection of the TSF ...................................................................................................................................12
4.6 TOE Access ...................................................................................................................................................13
4.7 Trusted path/Channels.................................................................................................................................13
5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope ............................................................... 14
5.1 Assumptions..................................................................................................................................................14
5.2 Threats...........................................................................................................................................................15
5.3 Clarification of Scope...................................................................................................................................17
6 Documentation..................................................................................................................... 18
7 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................... 19
7.1 Developer Testing .........................................................................................................................................19
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.......................................................................................................19
8 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................... 20
8.1 Evaluation of Security Target (ASE) ..........................................................................................................20
8.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)...................................................................................20
8.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD) ...............................................................................................20
8.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)...................................................................................20
8.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)..............................................................20
8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN) ..................................................................................................21
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results..................................................................................................................21
9 Validator Comments & Recommendations ...................................................................... 22
10 Annexes................................................................................................................................. 23
11 Security Target .................................................................................................................... 24
12 Glossary ................................................................................................................................ 25
13 Bibliography......................................................................................................................... 26
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) assessment of the
evaluation of the Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.9 Target of
Evaluation (TOE). It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance
results. This Validation Report (VR) is not an endorsement of the TOE by any agency of the U.S.
Government and no warranty of the TOE is either expressed or implied. This VR applies only to
the specific version and configuration of the product as evaluated and documented in the
Security Target (ST).
The evaluation was completed by Acumen Security in March 2019. The information in this
report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test report,
all written by Acumen Security. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common
Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant and meets the assurance requirements defined in
the U.S. Government collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 +
Errata 20180314, Version 2.0, 14 March 2018 (NDcPP20E) and NDcPP Extended Package
MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.2, 10 May 2016 (MACsec EP).
The TOE identified in this VR has been evaluated at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1,
Rev. 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev.
4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities contained in the NDcPP20E. This VR applies only
to the specific version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
(CCEVS) and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The Validation Team provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes and
reviewed the individual work units documented in the ETR and the Assurance Activities Report
(AAR). The Validation Team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of
the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the ST. Based on these
findings, the Validation Team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the
conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Cisco Catalyst 3650 and
3850 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.9 Common Criteria Security Target, Version 1.0, 5
March 2019 and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted
product evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial
testing laboratories called CCTLs. CCTLs evaluate products against Protection Profile(s)
(PP) containing Assurance Activities (AA), which are interpretation of Common Evaluation
Methodology (CEM) work units specific to the technology described by the PP and in
accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality
and consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products
desiring a security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product's
evaluation. Upon successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP's
Product Compliance List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The TOE: the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The ST, describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The PPs to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.9
Protection Profile NDcPP 2.0e and MACsec EP 1.2
Security Target Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.9 Security Target,
Version 1.0, 5 March 2019
Evaluation Technical
Report
Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.9 Evaluation
Technical Report, Version 1.2, March 2019
CC Version Version 3.1, Revision 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 Extended and CC Part 3 Conformant
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Acumen Security
Rockville, MD
CCEVS Validators Paul Bicknell
Jenn Dotson
Sheldon Durrant
Linda Morrison
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the ST.
The TOE is a hardware and software solution that makes up the switch models as follows:
Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches running Cisco IOS-XE 16.9. They are switching and
routing platforms that provide connectivity and security services, including MACsec
encryption in a single device. The network, on which they reside, is considered part of the
environment.
Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches primary features include the following:
 Central processor that supports all system operations;
 Dynamic memory, used by the central processor for all system operation.
 Flash memory (EEPROM), used to store the Cisco IOS image (binary program).
 USB port (v2.0) (note, none of the USB devices are included in the TOE).
o Type A for Storage, all Cisco supported USB flash drives.
o Type mini-B as console port in the front.
 Non-volatile read-only memory (ROM) is used to store the bootstrap program and power-on
diagnostic programs.
 Non-volatile random-access memory (NVRAM) is used to store switch configuration
parameters that are used to initialize the system at start-up.
 Management is through a 10/100/1000 Ethernet port or an RJ-45 console port
 Physical network interfaces (minimally two) (e.g. RJ45 serial and standard 10/100/1000
Ethernet ports). Some models have a fixed number and/or type of interfaces; some models
have slots that accept additional network interfaces.
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The evaluated platforms consist of the following modes:
Cisco Catalyst 3650 Series
 WS-C3650-24TS
 WS-C3650-48TS
 WS-C3650-24PS
 WS-C3650-48PS
 WS-C3650-48FS
 WS-C3650-24TD
 WS-C3650-48TD
 WS-C3650-24PD
 WS-C3650-48PD
 WS-C3650-48FD
 WS-C3650-48TQ
 WS-C3650-48PQ
 WS-C3650-48FQ)
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 WS-C3650-48FQM
Cisco Catalyst 3850 Series
 WS-C3850-24T
 WS-C3850-48T
 WS-C3850-24P
 WS-C3850-48P
 WS-C3850-48F
 WS-C3850-24U
 WS-C3850-48U
 WS-C3850-12S
 WS-C3850-24S
 WS-C3850-12XS
 WS-C3850-24XS
 WS-C3850-24XU
 WS-C3850-48XS
3.2 Excluded Functionality
Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale
Non-FIPS 140-2 mode of operation This mode of operation includes non-FIPS allowed operations.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is comprised of the physical specifications as described in the ST. The hardware, size and
the interfaces are based on the number of ports on a particular model. For example the 3650, WS-
C3650-24TS measures 1.73 x 17.5 x 19.125 and has 24 ports (10M/100M/1000M (10 Gigabit
Ethernet SFP+ Ports and Gigabit Ethernet SFP Ports). The USB, RJ-45, StackWise, power, software
and processors are the same on all hardware series listed.
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4 Security Policy
The TOE is comprised of several security features. Each of the security features identified
above consists of several security functionalities, as identified below.
 Security Audit
 Cryptographic Support
 Identification and Authentication
 Security Management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE Access
 Trusted Path/Channels
These features are described in more detail in the subsections below. In addition, the TOE
implements all RFCs of the NDcPP v2.0e and MACsec EP v1.2 as necessary to satisfy
testing/assurance measures prescribed therein.
4.1 Security Audit
The Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches provide extensive auditing capabilities.
The TOE generates a comprehensive set of audit logs that identify specific TOE operations.
For each event, the TOE records the date and time of each event, the type of event, the
subject identity, and the outcome of the event.
Auditable events include:
 failure on invoking cryptographic functionality such as establishment, termination
and failure of cryptographic session establishments and connections;
 creation and update of Secure Association Key;
 modifications to the group of users that are part of the authorized administrator roles;
 all use of the user identification mechanism;
 any use of the authentication mechanism;
 administrator lockout due to excessive authentication failures;
 any change in the configuration of the TOE;
 changes to time;
 initiation of TOE update;
 indication of completion of TSF self-test;
 maximum sessions being exceeded;
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 termination of a remote session;
 attempts to unlock a termination session; and
 initiation and termination of a trusted channel.
The TOE is configured to transmit its audit messages to an external syslog server.
Communication with the syslog server is protected using IPsec and the TOE can determine
when communication with the syslog server fails. If that should occur, the TOE can be
configured to block new permit actions.
The audit logs can be viewed on the TOE using the appropriate IOS commands. The records
include the date/time the event occurred, the event/type of event, the user associated with the
event, and additional information of the event and its success and/or failure. The TOE does
not have an interface to modify audit records, though there is an interface available for the
authorized administrator to clear audit data stored locally on the TOE.
4.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of TOE security functionality. All the
algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates (Operation Environment - Cavium Octeon
CN6230, a MIPS64 processor).
The TOE leverages the IOS Common Criteria Module (IC2M) Rel5 as identified in the table
below. The IOS software calls the IC2M Rel5 (Firmware Version: Rel 5) certificate 2388
and has been validated for conformance to the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1.
In addition, the TOE supports MACsec using proprietary Unified Access Data Plane
(UADP) ASIC. The MACsec Controller (MSC) is embedded within the ASICs that are
utilized within Cisco hardware platforms.
Refer to Table 1 for algorithm certificate references.
Table 1 FIPS References
Algorithm Description Supported
Mode
CAVP
Cert. #
Module SFR
AES Used for symmetric
encryption/decryption
AES Key
Wrap in
CMAC, CBC
and GCM (128
and 256 bits)
4583 IC2M FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption
4769 UADP
MSC
SHS (SHA-
1, SHA-256
and SHA-
512)
Cryptographic
hashing services
Byte Oriented 3760 IC2M FCS_COP.1/Hash
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Algorithm Description Supported
Mode
CAVP
Cert. #
Module SFR
HMAC
(HMAC-
SHA-1,
HMAC-
SHA-256
and HMAC-
SHA-512)
Keyed hashing
services and software
integrity test
Byte Oriented 3034 IC2M FCS_COP.1/KeydHash
DRBG Deterministic random
bit generation services
in accordance with
ISO/IEC 18031:2011
CTR_DRBG
(AES 256)
1529 IC2M FCS_RBG_EXT.1
RSA Key Generation and
Signature Verification
FIPS PUB
186-4 Key
Generation
PKCS #1 v2.1
2048 bit key
2500 IC2M FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SigGen
The TOE provides cryptography in support of VPN connections that includes remote
administrative management via SSHv2 and IPsec to secure the transmission of audit records
to the remote syslog server. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE
and the authentication servers.
The TOE authenticates and encrypts packets between itself and a MACsec peer. The
MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) Protocol provides the required session keys and manages
the required encryption keys to protect data exchanged by the peers.
The cryptographic services provided by the TOE are described in Table 2 below.
Table 2 TOE Provided Cryptography
Cryptographic Method Use within the TOE
AES Used to encrypt IPsec session traffic.
Used to encrypt SSH session traffic.
Used to encrypt MACsec traffic.
HMAC Used for keyed hash, integrity services in IPsec and SSH session
establishment.
DH Used as the Key exchange method for SSH and IPsec
Internet Key Exchange Used to establish initial IPsec session.
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Cryptographic Method Use within the TOE
RSA Signature Services Used in IPsec session establishment.
Used in SSH session establishment.
X.509 certificate signing.
RSA Used in IKE protocols peer authentication
Used to provide cryptographic signature services
Used in Cryptographic Key Generation and Key Establishment
Secure Shell Establishment Used to establish initial SSH session.
SHS Used to provide IPsec traffic integrity verification
Used to provide SSH traffic integrity verification
Used for keyed-hash message authentication
SP 800-90 RBG Used for random number generation, key generation and seeds
to asymmetric key generation
Used in IPsec session establishment.
Used in SSH session establishment
Used in MACsec session establishment
The Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches platforms contain the following
processors as listed in Table 3.
Table 3 Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches Platform Processors
Chassis CPU Designation
3650 Cavium Octeon CN6230, a MIPS64 processor
3850 Cavium Octeon CN6230, a MIPS64 processor
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote
device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE.
Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer.
The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-
level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The IKE phase
authentication for the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and authentication
server and between the TOE and syslog server is considered part of the Identification and
Authentication security functionality of the TOE.
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s
secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to
authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE
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can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as
mandatory password complexity rules. The TOE provides administrator authentication
against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the serial
console or SSHv2 interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH
keys. The TOE supports use of a RADIUS AAA server (part of the IT Environment) for
authentication of administrative users attempting to connect to the TOE’s CLI.
The TOE also provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters
invalid information. When the threshold for a defined number of authentication attempts fail
has exceeded the configured allowable attempts, the user is locked out until an Authorized
Administrator can enable the user account.
The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for
IPsec connections.
4.4 Security Management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration
occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection. The TOE
provides the ability to securely manage:
 Administration of the TOE locally and remotely;
 Configuration of warning and consent access banners;
 Configuration of session inactivity thresholds;
 Updates of the TOE software;
 Configuration of authentication failures;
 Configuration of the audit functions of the TOE;
 Configuration of the TOE provided services;
 Configuration of the cryptographic functionality of the TOE;
 Generate, install and manage PSK;
 Manage the Key Server, CAK and MKA participants; and
 Configure lockout time interval for excessive authentication failures.
The TOE supports two separate administrator roles: non-privileged administrator and
privileged administrator. Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security
relevant management functions. The privileged administrator is the Authorized
Administrator of the TOE who has the ability to enable, disable, determine and modify the
behavior of all of the security functions of the TOE as described in this document.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized
Administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.
Additionally, Cisco IOS is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS
memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS functions.
The TOE is able to verify any software updates prior to the software updates being installed
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on the TOE to avoid the installation of unauthorized software.
The TOE is also able to detect replay of information received via secure channels (MACsec).
The detection applied to network packets that terminate at the TOE, such as trusted
communications between the TOE and an IT entity (e.g., MACsec peer). If replay is
detected, the packets are discarded.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time are used as the
timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. The TOE provides the
Authorized Administrators the capability to update the TOE’s clock manually to maintain a
reliable timestamp.
Finally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the TOE itself and that of the
cryptographic module.
4.6 TOE Access
The TOE can terminate inactive sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable
time-period. Once a session has been terminated, the TOE requires the user to re-
authenticate to establish a new session. The TOE can also be configured to lock the
Authorized Administrator account after a specified number of failed logon attempts until an
Authorized Administrator can enable the user account.
The TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI
management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
4.7 Trusted path/Channels
The TOE allows trusted channels to be established to itself from remote administrators over
SSHv2 and initiates outbound IPsec tunnels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog
servers. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the
authentication servers.
The TOE can also establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer IPsec sessions. The peer-to-peer
IPsec sessions can be used for securing the communications between the TOE and
authentication server/syslog server, as well as to protect the communications with the CA
server.
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5 Assumptions, Threats & Clarification of Scope
5.1 Assumptions
The specific conditions listed below are assumed to exist in the TOE’s environment. These
assumptions include both practical realities in the development of the TOE security
requirements and the essential environmental conditions on the use of the TOE.
Assumption Assumption Definition
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its
operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that
compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s
physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection
is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it
contains. As a result, the cPP will not include any requirements
on physical tamper protection or other physical attack
mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend against
physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to
extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the
device.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its
core function and not provide functionality/ services that could be
deemed as general purpose computing. For example the device
should not provide computing platform for general purpose
applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed
to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the
organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following
policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators
are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength
and entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the
device. The network device is not expected to be capable of
defending against a malicious administrator that actively works to
bypass or compromise the security of the device.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized
access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g.
cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on
networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or
removed from its operational environment.
A.REGULAR_UPDATES The network device firmware and software is assumed to be
updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the
release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE The administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the
network device are protected by the platform on which they
reside.
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5.2 Threats
The following table lists the threats addressed by the TOE and the IT Environment. The
assumed level of expertise of the attacker for all the threats identified below is Enhanced-Basic.
Threat Threat Definition
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS Threat agents may attempt to gain administrator
access to the network device by nefarious means such
as masquerading as an administrator to the device,
masquerading as the device to an administrator,
replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or
selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle
attacks, which would provide access to the
administrative session, or sessions between network
devices. Successfully gaining administrator access
allows malicious actions that compromise the security
functionality of the device and the network on which
it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic
algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust
against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption
algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers
to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust
the key space and give them unauthorized access
allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the
traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS Threat agents may attempt to target network devices
that do not use standardized secure tunneling
protocols to protect the critical network traffic.
Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed
protocols or poor key management to successfully
perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc.
Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality
and integrity of the critical network traffic, and
potentially could lead to a compromise of the network
device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols
that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints
– e.g., shared password that is guessable or
transported as plaintext. The consequences are the
same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker
could masquerade as the administrator or another
device, and the attacker could insert themselves into
the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle
attack. The result is the critical network traffic is
exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiality
and integrity, and potentially the network device
itself could be compromised.
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Threat Threat Definition
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised
update of the software or firmware which
undermines the security functionality of the device.
Non-validated updates or updates validated using
non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update
firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or
modify the security functionality of the network
device without administrator awareness. This could
result in the attacker finding an avenue (e.g.,
misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to
compromise the device and the administrator would
have no knowledge that the device has been
compromised.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE Threat agents may compromise credentials and
device data enabling continued access to the network
device and its critical data. The compromise of
credentials include replacing existing credentials
with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing
credentials, or obtaining the administrator or device
credentials for use by the attacker.
T.PASSWORD_CRACKING Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak
administrative passwords to gain privileged access to
the device. Having privileged access to the device
provides the attacker unfettered access to the network
traffic, and may allow them to take advantage of any
trust relationships with other network devices.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE An external, unauthorized entity could make use of
failed or compromised security functionality and
might therefore subsequently use or abuse security
functions without prior authentication to access,
change or modify device data, critical network traffic
or security functionality of the device.
T.DATA_INTEGRITY An attacker may modify data transmitted over the
MACsec channel in a way that is not detected by the
recipient.
T.NETWORK_ACCESS An attacker may send traffic through the TOE that
enables them to access devices in the TOE’s
Operational Environment without authorization.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS An attacker may acquire sensitive TOE or user data
that is transmitted to or from the TOE because an
untrusted communication channel causes a
disclosure of data in transit.
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5.3 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration meets
the security claims made with a certain level of assurance. The level of assurance for this
evaluation is defined within the NDcPP 2.0e and MACsec EP 1.2.
 Consistent with the expectations of the PP, this evaluation did not specifically search for,
nor seriously attempt to counter, vulnerabilities that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities
to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one
that is easily exploited with a minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical
sophistication and resources.
 The evaluation of security functionality of the product was limited to the functionality
specified in the claimed PPs and applicable Technical Decisions. Any additional security
related functional capabilities included in the product were not covered by this
evaluation.
 This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were provided by the vendor with the TOE for evaluation:
 Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.9 Common Criteria
Security Target, Version 1.0, 5 March 2019
 Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.9 Common Criteria
Operational User Guidance And Preparative Procedures, Version 1.0, 27 November 2018
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived
from information contained in ETR for Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches, which is
not publicly available. The AAR provides an overview of testing and the prescribed assurance
activities.
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the AAs for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The Evaluation Team verified the product according the vendor-provided guidance
documentation and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP 2.0e and MACsec EP 1.2. The
Independent Testing activity is documented in the AAR, which is publicly available, and is not
duplicated here.
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8 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary documents: Detailed Test Report (DTR) and ETR. The
reader of this document can assume that activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Cisco Catalyst 3650 and
3850 Series Switches to be Part 2 extended and meets the assurance requirements contained in
the PP. Additionally, the evaluator performed the AAs specified in the NDcPP 2.0e and MACsec
EP.
8.1 Evaluation of Security Target (ASE)
The Evaluation Team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contained a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches
that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that
support the requirements. Additionally, the evaluator performed an assessment of the Assurance
Activities specified in the NDcPP 2.0e and MACsec EP 1.2.
8.2 Evaluation of Development Documentation (ADV)
The Evaluation Team assessed the design documentation and found it adequate to aid in
understanding how the TSF provides the security functions. The design documentation consists
of a functional specification contained in the ST’s TOE Summary Specification. Additionally,
the evaluator performed the AAs specified in the NDcPP 2.0e and MACsec EP 1.2 related to the
examination of the information contained in the TOE Summary Specification.
8.3 Evaluation of Guidance Documents (AGD)
The Evaluation Team ensured the adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the
operational TOE. Additionally, the Evaluation Team ensured the adequacy of the administrator
guidance in describing how to securely administer the TOE. The guides were assessed during the
design and testing phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete. Additionally, the
evaluator performed the AAs specified in the NDcPP 2.0e and MACsec EP 1.2 related to the
examination of the information contained in the operational guidance documents.
8.4 Evaluation of Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The Evaluation Team found that the TOE was identified.
8.5 Evaluation of Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The Evaluation Team ran the set of tests specified by the AAs in the NDcPP 1.0 and MACsec EP
1.2 and recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the ETR and AAR.
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8.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The Evaluation Team performed a public search for vulnerabilities, performed vulnerability
testing and did not discover any issues with the TOE.
8.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The Evaluation Team's assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the Evaluation Team's test activities also demonstrated the
accuracy of the claims in the ST.
The Validation Team's assessment of the evidence provided by the Evaluation Team is that it
demonstrates that the Evaluation Team performed the AAs in the NDcPP 2.0e and MACsec EP
1.2, and correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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9 Validator Comments & Recommendations
The Validation Team suggests that the consumer pay particular attention to the evaluated
configuration of the products(s). The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security
functional requirements specified in the ST, and only the functionality implemented by the
SFR’s within the ST was evaluated. All other functionality provided by the product(s), to include
software that was not part of the evaluated configuration, needs to be assessed separately and no
further conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness of the additional functionality.
Consumers employing the devices must follow the configuration instructions provided in the
Users Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated configuration is
established and maintained.
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10 Annexes
Not applicable.
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11 Security Target
The ST is identified as: Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.9
Common Criteria Security Target, Version 1.0, 5 March 2019
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12 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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13 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
1. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
2. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
3. Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation - Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1 Revision 4.
4. Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4.
5. collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314,
Version 2.0, 14 March 2018 (NDcPP20E)
6. NDcPP Extended Package MACsec Ethernet Encryption, Version 1.2, 10 May 2016
(MACsec EP).
7. Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.9 Common Criteria
Security Target, Version 1.0, 5 March 2019
8. Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.9 Common Criteria
Operational User Guidance And Preparative Procedures, Version 1.0, 27 November 2018
9. Assurance Activity Report for Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches running on
IOS-XE 16.9, Version 1.2, 31 January 2019
10. Test Plan for Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.9,
Version 1.0, Date 1/31/2019 (NDcPP)
11. Test Plan for Cisco Catalyst 3650 and 3850 Series Switches running IOS-XE 16.9,
Version 1.1, Date 12/20/2018 (MACsec)