Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007
for
netfence firewall
Version 3.0-2
from
phion information technologies GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.32
BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
netfence firewall
Version 3.0-2
from
phion information technologies GmbH
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
AVA_VLA.3 – Moderately resistant
ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 08 March 2007
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1 Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
2
• BSIG
3
• BSI Certification Ordinance
4
• BSI Schedule of Costs
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
5
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.3
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective in March 1998. This agreement has been signed by
the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates
was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels
(EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and
the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC. As of February 2007 the arrangement
has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America.
The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
This evaluation contains the components AVA_VLA.3 and ALC_FLR.1 that are
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For
mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are
relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Netfence firewall, Version 3.0-2 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. The evaluation of the product Netfence firewall, Version 3.0-2
was conducted by Tele-Consulting GmbH. The Tele-Consulting GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
phion information technologies GmbH
Eduard Bodem Gasse 1
A-6020 Innsbruck, AUSTRIA
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 08 March 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-18.
The product Netfence firewall, Version 3.0-2 has been included in the BSI list of
the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
7
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
phion information technologies GmbH
Eduard Bodem Gasse 1
A-6020 Innsbruck, AUSTRIA
A-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 8
3 Security Policy 9
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 9
5 Architectural Information 10
6 Documentation 11
7 IT Product Testing 11
8 Evaluated Configuration 13
9 Results of the Evaluation 13
10 Comments/Recommendations 15
11 Annexes 15
12 Security Target 15
13 Definitions 15
14 Bibliography 17
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The netfence firewall system allows to control IP traffic between different
networks and in particular from and to the internet. The system controls IP
traffic between network nodes located in separated networks. The firewall
system acts as an IP datagram router that controls datagram flow according to
a configurable security policy which allows regulation of all IP protocols. To this
end the product provides an Application Controlled Packet Forwarder (ACPF)
as well as a Transparent Application Proxy (TAP).
The Application Controlled Packet Forwarder acts on IP packets (datagrams).
For each datagram a decision based upon the configured firewall rules is made
to control traffic between nodes. If the carried network protocol allows
assignment of datagrams to sessions (e.g. TCP or UDP pseudo sessions) a
state of these sessions is kept (stateful) and is taken into account in the
decision process.
The Transparent Application Proxy controls data streams (TCP) from one
network node to another. Based on the address (IP-Address and Port Number)
of the initiating node (source) and the responding node (destination)
establishments of such data streams can be allowed or denied as seen fit by
the firewall ruleset. The system acts as an endpoint for the source node and as
an initiator for the destination, controlling and analysing the flow and its content.
For each of these two transport methods (ACPF and TAP) two operation
modes, inbound mode and outbound mode, are provided. The inbound method
is provided to shield protected network nodes from TCP-SYN attacks performed
across the TOE which aim at resource exhaustion of the protected node or
nodes. To this end the TOE will first expect the three-way TCP handshake with
the inititiating source node to be completed before attempting to connect the
protected target network node. In outbound mode an incoming TCP-SYN
packet is immediately passed on to the target network node.
The IT product Netfence firewall, Version 3.0-2 was evaluated by Tele-
Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 30 January 2007. The
Tele-Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is
phion information technologies GmbH
Eduard Bodem Gasse 1
A-6020 Innsbruck, AUSTRIA
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL 4 Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented by AVA_VLA.3 and
ALC_FLR.1. The following table shows the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: AVA_VLA.3 Vulnerability assessment – Moderately resistant
+: ALC_FLR.1 Life cycle support – Basic flaw remediation
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FDP User data protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FMT Security Management
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles
FPR Privacy
FPR_PSE.1 Pseudonymity
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FPT Protection of the TSF
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Table 3: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
• Security Administration
• Identification and Authentication
• Information Flow Control
• Privacy
• Security Audit
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6, chapter 8.2.3].
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1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The Security Target [6] describes the following threats to be countered by the
TOE:
• T.NOAUTH: An unauthorised human user may attempt to bypass the
security of the TOE so as to access and use security functions provided by
the TOE.
• T.ASPOOF: An unauthorised user may carry out spoofing in which
information flows through the TOE into the connected network by using a
spoofed source address for TCP connections. An unauthorised user may
carry out spoofing in which information flows through the TOE into the
connected network by using a spoofed source address for all IP protocols for
which a reverse routing path check from the TOE back to the source
address yields a network device of the TOE other than the one the request
from the source arrived on.
• T.MEDTF: An unauthorised user may send impermissible network
information through the TOE which results in the exploitation of resources on
a protected network.
• T.PRIVACY: A user may send information to the TOE and may analyse
information received from the TOE to determine real IP addresses of
external IT entities (network nodes such as hosts providing services or
access to other networks) on the internal and demilitarized zone networks
based on information extracted from received IP protocol headers. He may
gain information about the IP addresses or TCP stacks used by the network
nodes on the internal or demilitarized zone networks or about the topology of
the protected networks. Retrieved information could be used by the user to
optimise an attack strategy on network nodes within the protected networks.
• T.NODETECT: An unauthorised user may continually attempt to bypass the
TSP without detection in order to successfully send data through the TOE.
The following security policies have to be met by the TOE as described in the
Security Target:
• P.ROLE: The TOE must be able to distinguish between a root administrator
with unrestricted management access, administrators with read/write
permissions and administrators with read-only permissions.
• P.AUDACC: Users must be accountable for the actions that they conduct.
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1.5 Special configuration requirements
For using the evaluated configuration of the TOE, the following physical
components are needed:
• Firewall: Intel x686 compatible PC with at least 128 MB of memory, 4 GB
Hard Disk, CDROM for installation, 1.44 MB Floppy disk drive for installation
and 2 Network interfaces. The operating system used is Linux with Kernel
Version 2.4.
• Workstation for remote management: Intel x86 compatible PC with 128
MB of memory, 4 GB Hard Disk, CDROM for software installation, 1.44 MB
Floppy disk drive for preparation of firewall installation, 1 Network interface.
As operationg system Windows NT4.0 (Service Pack 6a or newer), 2000 or
XP is needed. Phioni (for installation or recovery purposes only) and Phiona
remote administration software have to be installed.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following assumptions about the environment of the TOE are made:
• A.MEDEXP: Potential threat agents attempting to attack the TOE are
considered to be of a moderate attack potential. This incorporates familiarity
with internet protocols, firewall principles and design, information published
about the TOE, as well as tools and techniques for firewall penetration
testing.
• A.NOEVIL: Administrators are non-hostile, competent, trained, and follow all
administrator guidance.
• A.ONEWAY: Information cannot flow between networks connected to the
netfence firewall unless it passes through the netfence firewall.
• A.PHIONA: After the netfence firewall has been installed, administrators use
a Management Workstation to administrate it, not the system console.
• A.PHYSEC: The netfence firewall is operated in a physically secure
environment which prevents access from unauthorised users.
• A.WSSEC: The Management Workstation is operated in an environment
which is free of malicious software (trojan horses, etc.)
• A.TIME: The underlying operating system provides reliable time information
to the TOE.
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1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Netfence firewall, Version 3.0-2
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW Phion Netfence firewall Version 3.0-2 CD ROM
2 SW Linux Operating System Kernel Version
2.4
CD ROM
3 DOC Administrator Guidance Rev.1.17 CD ROM
4 DOC Start-up and Installation
Guidance
Rev 1.10 CD ROM
Table 4: Deliverables of the TOE
All listed parts were delivered on 1 CD-ROM.
The user is able to verify the authenticity of the delivered TOE. The procedure is
described in detail in the guidance documentation. At the phion website
https://secure.phion.com/ the customer will find the actual guidance
documentation, application phioni.exe and an MD5 checksum (CD-ID) of the
TOE. The valid checksum of the TOE is:
64:c2:5f:99:05:72:47:38:f2:ba:a3:ee:a1:c7:3d:de
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007 Certification Report
3 Security Policy
The netfence firewall system acts as an IP datagram router that controls
datagram flow according to a configurable security policy which allows
regulation of all IP protocols.
Therefore it provides mechanisms for controling and analysing the information
related to security relevant activities and for the protection of user data.
Management functionality is also provided, as well as mechanisms for
identification and authentication.
The security policy of the TOE is definded by the following TOE security
functional requirements:
• SFR components of the class FAU define the mechanisms for the security
audit.
• SFR components of the class FDP define the mechanisms for the protection
of user data.
• SFR components of the class FIA define the mechanisms for identification
and authentication.
• SFR components of the class FMT define the management functions the
TOE provides.
• SFR components of the class FPR define the mechanisms to provide
privacy.
4 Assumptions
The security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is expected to be
used are described in terms of assumptions. The assumptions for the
environment are divided into assumptions about the intended usage of the TOE
and assumptions about the environment the TOE is going to be used in.
4.1 Usage assumptions
• A.MEDEXP: Potential threat agents attempting to attack the TOE are
considered to be of a moderate attack potential. This incorporates familiarity
with internet protocols, firewall principles and design, information published
about the TOE, as well as tools and techniques for firewall penetration
testing.
• A.NOEVIL: Administrators are non-hostile, competent, trained, and follow all
administrator guidance.
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4.2 Environmental assumptions
• A.ONEWAY: Information cannot flow between networks connected to the
netfence firewall unless it passes through the netfence firewall.
• A.PHIONA: After the netfence firewall has been installed, administrators use
a Management Workstation to administrate it, not the system console.
• A.PHYSEC: The netfence firewall is operated in a physically secure
environment which prevents access from unauthorised users.
• A.WSSEC: The Management Workstation is operated in an environment
which is free of malicious software (trojan horses, etc.)
• A.TIME: The underlying operating system provides reliable time information
to the TOE.
5 Architectural Information
The netfence firewall system controls IP traffic between network nodes located
in separated networks. The firewall system acts as an IP datagram router that
controls datagram flow according to a configurable security policy which allows
regulation of all IP protocols.
The TOE is built of the following components:
• Netfence firewall service (TAP, ACPF): Software consisting of a
collection of daemon processes that control packet forwarding and
transparent proxying.
• Netfence kernel extensions (ACPF and Application Protection): Linux
kernel modules that implement Application Controlled Packet Forwarding
(ACPF) and support transparent proxying with additional security
features (SYN Protection). The netfence firewall kernel extension is a
loadable kernel module that adds firewalling functionality, used by the
netfence firewall system, to the standard linux kernel.
• Netfence firewall base system (Visualization and Configuration): A
collection of software modules allowing the administrator to control and
analyse the status of the netfence system as well as that of the
underlying Linux system. The netfence firewall base system also
provides the interfaces for authorised rule set and system attribute
management.
• Phiona (Remote administration client application): Software running on a
Windows NT/2000/XP system allowing remote management of the
netfence firewall. This involves firewall rule management, status
visualisation as well as security audit evaluation.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0219-2007 Certification Report
• Phioni (Preinstallation setup): Software running on a Windows
NT/2000/XP system allowing to preconfigure a netfence system for
installation.
6 Documentation
For a listing of the documentation delivered with the TOE please refer to
chapter 2 or chapter 14 of this report.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
The developer has provided test documentation (FAA2478) which identifies in
chapter 1 the hardware of the used systems Alice (phion netfence firewall 3.0),
Brain (Client, Red Hat Release 9), Barga (Client, Red Hat Release 9), Bob
(Client / Administrator Workstation, Microsoft Windows XP SP2), and Acheron
(Terminal Server / Administrator Workstation, Windows Server 2003). The test
configuration consists of the TOE (firewall) with three network interface
adapters. These are used to establish network connections to a management
workstation and to test systems (barga, brain, bob) sending and receiving
network traffic through the firewall.
The Security Target specifies seven assumptions about the environment of the
TOE: Assumptions A.MEDEXP, A.NOEVIL, A.ONEWAY A.PHIONA,
A.PHYSEC, A.WSSEC, and A.TIME. A.MEDEXP, A.PHYSEC, A.WSSEC and
A.NOEVIL are not applicable to the test environment because access to the test
equipment is properly set up and controlled by standard phion measures and
procedures. Assumption A.ONEWAY is given in the test environment as figure
1 in the test documentation demonstrates. A.TIME is given in all TOE
configurations because of the properties of the underlying operation system.
Assumption A.PHIONA has been intentionally not fulfilled in the test
environment in all cases to allow box access by a tool (cbad_test02) on a lower
level interface than phiona or to allow to generate traffic via the local console
which is blocked by the TSF.
The developer has elaborated a test suite of about 450 tests. To cope with
dependencies within steps they have been arranged into test step assemblies.
The description provided regarding the behaviour of the security functions
varies between “minimal” (information flow control) to “detailed” (other security
functions). Clear initial test conditions are assured by notes such as “Note that
for these tests either a newly installed TOE must be used” or that “all existing
administrators must be deleted before performing the test” or “any
administrators or locks present from tests performed already have to be
removed using phiona before continuing”. Cleanup activities are addressed in
the test procedures by notes such as “IMPORTANT: restore the old hostname
to the default settings after performing this test” or “IMPORTANT: restore the
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old management IP and device to the default settings after performing this test”.
The test strategy makes intensive use of a pre-defined ruleset, which allows to
ctivate and deactivate rules for specific tests. The test strategy also makes
intensive use of test tools to support the tester in setting up the information flow
for specific tests and to get access to lowerlevel interfaces which can not be
stimulated directly by the management tool phiona. This allows to generate
command sequences which are not admissible when using phiona. This is one
of the means used by the developer to perform tests against the high level
design specification. The majority of the tests focuses on testing the various
modules controlling the information flow through and from/to the firewall.
The information provided shows that the expected test results are consistent
with the actual test results.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The evaluator has conducted independent testing by repeating developer tests
and by performing additional tests.
The TOE system (“Alice”) and two Linux test systems (“Barga” and “Brain”)
were provided by the developer. “Barga” and “Brain” were equipped with all test
tools referenced in the developer’s test documentation. The evaluator provided
own equipment for use as management station (Windows XP SP2) and an
additional MS-Windows based test systems (Windows XP SP1, not used for the
documented tests). Alice were configured by the evaluator with three network
interfaces. This configuration matches the configuration in the Security Target.
Most of the tests were performed with Version 3.0-0.63, which differs from
Version 3.0-0.64 only by the two guidance documents “Startup- and Installation
Guidance” and “Administrator Guidance”.
The version number of the TOE was changed from 3.0 to 3.0-2 during the
evaluation. The change made on the operational TOE is only the change of the
Version Number from 3.0-0.64 (this version of the TOE was included in the tests
performed by the evaluation facility) to 3.0-2. Beside this change the software
packages and documentation delivered with on CD 3.0-0.64 and 3.0-2 are
identical.
The evaluator has devised penetration tests, building on the developer
vulnerability analysis and its own vulnerability analysis.
The first type of penetration tests performed can be assigned to the category
„testing against obvious vulnerabilities“ (port scan, tool based vulnerability
check etc.).
The evaluator devised a series of penetration tests to determine whether the
suspected vulnerability regarding the double use of the TCP port 688 is existing.
The evaluator also performed a variation of the developer tests addressing
unexpected input, invalid commands or parameters, data in unexpected
context. These tests were performed using the developer tool test_cbad02.
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It has to be considered that for this product type the boundary between
functional tests and penetration tests is a bit fuzzy. This applies specifically for
the tests of security function information flow control.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated version of the TOE is phion netfence firewall version 3.0-2 as
described in the ST.
The TOE has to be set up in accordance to the guidance documentation ([8] -
[9]) and the ST [6].
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co-
ordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]).
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL 4
augmented by AVA_VLA.3 and ALC_FLR.1 and the class ASE for the Security
Target evaluation) are summarised in the following table:
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Informal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: high-level design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Moderately resistant AVA_VLA.3 PASS
Table 5: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 conformant
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by AVA_VLA.3 and ALC_FLR.1
• The following TOE Security Functions for identification and authentication
fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the netfence firewall Version
3.0-2 as described in chapter 2 of this report.
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The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents [8] - [9] contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
ACPF Application Controlled Packet Forwarding
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IP Internet Protocol
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
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UDP User Datagram Protocol
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
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TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0219-2007, Version 1.9, 25.01.2007, of phion
IT GmbH
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 29.01.207 (confidential
document)
[8] phion netfence firewall 3.0 Administrator Guidance, Revision 1.17, 2006
[9] phion netfence firewall 3.0 Start-up and Installation Guidance, Revision
1.10, 2006
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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