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FOREWORD
This certification report is an UNCLASSIFIED publication, issued under the authority of the Chief, Communications Security
Establishment (CSE).
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (a branch of CSE).
This certification report, and its associated certificate, applies only to the identified version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Canadian Common
Criteria Program, and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This report, and its associated certificate, are not an endorsement of the IT product by Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or
any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report, and its associated certificate, and no warranty for the IT
product by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report,
and its associated certificate, is either expressed or implied.
If your organization has identified a requirement for this certification report based on business needs and would like more
detailed information, please contact:
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
Contact Centre and Information Services
contact@cyber.gc.ca | 1-833-CYBER-88 (1-833-292-3788)
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OVERVIEW
The Canadian Common Criteria Program provides a third-party evaluation service for determining the trustworthiness of
Information Technology (IT) security products. Evaluations are performed by a commercial Common Criteria Testing
Laboratory (CCTL) under the oversight of the Certification Body, which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Cyber
Security.
A CCTL is a commercial facility that has been approved by the Certification Body to perform Common Criteria evaluations; a
significant requirement for such approval is accreditation to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025, the General Requirements
for the Competence of Testing and Calibration Laboratories.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the Certification Body asserts that the product complies with the security
requirements specified in the associated security target. A security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the security target, in
addition to this certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, the evaluated security functionality, and the testing and analysis conducted by the CCTL.
The certification report, certificate of product evaluation and security target are posted to the Common Criteria portal (the
official website of the International Common Criteria Program).
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 6
1 Identification of Target of Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 7
1.1 Common Criteria Conformance.......................................................................................................................... 7
1.2 TOE Description................................................................................................................................................. 7
1.3 TOE Architecture ............................................................................................................................................... 7
2 Security Policy......................................................................................................................................... 8
2.1 Cryptographic Functionality ............................................................................................................................... 8
3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ....................................................................................................... 9
3.1 Usage and Environmental Assumptions.............................................................................................................. 9
3.2 Clarification of Scope ........................................................................................................................................ 9
4 Evaluated Configuration............................................................................................................................10
4.1 Documentation.................................................................................................................................................10
5 Evaluation Analysis Activities....................................................................................................................11
5.1 Development....................................................................................................................................................11
5.2 Guidance Documents........................................................................................................................................11
5.3 Life-Cycle Support ............................................................................................................................................11
6 Testing Activities ....................................................................................................................................12
6.1 Assessment of Developer tests.........................................................................................................................12
6.2 Conduct of Testing...........................................................................................................................................12
6.3 Independent Testing.........................................................................................................................................12
6.3.1 Independent Testing Results .........................................................................................................................13
6.4 Vulnerability Analysis .......................................................................................................................................14
6.4.1 Vulnerability Analysis Results........................................................................................................................14
7 Results of the Evaluation ..........................................................................................................................15
7.1 Recommendations/Comments..........................................................................................................................15
8 Supporting Content..................................................................................................................................16
8.1 List of Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................16
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8.2 References.......................................................................................................................................................16
LIST OF FIGURES
TOE Architecture..................................................................................................................................................7
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: TOE Identification ................................................................................................................................................7
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s).........................................................................................................................8
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Dell PowerScale OneFS v9.5 (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation, or TOE), from Dell Technologies, was the
subject of this Common Criteria evaluation. A description of the TOE can be found in Section 1.2. The results of this
evaluation demonstrate that the TOE meets the requirements of the conformance claim listed in Section 1.1 for the
evaluated security functionality.
Lightship Security is the CCTL that conducted the evaluation. This evaluation was completed on 22 May 2024 and was
carried out in accordance with the rules of the Canadian Common Criteria Program.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target, which identifies assumptions made during the evaluation, the
intended environment for the TOE, and the security functional/assurance requirements. Consumers are advised to verify that
their operating environment is consistent with that specified in the security target, and to give due consideration to the
comments, observations, and recommendations in this Certification Report.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, as the Certification Body, declares that this evaluation meets all the conditions of
the Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product is listed on the Certified Products
list (CPL) for the Canadian Common Criteria Program and the Common Criteria portal (the official website of the
International Common Criteria Program).
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1 IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET OF EVALUATION
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is identified as follows:
Table 1: TOE Identification
TOE Name and Version Dell PowerScale OneFS v9.5
Developer Dell Technologies
1.1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE
The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 5, for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5.
The TOE claims the following conformance:
EAL 2+ (ALC_FLR.2)
1.2 TOE DESCRIPTION
The TOE is a storage solution for unstructured data. It provides a platform to support large data workload, simplify
management and protect data at scale. The TOE is managed using a Command Line Interface (CLI), Web User Interface
(WebUI) and REST API.
1.3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
A diagram of the TOE architecture is as follows:
TOE Architecture
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2 SECURITY POLICY
The TOE implements and enforces policies pertaining to the following security functionality:
 Security Audit
 User Data Protection
 Security Management
 TOE Access
 Cryptographic Support
 Identification and Authentication
 Protection of the TSF
 Trusted Path/Channels
Complete details of the security functional requirements (SFRs) can be found in the Security Target (ST) referenced in
section 8.2.
2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONALITY
The following cryptographic implementations are used by the TOE and have been evaluated by the CAVP:
Table 2: Cryptographic Implementation(s)
Cryptographic Implementation Certificate Number
TC58NC1132GTC HW Algorithms C1925
AES in ASIC SVN 58160 AES 4309
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3 ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
Consumers of the TOE should consider assumptions about usage and environmental settings as requirements for the
product’s installation and its operating environment. This will ensure the proper and secure operation of the TOE.
3.1 USAGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made regarding the use and deployment of the TOE:
 Data path users are identified and authenticated prior to gaining access to the TOE.
 The TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical and logical access.
 There are one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE. These administrators are not careless,
wilfully negligent, or hostile, are appropriately trained and will follow the instructions provided by the TOE
documentation.
3.2 CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
The following features are excluded from this evaluation:
 Log offloading
 LDAP / Active Directory Authentication
 iDRAC
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4 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The evaluated configuration for the TOE comprises:
TOE Software/Firmware Dell PowerScale OneFS v9.5.0.8 Build B_9_5_0_005 Patch 9.5.0.8_LTS2023_GA-RUP_PSP-
4211
 TOE Hardware KIOXIA Drives Hitachi Drives
F200  KPM6WRUG1T92
 KPM6WRUG3T84
 KPM6WRUG7T68
 KPM6WVUG960G
 P6V1T60D
 W5QTR641
 W5STR641

F800
F810
F600  KCM6FRUL1T92
 KCM6FRUL3T84
 KCM6FRUL7T68
 KCM6FRUL15T3
F900
Environmental Support  Administrator workstation to access and manage the TOE.
 Data path user workstations to support NFS, HDFS and SMB file sharing services.
 Frontend switch for TOE cluster connection.
 Backend switches for TOE nodes in a single cluster.
4.1 DOCUMENTATION
The following documents are provided to the consumer to assist in the configuration and installation of the TOE:
a) PowerScale OneFS 9.5.0.0 Web Administration Guide, October 2023
b) PowerScale OneFS 9.5.0.0 CLI Administration Guide, October 2023
c) PowerScale OneFS 9.5.0.0 CLI Command Reference, January 2023
d) PowerScale OneFS 9.5.0.0 API Reference Guide, January 2023
e) PowerScale OneFS Event Reference Guide, January 2023
f) PowerScale OneFS 9.5.0.0 Security Configuration Guide, January 2023
g) Dell PowerScale OneFS v9.5 Common Criteria Guide, Version 1.5, May 2024
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5 EVALUATION ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES
The evaluation analysis activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE. Documentation and process dealing with
Development, Guidance Documents, and Life-Cycle Support were evaluated.
5.1 DEVELOPMENT
The evaluators analyzed the documentation provided by the vendor; they determined that the design completely and
accurately describes the TOE security functionality (TSF) interfaces and how the TSF implements the security functional
requirements. The evaluators determined that the initialization process is secure, that the security functions are protected
against tamper and bypass, and that security domains are maintained.
5.2 GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS
The evaluators examined the TOE preparative user guidance and operational user guidance and determined that it
sufficiently and unambiguously describes how to securely transform the TOE into its evaluated configuration and how to use
and administer the product. The evaluators examined and tested the preparative and operational guidance and determined
that they are complete and sufficiently detailed to result in a secure configuration.
Section 4.1 provides details on the guidance documents.
5.3 LIFE-CYCLE SUPPORT
An analysis of the TOE configuration management system and associated documentation was performed. The evaluators
found that the TOE configuration items were clearly marked.
The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it described all the procedures required to
maintain the integrity of the TOE during distribution to the consumer.
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6 TESTING ACTIVITIES
Testing consists of the following three steps: assessing developer tests, performing independent tests, and performing a
vulnerability analysis.
6.1 ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPER TESTS
The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by examining their test evidence, and
reviewing their test results, as documented in the Evaluation Test Report (ETR). The correspondence between the tests
identified in the developer’s test documentation and the functional specification was complete.
6.2 CONDUCT OF TESTING
The TOE was subjected to a comprehensive suite of formally documented, independent functional and penetration tests. The
detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed results are
documented in a separate Test Results document.
6.3 INDEPENDENT TESTING
During this evaluation, the evaluator developed independent functional & penetration tests by examining design and
guidance documentation.
All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow repeatability of the testing procedures and
results. The following testing activities were performed:
a. Repeat of Developer's Tests: The evaluator repeated a subset of the developer's tests;
b. TOE Reboot. The evaluator rebooted the TOE to verify that start and stop of the audit service is logged;
c. Audit Restrictions. The evaluator verified that role-based restrictions are enforced when reviewing the audit log;
d. SMB, NFS, HDFS permission checks. The evaluator verified permissions are enforced as claimed;
e. SmartLock Restrictions. The evaluator verified that data modifications cannot occur after the SmartLock retention
period has expired;
f. Data Rebuild. The evaluator demonstrated data recovery in the case of node failure;
g. Management Restrictions. The evaluator verified that administrative users with the appropriate role can modify data
path attributes and that only the file owner can specify permission defaults;
h. Validate Clock. The evaluator verified that the clock is accurate on a subset of nodes in a cluster;
i. Cryptographic Implementation Verification. The evaluator verified the presence of the cryptographic
implementations used in the TOE; and
j. Trusted Path. The evaluator performed TLS and SSH interoperability testing with FIPS-validated cryptography.
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6.3.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING RESULTS
The developer’s tests and the independent tests yielded the expected results, providing assurance that the TOE behaves as
specified in its ST and functional specification.
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6.4 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
The vulnerability analysis focused on 4 flaw hypotheses.
 Public Vulnerability based (Type 1)
 Technical community sources (Type 2)
 Evaluation team generated (Type 3)
 Tool Generated (Type 4)
The evaluators conducted an independent review of all evaluation evidence, public domain vulnerability databases and
technical community sources (Type 1 & 2). Additionally, the evaluators used automated vulnerability scanning tools to
discover potential network, platform, and application layer vulnerabilities (Type 4). Based upon this review, the evaluators
formulated flaw hypotheses (Type 3), which they used in their vulnerability analysis.
Type 1 & 2 searches were conducted on 12 April 2024 and included the following search terms:
Intel Silver 4210 Intel E5-2697AV4 Intel Gold 6240R
F200 F600 F800
F810 F900 KPM6WRUG
KPM6WVUG KCM6FRUL W5QTR641
W5STR641 KIOXIA freebsd 12.1
openssh 9.3 openssl1.0.2zi Apache server 2.4.55
ntpd lldpd Python 3.8.18
Dell emc powerscale onefs 9 TC58NC1132GTC
Vulnerability searches were conducted using the following sources:
http://nvd.nist.gov https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-
catalog
https://www.dell.com/support/home/en-us/product-
support/product/isilon-onefs/advisories
6.4.1 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS
The vulnerability analysis did not uncover any security relevant residual exploitable vulnerabilities in the intended operating
environment.
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7 RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report, and its associated certificate, has been
evaluated at an approved testing laboratory established under the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. This certification
report, and its associated certificate, apply only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration.
This evaluation has provided the basis for the conformance claim documented in Section 1.1. The overall verdict for this
evaluation is PASS. These results are supported by evidence in the ETR.
7.1 RECOMMENDATIONS/COMMENTS
It is recommended that all guidance outlined in Section 4.1 be followed to configure the TOE in the evaluated configuration.
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8 SUPPORTING CONTENT
8.1 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Term Definition
CAVP Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CCTL Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
CLI Command Line Interface
CMVP Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE Communications Security Establishment
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
HDFS Hadoop Distributed File System
IT Information Technology
NFS Network File System
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMB Server Message Block
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Function
WebUI Web User Interface
8.2 REFERENCES
Reference
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
Dell PowerScale OneFS v9.5 Security Target, Version 1.9, May 22, 2024.
Dell Technologies Dell PowerScale OneFS v9.5 Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.4, May 22, 2024.