Power Plus Communications AG • Dudenstrasse 6 • 68167 Mannheim • Deutschland • www.ppc-ag.de Security Target SMGW Version 2.2 page 2 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Version History 1 Version Datum Name Änderungen 1.5 30.09.2024 C. Miller SMGW 2.2 page 3 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Contents 2 Contents.............................................................................................................3 3 1 Introduction.................................................................................................6 4 1.1 ST reference........................................................................................................... 6 5 1.2 TOE reference ........................................................................................................ 6 6 1.3 Introduction.......................................................................................................... 10 7 1.4 TOE Overview ...................................................................................................... 12 8 1.4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 12 9 1.4.2 Overview of the Gateway in a Smart Metering System ................................................ 13 10 1.4.3 TOE description................................................................................................................ 16 11 1.4.4 TOE Type definition ......................................................................................................... 17 12 1.4.5 TOE logical boundary ...................................................................................................... 20 13 1.4.6 The logical interfaces of the TOE ................................................................................... 28 14 1.4.7 The cryptography of the TOE and its Security Module ................................................ 29 15 TOE life-cycle ................................................................................................................................ 33 16 2 Conformance Claims................................................................................34 17 2.1 CC Conformance Claim....................................................................................... 34 18 2.2 PP Claim / Conformance Statement ................................................................... 34 19 2.3 Package Claim ..................................................................................................... 34 20 2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale ............................................................................ 34 21 3 Security Problem Definition.....................................................................35 22 3.1 External entities ................................................................................................... 35 23 3.2 Assets................................................................................................................... 35 24 3.3 Assumptions........................................................................................................ 39 25 3.4 Threats.................................................................................................................. 41 26 3.5 Organizational Security Policies......................................................................... 44 27 4 Security Objectives ..................................................................................46 28 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ......................................................................... 46 29 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment....................................... 51 30 4.3 Security Objective Rationale............................................................................... 53 31 4.3.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................... 53 32 4.3.2 Countering the threats..................................................................................................... 54 33 4.3.3 Coverage of organisational security policies ............................................................... 57 34 4.3.4 Coverage of assumptions ............................................................................................... 58 35 5 Extended Component definition .............................................................60 36 5.1 Communication concealing (FPR_CON) ............................................................ 60 37 5.2 Family behaviour ................................................................................................. 60 38 5.3 Component levelling............................................................................................ 60 39 5.4 Management......................................................................................................... 60 40 5.5 Audit ..................................................................................................................... 60 41 5.6 Communication concealing (FPR_CON.1) ......................................................... 60 42 6 Security Requirements.............................................................................62 43 6.1 Overview............................................................................................................... 62 44 page 4 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2 Class FAU: Security Audit................................................................................... 66 45 6.2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 66 46 6.2.2 Security Requirements for the System Log .................................................................. 68 47 6.2.3 Security Requirements for the Consumer Log ............................................................. 71 48 6.2.4 Security Requirements for the Calibration Log ............................................................ 74 49 6.2.5 Security Requirements that apply to all logs ................................................................ 79 50 6.3 Class FCO: Communication................................................................................ 81 51 6.3.1 Non-repudiation of origin (FCO_NRO)........................................................................... 81 52 6.4 Class FCS: Cryptographic Support .................................................................... 82 53 6.4.1 Cryptographic support for TLS....................................................................................... 82 54 6.4.2 Cryptographic support for CMS ..................................................................................... 83 55 6.4.3 Cryptographic support for Meter communication encryption .................................... 85 56 6.4.4 General Cryptographic support...................................................................................... 87 57 6.5 Class FDP: User Data Protection........................................................................ 90 58 6.5.1 Introduction to the Security Functional Policies .......................................................... 90 59 6.5.2 Gateway Access SFP....................................................................................................... 90 60 6.5.3 Firewall SFP...................................................................................................................... 92 61 6.5.4 Meter SFP.......................................................................................................................... 95 62 6.5.5 General Requirements on user data protection............................................................ 99 63 6.6 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication ................................................... 100 64 6.6.1 User Attribute Definition (FIA_ATD) ............................................................................. 100 65 6.6.2 Authentication Failures (FIA_AFL) ............................................................................... 101 66 6.6.3 User Authentication (FIA_UAU) .................................................................................... 101 67 6.6.4 User identification (FIA_UID) ........................................................................................ 103 68 6.6.5 User-subject binding (FIA_USB)................................................................................... 104 69 6.7 Class FMT: Security Management .................................................................... 105 70 6.7.1 Management of the TSF................................................................................................. 105 71 6.7.2 Security management roles (FMT_SMR) ..................................................................... 112 72 6.7.3 Management of security attributes for Gateway access SFP.................................... 113 73 6.7.4 Management of security attributes for Firewall SFP .................................................. 114 74 6.7.5 Management of security attributes for Meter SFP ...................................................... 115 75 6.8 Class FPR: Privacy ............................................................................................ 116 76 6.8.1 Communication Concealing (FPR_CON) ..................................................................... 116 77 6.8.2 Pseudonymity (FPR_PSE)............................................................................................. 117 78 6.9 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF ..................................................................... 118 79 6.9.1 Fail secure (FPT_FLS).................................................................................................... 118 80 6.9.2 Replay Detection (FPT_RPL)......................................................................................... 119 81 6.9.3 Time stamps (FPT_STM) ............................................................................................... 119 82 6.9.4 TSF self test (FPT_TST)................................................................................................. 119 83 6.9.5 TSF physical protection (FPT_PHP)............................................................................. 120 84 6.10 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels.................................................................... 120 85 6.10.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC)............................................................................ 120 86 page 5 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.11 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE............................................... 122 87 6.12 Security Requirements rationale ...................................................................... 124 88 6.12.1 Security Functional Requirements rationale............................................................... 124 89 6.12.2 Security Assurance Requirements rationale .............................................................. 137 90 7 TOE Summary Specification..................................................................138 91 7.1 SF.1: Authentication of Communication and Role Assignment for external 92 entities............................................................................................................................ 138 93 7.2 SF.2: Acceptance and Deposition of Meter Data, Encryption of Meter Data for 94 WAN transmission......................................................................................................... 145 95 7.3 SF.3: Administration, Configuration and SW Update...................................... 147 96 7.4 SF.4: Displaying Consumption Data................................................................. 149 97 7.5 SF.5: Audit and Logging.................................................................................... 150 98 7.6 SF.6: TOE Integrity Protection .......................................................................... 152 99 7.7 TSS Rationale..................................................................................................... 153 100 8 List of Tables...........................................................................................157 101 9 List of Figures .........................................................................................158 102 10 Appendix ..............................................................................................159 103 10.1 Mapping from English to German terms .......................................................... 159 104 10.2 Glossary ............................................................................................................. 161 105 11 Literature..............................................................................................166 106 107 page 6 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 1 Introduction 108 1.1ST reference 109 Title: Security Target, SMGW Version 2.2 110 Editors: Power Plus Communications AG 111 CC-Version: 3.1 Revision 5 112 Assurance Level: EAL 4+, augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2 113 General Status: Final 114 Document Version: 1.5 115 Document Date: 30.09.2024 116 TOE: SMGW Version 2.2 117 Certification ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-0831-V10-2024 118 This document contains the security target of the SMGW Version 2.2. 119 This security target claims conformance to the Smart Meter Gateway protection profile 120 [PP_GW]. 121 122 1.2TOE reference 123 The TOE described in this security target is the SMGW Version 2.2. 124 The following classifications of the product “Smart Meter Gateway” contain the TOE: 125 • BPL Smart Meter Gateway (BPL-SMGW), SMGW-B-2A-111-00, SMGW-B-2B- 126 111-00, SMGW-H-2B-111-00 127 • ETH Smart Meter Gateway (ETH-SMGW), SMGW-E-2A-111-00, SMGW-E-2B- 128 111-00 129 • LTE Smart Meter Gateway (LTE-SMGW), SMGW-J-2A-111-10, SMGW-J-2A- 130 111-30, SMGW-K-2A-111-10, SMGW-K-2A-111-30, SMGW-J-2B-111-10, 131 SMGW-J-2B-111-30, SMGW-K-2B-111-10, SMGW-K-2B-111-20, SMGW-K- 132 page 7 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 2B-111-30, SMGW-D-2B-111-10, SMGW-D-2B-111-20, SMGW-D-2B-111-30, 133 SMGW-O-2B-111-10, SMGW-O-2B-111-20 oder SMGW-O-2B-111-30 134 • G.hn Smart Meter Gateway (G.hn-SMGW), SMGW-N-2A-111-00, SMGW-N- 135 2B-111-00 136 • LTE450 Smart Meter Gateway (LTE450-SMGW), SMGW-V-2A-111-20, 137 SMGW-V-2B-111-20 138 • pWE Smart Meter Gateway (pWE-SMGW), SMGW-P-2A-111-00, SMGW-P- 139 2B-111-00 140 The TOE comprises the following parts: 141 • hardware device of the hardware generation 2A or 2B according to Table 1, 142 including the TOE’s main circuit board, a carrier board, a power-supply unit and 143 a radio module for communication with wireless meter (included in the hardware 144 device “Smart Meter Gateway”) 145 • firmware including software application (loaded into the circuit board) 146 o “SMGW Software Version 2.2.2”, identified by the value 00931-34864 147 which comprises of two revision numbers of the underlying version control sys- 148 tem for the TOE, where the first part is for the operating system and the second 149 part is for the SMGW application 150 • manuals 151 o „Handbuch für Verbraucher, Smart Meter Gateway“ [AGD_CON- 152 SUMER], identified by the SHA-256 hash value 153 c98c8697b851c3622a4eb4a0692ea98048e0455a5a38f27984c73e9b32fa3ef0 154 o „Handbuch für Service-Techniker, Smart Meter Gateway“ [AGD_Techni- 155 ker], identified by the SHA-256 hash value 156 53074ebd01b733a3218dd8923f34c74995ac9908ace2f6c2472889e92c844703 157 o „Handbuch für Hersteller von Smart-Meter Gateway-Administrations- 158 Software, Smart Meter Gateway“ [AGD_GWA], identified by the SHA- 159 256 hash value 160 fd3320a71774ac5c00775d543888ce55e32da37c10b442d0a90fc7844e2c42ea 161 o „Logmeldungen, SMGW “ [SMGW_Logging] identified by the SHA-256 162 hash value 163 132352ca781817706b5a83490f92b92f4e5ff9327c6533b49637efb0085a7e25 164 page 8 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland o „Auslieferungs- und Fertigungsprozeduren, Anhang Sichere Ausliefe- 165 rung“ [AGD_SEC], identified by the SHA-256 hash value 166 5a54d0b95e8473e6c998049f71b6b27ab4fd0daab8363aea39b94d825efe99c9 167 The hardware device “Smart Meter Gateway” includes a secure module with the product 168 name “TCOS Smart Meter Security Module Version 1.0 Release 2/P60C144PVE” which 169 is not part of the TOE but has its own certification id “BSI-DSZ-CC-0957-V2-2016” or the 170 security module with the product name “TCOS eEnergy Security Module Version 2.0 171 Release 1/P71” which is not part of the TOE but has its own certification id “BSI-DSZ- 172 CC-1217-2024”. Moreover, a hard-wired communication adapter is connected to the 173 TOE via [USB] as shown in Figure 3 which is not part of the TOE (but always an insep- 174 arable part of the delivered entity). This communication adapter can be either a LTE 175 communication adapter, a LTE450 communication adapter, a BPL [IEEE 1901] commu- 176 nication adapter, a GPRS communication adapter, a CDMA communication adapter, a 177 powerWAN-Ethernet communication adapter, a G.hn [ITU G.hn] communication adapter 178 or an ethernet communication adapter. There might be not every communication adapter 179 available for each Hardware Generation. 180 The following table shows the different “Smart Meter Gateway” product classifications 181 applied on the case of the product, while not all of them might be part of the TOE: 182 # Characteristic Value Description 1 Product family SMGW each classification of a type start with this value 2 - Delimiter 3 Communication Technology B Product Type „BPL Smart Meter Gateway“ H Product Type “BPL Smart Meter Gateway” C Product Type „CDMA Smart Meter Gateway“ E Product Type „ETH Smart Meter Gateway“ G Product Type „GPRS Smart Meter Gateway“ L Product Type „LTE Smart Meter Gateway“ J Product Type “LTE Smart Meter Gateway” page 9 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland # Characteristic Value Description K Product Type „LTE Smart Meter Gateway“ D Product Type „LTE Smart Meter Gateway“ O Product Type „LTE Smart Meter Gateway“ P Product Type „powerWAN-ETH Smart Meter Gateway“ N Product Type „G.hn Smart Meter Gateway“ V Product Type “LTE450 Smart Meter Gateway” 4 - Delimiter 5 Hardware gen- eration 1A Identification of hardware generation; version 1.0 of “SMGW Hardware” 1B Identification of hardware generation; version 1.0.1 of “SMGW Hardware” (with new power adapter) 2A Identification of hardware generation; version 2.0 of “SMGW Hardware” 2B Identification of hardware generation; version 2B of “SMGW Hardware” 6 - Delimiter 7 HAN Interface 1 Ethernet 8 CLS Interface 1 Ethernet 9 LMN Interface 1 Wireless and wired 10 - Delimiter page 10 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland # Characteristic Value Description 11 SIM card type 0 None 1 SIM card assembled at factory and SIM slot 2 SIM card assembled at factory only 3 SIM slot only 12 reserved 0 Table 1: Smart Meter Gateway product classifications 183 1.3Introduction 184 The increasing use of green energy and upcoming technologies around e-mobility lead 185 to an increasing demand for functions of a so called smart grid. A smart grid hereby 186 refers to a commodity 1 network that intelligently integrates the behaviour and actions of 187 all entities connected to it – suppliers of natural resources and energy, its consumers 188 and those that are both – in order to efficiently ensure a more sustainable, economic and 189 secure supply of a certain commodity (definition adopted from [CEN]). 190 In its vision such a smart grid would allow to invoke consumer devices to regulate the 191 load and availability of resources or energy in the grid, e.g. by using consumer devices 192 to store energy or by triggering the use of energy based upon the current load of the 193 grid2. Basic features of such a smart use of energy or resources are already reality. 194 Providers of electricity in Germany, for example, have to offer at least one tariff that has 195 the purpose to motivate the consumer to save energy. 196 In the past, the production of electricity followed the demand/consumption of the con- 197 sumers. Considering the strong increase in renewable energy and the production of en- 198 ergy as a side effect in heat generation today, the consumption/demand has to follow 199 the – often externally controlled – production of energy. Similar mechanisms can exist 200 1 Commodities can be electricity, gas, water or heat which is distributed from its generator to the consumer through a grid (network). 2 Please note that such a functionality requires a consent or a contract between the supplier and the consumer, alterna- tively a regulatory requirement. page 11 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland for the gas network to control the feed of biogas or hydrogen based on information sub- 201 mitted by consumer devices. 202 An essential aspect for all considerations of a smart grid is the so called Smart Metering 203 System that meters the consumption or production of certain commodities at the con- 204 sumers’ side and allows sending the information about the consumption or production to 205 external entities, which is then the basis for e. g. billing the consumption or production. 206 This Security Target defines the security objectives, corresponding requirements and 207 their fulfilment for a Gateway which is the central communication component of such a 208 Smart Metering System (please refer to chapter 1.4.2 for a more detailed overview). 209 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) that is described in this document is an electronic unit 210 comprising hardware and software/firmware3 used for collection, storage and provision 211 of Meter Data4 from one or more Meters of one or multiple commodities. 212 The Gateway connects a Wide Area Network (WAN) with a Network of Devices of one 213 or more Smart Metering devices (Local Metrological Network, LMN) and the consumer 214 Home Area Network (HAN), which hosts Controllable Local Systems (CLS) and visuali- 215 zation devices. The security functionality of the TOE comprises 216 • protection of confidentiality, authenticity, integrity of data and 217 • information flow control 218 mainly to protect the privacy of consumers, to ensure a reliable billing process and to 219 protect the Smart Metering System and a corresponding large scale infrastructure of the 220 smart grid. The availability of the Gateway is not addressed by this ST. 221 222 3 For the rest of this document the term “firmware” will be used if the complete firmware ist meant. For the application in- cluding its services the term “software” will be used. 4 Please refer to chapter 3.2 for an exact definition of the term "Meter Data”. page 12 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 1.4TOE Overview 223 1.4.1 Introduction 224 The TOE as defined in this Security Target is the Gateway in a Smart Metering System. 225 In the following subsections the overall Smart Metering System will be described first 226 and afterwards the Gateway itself. 227 There are various different vocabularies existing in the area of Smart Grid, Smart Meter- 228 ing and Home Automation. Furthermore, the Common Criteria maintain their own vo- 229 cabulary. The Protection Profile [PP_GW, chapter 1.3] provides an overview over the 230 most prominent terms used in this Security Target to avoid any bias which is not fully 231 repeated here. 232 page 13 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 1.4.2 Overview of the Gateway in a Smart Metering System 233 The following figure provides an overview of the TOE as part of a complete Smart Me- 234 tering System from a purely functional perspective as used in this ST.5 235 236 Figure 1: The TOE and its direct environment 237 238 As can be seen in Figure 1, a system for smart metering comprises different functional 239 units in the context of the descriptions in this ST: 240 • The Gateway (as defined in this ST) serves as the communication component 241 between the components in the local area network (LAN) of the consumer and 242 the outside world. It can be seen as a special kind of firewall dedicated to the 243 smart metering functionality. It also collects, processes and stores the records 244 5 It should be noted that this description purely contains aspects that are relevant to motivate and understand the function- alities of the Gateway as described in this ST. It does not aim to provide a universal description of a Smart Metering Sys- tem for all application cases. page 14 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland from Meter(s) and ensures that only authorised parties have access to them or 245 derivatives thereof. Before sending meter data6 the information will be en- 246 crypted and signed using the services of a Security Module. The Gateway fea- 247 tures a mandatory user interface, enabling authorised consumers to access the 248 data relevant to them. 249 • The Meter itself records the consumption or production of one or more com- 250 modities (e.g. electricity, gas, water, heat) and submits those records in defined 251 intervals to the Gateway. The Meter Data has to be signed and encrypted be- 252 fore transfer in order to ensure its confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity. The 253 Meter is comparable to a classical meter7 and has comparable security require- 254 ments; it will be sealed as classical meters according to the regulations of the 255 calibration authority. The Meter further supports the encryption and integrity 256 protection of its connection to the Gateway8. 257 • The Gateway utilises the services of a Security Module (e.g. a smart card) as 258 a cryptographic service provider and as a secure storage for confidential assets. 259 The Security Module will be evaluated separately according to the requirements 260 in the corresponding Protection Profile (c.f. [SecModPP]). 261 Controllable Local Systems (CLS, as shown in Figure 2) may range from local power 262 generation plants, controllable loads such as air condition and intelligent household ap- 263 pliances (“white goods”) to applications in home automation. CLS may utilise the ser- 264 vices of the Gateway for communication services. However, CLS are not part of the 265 Smart Metering System. 266 The following figure introduces the external interfaces of the TOE and shows the cardi- 267 nality of the involved entities. Please note that the arrows of the interfaces within the 268 Smart Metering System as shown in Figure 2 indicate the flow of information. However, 269 it does not indicate that a communication flow can be initiated bi-directionally. Indeed, 270 6 Please note that readings and data which are not relevant for billing may require an explicit endorsement of the consumer. 7 In this context, a classical meter denotes a meter without a communication channel, i.e. whose values have to be read out locally. 8 It should be noted that this ST does not imply that the connection between the Gateways and external components (specifically meters and CLS) is cable based. It is also possible that the connections as shown in Figure 1 are realised deploying a wireless technology. However, the requirements on how the connections shall be secured apply regardless of the realisation. page 15 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland the following chapters of this ST will place dedicated requirements on the way an infor- 271 mation flow can be initiated9. 272 273 Figure 2: The logical interfaces of the TOE 274 The overview of the Smart Metering System as described before is based on a threat 275 model that has been developed for the Smart Metering System and has been motivated 276 by the following considerations: 277 • The Gateway is the central communication unit in the Smart Metering System. 278 It is the only unit directly connected to the WAN, to be the first line of defence 279 an attacker located in the WAN would have to conquer. 280 • The Gateway is the central component that collects, processes and stores Me- 281 ter Data. It therewith is the primary point for user interaction in the context of 282 the Smart Metering System. 283 9 Please note that the cardinality of the interface to the consumer is 0...n as it cannot be assumed that a consumer is interacting with the TOE at all. page 16 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland • To conquer a Meter in the LMN or CLS in the HAN (that uses the TOE for com- 284 munication) a WAN attacker first would have to attack the Gateway success- 285 fully. All data transferred between LAN and WAN flows via the Gateway which 286 makes it an ideal unit for implementing significant parts of the system's overall 287 security functionality. 288 • Because a Gateway can be used to connect and protect multiple Meters (while 289 a Meter will always be connected to exactly one Gateway) and CLS with the 290 WAN, there might be more Meters and CLS in a Smart Metering System than 291 there are Gateways. 292 All these arguments motivated the approach to have a Gateway (using a Security Mod- 293 ule for cryptographic support), which is rich in security functionality, strong and evaluated 294 in depth, in contrast to a Meter which will only deploy a minimum of security functions. 295 The Security Module will be evaluated separately. 296 1.4.3 TOE description 297 The Smart Metering Gateway (in the following short: Gateway or TOE) may serve as the 298 communication unit between devices of private and commercial consumers and service 299 providers of a commodity industry (e.g. electricity, gas, water, etc.). It also collects, pro- 300 cesses and stores Meter Data and is responsible for the distribution of this data to ex- 301 ternal entities. 302 Typically, the Gateway will be placed in the household or premises of the consumer10 of 303 the commodity and enables access to local Meter(s) (i.e. the unit(s) used for measuring 304 the consumption or production of electric power, gas, water, heat etc.) and may enable 305 access to Controllable Local Systems (e.g. power generation plants, controllable loads 306 such as air condition and intelligent household appliances). 307 The TOE has a fail-safe design that specifically ensures that any malfunction can not 308 impact the delivery of a commodity, e.g. energy, gas or water11. 309 310 10 Please note that it is possible that the consumer of the commodity is not the owner of the premises where the Gateway will be placed. However, this description acknowledges that there is a certain level of control over the physical access to the Gateway. 11 Indeed, this Security Target assumes that the Gateway and the Meters have no possibility at all to impact the delivery of a commodity. Even an intentional stop of the delivery of a certain commodity is Not within the scope of this Security Target. It should, however, be noted that such a functionality may be realised by a CLS that utilises the services of the TOE for its communication. page 17 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland The following figure provides an overview of the product with its TOE and non-TOE parts: 311 312 Figure 3: The product with its TOE and non-TOE parts 313 The TOE communicates over the interface IF_GW_SM with a security module and over 314 the interfaces USB_P, USB_N and Module Reset with one of the possible communica- 315 tion adapters according to chapter 1.2. The communication adapters, which are not part 316 of the TOE, transmit data from the USB interface to the WAN interface and vice versa. 317 1.4.4 TOE Type definition 318 At first, the TOE is a communication Gateway. It provides different external communica- 319 tion interfaces and enables the data communication between these interfaces and con- 320 nected IT systems. It further collects, processes and stores Meter Data and is responsi- 321 ble for the distribution of this data to external parties. 322 Typically, the Gateway will be placed in the household or premises of the consumer of 323 the commodity and enables access to local Meter(s) (i.e. the unit(s) used for measuring 324 the consumption or production of electric power, gas, water, heat etc.) and may enable 325 access to Controllable Local Systems (e.g. power generation plants, controllable loads 326 such as air condition and intelligent household appliances). Roles respectively External 327 Entities in the context of the TOE are introduced in chapter 3.1. 328 The TOE described in this ST is a product that has been developed by Power Plus Com- 329 munication AG. It is a communication product which complies with the requirements of 330 the Protection Profile “Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering System” 331 page 18 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland [PP_GW]. The TOE consists of hardware and software including the operating system. 332 The communication with more than one meter is possible. 333 The TOE is implemented as a separate physical module which can be integrated into 334 more complex modular systems. This means that the TOE can be understood as an 335 OEM module which provides all required physical interfaces and protocols on well de- 336 fined interfaces. Because of this, the module can be integrated into communication de- 337 vices and directly into meters. 338 The TOE-design includes the following components: 339 • The security relevant components compliant to the Protection Profile. 340 • Components with no security relevance (e.g. communication protocols and in- 341 terfaces). 342 The TOE evaluation does not include the evaluation of the Security Module. In fact, the 343 TOE relies on the security functionality of the Security Module but it must be security 344 evaluated in a separate security evaluation12. 345 The hardware platform of the TOE mainly consists of a suitable embedded CPU, volatile 346 and non-volatile memory and supporting circuits like Security Module and RTC. 347 The TOE contains mechanisms for the integrity protection for its firmware. 348 The TOE supports the following communication protocols: 349 • OBIS according to [IEC-62056-6-1] and [EN 13757-1], 350 • DLMS/COSEM according to [IEC-62056-6-2], 351 • SML according to [IEC-62056-5-3-8], 352 • unidirectional and bidirectional wireless M-Bus according to [EN 13757-3], 353 [EN 13757-4], and [IEC-62056-21]. 354 355 12 Please note that the Security Module is physically integrated into the Gateway even though it is not part of the TOE. page 19 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland The TOE provides the following physical interfaces for communication 356 • Wireless M-Bus (LMN) according to [EN 13757-3], 357 • RS-485 (LMN) according to [EIA RS-485], 358 • Ethernet (HAN) according to [IEEE 802.3], and 359 • USB (WAN) according to [USB]. 360 The physical interface for the WAN communication is described in chapter 1.4.3. The 361 communication is protected according to [TR-03109]. 362 The communication into the HAN is also provided by the Ethernet interface. The proto- 363 cols HTTPS and TLS proxy are therefore supported. 364 365 Figure 4: The TOE’s protocol stack 366 The TOE provides the following functionality: 367 • Protected handling of Meter Data compliant to [PP_GW, chapter 1.4.6.1 and 368 1.4.6.2] 369 • Integrity and authenticity protection e. g. of Meter Data compliant to [PP_GW, 370 chapter 1.6.4.3] 371 • Protection of LAN devices against access from the WAN compliant to [PP_GW, 372 chapter 1.4.6.4] 373 • Wake-Up Service compliant to [PP_GW, chapter 1.4.6.5] 374 • Privacy protection compliant to [PP_GW, chapter 1.4.6.6] 375 • Management of Security Functions compliant to [PP_GW, chapter 1.4.6.7] 376 page 20 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland • Cryptography of the TOE and its Security Module compliant to [PP_GW, chap- 377 ter 1.4.8] 378 1.4.5 TOE logical boundary 379 The logical boundary of the Gateway can be defined by its security features: 380 • Handling of Meter Data, collection and processing of Meter Data, submission 381 to authorised external entities (e.g. one of the service providers involved) where 382 necessary protected by a digital signature 383 • Protection of authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of data temporarily or per- 384 sistently stored in the Gateway, transferred locally within the LAN and trans- 385 ferred in the WAN (between Gateway and authorised external entities) 386 • Firewalling of information flows to the WAN and information flow control among 387 Meters, Controllable Local Systems and the WAN 388 • A Wake-Up-Service that allows to contact the TOE from the WAN side 389 • Privacy preservation 390 • Management of Security Functionality 391 • Identification and Authentication of TOE users 392 The following sections introduce the security functionality of the TOE in more detail. 393 1.4.5.1 Handling of Meter Data13 394 The Gateway is responsible for handling Meter Data. It receives the Meter Data from the 395 Meter(s), processes it, stores it and submits it to external entities. 396 The TOE utilises Processing Profiles to determine which data shall be sent to which 397 component or external entity. A Processing Profile defines: 398 • how Meter Data must be processed, 399 • which processed Meter Data must be sent in which intervals, 400 • to which component or external entity, 401 • signed using which key material, 402 • encrypted using which key material, 403 • whether processed Meter Data shall be pseudonymised or not, and 404 • which pseudonym shall be used to send the data. 405 13 Please refer to chapter 3.2 for an exact definition of the various data types. page 21 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland The Processing Profiles are not only the basis for the security features of the TOE; they 406 also contain functional aspects as they indicate to the Gateway how the Meter Data shall 407 be processed. More details on the Processing Profiles can be found in [TR-03109-1]. 408 The Gateway restricts access to (processed) Meter Data in the following ways: 409 • consumers must be identified and authenticated first before access to any data 410 may be granted, 411 • the Gateway accepts Meter Data from authorised Meters only, 412 • the Gateway sends processed Meter Data to correspondingly authorised exter- 413 nal entities only. 414 The Gateway accepts data (e.g. configuration data, firmware updates) from correspond- 415 ingly authorised Gateway Administrators or correspondingly authorised external entities 416 only. This restriction is a prerequisite for a secure operation and therewith for a secure 417 handling of Meter Data. Further, the Gateway maintains a calibration log with all relevant 418 events that could affect the calibration of the Gateway. 419 These functionalities: 420 • prevent that the Gateway accepts data from or sends data to unauthorised en- 421 tities, 422 • ensure that only the minimum amount of data leaves the scope of control of the 423 consumer, 424 • preserve the integrity of billing processes and as such serve in the interests of 425 the consumer as well as in the interests of the supplier. Both parties are inter- 426 ested in an billing process that ensures that the value of the consumed amount 427 of a certain commodity (and only the used amount) is transmitted, 428 • preserve the integrity of the system components and their configurations. 429 The TOE offers a local interface to the consumer (see also IF_GW_CON in Figure 2) 430 and allows the consumer to obtain information via this interface. This information com- 431 prises the billing-relevant data (to allow the consumer to verify an invoice) and infor- 432 mation about which Meter Data has been and will be sent to which external entity. The 433 TOE ensures that the communication to the consumer is protected by using TLS and 434 ensures that consumers only get access to their own data. Therefore, the TOE contains 435 a web server that delivers the content to the web browser after successful authentication 436 of the user. 437 page 22 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 1.4.5.2 Confidentiality protection 438 The TOE protects data from unauthorised disclosure 439 • while received from a Meter via the LMN, 440 • while received from the administrator via the WAN, 441 • while temporarily stored in the volatile memory of the Gateway, 442 • while transmitted to the corresponding external entity via the WAN or HAN. 443 Furthermore, all data, which no longer have to be stored in the Gateway, are securely 444 erased to prevent any form of access to residual data via external interfaces of the TOE. 445 These functionalities protect the privacy of the consumer and prevent that an unauthor- 446 ised party is able to disclose any of the data transferred in and from the Smart Metering 447 System (e.g. Meter Data, configuration settings). 448 The TOE utilises the services of its Security Module for aspects of this functionality. 449 1.4.5.3 Integrity and Authenticity protection 450 The Gateway provides the following authenticity and integrity protection: 451 • Verification of authenticity and integrity when receiving Meter Data from a Meter 452 via the LMN, to verify that the Meter Data have been sent from an authentic 453 Meter and have not been altered during transmission. The TOE utilises the ser- 454 vices of its Security Module for aspects of this functionality. 455 • Application of authenticity and integrity protection measures when sending pro- 456 cessed Meter Data to an external entity, to enable the external entity to verify 457 that the processed Meter Data have been sent from an authentic Gateway and 458 have not been changed during transmission. The TOE utilises the services of 459 its Security Module for aspects of this functionality. 460 • Verification of authenticity and integrity when receiving data from an external 461 entity (e.g. configuration settings or firmware updates) to verify that the data 462 have been sent from an authentic and authorised external entity and have not 463 been changed during transmission. The TOE utilises the services of its Security 464 Module for aspects of this functionality. 465 These functionalities 466 • prevent within the Smart Metering System that data may be sent by a non- 467 authentic component without the possibility that the data recipient can detect 468 this, 469 page 23 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland • facilitate the integrity of billing processes and serve for the interests of the con- 470 sumer as well as for the interest of the supplier. Both parties are interested in 471 the transmission of correct processed Meter Data to be used for billing, 472 • protect the Smart Metering System and a corresponding large scale Smart Grid 473 infrastructure by preventing that data (e.g. Meter Data, configuration settings, 474 or firmware updates) from forged components (with the aim to cause damage 475 to the Smart Grid) will be accepted in the system. 476 1.4.5.4 Information flow control and firewall 477 The Gateway separates devices in the LAN of the consumer from the WAN and enforces 478 the following information flow control to control the communication between the networks 479 that the Gateway is attached to: 480 • only the Gateway may establish a connection to an external entity in the WAN14; 481 specifically connection establishment by an external entity in the WAN or a Me- 482 ter in the LMN to the WAN is not possible, 483 • the Gateway can establish connections to devices in the LMN or in the HAN, 484 • Meters in the LMN are only allowed to establish a connection to the Gateway, 485 • the Gateway shall offer a wake-up service that allows external entities in the 486 WAN to trigger a connection establishment by the Gateway, 487 • connections are allowed to pre-configured addresses only, 488 • only cryptographically-protected (i.e. encrypted, integrity protected and mutu- 489 ally authenticated) connections are possible.15 490 These functionalities 491 • prevent that the Gateway itself or the components behind the Gateway (i.e. 492 Meters or Controllable Local Systems) can be conquered by a WAN attacker 493 (as defined in section 3.4), that processed data are transmitted to the wrong 494 external entity, and that processed data are transmitted without being confi- 495 dentiality/authenticity/integrity-protected, 496 • protect the Smart Metering System and a corresponding large scale infrastruc- 497 ture in two ways: by preventing that conquered components will send forged 498 14 Please note that this does not affect the functionality for a CLS to establish a secure channel to a party in the WAN. Technically however, this channel is established by the TOE who acts as a proxy between the CLS and the WAN. 15 To establish an encrypted channel the TOE may use the required protocols such as DHCP or PPP. Beside the establishment of an encrypted channel no unprotected communication between the TOE and external entities located in the WAN or LAN is allowed. page 24 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Meter Data (with the aim to cause damage to the Smart Grid), and by preventing 499 that widely distributed Smart Metering Systems can be abused as a platform 500 for malicious software/firmware to attack other systems in the WAN (e.g. a WAN 501 attacker who would be able to install a botnet on components of the Smart Me- 502 tering System). 503 The communication flows that are enforced by the Gateway between parties in the HAN, 504 LMN and WAN are summarized in the following table16: 505 Table 2: Communication flows between devices in different networks 506 For communications within the different networks the following assumptions are defined: 507 1. Communications within the WAN are not restricted. However, the Gateway is 508 not involved in this communication, 509 2. No communications between devices in the LMN are assumed. Devices in the 510 LMN may only communicate to the Gateway and shall not be connected to any 511 other network, 512 3. Devices in the HAN may communicate with each other. However, the Gateway 513 is not involved in this communication. If devices in the HAN have a separate 514 16 Please note that this table only addresses the communication flow between devices in the various networks attached to the Gateway. It does not aim to provide an overview over the services that the Gateway itself offers to those devices nor an overview over the communication between devices in the same network. This information can be found in the paragraphs following the table. 17 The channel to the external entity in the WAN is established by the Gateway. Source(1st column) Destination (1st row) WAN LMN HAN WAN - (see following list) No connection establishment allowed No connection establishment allowed LMN No connection establishment allowed - (see following list) No connection establishment allowed HAN Connection establishment is allowed to trustworthy, pre-configured endpoints and via an encrypted channel only17 No connection establishment allowed - (see following list) page 25 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland connection to parties in the WAN (beside the Gateway) this connection is as- 515 sumed to be appropriately protected. It should be noted that for the case that a 516 TOE connects to more than one HAN communications between devices within 517 different HAN via the TOE are only allowed if explicitly configured by a Gateway 518 Administrator. 519 Finally, the Gateway itself offers the following services within the various networks: 520 • the Gateway accepts the submission of Meter Data from the LMN, 521 • the Gateway offers a wake-up service at the WAN side as described in chapter 522 1.4.6.5 of [PP_GW], 523 • the Gateway offers a user interface to the HAN that allows CLS or consumers 524 to connect to the Gateway in order to read relevant information. 525 1.4.5.5 Wake-Up-Service 526 In order to protect the Gateway and the devices in the LAN against threats from the WAN 527 side the Gateway implements a strict firewall policy and enforces that connections with 528 external entities in the WAN shall only be established by the Gateway itself (e.g. when 529 the Gateway delivers Meter Data or contacts the Gateway Administrator to check for 530 updates)18. 531 While this policy is the optimal policy from a security perspective, the Gateway 532 Administrator may want to facilitate applications in which an instant communication to 533 the Gateway is required. 534 In order to allow this kind of re-activeness of the Gateway, this ST allows the Gateway 535 to keep existing connections to external entities open (please refer to [TR-03109-3] for 536 more details) and to offer a so called wake-up service. 537 The Gateway is able to receive a wake-up message that is signed by the Gateway 538 Administrator. The following steps are taken: 539 1. The Gateway verifies the wake-up packet. This comprises 540 i. a check if the header identification is correct, 541 ii. the recipient is the Gateway, 542 iii. the wake-up packet has been sent/received within an acceptable period 543 of time in order to prevent replayed messages, 544 18 Please note that this does not affect the functionality for a CLS to establish a secure channel to a party in the WAN. Technically however, this channel is established by the TOE who acts as a proxy between the CLS and the WAN. page 26 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland iv. the wake-up message has not been received before, 545 2. If the wake-up message could not be verified as described in step #1, the 546 message will be dropped/ignored. No further operations will be initiated and no 547 feedback is provided. 548 3. If the message could be verified as described in step #1, the signature of the 549 wake-up message will be verified. The Gateway uses the services of its Security 550 Module for signature verification. 551 4. If the signature of the wake-up message cannot be verified as described in step 552 #3 the message will be dropped/ignored. No feedback is given to the sending 553 external entity and the wake-up sequence terminates. 554 5. If the signature of the wake-up message could be verified successfully , the 555 Gateway initiates a connection to a pre-configured external entity; however no 556 feedback is given to the sending external entity. 557 More details on the exact implementation of this mechanism can be found in [TR-03109- 558 1, „Wake-Up Service“]. 559 1.4.5.6 Privacy Preservation 560 The preservation of the privacy of the consumer is an essential aspect that is imple- 561 mented by the functionality of the TOE as required by this ST. 562 This contains two aspects: 563 The Processing Profiles that the TOE obeys facilitate an approach in which only a mini- 564 mum amount of data have to be submitted to external entities and therewith leave the 565 scope of control of the consumer. The mechanisms “encryption” and “pseudonymisation” 566 ensure that the data can only be read by the intended recipient and only contains an 567 association with the identity of the Meter if this is necessary. 568 On the other hand, the TOE provides the consumer with transparent information about 569 the information flows that happen with their data. In order to achieve this, the TOE im- 570 plements a consumer log that specifically contains the information about the information 571 flows which has been and will be authorised based on the previous and current Pro- 572 cessing Profiles. The access to this consumer log is only possible via a local interface 573 from the HAN and after authentication of the consumer. The TOE does only allow a 574 consumer access to the data in the consumer log that is related to their own consumption 575 or production. The following paragraphs provide more details on the information that is 576 included in this log: 577 page 27 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Monitoring of Data Transfers 578 The TOE keeps track of each data transmission in the consumer log and allows the 579 consumer to see details on which information have been and will be sent (based on the 580 previous and current settings) to which external entity. 581 Configuration Reporting 582 The TOE provides detailed and complete reporting in the consumer log of each security 583 and privacy-relevant configuration setting. Additional to device specific configuration set- 584 tings, the consumer log contains the parameters of each Processing Profile. The con- 585 sumer log contains the configured addresses for internal and external entities including 586 the CLS. 587 Audit Log and Monitoring 588 The TOE provides all audit data from the consumer log at the user interface 589 IF_GW_CON. Access to the consumer log is only possible after successful authentica- 590 tion and only to information that the consumer has permission to (i.e. that has been 591 recorded based on events belonging to the consumer). 592 1.4.5.7 Management of Security Functions 593 The Gateway provides authorised Gateway Administrators with functionality to manage 594 the behaviour of the security functions and to update the TOE. 595 Further, it is defined that only authorised Gateway Administrators may be able to use 596 the management functionality of the Gateway (while the Security Module is used for the 597 authentication of the Gateway Administrator) and that the management of the Gateway 598 shall only be possible from the WAN side interface. 599 System Status 600 The TOE provides information on the current status of the TOE in the system log. Spe- 601 cifically it shall indicate whether the TOE operates normally or any errors have been 602 detected that are of relevance for the administrator. 603 1.4.5.8 Identification and Authentication 604 To protect the TSF as well as User Data and TSF data from unauthorized modification 605 the TOE provides a mechanism that requires each user to be successfully identified and 606 authenticated before allowing any other actions on behalf of that user. This functionality 607 includes the identification and authentication of users who receive data from the 608 page 28 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Gateway as well as the identification and authentication of CLS located in HAN and 609 Meters located in LMN. 610 The Gateway provides different kinds of identification and authentication mechanisms 611 that depend on the user role and the used interfaces. Most of the mechanisms require 612 the usage of certificates. Only consumers are able to decide whether they use certifi- 613 cates or username and password for identification and authentication. 614 1.4.6 The logical interfaces of the TOE 615 The TOE offers its functionality as outlined before via a set of external interfaces. Figure 616 2 also indicates the cardinality of the interfaces. The following table provides an overview 617 of the mandatory external interfaces of the TOE and provides additional information: 618 19 Please note that this interface allows consumer (or consumer’s CLS) to connect to the gateway in order to read consumer specific information. 20 Please note that an implementation of this external interface is also required in the case that Meter and Gateway are implemented within one physical device in order to allow the extension of the system by another Meter. Interface Name Description IF_GW_CON Via this interface the Gateway provides the consumer19 with the possibility to review information that is relevant for billing or the privacy of the consumer. Specifically the access to the consumer log is only allowed via this interface. IF_GW_MTR Interface between the Meter and the Gateway. The Gateway receives Meter Data via this interface.20 IF_GW_SM The Gateway invokes the services of its Security Module via this interface. IF_GW_CLS CLS may use the communication services of the Gateway via this interface. The implementation of at least one interface for CLS is mandatory. IF_GW_WAN The Gateway submits information to authorised external entities via this interface. IF_GW_SRV Local interface via which the service technician has the possibility to review information that are relevant to maintain the Gateway. Specifically he has page 29 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 3: Mandatory TOE external interfaces 619 1.4.7 The cryptography of the TOE and its Security Module 620 Parts of the cryptographic functionality used in the upper mentioned functions is provided 621 by a Security Module. The Security Module provides strong cryptographic functionality, 622 random number generation, secure storage of secrets and supports the authentication 623 of the Gateway Administrator. The Security Module is a different IT product and not part 624 of the TOE as described in this ST. Nevertheless, it is physically embedded into the 625 Gateway and protected by the same level of physical protection. The requirements 626 applicable to the Security Module are specified in a separate PP (see [SecModPP]). 627 The following table provides a more detailed overview on how the cryptographic 628 functions are distributed between the TOE and its Security Module. 629 read access to the system log only via this interface. He has also the possibility to view non-TSF data via this interface. Aspect TOE Security Module Communicatio n with external entities • encryption • decryption • hashing • key derivation • MAC generation • MAC verification • secure storage of the TLS certificates Key negotiation: • support of the authentication of the external entity • secure storage of the private key • random number generation • digital signature verification and generation Communicatio nwith the consumer • encryption • decryption • hashing • key derivation • MAC generation • MAC verification • secure storage of the TLS certificates Key negotiation: • support of the authentication of the consumer • secure storage of the private key • digital signature verification and generation • random number generation page 30 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 4: Cryptographic support of the TOE and its Security Module 630 631 1.4.7.1 Content data encryption vs. an encrypted channel 632 The TOE utilises concepts of the encryption of data on the content level as well as the 633 establishment of a trusted channel to external entities. 634 As a general rule, all processed Meter Data that is prepared to be submitted to ex- 635 ternal entities is encrypted and integrity protected on a content level using CMS (ac- 636 cording to [TR-03109-1-I]). 637 Further, all communication with external entities is enforced to happen via encrypted, 638 integrity protected and mutually authenticated channels. 639 This concept of encryption on two layers facilitates use cases in which the external 640 party that the TOE communicates with is not the final recipient of the Meter Data. In 641 Communicatio n with the Meter • encryption • decryption • hashing • key derivation • MAC generation • MAC verification • secure storage of the TLS certificates Key negotiation (in case of TLS connection): • support of the authentication of the meter • secure storage of the private key • digital signature verification and generation • random number generation Signing data before submission to an external entity • hashing Signature creation • secure storage of the private key Content data encryption and integrity protection • encryption • decryption • MAC generation • key derivation • secure storage of the public Key Key negotiation: • secure storage of the private key • random number generation page 31 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland this way, it is for example possible that the Gateway Administrator receives Meter 642 Data that they forward to other parties. In such a case, the Gateway Administrator is 643 the endpoint of the trusted channel but cannot read the Meter Data. 644 Administration data that is transmitted between the Gateway Administrator and the TOE 645 is also encrypted and integrity protected using CMS. 646 The following figure introduces the communication process between the Meter, the TOE 647 and external entities (focussing on billing-relevant Meter Data). 648 The basic information flow for Meter Data is as follows and shown in Figure 5: 649 1. The Meter measures the consumption or production of a certain commodity. 650 2. The Meter Data is prepared for transmission: 651 a. The Meter Data is typically signed (typically using the services of an 652 integrated Security Module). 653 b. If the communication between the Meter and the Gateway is performed 654 bidirectional, the Meter Data is transmitted via an encrypted and mutually 655 authenticated channel to the Gateway. Please note that the submission of 656 this information may be triggered by the Meter or the Gateway. 657 or 658 c. If a unidirectional communication is performed between the Meter and the 659 Gateway, the Meter Data is encrypted using a symmetric algorithm 660 (according to [TR-03109-3]) and facilitating a defined data structure to ensure 661 the authenticity and confidentiality. 662 3. The authenticity and integrity of the Meter Data is verified by the Gateway. 663 4. If (and only if) authenticity and integrity have been verified successfully, the 664 Meter Data is further processed by the Gateway according to the rules in the 665 Processing Profile else the cryptographic information flow will be cancelled. 666 5. The processed Meter Data is encrypted and integrity protected using CMS 667 (according to [TR-03109-1-I]) for the final recipient of the data21. 668 6. The processed Meter Data is signed using the services of the Security Module. 669 7. The processed and signed Meter Data may be stored for a certain amount of 670 time. 671 21 Optionally the Meter Data can additionally be signed before any encryption is done. page 32 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 8. The processed Meter Data is finally submitted to an authorised external entity 672 in the WAN via an encrypted and mutually authenticated channel. 673 674 Figure 5: Cryptographic information flow for distributed Meters and Gateway 675 676 page 33 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland TOE life-cycle 677 The life-cycle of the TOE can be separated into the following phases: 678 1. Development 679 2. Production 680 3. Pre-personalization at the developer's premises (without Security Module) 681 4. Pre-personalization and integration of Security Module 682 5. Installation and start of operation 683 6. Personalization 684 7. Normal operation 685 A detailed description of the phases #1 to #4 and #6 to #7 is provided in [TR-03109-1- 686 VI], while phase #5 is described in the TOE manuals. 687 The TOE will be delivered after phase “Pre-personalization and integration of Security 688 Module”. The phase “Personalization” will be performed when the TOE is started for the 689 first time after phase “Installation and start of operation”. The TOE delivery process is 690 specified in [AGD_SEC]. 691 page 34 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 2 Conformance Claims 692 2.1CC Conformance Claim 693 • This ST has been developed using Version 3.1 Revision 5 of Common Criteria 694 [CC]. 695 • This ST is [CC] part 2 extended due to the use of FPR_CON.1. 696 • This ST claims conformance to [CC] part 3; no extended assurance compo- 697 nents have been defined. 698 699 2.2PP Claim / Conformance Statement 700 This Security Target claims strict conformance to Protection Profile [PP_GW]. 701 702 2.3Package Claim 703 This Security Target claims an assurance package EAL4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 704 and ALC_FLR.2 as defined in [CC] Part 3 for product certification. 705 706 2.4Conformance Claim Rationale 707 This Security Target claims strict conformance to only one PP [PP_GW]. 708 This Security Target is consistent to the TOE type according to [PP_GW] because the 709 TOE is a communication Gateway that provides different external communication inter- 710 faces and enables the data communication between these interfaces and connected IT 711 systems. It further collects processes, and stores Meter Data. 712 This Security Target is consistent to the security problem defined in [PP_GW]. 713 This Security Target is consistent to the security objectives stated in [PP_GW], no secu- 714 rity objective of the PP is removed, nor added to this Security Target. 715 This Security Target is consistent to the security requirements stated in [PP_GW], no 716 security requirement of the PP is removed, nor added to this Security Target. 717 718 page 35 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 3 Security Problem Definition 719 3.1External entities 720 The following external entities interact with the system consisting of Meter and Gateway. 721 Those roles have been defined for the use in this Security Target. It is possible that a 722 party implements more than one role in practice. 723 Role Description Consumer The authorised individual or organization that “owns” the Meter Data. In most cases, this will be tenants or house owners con- suming electricity, water, gas or further commodities. However, it is also possible that the consumer produces or stores energy (e.g. with their own solar plant). Gateway Admin- istrator Authority that installs, configures, monitors, and controls the Smart Meter Gateway. Service Techni- cian The authorised individual that is responsible for diagnostic pur- poses. Authorised Exter- nal Entity / User Human or IT entity possibly interacting with the TOE from outside of the TOE boundary. In the context of this ST, the term user or external entity serve as a hypernym for all entities mentioned be- fore. Table 5: Roles used in the Security Target 724 725 3.2Assets 726 The following tables introduces the relevant assets for this Security Target. The tables 727 focus on the assets that are relevant for the Gateway and does not claim to provide an 728 overview over all assets in the Smart Metering System or for other devices in the LMN. 729 The following Table 6 lists all assets typified as “user data”: 730 731 page 36 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Asset Description Need for Protection Meter Data Meter readings that allow calculation of the quantity of a commodity, e.g. electricity, gas, water or heat consumed over a period. Meter Data comprise Consumption or Production Data (billing-relevant) and grid status data (not billing-relevant). While billing-relevant data needs to have a relation to the Consumer, grid status data do not have to be directly related to a Consumer. • According to their specific need (see below) System log data Log data from the • system log. • Integrity • Confidentiality (only authorised SMGW administrators and Service technicians may read the log data) Consumer log data Log data from the • consumer log. • Integrity • Confidentiality (only authorised Consumers may read the log data) Calibration log data Log data from the • calibration log. • Integrity • Confidentiality (only authorised SMGW ad- ministrators may read the log data) Consumption Data Billing-relevant part of Meter Data. Please note that the term Consumption Data implicitly includes Production Data. • Integrity and authenticity (comparable to the classical meter and its security requirements) • Confidentiality (due to privacy concerns) page 37 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 6: Assets (User data) 732 Table 7 lists all assets typified as “TSF data”: 733 22 Please note that these readings and data of the Meter which are not relevant for billing may require an explicit endorsement of the consumer(s). Status Data Grid status data, subset of Meter Data that is not billing-relevant22. • Integrity and authenticity (comparable to the classical meter and its security requirements) • Confidentiality (due to privacy concerns) Supplementar y Data The Gateway may be used for communication purposes by devices in the LMN or HAN. It may be that the functionality of the Gateway that is used by such a device is limited to pure (but secure) communication services. Data that is transmitted via the Gateway but that does not belong to one of the aforementioned data types is named Supplementary Data. • According to their specific need Data The term Data is used as hypernym for Meter Data and Supplementary Data. • According to their specific need Gateway time Date and time of the real-time clock of the Gateway. Gateway Time is used in Meter Data records sent to external entities. • Integrity • Authenticity (when time is adjusted to an external reference time) Personally Identifiable Information (PII) Personally Identifiable Information refers to information that can be used to uniquely identify, contact, or locate a single person or can be used with other sources to uniquely identify a single individual. • Confidentiality page 38 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 7: Assets (TSF data) 734 735 Asset Description Need for Protection Meter config (secondary asset) Configuration data of the Meter to control its behaviour including the Meter identity. Configuration data is transmitted to the Meter via the Gateway. • Integrity and authenticity • Confidentiality Gateway config (secondary asset) Configuration data of the Gateway to control its behaviour including the Gateway identity, the Processing Profiles and certificate/key material for authentication. • Integrity and authenticity • Confidentiality CLS config (secondary asset) Configuration data of a CLS to control its behaviour. Configuration data is transmitted to the CLS via the Gateway. • Integrity and authenticity • Confidentiality Firmware update (secondary asset) Firmware update that is downloaded by the TOE to update the firmware of the TOE. • Integrity and authenticity Ephemeral keys (secondary asset) Ephemeral cryptographic material used by the TOE for cryptographic operations. • Integrity and authenticity • Confidentiality page 39 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 3.3Assumptions 736 In this threat model the following assumptions about the environment of the components 737 need to be taken into account in order to ensure a secure operation. 738 A.ExternalPrivacy It is assumed that authorised and authenticated external 739 entities receiving any kind of privacy-relevant data or bill- 740 ing-relevant data and the applications that they operate are 741 trustworthy (in the context of the data that they receive) and 742 do not perform unauthorised analyses of this data with re- 743 spect to the corresponding Consumer(s). 744 A.TrustedAdmins It is assumed that the Gateway Administrator and the Ser- 745 vice Technician are trustworthy and well-trained. 746 A.PhysicalProtection It is assumed that the TOE is installed in a non-public en- 747 vironment within the premises of the Consumer which pro- 748 vides a basic level of physical protection. This protection 749 covers the TOE, the Meter(s) that the TOE communicates 750 with and the communication channel between the TOE and 751 its Security Module. 752 A.ProcessProfile The Processing Profiles that are used when handling data 753 are assumed to be trustworthy and correct. 754 A.Update It is assumed that firmware updates for the Gateway that 755 can be provided by an authorised external entity have un- 756 dergone a certification process according to this Security 757 Target before they are issued and can therefore be as- 758 sumed to be correctly implemented. It is further assumed 759 that the external entity that is authorised to provide the up- 760 date is trustworthy and will not introduce any malware into 761 a firmware update. 762 A.Network It is assumed that 763 • a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliabil- 764 ity and bandwidth for the individual situation is 765 available, 766 • one or more trustworthy sources for an update of 767 the system time are available in the WAN, 768 page 40 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland • the Gateway is the only communication gateway for 769 Meters in the LMN23, 770 • if devices in the HAN have a separate connection 771 to parties in the WAN (beside the Gateway) this 772 connection is appropriately protected. 773 A.Keygen It is assumed that the ECC key pair for a Meter (TLS) is 774 generated securely according to [TR-03109-3] and brought 775 into the Gateway in a secure way by the Gateway Admin- 776 istrator. 777 Application Note 1: This ST acknowledges that the Gateway cannot be com- 778 pletely protected against unauthorised physical access by 779 its environment. However, it is important for the overall se- 780 curity of the TOE that it is not installed within a public envi- 781 ronment. 782 The level of physical protection that is expected to be pro- 783 vided by the environment is the same level of protection 784 that is expected for classical meters that operate according 785 to the regulations of the national calibration authority [TR- 786 03109-1]. 787 Application Note 2: The Processing Profiles that are used for information flow 788 control as referred to by A.ProcessProfile are an essential 789 factor for the preservation of the privacy of the Consumer. 790 The Processing Profiles are used to determine which data 791 shall be sent to which entity at which frequency and how 792 data are processed, e.g. whether the data needs to be re- 793 lated to the Consumer (because it is used for billing pur- 794 poses) or whether the data shall be pseudonymised. 795 The Processing Profiles shall be visible for the Consumer 796 to allow a transparent communication. 797 23 Please note that this assumption holds on a logical level rather than on a physical one. It may be possible that the Meters in the LMN have a physical connection to other devices that would in theory also allow a communication. This is specifically true for wireless communication technologies. It is further possible that signals of Meters are amplified by other devices or other Meters on the physical level without violating this assumption. However, it is assumed that the Meters do only communicate with the TOE and that only the TOE is able to decrypt the data sent by the Meter. page 41 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland It is essential that Processing Profiles correctly define the 798 amount of information that must be sent to an external en- 799 tity. Exact regulations regarding the Processing Profiles 800 and the Gateway Administrator are beyond the scope of 801 this Security Target. 802 803 3.4Threats 804 The following sections identify the threats that are posed against the assets handled by 805 the Smart Meter System. Those threats are the result of a threat model that has been 806 developed for the whole Smart Metering System first and then has been focussed on 807 the threats against the Gateway. It should be noted that the threats in the following par- 808 agraphs consider two different kinds of attackers: 809 • Attackers having physical access to Meter, Gateway, a connection between 810 these components or local logical access to any of the interfaces (local at- 811 tacker), trying to disclose or alter assets while stored in the Gateway or while 812 transmitted between Meters in the LMN and the Gateway. Please note that the 813 following threat model assumes that the local attacker has less motivation than 814 the WAN attacker as a successful attack of a local attacker will always only 815 impact one Gateway. Please further note that the local attacker includes au- 816 thorised individuals like consumers. 817 • An attacker located in the WAN (WAN attacker) trying to compromise the con- 818 fidentiality and/or integrity of the processed Meter Data and or configuration 819 data transmitted via the WAN, or attacker trying to conquer a component of the 820 infrastructure (i.e. Meter, Gateway or Controllable Local System) via the WAN 821 to cause damage to a component itself or to the corresponding grid (e.g. by 822 sending forged Meter Data to an external entity). 823 The specific rationale for this situation is given by the expected benefit of a successful 824 attack. An attacker who has to have physical access to the TOE that they are attacking, 825 will only be able to compromise one TOE at a time. So the effect of a successful attack 826 will always be limited to the attacked TOE. A logical attack from the WAN side on the 827 other hand may have the potential to compromise a large amount of TOEs. 828 829 page 42 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland T.DataModificationLocal A local attacker may try to modify (i.e. alter, delete, insert, 830 replay or redirect) Meter Data when transmitted between 831 Meter and Gateway, Gateway and Consumer, or Gateway 832 and external entities. The objective of the attacker may be 833 to alter billing-relevant information or grid status infor- 834 mation. The attacker may perform the attack via any inter- 835 face (LMN, HAN, or WAN). 836 In order to achieve the modification, the attacker may also 837 try to modify secondary assets like the firmware or config- 838 uration parameters of the Gateway. 839 T.DataModificationWAN A WAN attacker may try to modify (i.e. alter, delete, insert, 840 replay or redirect) Meter Data, Gateway config data, Meter 841 config data, CLS config data or a firmware update when 842 transmitted between the Gateway and an external entity in 843 the WAN. 844 When trying to modify Meter Data, it is the objective of the 845 WAN attacker to modify billing-relevant information or grid 846 status data. 847 When trying to modify config data or a firmware update, the 848 WAN attacker tries to circumvent security mechanisms of 849 the TOE or tries to get control over the TOE or a device in 850 the LAN that is protected by the TOE. 851 T.TimeModification A local attacker or WAN attacker may try to alter the Gate- 852 way time. The motivation of the attacker could be e.g. to 853 change the relation between date/time and measured con- 854 sumption or production values in the Meter Data records 855 (e.g. to influence the balance of the next invoice). 856 T.DisclosureWAN A WAN attacker may try to violate the privacy of the Con- 857 sumer by disclosing Meter Data or configuration data (Me- 858 ter config, Gateway config or CLS config) or parts of it 859 when transmitted between Gateway and external entities 860 in the WAN. 861 page 43 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland T.DisclosureLocal A local attacker may try to violate the privacy of the Con- 862 sumer by disclosing Meter Data transmitted between the 863 TOE and the Meter. This threat is of specific importance if 864 Meters of more than one Consumer are served by one 865 Gateway. 866 T.Infrastructure A WAN attacker may try to obtain control over Gateways, 867 Meters or CLS via the TOE, which enables the WAN at- 868 tacker to cause damage to Consumers or external entities 869 or the grids used for commodity distribution (e.g. by send- 870 ing wrong data to an external entity). 871 A WAN attacker may also try to conquer a CLS in the HAN 872 first in order to logically attack the TOE from the HAN side. 873 T.ResidualData By physical and/or logical means a local attacker or a WAN 874 attacker may try to read out data from the Gateway, which 875 travelled through the Gateway before and which are no 876 longer needed by the Gateway (i.e. Meter Data, Meter con- 877 fig, or CLS config). 878 T.ResidentData A WAN or local attacker may try to access (i.e. read, alter, 879 delete) information to which they don't have permission to 880 while the information is stored in the TOE. 881 While the WAN attacker only uses the logical interface of 882 the TOE that is provided into the WAN, the local attacker 883 may also physically access the TOE. 884 T.Privacy A WAN attacker may try to obtain more detailed infor- 885 mation from the Gateway than actually required to fulfil the 886 tasks defined by its role or the contract with the Consumer. 887 This includes scenarios in which an external entity that is 888 primarily authorised to obtain information from the TOE 889 tries to obtain more information than the information that 890 has been authorised as well as scenarios in which an at- 891 tacker who is not authorised at all tries to obtain infor- 892 mation. 893 894 page 44 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 3.5Organizational Security Policies 895 This section lists the organizational security policies (OSP) that the Gateway shall com- 896 ply with: 897 OSP.SM The TOE shall use the services of a certified Security Mod- 898 ule for 899 • verification of digital signatures, 900 • generation of digital signatures, 901 • key agreement, 902 • key transport, 903 • key storage, 904 • Random Number Generation, 905 The Security Module shall be certified according to 906 [SecModPP] and shall be used in accordance with its rele- 907 vant guidance documentation. 908 OSP.Log The TOE shall maintain a set of log files as defined in [TR- 909 03109-1] as follows: 910 1. A system log of relevant events in order to allow an 911 authorised Gateway Administrator to analyse the 912 status of the TOE. The TOE shall also analyse the 913 system log automatically for a cumulation of secu- 914 rity relevant events. 915 2. A consumer log that contains information about the 916 information flows that have been initiated to the 917 WAN and information about the Processing Profiles 918 causing this information flow as well as the billing- 919 relevant information. 920 3. A calibration log (as defined in chapter 6.2.1) that 921 provides the Gateway Administrator with a possibil- 922 ity to review calibration relevant events. 923 The TOE shall further limit access to the information in the 924 different log files as follows: 925 1. Access to the information in the system log shall 926 only be allowed for an authorised Gateway 927 page 45 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Administrator via the IF_GW_WAN interface of the 928 TOE and an authorised Service Technician via the 929 IF_GW_SRV interface of the TOE. 930 2. Access to the information in the calibration log shall 931 only be allowed for an authorised Gateway Admin- 932 istrator via the IF_GW_WAN interface of the TOE. 933 3. Access to the information in the consumer log shall 934 only be allowed for an authorised Consumer via the 935 IF_GW_CON interface of the TOE. The Consumer 936 shall only have access to their own information. 937 The system log may overwrite the oldest events in case 938 that the audit trail gets full. 939 For the consumer log the TOE shall ensure that a sufficient 940 amount of events is available (in order to allow a Consumer 941 to verify an invoice) but may overwrite older events in case 942 that the audit trail gets full. 943 For the calibration log, however, the TOE shall ensure the 944 availability of all events over the lifetime of the TOE. 945 page 46 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 4 Security Objectives 946 4.1Security Objectives for the TOE 947 O.Firewall The TOE shall serve as the connection point for the con- 948 nected devices within the LAN to external entities within 949 the WAN and shall provide firewall functionality in order to 950 protect the devices of the LMN and HAN (as long as they 951 use the Gateway) and itself against threats from the WAN 952 side. 953 The firewall: 954 • shall allow only connections established from HAN 955 or the TOE itself to the WAN (i.e. from devices in 956 the HAN to external entities in the WAN or from the 957 TOE itself to external entities in the WAN), 958 • shall provide a wake-up service on the WAN side 959 interface, 960 • shall not allow connections from the LMN to the 961 WAN, 962 • shall not allow any other services being offered on 963 the WAN side interface, 964 • shall not allow connections from the WAN to the 965 LAN or to the TOE itself, 966 • shall enforce communication flows by allowing traf- 967 fic from CLS in the HAN to the WAN only if confi- 968 dentiality-protected and integrity-protected and if 969 endpoints are authenticated. 970 O.SeparateIF The TOE shall have physically separated ports for the 971 LMN, the HAN and the WAN and shall automatically detect 972 during its self test whether connections (wired or wireless), 973 if any, are wrongly connected. 974 Application Note 3: O.SeparateIF refers to physical inter- 975 faces and must not be fulfilled by a pure logical separation 976 of one physical interface only. 977 page 47 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland O.Conceal To protect the privacy of its Consumers, the TOE shall con- 978 ceal the communication with external entities in the WAN 979 in order to ensure that no privacy-relevant information may 980 be obtained by analysing the frequency, load, size or the 981 absence of external communication.24 982 O.Meter The TOE receives or polls information about the consump- 983 tion or production of different commodities from one or mul- 984 tiple Meters and is responsible for handling this Meter 985 Data. 986 This includes that: 987 • The TOE shall ensure that the communication to 988 the Meter(s) is established in an Gateway Adminis- 989 trator-definable interval or an interval as defined by 990 the Meter, 991 • the TOE shall enforce encryption and integrity pro- 992 tection for the communication with the Meter25, 993 • the TOE shall verify the integrity and authenticity of 994 the data received from a Meter before handling it 995 further, 996 • the TOE shall process the data according to the 997 definition in the corresponding Processing Profile, 998 • the TOE shall encrypt the processed Meter Data for 999 the final recipient, sign the data and 1000 • deliver the encrypted data to authorised external 1001 entities as defined in the corresponding Processing 1002 Profiles facilitating an encrypted channel, 1003 • the TOE shall store processed Meter Data if an ex- 1004 ternal entity cannot be reached and re-try to send 1005 24 It should be noted that this requirement only applies to communication flows in the WAN. 25 It is acknowledged that the implementation of a secure channel between the Meter and the Gateway is a security function of both units. The TOE as defined in this Security Target only has a limited possibility to secure this communication as both sides have to sign responsible for the quality of a cryptographic connection. However, it should be noted that the encryption of this channel only needs to protect against the Local Attacker possessing a basic attack potential and that the Meter utilises the services of its Security Module to negotiate the channel. page 48 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland the data until a configurable number of unsuccess- 1006 ful retries has been reached, 1007 • the TOE shall pseudonymize the data for parties 1008 that do not need the relation between the pro- 1009 cessed Meter Data and the identity of the Con- 1010 sumer. 1011 O.Crypt The TOE shall provide cryptographic functionality as fol- 1012 lows: 1013 • authentication, integrity protection and encryption 1014 of the communication and data to external entities 1015 in the WAN, 1016 • authentication, integrity protection and encryption 1017 of the communication to the Meter, 1018 • authentication, integrity protection and encryption 1019 of the communication to the Consumer, 1020 • replay detection for all communications with exter- 1021 nal entities, 1022 • encryption of the persistently stored TSF and user 1023 data of the TOE26. 1024 In addition, the TOE shall generate the required keys uti- 1025 lising the services of its Security Module27, ensure that the 1026 keys are only used for an acceptable amount of time and 1027 destroy ephemeral28 keys if no longer needed.29 1028 O.Time The TOE shall provide reliable time stamps and update 1029 its internal clock in regular intervals by retrieving reliable 1030 time information from a dedicated reliable source in the 1031 WAN. 1032 26 The encryption of the persistent memory shall support the protection of the TOE against local attacks. 27 Please refer to chapter 1.4.7 for an overview on how the cryptographic functions are distributed between the TOE and its Security Module. 28 This objective addresses the destruction of ephemeral keys only because all keys that need to be stored persistently are stored in the Security Module. 29 Please refer to chapter F.9 of part 2 of [CC] for more detailed information about what kind of information this objective applies to. page 49 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland O.Protect The TOE shall implement functionality to protect its secu- 1033 rity functions against malfunctions and tampering. 1034 Specifically, the TOE shall 1035 • encrypt its TSF and user data as long as it is not in 1036 use, 1037 • overwrite any information that is no longer needed 1038 to ensure that it is no longer available via the exter- 1039 nal interfaces of the TOE30, 1040 • monitor user data and the TOE firmware for integ- 1041 rity errors, 1042 • contain a test that detects whether the interfaces 1043 for WAN and LAN are separate, 1044 • have a fail-safe design that specifically ensures that 1045 no malfunction can impact the delivery of a com- 1046 modity (e.g. energy, gas, heat or water)31, 1047 • make any physical manipulation within the scope of 1048 the intended environment detectable for the Con- 1049 sumer and Gateway Administrator. 1050 O.Management The TOE shall only provide authorised Gateway Adminis- 1051 trators with functions for the management of the security 1052 features. 1053 The TOE shall ensure that any change in the behaviour of 1054 the security functions can only be achieved from the WAN 1055 side interface. Any management activity from a local inter- 1056 face may only be read only. 1057 Further, the TOE shall implement a secure mechanism to 1058 update the firmware of the TOE that ensures that only au- 1059 thorised entities are able to provide updates for the TOE 1060 30 Please refer to chapter F.9 of part 2 of [CC] for more detailed information about what kind of information this objective applies to. 31 Indeed this Security Target acknowledges that the Gateway and the Meters have no possibility at all to impact the deliv- ery of a commodity. Even an intentional stop of the delivery of a certain commodity is not within the scope of this Security Target. It should however be noted that such a functionality may be realised by a CLS that utilises the services of the TOE for its communication. page 50 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland and that only authentic and integrity protected updates are 1061 applied. 1062 O.Log The TOE shall maintain a set of log files as defined in [TR- 1063 03109-1] as follows: 1064 1. A system log of relevant events in order to allow an 1065 authorised Gateway Administrator or an authorised 1066 Service Technician to analyse the status of the 1067 TOE. The TOE shall also analyse the system log 1068 automatically for a cumulation of security relevant 1069 events. 1070 2. A consumer log that contains information about the 1071 information flows that have been initiated to the 1072 WAN and information about the Processing Profiles 1073 causing this information flow as well as the billing- 1074 relevant information and information about the sys- 1075 tem status (including relevant error messages). 1076 3. A calibration log that provides the Gateway Admin- 1077 istrator with a possibility to review calibration rele- 1078 vant events. 1079 The TOE shall further limit access to the information in the 1080 different log files as follows: 1081 1. Access to the information in the system log shall 1082 only be allowed for an authorised Gateway Admin- 1083 istrator via IF_GW_WAN or for an authorised Ser- 1084 vice Technician via IF_GW_SRV. 1085 2. Access to the information in the consumer log shall 1086 only be allowed for an authorised Consumer via the 1087 IF_GW_CON interface of the TOE and via a se- 1088 cured (i.e. confidentiality and integrity protected) 1089 connection. The Consumer shall only have access 1090 to their own information. 1091 3. Read-only access to the information in the calibra- 1092 tion log shall only be allowed for an authorised 1093 page 51 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Gateway Administrator via the WAN interface of the 1094 TOE. 1095 The system log may overwrite the oldest events in case 1096 that the audit trail gets full. 1097 For the consumer log, the TOE shall ensure that a suffi- 1098 cient amount of events is available (in order to allow a Con- 1099 sumer to verify an invoice) but may overwrite older events 1100 in case that the audit trail gets full. 1101 For the calibration log however, the TOE shall ensure the 1102 availability of all events over the lifetime of the TOE. 1103 O.Access The TOE shall control the access of external entities in 1104 WAN, HAN or LMN to any information that is sent to, from 1105 or via the TOE via its external interfaces32. Access control 1106 shall depend on the destination interface that is used to 1107 send that information. 1108 1109 4.2Security Objectives for the Operational Environment 1110 OE.ExternalPrivacy Authorised and authenticated external entities receiving 1111 any kind of private or billing-relevant data shall be trustwor- 1112 thy and shall not perform unauthorised analyses of these 1113 data with respect to the corresponding consumer(s). 1114 OE.TrustedAdmins The Gateway Administrator and the Service Technician 1115 shall be trustworthy and well-trained. 1116 OE.PhysicalProtection The TOE shall be installed in a non-public environment 1117 within the premises of the Consumer that provides a basic 1118 level of physical protection. This protection shall cover the 1119 TOE, the Meters that the TOE communicates with and the 1120 communication channel between the TOE and its Security 1121 32 While in classical access control mechanisms the Gateway Administrator gets complete access, the TOE also maintains a set of information (specifically the consumer log) to which Gateway Administrators have restricted access. page 52 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Module. Only authorised individuals may physically access 1122 the TOE. 1123 OE.Profile The Processing Profiles that are used when handling data 1124 shall be obtained from a trustworthy and reliable source 1125 only. 1126 OE.SM The environment shall provide the services of a certified 1127 Security Module for 1128 • verification of digital signatures, 1129 • generation of digital signatures, 1130 • key agreement, 1131 • key transport, 1132 • key storage, 1133 • Random Number Generation. 1134 The Security Module used shall be certified according to 1135 [SecModPP] and shall be used in accordance with its rele- 1136 vant guidance documentation. 1137 OE.Update The firmware updates for the Gateway that can be pro- 1138 vided by an authorised external entity shall undergo a cer- 1139 tification process according to this Security Target before 1140 they are issued to show that the update is implemented 1141 correctly. The external entity that is authorised to provide 1142 the update shall be trustworthy and ensure that no mal- 1143 ware is introduced via a firmware update. 1144 OE.Network It shall be ensured that 1145 • a WAN network connection with a sufficient reliabil- 1146 ity and bandwidth for the individual situation is 1147 available, 1148 • one or more trustworthy sources for an update of 1149 the system time are available in the WAN, 1150 • the Gateway is the only communication gateway for 1151 Meters in the LMN, 1152 page 53 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland • if devices in the HAN have a separate connection 1153 to parties in the WAN (beside the Gateway) this 1154 connection is appropriately protected. 1155 OE.Keygen It shall be ensured that the ECC key pair for a Meter (TLS) 1156 is generated securely according to the [TR-03109-3]. It 1157 shall also be ensured that the keys are brought into the 1158 Gateway in a secure way by the Gateway Administrator. 1159 1160 4.3Security Objective Rationale 1161 4.3.1 Overview 1162 The following table gives an overview how the assumptions, threats, and organisational 1163 security policies are addressed by the security objectives. The text of the following sec- 1164 tions justifies this more in detail. 1165 O.Firewall O.SeparateIF O.Conceal O.Meter O.Crypt O.Time O.Protect O.Management O.Log O.Access OE.SM OE.ExternalPrivacy OE.TrustedAdmins OE.PhysicalProtec- tion OE.Profile OE.Update OE.Network OE.Keygen T.DataModification- Local X X X X X X T.DataModification- WAN X X X X X T.TimeModification X X X X X X T.DisclosureWAN X X X X X X T.DisclosureLocal X X X X X X T.Infrastructure X X X X X X X T.ResidualData X X X page 54 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 8: Rationale for Security Objectives 1166 1167 4.3.2 Countering the threats 1168 The following sections provide more detailed information on how the threats are coun- 1169 tered by the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment. 1170 1171 4.3.2.1 General objectives 1172 The security objectives O.Protect, O.Management and OE.TrustedAdmins contribute 1173 to counter each threat and contribute to each OSP. 1174 O.Management is indispensable as it defines the requirements around the management 1175 of the Security Functions. Without a secure management no TOE can be secure. Also 1176 OE.TrustedAdmins contributes to this aspect as it provides the requirements on the 1177 availability of a trustworthy Gateway Administrator and Service Technician. O.Protect is 1178 present to ensure that all security functions are working as specified. 1179 Those general objectives will not be addressed in detail in the following paragraphs. 1180 T.ResidentData X X X X X X X T.Privacy X X X X X X X X OSP.SM X X X X X OSP.Log X X X X X A.ExternalPrivacy X A.TrustedAdmins X A.PhysicalProtection X A.ProcessProfile X A.Update X A.Network X A.Keygen X page 55 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 4.3.2.2 T.DataModificationLocal 1181 The threat T.DataModificationLocal is countered by a combination of the security ob- 1182 jectives O.Meter, O.Crypt, O.Log and OE.PhysicalProtection. 1183 O.Meter defines that the TOE will enforce the encryption of communication when receiv- 1184 ing Meter Data from the Meter. O.Crypt defines the required cryptographic functionality. 1185 The objectives together ensure that the communication between the Meter and the TOE 1186 cannot be modified or released. 1187 OE.PhysicalProtection is of relevance as it ensures that access to the TOE is limited. 1188 4.3.2.3 T.DataModificationWAN 1189 The threat T.DataModificationWAN is countered by a combination of the security ob- 1190 jectives O.Firewall and O.Crypt. 1191 O.Firewall defines the connections for the devices within the LAN to external entities 1192 within the WAN and shall provide firewall functionality in order to protect the devices of 1193 the LMN and HAN (as long as they use the Gateway) and itself against threats from the 1194 WAN side. O.Crypt defines the required cryptographic functionality. Both objectives to- 1195 gether ensure that the data transmitted between the TOE and the WAN cannot be mod- 1196 ified by a WAN attacker. 1197 4.3.2.4 T.TimeModification 1198 The threat T.TimeModification is countered by a combination of the security objectives 1199 O.Time, O.Crypt and OE.PhysicalProtection. 1200 O.Time defines that the TOE needs a reliable time stamp mechanism that is also up- 1201 dated from reliable sources regularly in the WAN. O.Crypt defines the required crypto- 1202 graphic functionality for the communication to external entities in the WAN. Therewith, 1203 O.Time and O.Crypt are the core objective to counter the threat T.TimeModification. 1204 OE.PhysicalProtection is of relevance as it ensures that access to the TOE is limited. 1205 4.3.2.5 T.DisclosureWAN 1206 The threat T.DisclosureWAN is countered by a combination of the security objectives 1207 O.Firewall, O.Conceal and O.Crypt. 1208 O.Firewall defines the connections for the devices within the LAN to external entities 1209 within the WAN and shall provide firewall functionality in order to protect the devices of 1210 the LMN and HAN (as long as they use the Gateway) and itself against threats from the 1211 WAN side. O.Crypt defines the required cryptographic functionality. Both objectives 1212 page 56 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland together ensure that the communication between the Meter and the TOE cannot be dis- 1213 closed. 1214 O.Conceal ensures that no information can be disclosed based on additional character- 1215 istics of the communication like frequency, load or the absence of a communication. 1216 4.3.2.6 T.DisclosureLocal 1217 The threat T.DisclosureLocal is countered by a combination of the security objectives 1218 O.Meter, O.Crypt and OE.PhysicalProtection. 1219 O.Meter defines that the TOE will enforce the encryption and integrity protection of com- 1220 munication when polling or receiving Meter Data from the Meter. O.Crypt defines the 1221 required cryptographic functionality. Both objectives together ensure that the communi- 1222 cation between the Meter and the TOE cannot be disclosed. 1223 OE.PhysicalProtection is of relevance as it ensures that access to the TOE is limited. 1224 4.3.2.7 T.Infrastructure 1225 The threat T.Infrastructure is countered by a combination of the security objectives 1226 O.Firewall, O.SeparateIF, O.Meter and O.Crypt. 1227 O.Firewall is the core objective that counters this threat. It ensures that all communica- 1228 tion flows to the WAN are initiated by the TOE. The fact that the TOE does not offer any 1229 services to the WAN side and will not react to any requests (except the wake-up call) 1230 from the WAN is a significant aspect in countering this threat. Further the TOE will only 1231 communicate using encrypted channels to authenticated and trustworthy parties which 1232 mitigates the possibility that an attacker could try to hijack a communication. 1233 O.Meter defines that the TOE will enforce the encryption and integrity protection for the 1234 communication with the Meter. 1235 O.SeparateIF facilitates the disjunction of the WAN from the LMN. 1236 O.Crypt supports the mitigation of this threat by providing the required cryptographic 1237 primitives. 1238 4.3.2.8 T.ResidualData 1239 The threat T.ResidualData is mitigated by the security objective O.Protect as this se- 1240 curity objective defines that the TOE shall delete information as soon as it is no longer 1241 used. Assuming that a TOE follows this requirement, an attacker cannot read out any 1242 residual information as it does simply not exist. 1243 page 57 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 4.3.2.9 T.ResidentData 1244 The threat T.ResidentData is countered by a combination of the security objectives 1245 O.Access, O.Firewall, O.Protect and O.Crypt. Further, the environment (OE.Physi- 1246 calProtection and OE.TrustedAdmins) contributes to this. 1247 O.Access defines that the TOE shall control the access of users to information via the 1248 external interfaces. 1249 The aspect of a local attacker with physical access to the TOE is covered by a combi- 1250 nation of O.Protect (defining the detection of physical manipulation) and O.Crypt (re- 1251 quiring the encryption of persistently stored TSF and user data of the TOE). In addition, 1252 the physical protection provided by the environment (OE.PhysicalProtection) and the 1253 Gateway Administrator (OE.TrustedAdmins) who could realise a physical manipulation 1254 contribute to counter this threat. 1255 The aspect of a WAN attacker is covered by O.Firewall as this objective ensures that 1256 an adequate level of protection is realised against attacks from the WAN side. 1257 4.3.2.10 T.Privacy 1258 The threat T.Privacy is primarily addressed by the security objectives O.Meter, O.Crypt 1259 and O.Firewall as these objective ensures that the TOE will only distribute Meter Data 1260 to external parties in the WAN as defined in the corresponding Processing Profiles and 1261 that the data will be protected for the transfer. OE.Profile is present to ensure that the 1262 Processing Profiles are obtained from a trustworthy and reliable source only. 1263 Finally, O.Conceal ensures that an attacker cannot obtain the relevant information for 1264 this threat by observing external characteristics of the information flow. 1265 4.3.3 Coverage of organisational security policies 1266 The following sections provide more detailed information about how the security objec- 1267 tives for the environment and the TOE cover the organizational security policies. 1268 4.3.3.1 OSP.SM 1269 The Organizational Security Policy OSP.SM that mandates that the TOE utilises the ser- 1270 vices of a certified Security Module is directly addressed by the security objectives 1271 OE.SM and O.Crypt. The objective OE.SM addresses the functions that the Security 1272 Module shall be utilised for as defined in OSP.SM and also requires a certified Security 1273 Module. O.Crypt defines the cryptographic functionalities for the TOE itself. In this 1274 page 58 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland context, it has to be ensured that the Security Module is operated in accordance with its 1275 guidance documentation. 1276 4.3.3.2 OSP.Log 1277 The Organizational Security Policy OSP.Log that mandates that the TOE maintains an 1278 audit log is directly addressed by the security objective for the TOE O.Log. 1279 O.Access contributes to the implementation of the OSP as it defines that also Gateway 1280 Administrators are not allowed to read/modify all data. This is of specific importance to 1281 ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the log data as is required by the OSP.Log. 1282 4.3.4 Coverage of assumptions 1283 The following sections provide more detailed information about how the security objec- 1284 tives for the environment cover the assumptions. 1285 4.3.4.1 A.ExternalPrivacy 1286 The assumption A.ExternalPrivacy is directly and completely covered by the security 1287 objective OE.ExternalPrivacy. The assumption and the objective for the environment 1288 are drafted in a way that the correspondence is obvious. 1289 4.3.4.2 A.TrustedAdmins 1290 The assumption A.TrustedAdmins is directly and completely covered by the security 1291 objective OE.TrustedAdmins. The assumption and the objective for the environment 1292 are drafted in a way that the correspondence is obvious. 1293 4.3.4.3 A.PhysicalProtection 1294 The assumption A.PhysicalProtection is directly and completely covered by the secu- 1295 rity objective OE.PhysicalProtection. The assumption and the objective for the envi- 1296 ronment are drafted in a way that the correspondence is obvious. 1297 4.3.4.4 A.ProcessProfile 1298 The assumption A.ProcessProfile is directly and completely covered by the security 1299 objective OE.Profile. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted 1300 in a way that the correspondence is obvious. 1301 4.3.4.5 A.Update 1302 The assumption A.Update is directly and completely covered by the security objective 1303 OE.Update. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way 1304 that the correspondence is obvious. 1305 page 59 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 4.3.4.6 A.Network 1306 The assumption A.Network is directly and completely covered by the security objective 1307 OE.Network. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way 1308 that the correspondence is obvious. 1309 4.3.4.7 A.Keygen 1310 The assumption A.Keygen is directly and completely covered by the security objective 1311 OE.Keygen. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way 1312 that the correspondence is obvious. 1313 1314 page 60 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 5 Extended Component definition 1315 5.1Communication concealing (FPR_CON) 1316 The additional family Communication concealing (FPR_CON) of the Class FPR (Pri- 1317 vacy) is defined here to describe the specific IT security functional requirements of the 1318 TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of 1319 the Consumer that may be obtained by an attacker by observing the encrypted commu- 1320 nication of the TOE with remote entities. 1321 1322 5.2Family behaviour 1323 This family defines requirements to mitigate attacks against communication channels in 1324 which an attacker tries to obtain privacy relevant information based on characteristics of 1325 an encrypted communication channel. Examples include but are not limited to an analy- 1326 sis of the frequency of communication or the transmitted workload. 1327 1328 5.3Component levelling 1329 FPR_CON: Communication concealing ------------1 1330 1331 5.4Management 1332 The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT: 1333 a. Definition of the interval in FPR_CON.1.2 if definable within the operational 1334 phase of the TOE. 1335 1336 5.5Audit 1337 There are no auditable events foreseen. 1338 1339 5.6Communication concealing (FPR_CON.1) 1340 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1341 Dependencies: No dependencies. 1342 page 61 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FPR_CON.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information 1343 flow policy] in order to ensure that no personally iden- 1344 tifiable information (PII) can be obtained by an analysis 1345 of [assignment: characteristics of the information flow 1346 that need to be concealed]. 1347 FPR_CON.1.2 The TSF shall connect to [assignment: list of external 1348 entities] in intervals as follows [selection: weekly, 1349 daily, hourly, [assignment: other interval]] to conceal 1350 the data flow. 1351 page 62 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6 Security Requirements 1352 6.1Overview 1353 This chapter describes the security functional and the assurance requirements which 1354 have to be fulfilled by the TOE. Those requirements comprise functional components 1355 from part 2 of [CC] and the assurance components as defined for the Evaluation Assur- 1356 ance Level 4 from part 3 of [CC]. 1357 The following notations are used: 1358 • Refinement operation (denoted by bold text): is used to add details to a re- 1359 quirement, and thus further restricts a requirement. In case that a word has 1360 been deleted from the original text this refinement is indicated by crossed out 1361 bold text. 1362 • Selection operation (denoted by underlined text): is used to select one or more 1363 options provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement. 1364 • Assignment operation (denoted by italicised text): is used to assign a specific 1365 value to an unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password. 1366 • Iteration operation: are identified with a suffix in the name of the SFR (e.g. 1367 FDP_IFC.2/FW). 1368 It should be noted that the requirements in the following chapters are not necessarily be 1369 ordered alphabetically. Where useful the requirements have been grouped. 1370 The following table summarises all TOE security functional requirements of this ST: 1371 Class FAU: Security Audit FAU_ARP.1/SYS Security alarms for system log FAU_GEN.1/SYS Audit data generation for system log FAU_SAA.1/SYS Potential violation analysis for system log FAU_SAR.1/SYS Audit review for system log FAU_STG.4/SYS Prevention of audit data loss for the system log FAU_GEN.1/CON Audit data generation for consumer log page 63 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FAU_SAR.1/CON Audit review for consumer log FAU_STG.4/CON Prevention of audit data loss for the consumer log FAU_GEN.1/CAL Audit data generation for calibration log FAU_SAR.1/CAL Audit review for calibration log FAU_STG.4/CAL Prevention of audit data loss for the calibration log FAU_GEN.2 User identity association FAU_STG.2 Guarantees of audit data availability Class FCO: Communication FCO_NRO.2 Enforced proof of origin Class FCS: Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM.1/TLS Cryptographic key generation for TLS FCS_COP.1/TLS Cryptographic operation for TLS FCS_CKM.1/CMS Cryptographic key generation for CMS FCS_COP.1/CMS Cryptographic operation for CMS FCS_CKM.1/MTR Cryptographic key generation for Meter communication encryption FCS_COP.1/MTR Cryptographic operation for Meter communication encryption FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1/HASH Cryptographic operation for Signatures FCS_COP.1/MEM Cryptographic operation for TSF and user data encryption page 64 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Class FDP: User Data Protection FDP_ACC.2 Complete Access Control FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDP_IFC.2/FW Complete information flow control for firewall FDP_IFF.1/FW Simple security attributes for Firewall FDP_IFC.2/MTR Complete information flow control for Meter information flow FDP_IFF.1/MTR Simple security attributes for Meter information FDP_RIP.2 Full residual information protection FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action Class FIA: Identification and Authentication FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms FIA_UAU.6 Re-Authenticating FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding Class FMT: Security Management FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles page 65 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FMT_MSA.1/AC Management of security attributes for Gateway access policy FMT_MSA.3/AC Static attribute initialisation for Gateway access policy FMT_MSA.1/FW Management of security attributes for Firewall policy FMT_MSA.3/FW Static attribute initialisation for Firewall policy FMT_MSA.1/MTR Management of security attributes for Meter policy FMT_MSA.3/MTR Static attribute initialisation for Meter policy Class FPR: Privacy FPR_CON.1 Communication Concealing FPR_PSE.1 Pseudonymity Class FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state FPT_RPL.1 Replay Detection FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FPT_TST.1 TSF testing FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack Class FTP: Trusted path/channels FTP_ITC.1/WAN Inter-TSF trusted channel for WAN FTP_ITC.1/MTR Inter-TSF trusted channel for Meter FTP_ITC.1/USR Inter-TSF trusted channel for User Table 9: List of Security Functional Requirements 1372 page 66 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2Class FAU: Security Audit 1373 6.2.1 Introduction 1374 The TOE compliant to this Security Target shall implement three different audit logs as 1375 defined in OSP.Log and O.Log. The following table provides an overview over the three 1376 audit logs before the following chapters introduce the SFRs related to those audit logs. 1377 System-Log Consumer-Log Calibration-Log Purpose • Inform the Gateway Administrator about security relevant events • Log all events as defined by Common Criteria [CC] for the used SFR • Log all system relevant events on specific functionality • Automated alarms in case of a cumulation of certain events • Inform the Service Technician about the status of the Gateway • Inform the Consumer about all information flows to the WAN • Inform the Consumer about the Processing Profiles • Inform the Consumer about other metering data (not billing-relevant) • Inform the Consumer about all billing-relevant data needed to verify an invoice • Track changes that are relevant for the calibration of the TOE relevant data needed to verify an invoice Data • As defined by CC part 2 • Augmented by specific events for the security functions • Information about all information flows to the WAN • Information about the current and the previous Processing Profiles • Non-billing-relevant Meter Data • Information about the system status (including relevant errors) • Calibration relevant data only page 67 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 10: Overview over audit processes 1378 • Billing-relevant data needed to verify an invoice Access • Access by authorised Gateway Administrator and via IF_GW_WAN only • Events may only be deleted by an authorised Gateway Administrator via IF_GW_WAN • Read access by authorised Service Technician via IF_GW_SRV only • Read access by authorised Consumer and via IF_GW_CON only to the data related to the current consumer • Read access by authorised Gateway Administrator and via IF_GW_WAN only Deletion • Ring buffer. • The availability of data has to be ensured for a sufficient amount of time • Overwriting old events is possible if the memory is full. • Ring buffer. • The availability of data has to be ensured for a sufficient amount of time. • Overwriting old events is possible if the memory is full • Retention period is set by authorised Gateway Administrator on request by consumer, data older than this are deleted. • The availability of data has to be ensured over the lifetime of the TOE. page 68 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2.2 Security Requirements for the System Log 1379 6.2.2.1 Security audit automatic response (FAU_ARP) 1380 6.2.2.1.1 FAU_ARP.1/SYS: Security Alarms for system log 1381 FAU_ARP.1.1/SYS The TSF shall take inform an authorised Gateway 1382 Administrator and create a log entry in the system log 33 1383 upon detection of a potential security violation. 1384 Hierarchical to: No other components 1385 Dependencies: FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis 1386 1387 6.2.2.2 Security audit data generation (FAU_GEN) 1388 6.2.2.2.1 FAU_GEN.1/SYS: Audit data generation for system log 1389 FAU_GEN.1.1/SYS The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the 1390 following auditable events: 1391 a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; 1392 b) All auditable events for the basic34 level of audit; and 1393 c) other non privacy relevant auditable events: none35. 1394 FAU_GEN.1.2/SYS The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the 1395 following information: 1396 a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity 1397 (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the 1398 event; and 1399 b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event 1400 definitions of the functional components included in the 1401 PP/ST36, other audit relevant information: none 37. 1402 33 [assignment: list of actions] 34 [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] 35 [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events] 36 [refinement: PP/ST] 37 [assignment: other audit relevant information] page 69 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Hierarchical to: No other components 1403 Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 1404 6.2.2.3 Security audit analysis (FAU_SAA) 1405 6.2.2.3.1 FAU_SAA.1/SYS: Potential violation analysis for system 1406 log 1407 FAU_SAA.1.1./SYS The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring 1408 the audited events and based upon these rules indicate a 1409 potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs. 1410 FAU_SAA.1.2/SYS The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring 1411 audited events: 1412 a) Accumulation or combination of 1413 • Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions 1414 • all auditable events for the basic level of audit 1415 • all types of failures in the TSF as listed in 1416 FPT_FLS.1 38 1417 known to indicate a potential security violation. 1418 b) any other rules: none 39. 1419 Hierarchical to: No other components 1420 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 1421 6.2.2.4 Security audit review (FAU_SAR) 1422 6.2.2.4.1 FAU_SAR.1/SYS: Audit Review for system log 1423 FAU_SAR.1.1/SYS The TSF shall provide only authorised Gateway 1424 Administrators via the IF_GW_WAN interface and 1425 authorised Service Technicians via the IF_GW_SRV 1426 38 [assignment: subset of defined auditable events] 39 [assignment: any other rules] page 70 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland interface 40 with the capability to read all information 41 1427 from the system audit records 42. 1428 FAU_SAR.1.2/SYS The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner 1429 suitable for the user to interpret the information. 1430 Hierarchical to: No other components 1431 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 1432 6.2.2.5 Security audit event storage (FAU_STG) 1433 6.2.2.5.1 FAU_STG.4/SYS: Prevention of audit data loss for 1434 systemlog 1435 FAU_STG.4.1/SYS The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records 43 1436 and other actions to be taken in case of audit storage 1437 failure: none 44 if the system audit trail 45 is full. 1438 Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss 1439 Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage 1440 Application Note 4: The size of the audit trail that is available before the oldest 1441 events get overwritten is configurable for the Gateway 1442 Administrator. 1443 40 [assignment: authorised users] 41 [assignment: list of audit information] 42 [refinement: audit records] 43 [selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events”, “prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit records”] 44 [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] 45 [refinement: audit trail] page 71 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2.3 Security Requirements for the Consumer Log 1444 6.2.3.1 Security audit data generation (FAU_GEN) 1445 6.2.3.1.1 FAU_GEN.1/CON: Audit data generation for consumer log 1446 FAU_GEN.1.1/CON The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the 1447 following auditable events: 1448 a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; 1449 b) All auditable events for the not specified46 level of audit; 1450 and 1451 c) all audit events as listed in Table 11 and additional 1452 events: none 47. 1453 FAU_GEN.1.2/CON The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the 1454 following information: 1455 a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity 1456 (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the 1457 event; and 1458 b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event 1459 definitions of the functional components included in the 1460 PP/ST48, additional information as listed in Table 11 and 1461 additional events: none 49. 1462 Hierarchical to: No other components 1463 Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 1464 1465 46 [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] 47 [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events] 48 [refinement: PP/ST] 49 [assignment: other audit relevant information] page 72 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 11: Events for consumer log 1466 1467 6.2.3.2 Security audit review (FAU_SAR) 1468 6.2.3.2.1 FAU_SAR.1/CON: Audit Review for consumer log 1469 FAU_SAR.1.1/CON The TSF shall provide only authorised Consumer via the 1470 IF_GW_CON interface 50 with the capability to read all 1471 50 [assignment: authorised users] Event Additional Information Any change to a Processing Profile The new and the old Processing Profile Any submission of Meter Data to an external entity The Processing Profile that lead to the submission The submitted values Any submission of Meter Data that is not billing- relevant - Billing-relevant data - Any administrative action performed - Relevant system status information including relevant errors - page 73 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland information that are related to them 51 from the consumer 1472 audit records 52. 1473 FAU_SAR.1.2/CON The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner 1474 suitable for the user to interpret the information. 1475 Hierarchical to: No other components 1476 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 1477 Application Note 5: FAU_SAR.1.2/CON shall ensure that the Consumer is 1478 able to interpret the information that is provided to him in a 1479 way that allows him to verify the invoice. 1480 6.2.3.3 Security audit event storage (FAU_STG) 1481 6.2.3.3.1 FAU_STG.4/CON: Prevention of audit data loss for the 1482 consumer log 1483 FAU_STG.4.1/CON The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records and 1484 interrupt metrological operation in case that the oldest 1485 audit record must still be kept for billing verification 53 if the 1486 consumer audit trail is full. 1487 Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss 1488 Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage 1489 Application Note 6: The size of the audit trail that is available before the oldest 1490 events get overwritten is configurable for the Gateway 1491 Administrator. 1492 51 [assignment: list of audit information] 52 [refinement: audit records] 53 [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] page 74 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2.4 Security Requirements for the Calibration Log 1493 6.2.4.1 Security audit data generation (FAU_GEN) 1494 6.2.4.1.1 FAU_GEN.1/CAL: Audit data generation for calibration log 1495 FAU_GEN.1.1/CAL The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the 1496 following auditable events: 1497 a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions; 1498 b) All auditable events for the not specified 54 level of audit; 1499 and 1500 c) all calibration-relevant information according to Table 1501 1255. 1502 FAU_GEN.1.2/CAL The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the 1503 following information: 1504 a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity 1505 (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the 1506 event; and 1507 b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event 1508 definitions of the functional components included in the 1509 PP/ST 56, other audit relevant information: none 57. 1510 Hierarchical to: No other components 1511 Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 1512 Application Note 7: The calibration log serves to fulfil national requirements in 1513 the context of the calibration of the TOE. 1514 1515 54 [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] 55 [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events] 56 [refinement: PP/ST] 57 [assignment: other audit relevant information] page 75 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Event / Parameter Content Commissioning Commissioning of the SMGW MUST be logged in calibration log. Event of self-test Initiation of self-test MUST be logged in calibration log. New meter Connection and registration of a new meter MUST be logged in calibration log. Meter removal Removal of a meter from SMGW MUST be logged in calibration log. Change of tarification profiles Every change (incl. parameter change) of a tarification profile according to [TR-03109-1, 4.4], provided the parameter is relevant for calibration regulations (see below) as well as new storage or removal of tarification profiles MUST be logged in calibration log. Parameter relevant for calibration regulations are: • Device-ID of a meter - Unique identifier of the meter, which send the input values for a TAF • OBIS value of the measured variable of the meter - Unique value for the measured variable of the meter for the used TAF • Metering point name - Unique name of the metering point • Billing period - Period in which a billing should be done • Consumer ID • Validity period - Period for which the TAF is booked • Definition of tariff stages - Defines different tariff stages and associated OBIS values. Here it will be defined which tariff stage is valid at the time of rule set activation • Tariff switching time - Defines to the split second the switching of tariff stages. The time points can be defined as periodic values • Register period - Time distance of two consecutive measured value acquisitions for meter readings page 76 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Change of meter profiles Every change (incl. parameter change) of a meter profile according to [TR-03109-1, 4.4], provided the parameter is relevant for calibration regulations (see below) as well as new storage or removal of meter profiles MUST be logged in calibration log. Parameter relevant for legal metrology are: • Device-ID - Unique identifier of the meter according to DIN 43863-5 • Key material - Public key for inner signature (dependent on the used meter in LMN) • Register period - Interval during receipt of meter values • Displaying interval (‘Anzeigeintervall’) - Interval during which the actual meter value (only during display) must be updated in case of bidirectional communication between meter and SMGW • Balancing (‘Saldierend’) - Determines if the meter is balancing (‘saldierend’) and meter values can grow and fall • OBIS values - OBIS values according to IEC-62056-6-1 resp. EN 13757-1 • Converter factor (‘Wandlerfaktor’) - Value is 1 in case of directly connected meter. In usage of converter counter (‘Wandlerzähler’) the value may be different. Software update Every update of the code which touches calibration regulations (serialized COSEM-objects, rules) MUST be logged in calibration log. Firmware update Every firmware update (incl. operating system update if applicable) MUST be logged in calibration log. Error messages of a meter All FATAL messages of a connected meter MUST be logged in calibration log according to 0 - no error 1 - Warning, no action to be done according to calibration authority, meter value valid page 77 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 2 - Temporal error, send meter value will be marked as invalid, the value in meter field (‘Messwertfeld’) could be used according to the rules of [VDE4400] resp. [G865] as replacement value (‘Ersatzwert’) in backend. 3 - Temporal error, send meter value is invalid; the value in the meter field (‘Messwertfeld’) cannot be used as replacement value in backend. 4 - Fatal error (meter defect), actual send value is invalid and all future values will be invalid. including the device-ID. Error messages of a SMGW All self-test and calibration regulations relevant errors MUST be logged in calibration log. Table 12: Content of calibration log 1516 1517 page 78 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2.4.2 Security audit review (FAU_SAR) 1518 6.2.4.2.1 FAU_SAR.1/CAL: Audit Review for the calibration log 1519 FAU_SAR.1.1/CAL The TSF shall provide only authorised Gateway 1520 Administrators via the IF_GW_WAN interface 58 with the 1521 capability to read all information 59 from the calibration 1522 audit records 60. 1523 FAU_SAR.1.2/CAL The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner 1524 suitable for the user to interpret the information. 1525 Hierarchical to: No other components 1526 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 1527 6.2.4.3 Security audit event storage (FAU_STG) 1528 6.2.4.3.1 FAU_STG.4/CAL: Prevention of audit data loss for 1529 calibration log 1530 FAU_STG.4.1/CAL The TSF shall ignore audited events 61 and stop the 1531 operation of the TOE and inform a Gateway 1532 Administrator 62 if the calibration audit trail 63 is full. 1533 Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss 1534 Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage 1535 Application Note 8: As outlined in the introduction it has to be ensured that the 1536 events of the calibration log are available over the lifetime 1537 of the TOE. 1538 58 [assignment: authorised users] 59 [assignment: list of audit information] 60 [refinement: audit records] 61 [selection, choose one of: “ignore audited events”, “prevent audited events, except those taken by the authorised user with special rights”, “overwrite the oldest stored audit records”] 62 [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] 63 [refinement: audit trail] page 79 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2.5 Security Requirements that apply to all logs 1539 6.2.5.1 Security audit data generation (FAU_GEN) 1540 6.2.5.1.1 FAU_GEN.2: User identity association 1541 FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, 1542 the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event 1543 with the identity of the user that caused the event. 1544 Hierarchical to: No other components 1545 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 1546 FIA_UID.1 1547 Application Note 9: Please note that FAU_GEN.2 applies to all audit logs, the 1548 system log, the calibration log, and the consumer log. 1549 page 80 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.2.5.2 Security audit event storage (FAU_STG) 1550 6.2.5.2.1 FAU_STG.2: Guarantees of audit data availability 1551 FAU_STG.2.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the all 1552 audit trails 64 from unauthorised deletion. 1553 FAU_STG.2.2 The TSF shall be able to prevent 65 unauthorised 1554 modifications to the stored audit records in the all audit 1555 trails 66. 1556 FAU_STG.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that all 67 stored audit records will be 1557 maintained when the following conditions occur: audit 1558 storage exhaustion or failure 68. 1559 Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage 1560 Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 1561 Application Note 10: Please note that FAU_STG.2 applies to all audit logs, the 1562 system log, the calibration log, and the consumer log. 1563 64 [refinement: audit trail] 65 [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] 66 [refinement: audit trail] 67 [assignment: metric for saving audit records] 68 [selection: audit storage exhaustion, failure, attack] page 81 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.3Class FCO: Communication 1564 6.3.1 Non-repudiation of origin (FCO_NRO) 1565 6.3.1.1 FCO_NRO.2: Enforced proof of origin 1566 FCO_NRO.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the generation of evidence of origin 1567 for transmitted Meter Data 69 at all times. 1568 FCO_NRO.2.2 The TSF shall be able to relate the key material used for 1569 signature 70, 71 of the originator of the information, and the 1570 signature 72 of the information to which the evidence 1571 applies. 1572 FCO_NRO.2.3 The TSF shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of 1573 origin of information to recipient, Consumer 73 given 1574 limitations of the digital signature according to TR-03109- 1575 1 74. 1576 Hierarchical to: FCO_NRO.1 Selective proof of origin 1577 Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification 1578 Application Note 11: FCO_NRO.2 requires that the TOE calculates a signature 1579 over Meter Data that is submitted to external entities. 1580 Therefore, the TOE has to create a hash value over the 1581 Data To Be Signed (DTBS) as defined in 1582 FCS_COP.1/HASH. The creation of the actual signature 1583 however is performed by the Security Module. 1584 69 [assignment: list of information types] 70 [assignment: list of attributes] 71 The key material here also represents the identity of the Gateway. 72 [assignment: list of information fields] 73 [selection: originator, recipient, [assignment: list of third parties]] 74 [assignment: limitations on the evidence of origin] page 82 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.4Class FCS: Cryptographic Support 1585 6.4.1 Cryptographic support for TLS 1586 6.4.1.1 Cryptographic key management (FCS_CKM) 1587 6.4.1.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/TLS: Cryptographic key generation for TLS 1588 FCS_CKM.1.1/TLS The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance 1589 with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm 1590 TLS-PRF with SHA-256 or SHA-384 75 and specified 1591 cryptographic key sizes 128 bit, 256 bit or 384 bit 76 that 1592 meet the following: [RFC 5246] in combination with 1593 [FIPS Pub. 180-4] and [RFC 2104] 77. 1594 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1595 Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or 1596 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation], fulfilled by 1597 FCS_COP .1/TLS 1598 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1599 Application Note 12: The Security Module is used for the generation of random 1600 numbers and for all cryptographic operations with the pri- 1601 vate key of a TLS certificate. 1602 Application Note 13: The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and 1603 algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3]. 1604 6.4.1.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP) 1605 6.4.1.2.1 FCS_COP.1/TLS: Cryptographic operation for TLS 1606 FCS_COP.1.1/TLS The TSF shall perform TLS encryption, decryption, and 1607 integrity protection 78 in accordance with a specified 1608 cryptographic algorithm TLS cipher suites 1609 75 [assignment: key generation algorithm] 76 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 77 [assignment: list of standards] 78 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] page 83 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 1610 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, 1611 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, 1612 and 1613 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 1614 79 using elliptic curves BrainpoolP256r1, BrainpoolP384r1, 1615 BrainpoolP512r1 (according to [RFC 5639]), NIST P-256, 1616 and NIST P-384 (according to [RFC 5114]) and 1617 cryptographic key sizes 128 bit or 256 bit 80 that meet the 1618 following: [RFC 2104], [RFC 5114], [RFC 5246], 1619 [RFC 5289], [RFC 5639], [NIST 800-38A], and [NIST 800- 1620 38D] 81. 1621 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1622 Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, 1623 or 1624 FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or 1625 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], fulfilled by 1626 FCS_CKM.1/TLS 1627 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1628 Application Note 14: The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and 1629 algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3]. 1630 6.4.2 Cryptographic support for CMS 1631 6.4.2.1 Cryptographic key management (FCS_CKM) 1632 6.4.2.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/CMS: Cryptographic key generation for CMS 1633 FCS_CKM.1.1/CMS The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance 1634 with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm 1635 ECKA-EG 82 and specified cryptographic key sizes 128 1636 79 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] 80 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 81 [assignment: list of standards] 82 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] page 84 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland bit 83 that meet the following: [X9.63] in combination with 1637 [RFC 3565] 84. 1638 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1639 Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or 1640 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation], fulfilled by 1641 FCS_COP.1/CMS 1642 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1643 Application Note 15: The TOE utilises the services of its Security Module for the 1644 generation of random numbers and for all cryptographic 1645 operations with the private asymmetric key of a CMS cer- 1646 tificate. 1647 Application Note 16: The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and 1648 algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3]. 1649 6.4.2.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP) 1650 6.4.2.2.1 FCS_COP.1/CMS: Cryptographic operation for CMS 1651 FCS_COP.1.1/CMS The TSF shall perform 1652 symmetric encryption, decryption and integrity protection 1653 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm 1654 AES-CBC-CMAC or AES-GCM 85 and cryptographic key 1655 sizes 128 bit 86 that meet the following: [FIPS Pub. 197], 1656 83 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 84 [assignment: list of standards] 85 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] 86 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] page 85 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland [NIST 800-38D], [RFC 4493], [RFC 5084], and [RFC 5652] 1657 in combination with [NIST 800-38A] 87. 1658 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1659 Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, 1660 or 1661 FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or 1662 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], fulfilled by 1663 FCS_CKM.1/CMS 1664 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1665 Application Note 17: The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and 1666 algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3]. 1667 6.4.3 Cryptographic support for Meter communication encryption 1668 6.4.3.1 Cryptographic key management (FCS_CKM) 1669 6.4.3.1.1 FCS_CKM.1/MTR: Cryptographic key generation for Meter 1670 communication (symmetric encryption) 1671 FCS_CKM.1.1/MTR The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance 1672 with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm 1673 AES-CMAC 88 and specified cryptographic key sizes 128 1674 bit 89 that meet the following: [FIPS Pub. 197], and 1675 [RFC 4493] 90. 1676 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1677 Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or 1678 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation], fulfilled by 1679 FCS_COP.1/MTR 1680 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1681 87 [assignment: list of standards] 88 [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] 89 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 90 [assignment: list of standards] page 86 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Application Note 18: The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and 1682 algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3]. 1683 6.4.3.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP) 1684 6.4.3.2.1 FCS_COP.1/MTR: Cryptographic operation for Meter 1685 communication encryption 1686 FCS_COP.1.1/MTR The TSF shall perform symmetric encryption, decryption, 1687 integrity protection 91 in accordance with a specified 1688 cryptographic algorithm AES-CBC-CMAC 92 and 1689 cryptographic key sizes 128 bit 93 that meet the following: 1690 [FIPS Pub. 197] and [RFC 4493] in combination with 1691 [ISO 10116] 94. 1692 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1693 Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, 1694 or 1695 FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or 1696 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], fulfilled by 1697 FCS_CKM.1/MTR 1698 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1699 Application Note 19: The ST allows different scenarios of key generation for 1700 Meter communication encryption. Those are: 1701 1. If a TLS encryption is being used, the key 1702 generation/negotiation is as defined by 1703 FCS_CKM.1/TLS. 1704 2. If AES encryption is being used, the key has been 1705 brought into the Gateway via a management 1706 function during the pairing process for the Meter 1707 91 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] 92 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] 93 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 94 [assignment: list of standards] page 87 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland (see FMT_SMF.1) as defined by 1708 FCS_COP.1/MTR. 1709 Application Note 20: If the connection between the Meter and TOE is 1710 unidirectional, the communication between the Meter and 1711 the TOE is secured by the use of a symmetric AES 1712 encryption. If a bidirectional connection between the Meter 1713 and the TOE is established, the communication is secured 1714 by a TLS channel as described in chapter 6.4.1. As the 1715 TOE shall be interoperable with all kind of Meters, both 1716 kinds of encryption are implemented. 1717 Application Note 21: The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and 1718 algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3]. 1719 6.4.4 General Cryptographic support 1720 6.4.4.1 Cryptographic key management (FCS_CKM) 1721 6.4.4.1.1 FCS_CKM.4: Cryptographic key destruction 1722 FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance 1723 with a specified cryptographic key destruction method 1724 Zeroisation 95 that meets the following: none 96. 1725 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1726 Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, 1727 or 1728 FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or 1729 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], fulfilled by 1730 FCS_CKM.1/TLS and 1731 FCS_CKM.1/CMS and FCS_CKM.1/MTR 1732 Application Note 22: Please note that as against the requirement FDP_RIP.2, 1733 the mechanisms implementing the requirement from 1734 FCS_CKM.4 shall be suitable to avoid attackers with 1735 95 [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method] 96 [assignment: list of standards] page 88 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland physical access to the TOE from accessing the keys after 1736 they are no longer used. 1737 6.4.4.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP) 1738 6.4.4.2.1 FCS_COP.1/HASH: Cryptographic operation, hashing for 1739 signatures 1740 FCS_COP.1.1/HASH The TSF shall perform hashing for signature creation and 1741 verification 97 in accordance with a specified cryptographic 1742 algorithm SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 98 and 1743 cryptographic key sizes none 99 that meet the following: 1744 [FIPS Pub. 180-4]100. 1745 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1746 Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, 1747 or 1748 FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or 1749 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation 101] 1750 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1751 Application Note 23: The TOE is only responsible for hashing of data in the 1752 context of digital signatures. The actual signature 1753 operation and the handling (i.e. protection) of the 1754 cryptographic keys in this context is performed by the 1755 Security Module. 1756 Application Note 24: The TOE uses only cryptographic specifications and 1757 algorithms as described in [TR-03109-3]. 1758 97 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] 98 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] 99 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 100 [assignment: list of standards] 101 The justification for the missing dependency FCS_CKM.1 can be found in chapter 6.12.1.3. page 89 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.4.4.2.2 FCS_COP.1/MEM: Cryptographic operation, encryption of 1759 TSF and user data 1760 FCS_COP.1.1/MEM The TSF shall perform TSF and user data encryption and 1761 decryption 102 in accordance with a specified cryptographic 1762 algorithm AES-XTS 103 and cryptographic key sizes 128 1763 bit 104 that meet the following: [FIPS Pub. 197] and 1764 [NIST 800-38E] 105. 1765 Hierarchical to: No other components. 1766 Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, 1767 or 1768 FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or 1769 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], not fulfilled s. 1770 Application Note 25 1771 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction 1772 Application Note 25: Please note that for the key generation process an external 1773 security module is used during TOE production. 1774 Application Note 26: The TOE encrypts its local TSF and user data while it is 1775 not in use (i.e. while stored in a persistent memory). 1776 It shall be noted that this kind of encryption cannot provide 1777 an absolute protection against physical manipulation and 1778 does not aim to. It however contributes to the security 1779 concept that considers the protection that is provided by 1780 the environment. 1781 102 [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] 103 [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] 104 [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] 105 [assignment: list of standards] page 90 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.5Class FDP: User Data Protection 1782 6.5.1 Introduction to the Security Functional Policies 1783 The security functional requirements that are used in the following chapters implicitly 1784 define a set of Security Functional Policies (SFP). These policies are introduced in the 1785 following paragraphs in more detail to facilitate the understanding of the SFRs: 1786 • The Gateway access SFP is an access control policy to control the access to 1787 objects under the control of the TOE. The details of this access control policy 1788 highly depend on the concrete application of the TOE. The access control policy 1789 is described in more detail in [TR-03109-1]. 1790 • The Firewall SFP implements an information flow policy to fulfil the objective 1791 O.Firewall. All requirements around the communication control that the TOE 1792 poses on communications between the different networks are defined in this 1793 policy. 1794 • The Meter SFP implements an information flow policy to fulfil the objective 1795 O.Meter. It defines all requirements concerning how the TOE shall handle Meter 1796 Data. 1797 6.5.2 Gateway Access SFP 1798 6.5.2.1 Access control policy (FDP_ACC) 1799 6.5.2.1.1 FDP_ACC.2: Complete access control 1800 FDP_ACC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the Gateway access SFP 106 on 1801 subjects: external entities in WAN, HAN and LMN 1802 objects: any information that is sent to, from or via 1803 the TOE and any information that is stored in the 1804 TOE 107 and all operations among subjects and 1805 objects covered by the SFP. 1806 FDP_ACC.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any 1807 subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by 1808 the TSF are covered by an access control SFP. 1809 106 [assignment: access control SFP] 107 [assignment: list of subjects and objects] page 91 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Hierarchical to: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control 1810 Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control 1811 6.5.2.1.2 FDP_ACF.1: Security attribute based access control 1812 FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Gateway access SFP 108 to 1813 objects based on the following: 1814 subjects: external entities on the WAN, HAN or 1815 LMN side 1816 objects: any information that is sent to, from or via 1817 the TOE 1818 attributes: destination interface 109. 1819 FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if 1820 an operation among controlled subjects and controlled 1821 objects is allowed: 1822 • an authorised Consumer is only allowed to have 1823 read access to his own User Data via the interface 1824 IF_GW_CON, 1825 • an authorised Service Technician is only allowed to 1826 have read access to the system log via the interface 1827 IF_GW_SRV, the Service Technician must not be 1828 allowed to read, modify or delete any other TSF 1829 data, 1830 • an authorised Gateway Administrator is allowed to 1831 interact with the TOE only via IF_GW_WAN, 1832 • only authorised Gateway Administrators are 1833 allowed to establish a wake-up call, 1834 • additional rules governing access among controlled 1835 subjects and controlled objects using controlled 1836 108 [assignment: access control SFP] 109 [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes] page 92 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland operations on controlled objects or none: 1837 none 110. 111 1838 FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to 1839 objects based on the following additional rules: none 112. 1840 FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects 1841 based on the following additional rules: 1842 • the Gateway Administrator is not allowed to read 1843 consumption data or the Consumer Log, 1844 • nobody must be allowed to read the symmetric 1845 keys used for encryption 113. 1846 Hierarchical to: No other components 1847 Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control 1848 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation 1849 6.5.3 Firewall SFP 1850 6.5.3.1 Information flow control policy (FDP_IFC) 1851 6.5.3.1.1 FDP_IFC.2/FW: Complete information flow control for 1852 firewall 1853 FDP_IFC.2.1/FW The TSF shall enforce the Firewall SFP 114 on the TOE, 1854 external entities on the WAN side, external entities on the 1855 LAN side and all information flowing between them 115 and 1856 all operations that cause that information to flow to and 1857 from subjects covered by the SFP. 1858 110 [assignment: additional rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects or none] 111 [assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects] 112 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects] 113 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects] 114 [assignment: information flow control SFP] 115 [assignment: list of subjects and information] page 93 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FDP_IFC.2.2/FW The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any 1859 information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in 1860 the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP. 1861 Hierarchical to: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control 1862 Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes 1863 6.5.3.2 Information flow control functions (FDP_IFF) 1864 6.5.3.2.1 FDP_IFF.1/FW: Simple security attributes for Firewall 1865 FDP_IFF.1.1/FW The TSF shall enforce the Firewall SFP 116 based on the 1866 following types of subject and information security 1867 attributes: 1868 subjects: The TOE and external entities on the 1869 WAN, HAN or LMN side 1870 information: any information that is sent to, from or 1871 via the TOE 1872 attributes: destination_interface (TOE, LMN, HAN 1873 or WAN), source_interface (TOE, LMN, HAN or 1874 WAN), destination_authenticated, 1875 source_authenticated 117. 1876 FDP_IFF.1.2/FW The TSF shall permit an information flow between a 1877 controlled subject and controlled information via a 1878 controlled operation if the following rules hold: 1879 (if source_interface=HAN or 1880 source_interface=TOE) and 1881 destination_interface=WAN and 1882 destination_authenticated = true 1883 Connection establishment is allowed 1884 1885 116 [assignment: information flow control SFP] 117 [assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes] page 94 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland if source_interface=LMN and 1886 destination_interface= TOE and 1887 source_authenticated = true 1888 Connection establishment is allowed 1889 1890 if source_interface=TOE and 1891 destination_interface= LMN and 1892 destination_authenticated = true 1893 Connection establishment is allowed 1894 1895 if source_interface=HAN and 1896 destination_interface= TOE and 1897 source_authenticated = true 1898 Connection establishment is allowed 1899 1900 if source_interface=TOE and 1901 destination_interface= HAN and 1902 destination_authenticated = true 1903 Connection establishment is allowed 1904 else 1905 Connection establishment is denied 118. 1906 FDP_IFF.1.3/FW The TSF shall enforce the establishment of a connection 1907 to a configured external entity in the WAN after having 1908 received a wake-up message on the WAN interface 119. 1909 118 [assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes] 119 [assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules] page 95 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FDP_IFF.1.4/FW The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow 1910 based on the following rules: none 120. 1911 FDP_IFF.1.5/FW The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on 1912 the following rules: none 121. 1913 Hierarchical to: No other components 1914 Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control 1915 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation 1916 Application Note 27: It should be noted that the FDP_IFF.1.1/FW facilitates 1917 different interfaces of the origin and the destination of an 1918 information flow implicitly requires the TOE to implement 1919 physically separate ports for WAN, LMN and HAN. 1920 6.5.4 Meter SFP 1921 6.5.4.1 Information flow control policy (FDP_IFC) 1922 6.5.4.1.1 FDP_IFC.2/MTR: Complete information flow control for 1923 Meter information flow 1924 FDP_IFC.2.1/MTR The TSF shall enforce the Meter SFP 122 on the TOE, 1925 attached Meters, authorized External Entities in the WAN 1926 and all information flowing between them 123 and all 1927 operations that cause that information to flow to and from 1928 subjects covered by the SFP. 1929 FDP_IFC.2.2/MTR The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any 1930 information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in 1931 the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP. 1932 Hierarchical to: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control 1933 Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes 1934 120 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise information flows] 121 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows] 122 [assignment: information flow control SFP] 123 [assignment: list of subjects and information] page 96 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.5.4.2 Information flow control functions (FDP_IFF) 1935 6.5.4.2.1 FDP_IFF.1/MTR: Simple security attributes for Meter 1936 information 1937 FDP_IFF.1.1/MTR The TSF shall enforce the Meter SFP 124 based on the 1938 following types of subject and information security 1939 attributes: 1940 • subjects: TOE, external entities in WAN, Meters 1941 located in LMN 1942 • information: any information that is sent via the 1943 TOE 1944 • attributes: destination interface, source interface 1945 (LMN or WAN), Processing Profile 125. 1946 FDP_IFF.1.2/MTR The TSF shall permit an information flow between a 1947 controlled subject and controlled information via a 1948 controlled operation if the following rules hold: 1949 • an information flow shall only be initiated if allowed 1950 by a corresponding Processing Profile 126. 1951 FDP_IFF.1.3/MTR The TSF shall enforce the following rules: 1952 • Data received from Meters shall be processed as 1953 defined in the corresponding Processing Profiles, 1954 • Results of processing of Meter Data shall be 1955 submitted to external entities as defined in the 1956 Processing Profiles, 1957 • The internal system time shall be synchronised as 1958 follows: 1959 124 [assignment: information flow control SFP] 125 [assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes] 126 [assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes] page 97 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland o The TOE shall compare the system time to a 1960 reliable external time source every 24 1961 hours 127. 1962 o If the deviation between the local time and the 1963 remote time is acceptable 128 , the local system 1964 time shall be updated according to the remote 1965 time. 1966 o If the deviation is not acceptable the TOE 1967 shall ensure that any following Meter Data is 1968 not used, stop operation 129 and 1969 inform a Gateway Administrator 130. 1970 FDP_IFF.1.4/MTR The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow 1971 based on the following rules: none 131. 1972 FDP_IFF.1.5/MTR The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on 1973 the following rules: The TOE shall deny any acceptance of 1974 information by external entities in the LMN unless the 1975 authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of the Meter Data 1976 could be verified 132. 1977 Hierarchical to: No other components 1978 Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control 1979 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation 1980 Application Note 28: FDP_IFF.1.3 defines that the TOE shall update the local 1981 system time regularly with reliable external time sources if 1982 the deviation is acceptable. In the context of this 1983 functionality two aspects should be mentioned: 1984 127 [assignment: synchronization interval between 1 minute and 24 hours] 128 Please refer to the following application note for a detailed definition of “acceptable”. 129 Please note that this refers to the complete functional operation of the TOE and not only to the update of local time. However, an administrative access shall still be possible. 130 [assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules] 131 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise information flows] 132 [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows] page 98 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Reliability of external source 1985 There are several ways to achieve the reliability of the 1986 external source. On the one hand, there may be a source 1987 in the WAN that has an acceptable reliability on its own 1988 (e.g. because it is operated by a very trustworthy 1989 organisation (an official legal time issued by the calibration 1990 authority would be a good example for such a source133)). 1991 On the other hand a developer may choose to maintain 1992 multiple external sources that all have a certain level of 1993 reliability but no absolute reliability. When using such 1994 sources the TOE shall contact more than one source and 1995 harmonize the results in order to ensure that no attack 1996 happened. 1997 Acceptable deviation 1998 For the question whether a deviation between the time 1999 source(s) in the WAN and the local system time is still 2000 acceptable, normative or legislative regulations shall be 2001 considered. If no regulation exists, a maximum deviation of 2002 3% of the measuring period is allowed to be in 2003 conformance with [PP_GW]. It should be noted that 2004 depending on the kind of application a more accurate 2005 system time is needed. For doing so, the intervall for the 2006 comparison of the system time to a reliable external time 2007 source is configurable. But this aspect is not within the 2008 scope of this Security Target. 2009 Please further note that – depending on the exactness of 2010 the local clock – it may be required to synchronize the time 2011 more often than every 24 hours. 2012 Application Note 29: In FDP_IFF.1.5/MTR the TOE is required to verify the 2013 authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of the Meter Data 2014 133 By the time that this ST is developed however, this time source is not yet available. page 99 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland received from the Meter. The TOE has two options to do 2015 so: 2016 1. To implement a channel between the Meter and the 2017 TOE using the functionality as described in 2018 FCS_COP.1/TLS. 2019 2. To accept, decrypt and verify data that has been 2020 encrypted by the Meter as required in 2021 FCS_COP.1/MTR if a wireless connection to the 2022 meters is established. 2023 The latter possibility can be used only if a wireless 2024 connection between the Meter and the TOE is established. 2025 6.5.5 General Requirements on user data protection 2026 6.5.5.1 Residual information protection (FDP_RIP) 2027 6.5.5.1.1 FDP_RIP.2: Full residual information protection 2028 FDP_RIP.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information 2029 content of a resource is made unavailable upon the 2030 deallocation of the resource from 134 all objects. 2031 Hierarchical to: FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection 2032 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2033 Application Note 30: Please refer to chapter F.9 of part 2 of [CC] for more 2034 detailed information about what kind of information this 2035 requirement applies to. 2036 Please further note that this SFR has been used in order 2037 to ensure that information that is no longer used is made 2038 unavailable from a logical perspective. Specifically, it has 2039 to be ensured that this information is no longer available 2040 via an external interface (even if an access control or 2041 information flow policy would fail). However, this does not 2042 necessarily mean that the information is overwritten in a 2043 134 [selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from] page 100 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland way that makes it impossible for an attacker to get access 2044 to is assuming a physical access to the memory of the 2045 TOE. 2046 6.5.5.2 Stored data integrity (FDP_SDI) 2047 6.5.5.2.1 FDP_SDI.2: Stored data integrity monitoring and action 2048 FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers 2049 controlled by the TSF for integrity errors 135 on all objects, 2050 based on the following attributes: cryptographical check 2051 sum 136. 2052 FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall 2053 create a system log entry137. 2054 Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring 2055 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2056 6.6Class FIA: Identification and Authentication 2057 6.6.1 User Attribute Definition (FIA_ATD) 2058 6.6.1.1 FIA_ATD.1: User attribute definition 2059 FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security 2060 attributes belonging to individual users: 2061 • User Identity 2062 • Status of Identity (Authenticated or not) 2063 • Connecting network (WAN, HAN or LMN) 2064 • Role membership 2065 • none 138. 2066 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2067 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2068 135 [assignment: integrity errors] 136 [assignment: user data attributes] 137 [assignment: action to be taken] 138 [assignment: list of security attributes] page 101 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.6.2 Authentication Failures (FIA_AFL) 2069 6.6.2.1 FIA_AFL.1: Authentication failure handling 2070 FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when 5 139 unsuccessful 2071 authentication attempts occur related to authentication 2072 attempts at IF_GW_CON 140. 2073 FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication 2074 attempts has been met 141, the TSF shall block 2075 IF_GW_CON for 5 minutes 142. 2076 Hierarchical to: No other components 2077 Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication 2078 6.6.3 User Authentication (FIA_UAU) 2079 6.6.3.1 FIA_UAU.2: User authentication before any action 2080 FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully 2081 authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated 2082 actions on behalf of that user. 2083 Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 2084 Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification 2085 Application Note 31: Please refer to [TR-03109-1] for a more detailed overview 2086 on the authentication of TOE users. 2087 6.6.3.2 FIA_UAU.5: Multiple authentication mechanisms 2088 FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide 2089 • authentication via certificates at the IF_GW_MTR 2090 interface 2091 • TLS-authentication via certificates at the 2092 IF_GW_WAN interface 2093 139 [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] 140 [assignment: list of authentication events] 141 [selection: met, surpassed] 142 [assignment: list of actions] page 102 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland • TLS-authentication via HAN-certificates at the 2094 IF_GW_CON interface 2095 • authentication via password at the IF_GW_CON 2096 interface 2097 • TLS-authentication via HAN-certificates at the 2098 IF_GW_SRV interface 2099 • authentication at the IF_GW_CLS interface 2100 • verification via a commands' signature 143 2101 to support user authentication. 2102 FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity 2103 according to the 2104 • meters shall be authenticated via certificates at the 2105 IF_GW_MTR interface only 2106 • Gateway Administrators shall be authenticated via 2107 TLS-certificates at the IF_GW_WAN interface only 2108 • Consumers shall be authenticated via TLS- 2109 certificates or via password at the IF_GW_CON 2110 interface only 2111 • Service Technicians shall be authenticated via 2112 TLS-certificates at the IF_GW_SRV interface only 2113 • CLS shall be authenticated at the IF_GW_CLS only 2114 • each command of an Gateway Administrator shall 2115 be authenticated by verification of the commands' 2116 signature, 2117 • other external entities shall be authenticated via 2118 TLS-certificates at the IF_GW_WAN interface 2119 only 144. 2120 143 [assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms] 144 [assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication] page 103 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Hierarchical to: No other components. 2121 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2122 Application Note 32: Please refer to [TR-03109-1] for a more detailed overview 2123 on the authentication of TOE users. 2124 6.6.3.3 FIA_UAU.6: Re-authenticating 2125 FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate an external entity 145 under 2126 the conditions 2127 • TLS channel to the WAN shall be disconnected 2128 after 48 hours, 2129 • TLS channel to the LMN shall be disconnected after 2130 5 MB of transmitted information, 2131 • other local users shall be re-authenticated after at 2132 least 10 minutes146 of inactivity 147. 2133 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2134 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2135 Application Note 33: This requirement on re-authentication for external entities 2136 in the WAN and LMN is addressed by disconnecting the 2137 TLS channel even though a re-authentication is - strictly 2138 speaking - only achieved if the TLS channel is build up 2139 again. 2140 6.6.4 User identification (FIA_UID) 2141 6.6.4.1 FIA_UID.2: User identification before any action 2142 FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully 2143 identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions 2144 on behalf of that user. 2145 Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 2146 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2147 145 [refinement: the user] 146 [refinement: after at least 10 minutes]. This value is configurable by the authorised Gateway Administrator. 147 [assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required] page 104 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.6.5 User-subject binding (FIA_USB) 2148 6.6.5.1 FIA_USB.1: User-subject binding 2149 FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security 2150 attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: 2151 attributes as defined in FIA_ATD.1 148. 2152 FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial 2153 association of user security attributes with subjects acting 2154 on the behalf of users: 2155 • The initial value of the security attribute ‘connecting 2156 network’ is set to the corresponding physical 2157 interface of the TOE (HAN, WAN, or LMN). 2158 • The initial value of the security attribute ‘role 2159 membership’ is set to the user role claimed on basis 2160 of the credentials used for authentication at the 2161 connecting network as defined in FIA_UAU.5.2. For 2162 role membership ‘Gateway Administrators’, 2163 additionally the remote network endpoint 149used 2164 and configured in the TSF data must be identical. 2165 • The initial value of the security attribute ‘user 2166 identity’ is set to the identification attribute of the 2167 credentials used by the subject. The security 2168 attribute ‘user identity’ is set to the subject key ID of 2169 the certificate in case of a certificate-based 2170 authentication, the meter-ID for wired Meters and 2171 the user name owner in case of a password-based 2172 authentication at interface IF_GW_CON. 2173 • The initial value of the security attribute ‘status of 2174 identity’ is set to the authentication status of the 2175 claimed identity. If the authentication is successful 2176 on basis of the used credentials, the status of 2177 148 [assignment: list of user security attributes] 149 The remote network endpoint can be either the remote IP address or the remote host name. page 105 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland identity is ‘authenticated’, otherwise it is 2178 ‘not authenticated’ 150. 2179 FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing 2180 changes to the user security attributes associated with 2181 subjects acting on the behalf of users: 2182 • security attribute ‘connecting network’ is not 2183 changeable. 2184 • security attribute ‘role membership’ is not 2185 changeable. 2186 • security attribute ‘user identity’ is not changeable. 2187 • security attribute ‘status of identity’ is not 2188 changeable151. 2189 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2190 Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition 2191 6.7Class FMT: Security Management 2192 6.7.1 Management of the TSF 2193 6.7.1.1 Management of functions in TSF (FMT_MOF) 2194 6.7.1.1.1 FMT_MOF.1: Management of security functions 2195 behaviour 2196 FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the behaviour 2197 of 152 the functions for management as defined in 2198 150 [assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes] 151 [assignment: rules for the changing of attributes] 152 [selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of] page 106 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FMT_SMF.1 153 to roles and criteria as defined in Table 2199 13 154. 2200 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2201 Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 2202 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 2203 Table 13: Restrictions on Management Functions 2204 153 [assignment: list of functions] 154 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] 155 The TOE displays the version number of the TOE and the current time of the TOE also to the authorized service techni- cian via the interface IF_GW_SRV because the service technician must be able to determine if the current time of the TOE is correct or if the version number of the TOE is correct. 156 This criterion applies to all management functions. The following entries in this table only augment this restriction further. Function Limitation Display the version number of the TOE Display the current time The management functions must only be accessible for an authorised Consumer and only via the interface IF_GW_CON. An authorized Service Technician is also able to access the version numer of the TOE and the current time of the TOE via interface IF_GW_SRV 155. All other management functions as defined in FMT_SMF.1 The management functions must only be accessible for an authorised Gateway Administrator and only via the interface IF_GW_WAN 156. Firmware Update The firmware update must only be possible after the authenticity of the firmware update has been verified (using the services of the Security Module and the trust anchor of the Gateway developer) and if the version number of the new firmware is higher to the version of the installed firmware. Deletion or modification of events from the Calibration Log A deletion or modification of events from the calibration log must not be possible. page 107 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.7.1.2 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF) 2205 6.7.1.2.1 FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions 2206 FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following 2207 management functions: list of management functions as 2208 defined in Table 14 and Table 15 and additional 2209 functionalities: none 157. 2210 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2211 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2212 157 [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF] 158 The TOE does not have the indicated management ability since there exist no standard method calls for the Gateway Administrator to enforce such management ability. 159 As the rules for audit review are fixed within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply. SFR Management functionality FAU_ARP.1/SYS • The management (addition, removal, or modification) of actions 158 FAU_GEN.1/SYS FAU_GEN.1/CON FAU_GEN.1/CAL - FAU_SAA.1/SYS • Maintenance of the rules by (adding, modifying, deletion) of rules from the set of rules 158 FAU_SAR.1/SYS FAU_SAR.1/CON FAU_SAR.1/CAL - 159 FAU_STG.4/SYS FAU_STG.4/CON • Maintenance (deletion, modification, addition) of actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure 158 • Size configuration of the audit trail that is available before the oldest events get overwritten 158 page 108 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 160 As the actions that shall be performed if the audit trail is full are fixed within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply. FAU_STG.4/CAL - 160 FAU_GEN.2 - FAU_STG.2 • Maintenance of the parameters that control the audit storage capability for the consumer log and the system log 158 FCO_NRO.2 • The management of changes to information types, fields, 158 originator attributes and recipients of evidence FCS_CKM.1/TLS - FCS_COP.1/TLS • Management of key material including key material stored in the Security Module FCS_CKM.1/CMS - FCS_COP.1/CMS • Management of key material including key material stored in the Security Module FCS_CKM.1/MTR - FCS_COP.1/MTR • Management of key material stored in the Security Module and key material brought into the gateway during the pairing process FCS_CKM.4 - FCS_COP.1/HASH - FCS_COP.1/MEM • Management of key material FDP_ACC.2 - FDP_ACF.1 - FDP_IFC.2/FW - page 109 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 161 In the assignment it is not indicated that the authorized Gateway Administrator might be able to define additional security attributes for users. 162 As the rules for re-authentication are fixed within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply. FDP_IFF.1/FW • Managing the attributes used to make explicit access based decisions • Add authorised units for communication (pairing) • Management of endpoint to be contacted after successful wake-up call • Management of CLS systems FDP_IFC.2/MTR - FDP_IFF.1/MTR • Managing the attributes (including Processing Profiles) used to make explicit access based decisions FDP_RIP.2 - FDP_SDI.2 • The actions to be taken upon the detection of an integrity error shall be configurable. 158 FIA_ATD.1 • If so indicated in the assignment, the authorised Gateway Administrator might be able to define additional security attributes for users161. FIA_AFL.1 • Management of the threshold for unsuccessful authentication attempts 158 • Management of actions to be taken in the event of an authentication failure 158 FIA_UAU.2 • Management of the authentication data by an Gateway Administrator FIA_UAU.5 - 162 FIA_UAU.6 • Management of re-authentication time page 110 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 163 As the role that can interact with the security attributes is restricted to the Gateway Administrator within [PP_GW], not all management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do apply. 164 As no role is allowed to specify alternative initial values within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply. 165 As the role that can read, modify, delete or add the security attributes is restricted to the Gateway Administrator within [PP_GW], not all management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do apply. 166 As no role is allowed to specify alternative initial values within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply. 167 As the role that can read, modify, delete or add the security attributes is restricted to the Gateway Administrator within [PP_GW], not all management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do apply. FIA_UID.2 • The management of the user identities FIA_USB.1 • An authorised Gateway Administrator can define default subject security attributes, if so indicated in the assignment of FIA_ATD.1. 158 • An authorised Gateway Administrator can change subject security attributes, if so indicated in the assignment of FIA_ATD.1. 158 FMT_MOF.1 • Managing the group of roles that can interact with the functions in the TSF FMT_SMF.1 - FMT_SMR.1 • Managing the group of users that are part of a role FMT_MSA.1/AC • Management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values 163 158 FMT_MSA.3/AC - 164 FMT_MSA.1/FW • Management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values 165 158 FMT_MSA.3/FW - 166 FMT_MSA.1/MTR • Management of rules by which security attributes inherit specified values 167 158 page 111 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 14: SFR related Management Functionalities 2213 168 As no role is allowed to specify alternative initial values within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply. 169 As the rules for TSF testing are fixed within [PP_GW], the management functions as defined by [CC, part 2] do not apply. 170 As the configuration of the actions that require a trusted channel is fixed by [PP_GW], the management functions as defined in [CC, part 2] do not apply. 171 As the configuration of the actions that require a trusted channel is fixed by [PP_GW], the management functions as defined in [CC, part 2] do not apply. 172 As the configuration of the actions that require a trusted channel is fixed by [PP_GW], the management functions as defined in [CC, part 2] do not apply. FMT_MSA.3/MTR - 168 FPR_CON.1 • Definition of the interval in FPR_CON.1.2 if definable within the operational phase of the TOE 158 FPR_PSE.1 - FPT_FLS.1 - FPT_RPL.1 - FPT_STM.1 • Management a time source FPT_TST.1 - 169 FPT_PHP.1 • Management of the user or role that determines whether physical tampering has occurred 158 FTP_ITC.1/WAN - 170 FTP_ITC.1/MTR - 171 FTP_ITC.1/USR - 172 page 112 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 2214 Table 15: Gateway specific Management Functionalities 2215 6.7.2 Security management roles (FMT_SMR) 2216 6.7.2.1 FMT_SMR.1: Security roles 2217 FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles authorised Consumer, 2218 authorised Gateway Administrator, authorised Service 2219 Technician, the authorised identified roles: authorised 2220 external entity, CLS, and Meter 174. 2221 FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. 2222 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2223 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2224 173 Resetting the TOE will be necessary when the TOE stopped operation due to a critical deviation between local and remote time (see FDP_IFF.1.3/MTR)or when the calibration log is full. 174 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] Gateway specific Management functionality Pairing of a Meter Performing a firmware update Displaying the current version number of the TOE Displaying the current time Management of certificates of external entities in the WAN for communication Resetting of the TOE 173 page 113 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.7.3 Management of security attributes for Gateway access SFP 2225 6.7.3.1 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA) 2226 6.7.3.1.1 FMT_MSA.1/AC: Management of security attributes for 2227 Gateway access SFP 2228 FMT_MSA.1.1/AC The TSF shall enforce the Gateway access SFP 175 to 2229 restrict the ability to query, modify, delete, other 2230 operations: none 176 the security attributes all relevant 2231 security attributes 177 to authorised Gateway 2232 Administrators 178. 2233 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2234 Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or 2235 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], fulfilled by 2236 FDP_ACC.2 2237 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 2238 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 2239 6.7.3.1.2 FMT_MSA.3/AC: Static attribute initialisation for Gateway 2240 access SFP 2241 FMT_MSA.3.1/AC The TSF shall enforce the Gateway access SFP 179 to 2242 provide restrictive 180 default values for security attributes 2243 that are used to enforce the SFP. 2244 FMT_MSA.3.2/AC The TSF shall allow the no role 181 to specify alternative 2245 initial values to override the default values when an object 2246 or information is created. 2247 175 [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] 176 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] 177 [assignment: list of security attributes] 178 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] 179 [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] 180 [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] 181 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] page 114 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Hierarchical to: No other components. 2248 Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes 2249 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 2250 6.7.4 Management of security attributes for Firewall SFP 2251 6.7.4.1 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA) 2252 6.7.4.1.1 FMT_MSA.1/FW: Management of security attributes for 2253 firewall policy 2254 FMT_MSA.1.1/FW The TSF shall enforce the Firewall SFP 182 to restrict the 2255 ability to query, modify, delete, other operations: none 183 2256 the security attributes all relevant security attributes 184 to 2257 authorised Gateway Administrators 185. 2258 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2259 Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or 2260 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], fulfilled by 2261 FDP_IFC.2/FW 2262 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 2263 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 2264 6.7.4.1.2 FMT_MSA.3/FW: Static attribute initialisation for Firewall 2265 policy 2266 FMT_MSA.3.1/FW The TSF shall enforce the Firewall SFP 186 to provide 2267 restrictive 187 default values for security attributes that are 2268 used to enforce the SFP. 2269 182 [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] 183 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] 184 [assignment: list of security attributes] 185 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] 186 [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] 187 [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] page 115 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FMT_MSA.3.2/FW The TSF shall allow the no role 188 to specify alternative 2270 initial values to override the default values when an object 2271 or information is created. 2272 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2273 Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes 2274 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 2275 Application Note 34: The definition of restrictive default rules for the firewall 2276 information flow policy refers to the rules as defined in 2277 FDP_IFF.1.2/FW and FDP_IFF.1.5/FW. Those rules apply 2278 to all information flows and must not be overwritable by 2279 anybody. 2280 6.7.5 Management of security attributes for Meter SFP 2281 6.7.5.1 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA) 2282 6.7.5.1.1 FMT_MSA.1/MTR: Management of security attributes for 2283 Meter policy 2284 FMT_MSA.1.1/MTR The TSF shall enforce the Meter SFP 189 to restrict the 2285 ability to change_default, query, modify, delete, other 2286 operations: none 190 the security attributes all relevant 2287 security attributes 191 to authorised Gateway 2288 Administrators 192. 2289 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2290 Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or 2291 FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control], fulfilled by 2292 FDP_IFC.2/FW 2293 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 2294 188 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] 189 [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)] 190 [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]] 191 [assignment: list of security attributes] 192 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] page 116 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions 2295 6.7.5.1.2 FMT_MSA.3/MTR: Static attribute initialisation for Meter 2296 policy 2297 FMT_MSA.3.1/MTR The TSF shall enforce the Meter SFP 193 to provide 2298 restrictive 194 default values for security attributes that are 2299 used to enforce the SFP. 2300 FMT_MSA.3.2/MTR The TSF shall allow the no role 195 to specify alternative 2301 initial values to override the default values when an object 2302 or information is created. 2303 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2304 Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes 2305 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 2306 2307 6.8Class FPR: Privacy 2308 6.8.1 Communication Concealing (FPR_CON) 2309 6.8.1.1 FPR_CON.1: Communication Concealing 2310 FPR_CON.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Firewall SFP 196 in order to 2311 ensure that no personally identifiable information (PII) can 2312 be obtained by an analysis of frequency, load, size or the 2313 absence of external communication 197. 2314 FPR_CON.1.2 The TSF shall connect to the Gateway Administrator, 2315 authorized External Entity in the WAN 198 in intervals as 2316 193 [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP] 194 [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] 195 [assignment: the authorised identified roles] 196 [assignment: information flow policy] 197 [assignment: characteristics of the information flow that need to be concealed] 198 [assignment: list of external entities] page 117 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland follows daily, other interval: none 199 to conceal the data 2317 flow200. 2318 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2319 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2320 6.8.2 Pseudonymity (FPR_PSE) 2321 6.8.2.1 FPR_PSE.1 Pseudonymity 2322 FPR_PSE.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that external entities in the WAN 201 2323 are unable to determine the real user name bound to 2324 information neither relevant for billing nor for a secure 2325 operation of the Grid sent to parties in the WAN 202. 2326 FPR_PSE.1.2 The TSF shall be able to provide aliases as defined by the 2327 Processing Profiles 203 of the real user name for the 2328 Meter and Gateway identity 204 to external entities in the 2329 WAN 205. 2330 FPR_PSE.1.3 The TSF shall determine an alias for a user 206 and verify 2331 that it conforms to the alias given by the Gateway 2332 Administrator in the Processing Profile207. 2333 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2334 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2335 Application Note 35: When the TOE submits information about the consumption 2336 or production of a certain commodity that is not relevant for 2337 the billing process nor for a secure operation of the Grid, 2338 there is no need that this information is sent with a direct 2339 199 [selection: weekly, daily, hourly, [assignment: other interval]] 200 The TOE uses a randomized value of about ±50 percent per delivery. 201 [assignment: set of users and/or subjects] 202 [assignment: list of subjects and/or operations and/or objects] 203 [assignment: number of aliases] 204 [refinement: of the real user name] 205 [assignment: list of subjects] 206 [selection, choose one of: determine an alias for a user, accept the alias from the user] 207 [assignment: alias metric] page 118 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland link to the identity of the consumer. In those cases, the 2340 TOE shall replace the identity of the Consumer by a 2341 pseudonymous identifier. Please note that the identity of 2342 the Consumer may not be their name but could also be a 2343 number (e.g. consumer ID) used for billing purposes. 2344 A Gateway may use more than one pseudonymous 2345 identifier. 2346 A complete anonymisation would be beneficial in terms of 2347 the privacy of the consumer. However, a complete 2348 anonymous set of information would not allow the external 2349 entity to ensure that the data comes from a trustworthy 2350 source. 2351 Please note that an information flow shall only be initiated 2352 if allowed by a corresponding Processing Profile. 2353 2354 6.9Class FPT: Protection of the TSF 2355 6.9.1 Fail secure (FPT_FLS) 2356 6.9.1.1 FPT_FLS.1: Failure with preservation of secure state 2357 FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following 2358 types of failures occur: 2359 • the deviation between local system time of the TOE 2360 and the reliable external time source is too large, 2361 • TOE hardware / firmware integrity violation or 2362 • TOE software application integrity violation 208. 2363 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2364 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2365 Application Note 36: The local clock shall be as exact as required by normative 2366 or legislative regulations. If no regulation exists, a 2367 208 [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF] page 119 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland maximum deviation of 3% of the measuring period is 2368 allowed to be in conformance with [PP_GW]. 2369 6.9.2 Replay Detection (FPT_RPL) 2370 6.9.2.1 FPT_RPL.1: Replay detection 2371 FPT_RPL.1.1 The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: all 2372 external entities 209. 2373 FPT_RPL.1.2 The TSF shall perform ignore replayed data 210 when 2374 replay is detected. 2375 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2376 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2377 6.9.3 Time stamps (FPT_STM) 2378 6.9.3.1 FPT_STM.1: Reliable time stamps 2379 FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps. 2380 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2381 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2382 2383 6.9.4 TSF self test (FPT_TST) 2384 6.9.4.1 FPT_TST.1: TSF testing 2385 FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial startup, 2386 at the request of a user and periodically during normal 2387 operation 211 to demonstrate the correct operation of the 2388 TSF 212. 2389 209 [assignment: list of identified entities] 210 [assignment: list of specific actions] 211 [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions[assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] 212 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF] page 120 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability 2390 to verify the integrity of TSF data 213. 2391 FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability 2392 to verify the integrity of TSF 214. 2393 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2394 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2395 6.9.5 TSF physical protection (FPT_PHP) 2396 6.9.5.1 FPT_PHP.1: Passive detection of physical attack 2397 FPT_PHP.1.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical 2398 tampering that might compromise the TSF. 2399 FPT_PHP.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether 2400 physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF 2401 elements has occurred. 2402 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2403 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2404 2405 6.10 Class FTP: Trusted path/channels 2406 6.10.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC) 2407 6.10.1.1 FTP_ITC.1/WAN: Inter-TSF trusted channel for WAN 2408 FTP_ITC.1.1/WAN The TSF shall provide a communication channel between 2409 itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct 2410 from other communication channels and provides assured 2411 identification of its end points and protection of the channel 2412 data from modification or disclosure. 2413 213 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data] 214 [selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF] page 121 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FTP_ITC.1.2/WAN The TSF shall permit the TSF 215 to initiate communication 2414 via the trusted channel. 2415 FTP_ITC.1.3/WAN The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted 2416 channel for all communications to external entities in the 2417 WAN 216. 2418 Hierarchical to: No other components 2419 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2420 6.10.1.2 FTP_ITC.1/MTR: Inter-TSF trusted channel for Meter 2421 FTP_ITC.1.1/MTR The TSF shall provide a communication channel between 2422 itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct 2423 from other communication channels and provides assured 2424 identification of its end points and protection of the channel 2425 data from modification or disclosure. 2426 FTP_ITC.1.2/MTR The TSF shall permit the Meter and the TOE 217 to initiate 2427 communication via the trusted channel. 2428 FTP_ITC.1.3/MTR The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted 2429 channel for any communication between a Meter and the 2430 TOE 218. 2431 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2432 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2433 Application Note 37: The corresponding cryptographic primitives are defined by 2434 FCS_COP.1/MTR. 2435 6.10.1.3 FTP_ITC.1/USR: Inter-TSF trusted channel for User 2436 FTP_ITC.1.1/USR The TSF shall provide a communication channel between 2437 itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct 2438 from other communication channels and provides assured 2439 215 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] 216 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required] 217 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] 218 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required] page 122 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland identification of its end points and protection of the channel 2440 data from modification or disclosure. 2441 FTP_ITC.1.2/USR The TSF shall permit the Consumer, the Service 2442 Technician 219 to initiate communication via the trusted 2443 channel. 2444 FTP_ITC.1.3/USR The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted 2445 channel for any communication between a Consumer and 2446 the TOE and the Service Technician and the TOE 220. 2447 Hierarchical to: No other components. 2448 Dependencies: No dependencies. 2449 2450 6.11 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE 2451 The minimum Evaluation Assurance Level for this Security Target is EAL 4 augmented 2452 by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2. The following table lists the assurance components 2453 which are therefore applicable to this ST. 2454 Assurance Class Assurance Component Development ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.4 ADV_IMP.1 ADV_TDS.3 Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1 AGD_PRE.1 Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.4 219 [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] 220 [assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required] page 123 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Assurance Class Assurance Component ALC_CMS.4 ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DVS.1 ALC_LCD.1 ALC_TAT.1 ALC_FLR.2 Security Target Evaluation ASE_CCL.1 ASE_ECD.1 ASE_INT.1 ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_REQ.2 ASE_SPD.1 ASE_TSS.1 Tests ATE_COV.2 ATE_DPT.1 ATE_FUN.1 ATE_IND.2 Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VAN.5 Table 16: Assurance Requirements 2455 page 124 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.12 Security Requirements rationale 2456 6.12.1 Security Functional Requirements rationale 2457 6.12.1.1 Fulfilment of the Security Objectives 2458 This chapter proves that the set of security requirements (TOE) is suited to fulfil the 2459 security objectives described in chapter 4 and that each SFR can be traced back to the 2460 security objectives. At least one security objective exists for each security requirement. 2461 O.Firewall O.SeparateIF O.Conceal O.Meter O.Crypt O.Time O.Protect O.Manage- ment O.Log O.Access FAU_ARP.1/SYS X FAU_GEN.1/SYS X FAU_SAA.1/SYS X FAU_SAR.1/SYS X FAU_STG.4/SYS X FAU_GEN.1/CON X FAU_SAR.1/CON X FAU_STG.4/CON X FAU_GEN.1/CAL X FAU_SAR.1/CAL X FAU_STG.4/CAL X FAU_GEN.2 X FAU_STG.2 X FCO_NRO.2 X page 125 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland O.Firewall O.SeparateIF O.Conceal O.Meter O.Crypt O.Time O.Protect O.Manage- ment O.Log O.Access FCS_CKM.1/TLS X FCS_COP.1/TLS X FCS_CKM.1/CMS X FCS_COP.1/CMS X FCS_CKM.1/MTR X FCS_COP.1/MTR X FCS_CKM.4 X FCS_COP.1/HASH X FCS_COP.1/MEM X X FDP_ACC.2 X FDP_ACF.1 X FDP_IFC.2/FW X X FDP_IFF.1/FW X X FDP_IFC.2/MTR X X FDP_IFF.1/MTR X X FDP_RIP.2 X FDP_SDI.2 X FIA_ATD.1 X page 126 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland O.Firewall O.SeparateIF O.Conceal O.Meter O.Crypt O.Time O.Protect O.Manage- ment O.Log O.Access FIA_AFL.1 X FIA_UAU.2 X FIA_UAU.5 X FIA_UAU.6 X FIA_UID.2 X FIA_USB.1 X FMT_MOF.1 X FMT_SMF.1 X FMT_SMR.1 X FMT_MSA.1/AC X FMT_MSA.3/AC X FMT_MSA.1/FW X FMT_MSA.3/FW X FMT_MSA.1/MTR X FMT_MSA.3/MTR X FPR_CON.1 X FPR_PSE.1 X FPT_FLS.1 X page 127 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland O.Firewall O.SeparateIF O.Conceal O.Meter O.Crypt O.Time O.Protect O.Manage- ment O.Log O.Access FPT_RPL.1 X FPT_STM.1 X X FPT_TST.1 X X FPT_PHP.1 X FTP_ITC.1/WAN X FTP_ITC.1/MTR X FTP_ITC.1/USR X Table 17: Fulfilment of Security Objectives 2462 The following paragraphs contain more details on this mapping. 2463 6.12.1.1.1 O.Firewall 2464 O.Firewall is met by a combination of the following SFRs: 2465 • FDP_IFC.2/FW defines that the TOE shall implement an information flow policy 2466 for its firewall functionality. 2467 • FDP_IFF.1/FW defines the concrete rules for the firewall information flow policy. 2468 • FTP_ITC.1/WAN defines the policy around the trusted channel to parties in the 2469 WAN. 2470 6.12.1.1.2 O.SeparateIF 2471 O.SeparateIF is met by a combination of the following SFRs: 2472 • FDP_IFC.2/FW and FDP_IFF.1/FW implicitly require the TOE to implement 2473 physically separate ports for WAN and LMN. 2474 • FPT_TST.1 implements a self test that also detects whether the ports for WAN 2475 and LAN have been interchanged. 2476 page 128 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.12.1.1.3 O.Conceal 2477 O.Conceal is completely met by FPR_CON.1 as directly follows. 2478 6.12.1.1.4 O.Meter 2479 O.Meter is met by a combination of the following SFRs: 2480 • FDP_IFC.2/MTR and FDP_IFF.1/MTR define an information flow policy to 2481 introduce how the Gateway shall handle Meter Data. 2482 • FCO_NRO.2 ensure that all Meter Data will be signed by the Gateway (invoking 2483 the services of its Security Module) before being submitted to external entities. 2484 • FPR_PSE.1 defines requirements around the pseudonymization of Meter 2485 identities for Status data. 2486 • FTP_ITC.1/MTR defines the requirements around the Trusted Channel that 2487 shall be implemented by the Gateway in order to protect information submitted 2488 via the Gateway and external entities in the WAN or the Gateway and a 2489 distributed Meter. 2490 2491 page 129 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.12.1.1.5 O.Crypt 2492 O.Crypt is met by a combination of the following SFRs: 2493 • FCS_CKM.4 defines the requirements around the secure deletion of ephemeral 2494 cryptographic keys. 2495 • FCS_CKM.1/TLS defines the requirements on key negotiation for the TLS 2496 protocol. 2497 • FCS_CKM.1/CMS defines the requirements on key generation for symmetric 2498 encryption within CMS. 2499 • FCS_COP.1/TLS defines the requirements around the encryption and 2500 decryption capabilities of the Gateway for communications with external parties 2501 and to Meters. 2502 • FCS_COP.1/CMS defines the requirements around the encryption and 2503 decryption of content and administration data. 2504 • FCS_CKM.1/MTR defines the requirements on key negotiation for meter com- 2505 munication encryption. 2506 • FCS_COP.1/MTR defines the cryptographic primitives for meter 2507 communication encryption. 2508 • FCS_COP.1/HASH defines the requirements on hashing that are needed in the 2509 context of digital signatures (which are created and verified by the Security 2510 Module). 2511 • FCS_COP.1/MEM defines the requirements around the encryption of TSF data. 2512 • FPT_RPL.1 ensures that a replay attack for communications with external 2513 entities is detected. 2514 6.12.1.1.6 O.Time 2515 O.Time is met by a combination of the following SFRs: 2516 • FDP_IFC.2/MTR and FDP_IFF.1/MTR define the required update functionality 2517 for the local time as part of the information flow control policy for handling Meter 2518 Data. 2519 • FPT_STM.1 defines that the TOE shall be able to provide reliable time stamps. 2520 2521 page 130 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 6.12.1.1.7 O.Protect 2522 O.Protect is met by a combination of the following SFRs: 2523 • FCS_COP.1/MEM defines that the TOE shall encrypt its TSF and user data as 2524 long as it is not in use. 2525 • FDP_RIP.2 defines that the TOE shall make information unavailable as soon 2526 as it is no longer needed. 2527 • FDP_SDI.2 defines requirements around the integrity protection for stored data. 2528 • FPT_FLS.1 defines requirements that the TOE falls back to a safe state for 2529 specific error cases. 2530 • FPT_TST.1 defines the self testing functionality to detect whether the interfaces 2531 for WAN and LAN are separate. 2532 • FPT_PHP.1 defines the exact requirements around the physical protection that 2533 the TOE has to provide. 2534 6.12.1.1.8 O.Management 2535 O.Management is met by a combination of the following SFRs: 2536 • FIA_ATD.1 defines the attributes for users. 2537 • FIA_AFL.1 defines the requirements if the authentication of users fails multiple 2538 times. 2539 • FIA_UAU.2 defines requirements around the authentication of users. 2540 • FIA_UID.2 defines requirements around the identification of users. 2541 • FIA_USB.1 defines that the TOE must be able to associate users with subjects 2542 acting on behalf of them. 2543 • FMT_MOF.1 defines requirements around the limitations for management of 2544 security functions. 2545 • FMT_MSA.1/AC defines requirements around the limitations for management 2546 of attributes used for the Gateway access SFP. 2547 • FMT_MSA.1/FW defines requirements around the limitations for management 2548 of attributes used for the Firewall SFP. 2549 • FMT_MSA.1/MTR defines requirements around the limitations for management 2550 of attributes used for the Meter SFP. 2551 • FMT_MSA.3/AC defines the default values for the Gateway access SFP. 2552 • FMT_MSA.3/FW defines the default values for the Firewall SFP. 2553 • FMT_MSA.3/MTR defines the default values for the Meter SFP. 2554 page 131 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland • FMT_SMF.1 defines the management functionalities that the TOE must offer. 2555 • FMT_SMR.1 defines the role concept for the TOE. 2556 6.12.1.1.9 O.Log 2557 O.Log defines that the TOE shall implement three different audit processes that are 2558 covered by the Security Functional Requirements as follows: 2559 System Log 2560 The implementation of the system log itself is covered by the use of FAU_GEN.1/SYS. 2561 FAU_ARP.1/SYS and FAU_SAA.1/SYS allow to define a set of criteria for automated 2562 analysis of the audit and a corresponding response. FAU_SAR.1/SYS defines the 2563 requirements around the audit review functions and that access to them shall be limited 2564 to authorised Gateway Administrators via the IF_GW_WAN interface and to authorised 2565 Service Technicians via the IF_GW_SRV interface. Finally, FAU_STG.4/SYS defines 2566 the requirements on what should happen if the audit log is full. 2567 Consumer Log 2568 The implementation of the consumer log itself is covered by the use of 2569 FAU_GEN.1/CON. FAU_STG.4/CON defines the requirements on what should happen 2570 if the audit log is full. FAU_SAR.1/CON defines the requirements around the audit review 2571 functions for the consumer log and that access to them shall be limited to authorised 2572 Consumer via the IF_GW_CON interface. FTP_ITC.1/USR defines the requirements on 2573 the protection of the communication of the Consumer with the TOE. 2574 Calibration Log 2575 The implementation of the calibration log itself is covered by the use of 2576 FAU_GEN.1/CAL. FAU_STG.4/CAL defines the requirements on what should happen 2577 if the audit log is full. FAU_SAR.1/CAL defines the requirements around the audit review 2578 functions for the calibration log and that access to them shall be limited to authorised 2579 Gateway Administrators via the IF_GW_WAN interface. 2580 FAU_GEN.2, FAU_STG.2 and FPT_STM.1 apply to all three audit processes. 2581 6.12.1.1.10 O.Access 2582 FDP_ACC.2 and FDP_ACF.1 define the access control policy as required to address 2583 O.Access. FIA_UAU.5 ensures that entities that would like to communicate with the TOE 2584 are authenticated before any action whereby FIA_UAU.6 ensures that external entities 2585 page 132 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland in the WAN are re-authenticated after the session key has been used for a certain 2586 amount of time. 2587 6.12.1.2 Fulfilment of the dependencies 2588 The following table summarises all TOE functional requirements dependencies of this 2589 ST and demonstrates that they are fulfilled. 2590 SFR Dependencies Fulfilled by FAU_ARP.1/SYS FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis FAU_SAA.1/SYS FAU_GEN.1/SYS FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FPT_STM.1 FAU_SAA.1/SYS FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1/SYS FAU_SAR.1/SYS FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1/SYS FAU_STG.4/SYS FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage FAU_STG.2 FAU_GEN.1/CON FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FPT_STM.1 FAU_SAR.1/CON FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1/CON FAU_STG.4/CON FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage FAU_STG.2 FAU_GEN.1/CAL FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps FPT_STM.1 FAU_SAR.1/CAL FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1/CAL FAU_STG.4/CAL FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage FAU_STG.2 FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FAU_GEN.1/SYS FAU_GEN.1/CON FIA_UID.2 FAU_STG.2 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation FAU_GEN.1/SYS FAU_GEN.1/CON FAU_GEN.1/CAL page 133 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FCO_NRO.2 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FIA_UID.2 FCS_CKM.1/TLS [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1/TLS FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/TLS [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.1/TLS FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1/CMS [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1/CMS FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/CMS [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.1/CMS FCS_CKM.4 FCS_CKM.1/MTR [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_COP.1/MTR FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/MTR [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1/TLS FCS_CKM.4 page 134 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 221 The key will be generated by secure production environment and not the TOE itself. FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.1/TLS FCS_CKM.1/CMS FCS_CKM.1/MTR FCS_COP.1/HASH [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction Please refer to chapter 6.12.1.3 for missing dependency FCS_CKM.4 FCS_COP.1/MEM [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction not fulfilled 221 FCS_CKM.4 FDP_ACC.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_ACC.2 FMT_MSA.3/AC FDP_IFC.2/FW FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes FDP_IFF.1/FW page 135 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FDP_IFF.1/FW FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_IFC.2/FW FMT_MSA.3/FW FDP_IFC.2/MTR FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes FDP_IFF.1/MTR FDP_IFF.1/MTR FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_IFC.2/MTR FMT_MSA.3/MTR FDP_RIP.2 - - FDP_SDI.2 - - FIA_ATD.1 - - FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FIA_UID.2 FIA_UAU.5 - - FIA_UAU.6 - - FIA_UID.2 - - FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition FIA_ATD.1 FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 - - FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification FIA_UID.2 FMT_MSA.1/AC [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FDP_ACC.2 FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 page 136 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MSA.3/AC FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MSA.1/AC FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.1/FW [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FDP_IFC.2/WAN FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MSA.3/FW FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MSA.1/FW FMT_SMR.1 FMT_MSA.1/MTR [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions FDP_IFC.2/MTR FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1 FMT_MSA.3/MTR FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1 Security roles FMT_MSA.1/MTR FMT_SMR.1 FPR_CON.1 - - FPR_PSE.1 - - FPT_FLS.1 - - FPT_RPL.1 - - FPT_STM.1 - - FPT_TST.1 - - page 137 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Table 18: SFR Dependencies 2591 6.12.1.3 Justification for missing dependencies 2592 Dependency FCS_CKM.1 for FCS_COP.1/MEM ist not fulfilled. For the key generation 2593 process an external security module (“D-HSM”) is used so that the key is imported from 2594 an HSM during TOE production. 2595 The hash algorithm as defined in FCS_COP.1/HASH does not need any key material. 2596 As such the dependency to an import or generation of key material is omitted for this 2597 SFR. 2598 6.12.2 Security Assurance Requirements rationale 2599 The decision on the assurance level has been mainly driven by the assumed attack 2600 potential. As outlined in the previous chapters of this Security Target it is assumed that 2601 – at least from the WAN side – a high attack potential is posed against the security 2602 functions of the TOE. This leads to the use of AVA_VAN.5 (Resistance against high 2603 attack potential). 2604 In order to keep evaluations according to this Security Target commercially feasible EAL 2605 4 has been chosen as assurance level as this is the lowest level that provides the 2606 prerequisites for the use of AVA_VAN.5. 2607 Eventually, the augmentation by ALC_FLR.2 has been chosen to emphasize the 2608 importance of a structured process for flaw remediation at the developer’s side, 2609 specifically for such a new technology. 2610 6.12.2.1 Dependencies of assurance components 2611 The dependencies of the assurance requirements taken from EAL 4 are fulfilled 2612 automatically. The augmentation by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_FLR.2 does not introduce 2613 additional assurance components that are not contained in EAL 4. 2614 FPT_PHP.1 - - FTP_ITC.1/WAN - - FTP_ITC.1/MTR - - FTP_ITC.1/USR - - page 138 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 7 TOE Summary Specification 2615 The following paragraph provides a TOE summary specification describing how the TOE 2616 meets each SFR. 2617 2618 7.1SF.1: Authentication of Communication and Role Assignment 2619 for external entities 2620 The TOE contains a software module that authenticates all communication channels 2621 with WAN, HAN and LMN networks. The authentication is based on the TLS 1.2 protocol 2622 compliant to [RFC 5246]. According to [TR-03109], this TLS authentication mechanism 2623 is used for all TLS secured communications channels with external entities. The TOE 2624 does always implement the bidirectional authentication as required by [TR-03109-1] with 2625 one exception: if the Consumer requests a password-based authentication from the 2626 GWA according to [TR-03109-1], and the GWA activates this authentication method for 2627 this Consumer, the TOE uses a unidirectional TLS authentication. Thus, although the 2628 client has not sent a valid certificate, the TOE continues the TLS authentication process 2629 with the password authentication process for this client (see [RFC 5246, chap. 7.4.6.]). 2630 The password policy to be fulfilled hereby is that the password must be at least 10 char- 2631 acters long containing at least one character of each of the following character groups: 2632 capital letters, small letters, digits, and special characters (!"§$%&/()=?+*~#',;.:-_). Fur- 2633 ther characters could also be used. 2634 [TR-03109-1] requires the TOE to use elliptical curves conforming to [RFC 5289] 2635 whereas the following cipher suites are supported: 2636 • TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, 2637 • TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, 2638 • TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, and 2639 • TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384. 2640 The following elliptical curves are supported by the TOE 2641 • BrainpoolP256r1 (according to [RFC 5639]), 2642 • BrainpoolP384r1 (according to [RFC 5639]), 2643 • BrainpoolP512r1 (according to [RFC 5639]), 2644 • NIST P-256 (according to [RFC 5114]), and 2645 • NIST P-384 (according to [RFC 5114]). 2646 page 139 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Alongside, the TOE supports the case of unidirectional communication with wireless me- 2647 ter (via the wM-Bus protocol), where the external entity is authenticated via AES with 2648 CMAC authentication. In this case, the AES algorithm is operating in CBC mode with 2649 128-bit symmetric keys. The authentication is successful in case that the CMAC has 2650 been successfully verified by the use of a cryptographic key Kmac. The cryptographic key 2651 for CMAC authentication (Kmac) is derived from the meter individual key MK conformant 2652 to [TR-03116-3, chap. 7.2]. The meter individual key MK (brought into the TOE by the 2653 GWA) is selected by the TOE through the MAC-protected but unencrypted meter-id sub- 2654 mitted by the meter. 2655 The generation of the cryptographic key material for TLS secured communication chan- 2656 nels utilizes a Security Module. This Security Module is compliant to [TR-03109-2] and 2657 evaluated according to [SecModPP]. 2658 The destruction of cryptographic key material used by the TOE is performed through 2659 “zeroisation”. The TOE stores all ephemeral keys used for TLS secured communication 2660 or other cryptographic operations in the RAM only. For instance, whenever a TLS se- 2661 cured communication is terminated, the TOE wipes the RAM area used for the crypto- 2662 graphic key material with 0-bytes directly after finishing the usage of that material. 2663 The TOE receives the authentication certificate of the external entity during the hand- 2664 shake phase of the TLS protocol. For the establishment of the TLS secured communi- 2665 cation channel, the TOE verifies the correctness of the signed data transmitted during 2666 the TLS protocol handshake phase. While importing an authentication certificate the 2667 TOE verifies the certificate chain of the certificate for all certificates of the SM-PKI ac- 2668 cording to [TR-03109-4]. Note, that the certificate used for the TLS-based authentication 2669 of wired meters is self-signed and not part of the SM-PKI. Additionally, the TOE checks 2670 whether the certificate is configured by the Gateway Administrator for the used interface, 2671 and whether the remote IP address used and configured in the TSF data are identical 2672 (FIA_USB.1). The TOE does not check the certificate’s revocation status. In order to 2673 authenticate the external entity, the key material of the TOE’s communication partner 2674 must be known and trusted. 2675 The following communication types are known to the TOE 222: 2676 a) WAN communication via IF_GW_WAN 2677 222 Please note that the TOE additionally offers the interface IF_GW_SM to the certified Security Module built into the TOE. page 140 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland b) LMN communication via IF_GW_MTR (wireless or wired Meter) 2678 c) HAN communication via IF_GW_CON, IF_GW_CLS or IF_GW_SRV 2679 Except the communication with wireless meters at IF_GW_MTR, all communication 2680 types are TLS-based. In order to accept a TLS communication connection as being au- 2681 thenticated, the following conditions must be fulfilled: 2682 a) The TLS channel must have been established successfully with the required 2683 cryptographic mechanisms. 2684 b) The certificate of the external entity must be known and trusted through config- 2685 uration by the Gateway Administrator, and associated with the according com- 2686 munication type223. 2687 For the successfully authenticated external entity, the TOE performs an internal assign- 2688 ment of the communication type based on the certificate received at the external inter- 2689 face if applicable. The user identity is associated with the name of the certificate owner 2690 in case of a certificate-based authentication or with the user name in case of a password- 2691 based authentication at interface IF_GW_CON. 2692 For the LMN communication of the TOE with wireless (a.k.a. wM-Bus-based) meters, 2693 the external entity is authenticated by the use of the AES-CMAC algorithm and the me- 2694 ter-ID for wired Meters is used for association to the user identity (FIA_USB.1). This 2695 communication is only allowed for meters not supporting TLS-based communication 2696 scenarios. 2697 FCS_CKM.1/TLS is fulfilled by the TOE through the implementation of the pseudoran- 2698 dom function of the TLS protocol compliant to [RFC 5246] while the Security Module is 2699 used by the TOE for the generation of the cryptographic key material. The use of TLS 2700 according to [RFC 5246] and the use of the postulated cipher suites according to 2701 [RFC 5639] fulfill the requirement FCS_COP.1/TLS. The requirements 2702 FCS_CKM.1/MTR and FCS_COP.1/MTR are fulfilled by the use of AES-CMAC-secured 2703 communication for wireless meters. The requirement FCS_CKM.4 is fulfilled by the de- 2704 scribed method of “zeroisation” when destroying cryptographic key material. The imple- 2705 mentation of the described mechanisms (especially the use of TLS and AES-CBC with 2706 CMAC) fulfills the requirements FTP_ITC.1/WAN, FTP_ITC.1/MTR, and 2707 223 Of course, this does not apply if password-based authentication is configured at IF_GW_CON. page 141 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland FTP_ITC.1/USR. FPT_RPL.1 is fulfilled by the use of the TLS protocol respectively the 2708 integration of transmission counters according to [TR-03116-3, chap. 7.3]. 2709 A successfully established connection will be automatically disconnected by the TOE if 2710 a TLS channel to the WAN is established more than 48 hours, if a TLS channel to the 2711 LMN has transmitted more than 5 MB of information or if a channel to a local user is 2712 inactive for a time configurable by the authorised Gateway Administrator of up to 10 2713 minutes, and a new connection establishment will require a new full authentication pro- 2714 cedure (FIA_UAU.6). In any case – whether the connection has been successfully es- 2715 tablished or not – all associated resources related with the connection or connection 2716 attempt are freed. The implementation of this requirement is done by means of the TOE’s 2717 operation system monitoring and limiting the resources of each process. This means 2718 that with each connection (or connection attempt) an internal session is created that is 2719 associated with resources monitored and limited by the TOE. All resources are freed 2720 even before finishing a session if the respective resource is no longer needed so that no 2721 previous information content of a resource is made available. Especially, the associated 2722 cryptographic key material is wiped as soon it is no longer needed. As such, the TOE 2723 ensures that during the phase of connection termination the internal session is also ter- 2724 minated and by this, all internal data (associated cryptographic key material and volatile 2725 data) is wiped by the zeroisation procedure described. Allocated physical resources are 2726 also freed. In case non-volatile data is no longer needed, the associated resources data 2727 are freed, too. The TOE doesn’t reuse any objects after deallocation of the resource 2728 (FDP_RIP.2). 2729 If the external entity can be successfully authenticated on basis of the received certificate 2730 (or the password in case of a consumer using password authentication) and the ac- 2731 claimed identity could be approved for the used external interface, the TOE associates 2732 the user identity, the authentication status and the connecting network to the role ac- 2733 cording to the internal role model (FIA_ATD.1). In order to implement this, the TOE uti- 2734 lizes an internal data model which supplies the allowed communication network and 2735 other restricting properties linked with the submitted security attribute on the basis of the 2736 submitted authentication data providing the multiple mechanisms for authentication of 2737 any user's claimed identity according to the necessary rules according to [TR-03109-1] 2738 (FIA_UAU.5). 2739 In case of wireless meter communication (via the wM-Bus protocol), the security attribute 2740 of the Meter is the meter-id authenticated by the CMAC, where the meter-id is the identity 2741 providing criterion that is used by the TOE. The identity of the Meter is associated to the 2742 page 142 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland successfully authenticated external entity by the TOE and linked to the respective role 2743 according to Table 5 and its active session. In this case, the identity providing criterion 2744 is also the meter-id. 2745 The TOE enforces an explicit and complete security policy protecting the data flow for 2746 all external entities (FDP_IFC.2/FW, FDP_IFF.1/FW, FDP_IFC.2/MTR, 2747 FDP_IFF.1/MTR). The security policy defines the accessibility of data for each external 2748 entity and additionally the permitted actions for these data. Moreover, the external enti- 2749 ties do also underlie restrictions for the operations which can be executed with the TOE 2750 (FDP_ACF.1). In case that it is not possible to authenticate an external entity success- 2751 fully (e.g. caused by unknown authentication credentials), no other action is allowed on 2752 behalf of this user and the concerning connection is terminated (FIA_UAU.2). Any com- 2753 munication is only possible after successful authentication and identification of the ex- 2754 ternal entity (FIA_UID.2, FIA_USB.1). 2755 The reception of the wake-up service data package is a special case that requests the 2756 TOE to establish a TLS authenticated and protected connection to the Gateway Admin- 2757 istrator. The TOE validates the data package due to its compliance to the structure de- 2758 scribed in [TR-03109-1] and verifies the ECDSA signature with the public key of the 2759 Gateway Administrator’s certificate which must be known and trusted to the TOE. The 2760 TOE does n ot perform a revocation check or any validity check compliant to the shell 2761 model. The TOE verifies the electronic signature successfully when the certificate is 2762 known, trusted and associated to the Gateway Administrator. The TOE establishes the 2763 connection to the Gateway Administrator when the package has been validated due to 2764 its structural conformity, the signature has been verified and the integrated timestamp 2765 fulfills the requirements of [TR-03109-1]. Receiving the data package and the successful 2766 validation of the wake-up package does not mean that the Gateway Administrator has 2767 successfully been authenticated. 2768 If the Gateway Administrator could be successfully authenticated based on the certificate 2769 submitted during the TLS handshake phase, the role will be assigned by the TOE ac- 2770 cording to now approved identity based on the internal role model and the TLS channel 2771 will be established. 2772 WAN roles 2773 The TOE assigns the following roles in the WAN communication (FMT_SMR.1): 2774 • authorised Gateway Administrator, 2775 • authorised External Entity. 2776 page 143 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland The role assignment is based on the X.509 certificate used by the external entity during 2777 TLS connection establishment. The TOE has explicit knowledge of the Gateway Admin- 2778 istrator’s certificate and the assignment of the role “Gateway Administrator” requires the 2779 successful authentication of the WAN connection. 2780 The assignment of the role “Authorized External Entity” requires the X.509 certificate 2781 that is used during the TLS handshake to be part of an internal trust list that is under 2782 control of the TOE. 2783 The role “Authorized External Entity” can be assigned to more than one external entity. 2784 HAN roles 2785 The TOE differentiates and assigns the following roles in the HAN communication 2786 (FMT_SMR.1): 2787 • authorised Consumer 2788 • authorised Service Technician 2789 The role assignment is based on the X.509 certificate used by the external entity for 2790 TLS-secured communication channels or on password-based authentication at interface 2791 IF_GW_CON if configured (FIA_USB.1). 2792 The assignment of roles in the HAN communication requires the successful identification 2793 of the external entity as a result of a successful authentication based on the certificate 2794 used for the HAN connection. The certificates used to authenticate the “Consumer” or 2795 the “Service Technician” are explicitly known to the TOE through configuration by the 2796 Gateway Administrator. 2797 Multi-client capability in the HAN 2798 The HAN communication might use more than one, parallel and independent authenti- 2799 cated communication channels. The TOE ensures that the certificates that are used for 2800 the authentication are different from each other. 2801 The role “Consumer” can be assigned to multiple, parallel sessions. The TOE ensures 2802 that these parallel sessions are logically distinct from each other by the use of different 2803 authentication information. This ensures that only the Meter Data associated with the 2804 authorized user are provided and Meter Data of other users are not accessible. 2805 LMN roles 2806 One of the following authentication mechanisms is used for Meters: 2807 page 144 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland a) authentication by the use of TLS according to [RFC 5246] for wired Meters 2808 a) authentication by the use of AES with CMAC authentication according to 2809 [RFC 3394] for wireless Meters. 2810 The TOE explicitly knows the identification credentials needed for authentication (X.509 2811 certificate when using TLS; meter-id in conjunction with CMAC and known Kmac when 2812 using AES) through configuration by the Gateway Administrator. If the Meter could be 2813 successfully authenticated and the claimed identity could thus be proved, the according 2814 role “Authorised External Entity” is assigned by the TOE for this Meter at IF_GW_MTR 2815 based on the internal role model. 2816 LMN multi-client capabilities 2817 The LMN communication can be run via parallel, logically distinct and separately au- 2818 thenticated communication channels. The TOE ensures that the authentication creden- 2819 tials of each separate channel are different. 2820 The TOE’s internal policy for access to data and objects under control of the TOE is 2821 closely linked with the identity of the external entity at IF_GW_MTR according to the 2822 TOE-internal role model. Based on the successfully verified authentication data, a per- 2823 mission catalogue with security attributes is internally assigned, which defines the al- 2824 lowed actions and access permissions within a communication channel. 2825 The encapsulation of the TOE processes run by this user is realized through the mech- 2826 anisms offered by the TOE´s operating system and very restrictive user rights for each 2827 process. Each role is assigned to a separate, limited user account in the TOE´s operating 2828 system. For all of these accounts, it is only allowed to read, write or execute the files 2829 absolutely necessary for implementing the program logic. For each identity interacting 2830 with the TOE, a separate operating system process is started. Especially, the databases 2831 used by the TOE and the logging service are adequately separated for enforcement of 2832 the necessary security domain separation (FDP_ACF.1). The allowed actions and ac- 2833 cess permissions and associated objects are assigned to the successfully approved 2834 identity of the user based on the used authentication credentials and the resulting asso- 2835 ciated role. The current session is unambiguously associated with this user. No interac- 2836 tion (e.g. access to Meter Data) is possible without an appropriate permission catalogue 2837 (FDP_ACC.2). The freeing of the role assignment and associated resources are ensured 2838 through the monitoring of the current session. 2839 page 145 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 7.2SF.2: Acceptance and Deposition of Meter Data, Encryption of 2840 Meter Data for WAN transmission 2841 The TOE receives Meter Data from an LMN communication channel and deposits these 2842 Meter Data with the associated data for tariffing in a database especially assigned to this 2843 individual Meter residing in an encrypted file system (FCS_COP.1/MEM). The time in- 2844 terval for receiving or retrieving Meter Data can be configured individually per meter 2845 through a successfully authenticated Gateway Administrator and are initialized by the 2846 TOE during the setup procedure with pre-defined values. 2847 The Meter Data are cryptographically protected and their integrity is verified by the TOE 2848 before the tariffing and deposition is performed. In case of a TLS secured communica- 2849 tion, the integrity and confidentiality of the transmitted data is protected by the TLS pro- 2850 tocol according to [RFC 5246]. In case of a unidirectional communication at 2851 IF_GW_MTR/wireless, the integrity is verified by the verification of the CMAC check sum 2852 whereas the protection of the confidentiality is given by the use of AES in CBC mode 2853 with 128 bit key length in combination with the CMAC authentication (FCS_CKM.1/MTR, 2854 FCS_COP.1/MTR). The AES encryption key has been brought into the TOE via a man- 2855 agement function during the pairing process for the Meter. In the TOE’s internal data 2856 model, the used cryptographic keys Kmac and Kenc are associated with the meter-id due 2857 to the fact of the unidirectional communication. The TOE contains a packet monitor for 2858 Meter Data to avoid replay attacks based on the re-sending of Meter Data packages. In 2859 case of recognized data packets which have already been received and processed by 2860 the TOE, these data packets are blocked by the packet monitor (FPT_RPL.1). 2861 Concerning the service layers, the TOE detects replay attacks that can occur during 2862 authentication processes against the TOE or for example receiving data from one of the 2863 involved communication networks. This is for instance achieved through the correct in- 2864 terpretation of the strictly increasing ordering numbers for messages from the meters (in 2865 case that a TLS-secured communication channel is not used), through the enforcement 2866 of an appropriate time slot of execution for successfully authenticated wake-up calls, and 2867 of course through the use of the internal means of the TLS protocol according to 2868 [RFC 5246] (FPT_RPL.1). 2869 The deposition of Meter Data is performed in a way that these Meter Data are associated 2870 with a permission profile. This means that all of the operations and actions that can be 2871 taken with these data as described afterwards (e.g. sending via WAN to an Authenti- 2872 cated External Entity) depend on the permissions which are associated with the 2873 page 146 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Meter Data. For metrological purposes, the Meter Data’s security attribute - if applicable 2874 - will be persisted associated with its corresponding Meter Data by the TOE. All user 2875 associated data stored by the TOE are protected by an AES-128-CMAC value. Before 2876 accessing these data, the TOE verifies the CMAC value that has been applied to the 2877 user data and detects integrity errors on any data and especially on user associated 2878 Meter Data in a reliable manner (FDP_SDI.2). 2879 Closely linked with the deposition of the Meter Data is the assignment of an unambigu- 2880 ous and reliable timestamp on these data. The reliability grounds on the regular use of 2881 an external time source offering a sufficient exactness (FPT_STM.1) which is used to 2882 synchronize the operating system of the TOE. A maximum deviation of 3% of the meas- 2883 uring period is allowed to be in conformance with [PP_GW]. The data set (Meter Data 2884 and tariff data) is associated with the timestamp in an inseparably manner because each 2885 Meter Data entry in the database includes the corresponding time stamp and the data- 2886 base is cryptographically protected through the encrypted file system. For details about 2887 database encryption please see page 151). 2888 For transmission of consumption data (tariffed Meter Data) or status data into the WAN, 2889 the TOE ensures that the data are encrypted and digitally signed (FCO_NRO.2, 2890 FCS_CKM.1/CMS, FCS_COP.1/CMS, FCS_COP.1/HASH, FCS_COP.1/MEM). In case 2891 of a successful transmission of consumption data into the WAN, beside the transmitted 2892 data the data’s signature applied by the TOE is logged in the Consumer-Log for the 2893 respective Consumer at IF_GW_CON thus providing the possibility not only for the re- 2894 cipient to verify the evidence of origin for the transmitted data but to the Consumer at 2895 IF_GW_CON, too (FCO_NRO.2). The encryption is performed with the hybrid encryption 2896 as specified in [TR-03109-1-I] in combination with [TR-03116-3]. The public key of the 2897 external entity, the data have to be encrypted for, is known by the TOE through the 2898 authentication data configured by the Gateway Administrator and its assigned identity. 2899 This public key is assumed by the TOE to be valid because the TOE does not verify the 2900 revocation status of certificates. The public key used for the encryption of the derived 2901 symmetric key used for transmission of consumption data is different from the public key 2902 in the TLS certificate of the external entity used for the TLS secured communication 2903 channel. The derivation of the hybrid key used for transmission of consumption data is 2904 done according to [TR-03116-3, chapter 8]. 2905 The TOE does also foresee the case that the data is encrypted for an external entity that 2906 is not directly assigned to the external entity holding the active communication channel. 2907 The electronic signature is created through the utilization of the Security Module whereas 2908 page 147 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland the TOE is responsible for the computation of the hash value for the data to be signed. 2909 Therefore, the TOE utilizes the SHA-256 or SHA-384 hash algorithm. The SHA-512 hash 2910 algorithm is available in the TOE but not yet used (FCS_COP.1/HASH). The data to be 2911 sent to the external entity are prepared on basis of the tariffed meter data. The data to 2912 be transmitted are removed through deallocation of the resources after the (successful 2913 or unsuccessful) transmission attempt so that afterwards no previous information will be 2914 available (FDP_RIP.2). The created temporary session keys which have been used for 2915 encryption of the data are also deleted by the already described zeroisation mechanism 2916 as soon they are no longer needed (FCS_CKM.4). 2917 The time interval for transmission of the data is set for a daily transmission, and can be 2918 additionally configured by the Gateway Administrator. The TOE sends randomly gener- 2919 ated messages into the WAN, so that through this the analysis of frequency, load, size 2920 or the absence of external communication is concealed (FPR_CON.1). Data that are not 2921 relevant for accounting are aliased for transmission so that no personally identifiable 2922 information (PII) can be obtained by an analysis of not billing-relevant information sent 2923 to parties in the WAN. Therefore, the TOE utilizes the alias as defined by the Gateway 2924 Administrator in the Processing Profile for the Meter identity to external parties in the 2925 WAN. Thereby, the TOE determines the alias for a user and verifies that it conforms to 2926 the alias given in the Processing Profile (FPR_PSE.1). 2927 2928 7.3SF.3: Administration, Configuration and SW Update 2929 The TOE includes functionality that allows its administration and configuration as well as 2930 updating the TOE’s complete firmware (“firmware updates”) or only the software appli- 2931 cation including the service layer (“software updates”). This functionality is only provided 2932 for the authenticated Gateway Administrator (FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1/AC, 2933 FMT_MSA.1/FW, FMT_MSA.1/MTR). 2934 The following operations can be performed by the successfully authenticated Gateway 2935 Administrator: 2936 a) Definition and deployment of Processing Profiles including user administration, 2937 rights management and setting configuration parameters of the TOE 2938 b) Deployment of tariff information 2939 c) Deployment and installation of software/firmware updates 2940 page 148 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland A complete overview of the possible management functions is given in Table 14 and 2941 Table 15 (FMT_SMF.1). Beside the possibility for a successfully authenticated Service 2942 Technician to view the system log via interface IF_GW_SRV, administrative or configu- 2943 ration measures on the TOE can only be taken by the successfully authenticated Gate- 2944 way Administrator. 2945 In order to perform these measures, the TOE has to establish a TLS secured channel 2946 to the Gateway Administrator and must authenticate the Gateway Administrator suc- 2947 cessfully. There are two possibilities: 2948 a) The TOE independently contacts the Gateway Administrator at a certain time 2949 specified in advance by the Gateway Administrator. 2950 b) Through a message sent to the wake-up service, the TOE is requested to con- 2951 tact the Gateway Administrator. 2952 In the second case, the wake-up data packet is received by the TOE from the WAN and 2953 checked by the TOE for structural correctness according to [TR-03109-1]. Afterwards, 2954 the TOE verifies the correctness of the electronic signature applied to the wake-up mes- 2955 sage data packet using the certificate of the Gateway Administrator stored in the TSF 2956 data. Afterwards, a TLS connection to the Gateway Administrator is established by the 2957 TOE and the above mentioned operations can be performed. 2958 Software/firmware updates always have to be signed by the TOE manufacturer. 2959 Software/firmware updates can be of different content: 2960 a) The whole boot image of the TOE is changed. 2961 b) Only individual components of the TOE are changed. These components can 2962 be the boot loader plus the static kernel or the SMGW application. 2963 The update packet is realized in form of an archive file enveloped into a CMS signature 2964 container according to [RFC 5652]. The electronic signature of the update packet is cre- 2965 ated using signature keys from the TOE manufacturer. The verification of this signature 2966 is performed by the TOE using the TOE's Security Module using the trust anchor of the 2967 TOE manufacturer. If the signature of the transferred data could not be successfully 2968 verified by the TOE or if the version number of the new firmware is not higher than the 2969 version number of the installed firmware, the received data is rejected by the TOE and 2970 not used for further processing. Any administrator action is entered in the System Log of 2971 the TOE. Additionally, an authorised Consumer can interact with the TOE via the 2972 page 149 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland interface IF_GW_CON to get the version number and the current time displayed 2973 (FMT_MOF.1). 2974 The signature of the update packet is immediately verified after receipt. After successful 2975 verification of the update packet the update process is immediately performed. In each 2976 case, the Gateway Administrator gets notified by the TOE and an entry in the TOE´s 2977 system log will be written. 2978 All parameters that can be changed by the Gateway Administrator are preset with re- 2979 strictive values by the TOE. No role can specify alternative initial values to override these 2980 restrictive default values (FMT_MSA.3/AC, FMT_MSA.3/FW, FMT_MSA.3/MTR). 2981 This mechanism is supported by the TOE-internal resource monitor that internally mon- 2982 itors existing connections, assigned roles and operations allowed at a specific time. 2983 2984 7.4SF.4: Displaying Consumption Data 2985 The TOE offers the possibility of displaying consumption data to authenticated Consum- 2986 ers at interface IF_GW_CON. Therefore, the TOE contains a web server that implements 2987 TLS-based communication with mutual authentication (FTP_ITC.1/USR). If the Con- 2988 sumer requests a password-based authentication from the GWA according to [TR- 2989 03109-1] and the GWA activates this authentication method for this Consumer, the TOE 2990 uses TLS authentication with server-side authentication and HTTP digest access au- 2991 thentication according to [RFC 7616]. In both cases, the requirement FCO_NRO.2 is 2992 fulfilled through the use of TLS-based communication and through encryption and digital 2993 signature of the (tariffed) Meter Data to be displayed using FCS_COP.1/HASH. 2994 To additionally display consumption data, a connection at interface IF_GW_CON must 2995 be established and the role “(authorised) Consumer” is assigned to the user with his 2996 used display unit by the TOE. Different Consumer can use different display units. The 2997 amount of allowed connection attempts at IF_GW_CON is set to 5. In case the amount 2998 of allowed connection attempts is reached, the TOE blocks IF_GW_CON (FIA_AFL.1). 2999 The display unit has to technically support the applied authentication mechanism and 3000 the HTTP protocol version 1.1 according to [RFC 2616] as communication protocol. Data 3001 is provided as HTML data stream and transferred to the display unit. In this case, further 3002 processing of the transmitted data stream is carried out by the display unit. 3003 According to [TR-03109-1], the TOE exclusively transfers Consumer specific consump- 3004 tion data to the display unit. The Consumer can be identified in a clear and unambiguous 3005 page 150 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland manner due to the applied authentication mechanism. Moreover, the TOE ensures that 3006 exclusively the data actually assigned to the Consumer is provided at the display unit 3007 via IF_GW_CON (FIA_USB.1). 3008 3009 7.5SF.5: Audit and Logging 3010 The TOE generates audit data for all actions assigned in the System-Log 3011 (FAU_GEN.1/SYS), the Consumer-Log (FAU_GEN.1/CON), and the Calibration-Log 3012 (FAU_GEN.1/CAL) as well. On the one hand, this applies to the values measured by 3013 the Meter (Consumer-Log) and on the other hand to system data (System-Log) used by 3014 the Gateway Administrator of the TOE in order to check the TOE’s current functional 3015 status. In addition, metrological entries are created in the Calibration-Log. The TOE thus 3016 distinguishes between the following log classes: 3017 a) System-Log 3018 b) Consumer-Log 3019 c) Calibration-Log 3020 The TOE audits and logs all security functions that are used. Thereby, the TOE compo- 3021 nent accomplishing this security audit functionality includes the necessary rules moni- 3022 toring these audited events and through this indicating a potential violation of the en- 3023 forcement of the TOE security functionality (e. g. in case of an integrity violation, replay 3024 attack or an authentication failure). If such a security breach is detected, it is shown as 3025 such in the log entry (FAU_SAA.1/SYS). 3026 The System-Log can only be read by the authorized Gateway Administrator via interface 3027 IF_GW_WAN or by an authorized Service Technician via interface IF_GW_SRV 3028 (FAU_SAR.1/SYS). Potential security breaches are separately indicated and identified 3029 as such in the System-Log and the GWA gets informed about this potential security 3030 breach (FAU_ARP.1/SYS, FDP_SDI.2). Data of the Consumer-Log can exclusively be 3031 viewed by authenticated Consumers via interface IF_GW_CON designed to display con- 3032 sumption data (FAU_SAR.1/CON). The data included in the Calibration-Log can only be 3033 read by the authenticated Gateway Administrator via interface IF_GW_WAN 3034 (FAU_SAR.1/CAL). 3035 If possible, each log entry is assigned to an identity that is known to the TOE. For audit 3036 events resulting from actions of identified users resp. roles, the TOE associates the 3037 page 151 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland generated log information to the identified users while generating the audit information 3038 (FAU_GEN.2). 3039 Generated audit and log data are stored in a cryptographically secured storage. For this 3040 purpose, a file-based SQL database system is used securing its’ data using an AES- 3041 XTS-128 encrypted file system (AES in XTS mode with 128-bit keys) according to 3042 [FIPS Pub. 197] and [NIST 800-38E]. This is achieved by using device-specific AES 3043 keys so that the secure environment can only be accessed with the associated symmet- 3044 ric key available. Using an appropriately limited access of this symmetric, the TOE im- 3045 plements the necessary rules so that it can be ensured that unauthorised modification 3046 or deletion is prohibited (FAU_STG.2). 3047 Audit and log data are stored in separate locations: One location is used to store Con- 3048 sumer-specific log data (Consumer-Log) whereas device status data and metrological 3049 data are stored in a separate location: status data are stored in the System-Log and 3050 metrological data are stored in the Calibration-Log. Each of these logs is located in phys- 3051 ically separate databases secured by different cryptographic keys. In case of several 3052 external meters, a separate database is created for each Meter to store the respective 3053 consumption and log data (FAU_GEN.2). 3054 If the audit trail of the System-Log or the Consumer-Log is full (so that no further data 3055 can be added), the oldest entries in the audit trail are overwritten (FAU_STG.2, 3056 FAU_STG.4/SYS, FAU_STG.4/CON). If the Consumer-Log‘s oldest audit record must 3057 be kept because the period of billing verification (of usually 15 months) has not beeen 3058 reached, the TOE’s metrological activity is paused until the oldest audit record gets 3059 deletable. Thereafter, the TOE’s metrological activity is started again through an internal 3060 timer. Moreover, the mechanism for storing log entries is designed in a way that these 3061 entries are cryptographically protected against unauthorized deletion. This is especially 3062 achieved by assigning cryptographic keys to each of the individual databases for the 3063 System-Log, Consumer-Log and Calibration-Log. 3064 If the Calibration-Log cannot store any further data, the operation of the TOE is stopped 3065 through the termination of its metering services and the TOE informs the Gateway Ad- 3066 ministrator by creating an entry in the System-Log, so that additional measures can be 3067 taken by the Gateway Administrator. Calibration-Log entries are never overwritten by 3068 the TOE (FAU_STG.2, FAU_STG.4/CAL, FMT_MOF.1). 3069 The TOE anonymizes the data in a way that no conclusions about a specific person or 3070 user can be drawn from the log or recorded not billing relevant data. Stored consumption 3071 page 152 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland data are exclusively intended for accounting with the energy supplier. The data stored 3072 in the System-Log are used for analysis purposes concerning necessary technical anal- 3073 yses and possible security-related information. 3074 7.6SF.6: TOE Integrity Protection 3075 The TOE makes physical tampering detectable through the TOE's sealed packaging of 3076 the device. So if an attacker opens the case, this can be physically noticed, e. g. by the 3077 Service Technician (FPT_PHP.1). 3078 The TOE provides a secure boot mechanism. Beginning from the AES-128-encrypted 3079 bootloader protected by a digital signature applied by the TOE manufacturer, each sub- 3080 sequent step during the boot process is based on the previous step establishing a con- 3081 tinuous forward-concatenation of cryptographical verification procedures. Thus, it is en- 3082 sured that each part of the firmware, that means the operating system, the service layers 3083 and the software application in general, is tested by the TOE during initial startup. 3084 Thereby, a test of the TSF data being part of the software application is included. During 3085 this complete self-test, it is checked that the electronic system of the physical device, 3086 and all firmware components of the TOE are in authentic condition. This complete self- 3087 test can also be run at the request of the successfully authenticated Gateway Adminis- 3088 trator via interface IF_GW_WAN or at the request of the successfully authenticated Ser- 3089 vice Technician via interface IF_GW_SRV. At the request of the successfully authenti- 3090 cated Consumer via interface IF_GW_CON, the TOE will only test the integrity of the 3091 Smart Metering software application including the service layers (without the operating 3092 system) and the completeness of the TSF data stored in the TOE’s database. Addition- 3093 ally, the TOE itself runs a complete self-test periodically at least once a month during 3094 normal operation. The integrity of TSF data stored in the TOE’s database is always 3095 tested during read access of that part of TSF data (FPT_TST.1). FPT_RPL.1 is fulfilled 3096 by the use of the TLS protocol respectively the integration of transmission counters ac- 3097 cording to [TR-03116-3, chap. 7.3], and through the enforcement of an appropriate time 3098 slot of execution for successfully authenticated wake-up calls. 3099 If an integrity violation of the TOE’s hardware or firmware is detected or if the deviation 3100 between local system time of the TOE and the reliable external time source is too large, 3101 further use of the TOE for the purpose of gathering Meter Data is not possible. Also in 3102 this case, the TOE signals the incorrect status via a suitable signal output on the case 3103 page 153 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland of the device, and the further use of the TOE for the purpose of gathering Meter Data is 3104 not allowed (FPT_FLS.1). 3105 Basically, if an integrity violation is detected, the TOE will create an entry in the System 3106 Log to document this status for the authorised Gateway Administrator on interface 3107 IF_GW_WAN resp. for the authorised Service Technician on interface IF_GW_SRV, and 3108 will inform the Gateway Administrator on this incident (FAU_ARP.1/SYS, 3109 FAU_GEN.1/SYS, FAU_SAR.1/SYS, FPT_TST.1). 3110 7.7TSS Rationale 3111 The following table shows the correspondence analysis for the described TOE security 3112 functionalities and the security functional requirements. 3113 SF.1 SF.2 SF.3 SF.4 SF.5 SF.6 FAU_ARP.1/SYS X (X) FAU_GEN.1/SYS X (X) FAU_SAA.1/SYS X FAU_SAR.1/SYS X (X) FAU_STG.4/SYS X FAU_GEN.1/CON X FAU_SAR.1/CON X FAU_STG.4/CON X FAU_GEN.1/CAL X FAU_SAR.1/CAL X FAU_STG.4/CAL X FAU_GEN.2 X page 154 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland SF.1 SF.2 SF.3 SF.4 SF.5 SF.6 FAU_STG.2 X FCO_NRO.2 X X FCS_CKM.1/TLS X FCS_COP.1/TLS X FCS_CKM.1/CMS X FCS_COP.1/CMS X FCS_CKM.1/MTR X X FCS_COP.1/MTR X X FCS_CKM.4 X X FCS_COP.1/HASH X FCS_COP.1/MEM X FDP_ACC.2 X FDP_ACF.1 X FDP_IFC.2/FW X FDP_IFF.1/FW X FDP_IFC.2/MTR X FDP_IFF.1/MTR X FDP_RIP.2 X X FDP_SDI.2 X X page 155 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland SF.1 SF.2 SF.3 SF.4 SF.5 SF.6 FIA_ATD.1 X FIA_AFL.1 X FIA_UAU.2 X FIA_UAU.5 X FIA_UAU.6 X FIA_UID.2 X FIA_USB.1 X X FMT_MOF.1 X X FMT_SMF.1 X FMT_SMR.1 X FMT_MSA.1/AC X FMT_MSA.3/AC X FMT_MSA.1/FW X FMT_MSA.3/FW X FMT_MSA.1/MTR X FMT_MSA.3/MTR X FPR_CON.1 X FPR_PSE.1 X FPT_FLS.1 X page 156 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland SF.1 SF.2 SF.3 SF.4 SF.5 SF.6 FPT_RPL.1 X X x FPT_STM.1 X FPT_TST.1 X FPT_PHP.1 X FTP_ITC.1/WAN X FTP_ITC.1/MTR X FTP_ITC.1/USR X X Table 19: Rationale for the SFR and the TOE Security Functionalities 224 3114 224 Please note that SFRs marked with “(X)” only have supporting effect on the fulfilment of the TSF. page 157 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 8 List of Tables 3115 TABLE 1: SMART METER GATEWAY PRODUCT CLASSIFICATIONS............................................... 10 3116 TABLE 2: COMMUNICATION FLOWS BETWEEN DEVICES IN DIFFERENT NETWORKS ............... 24 3117 TABLE 3: MANDATORY TOE EXTERNAL INTERFACES..................................................................... 29 3118 TABLE 4: CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT OF THE TOE AND ITS SECURITY MODULE .................... 30 3119 TABLE 5: ROLES USED IN THE SECURITY TARGET ......................................................................... 35 3120 TABLE 6: ASSETS (USER DATA).......................................................................................................... 37 3121 TABLE 7: ASSETS (TSF DATA) ............................................................................................................. 38 3122 TABLE 8: RATIONALE FOR SECURITY OBJECTIVES ........................................................................ 54 3123 TABLE 9: LIST OF SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS......................................................... 65 3124 TABLE 10: OVERVIEW OVER AUDIT PROCESSES ............................................................................ 67 3125 TABLE 11: EVENTS FOR CONSUMER LOG ........................................................................................ 72 3126 TABLE 12: CONTENT OF CALIBRATION LOG..................................................................................... 77 3127 TABLE 13: RESTRICTIONS ON MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS.......................................................... 106 3128 TABLE 14: SFR RELATED MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONALITIES ....................................................... 111 3129 TABLE 15: GATEWAY SPECIFIC MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONALITIES ............................................ 112 3130 TABLE 16: ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS........................................................................................ 123 3131 TABLE 17: FULFILMENT OF SECURITY OBJECTIVES ..................................................................... 127 3132 TABLE 18: SFR DEPENDENCIES ....................................................................................................... 137 3133 TABLE 19: RATIONALE FOR THE SFR AND THE TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONALITIES ................ 156 3134 3135 page 158 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 9 List of Figures 3136 FIGURE 1: THE TOE AND ITS DIRECT ENVIRONMENT..................................................................... 13 3137 FIGURE 2: THE LOGICAL INTERFACES OF THE TOE ....................................................................... 15 3138 FIGURE 3: THE PRODUCT WITH ITS TOE AND NON-TOE PARTS ................................................... 17 3139 FIGURE 4: THE TOE’S PROTOCOL STACK......................................................................................... 19 3140 FIGURE 5: CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION FLOW FOR DISTRIBUTED METERS AND GATEWAY 3141 ........................................................................................................................................................ 32 3142 3143 page 159 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 10 Appendix 3144 10.1 Mapping from English to German terms 3145 English term German term billing-relevant abrechnungsrelevant CLS, Controllable Local System dezentral steuerbare Verbraucher- oder Erzeugersysteme Consumer Anschlussnutzer; Letztverbraucher (im verbrauchenden Sinne); u.U. auch Einspeiser Consumption Data Verbrauchsdaten Gateway Kommunikationseinheit Grid Netz (für Strom/Gas/Wasser) Grid Status Data Zustandsdaten des Versorgungsnetzes LAN, Local Area Network Lokales Kommunikationsnetz LMN, Local Metrological Network Lokales Messeinrichtungsnetz Meter Messeinrichtung (Teil eines Messsystems) Processing Profiles Konfigurationsprofile Security Module Sicherheitsmodul (z.B. eine Smart Card) Service Provider Diensteanbieter Smart Meter, Smart Metering System 225 Intelligente, in ein Kommunikationsnetz eingebundene, elektronische Messeinrichtung (Messsystem) TOE EVG (Evaluierungsgegenstand) 225 Please note that the terms “Smart Meter” and “Smart Metering System” are used synonymously within this document. page 160 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland WAN, Wide Area Network Weitverkehrsnetz (für Kommunikation) 3146 page 161 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 10.2 Glossary 3147 Term Description Authenticity property that an entity is what it claims to be (according to [SD_6]) Block Tariff Tariff in which the charge is based on a series of different energy/volume rates applied to successive usage blocks of given size and supplied during a specified period. (according to [CEN]) BPL Broadband Over Power Lines, a method of power line communica- tion CA Certification Authority, an entity that issues digital certificates. CLS config CDMA Code Division Multiple Access CLS config (secondary asset) See chapter 3.2 CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax Confidentiality the property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities, or processes (according to [SD_6]) Consumer End user of electricity, gas, water or heat (according to [CEN]). See chapter 3.1 DCP Data Co-Processor; security hardware of the CPU DLMS Device Language Message Specification DTBS Data To Be Signed EAL Evaluation Assurance Level page 162 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Term Description Energy Service Provider Organisation offering energy related services to the Consumer (ac- cording to [CEN]) ETH Ethernet external entity See chapter 3.1 firmware update See chapter 3.2 Gateway Administrator (GWA) See chapter 3.1 Gateway config (secondary asset) See chapter 3.2 Gateway time See chapter 3.2 G.hn Gigabit Home Networks GPRS General Packet Radio Service, a packet oriented mobile data ser- vice Home Area Network (HAN) In-house data communication network which interconnects domestic equipment and can be used for energy management purposes (adopted according to [CEN]). Integrity property that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorised and undetected manner (according to [SD_6]) IT-System Computersystem Local Area Network (LAN) Data communication network, connecting a limited number of com- munication devices (Meters and other devices) and covering a mod- erately sized geographical area within the premises of the consumer. In the context of this ST, the term LAN is used as a hypernym for HAN and LMN (according to [CEN], adopted). page 163 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Term Description Local attacker See chapter 3.4 LTE Long Term Evolution mobile broadband communication standard Meter config (secondary asset) See chapter 3.2 Local Metrological Network (LMN) In-house data communication network which interconnects metrological equipment. Meter Data See chapter 3.2 Meter Data Aggregator (MDA) Entity which offers services to aggregate metering data by grid supply point on a contractual basis. NOTE: The contract is with a supplier. The aggregate is of all that supplier's consumers connected to that particular grid supply point. The aggregate may include both metered data and data estimated by reference to standard load profiles (adopted from [CEN]) Meter Data Collector (MDC) Entity which offers services on a contractual basis to collect metering data related to a supply and provide it in an agreed format to a data aggregator (that can also be the DNO). NOTE: The contract is with a supplier or a pool. The collection may be carried out by manual or automatic means. ([CEN]) Meter Data Management System (MDMS) System for validating, storing, processing and analysing large quantities of Meter Data. ([CEN]) Metrological Area Network In-house data communication network which interconnects metrological equipment (i.e. Meters) OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer OMS Open Metering System page 164 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Term Description OCOTP On-Chip One-time-programmable Personally Identifiable Information (PII) Personally Identifiable Information refers to information that can be used to uniquely identify, contact, or locate a single person or can be used with other sources to uniquely identify a single individual. RJ45 registered jack #45; a standardized physical network interface RMII Reduced Media Independent Interface RTC Real Time Clock Service Technician Human entity being responsible for diagnostic purposes. Smart Metering System The Smart Metering System consists of a Smart Meter Gateway and connected to one or more meters. In addition, CLS (i.e. generation plants) may be connected with the gateway for dedicated communi- cation purposes. SML Smart Message Language Tariff Price structure (normally comprising a set of one or more rates of charge) applied to the consumption or production of a product or service provided to a Consumer (according to [CEN]). TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol TLS Transport Layer Security protocol according to [RFC 5246] TOE Target of Evaluation - set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance TSF TOE security functionality UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter page 165 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Term Description WAN attacker See chapter 3.4 WLAN Wireless Local Area Network page 166 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland 11 Literature 3148 [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security 3149 Evaluation – 3150 Part 1: Introduction and general model, April 2017, ver- 3151 sion 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001, 3152 https://www.commoncriteriapor- 3153 tal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART1V3.1R5.pdf 3154 Part 2: Security functional requirements, April 2017, ver- 3155 sion 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002, 3156 https://www.commoncriteriapor- 3157 tal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART2V3.1R5.pdf 3158 Part 3: Security assurance requirements, April 2017, ver- 3159 sion 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003, 3160 https://www.commoncriteriapor- 3161 tal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3.1R5.pdf 3162 [CEN] SMART METERS CO-ORDINATION GROUP (SM-CG) 3163 Item 5. M/441 first phase deliverable – Communication – 3164 Annex: Glossary (SMCG/Sec0022/DC) 3165 [PP_GW] Protection Profile for the Gateway of a Smart Metering 3166 System (Smart Meter Gateway PP), Schutzprofil für die 3167 Kommunikationseinheit eines intelligenten Messsystems 3168 für Stoff- und Energiemengen, SMGW-PP, v.1.3, Bundes- 3169 amt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 31.03.2014 3170 [SecModPP] Protection Profile for the Security Module of a Smart Me- 3171 ter Gateway (Security Module PP), Schutzprofil für das 3172 Sicherheitsmodul der Kommunikationseinheit eines intelli- 3173 genten Messsystems für Stoff- und Energiemengen, 3174 SecMod-PP, Version 1.0.2, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in 3175 der Informationstechnik, 18.10.2013 3176 [SD_6] ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 N7446, Standing Document 6 3177 (SD6): Glossary of IT Security Terminology 2009-04-29, 3178 available at 3179 page 167 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland http://www.teletrust.de/uploads/me- 3180 dia/ISOIEC_JTC1_SC27_IT_Security_Glossary_Tele- 3181 TrusT_Documentation.pdf 3182 [TR-02102] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102, Kryptographische 3183 Verfahren: Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen, Bundes- 3184 amt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Version 3185 2022-01 3186 [TR-03109] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109, Version 1.1, Bun- 3187 desamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 3188 22.09.2021 3189 [TR-03109-1] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-1, Anforderungen an 3190 die Interoperabilität der Kommunikationseinheit eines 3191 Messsystems, Version 1.1, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in 3192 der Informationstechnik, 17.09.2021 3193 [TR-03109-1-I] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-1 Anlage I, CMS- 3194 Datenformat für die Inhaltsdatenverschlüsselung und - 3195 signatur, Version 1.0.9, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 3196 Informationstechnik, 18.03.2013 3197 [TR-03109-1-VI] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-1 Anlage VI, Be- 3198 triebsprozesse, Version 1.0, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in 3199 der Informationstechnik, 18.03.2013 3200 [TR-03109-2] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-2, Smart Meter Ga- 3201 teway – Anforderungen an die Funktionalität und In- 3202 teroperabilität des Sicherheitsmoduls, Version 1.1, Bun- 3203 desamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 3204 15.12.2014 3205 [TR-03109-3] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-3, Kryptographische 3206 Vorgaben für die Infrastruktur von intelligenten Messsys- 3207 temen, Version 1.1, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Infor- 3208 mationstechnik, 17.04.2014 3209 [TR-03109-4] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-4, Smart Metering 3210 PKI - Public Key Infrastruktur für Smart Meter Gateways, 3211 page 168 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Version 1.2.1, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informati- 3212 onstechnik, 09.08.2017 3213 [TR-03109-6] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03109-6, Smart Meter Ga- 3214 teway Administration, Version 1.0, Bundesamt für Sicher- 3215 heit in der Informationstechnik, 26.11.2015 3216 [TR-03111] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03111, Elliptic Curve Cryp- 3217 tography (ECC), Version 2.1, 01.06.2018 3218 [TR-03116-3] Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-03116-3, Kryptographische 3219 Vorgaben für Projekte der Bundesregierung, Teil 3 - Intel- 3220 ligente Messsysteme, Stand 2023, Bundesamt für Sicher- 3221 heit in der Informationstechnik, 06.12.2022 3222 [AGD_Consumer] Handbuch für Verbraucher, Smart Meter Gateway, Ver- 3223 sion 4.15, 15.08.2024, Power Plus Communications AG 3224 [AGD_Techniker] Handbuch für Service-Techniker, Smart Meter Gateway, 3225 Version 5.13, 15.08.2024, Power Plus Communications 3226 AG 3227 [AGD_GWA] Handbuch für Hersteller von Smart-Meter Gateway-Admi- 3228 nistrations-Software, Smart Meter Gateway, Version 4.18, 3229 15.08.2024, Power Plus Communications AG 3230 [AGD_SEC] Auslieferungs- und Fertigungsprozeduren, Anhang Si- 3231 chere Auslieferung, Version 1.13, 08.07.2024, Power 3232 Plus Communications AG 3233 [SMGW_Logging] Logmeldungen, SMGW, Version 3.5, 29.07.2024, Power 3234 Plus Communications AG 3235 [FIPS Pub. 140-2] NIST, FIPS 140-3, Security Requirements for crypto- 3236 graphic modules, 2019 3237 [FIPS Pub. 180-4] NIST, FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard, 2015 3238 [FIPS Pub. 197] NIST, FIPS 197, Advances Encryption Standard (AES), 3239 2001 3240 [IEEE 1901] IEEE Std 1901-2010, IEEE Standard for Broadband over 3241 Power Line Networks: Medium Access Control and Physi- 3242 cal Layer Specifications, 2010 3243 page 169 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland [IEEE 802.3] IEEE Std 802.3-2008, IEEE Standard for Information 3244 technology, Telecommunications and information ex- 3245 change between systems, Local and metropolitan area 3246 networks, Specific requirements, 2008 3247 [ISO 10116] ISO/IEC 10116:2006, Information technology -- Security 3248 techniques -- Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher, 3249 2006 3250 [NIST 800-38A] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for 3251 Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Tech- 3252 niques, December 2001, http://nvl- 3253 pubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublica- 3254 tion800-38a.pdf 3255 [NIST 800-38D] NIST Special Publication 800-38D, Recommendation for 3256 Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode 3257 (GCM) and GMAC, M. Dworkin, November 2007, 3258 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP- 3259 800-38D.pdf 3260 [NIST 800-38E] NIST Special Publication 800-38E, Recommendation for 3261 Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode 3262 for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, M. Dworkin, Janu- 3263 ary, 2010, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800- 3264 38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf 3265 [RFC 2104] RFC 2104, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authenti- 3266 cation, M. Bellare, R. Canetti und H. Krawczyk, February 3267 1997, http://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt 3268 [RFC 2616] RFC 2616, Hypertext Transfer Protocol - HTTP/1.1, R. 3269 Fielding, J. Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Frystyk, P. Masinter, P. 3270 Leach, T. Berners-Lee, June 1999, http://rfc-edi- 3271 tor.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt 3272 [RFC 7616] RFC 7616, HTTP Digest Access Authentication, R. 3273 Shekh-Yusef, D. Ahrens, S. Bremer, September 2015, 3274 http://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7616.txt 3275 page 170 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland [RFC 3394] RFC 3394, Schaad, J. and R. Housley, Advanced En- 3276 cryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm, September 3277 2002, http://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3394.txt 3278 [RFC 3565] RFC 3565, J. Schaad, Use of the Advanced Encryption 3279 Standard (AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic 3280 Message Syntax (CMS), July 2003, http://rfc-edi- 3281 tor.org/rfc/rfc3565.txt 3282 [RFC 4493] IETF RFC 4493, The AES-CMAC Algorithm, J. H. Song, J. 3283 Lee, T. Iwata, June 2006, http://www.rfc-edi- 3284 tor.org/rfc/rfc4493.txt 3285 [RFC 5083] RFC 5083, R. Housley, Cryptographic Message Syntax 3286 (CMS) 3287 Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type, November 3288 2007, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5083.txt 3289 [RFC 5084] RFC 5084, R. Housley, Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM 3290 Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message 3291 Syntax (CMS), November 2007, 3292 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5084.txt 3293 [RFC 5114] RFC 5114, Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with 3294 IETF Standards, M. Lepinski, S. Kent, January 2008, 3295 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5114.txt 3296 [RFC 5246] RFC 5246, T. Dierks, E. Rescorla, The Transport Layer 3297 Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, August 2008, 3298 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt 3299 [RFC 5289] RFC 5289, TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA- 3300 256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM), E. 3301 Rescorla, RTFM, Inc., August 2008, 3302 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5289.txt 3303 [RFC 5639] RFC 5639, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool 3304 Standard Curves and Curve Generation, M. Lochter, BSI, 3305 J. Merkle, secunet Security Networks, March 2010, 3306 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt 3307 page 171 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland [RFC 5652] RFC 5652, Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), R. 3308 Housley, Vigil Security, September 2009, 3309 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5652.txt 3310 [EIA RS-485] EIA Standard RS-485, Electrical Characteristics of Gener- 3311 ators and Receivers for Use in Balanced Multipoint Sys- 3312 tems, ANSI/TIA/EIA-485-A-98, 1983/R2003 3313 [EN 13757-1] M-Bus DIN EN 13757-1: Kommunikationssysteme für 3314 Zähler und deren Fernablesung Teil 1: Datenaustausch 3315 [EN 13757-3] M-Bus DIN EN 13757-3, Kommunikationssysteme für 3316 Zähler und deren Fernablesung Teil 3: Spezielle Anwen- 3317 dungsschicht 3318 [EN 13757-4] M-Bus DIN EN 13757-4, Kommunikationssysteme für 3319 Zähler und deren Fernablesung Teil 4: Zählerauslesung 3320 über Funk, Fernablesung von Zählern im SRD-Band von 3321 868 MHz bis 870 MHz 3322 [IEC-62056-5-3-8] Electricity metering – Data exchange for meter reading, 3323 tariff and load control – Part 5-3-8: Smart Message Lan- 3324 guage SML, 2012 3325 [IEC-62056-6-1] IEC-62056-6-1, Datenkommunikation der elektrischen 3326 Energiemessung, Teil 6-1: OBIS Object Identification Sys- 3327 tem, 2017, International Electrotechnical Commission 3328 [IEC-62056-6-2] IEC-62056-6-2, Datenkommunikation der elektrischen 3329 Energiemessung - DLMS/COSEM, Teil 6-2: COSEM Inter- 3330 face classes, 2017, International Electrotechnical Commis- 3331 sion 3332 [IEC-62056-21] IEC-62056-21, Direct local data exchange - Mode C, 2011, 3333 International Electrotechnical Commission 3334 [LUKS] LUKS On-Disk Format Specification Version 1.2.1, Clem- 3335 ens Fruhwirth, October 16th, 2011 3336 [PACE] The PACE-AA Protocol for Machine Readable Travel Doc- 3337 uments, and its Security, Jens Bender, Ozgur Dagdelen, 3338 page 172 of 173 © 2024 Power Plus Communications AG, Mannheim, Deutschland Marc Fischlin and Dennis Kügler, http://fc12.ifca.ai/pre- 3339 proceedings/paper_49.pdf 3340 [X9.63] ANSI X9.63, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial 3341 Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key Transport Us- 3342 ing Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 2011 3343 [G865] DVGW-Arbeitsblatt G865 Gasabrechnung, 11/2008 3344 [VDE4400] VDE-AR-N 4400:2011-09, Messwesen Strom, VDE-An- 3345 wendungsregel, 01.09.2011 3346 [DIN 43863-5] DIN: Herstellerübergreifende Identifikationsnummer für 3347 Messeinrichtungen, 2012 3348 [USB] Universal Serial Bus Specification, Revision 2.0, April 27, 3349 2000, USB Communications CLASS Specification for 3350 Ethernet Devices, http://www.usb.org/develop- 3351 ers/docs/usb20_docs/#usb20spec 3352 [ITU G.hn] G.996x Unified high-speed wireline-based home network- 3353 ing transceivers, 2018 3354 Power Plus Communications AG • Dudenstrasse 6 • 68167 Mannheim • Deutschland • www.ppc-ag.de #pwib#pigjnpiz5jnjnpo Power Plus Communications AG Dudenstraße 6, 68167 Mannheim Tel. 00 49 621 40165 100 | Fax. 00 49 621 40165 111 info@ppc-ag.de | www.ppc-ag.de