Security Target Lite Please read the Important Notice and Warnings at the end of this document v3.6
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IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h, IFX_CCI_0031h,
IFX_CCI_0032h, IFX_CCI_0034h T23
Security Target Lite
Revision: v3.6
Security Target Lite Please read the Important Notice and Warnings at the end of this document v3.6
www.infineon.com 2018-09-17
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Table of Contents
Contents
Table of Contents............................................................................................................................................................................... 2
1 Security Target Lite Introduction (ASE_INT)..................................................................................................... 4
1.1 ST reference......................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.2 TOE Reference .................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.3 TOE Overview ..................................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.3.1 TOE Definition and Usage........................................................................................................................................ 5
1.3.2 TOE major security features................................................................................................................................... 5
1.4 TOE description.................................................................................................................................................................. 5
1.4.1 TOE components ......................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.4.2 Physical scope of the TOE........................................................................................................................................ 8
1.4.3 Logical scope of the TOE........................................................................................................................................... 8
1.4.4 Interfaces of the TOE ................................................................................................................................................. 9
1.4.5 Forms of Delivery........................................................................................................................................................ 9
1.4.6 Production sites.........................................................................................................................................................10
1.4.7 TOE Configuration ....................................................................................................................................................10
1.4.8 TOE initialization with Customer Software....................................................................................................11
2 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)..........................................................................................................................12
2.1 CC Conformance Claim..................................................................................................................................................12
2.2 PP Claim...............................................................................................................................................................................12
2.3 Package Claim ...................................................................................................................................................................12
2.4 Conformance Rationale.................................................................................................................................................13
2.4.1 Security Problem Definition:................................................................................................................................13
2.4.2 Conformance Rationale:.........................................................................................................................................13
2.4.3 Adding Objective........................................................................................................................................................13
2.4.4 Summary.......................................................................................................................................................................13
3 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)............................................................................................................15
3.1 Threats.................................................................................................................................................................................15
3.1.1 Additional Threat due to TOE specific Functionality .................................................................................15
3.1.2 Assets regarding the Threats................................................................................................................................16
3.2 Organizational Security Policies................................................................................................................................16
3.3 Assumptions......................................................................................................................................................................16
4 Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)..............................................................................................................................17
4.1 Security objectives of the TOE....................................................................................................................................17
4.2 Security Objectives for the development and operational Environment.................................................18
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale.....................................................................................................................................18
5 Extended Component Definition (ASE_ECD) ...................................................................................................19
5.1 Component “Subset TOE security testing (FPT_TST.2)”.................................................................................19
5.2 Definition of FPT_TST.2 ................................................................................................................................................19
5.3 TSF self test (FPT_TST).................................................................................................................................................20
6 Security Requirements (ASE_REQ).....................................................................................................................21
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements.................................................................................................................21
6.1.1 Definition required by [1]......................................................................................................................................22
6.1.2 Extended Components FCS_RNG.1 and FAU_SAS.1.....................................................................................22
6.1.3 Support of Cipher Schemes...................................................................................................................................23
6.1.4 Subset of TOE testing...............................................................................................................................................25
6.1.5 Memory access control ...........................................................................................................................................26
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6.1.6 Memory Access Control Policy.............................................................................................................................26
6.1.7 Data Integrity..............................................................................................................................................................29
6.1.8 Support of Flash Loader .........................................................................................................................................30
6.1.9 Flash Loader Policy...................................................................................................................................................30
6.1.10 Support of Authentication of the Security IC.................................................................................................33
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements..................................................................................................................33
6.2.1 Refinements.................................................................................................................................................................34
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale.............................................................................................................................34
6.3.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements.................................................................................34
6.3.2 Rationale of the Assurance Requirements......................................................................................................37
7 TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS).............................................................................................................39
7.1 SF_DPM: Device Phase Management.......................................................................................................................39
7.2 SF_PS: Protection against Snooping.........................................................................................................................39
7.3 SF_PMA: Protection against Modifying Attacks ..................................................................................................39
7.4 SF_PLA: Protection against Logical Attacks..........................................................................................................39
7.5 SF_CS: Cryptographic Support....................................................................................................................................39
7.6 Assignment of Security Functional Requirements to TOE’s Security Functionality............................39
7.7 Security Requirements are internally consistent...............................................................................................40
8 References..................................................................................................................................................................42
8.1 Literature............................................................................................................................................................................42
9 Appendix: hash signatures of the HSL................................................................................................................43
10 Appendix: hash signatures of the SCL ................................................................................................................44
11 Appendix: hash signatures of UMSLC lib...........................................................................................................45
12 List of Abbreviations...............................................................................................................................................46
13 Glossary.......................................................................................................................................................................48
14 Revision History.......................................................................................................................................................50
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1 Security Target Lite Introduction (ASE_INT)
1.1 ST reference
The Security Target Lite has the revision v3.6 and is dated 2018-09-17. The title of this document is
IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h, IFX_CCI_0031h, IFX_CCI_0032h, IFX_CCI_0034h T23 Security Target Lite.
1.2 TOE Reference
The Security Target Lite comprises an Infineon Technologies Security Controller named IFX_CCI_000Dh,
IFX_CCI_0020h, IFX_CCI_0031h, IFX_CCI_0032h, IFX_CCI_0034h design step T23 with optional HSL
v2.62.7626, optional SCL version v2.04.003, UMSLC lib v01.00.0234 with specific IC-dedicated firmware
identifier 80.301.05.1 and user guidance in the following called TOE (Target of evaluation).
The Security Target Lite is based on the Protection Profile “Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile” [1].
The Protection Profile and the Security Target Lite are built in compliance to Common Criteria v3.1.
The targeted assurance level is EAL5+.
Table 1 Identification
Hardware Version Method of identification
IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h,
IFX_CCI_0031h, IFX_CCI_0032h,
IFX_CCI_0034h (each of the
comma separated term is a
Common Criteria Certification
Identifier)
T23 (design step) Non-ISO ATR
firmware
BOS 80.301.05.1 Non-ISO ATR: firmware identifier
Flash-loader v8.07.006 Flash-loader function
Software
HSL v2.62.7626 HSL function
UMSLC v01.00.0234 UMSLC function
SCL v2.04.003 SCL function
User Guidance
32-bit Security Controller – V02,
Hardware Reference Manual
V7.0, 2018-06-13 document
32-bit ARM-based Securtity
Controller, SLC 37/40-nm
Technology, Programmer’s
Reference Manual
V4.0, 2018-04-13 document
32-bit Security Controller – V02,
Security Guidelines
v1.00-1797, 2018-04-24 document
Production and personalization
32-bit ARM-based security
controller
v.3.4, 2018-05-14 document
HSL library for SLCx7 in 40nm v02.62.7626, 2017-12-13 document
UMSLC library for SLCx7 in 40nm,
Version 01.00.0234
V1.1, 2018-05-23 document
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Hardware Version Method of identification
SCL37-uSCP-v3-C40 Symmetric
Crypto Library for uSCP-v3 DES
/AES
v2.04.003, 2018-03-02 document
A customer can identify the TOE hardware and its configuration (for details see chapter 1.4.7) using the
Non-ISO ATR. The Non-ISO ATR outputs a Common Criteria Certification Identifier and firmware identifier,
which links the TOE to this ST. Specific firmware functions can be used to determine the exact configuration
of a device from the certified range defined in Table 3
1.3 TOE Overview
1.3.1 TOE Definition and Usage
The TOE consists of smart card ICs (Security Controllers), firmware and user guidance meeting high
requirements in terms of performance and security designed by Infineon Technologies AG. This TOE is
intended to be used in smart cards for security-relevant applications and as developing platform for smart
card operating systems according to the lifecycle model from [1]
The term Smartcard Embedded Software is used in the following for all operating systems and applications
stored and executed on the TOE. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard Embedded Software. The
Smartcard Embedded Software itself is not part of the TOE. The TOE does not require any non-TOE
hardware/software/firmware.
1.3.2 TOE major security features
 Cryptographic support: TDES, AES, RNG (PTG.2 according to [6])
 Memory protection unit supporting different memory access levels
 Memory encryption
 Robust set of sensors and detectors for the purpose of monitoring proper chip operating conditions
 Redundant alarm propagation and system deactivation principle
 Register protection
 Security life control
 Program flow integrity protection
 Peripheral access control
 Bus encryption for security peripherals
 Tearing safe NVM programming
 Security optimized wiring
 Leakage control of data dependent code execution
 Device phase management supporting isolation of test features and flash loader accessibility
 Detection of NVM single and multi bit errors
1.4 TOE description
1.4.1 TOE components
1.4.1.1 Hardware components
Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the TOE hardware:
Figure 1 Block diagram of TOE hardware
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Peripherals
Peripheral Bus
Filters/
Sensors
TRNG
SPAU
Memory System
IFX ROM
Solid FlashTM
NVM
RAM
ICS Memory Bus
Core:
 CPU
 NVIC
 MPU
 ISS
µSCP
CLKU
2x timer
& WDT
UART/
GPIO
UMSLC
CPAU
The TOE hardware consists of a core, a memory system and peripherals.
The major components of the core system are a 32-bit CPU (Central Processing Unit), an MPU (Memory
Protection Unit), a Nested Vectored Interrupt Controller (NVIC) and an Instruction Stream Signature
Checking (ISS).
The MPU of the core stores code and data in a linear 4-GByte memory space (32-bit range), allowing direct
access without the need to swap memory segments in and out of memory using a memory protection unit.
There are two separate bus entities: a memory bus and a peripheral bus for high-speed communication with
the peripherals.
The SPAU can be configured by the user to block or allow peripheral access. It can also be used to block RAM
areas (For keeping Figure 1 simple, the connection between SPAU and RAM is not shown). The CPAU enables
the user to block or allow unprivileged level access to NVM and specific registers of ICS and NVM.
The CPU accesses memory via the Internal Ciphering System (ICS), which encrypts/decrypts memory
content. All data of the memory block is encrypted. The NVM is equipped with an error correction code
(ECC). Security modules manage the alarms. Alarms may be triggered when the environmental conditions
are outside the specified operational range.
A set of sensors (temperature sensor, backside light detector, glitch sensor, low frequency sensor) is used to
detect excessive deviations from the specified operational range and serve for robustness of the TOE. The
UMSLC function can be used to test the alarm lines.
A True Random Number Generator (TRNG) specially designed for smart card applications is implemented.
The TRNG a class PTG.2 random number generator of [6] and produces genuine random numbers which can
be used internally or by the user software.
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The micro Symmetric Cryptographic Processor (µSCP) supports calculation of dual-key or triple-key triple-
DES and AES.
The implemented sleep mode logic (clock stop mode per ISO/IEC 7816-3) is used to reduce overall power
consumption.
The UART- or GPIO-controlled I/O interface allows the smart card controller and the terminal interface to be
operated independently.
The UMSLC enables the user software to check the activity and proper function of the system’s security
features.
The Clock Unit (CLKU) supplies the clocks for all components of the TOE. The Clock Unit can work in internal
and external clock mode. When operating the internal clock mode the system frequency is derived from an
oscillator, whereas in external clock mode, the system clock is derived from an externally supplied interface
clock.
The watchdog timer triggers an event in case of a counter overflow. The timers are general purpose up-
counting timers.
The ROM is used by IFX only. The user software has to be implemented in SOLID FLASH™ memory. The user
can choose, whether the software is loaded into the SOLID FLASH™ memory by Infineon Technologies AG or
by the user.
The TOE uses Special Function Registers (SFRs). These SFRs are used for general purposes and chip
configuration; they are located in SOLID FLASH™ memory in a configuration area page. The Online
Configuration Check (OCC) function is used for register protection, i.e. controls the modification of relevant
SFR settings.
In case a security violation is detected, secure state is entered by the hardware.
1.4.1.2 Firmware and software components
The TOE provides low-level firmware components: the Boot Software (BOS) and the Flash Loader (FL).
The BOS firmware is used for test purposes during start-up and the FL allows downloading of user software
to the NVM during the manufacturing process. All mandatory functions for start-up and internal testing are
protected by a dedicated hardware firewall with two levels “BOS” and “user”.
The flash loader allows downloading of User Software into the NVM during the manufacturing process. It
uses the µSCP to download encrypted user data.
The software of the TOE consists of packages:
 Optional Symmetric Crypto Library (SCL): The optional SCL is used to provide a high level interface to the
TDES and AES cryptography, which is partly implemented on the hardware component µSCP and
includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The SCL is delivered as object code and in
this way integrated into the user software.
 Optional Hardware Support Layer (HSL): provides functionality via APIs to the Smartcard Embedded
Software . which contains SOLID FLASH™ NVM service routines and functionality for tearing safe
programming of SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
 UMSLC lib: this library provides a wrapper around the UMSLC hardware functionality with measures to
counter fault attacks.
1.4.1.3 User Guidance components
The user guidance consists of the components as follows:
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 32-bit Security Controller – V02, Hardware Reference Manual: description of hardware features and user
interfaces
 32-bit ARM-based Securtity Controller, SLC 37/40-nm Technology, Programmer’s Reference Manual:
description of firmware principles relevant for IC embedded software.
 Production and personalization 32-bit ARM-based security cvontroller:contains detailed information
about the usage of the Flash Loader
 32-bit Security Controller – V02, Security Guidelines: provides the guidance and recommendations to
develop secure software for and secure usage of this TOE.
 HSL library for SLCx7 in 40nm: provides an application interface (API) description and security
guidelines for the optional HSL software part.
 UMSLC library for SLCx7 in 40nm, Version 01.00.0234: provides some guidelines, how to use the UMSLC
library
 SCL37-uSCP-v3-C40 Symmetric Crypto Library for uSCP-v3 DES / AES (optional): User Interface,
contains all interfaces of the SCL. This document is only delivered to the user in case the SCL is part of the
delivered TOE.
1.4.2 Physical scope of the TOE
The physical scope of the TOE is defined by the TOE components described in chapter 1.4.1
1.4.3 Logical scope of the TOE
The logical scope of the TOE consists of the logical security features provided by the TOE. These features are
listed in chapter 1.3.2. More details are provided in this chapter:
 Cryptographic support: TDES, AES (block cipher modes ECB, CBC, CFB, CTR and CMAC); RNG (PTG.2
according to [6])
 Memory protection unit supporting up to eight memory regions with different access rights and two
privilege levels “privileged” and “user”. “User” level is more restricted in using TOE resources compared
to “privileged”
 Memory encryption: all data of memories ROM, RAM and NVM are encrypted. Addresses are scrambled to
disguise the location of data
 Robust set of sensors and detectors for the purpose of monitoring proper chip operating conditions
consisting of a temperature sensor, backside light detector, glitch sensor and low frequency sensor.
 Redundant alarm propagation and system deactivation principle, which decreases the risk of
manipulation and tampering.
 Register protection: protection of security relevant registers against fault attacks using OCC.
 Security life control: a life test on specific security features can be used by the IC embedded software to
detect manipulation of these security features
 Program flow integrity protection: The Instruction Stream Signature Checking (ISS) can be employed by
the IC embedded software to detect illegal program flows and trigger an alarm. The TOE also contains a
watchdog, which may be used to detect program flow manipulations.
 Peripheral access control: The TOE allows the IC embedded software to lock certain peripherals
dynamically.
 Bus encryption for security peripherals: All data transfers to and from dedicated peripherals are
encrypted dynamically.
 Tearing safe NVM programming: the HSL provides specific routines provided for tearing safe
programming. These routines prevent an unspecified interim state by either propagating the pre- or
post-programming condition.
 Security optimized wiring: shield lines in combination with layout measures reduce the risk of successful
manipulative attacks.
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 Leakage control of data dependant code execution: dedicated measures allow the user to reduce such
leakage.
 Device phase management supporting isolation of test features and flash loader accessibility: dedicated
test features employed during production are switched off before customer delivery. The flash loader
usage to download flash data requires a mutual authentication. The flash loader supports permanent
deactivation.
 Detection of NVM single and multi bit errors: Single bit errors are detected and corrected and multi bit
errors detected.
1.4.4 Interfaces of the TOE
 The physical interface of the TOE to the external environment is the entire surface of the IC.
 The electrical interface of the TOE to the external environment is constituted by the pads of the chip:
o The five ISO 7816 pads consist particularly of the contacted RES, I/O, CLK lines and supply
lines VCC and GND. The contact based communication is according to ISO 7816/ETSI/EMV.
o The I2C communication can be driven via the ISO 7816 pads. In this case no other
communication using the ISO 7816 pads is possible.
 The data-oriented I/O interface of the TOE is represented by the I/O pad.
 The interface between firmware and hardware consists of special registers used for hardware
configuration and control (Special Function Registers, SFR).
 Optional: The interface of the TOE to the operating system is covered by the optional HSL routines and by
the instruction set of the TOE.
 The interface of the UMSLC lib defined by the UMSLC lib
 Optional: The interface to the SCL calculations is defined by the SCL
1.4.5 Forms of Delivery
The TOE can be delivered in the form of complete modules, as plain wafers in an IC case (e.g. DSO20) or in
bare dies. The delivery can therefore be at the end of phase 3 or at the end of phase 4 which may also include
pre-personalization steps according to [1]. This means phase 4 is also part of the evaluation process. In any
case the testing of the TOE is finished and the extended test features are removed. From a security policy
point of view the different forms of delivery do not have any impact.
The delivery to the software developer (phase 2  phase 1) contains the documents as described above.
Part of the software delivery is the Flash Loader program, provided by Infineon Technologies AG, running on
the TOE and controlling the download of user software onto the TOE via the UART interface. The download
is only possible after successful authentication. The user software and data must be encrypted before
download. In addition, the user can permanently block further use of the Flash Loader.
The table as follows provides an overview about form and method of TOE deliveries:
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Table 2 TOE deliveries: forms and methods
TOE Component Delivered
Format
Delivery Method Comment
Hardware
IFX_CCI_000Dh, IFX_CCI_0020h,
IFX_CCI_0031h, IFX_CCI_0032h,
IFX_CCI_0034h T23
Wafer, IC case,
packages
Postal transfer in
cages
All materials are delivered to
distribution centers in cages,
locked.
Firmware
All (see Table 1 “firmware”) – – stored on the delivered
hardware.
Software
All software libraries (see Table
1 “Software”)
L251 Library
File (object
code)
Secured
download1
–
Guidance Documentation
HSL library for SLCx7 in 40nm Compiled html
help (chm)
Secured
download1
–
UMSLC library for SLCx7 in
40nm, Version 01.00.0234
Compiled html
help (chm)
Secured
download1
–
All other User Guidance
documents (see Table 1 “User
Guidance”)
PDF Secured
download1
–
1.4.6 Production sites
The TOE may be handled at different production sites but the silicon is produced at Global Foundries fab 7 in
Singapore only. The production site can be determined by the non-ISO ATR.
The delivery measures are described in the ALC_DVS aspect.
1.4.7 TOE Configuration
This TOE is represented by various configurations called products.
The module design, layout and footprint, of all products are identical.
The degree of freedom for configuring the TOE is predefined by Infineon Technologies AG. Table 3 shows the
TOE hardware configurations:
Table 3 TOE hardware configuration options
Memory Values Identification
SOLID FLASH™
up to 800 kBytes
IFX-Mailbox, see [7]
where this value is
encoded
RAM
up to 20 kBytes
IFX-Mailbox, see [7]
where this value is
encoded
1 Secured download is a way of delivery of documentation and TOE related software using a secure ishare connected to Infineon
customer portal. The TOE user needs a DMZ Account to login (authenticate) via the Internet.
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Further the flash-loader can be configured in different ways as explained in the following section.
1.4.8 TOE initialization with Customer Software
This TOE is equipped with Flash Loader software (FL) to download user software, i.e. an operating system
and applications. Various options can be chosen by the user to store software onto the SOLID FLASH™ NVM:
Table 4 Options to initialize the TOE with customer software
Case Option Flash loader status
1 The user or/and a subcontractor
downloads the software into the
SOLID FLASH™ memory. Infineon
Technologies does not receive
any user software.
The Flash Loader can be activated or reactivated
by the user or subcontractor to download
software into the SOLID FLASH™ memory.
2 The user provides software to
download into the SOLID
FLASH™ memory to Infineon
Technologies AG. The software is
loaded into the SOLID FLASH™
memory during chip production.
There is no Flash Loader present.
3 The user provides software to
download into the SOLID
FLASH™ memory to Infineon
Technologies AG. The software is
loaded into the NVM memory
during chip production.
The Flash Loader is blocked by Infineon but can
be activated or reactivated by the user or
subcontractor to download software into the
SOLID FLASH™ memory. The user is required to
provide a reactivation procedure as part of the
software to Infineon Technologies AG.
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2 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target (ST) Lite and the TOE claim conformance to Common Criteria version v3.1 part 1 [2],
part 2 [3] and part 3 [4].
Conformance of this ST is claimed for:
Common Criteria part 2 extended and Common Criteria part 3 conformant.
2.2 PP Claim
This Security Target Lite claims strict conformance to [1].
The Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages is registered and certified by the
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik1 (BSI) under the reference:
BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, dated 2014-01-13.
The security assurance requirements of the TOE are according to the Security IC Platform Protection Profile
[1]. They are all drawn from Part 3 of the Common Criteria version v3.1.
The augmentations of the PP [1] are listed below.
Table 5 Augmentations of the assurance level of the TOE
Assurance Class Assurance components Description
Life-cycle
support
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical
vulnerability analysis
2.3 Package Claim
This Security Target Lite implements the functional packages from [1] as follows:
 Packages “TDES” augmented and “AES” augmented; sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 in case the SCL is part of the
TOE
 Package “Loader dedicated for usage in secured environment only” conformant; section 7.3.1
 Package “Loader dedicated for usage by authorized users only” conformant, in case of an active flash
loader; section 7.3.2
 Package “Authentication of the Security IC” conformant in case of an active flash loader; section 7.2
The assurance level for the TOE is EAL5 augmented with the components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
Therefore this ST is package-augmented to the packages in [1].
1 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) is the German Federal Office for Information Security
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2.4 Conformance Rationale
This security target lite claims strict conformance to [1].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a typical security IC as defined in [1] chapter 1.2.2 comprising:
 the circuitry of the IC (hardware including the physical memories),
 configuration data, initialisation data related to the IC Dedicated Software and the behaviour of the
security functionality
 the IC Dedicated Software with the parts
 the IC Dedicated Test Software,
 the IC Dedicated Support Software.
 The user guidance documents
The TOE is designed, produced and/or generated by the TOE Manufacturer.
2.4.1 Security Problem Definition:
The security problem definition of [1] is enhanced by adding a threat. Including this add-on, the security
problem definition of this Security Target Lite is consistent with the statement of the security problem
definition in [1], as the Security Target Lite claims strict conformance to [1].
2.4.2 Conformance Rationale:
The threat memory access violation T.Mem-Access has been added, due to specific TOE memory access
control functionality. This add-on has no impact on the conformance statements regarding CC [2] and PP [1],
with following rational:
 The Security Target Lite remains conformant to CC [2], claim 576 as the possibility to introduce
additional restrictions is given.
 The Security Target Lite fulfils the strict conformance claim of the PP [1] due to the application notes 5, 6
and 7 which apply here. By those notes the addition of further security functions and security services
are covered, even without deriving particular security functionality from a threat but from a policy.
2.4.3 Adding Objective
Due to an additional security functionality regarding memory access control - O.Mem-Access, an additional
security objective has been introduced. This add-on has no impact on the conformance statements regarding
CC [2] and PP [1], with following rational:
 The Security Target Lite remains conformant to CC [2], claim 576 as the possibility to introduce
additional restrictions is given.
2.4.4 Summary
Due to the above rational, the security objectives of this Security Target Lite are consistent with the
statement of the security objectives in [1], as the Security Target Lite claims package-augmentation to [1].
All security functional requirements defined in [1] are included and completely defined in this ST.
The following security functional requirements are taken from [3] in addition to the SFRs defined in [1]:
 FMT_MSA.1 “Management of security attributes”
 FMT_MSA.3 “Static attribute initialization”
 FMT_SMF.1 “Specification of Management functions”
 FDP_ACC.1 “Subset access control”
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Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)
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 FDP_ACF.1 “Security attribute based access control”
The security functional requirements as follows are included and completely defined in this ST, section 5.
 FPT_TST.2 “Subset TOE security testing“ (Requirement from [1])
All assignments and selections of the security functional requirements are either done in [1] or in this
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Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)
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3 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)
The content of [1] applies to this chapter completely.
3.1 Threats
The threats are directed against the assets and/or the security functions of the TOE. For example, certain
attacks are only one step towards a disclosure of assets while others may directly lead to a compromise of
the application security. The more detailed description of specific attacks is given later on in the process of
evaluation and certification. An overview on attacks is given in PP [1] section 3.2.
The threats to security are defined and described in PP [1] sections 3.2 and 7.2.1.
Table 6 Threats according to [1]
T.Phys-Manipulation Physical Manipulation
T.Phys-Probing Physical Probing
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
T.Leak-Inherent Inherent Information Leakage
T.Leak-Forced Forced Information Leakage
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
T.Masquerade_TOE
(only relevant , if flash
loader active)
Masquerade the TOE
3.1.1 Additional Threat due to TOE specific Functionality
The additional functionality of introducing sophisticated privilege levels and access control allows the secure
separation between the operation system(s) and applications, the secure downloading of applications after
personalization and enables multitasking by separating memory areas and performing access controls
between different applications. Due to this additional functionality “area based memory access control” a
new threat is introduced.
The TOE shall avert the threat “Memory Access Violation (T.Mem-Access)” as specified below:
T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation
Parts of the Smartcard Embedded Software may cause security violations by
accidentally or deliberately accessing restricted data (which may include code) or
privilege levels. Any restrictions are defined by the security policy of the specific
application context and must be implemented by the Smartcard Embedded Software.
“Diffusion of open samples” threat:
T.Open_Samples_Diffusion Diffusion of Open Samples
An attacker may get access to open samples of the TOE and use them to gain
information about the TSF (loader, memory management unit, ROM code …). He may
also use the open samples to characterize the behavior of the IC and its security
functionalities (for example: characterization of side channel profiles, perturbation
cartography …). The execution of a dedicated security features (for example:
execution of a DES computation without countermeasures or by de-activating
countermeasures) through the loading of an adequate code would allow this kind of
characterization and the execution of enhanced attacks on the IC.
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Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)
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Note: this threat is only relevant, if the flash-loader is not blocked, i.e. additional software can be loaded onto
the TOE.
Table 7 Additional threats due to TOE specific functions and augmentations
T.Mem-Access Memory Access Violation
T.Open_Samples_Diffusion Diffusion of Open Samples
3.1.2 Assets regarding the Threats
The asset description from PP [1] section 3.1 applies.
3.2 Organizational Security Policies
The organizational policies from [1] sections 3.3, 7.3.1, 7.3.2 and 7.4 are applicable.
Table 8 Organizational Security Policies according PP [1]
P.Process-TOE Protection during TOE Development and Production
P.Crypto-Service (only available,
if SCL is part of the TOE)
Cryptographic services of the TOE
P.Lim_Block_Loader Limiting and Blocking the Loader Functionality
P.Ctlr_Loader (only available , if
flash loader active)
Controlled usage to Loader Functionality
3.3 Assumptions
The TOE assumptions about the operational environment are defined and described in PP [1] section 3.4.
Table 9 Assumption according PP [1]
A.Process-Sec-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization
A.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
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Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
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4 Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
This section shows the security objectives, which are relevant to the TOE.
4.1 Security objectives of the TOE
The security objectives of the TOE are defined and described in PP [1] sections 4.1, 7.2.1, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.4.1
and 7.4.2
Table 10 Objectives for the TOE according to PP [1]
O.Phys-Manipulation Protection against Physical Manipulation
O.Phys-Probing Protection against Physical Probing
O.Malfunction Protection against Malfunction
O.Leak-Inherent Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
O.Leak-Forced Protection against Forced Information Leakage
O.Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
O.Identification TOE Identification
O.RND Random Numbers
O.Cap_Avail_Loader Capability and availability of the Loader
O.Ctlr_Auth_Loader
(only available , if flash
loader active)
Access control and authenticity for the Loader
O.Authentication
(only available , if flash
loader active)
Authentication to external entities
O.TDES (only available,
if SCL is part of the TOE)
Cryptographic service Triple-DES
O.AES (only available, if
SCL is part of the TOE)
Cryptographic service AES
The TOE shall provide “Area based Memory Access Control (O.Mem-Access)” as specified below.
O.Mem-Access Area based Memory Access Control
The TOE must provide the Smartcard Embedded Software with the capability
to define restricted access memory areas. The TOE must then enforce the
partitioning of such memory areas so that access of software to memory areas
and privilege levels is controlled as required, for example, in a multi-
application environment.
The TOE shall provide TSF confidentiality protection as specified below:
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality Protection of confidentiality of TSF
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential operations
of the security IC (loader, memory management unit, …) through the use of a
dedicated code loaded on open samples.
Table 11 Additional objectives due to TOE specific functions and augmentations
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O.Mem-Access Area based Memory Access Control
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality Protection of confidentiality of TSF
4.2 Security Objectives for the development and operational Environment
The security objectives from [1] section 4.2, 4.3, 7.2.1, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.4.1 and section 7.4.2 are applicable for
this TOE.
The table below lists the environmental security objectives.
Table 12 Security objectives for the environment according to [1]
Environmental objective description
OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product
manufacturing
OE.Lim_Block_Loader Limitation of capability and blocking
the Loader
OE.Loader_Usage (only
relevant , if flash loader
active)
Secure communication and usage of the
Loader
OE.TOE_Auth (only
relevant , if flash loader
active)
External entities authenticating of the
TOE
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
The security objectives rationale of the TOE is defined and described in PP [1] section 4.4, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.4.1
and section 7.4.2.
Compared to [1] an enhancement regarding memory area protection has been established. The clear
definition of privilege levels for operated software establishes the clear separation of different restricted
memory areas for running the firmware, downloading and/or running the operating system and to establish
a clear separation between different applications. Nevertheless, it is also possible to define a shared memory
section where separated applications may exchange defined data. The privilege levels clearly define by using
a hierarchical model the access right from one level to the other. These measures ensure that the threat
T.Mem-Access is clearly covered by the security objective O.Mem-Access.
The objectives O.Authentication, O.Ctrl_Auth_Loader and the organizational policiy P.Ctlr_Loader and the
environmental objective OE.TOE_Auth as described in [1] chapter 7.2 and 7.3.2 apply only to TOE products
with Flash Loader enabled for software or data download by the user. In other cases the Flash Loader is not
available anymore and the user software or data download is completed.
The objective O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality counters the threat T.Open_Samples_Diffusion. In addition
T.Open_Samples_Diffusion is countered by O.Leak-Inherent and O.Leak-Forced.
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Extended Component Definition (ASE_ECD)
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5 Extended Component Definition (ASE_ECD)
There are several extended components defined and described for the TOE:
 the family FCS_RNG at the class FCS Cryptographic Support
 the family FMT_LIM at the class FMT Security Management
 the family FAU_SAS at the class FAU Security Audit
 the family FDP_SDC at the class FDP User Data Protection
 the family FIA_API at the class FIA Identification and Authentication
 the component FPT_TST.2 at the class FPT Protection of the TSF
The extended families FCS_RNG, FMT_LIM, FAU_SAS, FDP_SDC and FIA_API are defined and described in PP
[1] section 5. The component FPT_TST.2 is defined in the following sections.
5.1 Component “Subset TOE security testing (FPT_TST.2)”
The security is strongly dependent on the correct operation of the security functions. Therefore, the TOE
shall support that particular security functions or mechanisms are tested in the operational phase (Phase 7).
The tests can be initiated by the Smartcard Embedded Software and/or by the TOE or is done automatically
and continuously.
Part 2 of the Common Criteria provides the security functional component “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)”. The
component FPT_TST.1 provides the ability to test the TSF’s correct operation.
For the user it is important to know which security functions or mechanisms can be tested. The functional
component FPT_TST.1 does not mandate to explicitly specify the security functions being tested. In addition,
FPT_TST.1 requires verification of the integrity of TSF data and of the stored TSF executable code which
might violate the security policy. Therefore, the functional component ”Subset TOE security testing
(FPT_TST.2)” of the family TSF self test has been newly created. This component allows that particular parts
of the security mechanisms and functions provided by the TOE are tested.
5.2 Definition of FPT_TST.2
The functional component “Subset TOE security testing (FPT_TST.2)” has been newly created (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended). This component allows that particular parts of the security mechanisms and
functions provided by the TOE can be tested after TOE Delivery or are tested automatically and continuously
during normal operation transparent for the user.
This security functional component is used instead of the functional component FPT_TST.1 from Common
Criteria Part 2. For the user it is important to know which security functions or mechanisms can be tested.
The functional component FPT_TST.1 does not mandate to explicitly specify the security functions being
tested. In addition, FPT_TST.1 requires verifying the integrity of TSF data and stored TSF executable code
which might violate the security policy.
The functional component “Subset TOE testing (FPT_TST.2)” is specified as follows (Common Criteria Part 2
extended).
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5.3 TSF self test (FPT_TST)
Family Behavior The Family Behavior is defined in [3] section 15.14 (442,443).
Component levelling
FPT_TST TSF self test
1
2
FPT_TST.1: The component FPT_TST.1 is defined in [3] section 15.14 (444, 445,446).
FPT_TST.2: Subset TOE security testing, provides the ability to test the correct operation of particular
security functions or mechanisms. These tests may be performed at start-up, periodically, at
the request of the authorized user, or when other conditions are met. It also provides the
ability to verify the integrity of TSF data and executable code.
Management: FPT_TST.2
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
 management of the conditions under which subset TSF self testing occurs, such as during initial start-up,
regular interval or under specified conditions
 management of the time of the interval appropriate.
Audit: FPT_TST.2
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_TST.2.1: The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up, periodically during
normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, and/or at the conditions
[assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] to demonstrate the correct
operation of [assignment: functions and/or mechanisms].
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Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
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6 Security Requirements (ASE_REQ)
For this section [1] section 6 can be applied completely.
6.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The security functional requirements (SFR) for the TOE are defined and described in [1] and in the following
description.
Table 13 provides an overview of the functional security requirements of the TOE, defined in [1] section 6.1,
7.2.3, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.4.1 and 7.4.2.
Table 13 Security functional requirements of the TOE defined in PP [1]
Security Functional Requirement
FRU_FLT.2 “Limited fault tolerance“
FPT_FLS.1 “Failure with preservation of secure state”
FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
FAU_SAS.1 “Audit storage”
FDP_SDC.1 “Stored data confidentiality
FDP_SDI.2 “Stored data integrity monitoring and action”
FPT_PHP.3 “Resistance to physical attack”
FDP_ITT.1 “Basic internal transfer protection”
FPT_ITT.1 “Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FDP_IFC.1 “Subset information flow control”
FCS_RNG.1 “Random number generation”
FCS_COP.1/TDES “Cryptographic operation - TDES”
FCS_CKM.4/TDES “Cryptographic key destruction”
FCS_COP.1/AES “Cryptographic operation - AES”
FCS_CKM.4/AES “Cryptographic key destruction”
FMT_LIM.1/Loader “Limited Capabilities – Loader”
FMT_LIM.2/Loader “Limited availability – Loader”
FTP_ITC.1 “Inter-TSF trusted channel”
FDP_UCT.1 “Basic data exchange confidentiality”
FDP_UIT.1 “Data exchange integrity”
FDP_ACC.1/Loader “Subset access control – Loader”
FDP_ACF.1/Loader “Security attribute based access control – Loader”
FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”
Table 14 provides an overview about security functional requirements, which are added to the TOE. All
requirements are taken from [3] Part 2, with the exception of requirement FPT_TST.2, which is defined in
this ST completely.
Table 14 Additional security functional requirements of the TOE
Security Functional Requirement
FPT_TST.2 “Subset TOE security testing“
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Security Functional Requirement
FDP_ACC.1 “Subset access control”
FDP_ACF.1 “Security attribute based access control”
FMT_MSA.1 “Management of security attributes”
FMT_MSA.3 “Static attribute initialisation”
FMT_SMF.1 “Specification of Management functions”
6.1.1 Definition required by [1]
According to [1] Application Note 14 the term “secure state” used by FPT_FLS.1 shall be described and a
definition should be provided.
Definition of secure state:
Secure state describes three different conditions of the TOE:
1. the controller ceases operation. This condition can only be resolved by a cold or warm start of the
controller. It is triggered by a security reset.
2. the controller enters a security trap. The trap handler can be defined by the user. In case no trap handler
is provided the first condition is entered.
3. in case of a sudden power loss of the TOE during NVM programming (tearing): the TOE is in a condition
to either restore the old NVM content or to start with the new programmed value. This condition of
security state is only provided in case the HSL is part of the TOE and one of the tearing-safe functions of
the HSL is used.
Note: a security reset invalidates the RAM content.
According to [1] Application Note 15, “The Common Criteria suggest that the TOE generates audit data for
the security functional requirements Limited fault tolerance (FRU_FLT.2) and Failure with preservation of
secure state (FPT_FLS.1).” In case of the first two conditions no Audit data are collected, because the effect
entering the secure state is immediately visible. For the third condition indirect audit data is available, i.e.
the user can check, whether new or old NVM data is available.
6.1.2 Extended Components FCS_RNG.1 and FAU_SAS.1
6.1.2.1 FCS_RNG
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FCS_RNG) of the Class FCS
(cryptographic support) is defined in [1]. This family describes the functional requirements for random
number generation used for cryptographic purposes.
FCS_RNG.1 Random Number Generation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FCS_RNG.1 Random numbers generation Class PTG.2 according to [6]
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a physical random number generator that implements:
PTG.2.1 A total failure test detects a total failure of entropy source immediately when the RNG
has started. When a total failure is detected, no random numbers will be output.
PTG.2.2 If a total failure of the entropy source occurs while the RNG is being operated, the
RNG prevents the output of any internal random number that depends on some raw random
numbers that have been generated after the total failure of the entropy source.
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PTG.2.3 The online test shall detect non-tolerable statistical defects of the raw random
number sequence (i) immediately when the RNG has started, and (ii) while the RNG is being
operated. The TSF must not output any random numbers before the power-up online test has
finished successfully or when a defect has been detected.
PTG.2.4 The online test procedure shall be effective to detect non-tolerable weaknesses of the
random numbers soon.
PTG.2.5 The online test procedure checks the quality of the raw random number sequence. It is
triggered continuously. The online test is suitable for detecting non-tolerable statistical
defects of the statistical properties of the raw random numbers within an acceptable period
of time.
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide numbers in the format 32-bit that meet
PTG.2.6 Test procedure A, as defined in [6] does not distinguish the internal random numbers
from output sequences of an ideal RNG.
PTG.2.7 The average Shannon entropy per internal random bit exceeds 0.997.
Note: The physical random number generator implements total failure testing of the random
source data and a continuous random number generator test according to:
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Security Requirements for Cryptographic
Modules, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 140-2, 2002-03-12,
chapter 4.9.2
6.1.2.2 FAU_SAS
The [1] defines additional security functional requirements with the family FAU_SAS of the class FAU
(Security Audit). This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a
more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by
the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part
2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit Storage
Hierarchical to: No dependencies
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE Delivery with the capability to store the
Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data and/or supplements of the Security IC
Embedded Software in the not changeable configuration page area and non-volatile memory.
6.1.3 Support of Cipher Schemes
The following additional specific security functionality is implemented in the TOE:
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation requires a cryptographic operation to be performed in accordance with
a specified algorithm and with a cryptographic key of specified sizes. The specified algorithm and
cryptographic key sizes can be based on an assigned standard; dependencies are discussed in Section 6.3.1.1.
The TOE implements the packages “TDES” and “AES” from [1].
Triple-DES Operation
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The TDES Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below.
FCS_COP.1/TDES Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key management]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/TDES The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm TDES in ECB mode, CBC mode, CFB mode,
CTR mode, CMAC mode and cryptographic key sizes of 112 bit and 168 bit that
meet the following standards:
[19], [20], [22]
Note: The TOE can be delivered with or without the SCL. If the user decides not to use the SCL, the SFR above
is not part of the TOE.
The TDES cryptographic key destruction of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key
destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.4/TDES Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1/TDES The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method overwriting or zeroing that meets the
following:
None
The SCL offers a function to wipe the key with random numbers.
Note: The TOE can be delivered with or without the SCL. If the user decides not to use the SCL, the SFR above
is not part of the TOE.
AES Operation
The AES Operation of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below.
FCS_COP.1/AES Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
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FCS_COP.1.1/AES The TSF shall perform decryption and encryption in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm AES in ECB mode, CBC mode, CFB mode,
CTR mode, CMAC mode, and cryptographic key sizes 128 bit, 192 bit and 256
bit that meet the following standards:
[21], [20], [22]
Note: The TOE can be delivered with or without the SCL. If the user decides not to use the SCL, the SFR above
is not part of the TOE.
The AES cryptographic key destruction of the TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key
destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.4/AES Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1/AES The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method overwriting or zeroing that meets the
following:
None
The SCL offers a function to wipe the key with random numbers.
Note: The TOE can be delivered with or without the SCL. If the user decides not to use the SCL, the SFR above
is not part of the TOE.
6.1.4 Subset of TOE testing
The security is strongly dependent on the correct operation of the security functions. Therefore, the TOE
shall support that particular security functions or mechanisms are tested in the operational phase (Phase 7).
The tests can be initiated by the Smartcard Embedded Software and/or by the TOE.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset TOE testing (FPT_TST.2)” as specified below (Common Criteria
Part 2 extended).
FPT_TST.2 Subset TOE testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_TST.2.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions request of the Security IC Embedded
Software to demonstrate the correct operation of the alarm lines and/or the environmental
sensor mechanisms:
Please refer to the confidential Security Target
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6.1.5 Memory access control
Usage of multiple applications in one Smartcard often requires code and data separation in order to prevent
one application from accessing code and/or data of another application. For this reason the TOE provides
Area based Memory Access Control. The underlying memory protection unit (MPU) is documented in [7].
The security service being provided is described in the Security Function Policy (SFP) Memory Access
Control Policy. The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” requires that this
policy is in place and defines the scope were it applies. The security functional requirement “Security
attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” defines security attribute usage and characteristics of policies. It
describes the rules for the function that implements the Security Function Policy (SFP) as identified in
FDP_ACC.1. The decision whether an access is permitted or not is taken based upon attributes allocated to
the software. The Smartcard Embedded Software defines the attributes and memory areas. The
corresponding permission control information is evaluated “on-the-fly” by the hardware so that access is
granted/effective or denied/inoperable.
The security functional requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)” claims that the default
values of security attributes are appropriate either permissive or restrictive in nature. Alternative values can
be specified by any subject provided that the Memory Access Control Policy allows that. This is described by
the security functional requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)”. The attributes are
determined during TOE manufacturing (FMT_MSA.3) or set at run-time (FMT_MSA.1).
From TOE’s point of view the different roles in the Smartcard Embedded Software can be distinguished
according to the memory based access control. However the definition of the roles belongs to the user
software.
The following Security Function Policy (SFP) Memory Access Control Policy is defined for the requirement
“Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)”:
6.1.6 Memory Access Control Policy
The TOE shall support the standard ARMv7 Protected Memory System Architecture model.
The MPU provides full support for:
 Protection regions.
 Overlapping protection regions, with ascending region priority:
− Region 7 = highest priority.
− Region 0 = lowest priority.
 Access permissions.
 MPU mismatches and permission violations invoke the programmable-priority MemManage fault
handler.
The MPU can be used to:
 Enforce privilege rules, preventing user applications from corrupting operating system data.
 Separate processes, blocking the active task from accessing other tasks’ data.
 Enforce access rules, allowing memory regions to be defined as read-only or detecting unexpected
memory accesses.
Subjects, Objects and Operations of the policy
 Subjects: privilege or non-privilege level of the ARM processor
 Objects: memory/code addresses
 Operations: Read a/o write a/o execute access
Attributes of the policy:
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 MPU enable/disable bit.
 8 regions with the following attributes
− A unique priority
− The enable bit
− the start address and size
− an access matrix which defines if an Operation of a Subject to an Object lying in the region is allowed
or denied
 The default region with the following security attribute:
− A bit which defines if an Operation for the Subject (privilege level) is allowed or if no Operation is
allowed for any Subject.
Roles of the policy:
The roles correspond 1-1 to the subjects.
Properties of the policy:
 If an address is contained in multiple enabled regions, then the region with the highest priority defines
the access rights.
 If an address is contained in no region then the default region defines the access rights.
 The region defining the access rights checks in the access matrix if the Subject has access to the Object
with respect to the desired Operation. In case the access is denied the MPU throws an access violation
exception.
Access rules between privilege level and non-privilege level:
 the privilege level has access to regions which are defined for non-privilege level access
 the non-privilege level has no access to the regions which are defined for privilege level access
Table 15 access control rules
Privileged Mode
Permissions
User Mode
Permissions
Description
No access No access All accesses generate a permission fault
Read/write No access Privileged mode access only
Read/write Read only Writes in user mode generate a permission fault
Read/write Read/write Full access
Read only No access Privileged mode read only
Read only Read only Privileged and user mode read only
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy on all Subjects, all Objects
and all Operations.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as specified
below.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy to objects based on the
following:
As specified in the definition of the memory access control policy.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
As specified in the definition of the memory access control policy.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)” as specified below.
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy to provide restrictive1
default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the privilege level, to specify alternative initial values to override
the default values when an object or information is created.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1)” as specified below:
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Memory Access Control Policy to restrict the ability to
modify the security attributes “Attributes of the policy” from memory access control
policy to the privilege level.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of management functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as specified
below:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
1 The static definition of the access rules is documented in [7]
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Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions:
access the configuration registers of the MPU.
6.1.7 Data Integrity
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)” as specified
below:
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for data
integrity and one- and/or more-bit-errors on all objects, based on the following
attributes: error correction ECC for the SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall correct 1 bit errors in the SOLID
FLASH™ NVM automatically and inform the user about other bit errors.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data confidentiality (FDP_SDC.1)” as specified below:
FDP_SDC.1 Stored data confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_SDC.1.1 The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the information of the user data while it is
stored in the RAM, ROM and SOLID FLASH™ NVM.
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6.1.8 Support of Flash Loader
The TOE provides a Flash Loader to download user data into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM, either during
production of the TOE or at customer site. The Flash Loader is dedicated for usage by authorized users only
in secured and insecure environment during the production up to “Phase 6 Security IC Personalisation”. The
Flash Loader has to be permanently deactivated before entering “Phase 7 Security IC end-usage”. For this
reason the TOE shall meet the requirements as defined and described in the PP [1] section “7.3 Packages for
Loader” and “7.2 Package “Authentication of the Security IC”:
6.1.9 Flash Loader Policy
The Flash Loader supports the following security function policy (SFP)::
 Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1/Loader),
 Limited availability – Loader (FMT_LIM.2/Loader),
 Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1),
 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1),
 Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1),
 Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1),
 Subset access control – Loader (FDP_ACC.1/Loader),
 Security attribute based access control – Loader (FDP_ACF.1/Loader)
as defined in the PP [1], section 7.2 and 7.3.
The Flash Loader supports the following security function policy (SFP):
 Loader SFP: provides the mutual authentication between the TOE and the Administrator user or
Download operator user, the management of keys (Kc, Kd, Kfdi) and the download of the User data into
the memory of the TOE. The Loader SFP protects the downloaded data against unauthorized disclosure,
modification, deletion and insertion by transferring data always in encrypted form by using Kfdi and
including signature values in the data string which are checked during the download process.
The Flash Loader supports the following subjects defined by the roles:
 Administrator user.
 Download operator user.
Deployment of loader, which covers the following Flash Loader functionality:
 The Administrator user is enabled performing mutual authentication with the keys Kc and Kd, to manage
(set, exchange, delete) the keys Kc, Kd and Kfdi and to process the download of the User data into the
memory of the TOE.
 Download operator user is enabled performing mutual authentication with Kd, to exchange the key Kd
and to perform the download of the User data into the memory of the TOE. He can also delete Kfdi.
The Flash Loader supports the following object:
 user data: Data loaded into the memory of the TOE.
 The Flash Loader supports the following security attributes:
 Keys Kc and Kd used for the mutual authentication process.
 Key Kfdi used to encrypt/decrypt the user data.
The TOE shall meet the requirements “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1/Loader)” as specified below:
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FMT_LIM.1/Loader Limited Capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1/Loader The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced: Deploying Loader functionality after permanent
deactivation does not allow stored user data to be disclosed or manipulated by
unauthorized user.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability – Loader (FMT_LIM.2/Loader)” as specified below:
FMT_LIM.2/Loader Limited availability - Loader
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1/Loader The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced: The TSF prevents deploying the Loader functionality after
permanent deactivation.
Regarding FMT_LIM.1.1/Loader the User Guidance requires the Flash Loader to be permanently deactivated
prior delivery to the end user (Phase 7).
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)” as specified below.
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
administrator user, or Download operator user, that is logically distinct from
other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via
the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for deploying
Loader for downloading user data.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” is specified as follows.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
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FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP to receive user data in a manner
protected from unauthorised disclosure.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” is specified as follows.
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP to receive user data in a manner
protected from modification, deletion, insertion errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion has occurred.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Subset access control - Loader (FDP_ACC.1/Loader)” is specified as
follows.
FDP_ACC.1/Loader Subset access control - Loader
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
FDP_ACC.1.1/Loader The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP on
(1) the subjects Administrator User and Download Operator User,
(2) the objects user data in SOLID FLASH™ NVM memory of the TOE,
(3) the operation deployment of Loader
The TOE Functional Requirement “Security attribute based access control – Loader (FDP_ACF.1/Loader)” is
specified as follows.
FDP_ACF.1/Loader Security attribute based access control - Loader
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/Loader FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Loader SFP to objects based on the
following:
(1) the subjects Administrator user and the Download operator user with
security attributes Kc, Kd and Kfdi
(2) the objects user data in data loaded into the SOLID FLASH™ NVM memory
of the TOE with security attributes Kfdi.
FDP_ACF.1.2/Loader FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
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(1) evaluate the corresponding access control information of the relevant
subject, Administrator user and Download operator user, before the
access, so that accesses to be denied cannot be utilized by the subject
attempting to perform the operation. The subsequent download is then
protected by the key Kfdi.
FDP_ACF.1.3/Loader FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/Loader The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
The security functional requirements FIA_API.1, FTP_ITC.1, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1, FDP_ACC.1/Loader and
FDP_ACF.1/Loader apply only to TOE products with activated Flash Loader. In other cases the Flash Loader
is not available anymore and the user data download is completed. Depending on the capabilities of the user
software these security functional requirements may then reoccur as subject of the composite TOE.
The permanent locking of the Flash Loader after finalizing the download and prior delivery to the end-user
is covered by FMT_LIM1/Loader and FMT_LIM.2/Loader.
6.1.10 Support of Authentication of the Security IC
The flash loader provides the security IC authentication service.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified below.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a authentication mechanism according to [25] section
6.2.2 Mechanism 4: Three-pass authentication based on the security
attributes Kc and Kd to prove the identity of the TOE to an external entity.
This security functional requirement applies only to TOE products with Flash Loader activated.
6.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The evaluation assurance level is EAL 5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5. In the following table,
the security assurance requirements are given.
Table 16 Assurance components
Aspect Acronym Description Refinement
Development ADV_ARC.1 Security Architecture Description [1]
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional
specification with additional error
information
[1]
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the
TSF
[1]
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_TDS.4 Semi-formal modular design
Guidance Documents AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance [1]
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures [1]
Life-Cycle Support ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance [1]
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Aspect Acronym Description Refinement
procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage [1]
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures [1]
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures [1]
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation
standards
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Tests ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage [1]
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
Vulnerability
Assessment
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability
analysis
[1]
6.2.1 Refinements
Some refinements are taken unchanged from [1]. Table 16 provides an overview.
Two refinements from [1] have to be discussed here in the Security Target Lite, as the assurance level is
increased.
6.2.1.1 Life cycle support (ALC_CMS)
The refinement from [1] can also be applied to the assurance level EAL 5 augmented with ALC_CMS.5. The
assurance package ALC_CMS.4 is extended to ALC_CMS.5 with aspects regarding the configuration control
system for the TOE. The refinement is still valid.
6.2.1.2 Functional Specification (ADV_FSP)
The refinement from [1] can also be applied to the assurance level EAL 5 augmented with ADV_FSP.5. The
assurance package ADV_FSP.4 is extended to ADV_FSP.5 with aspects regarding the level of description.
ADV_FSP.5 requires a semi-formal description in addition. The refinement is still valid.
For refinement details see [1].
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Rationale for the Security Functional Requirements
While the security functional requirements rationale of the TOE are defined and described in [1] section
6.3.1, 7.2.3, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.4.1 and 7.4.2, the additional introduced SFRs are discussed below:
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Table 17 Rational for additional SFR in the ST
Objective TOE Security Functional Requirements
O.Phys-Manipulation - FPT_TST.2 „ Subset TOE security testing “
O.Mem-Access - FDP_ACC.1 “Subset access control”
- FDP_ACF.1 “Security attribute based access control”
- FMT_MSA.3 “Static attribute initialisation”
- FMT_MSA.1 “Management of security attributes”
- FMT_SMF.1 “Specification of Management Functions”
O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality - FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF-trusted channel
- FDP_ACC.1/Loader Subset access control –Loader
- FDP_ACF.1/Loader Security attribute based access control –
Loader
The table above gives an overview, how the security functional requirements are combined to meet the
security objectives (this table has to be read in addition to [1] table 2 “Security Requirements versus
Security Objectives”. The detailed justification is given in the following:
The security functional component Subset TOE security testing (FPT_TST.2) has been newly created
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended). This component allows that particular parts of the security mechanisms
and functions provided by the TOE can be tested after TOE Delivery. This security functional component is
used instead of the functional component FPT_TST.1 from Common Criteria Part 2. For the user it is
important to know which security functions or mechanisms can be tested. The functional component
FPT_TST.1 does not mandate to explicitly specify the security functions being tested. In addition, FPT_TST.1
requires verification of the integrity of TSF data and stored TSF executable code which might violate the
security policy.
The security functional requirement FPT_TST.2 detects attempts to conduce a physical manipulation on the
monitoring functions of the TOE. The objective of FPT_TST.2 is O.Phys-Manipulation.
The security functional requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” with the related Security Function
Policy (SFP) “Memory Access Control Policy” exactly require the implementation of an area based memory
access control as required by O.Mem-Access. The related TOE security functional requirements FDP_ACC.1,
FDP_ACF.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_SMF.1 cover this security objective. The implementation of
these functional requirements is represented by the dedicated privilege level concept.
The objective O.Prot_TSF_Confidentiality is met by the loader access control (FDP_ACC.1/Loader and
FDP_ACF.1/Loader) and trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1) for loading code. This prevents unauthorized users
from generating open samples.
The justification of the security objective and the additional requirements show that they do not contradict
the rationale already given in [1] for the assumptions, policy and threats defined there.
Nevertheless, the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software must ensure that the additional functions
are used as specified and that the User Data processed by these functions are protected as defined for the
application context. The TOE only provides the tool to implement the policy defined in the context of the
application.
6.3.1.1 Dependencies of Security Functional Requirements
The dependencies of security functional requirements are defined and described in [1] section 6.3.2, 7.2.3,
7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.4.1 and section 7.4.2 for the following security functional requirements: FDP_SDC.1, FDP_SDI.2,
FDP_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_ITT.1, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_FLS.1, FRU_FLT.2, FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2, FCS_RNG.1.
FAU_SAS.1, FIA_API.1, FMT_LIM.1/Loader, FMT_LIM.2/Loader, FTP_ITC.1, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1,
FDP_ACC.1/Loader, FDP_ACF.1/Loader.
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The dependencies of the additional security functional requirements (the functional requirements in
addition to the ones defined in [1]) are analysed in the following description.
Table 18 Dependency for cryptographic operation requirement
Security Functional Requirement Dependencies Fulfilled by security requirements
FPT_TST.2 None n.a.
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 Yes
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
Yes
Yes
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
Yes
Not required, see comment 1
FMT_MSA.1
FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
Yes
see comment 1
Yes
FMT_SMF.1 None n.a.
FCS_COP.1 FCS_CKM.4
[FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
Yes
No, see comment 2
FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
No, see comment 2
FDP_ACF.1/Loader FMT_MSA.3 No, see comment 3
Comment 1:
The dependency FMT_SMR.1 introduced by the two components FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3 is considered
to be satisfied because the access control specified for the intended TOE is not role-based but enforced for
each subject (user). Therefore, there is no need to identify roles in form of a security functional requirement
FMT_SMR.1.
End of comment.
Comment 2:
The security functional requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” met by the TOE has the
following dependencies:
 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
 FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes or
 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
These requirements all address the appropriate management of cryptographic keys used by the specified
cryptographic function and are not part of [1]. Most requirements concerning key management shall be
fulfilled by the environment since the Smartcard Embedded Software is designed for a specific application
context and uses the cryptographic functions provided by the TOE.
For the security functional requirement FCS_COP.1/3DES and FCS_COP.1/AES the respective dependency
[FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2] has to be fulfilled by the environment.
The same applies for FCS_CKM.4. Its dependencies differ slightly from FCS_COP.1, however the rationale is
the same.
End of comment.
Comment 3:
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The inter-TSF trusted channel SFR FTP_ITC.1 has no dependency and is provided as main purpose by the
Flash Loader. The Flash Loader provides a distinct and independent communication channel with
authenticated end points and protection from modification or disclosure.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 introduced by the component FDP_ACF.1/Loader is considered to be not
required, because the security attributes enforcing the Loader SFP are fixed by the IC manufacturer and no
new objects under the control of the Loader SFP are created. The Loader SFP also does not create any new
security attributes and the security attributes are fixed during the download process. Claim 371 of [1]
applies.
End of comment.
6.3.2 Rationale of the Assurance Requirements
The chosen assurance level EAL5 and the augmentation with the requirements ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
were chosen in order to meet the assurance expectations explained in the following paragraphs. In Table 16
the different assurance levels are shown as well as the augmentations. The augmentations are in compliance
with the Protection Profile.
An assurance level EAL5 with the augmentations ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 are required for this type of
TOE since it is intended to defend against highly sophisticated attacks without protective environment. This
evaluation assurance package was selected to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial practices. In order to provide a meaningful level of
assurance that the TOE provides an adequate level of defence against such attacks, the evaluators should
have access to all information regarding the TOE including the TSF internals, the low level design and source
code including the testing of the modular design. Additionally the mandatory technical document [11] shall
be taken as a basis for the vulnerability analysis of the TOE.
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
Development security is concerned with physical, procedural, personnel and other technical measures that
may be used in the development environment to protect the TOE.
In the particular case of a Security IC the TOE is developed and produced within a complex and distributed
industrial process which must especially be protected. Details about the implementation, (e.g. from design,
test and development tools as well as Initialization Data) may make such attacks easier. Therefore, in the
case of a Security IC, maintaining the confidentiality of the design is very important.
This assurance component is a higher hierarchical component to EAL5 (which only requires ALC_DVS.1).
ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Due to the intended use of the TOE, it must be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks. This
assurance requirement is achieved by AVA_VAN.5.
Independent vulnerability analysis is based on highly detailed technical information. The main intent of the
evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker
possessing high attack potential.
AVA_VAN.5 has dependencies to ADV_ARC.1 “Security architecture description”, ADV_FSP.4 “Complete
functional specification”, ADV_TDS.3 “Basic modular design”, ADV_IMP.1 “Implementation representation of
the TSF”, AGD_OPE.1 “Operational user guidance”, AGD_PRE.1 “Preparative procedures” and ATE_DPT.1
“Testing: basic design”
All these dependencies are satisfied by EAL5.
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It has to be assumed that attackers with high attack potential try to attack Security ICs like smartcards used
for digital signature applications or payment systems. Therefore, specifically AVA_VAN.5 was chosen in
order to assure that even these attackers cannot successfully attack the TOE.
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7 TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)
The product overview is given in Section 1.3.1. The Security Features are described below and the relation to
the security functional requirements is shown.
The TOE is equipped with the following security features to meet the security functional requirements:
Table 19 TOE Security Features
SF_DPM Device Phase Management
SF_PS Protection against Snooping
SF_PMA Protection against Modification Attacks
SF_PLA Protection against Logical Attacks
SF_CS Cryptographic Support
The following description of the security features is a complete representation of the TSF.
7.1 SF_DPM: Device Phase Management
The life cycle of the TOE is split up into several phases. Different operation modes help to protect the TOE
during each phase of its lifecycle.
7.2 SF_PS: Protection against Snooping
The TOE uses various means to protect from snooping of memories and busses and prevents single stepping.
7.3 SF_PMA: Protection against Modifying Attacks
This TOE implements protection against modifying attacks of memories, alarm lines, sensors and instruction
execution order.
7.4 SF_PLA: Protection against Logical Attacks
Memory access of the TOE is controlled by a Memory Protection Unit (MPU), which implements different
priviledge levels. The MPU decides, whether access to a physical memory location is allowed based on access
rights.
7.5 SF_CS: Cryptographic Support
The TOE is equipped with a hardware accelerator and symmetric cryptographic library (SCL) to support the
standard symmetric cryptographic operations TDES and AES. It further provides random numbers to meet
FCS_RNG.1
7.6 Assignment of Security Functional Requirements to TOE’s Security
Functionality
The justification and overview of the mapping between security functional requirements (SFR) and the
TOE’s security functionality (SF) is given in the sections above. The results are shown in Table 20. The
security functional requirements are addressed by at least one related security feature.
Table 20 Mapping of SFR and SF
SFR SF_DPM SF_PS SF_PMA SF_PLA SF_CS
FRU_FLT.2 x
FPT_FLS.1 x x x
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FMT_LIM.1 x
FMT_LIM.2 x
FAU_SAS.1 x
FDP_SDC.1 x
FDP_SDI.2 x
FPT_PHP.3 x x x
FDP_ITT.1 x x x x
FPT_ITT.1 x x x x
FDP_IFC.1 x x
FCS_RNG.1 x
FCS_COP.1/TDES x
FCS_CKM.4/TDES x
FCS_COP.1/AES x
FCS_CKM.4/AES x
FMT_LIM.1/Loade
r
x
FMT_LIM.2/Loade
r
x
FTP_ITC.1 x
FDP_UCT.1 x
FDP_UIT.1 x
FDP_ACC.1/Loader x
FDP_ACF.1/Loader x
FIA_API.1 x
FPT_TST.2 x
FDP_ACC.1 x
FDP_ACF.1 x
FMT_MSA.1 x
FMT_MSA.3 x
FMT_SMF.1 x
7.7 Security Requirements are internally consistent
For this chapter [1] section 6.3.4 can be applied completely.
The functional requirement FPT_TST.2 requires further protection to prevent manipulation of test results,
while checking the security functions of the TOE. An attacker could aim to switch off or disturb certain
sensors or filters and prevent the detection of distortion by blocking the correct operation of FPT_TST.2. The
security functional requirements required to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing,
O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced also protect the security functional requirement
FPT_TST.2. Therefore, the related security functional requirements support the secure implementation and
operation of FPT_TST.2.
The requirement FPT_TST.2 allows testing of some security mechanisms by the Smartcard Embedded
Software after delivery.
The implemented privilege level concept represents the area based memory access protection enforced by
the MPU. As an attacker could attempt to manipulate the level concept as defined and present in the TOE, the
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TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)
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functional requirement FDP_ACC.1 and the related other requirements have to be protected. The security
functional requirements necessary to meet the security objectives O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing,
O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation and O.Leak-Forced also protect the area based memory access control
function implemented according to the security functional requirement described in the security functional
requirement FDP_ACC.1 with reference to the Memory Access Control Policy and details given in FDP_ACF.1.
Therefore, those security functional requirements support the secure implementation and operation of
FDP_ACF.1 with its dependent security functional requirements.
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References
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8 References
8.1 Literature
[1] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Version 1.0, 13.01.2014, BSI-CC-
PP-0084-2014
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; Version 3.1 Revision 5 April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-001
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements; Version 3.1 Revision 5 April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-002
[4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1 Revision 5 April 2017, CCMB-2017-04-003
[5] Status report, List of all available user guidance
[6] Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random number generators
AIS31, Version 3.0, 05.15.2013
[7] 32-bit Security Controller –V02 Controller, Hardware Reference Manual, Revision 5.1, 2017-11-09
[11] Joint Interpretation Library, Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.9, January 2013
[18] Production and personalization 32-bit ARM-based security cvontroller
[19] NIST SP 800-67, Revision 2, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA)
Block Cipher, July 2017, National Institute of Standards and Technology
[20] NIST SP 800-38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, 2001, with Addendum
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Three Variants of Ciphertext Stealing for CBC
Mode, October 2010
[21] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD
(AES), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
November 26, 2001
[22] NIST SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CMAC Mode for
Authentication, 2005-05
[24] Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz – BSIG), Bundesgesetzblatt I, p.2821;
BSIG Section 9, Para.4, Clause 2, 2009-08-14
[25] ISO/IEC 9798-2, Information technology—Security techniques—Entity authentication, part 2:
Mechanisms using symmetric encipherment algorithms, ISO/IEC, third edition, 2008-12-15
Note that the versions of these documents are listed in the certification report.
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Appendix: hash signatures of the HSL
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9 Appendix: hash signatures of the HSL
HSL-02.62.7626-SLCx7V14.lib:
MD5 8b193e15625b170eea1501e0bd6a4c1c
SHA-1 7ff5fb82070375d317b41e9fa3b210bdf18c5731
SHA-256 9f9463a1f88a3e5e113327c6bfe7d38ad3c7d5c5383303c6bf4b3adac4e562e3
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Appendix: hash signatures of the SCL
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10 Appendix: hash signatures of the SCL
SCL37-uSCP-v3-C40-cipher.lib:
MD5=1b15f6984c5d30e1ea20655b6fc4aa2b
SHA1=f345cf5368d1bdaf7bd073d7e2bacb83ec9fd45e
SHA256=a3b3db265e6c955621953055ccb94a960b3cb62c96e6850cf4b011a7ed6a2d0c
SCL37-uSCP-v3-C40-mac.lib:
MD5=a51407d783119041306ce7b8d1203fd6
SHA1=1cade3ac1ab63cf89f1086be295a74913d6a620c
SHA256=c96a7b67453988701b3bc36e4e292609a6125d19f3b1713b2f3ddf4b4d00d542
SCL37-uSCP-v3-C40-des.lib:
MD5=92de0c028dadfc70fb584c4b19900435
SHA1=559299be365eb0009b6069610738fd83b7b021ca
SHA256=19c328a961b872081d22ee7219ecbfe3fe0ebff1198c64744f7bb395451f8a95
SCL37-uSCP-v3-C40-aes.lib:
MD5=e9a2f95897882cad929d00db790c8f98
SHA1=8b1bde0324532f9d6b5b4a7455e6a56b28b1cfb2
SHA256=14147f477de102c9bdaf281183073d1563ef1ab02abaedcbbeface02827b0fcf
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Appendix: hash signatures of UMSLC lib
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11 Appendix: hash signatures of UMSLC lib
UMSLC/UMSLC.lib:
MD5 2abc04d0b3711052db0aa531fe4e3f03
SHA-1 2365e551be7b79e5f5d89fea3ee80a78b613eef5
SHA-256 ec2c75184add66bbc89d825f5480fc4040720d560508ed4c618ab1f83d0e2e1f
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List of Abbreviations
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12 List of Abbreviations
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS31 “Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zu ITSEC und CC
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren”
API Application Programming Interface
ATR Answer to Reset
BLD Backside Light Detector
CC Common Criteria
CI Chip Identification Mode (STS-CI)
CPAU Codem Peripheral Access Unit
CPU Central Processing Unit
Crypto2304T Asymmetric Cryptographic Processor
DPA Differential Power Analysis
DFA Differential Failure Analysis
ECC Error Correction Code
EDC Error Detection Code
EMA Electro magnetic analysis
Flash Flash Memory
FSE Frequency Sensor
IC Integrated Circuit
ICO Internal Clock Oscillator
ID Identification
IMM Interface Management Module
ITP Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller
I/O Input/Output
ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
MED Memory Encryption and Decryption
MMU Memory Management Unit
O Object
OCC Online Configuration Check
OS Operating system
PEC Peripheral Event Channel
PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator
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List of Abbreviations
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RAM Random Access Memory
RNG Random Number Generator
ROM Read Only Memory
SAM Service Algorithm Minimal
SCL Symmetric Cryptographic Library
SCP Symmetric Cryptographic Processor
SPAU System Peripheral Access Unit
TSC TOE Security Functions Control
TSE Temperatrure Sensor
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
UM User Mode (STS)
UMSLC User mode Security Life Control
VSE Voltage Sensor
WDT Watch Dog Timer
TDES Triple DES Encryption Standard
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Glossary
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13 Glossary
Application Program/Data Software which implements the actual TOE functionality provided for
the user or the data required for that purpose
Central Processing Unit Logic circuitry for digital information processing
Chip Identification Data Data to identify the TOE
CPAU Code Peripheral Access Unit
Generic Chip Identification Mode Operational status phase of the TOE, in which actions for identifying
the individual chip by transmitting the Chip Identification Data take
place
Memory Encryption and Decryption Method of encoding/decoding data transfer between CPU and memory
Memory Hardware part containing digital information (binary data)
Microprocessor CPU with peripherals
Object Physical or non-physical part of a system which contains information
and is acted upon by subjects
Operating System Software which implements the basic TOE actions necessary for
operation
Programmable Read Only Memory Non-volatile memory which can be written once and then only permits
read operations
Random Access Memory Volatile memory which permits write and read operations
Random Number Generator Hardware part for generating random numbers
Read Only Memory Non-volatile memory which permits read operations only
Resource Management System Part of the firmware containing NVM programming routines, AIS31
testbench etc.
Self Test Software Part of the firmware with routines for controlling the operating state
and testing the TOE hardware
Security Function Part(s) of the TOE used to implement part(s) of the security objectives
Security Target Description of the intended state for countering threats
SmartCard Plastic card in credit card format with built-in chip
Software Information (non-physical part of the system) which is required to
implement functionality in conjunction with the hardware (program
code)
SPAU System Peripheral Access Unit
Subject Entity, generally in the form of a person, who performs actions
Target of Evaluation Product or system which is being subjected to an evaluation
Test Mode Operational status phase of the TOE in which actions to test the TOE
hardware take place
Threat Action or event that might prejudice security
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Glossary
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User Mode Operational status phase of the TOE in which actions intended for the
user takes place
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Revision History
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Common Criteria v3.1 - EAL5+
PUBLIC
14 Revision History
Major changes since the last revision
Version Description of change
0.2 Initial draft version
3.6 Final version
Trademarks of Infineon Technologies AG
AURIX™, C166™, CanPAK™, CIPOS™, CoolGaN™, CoolMOS™, CoolSET™, CoolSiC™, CORECONTROL™, CROSSAVE™, DAVE™, DI-POL™, DrBlade™,
EasyPIM™, EconoBRIDGE™, EconoDUAL™, EconoPACK™, EconoPIM™, EiceDRIVER™, eupec™, FCOS™, HITFET™, HybridPACK™, Infineon™, ISOFACE™,
IsoPACK™,
i-Wafer™, MIPAQ™, ModSTACK™, my-d™, NovalithIC™, OmniTune™, OPTIGA™, OptiMOS™, ORIGA™, POWERCODE™, PRIMARION™, PrimePACK™,
PrimeSTACK™, PROFET™, PRO-SIL™, RASIC™, REAL3™, ReverSave™, SatRIC™, SIEGET™, SIPMOS™, SmartLEWIS™, SOLID FLASH™, SPOC™, TEMPFET™,
thinQ!™, TRENCHSTOP™, TriCore™.
Trademarks updated August 2015
Other Trademarks
All referenced product or service names and trademarks are the property of their respective owners.
ifx1owners.
Edition 2018-09-17
<DOC_Number>
Published by
Infineon Technologies AG
81726 Munich, Germany
© 2018 Infineon Technologies AG.
All Rights Reserved.
Do you have a question about this
document?
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Document reference
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a description or warranty of a certain
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