Page 1 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
RICOH IM 460F/370F
Security Target
Author: RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
Date: 2024-02-16
Version: 1.00
This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target
written in Japanese.
Page 2 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Table of Contents
1 ST Introduction ........................................................................................................................................7
1.1 ST Reference....................................................................................................................................7
1.2 TOE Reference.................................................................................................................................7
1.3 TOE Overview ...............................................................................................................................10
1.3.1 TOE Type ................................................................................................................................10
1.3.2 TOE Usage and Major Security Features of the TOE ............................................................. 11
1.3.3 Hardware and Software Other than TOE That Is Necessary for the TOE ............................... 11
1.4 TOE Description............................................................................................................................13
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of the TOE................................................................................................13
1.4.2 Logical Boundary of the TOE .................................................................................................14
1.4.2.1. Basic Functions ...............................................................................................................15
1.4.2.2. Security Functions...........................................................................................................16
2 Conformance Claim ...............................................................................................................................19
2.1 CC Conformance Claim................................................................................................................19
2.2 PP Claims .......................................................................................................................................19
2.3 Package Claims..............................................................................................................................19
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale.....................................................................................................19
3 Security Problem Definitions.................................................................................................................20
3.1 Definition of Users.........................................................................................................................20
3.2 Assets ..............................................................................................................................................20
3.2.1 User Data.................................................................................................................................21
3.2.2 TSF Data..................................................................................................................................21
3.3 Threats............................................................................................................................................23
3.4 Organisational Security Policies ..................................................................................................24
3.5 Assumptions...................................................................................................................................24
4 Security Objectives..................................................................................................................................26
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE.........................................................................................................26
4.2 Security Objectives for Operational Environment.....................................................................27
Page 3 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale ......................................................................................................28
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives.........................................................................28
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions.............................................................................................29
5 Extended Components Definition..........................................................................................................34
5.1 Fax separation (FDP_FXS_EXP).................................................................................................34
5.2 TSF testing (FPT_TST_EXP).......................................................................................................34
6 Security Requirements............................................................................................................................36
6.1 Security Functional Requirements...............................................................................................39
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit .......................................................................................................39
6.1.1.1. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation.................................................................................39
6.1.1.2. FAU_GEN.2 User identity association............................................................................41
6.1.1.3. FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage........................................................................41
6.1.1.4. FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss ......................................................................41
6.1.1.5. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review...............................................................................................41
6.1.1.6. FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review...............................................................................42
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support ..........................................................................................42
6.1.2.1. FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation ...................................................................42
6.1.2.2. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction ..................................................................42
6.1.2.3. FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation..............................................................................43
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection..............................................................................................43
6.1.3.1. FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control .................................................................................43
6.1.3.2. FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control .......................................................44
6.1.3.3. FDP_FXS_EXP.1 Fax separation....................................................................................48
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication...........................................................................49
6.1.4.1. FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling ...................................................................49
6.1.4.2. FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition...............................................................................50
6.1.4.3. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets ..................................................................................50
6.1.4.4. FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication.............................................................................51
6.1.4.5. FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback..............................................................51
6.1.4.6. FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification ...............................................................................51
6.1.4.7. FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding....................................................................................51
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management...........................................................................................52
6.1.5.1. FMT_MOF.1 Control of the behaviour of the Security Functions ..................................52
6.1.5.2. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes............................................................53
Page 4 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
6.1.5.3. FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation......................................................................54
6.1.5.4. FMT_MTD.1(a) Management of TSF data.....................................................................55
6.1.5.5. FMT_MTD.1(b) Management of TSF data.....................................................................56
6.1.5.6. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Function.....................................................57
6.1.5.7. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles ............................................................................................58
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF ............................................................................................58
6.1.6.1. FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps...................................................................................58
6.1.6.2. FPT_TST_EXP.1 TSF testing..........................................................................................59
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access ...........................................................................................................59
6.1.7.1. FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination ............................................................................59
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted paths/channels..........................................................................................59
6.1.8.1. FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel.............................................................................59
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements ...............................................................................................60
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale.................................................................................................60
6.3.1 Tracing.....................................................................................................................................61
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability .....................................................................................................62
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis ..............................................................................................................69
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale...........................................................................71
7 TOE Summary Specification..................................................................................................................72
7.1 Audit Function...............................................................................................................................72
7.2 Identification and Authentication Function................................................................................75
7.3 Document Access Control Function.............................................................................................78
7.4 Network Protection Function .......................................................................................................81
7.5 Stored Data Protection Function..................................................................................................82
7.6 Security Management Function ...................................................................................................83
7.7 Integrity Verification Function.....................................................................................................88
7.8 Fax Line Separation Function......................................................................................................88
8 Glossary ..................................................................................................................................................89
Page 5 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
List of Figures
Figure 1: Example of TOE Environment ...................................................................................................... 11
Figure 2: Logical Boundary of the TOE........................................................................................................ 14
List of Tables
Table 1: Product Name and Model Code of the Target MFPs.........................................................................7
Table 2: Version and Part Number of Software for Version J-1.00 .................................................................7
Table 3: Combination to Be Delivered.......................................................................................................... 13
Table 4: Guidance Documents for [Japanese Version 1]............................................................................... 13
Table 5: Definition of Users.......................................................................................................................... 20
Table 6: Asset Categories.............................................................................................................................. 20
Table 7: Definitions of User Data ................................................................................................................. 21
Table 8: TSF Data Categories ....................................................................................................................... 21
Table 9: Definitions of TSF Data .................................................................................................................. 21
Table 10: Rationale for Security Objectives.................................................................................................. 29
Table 11: Terms in Section 6......................................................................................................................... 36
Table 12: List of Auditable Events................................................................................................................ 40
Table 13: List of Subjects, Objects, and Operations among Subjects and Objects ....................................... 44
Table 14: Subjects, Objects, and Security Attributes .................................................................................... 45
Table 15: Rules to Control Operations among Subjects and Objects............................................................ 45
Table 16: Rules That Explicitly Authorise Access ........................................................................................ 47
Table 17: Rules That Explicitly Deny Access ............................................................................................... 47
Table 18: List of Authentication Events........................................................................................................ 49
Table 19: List of Actions for Authentication Failure..................................................................................... 50
Table 20: User Privilege by Security Attribute ............................................................................................. 53
Table 21: Roles for Which Operation to Overwrite Default Values is Allowed............................................ 54
Table 22: List of TSF Data............................................................................................................................ 56
Table 23: List of TSF Data............................................................................................................................ 57
Table 24: List of Specification of Management Functions............................................................................ 58
Table 25: TOE Security Assurance Requirements (EAL2) ........................................................................... 60
Table 26: Correspondence between Security Objectives and Functional Requirements............................... 61
Table 27: Results of Dependency Analysis of TOE Security Functional Requirements............................... 69
Table 28: List of Audit Events ...................................................................................................................... 72
Table 29: List of Audit Log Data Items......................................................................................................... 73
Table 30 : Relationships regarding Lockout Release .................................................................................... 77
Table 31: Access Control Rules on Document Data ..................................................................................... 78
Table 32: Normal User Operations on Document Data................................................................................. 80
Table 33: Encrypted Communications Provided by the TOE ....................................................................... 82
Table 34: Management of TSF Data ............................................................................................................. 84
Table 35: List of Static Initialisation for Security Attributes......................................................................... 86
Table 36: Security Attributes for Each Case of Document Data Generation................................................. 86
Page 6 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Table 37: Specific Terms Related to This ST................................................................................................ 89
Page 7 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
1 ST Introduction
This section describes ST Reference, TOE Reference, TOE Overview, and TOE Description.
1.1 ST Reference
The following is the identification information of the ST.
Title: RICOH IM 460F/370F Security Target
Version: 1.00
Date: 2024-02-16
Author: RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
1.2 TOE Reference
The following is the identification information of the TOE.
TOE Names: RICOH IM 460F/370F
Version: J-1.00
TOE Type: Multifunction product (hereinafter "MFP")
The target MFPs are products for Japanese domestic market listed in Table 1, which are identified by product
name and model code.
Table 1: Product Name and Model Code of the Target MFPs
No. Product Name Model Code
1 RICOH IM 460F D0DN-00
2 RICOH IM 370F D0DM-03
Table 2 describes the identification information of version and part number of software installed in these
MFPs. Software is identified by name, version, and part number. However, Keymicon, GraphicData, and
LegacyUIData are identified by name and version.
Table 2: Version and Part Number of Software for Version J-1.00
No. Name of Software for the MFP Version Part Number
1 CTL System 1.04 D0DM5550F
2 Printer 1.00 D0DM5551C
Page 8 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
No. Name of Software for the MFP Version Part Number
3 IRIPS PS3PDF 1.00 D0DM5553B
4 CheetahSystem 1.04 D0DN1420F
5 appsite 3.06.20 D0DN1441D
6 bleservice 1.00 D0DN1433B
7 camelsl 1.00 D0DN1452C
8 cispluginble 5.0.0 D0DN1446A
9 cispluginkeystr 1.00.00 D0DN1445A
10 cispluginnfc 1.00.00 D0DN1444A
11 devicemanagemen 1.01.00 D0DN1455D
12 ecoinfo 1.00 D0DN1432B
13 faxinfo 1.00 D0DN1430B
14 helpservice 1.00 D0DN1449B
15 iccd 1.01.00 D0DN1443A
16 introductionset 1.00 D0DN1448B
17 iwnnimelanguage 2.16.2 D0E01433
18 iwnnimelanguage 2.16.2 D0E01431
19 iwnnimelanguage 2.16.2 D0E01432
20 iwnnimeml 2.16.204 D0E01430C
21 kerberos 1.0 D0DN1451B
22 langswitcher 1.00 D0DN1428B
23 mediaappappui 1.00 D0DN1439C
24 mlpsmartdevicec 5.0.0 D0DN1427A
25 optimorurcmf 1.1.9 D0E01462C
26 programinfoserv 1.00 D0DN1434C
27 remotesupport 1.00 D0DN1453B
28 rsisetup 1.01.14 D0DN1456D
29 simpleauth 1.00.00 D0DN1426A
30 simpledirectcon 1.25 D0DN1447
Page 9 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
No. Name of Software for the MFP Version Part Number
31 simpleprinter 1.00 D0DN1435C
32 smartcopy 1.01 D0DN1436D
33 smartdocumentbo 1.00 D0DN1454C
34 smartfax 1.01 D0DN1438C
35 smartprtstoredj 1.00 D0DN1440C
36 smartscanner 1.01 D0DN1437D
37 smartscannerex 3.00 D0DN1450C
38 stopwidget 1.00 D0DN1431B
39 tonerstate 1.00 D0DN1429B
40 traywidget 1.00 D0DN1442B
41 Engine 1.04:06 D0DM5500D
No. Name of Software for the Operation Panel Unit Version Part Number
42 Firmware 1.04 D0DN1420F
43 Keymicon 1.08 No display
44 Bluetooth サービス 1.00 D0DN1433B
45 Bluetooth 認証プラグイン 5.0.0 D0DN1446A
46 DeviceManagementService 1.01.00 D0DN1455D
47 GraphicData 0.10 DXXXXXXX
48 ICCardDispatcher 1.01.00 D0DN1443A
49 iWnn IME 2.16.204 D0E01430C
50 iWnn IME Korean Pack 2.16.2 D0E01433
51 iWnn IME Simplified Chinese Pack 2.16.2 D0E01431
52 iWnn IME Traditional Chinese Pack 2.16.2 D0E01432
53 KerberosService 1.0 D0DN1451B
54 LegacyUIData 0.24 DXXXXXXX
55 ProgramInfoService 1.00 D0DN1434C
56 RemoteSupportService 1.00 D0DN1453B
57 RicohScanGUIService 3.00 D0DN1450C
58 USB カードリーダー対応プラグイン 1.00.00 D0DN1445A
59 かんたんカード認証設定 1.00.00 D0DN1426A
Page 10 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
No. Name of Software for the Operation Panel Unit Version Part Number
60 かんたん文書印刷 1.00 D0DN1440C
61 アプリケーションサイト 3.06.20 D0DN1441D
62 カンタン入出力 5.0.0 D0DN1427A
63 クラウド設定 1.01.14 D0DN1456D
64 コピー 1.01 D0DN1436D
65 サポート設定 1.00 D0DN1449B
66 スキャナー 1.01 D0DN1437D
67 ストップウィジェット 1.00 D0DN1431B
68 ダイレクト接続 1.25 D0DN1447
69 トレイ設定/用紙残量 1.00 D0DN1442B
70 ドキュメントボックス 1.00 D0DN1454C
71 ファクス 1.01 D0DN1438C
72 プリンター情報確認 1.00 D0DN1435C
73 メディアプリント＆スキャン 1.00 D0DN1439C
74 リモートコネクトサポート 1.1.9 D0E01462C
75 導入設定 1.00 D0DN1448B
76 操作部画面の遠隔操作 1.00 D0DN1452C
77 標準 IC カードプラグイン 1.00.00 D0DN1444A
78 言語切り替えｳｨｼﾞｪｯﾄ 1.00 D0DN1428B
79 ｅｃｏウィジェット 1.00 D0DN1432B
80 ｻﾌﾟﾗｲ残量表示ｳｨｼﾞｪｯﾄ 1.00 D0DN1429B
81 ﾌｧｸｽ受信文書ｳｨｼﾞｪｯﾄ 1.00 D0DN1430B
Make clear to the sales representative that you purchase the MFP as CC-certified product.
1.3 TOE Overview
This section describes TOE Type, TOE Usage, and Major Security Features of the TOE.
1.3.1 TOE Type
This TOE is an MFP, which is an IT product that has Copy Function, Document Server Function, Printer
Function, Scanner Function, and Fax Function.
Page 11 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
1.3.2 TOE Usage and Major Security Features of the TOE
The TOE is an MFP which is assumed that it will be installed in an office and used in an environment where
it is connected with a telephone line and the LAN as shown in Figure 1. The user uses each function (Copy
Function, Document Server Function, Printer Function, Scanner Function, and Fax Function) by operating
from the Operation Panel of the MFP or from the client computer connected by the LAN.
Security functions, such as identification and authentication, access control, eMMC encryption, and encrypted
communication are provided to prevent disclosure or alteration of assets, including document data processed
by the TOE and setting information related to security functions, through unauthorized access to the TOE or
communication data on the network. The TOE also provides a function to prevent unauthorised intrusion from
telephone lines to the LAN. Events occurred on the TOE can be confirmed by the MFP administrator as audit
log, and the MFP administrator can use the management functions from the Operation Panel or the client
computer. In addition, the TOE verifies the integrity of the software configuration. Since the TOE is not
equipped with an HDD and processes user data with an eMMC, the Residual Data Overwrite Function is not
included in the security functions to be evaluated.
Figure 1: Example of TOE Environment
1.3.3 Hardware and Software Other than TOE That Is Necessary for the TOE
The following describes components other than TOE in the operational environment illustrated in Figure 1.
Page 12 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
 Client computer
- By connecting to the LAN, a computer performs as a client of the TOE and users can remotely
operate the MFP from the client computer. It is necessary to use a Web browser to operate various
MFP settings and user data from the client computer. In order to temporarily save or store
document data from the client computer, it is necessary to install the printer driver called RPCS
Driver (1.0.0.0 or later version) provided by RICOH, which has a function that supports TLS
(IPP over SSL). In addition, in order to store document data for fax transmission from the client
computer, it is necessary to install the fax driver called PC FAX Generic Driver (13.1.0.0 or later
version) provided by RICOH, which has a function that supports TLS (IPP over SSL). For the
client computer that receives e-mail, it is necessary to install a mail client that supports S/MIME.
 SMB server
- A server that is used to send document data scanned by the Scanner Function of the TOE using the
SMB protocol. The communication is protected by IPsec. It is necessary to use the folder transmission
function.
 FTP server
- A server that is used to send document data scanned by the Scanner Function of the TOE using the
FTP protocol. The communication is protected by IPsec. It is necessary to use the folder transmission
function.
 Mail server
- A server that is used when the TOE sends e-mail. The server supports the SMTP protocol. It is necessary
to use the e-mail transmission of attachments function.
 syslog server
- A server that can receive the audit log recorded by the TOE. The server uses the syslog protocol and
has a TLS-enabled service installed. The audit log can be transferred to the syslog server as well. If the
transfer setting is enabled, this server is used as a destination of the audit log.
The TOE is connected to the LAN to use the network, and connected to the telephone line to send and receive
data to and from external faxes. In order to connect the TOE to an external network, it is necessary to set up a
firewall to protect the TOE from unauthorized access from the external network.
Hardware and software other than TOE that was used in the TOE evaluation are shown below.
 Client computer
- OS: Windows 10 and Windows 11
- Printer driver: RPCS Driver 1.0.0.0
- Fax driver: PC FAX Generic Driver 13.1.0.0
- Web browser: Microsoft Edge 107
- Mail client: Thunderbird 102.6.0
 SMB server: Windows 10
 FTP server: Windows 10 (IIS10) version V10.0.19041.804
Linux (Ubuntu 20.04) vsftpd 3.0.3
 Mail server: Windows 10 P-Mail Server Manager version 1.91
Page 13 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
 syslog server: Linux (Ubuntu 20.04) rsyslogd 8.2001.0
1.4 TOE Description
This section describes Physical Boundary of the TOE and Logical Boundary of the TOE.
1.4.1 Physical Boundary of the TOE
The TOE consists of the MFP products in Table 1 and guidance documents in Table 4. The target MFP product
is the one equipped with software of a TOE version (J-1.00) listed in Table 3.
A delivery company delivers the MFP to users.
A guidance set of [Japanese Version 1] will be delivered. Some guidance documents are included in the MFP,
and others are delivered through the Web.
Guidance documents will be delivered to users in the combinations described below.
Table 3: Combination to Be Delivered
No. MFP Guidance Document Remarks
Product Name Model
Code
Version
1 RICOH IM 460F D0DN-00 J-1.00 [Japanese Version-1] SPDF is installed as standard
2 RICOH IM 370F D0DM-03 J-1.00 [Japanese Version-1] SPDF is installed as standard
Table 4 describes guidance documents, formats, and delivery methods for the guidance document set of
[Japanese Version 1].
Table 4: Guidance Documents for [Japanese Version 1]
No. Part Number Guidance Document Name Format Delivery Method
1 D0DM-7002 かんたん操作ガイド Brochure Included in theproduct
2 D0DM-7013 本機を安全にご利用いただくために Brochure Included in theproduct
3 D0DM-7300 安全上のご注意 PDF Through the Web
4 D0DM7302 使用説明書 RICOH IM 460F/370F HTML Through the Web
5 D0E37515 セキュリティーリファレンス HTML Through the Web
6 D0DM-7304
2023.11.10
使用説明書<Common Criteria 準拠でお使
いになる管理者の方へ>
PDF Through the Web
Page 14 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
No. Part Number Guidance Document Name Format Delivery Method
7 D0E3-7510
2023.09.28
セキュリティー機能をお使いになるお客様へ PDF Through the Web
8 83NHEZ-
JAR1.00 v281
ヘルプ HTML Through the Web
Guidance documents to be delivered through the Web can be downloaded from the following URL.
https://support.ricoh.com/services/device/ccmanual/IM_460_370-eal2-spf/ja/Guidance_ja.zip
Hash value (SHA256): d6d33162a728846622d465ad6ede9250edd1e8f51bba3a484f13467b67e4029d
1.4.2 Logical Boundary of the TOE
The logical boundary of the TOE is described below.
Figure 2: Logical Boundary of the TOE
As shown in Figure 2, the TOE has Basic Functions and Security Functions, which of each are described below.
Page 15 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
1.4.2.1. Basic Functions
The overview of the Basic Functions is described below.
Copy Function
The Copy Function has a function to scan a paper document and then copy and print the scanned image data
from the Operation Panel. Also, image to be copied and printed can be stored in the TOE. The document data
stored at this time can be operated as a Document Server document from the Operation Panel or Web browser
by using the Document Server Function.
Printer Function
The Printer Function has a function to temporarily save document data received from the printer driver by
specifying the print method that is handled as temporary saving in the TOE. The document data is then printed,
previewed, or deleted from the Operation Panel, or deleted from the Web browser as temporarily-saved
document data.
When the print method is specified as stored print in the printer driver, document data received by the TOE
from the printer driver can be stored in the TOE, and the stored document data can be printed, previewed, or
deleted from the Operation Panel, or deleted from the Web browser as a stored print document.
When the print method is specified as Document Server storage in the printer driver, document data can be
stored in the TOE from the printer driver. The document data stored at this time can be operated as a Document
Server document from the Operation Panel or Web browser by using the Document Server Function.
Scanner Function
The Scanner Function has a function to scan a paper document and then send the scanned image data to FTP
server or SMB server by using folder transmission, and to the mail server by using e-mail transmission of
attachments from the Operation Panel.
The scanned image of the paper document from the Operation Panel can be stored in the TOE. The stored
document data can be sent by using the folder transmission or e-mail transmission of attachments functions,
previewed, or deleted as a scanned document from the Operation Panel. The document data stored at this time
can also be operated as a scanned document from the Web browser by using the Document Server Function.
Fax Function
The Fax Function consists of Fax Transmission Function and Fax Reception Function. The fax compliant with
the G3 standard, which uses a telephone line, is the target of evaluation.
The Fax Transmission Function has a function to send a scanned image of a paper document as document data
to external fax devices from the Operation Panel.
Also, the scanned image of the paper document from the Operation Panel can be stored in the TOE, or the
received document data from the fax driver can be stored in the TOE. The stored document data can be sent
by fax transmission, previewed, or deleted as a fax transmission document from the Operation Panel. The
document data stored at this time can also be operated as a fax transmission document from the Operation
Panel or Web browser by using the Document Server Function.
Page 16 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
The Fax Reception Function has a function to receive document data from external fax devices via a telephone
line, and then store it in the TOE. The stored document data can be printed, previewed, or deleted as a fax
reception document from the Operation Panel, or can be downloaded, previewed, or deleted from the Web
browser.
Document Server Function
The Document Server Function stores a scanned image of a paper document in the TOE from the Operation
Panel. As a Document Server document, the stored document data is printed, previewed, or deleted from the
Operation Panel, or previewed or deleted from the Web browser. For document data stored in the TOE by
using functions other than the Document Server Function, the following operations can also be performed.
- Document Server documents stored by the Copy Function or Printer Function can be printed, previewed, or
deleted from the Operation Panel, or previewed or deleted from the Web browser.
- Fax transmission documents can be printed, previewed, or deleted from the Operation Panel, or can be sent
by fax transmission, downloaded, previewed, or deleted from the Web browser.
- Scanned documents can be sent by using folder transmission or e-mail transmission of attachments functions,
downloaded, previewed, or deleted from the Web browser.
Web Image Monitor Function
The Web Image Monitor Function is a function for the TOE user to remotely control the TOE from the Web
browser. It is sometimes referred to as "WIM".
1.4.2.2. Security Functions
The Security Functions are described below.
Audit Function
The Audit Function is to record a log that associates TOE use events and security-relevant events (hereinafter,
"audit events") with user identification information as audit log. Also, this function provides the recorded audit
log in a format that can be audited. The recorded audit log can be downloaded and deleted only by the MFP
administrator.
The date and time to be recorded in the audit log are derived from the system clock of the TOE. The oldest
audit log is overwritten with the newest audit log when there is insufficient space in the audit log file to append
the newest audit log. The TOE can also transfer the audit log to the syslog server.
Identification and Authentication Function
The Identification and Authentication Function is to verify whether a person who attempts to use the TOE is
an authorised user by performing identification and authentication with login user name and login password,
so that the TOE can allow only the authenticated users to operate the management functions and user data.
This function includes the following functionality:
- Authentication feedback area protection function that displays a login password using dummy letters when
entering the login password
Page 17 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
- Lockout function that prohibits users from logging in when the number of consecutive authentication
failures reaches the threshold
- A function for protection of the quality of login passwords that registers only passwords satisfying the
conditions of the minimum character number of passwords and the required character type defined in
advance by the MFP administrator.
- A function for automatic user logout when no operation is performed for a certain period of time from the
logged-in state.
Document Access Control Function
The Document Access Control Function is to authorise the operations for document data and user job data by
the authorised TOE users who are authenticated by the Identification and Authentication Function. It allows
user's operation on the document data and user job data based on the privileges for the user role, or the operation
permissions for each user.
Network Protection Function
The Network Protection Function is to prevent information leakage due to network monitoring and detect
alteration of communication details by providing encrypted communication when communicating with trusted
IT products. Communication with the client computer when using WIM, printer driver, or fax driver is
encrypted by TLS, and communication with SMB server and FTP server when using folder transmission is
protected by IPsec. Also, communication with mail server when using e-mail transmission of attachments is
protected by S/MIME, and communication with syslog server when the audit log transfer setting is enabled is
encrypted by TLS.
Stored Data Protection Function
The Stored Data Protection Function is to encrypt data to be written to the eMMC in order to protect data
recorded in the eMMC from data leakage.
Security Management Function
The Security Management Function is to control operations for TSF data in accordance with privileges allocated
to each user or role privileges allocated to the normal user, MFP administrator, and supervisor. In order to
enable control, this function includes a function to maintain the role of operating the Security Management
Function and associate the role with the authorised TOE user authenticated by the Identification and
Authentication Function, and a function to set appropriate default values for the security attributes.
Integrity Verification Function
The Integrity Verification Function is a self-test function that verifies the integrity of executable code in the
TSF.
Page 18 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Fax Line Separation Function
The Fax Line Separation Function is to prohibit communication via a fax interface, except for transmission or
reception of user data using a fax protocol, in order to prevent intrusion from the telephone line (same meaning
as Fax Line in this function name) into the LAN.
Page 19 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
2 Conformance Claim
This section describes Conformance Claim.
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
The CC conformance claim of this ST and TOE is as follows:
- CC version for which this ST and the TOE claim conformance
Part 1:
Introduction and general model April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5 (Japanese translation ver.1.0)
CCMB-2017-04-001
Part 2:
Security functional components April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5 (Japanese translation ver.1.0)
CCMB-2017-04-002
Part 3:
Security assurance components April 2017 Version 3.1 Revision 5 (Japanese translation ver.1.0)
CCMB-2017-04-003
- Functional requirements: Part 2 extended
- Assurance requirements: Part 3 conformance
2.2 PP Claims
There is no PP that this ST and TOE conform to.
2.3 Package Claims
This ST and TOE claim conformity to package: EAL2.
There are no assurance components to be added.
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale
This ST and TOE do not claim PP conformity.
Page 20 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
3 Security Problem Definitions
This section describes Users, Assets, Threats, Organisational Security Policies, and Assumptions.
3.1 Definition of Users
This section defines the users related to the TOE.
The users consist of normal users and administrators, and the administrators are divided into MFP
administrators and supervisors.
As described in Table 5, the users are classified according to their respective roles, and have user privileges
based on the roles of normal users, MFP administrators, and supervisors.
Table 5: Definition of Users
Definition of Users Explanation
Normal user
A user who is allowed to use the TOE. A normal user is provided
with a login user name and can operate user data.
Administrator
MFP administrator
A user who has the privilege to manage the TOE, including:
- Operation of configuration of normal user settings
- Operation of setting information related to MFP device
behaviour
- Operation of audit logs
- Operation of configuration of network settings
- Access management of fax reception documents
- Unlocking locked-out normal users and supervisor
Supervisor
A user who has the privilege to manage the TOE, including:
- Changing login password of MFP administrators
- Unlocking locked-out MFP administrators
3.2 Assets
Assets to be protected by the TOE are user data and TSF data. The definitions are described in Table 6.
Table 6: Asset Categories
Category Definition
User data Data created by the user, for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF.
TSF data Data created by the TOE, for the TOE, that may affect the operation of the TSF.
Page 21 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
3.2.1 User Data
The user data is categorized into document data and user job data. .The category definitions are described in
Table 7.
Table 7: Definitions of User Data
Category Definition
Document data Information contained in the user's document in electronic or hard-copy format.
Document data stored and saved in the eMMC (stored document data) and document
data received from the printer driver and temporarily saved in the TOE (temporarily-
saved document) are included. Stored document data includes scanned documents,
fax transmission documents, fax reception documents, stored print documents, and
Document Server documents.
User job data Information related to the user's document or document processing job.
3.2.2 TSF Data
The TSF data is categorized into TSF protected data and TSF confidential data. The category definitions are
described in Table 8.
Table 8: TSF Data Categories
TSF Data Category Definition
TSF protected data Protected TSF data that does not pose a security threat when published, but must
be protected from unauthorised alteration.
TSF confidential data Confidential TSF data that must be protected so that it cannot be viewed or
modified by anyone other than authorised users.
The TSF data handled by this TOE for each category is described below.
Table 9: Definitions of TSF Data
Category TSF Data Description
TSF protected
data
Lockout settings Settings related to lockout policies.
Date/time settings Settings related to date/time.
Password quality settings
Settings of the minimum character number and the
combination of characters to be registered for user
authentication regarding the password policy.
Auto logout settings
Auto logout settings for the Operation Panel and auto
logout settings for the WIM.
Page 22 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Category TSF Data Description
S/MIME user information Information required for e-mail transmission of
attachments using S/MIME. This information consists
of items set for each user (e-mail address and user
certificate) and S/MIME setting (encryption setting).
This information is registered and managed by the
MFP administrator.
Destination folder Destination information for the folder transmission
function. This includes the path information to the
destination server and the folder in the server, and
information including identification and authentication
information for user access. This information is
registered and managed by the MFP administrator.
Audit log settings Settings related to the transfer of audit logs.
Cryptographic communication
settings
Settings related to TLS and IPsec communications with
clients and servers.
Login user name User identifier associated with any of the normal user,
MFP administrator, and supervisor. The TOE identifies
users by this identifier.
User privilege Any role of normal user, MFP administrator, or
supervisor who uses the TOE, and the privilege
according to that role.
Document data owner
information
The security attribute of document data (temporarily-
saved document data, scanned documents, fax
transmission documents, stored print documents, and
Document Server documents). The owner information
(the login user name) of document data (except fax
reception documents) is set.
List of users who have been
granted access permission for
the document data
The security attribute of document data (temporarily-
saved document data, scanned documents, fax
transmission documents, stored print documents, and
Document Server documents).
The information of users (the login user names) who
are allowed access (viewing) document data (except
fax reception documents) is set.
The document data owner can allow other normal users
to read the document data.
Fax reception document user The security attribute of fax reception documents.
The list of the login user names of users who have been
granted access (read and delete) permission for fax
reception documents is set.
The users are managed with one list for all fax
reception documents.
User job data owner
information
The security attribute of user job data. The information
of user job data owners (the login user name) is set.
TSF confidential
data
Login password A password associated with each login user name.
Audit log Audit log data in which events occurred are recorded.
eMMC cryptographic key Cryptographic key used to encrypt data in the eMMC.
Page 23 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
3.3 Threats
This section defines and describes the assumed threats related to the use and operational environment of this
TOE. The threats defined in this section are unauthorised persons with knowledge of published information
about the TOE operations and such attackers are capable of Basic level of attack potential.
T.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS Disclosure of document data
Document data under the TOE management may be disclosed by persons without a
login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission
to the document data.
T.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT Alteration of document data
Document data under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a login
user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to
the document data.
T. JOB_ALT Alteration of user job data
User job data under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a login
user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to
the user job data.
T.PROTECT_DATA_ALT Alteration of TSF protected data
TSF protected data under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a
login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission
to the TSF protected data.
T.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS Disclosure of TSF confidential data
TSF confidential data under the TOE management may be disclosed by persons without
a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access
permission to the TSF confidential data.
T.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT Alteration of TSF confidential data
TSF confidential data under the TOE management may be altered by persons without
a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access
permission to the TSF confidential data.
Page 24 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
3.4 Organisational Security Policies
The following organisational security policies are taken as matters to be complied by TOE: Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Version 1.1 created by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology is considered.
P.AUTHORIZATION User identification and authentication
Only users with operation permission of the TOE shall be authorised to use the TOE.
P.VALIDATION Software verification
The TOE shall have procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
P.AUDIT Management of audit log records
To maintain operational accountability and security, records that provide an audit trail
of TOE security-relevant events shall be created, maintained, protected from disclosure
and alteration by unauthorised persons, and confirmed by authorised persons.
P.FAX Management of external interfaces
For provision of the Fax Function over the telephone line by the TOE, the separation
between the telephone line and the LAN shall be ensured.
P.ENCRYPTION eMMC encryption
The data recorded in the TOE's eMMC shall be encrypted.
3.5 Assumptions
This section identifies and describes the assumptions related to the operational environment of this TOE.
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION Access management
The MFP administrator shall install the TOE in a secure and monitored area in
accordance with the guidance documents and restrict a chance of physical access by
unspecified number of persons.
A.NETWORK_PROTECTION Network management
The MFP administrator shall install the TOE in an operational environment protected
from any external attempt to directly access the TOE's LAN interfaces.
Page 25 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
A.USER User training
The MFP administrator shall train normal users according to the guidance documents
and ensure that normal users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organisation and have the competence to follow those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN Administrator training
The MFP administrator shall be aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organisation and have the competence to correctly configure and operate the TOE in
accordance with the guidance documents following those policies and procedures.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN Trusted administrator
Persons who do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes according
to the guidance documents shall be appointed as administrators.
Page 26 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
4 Security Objectives
This section describes Security Objectives for TOE, Security Objectives for Operational Environment, and
Security Objectives Rationale.
4.1 Security Objectives for TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE.
O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS Protection of document data disclosure
The TOE shall protect document data from unauthorised disclosure by persons without
a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access
permission to the document data.
O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT Protection of document data alteration
The TOE shall protect document data from unauthorised alteration by persons without
a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access
permission to the document data.
O.JOB_ALT Protection of user job data alteration
The TOE shall protect user job data from unauthorised alteration by persons without a
login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission
to the user job data.
O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT Protection of TSF protected data alteration
The TOE shall protect TSF protected data from unauthorised alteration by persons
without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access
permission to the TSF protected data.
O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS Protection of TSF confidential data disclosure
The TOE shall protect TSF confidential data from unauthorised disclosure by persons
without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access
permission to the TSF confidential data.
O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT Protection of TSF confidential data alteration
The TOE shall protect TSF confidential data from unauthorised alteration by persons
without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access
permission to the TSF confidential data.
Page 27 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
O.AUTHORIZATION User identification and authentication
The TOE shall require identification and authentication of users and shall ensure that
users are authorised in accordance with security policies before allowing them to use
the TOE.
O.FAX Management of external interfaces by TOE
For provision of the Fax Function over the telephone line by the TOE, the TOE shall
ensure the separation between the telephone line and the LAN.
O.VALIDATION Software verification
The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
O.AUDIT Management of audit log records
The TOE shall ensure that logs of TOE security-relevant events are created and
maintained as audit log, and protected from disclosure or alteration by unauthorised
persons. It shall also provide audit logs in a format that can be verified by authorised
persons.
O.EMMC_ENCRYPTION eMMC encryption
The TOE shall ensure that the function to encrypt data first and then store it in the
eMMC is provided.
4.2 Security Objectives for Operational Environment
This section describes the security objectives for the operational environment.
OE.AUDIT Audit log protection in trusted IT products
The MFP administrator shall ensure that audit logs that are exported to a trusted IT
product are protected from unauthorised access and modifications.
OE.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION Physical management
The MFP administrator shall ensure that the TOE is installed in a secure and monitored
area in accordance with the guidance documents and a chance of physical access by
unspecified number of persons is restricted.
OE.NETWORK_PROTECTION Network management
The MFP administrator shall ensure that the TOE is installed in an operational
environment protected from any external attempt to directly access the TOE's LAN
interfaces.
Page 28 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
OE.AUTHORIZED_USER Assignment of user authority
The MFP administrator shall give users the authority to use the TOE in accordance with
the security policies and procedures of their organisation.
OE.TRAINED_USER User training
The MFP administrator shall train users according to the guidance documents and
ensure that users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation
and have the competence to follow those policies and procedures.
OE.TRAINED_ADMIN Administrator training
The responsible manager of MFP shall ensure that MFP administrators are trained to
correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with the guidance documents
following the security policies and procedures of their organisation and they have the
competence to follow those policies and procedures.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN Trusted administrator
The responsible manager of MFP shall appoint administrators who will not use their
privileged access rights for malicious purposes according to the guidance documents.
OE.AUDIT_MANAGE Log audit
The MFP administrator shall ensure that audit logs are reviewed at appropriate intervals
for detecting security violations or unusual patterns of activity.
4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
This section describes the rationale for security objectives. The security objectives are for upholding the
assumptions, countering the threats, and enforcing the organisational security policies, which are defined.
4.3.1 Correspondence Table of Security Objectives
Table 10 describes the correspondence between the assumptions, threats and organisational security policies,
and each security objective.
Page 29 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Table 10: Rationale for Security Objectives
Security Objectives
Security Problem Definitions
O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS
O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT
O.JOB_ALT
O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT
O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS
O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT
O.AUTHORIZATION
OE.AUTHORIZED_USER
O.VALIDATION
O.AUDIT
OE.AUDIT
OE.AUDIT_MANAGE
O.FAX
OE.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION
OE.NETWORK_PROTECTION
O.EMMC_ENCRYPTION
OE.TRAINED_ADMIN
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
OE.TRAINED_USER
T.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS X X X
T.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT X X X
T.JOB_ALT X X X
T.PROTECT_DATA_ALT X X X
T.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS X X X
T.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT X X X
P.AUTHORIZATION X X
P.VALIDATION X
P.AUDIT X X X
P.FAX X
P.ENCRYPTION X
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION X
A.NETWORK_PROTECTION X
A.ADMIN X
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN X
A.USER X
4.3.2 Security Objectives Descriptions
The following describes the rationale for each security objective being appropriate to satisfy the threats,
assumptions and organisational security policies.
Page 30 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
T.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS
T.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS is countered by O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS, O.AUTHORIZATION, and
OE.AUTHORIZED_USER.
By OE.AUTHORIZED_USER, the MFP administrator gives the authority to use the TOE to users in
accordance with the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.AUTHORIZATION, the TOE
requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security
policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS, the TOE protects document
data from unauthorised disclosure by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name
but without an access permission to the document data.
T.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS is countered by these objectives.
T.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT
T.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT is countered by O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT, O.AUTHORIZATION, and
OE.AUTHORIZED_USER.
By OE.AUTHORIZED_USER, the MFP administrator gives the authority to use the TOE to users in
accordance with the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.AUTHORIZATION, the TOE
requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security
policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT, the TOE protects document
data from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name
but without an access permission to the document data.
T.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT is countered by these objectives.
T.JOB_ALT
T.JOB_ALT is countered by O.JOB_ALT, O.AUTHORIZATION, and OE.AUTHORIZED_USER.
By OE.AUTHORIZED_USER, the MFP administrator gives the authority to use the TOE to users in
accordance with the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.AUTHORIZATION, the TOE
requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security
policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.JOB_ALT, the TOE protects the user job data from
unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without
an access permission to the user job data.
T.JOB_ALT is countered by these objectives.
Page 31 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
T.PROTECT_DATA_ALT
T.PROTECT_DATA_ALT is countered by O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT, O.AUTHORIZATION, and
OE.AUTHORIZED_USER.
By OE.AUTHORIZED_USER, the MFP administrator gives the authority to use the TOE to users in
accordance with the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.AUTHORIZATION, the TOE
requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security
policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT, the TOE protects the TSF
protected data from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login
user name but without an access permission to the TSF protected data.
T.PROTECT_DATA_ALT is countered by these objectives.
T.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS
T.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS is countered by O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS, O.AUTHORIZATION,
and OE.AUTHORIZED_USER.
By OE.AUTHORIZED_USER, the MFP administrator gives the authority to use the TOE to users in
accordance with the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.AUTHORIZATION, the TOE
requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security
policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS, the TOE protects the TSF
confidential data from unauthorised disclosure by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a
login user name but without an access permission to the TSF confidential data.
T.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS is countered by these objectives.
T.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT
T.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT is countered by O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT,
O.AUTHORIZATION, and OE.AUTHORIZED_USER.
By OE.AUTHORIZED_USER, the MFP administrator gives the authority to use the TOE to users in
accordance with the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.AUTHORIZATION, the TOE
requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security
policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT, the TOE protects the
TSF confidential data from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with
a login user name but without an access permission to the TSF confidential data.
T.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT is countered by these objectives.
P.AUTHORIZATION
P.AUTHORIZATION is countered by O.AUTHORIZATION and OE.AUTHORIZED_USER.
By OE.AUTHORIZED_USER, the MFP administrator gives the authority to use the TOE to users in
accordance with the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.AUTHORIZATION, the TOE
requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security
policies before being allowed to use the TOE.
P.AUTHORIZATION is enforced by these objectives.
Page 32 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
P.VALIDATION
P.VALIDATION is countered by O.VALIDATION.
By O.VALIDATION, the TOE provides measures for self-verifying the executable code of the TSF.
P.VALIDATION is enforced by this objective.
P.AUDIT
P.AUDIT is countered by O.AUDIT, OE.AUDIT, OE.AUDIT_MANAGE.
By O.AUDIT, the TOE creates and maintains logs of TOE security-relevant events as audit log and protects
them from disclosure or alteration by unauthorised persons. It also provides audit logs in a format that can be
verified by unauthorised persons.
On the other hand, by OE.AUDIT, the MFP administrator ensures that audit logs that are exported to a trusted
IT product are protected from being accessed and altered by unauthorised persons. In addition, by
OE.AUDIT_MANAGE, the MFP administrator reviews audit logs at appropriate intervals for detecting
security violations or unusual patterns of activity.
P.AUDIT is enforced by these objectives.
P.FAX
P.FAX is countered by O.FAX.
By O.FAX, for provision of the Fax Function over the telephone line by the TOE, the TOE ensures the
separation between the telephone line and the LAN.
P.FAX is enforced by this objective.
P.ENCRYPTION
P.ENCRYPTION is countered by O.EMMC_ENCRYPTION.
By O.EMMC_ENCRYPTION, the TOE provides the function to encrypt data first and then store it in the
eMMC.
P.ENCRYPTION is enforced by this objective.
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION is operated under OE.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION.
By OE.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION, the TOE is installed in a secure and monitored area in accordance with
the guidance documents and a chance of physical access by unspecified number of persons is restricted.
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION is fulfilled by this objective.
A.NETWORK_PROTECTION
A.NETWORK_PROTECTION is operated under OE.NETWORK_PROTECTION.
By OE.NETWORK_PROTECTION, the MFP administrator ensures that the TOE is installed in an operational
environment protected from any external attempt to directly access the TOE's LAN interfaces.
Page 33 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
A.NETWORK_PROTECTION is fulfilled by this objective.
A.ADMIN
A.ADMIN is operated under OE.TRAINED_ADMIN.
By OE.TRAINED_ADMIN, the responsible manager of MFP ensures that MFP administrators are trained to
correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with the guidance documents following the security
policies and procedures of their organisation and they have the competence to follow those policies and
procedures.
A.ADMIN is fulfilled by this objective.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN is operated under OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN.
By OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN, the responsible manager of MFP appoints administrators who will not use their
privileged access rights for malicious purposes according to the guidance documents.
A.TRUSTED_ADMIN is fulfilled by this objective.
A.USER
A.USER is operated under OE.TRAINED_USER.
By OE.TRAINED_USER, the MFP administrator instructs the users in accordance with the guidance
documents to make them aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation, and the users
follow those policies and procedures.
A.USER is fulfilled by this objective.
Page 34 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
5 Extended Components Definition
This section describes Extended Components Definition.
5.1 Fax separation (FDP_FXS_EXP)
Family behaviour
This family addresses the requirements for the separation between the fax telephone line and the LAN to which
the TOE is connected.
Component levelling
FDP_FXS_EXP.1 Fax separation requires that the fax interface is not available to create a network bridge
between the telephone line and the LAN to which the TOE is connected.
Management: FDP_FXS_EXP.1
- There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit: FDP_FXS_EXP.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FDP_FXS_EXP.1 Fax separation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_FXS_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall prohibit communication via a fax interface, except for transmission or
reception of user data using a fax protocol.
Rationale:
The fax separation protects the LAN against attacks from the telephone lines. Common Criteria does not
provide suitable SFRs for protecting TSF or user data. Since this extended component protects TSF data or
user data, it is considered as a component of the FDP class.
5.2 TSF testing (FPT_TST_EXP)
Family behaviour
This family addresses TSF's self-testing requirements for verifying the integrity of executable code in the TSF.
1
FDP_FXS_EXP.1 Fax separation
Page 35 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Component levelling
FPT_TST_EXP.1 TSF testing requires a suite of self-tests that runs at initial startup to verify the integrity of
executable code in the TSF.
Management: FPT_TST_EXP.1
- There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit: FPT_TST_EXP.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
FPT_TST_EXP.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests at initial startup (and power-on) to verify the
integrity of executable code in the TSF.
Rationale:
The TSF testing ensures that the integrity of executable code in the TSF is verified. The target of integrity
verification is different from that of the SFRs provided by Common Criteria. Since this extended component
protects the TOE, it is considered as a component of the FPT class.
1
FPT_TST_EXP.1 TSF testing
Page 36 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
6 Security Requirements
This section describes Security Functional Requirements, Security Assurance Requirements, and Security
Requirements Rationale.
The terms used in this section are defined in Table 11.
Table 11: Terms in Section 6
Classification of Term Name of Term Description of Term
Subject Normal user process A process that acts on behalf of a normal user
when the authentication of the normal user is
successful.
MFP administrator process A process that acts on behalf of an MFP
administrator when the authentication of the MFP
administrator is successful.
Supervisor process A process that acts on behalf of a supervisor when
the authentication of the supervisor is successful.
Object Document data Information contained in the user's document in
electronic or hard-copy format.
Document data stored and saved in the eMMC
(stored document data) and document data
received from the printer driver and temporarily
saved in the TOE (temporarily-saved document)
are included. Stored document data includes
scanned documents, fax transmission documents,
fax reception documents, stored print documents,
and Document Server documents.
Temporarily-saved
document
Document data received from the printer driver
and temporarily saved in the TOE.
Scanned document One of the stored document data types. Document
data stored in the TOE by the Scanner Function.
Fax transmission document One of the stored document data types. Document
data received from the fax driver and stored in the
TOE, and document data stored in the TOE for
sending by the Fax Function.
Fax reception document One of the stored document data types. Document
data stored in the TOE by means of fax reception
from an external fax via a telephone line instructed
by the TOE.
Page 37 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Classification of Term Name of Term Description of Term
Stored print document One of the stored document data types. Document
data received from the printer driver and stored in
the TOE with stored print specified as the print
method.
Document Server document One of the stored document data types. Document
data stored in the TOE by using the Copy or
Document Server Function, or document data
received from the printer driver and stored in the
TOE with Document Server storage specified as
the print method.
User job data Information related to the user's document or
document processing job. Information regarding a
sequence of operations of each TOE function
(Copy Function, Scanner Function, Printer
Function, Fax Transmission Function, Fax
Reception Function, and Document Server
Function) from beginning to end.
Operation Read To perform print, fax transmission, e-mail
transmission of attachments, folder transmission,
download, or preview.
Delete To delete TSF data or objects.
Newly create To newly create TSF data.
Query To refer to TSF data.
Modify To modify TSF data or objects.
Change_default To change the default value of TSF data.
Security attribute Login user name User identifier associated with any of the normal
user, MFP administrator, and supervisor. The
TOE identifies users by this identifier.
User privilege Any role of normal user, MFP administrator, or
supervisor who uses the TOE, and the privilege
according to that role.
Page 38 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Classification of Term Name of Term Description of Term
Document data owner
information
The security attribute of document data
(temporarily-saved document data, scanned
documents, fax transmission documents, stored
print documents, and Document Server
documents). The owner information (the login
user name) of document data (except fax reception
documents) is set.
List of users who have been
granted access permission
for the document data
The security attribute of document data
(temporarily-saved document data, scanned
documents, fax transmission documents, stored
print documents, and Document Server
documents).
The information of users (the login user names)
who are allowed access (viewing) document data
(except fax reception documents) is set.
The document data owner can allow other normal
users to read the document data.
Fax reception document
user
The security attribute of fax reception
documents.
The list of the login user names of users who
have been granted access (read and delete)
permission for fax reception documents is set.
The users are managed with one list for all fax
reception documents.
User job data owner
information
The security attribute of user job data. The
information of user job data owners (the login user
name) is set.
External entity Normal user A user who is allowed to use the TOE. A normal
user is provided with a login user name and can
operate the MFP application (that is, run and
cancel the Copy Function, Fax Function, Scanner
Function, Printer Function, and Document Server
Function).
Page 39 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Classification of Term Name of Term Description of Term
MFP administrator A user who has the privilege to manage the TOE,
including:
- Operation of configuration of normal user
settings
- Operation of setting information related to
MFP device behaviour
- Operation of audit logs
- Operation of configuration of network
settings
- Access management of fax reception
documents
- Unlocking locked-out normal users and
supervisor
Supervisor A user who has the privilege to manage the TOE,
including:
- Changing login password of MFP
administrators
- Unlocking locked-out MFP administrators
6.1 Security Functional Requirements
This section describes the TOE security functional requirements for fulfilling the security objectives defined
in section 4.1.
6.1.1 Class FAU: Security audit
6.1.1.1. FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not
specified] level of audit; and
c) [assignment: other specifically defined auditable events].
[selection, choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified]
⚫ not specified
[assignment: other specifically defined auditable events]
⚫ Auditable events of the TOE shown in Table 12
Page 40 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: other audit relevant information].
[assignment: other audit relevant information]
⚫ All login user names that attempted the user identification for FIA_UID.1, job type,
communicating devices with the trusted channel, lockout operation type, locked out user,
and locked out user who is to be released
The related SFRs and auditable events for the TOE are listed in Table 12.
Table 12: List of Auditable Events
Auditable Event Related SFR
Download and deletion of audit logs FAU_STG.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.2
- Start and end of printing temporarily-saved document data, fax
transmission documents, fax reception documents, stored print
documents, and Document Server documents
- Start and end of downloading scanned documents, fax transmission
documents, and fax reception documents
- Start and end of sending scanned documents by e-mail transmission
of attachments
- Start and end of sending scanned documents by folder transmission
- Start and end of sending fax transmission documents by fax
transmission
- Deletion of temporarily-saved document data, scanned documents,
fax transmission documents, fax reception documents, stored print
documents, and Document Server documents
- Deletion of user job data
FDP_ACF.1
Starting and releasing lockout FIA_AFL.1
Success and failure of login operation FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1
Use of the management functions in Table 24 FMT_SMF.1
FPT_STM.1
Termination of session by auto logout FTA_SSL.3
Page 41 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Auditable Event Related SFR
Failure of the trusted channel functions FTP_ITC.1
6.1.1.2. FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate
each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
6.1.1.3. FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose one of: prevent, detect] unauthorized
modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.
[selection, choose one of: prevent, detect]
⚫ prevent
6.1.1.4. FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies: FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: "ignore audited events", "prevent audited events,
except those taken by the authorised user with special rights", "overwrite the oldest stored
audit records"] and [assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the
audit trail is full.
[selection, choose one of: "ignore audited events", "prevent audited events, except those taken
by the authorised user with special rights", "overwrite the oldest stored audit records"]
⚫ "overwrite the oldest stored audit records"
[assignment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure]
⚫ None
6.1.1.5. FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Page 42 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
FAU_SAR.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to read
[assignment: list of audit information] from the audit records.
[assignment: authorised users]
⚫ MFP administrator
[assignment: the list of audit information]
⚫ All audit logs
FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
6.1.1.6. FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1 The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that
have been granted explicit read-access.
6.1.2 Class FCS: Cryptographic support
6.1.2.1. FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the
following: [assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: list of standards]
⚫ None
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
⚫ Random number generation using AES-128
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
⚫ 256 bits
6.1.2.2. FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Page 43 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key destruction method] that meets the
following: [assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: list of standards]
⚫ None
[assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
⚫ Overwrite with 0
6.1.2.3. FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic
key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
[assignment: list of standards]
⚫ FIPS197
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
⚫ AES
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
⚫ 256 bits
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
⚫ Encryption of data to be written to the eMMC
Decryption of data to be read from the eMMC
6.1.3 Class FDP: User data protection
6.1.3.1. FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Page 44 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects,
objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP].
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered in the
SFP]
⚫ List of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects shown in Table 13
[assignment: access control SFP]
⚫ User data access control SFP
Table 13: List of Subjects, Objects, and Operations among Subjects and Objects
Subjects Objects Operations
Normal user process
MFP administrator process
Supervisor process
Temporarily-saved document
data
Scanned document
Fax transmission document
Fax reception document
Stored print document
Document Server document
Read
Delete
Modify
User job data Delete
Modify
6.1.3.2. FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] to objects based on the
following: [assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and
for each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or a named group of SFP-relevant security
attributes].
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the
SFP-relevant security attributes, or a named group of SFP- relevant security attributes]
⚫ Subjects, objects, and for each, the security attributes shown in Table 14
[assignment: access control SFP]
⚫ User data access control SFP
Page 45 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Table 14: Subjects, Objects, and Security Attributes
Category Subjects or Objects Security Attributes
Subject Normal user process Login user name
User privilege
Subject MFP administrator process Login user name
User privilege
Subject Supervisor process Login user name
User privilege
Object Temporarily-saved document
data
Document data owner information
Object Scanned document
Fax transmission document
Stored print document
Document Server document
Document data owner information
List of users who have been granted access
permission for the document data
Object Fax reception document Fax reception document user
Object User job data User job data owner information
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [assignment: rules governing access among
controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects].
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using
controlled operations on controlled objects]
⚫ Rules to control operations among subjects and objects shown in Table 15
Table 15: Rules to Control Operations among Subjects and Objects
Objects Operations Subjects
(Security Attributes)
Rules of User Data Access Control SFP
Temporarily-saved
document
Read
Delete
Normal user process
(Login user name,
user privilege)
Not allowed. However, operation is
allowed when the login user name of
the normal user process and the login
user name registered in the "document
data owner information" of the object
match.
Page 46 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Objects Operations Subjects
(Security Attributes)
Rules of User Data Access Control SFP
Scanned document
Fax transmission
document
Stored print document
Document Server
document
Read Normal user process
(Login user name,
user privilege)
Not allowed. However, operation is
allowed when the login user name of
the normal user process and the login
user name registered in the "Document
data owner information" of the object
match. Further, operation is allowed
when the login user name of the normal
user process and the login user name
registered in the "list of users who have
been granted access permission for the
document data" of the object match.
Scanned document
Fax transmission
document
Stored print document
Document Server
document
Delete Normal user process
(Login user name,
user privilege)
Not allowed. However, operation is
allowed when the login user name of
the normal user process and the login
user name registered in the "document
data owner information" of the object
match.
Fax transmission
document
Read
Delete
Normal user process
(Login user name,
user privilege)
Not allowed. However, operation is
allowed when the login user name of
the normal user process and the login
user name registered in the "fax
reception document user " of the object
match.
User job data Delete Normal user process
(Login user name,
user privilege)
Not allowed. (*1)
However, operation is allowed when
the login user name of the normal user
process and the login user name
registered in the "user job data owner
information " of the object match.
(*1) No interface is provided.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise
access of subjects to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to
objects]
⚫ Rules that explicitly authorise access shown in Table 16
Page 47 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Table 16: Rules That Explicitly Authorise Access
Objects Operations Subjects
(Security Attributes)
Rules of User Data Access
Control SFP
Temporarily-saved
document
Scanned document
Fax transmission document
Stored print document
Document Server document
Delete MFP administrator
process
(User privilege, login
user name)
Allowed.
Scanned document
Fax transmission document
Document Server document
Read MFP administrator
process
(User privilege, login
user name)
Allowed.
User job data Delete MFP administrator
process
(User privilege, login
user name)
Allowed.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects
to objects].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to
objects]
⚫ Rules that explicitly deny access shown in Table 17
Table 17: Rules That Explicitly Deny Access
Objects Operations Subjects
(Security Attributes)
Rules of User Data Access
Control SFP
Temporarily-saved
document
Stored print document
Read MFP administrator process
(User privilege, login user
name)
Denied. (*1)
Fax transmission
document
Read
Delete
MFP administrator process
(User privilege, login user
name)
Denied. (*1)
Page 48 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Objects Operations Subjects
(Security Attributes)
Rules of User Data Access
Control SFP
Temporarily-saved
document
Scanned document
Fax transmission
document
Fax reception document
Stored print document
Document Server
document
Read
Delete
Supervisor process (User
privilege, login user name)
Denied. (*1)
Temporarily-saved
document
Scanned document
Fax transmission
document
Fax reception document
Stored print document
Document Server
document
Modify Normal user process
(User privilege, login user
name)
For any subject, document data
operation is denied. (*1)
MFP administrator process
(User privilege, login user
name)
Supervisor process
(User privilege, login user
name)
User job data Delete Supervisor process
(User privilege, login user
name)
Denied. (*1)
User job data Modify Normal user process
(User privilege, login user
name)
For any subject, user job data
operation is denied. (*1)
MFP administrator process
(User privilege, login user
name)
Supervisor process
(User privilege, login user
name)
(*1) No interface is provided.
6.1.3.3. FDP_FXS_EXP.1 Fax separation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_FXS_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall prohibit communication via a fax interface, except for transmission or
reception of user data using a fax protocol.
Page 49 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
6.1.4 Class FIA: Identification and authentication
6.1.4.1. FIA_AFL.1Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator
configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].
[assignment: list of authentication events]
⚫ Authentication events shown in Table 18
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive
integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]]
⚫ an administrator configurable positive integer number within [assignment: range of
acceptable values]
[assignment: range of acceptable values]
⚫ 1 to 5
Table 18: List of Authentication Events
Authentication Events
User authentication using the Operation Panel
User authentication using WIM
User authentication when document data is received from the printer driver and
temporarily saved or stored
User authentication when document data is received from the fax driver and stored
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met,
surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
[selection: met, surpassed]
⚫ met, surpassed
[assignment: the list of actions]
⚫ Actions shown in Table 19
Page 50 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Table 19: List of Actions for Authentication Failure
Unsuccessfully
Authenticated Users
Actions for Authentication Failure
Normal user The normal user is locked out during the lockout time set by the MFP
administrator, or until the MFP administrator performs the release operation.
MFP administrator The MFP administrator is locked out during the lockout time set by the MFP
administrator, until the supervisor performs the release operation, or until a given
time elapses after the TOE restarts.
Supervisor The supervisor is locked out during the lockout time set by the MFP administrator,
until the MFP administrator performs the release operation, or until a given time
elapses after the TOE restarts.
6.1.4.2. FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual
users: [assignment: list of security attributes]
[assignment: list of security attributes]
⚫ Login user name, user privilege
6.1.4.3. FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [assignment: a defined
quality metric].
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
⚫ Quality metrics are as follows:
(1) To use multiple character types of upper-case letters, lower-case letters, digits, and
symbols (The required number of types is set by the MFP administrator as the
password complexity setting.)
(2) Passwords must be single-byte alphanumeric letters and symbols with minimum
character number of password (8-32 characters set by the MFP administrator) or
more, and
 Must be 128 characters or less for normal users
 Must be 32 characters or less for MFP administrators and supervisors
Page 51 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
6.1.4.4. FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be
performed before the user is authenticated.
[assignment: list of TSF mediated actions]
⚫ Viewing of the list of user job data, WIM Help, system status, counter and information of
inquiries, and execution of fax reception
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.4.5. FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user while the authentication
is in progress.
[assignment: list of feedback]
⚫ Dummy letters
6.1.4.6. FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be
performed before the user is identified.
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
⚫ Viewing of the list of user job data, WIM Help, system status, counter and information of
inquiries, and execution of fax reception
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.4.7. FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
Page 52 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the
behalf of that user: [assignment: list of user security attributes]
[assignment: list of user security attributes]
⚫ Login user name, user privilege
FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes
with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the initial association of
attributes]
[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]
⚫ None
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes
associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules for changing of
attributes]
[assignment: rules for changing of attributes]
⚫ None
6.1.5 Class FMT: Security management
6.1.5.1. FMT_MOF.1 Control of the behaviour of the Security Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Function
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable,
modify the behaviour of] the functions [assignment: list of functions] to [assignment: the
authorised and identified roles].
[assignment: list of functions]
⚫ syslog transfer function
[selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of]
⚫ disable, enable
[assignment: the authorised and identified roles]
⚫ MFP administrator
Page 53 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
6.1.5.2. FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Function
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control
SFP(s)] to restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete,
[assignment: other operations]] the security attributes [assignment: list of security attributes]
to [assignment: the authorised and identified roles].
[assignment: list of security attributes]
⚫ Security attributes in Table 20
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
⚫ change_default, delete, [assignment: other operations]
[assignment: other operations]
⚫ Newly create, modify
[assignment: the authorised and identified roles]
⚫ Roles (user privileges) for which the operations in Table 20 are allowed
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
⚫ User data access control SFP(s)
Table 20: User Privilege by Security Attribute
Security Attributes Operations Roles (User Privileges) for Which
Operations are Allowed
Login user name
[When associated with a normal user]
Newly create
Modify
Delete
MFP administrator
Login user name
[When associated with an MFP
administrator]
Newly create MFP administrator
Modify MFP administrator in question
Login user name
[When associated with a supervisor]
Modify Supervisor
User privilege Modify No role with the operation permission
Document data owner information Modify No role with the operation permission
List of users who have been granted access
permission for the document data
Modify
MFP administrator
Document data owner (normal user)
Change_default MFP administrator
Page 54 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Security Attributes Operations Roles (User Privileges) for Which
Operations are Allowed
Fax reception document user Modify MFP administrator
User job data owner information Modify No role with the operation permission
6.1.5.3. FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
⚫ restrictive
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
⚫ User data access control SFP
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [assignment: the authorised identified roles] to specify alternative
initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
⚫ Roles (user privileges) for which the operation in Table 21 is allowed
Table 21: Roles for Which Operation to Overwrite Default Values is Allowed
Objects Security Attributes Roles (User Privileges) for Which the Operation is
Allowed
Temporarily-saved
document
Scanned document
Fax transmission
document
Stored print document
Document Server
document
Document data owner
information
No role with the operation permission
Scanned document
List of users who have been
granted access permission
for the document data
Normal user in question who creates the document
data
Page 55 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Objects Security Attributes Roles (User Privileges) for Which the Operation is
Allowed
Fax transmission
document
List of users who have been
granted access permission
for the document data
Normal user in question who creates the document
data
(Overwriting the default values is allowed only when
the document data is stored from the Operation
Panel. There is no interface for overwriting default
values when the document data is stored from the fax
driver.)
Fax reception document Fax reception document user No role with the operation permission
Stored print document
List of users who have been
granted access permission
for the document data
No role with the operation permission
Document Server
document
List of users who have been
granted access permission
for the document data
Normal user in question who creates the document
data
(Overwriting the default values is allowed only when
the document data is stored from the Operation
Panel. There is no interface for overwriting default
values when the document data is stored from the
printer driver.)
User job data User job data owner
information
No role with the operation permission
6.1.5.4. FMT_MTD.1(a) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Function
FMT_MTD.1.1(a)The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear,
[assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the
authorised identified roles].
[assignment: list of TSF data]
⚫ TSF data in Table 22
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
⚫ query, delete, [assignment: other operations]
[assignment: other operations]
⚫ Newly create, modify
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
⚫ Roles (user privileges) for which the operations in Table 22 are allowed
Page 56 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Table 22: List of TSF Data
Category TSF data Operations Roles (User Privileges) for
Which Operations are Allowed
TSF
protected
data
Lockout settings Modify MFP administrator
Date/time settings Modify MFP administrator
Password quality settings Modify MFP administrator
Auto logout settings Modify MFP administrator
S/MIME user information
Newly create
Modify
Delete
MFP administrator
Destination folder
Newly create
Modify
Delete
MFP administrator
Audit log settings Modify MFP administrator
Cryptographic communication settings Modify MFP administrator
TSF
confidential
data
Login password
[When associated with a normal user]
Modify Normal user in question
MFP administrator
Newly create MFP administrator
Login password
[When associated with an MFP
administrator]
Modify MFP administrator in
question
Supervisor
Newly create MFP administrator
Login password
[When associated with a supervisor]
Modify Supervisor
eMMC cryptographic key
Newly create
Query
Delete
MFP administrator
6.1.5.5. FMT_MTD.1(b) Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Function
FMT_MTD.1.1(b)The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear,
[assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the
authorised identified roles].
[assignment: list of TSF data]
⚫ TSF data in Table 23
Page 57 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
⚫ Query
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
⚫ Roles (user privileges) for which the operation in Table 23 is allowed
Table 23: List of TSF Data
Category TSF data Operations Roles (User Privileges) for Which
Operations are Allowed
TSF confidential data Login password Query No roles for which operations are
allowed
6.1.5.6. FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Function
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment:
list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
⚫ Management functions listed in Table 24
Page 58 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Table 24: List of Specification of Management Functions
Management Functions
Disable and enable the syslog transfer function
Newly create, modify, and delete login user names
Modify the list of users who have been granted access permission for
the document data, and change the default value of it
Modify fax reception document users
Newly create and modify login passwords
Query, delete, and newly create eMMC cryptographic keys
Modify lockout settings
Modify date/time settings
Modify password quality settings
Modify auto logout settings
Newly create, modify, and delete S/MIME user information
Newly create, modify, and delete destination folders
Modify audit log settings
Modify cryptographic communication settings
6.1.5.7. FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the authorised identified roles].
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
⚫ Normal user, MFP administrator, and supervisor
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.1.6 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
6.1.6.1. FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
Page 59 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
6.1.6.2. FPT_TST_EXP.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TST_EXP.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests at initial startup (and power-on) to verify the
integrity of executable code in the TSF.
6.1.7 Class FTA: TOE access
6.1.7.1. FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after [assignment: time interval of user
inactivity]
[assignment: time interval of user inactivity]
⚫ Time specified by the MFP administrator
6.1.8 Class FTP: Trusted paths/channels
6.1.8.1. FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT
product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
[selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
⚫ The TSF, another trusted IT product
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [assignment: list of
functions for which a trusted channel is required].
[assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
⚫ Scanner function
⚫ syslog transfer function
Page 60 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
⚫ Fax Function
⚫ Printer Function
⚫ WIM Function
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The evaluation assurance level of this TOE is EAL2. Table 25 lists the assurance components of the TOE.
Table 25: TOE Security Assurance Requirements (EAL2)
Assurance Classes Assurance Components
ADV:
Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC:
Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ASE:
Security Target evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE:
Tests
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA:
Vulnerability assessment
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
This section describes the rationale for security requirements.
If all security functional requirements are satisfied as below, the security objectives defined in "4 Security
Objectives" are fulfilled.
Page 61 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
6.3.1 Tracing
Table 26 describes the relationship between the TOE security functional requirements and TOE security
objectives. Items in bold provide the primal (P) fulfillment of the objectives, and items in standard typeface
support (S) its fulfillment. Table 26 describes that each TOE security functional requirement fulfils at least
one TOE security objective.
Table 26: Correspondence between Security Objectives and Functional Requirements
O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS
O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT
O.JOB_ALT
O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT
O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS
O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT
O.AUTHORIZATION
O.FAX
O.VALIDATION
O.AUDIT
O.EMMC_ENCRYPTION
FAU_GEN.1 P
FAU_GEN.2 P
FAU_STG.1 P P
FAU_STG.4 S
FAU_SAR.1 P P
FAU_SAR.2 P P
FCS_CKM.1 S
FCS_CKM.4 S
FCS_COP.1 P
FDP_ACC.1 P P P
FDP_ACF.1 P P P
FDP_FXS_EXP.1 P
FIA_AFL.1 S
FIA_ATD.1 S
FIA_SOS.1 S
FIA_UAU.1 P
FIA_UAU.7 S
FIA_UID.1 S S S S S S P S
FIA_USB.1 P
FMT_MOF.1 P
FMT_MSA.1 S S S P
Page 62 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS
O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT
O.JOB_ALT
O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT
O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS
O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT
O.AUTHORIZATION
O.FAX
O.VALIDATION
O.AUDIT
O.EMMC_ENCRYPTION
FMT_MSA.3 S S S
FMT_MTD.1(a) P P P
FMT_MTD.1(b) P
FMT_SMF.1 S S S S S S
FMT_SMR.1 S S S S S S
FPT_STM.1 S
FPT_TST_EXP.1 P
FTA_SSL.3 S
FTP_ITC.1 P P P P P P
6.3.2 Justification of Traceability
This section describes how the TOE security objectives are fulfilled by the TOE security functional
requirements corresponding to the TOE security objectives.
O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS Protection of document data disclosure
O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS is the security objective where the TOE protects the document data from
unauthorised disclosure by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without
an access permission to the document data. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the
following SFRs.
(1) FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 ensure that an access control policy for document data is defined and
access control functions are provided in accordance with the access control policy.
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 are major SFRs to fulfill O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS.
(2) FTP_ITC.1
FTP_ITC.1 ensures that document data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN is protected.
FTP_ITC.1 is a major SFR to fulfill O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS.
(3) FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.1 ensures that the management of security attributes is restricted to specific users.
FMT_MSA.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS.
Page 63 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
(4) FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.3 manages the default security attributes when document data is generated.
FMT_MSA.3 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS.
(5) FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 ensures that the necessary management functions for the security functions are implemented.
FMT_SMF.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS.
(6) FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1 ensures that the authorised user roles are maintained.
FMT_SMR.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS.
(7) FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1 ensures that persons who attempt to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or the client
computer on the network are identified.
FIA_UID.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS.
O.DOCUMENT_DATA_DIS can be fulfilled by implementing these security functional requirements.
O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT Protection of document data alteration
O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT is the security objective where the TOE protects the document data from
unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without
an access permission to the document data. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the
following SFRs.
(1) FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 ensure that an access control policy for document data is defined and
access control functions are provided in accordance with the access control policy.
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 are major SFRs to fulfill O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT.
(2) FTP_ITC.1
FTP_ITC.1 ensures that document data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN is protected.
FTP_ITC.1 is a major SFR to fulfill O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT.
(3) FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.1 ensures that the management of security attributes is restricted to specific users.
FMT_MSA.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT.
(4) FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.3 manages the default security attributes when document data is generated.
FMT_MSA.3 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT.
(5) FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 ensures that the necessary management functions for the security functions are implemented.
FMT_SMF.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT.
(6) FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1 ensures that the authorised user roles are maintained.
FMT_SMR.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT.
Page 64 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
(7) FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1 ensures that persons who attempt to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or the client
computer on the network are identified.
FIA_UID.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT.
O.DOCUMENT_DATA_ALT can be fulfilled by implementing these security functional requirements.
O.JOB_ALT Protection of user job data alteration
O.JOB_ALT is the security objective where the TOE protects the user job data from unauthorised alteration
by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission
to the user job data. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following SFRs.
(1) FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 ensure that an access control policy for user job data is defined and access
control functions are provided in accordance with the access control policy.
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 are major SFRs to fulfill O.JOB_ALT.
(2) FTP_ITC.1
FTP_ITC.1 ensures that user job data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN is protected.
FTP_ITC.1 is a major SFR to fulfill O.JOB_ALT.
(3) FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.1 ensures that the management of security attributes is restricted to specific users.
FMT_MSA.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.JOB_ALT.
(4) FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.3 manages the default security attributes when user job data is generated.
FMT_MSA.3 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.JOB_ALT.
(5) FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 ensures that the necessary management functions for the security functions are implemented.
FMT_SMF.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.JOB_ALT.
(6) FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1 ensures that the authorised user roles are maintained.
FMT_SMR.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.JOB_ALT.
(7) FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1 ensures that persons who attempt to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or the client
computer on the network are identified.
FIA_UID.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.JOB_ALT.
O.JOB_ALT can be fulfilled by implementing these security functional requirements.
O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT Protection of TSF protected data alteration
O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT is the security objective where the TOE protects the TSF protected data from
unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without
Page 65 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
an access permission to the TSF protected data. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the
following SFRs.
(1) FMT_MTD.1(a)
FMT_MTD.1(a) ensures that the operation of TSF protected data is restricted to authorised users.
FMT_MTD.1(a) is a major SFR to fulfill O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT.
(2) FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 ensures that the necessary management functions for the security functions are implemented.
FMT_SMF.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT.
(3) FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1 ensures that the authorised user roles are maintained.
FMT_SMR.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT.
(4) FTP_ITC.1
FTP_ITC.1 ensures that TSF protected data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN is protected.
FTP_ITC.1 is a major SFR to fulfill O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT.
(5) FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MOF.1 ensures that only MFP administrators are allowed to manage security functions.
FMT_MOF.1 is a major SFR to fulfill O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT.
(6) FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.1 ensures that the management of security attributes is restricted to specific users.
FMT_MSA.1 is a major SFR to fulfill O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT.
(7) FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1 ensures that persons who attempt to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or the client
computer on the network are identified.
FIA_UID.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT.
O.PROTECT_DATA_ALT can be fulfilled by implementing these security functional requirements.
O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS Protection of TSF confidential data disclosure
O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS is the security objective where the TOE protects the TSF confidential data
from unauthorised disclosure by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but
without an access permission to the TSF confidential data. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to
implement the following SFRs.
(1) FMT_MTD.1(a), FMT_MTD.1(b)
FMT_MTD.1(a) and FMT_MTD.1(b) ensure that the operation of TSF confidential data is restricted to
authorised users.
FMT_MTD.1(a) and FMT_MTD.1(b) are major SFRs to fulfill O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS.
(2) FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 ensures that the necessary management functions for the security functions are implemented.
FMT_SMF.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS.
Page 66 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
(3) FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1 ensures that the authorised user roles are maintained.
FMT_SMR.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS.
(4) FTP_ITC.1
FTP_ITC.1 ensures that TSF confidential data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN is protected.
FTP_ITC.1 is a major SFR to fulfill O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS.
(5) FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1 ensures that persons who attempt to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or the client
computer on the network are identified.
FIA_UID.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS.
(6) FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2
FAU_SAR.1 ensures that audit logs can be read in a format that can be verified by the MFP administrator.
FAU_SAR.2 ensures that anyone other than the MFP administrator is prohibited to read audit logs.
FAU_SAR.1 and FAU_SAR.2 are major SFRs to fulfill O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS.
O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_DIS can be fulfilled by implementing these security functional requirements.
O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT Protection of TSF confidential data alteration
O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT is the security objective where the TOE protects the TSF confidential data
from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but
without an access permission to the TSF confidential data. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to
implement the following SFRs.
(1) FMT_MTD.1(a)
FMT_MTD.1(a) ensures that the operation of TSF confidential data is restricted to authorised users.
FMT_MTD.1(a) is a major SFR to fulfill O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT.
(2) FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 ensures that the necessary management functions for the security functions are implemented.
FMT_SMF.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT.
(3) FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1 ensures that the authorised user roles are maintained.
FMT_SMR.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT.
(4) FTP_ITC.1
FTP_ITC.1 ensures that TSF confidential data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN is protected.
FTP_ITC.1 is a major SFR to fulfill O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT.
(5) FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1 ensures that persons who attempt to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or the client
computer on the network are identified.
FIA_UID.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT.
(6) FAU_STG.1
FAU_STG.1 ensures that audit logs are protected from alteration.
Page 67 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
FAU_STG.1 is a major SFR to fulfill O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT.
O.CONFIDENTIAL_DATA_ALT can be fulfilled by implementing these security functional requirements.
O.AUTHORIZATION User identification and authentication
O.AUTHORIZATION is the security objective where it is ensured that the TOE requires identification and
authentication of users and users are authorised in accordance with the security policies before being allowed
to use the TOE. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following SFRs.
(1) FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 ensure that persons who attempt to use the TOE from the Operation Panel
or the client computer on the network are identified and authenticated.
FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 are major SFRs to fulfill O.AUTHORIZATION.
(2) FIA_USB.1
FIA_USB.1 associates the security attributes with the user who is successfully identified and
authenticated.
FIA_USB.1 is a major SFR to fulfill O.AUTHORIZATION.
(3) FIA_ATD.1
FIA_ATD.1 maintains each user's security attributes registered in the TOE before performing
identification and authentication.
FIA_ATD.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.AUTHORIZATION.
(4) FIA_UAU.7
FIA_UAU.7 ensures that the disclosure of login passwords is prevented by displaying dummy letters as
authentication feedback.
FIA_UAU.7 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.AUTHORIZATION.
(5) FIA_SOS.1
FIA_SOS.1 accepts only passwords that satisfy the quality metrics specified by the MFP administrator,
and makes it difficult to guess the login password.
FIA_SOS.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.AUTHORIZATION.
(6) FIA_AFL.1
FIA_AFL.1 ensures that users who have repeatedly failed authentication a certain number of times are
not allowed to access the TOE for a certain period of time.
FIA_AFL.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.AUTHORIZATION.
(7) FTA_SSL.3
FTA_SSL.3 performs auto logout when the time specified by the MFP administrator has elapsed since
the last operation of the user and the logged-in state is cancelled. Therefore, the user's session is managed
and the inactive session is terminated.
FTA_SSL.3 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.AUTHORIZATION.
O.AUTHORIZATION can be fulfilled by implementing these security functional requirements.
Page 68 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
O.FAX Management of external interfaces by TOE
O.FAX is the security objective to ensure that, for provision of the Fax Function over the telephone line by the
TOE, the TOE ensures the separation between the telephone line and the LAN. To fulfil this security objective,
it is required to implement the following SFRs.
(1) FDP_FXS_EXP.1
FDP_FXS_EXP.1 ensures that communication via a fax interface is prohibited, except for transmission
or reception of user data using a fax protocol.
FDP_FXS_EXP.1 is a major SFR to fulfill O.FAX.
O.FAX can be fulfilled by implementing this security functional requirement.
O.VALIDATION Software verification
O.VALIDATION is the security objective where the TOE provides procedures to self-verify executable code
in the TSF. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following SFRs.
(1) FPT_TST_EXP.1
FPT_TST_EXP.1 ensures that a suite of self-tests is run at initial startup (and power-on) to verify the
integrity of executable code in the TSF.
FPT_TST_EXP.1 is a major SFR to fulfill O.VALIDATION.
O.VALIDATION can be fulfilled by implementing this security functional requirement.
O.AUDIT Management of audit log records
O.AUDIT is the security objective to ensure that the TOE creates and maintains logs of TOE security-related
events as audit log and protects them from disclosure or alteration by unauthorised persons, as well as provides
audit logs in a format that can be verified by authorised persons. To fulfil this security objective, it is required
to implement the following SFRs.
(1) FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2
FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2 ensure that the events that should be audited are recorded together with
the identification information of the cause of events that should be audited.
FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2 are major SFRs to fulfill O.AUDIT.
(2) FAU_STG.1
FAU_STG.1 ensures that audit logs are protected from alteration.
FAU_STG.1 is a major SFR to fulfill O.AUDIT.
(3) FAU_STG.4
FAU_STG.4 ensures that the audit log with the oldest time stamp is deleted and a new audit log is
recorded if an auditable event occurs while the audit log file is full.
FAU_STG.4 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.AUDIT.
(4) FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2
FAU_SAR.1 ensures that audit logs can be read in a format that can be verified by the MFP administrator.
FAU_SAR.2 ensures that anyone other than the MFP administrator is prohibited to read audit logs.
FAU_SAR.1 and FAU_SAR.2 are major SFRs to fulfill O.AUDIT.
Page 69 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
(5) FPT_STM.1
FPT_STM.1 ensures that reliable time stamps are provided and the exact time when the audit event
occurred is recorded to the audit log.
FPT_STM.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.AUDIT.
(6) FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1 ensures that persons who attempt to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or the client
computer on the network are identified.
FIA_UID.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.AUDIT.
O.AUDIT can be fulfilled by implementing these security functional requirements.
O.EMMC_ENCRYPTION eMMC encryption
O.EMMC_ENCRYPTION is the security objective to ensure that data to be written to the eMMC is encrypted.
To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following SFRs.
(1) FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1 ensures that cryptographic keys are generated in accordance with a specified algorithm.
FCS_CKM.1 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.EMMC_ENCRYPTION.
(2) FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 ensures that cryptographic keys are deleted in accordance with a specified method.
FCS_CKM.4 is an SFR that supports the fulfillment of O.EMMC_ENCRYPTION.
(3) FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1 ensures that data to be written to the eMMC is encrypted in accordance with the specified
algorithm and key sizes, and data read from the eMMC is decrypted.
FCS_COP.1 is a major SFR to fulfill O.EMMC_ENCRYPTION.
O.EMMC_ENCRYPTION can be fulfilled by implementing these security functional requirements.
6.3.3 Dependency Analysis
Table 27 describes the result of dependency analysis in this ST for the TOE security functional requirements.
Table 27: Results of Dependency Analysis of TOE Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security Functional
Requirements
Claimed Dependencies SFRs in this ST Sufficiency
FAU_GEN.1 FPT_STM.1 FPT_STM.1 OK
FAU_GEN.2 FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
OK
FAU_STG.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 OK
FAU_STG.4 FAU_STG.1 FAU_STG.1 OK
FAU_SAR.1 FAU_GEN.1 FAU_GEN.1 OK
Page 70 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
TOE Security Functional
Requirements
Claimed Dependencies SFRs in this ST Sufficiency
FAU_SAR.2 FAU_SAR.1 FAU_SAR.1 OK
FCS_CKM.1 [FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4
OK
FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.1 OK
FCS_COP.1 [FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1 OK
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1 OK
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
OK
FDP_FXS_EXP.1 None None OK
FIA_AFL.1 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 OK
FIA_ATD.1 None None OK
FIA_SOS.1 None None OK
FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 OK
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.1 FIA_UAU.1 OK
FIA_UID.1 None None OK
FIA_USB.1 FIA_ATD.1 FIA_ATD.1 OK
FMT_MOF.1 FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
OK
FMT_MSA.1 [FDP_ACC.1
or FDP_IFC.1]
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
OK
However, since no
interface is
provided to modify
user privileges,
modify document
data owner
information, or
modify user job
data owner
information, these
management
functions are not
required for
FMT_SMF.1.
Page 71 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
TOE Security Functional
Requirements
Claimed Dependencies SFRs in this ST Sufficiency
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1
OK
FMT_MTD.1(a) FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
OK
FMT_MTD.1(b) FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 OK
However, since no
interface is
provided to query
login passwords,
this management
function is not
required for
FMT_SMF.1.
FMT_SMF.1 None None OK
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 FIA_UID.1 OK
FPT_STM.1 None None OK
FPT_TST_EXP.1 None None OK
FTA_SSL.3 None None OK
FTP_ITC.1 None None OK
6.3.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
This TOE is an MFP, which is a commercially available product. The MFP is assumed that it will be used in
a general office and this TOE does not assume the attackers with Enhanced-Basic or higher level of attack
potential.
The evaluation of the TOE design (ADV_TDS.1) is adequate to show the validity of commercially available
products. A high attack potential is required for the attacks that circumvent or alter the TSF, which is not
covered in this evaluation. Dealing with attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack potential
(AVA_VAN.2) is therefore adequate for general needs.
Based on the terms and costs of the evaluation, the evaluation assurance level of EAL2 is appropriate for this
TOE.
Page 72 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
7 TOE Summary Specification
This section describes the TOE summary specification for each security function. The security functions are
described for each corresponding security functional requirement.
7.1 Audit Function
The Audit Function is to record a log that associates TOE audit events with user identification information in
eMMC as audit log. Also, this function provides the recorded audit log in a format that can be audited. The
recorded audit log can be downloaded and deleted only by the MFP administrator. This function also includes
a function to provide reliable time stamps and a control function used when the audit log is full. The audit log
can also be transferred to and saved on the syslog server.
FAU_GEN.1 (Audit data generation)
The TOE records audit log items, shown in Table 29, in the eMMC when audit events shown in Table 28 occur.
Audit log items include basic log items and expanded log items. Basic log items are recorded whenever audit
logs are recorded, and expanded log items are recorded only when audit events occur and the audit log items
shown in Table 29 are recorded. Among the auditable events, the failure of the trusted channel functions refers
to the failure of the function that performs communications via trusted channels. This function includes WIM
communication, folder transmission, e-mail transmission of attachments, temporary saving and storing
document data received from the printer driver, storing document data received from the fax driver, and syslog
transfer. Therefore, logs of these communication failures are audit events.
Table 28: List of Audit Events
Audit Events
Start-up of the Audit Function
Shutdown of the Audit Function
Download and deletion of audit logs
Success and failure of login operations
Starting and releasing lockout
Use of the management functions in Table 24
Termination of session by auto logout
Failure of WIM communication
Failure of folder transmission
Failure of e-mail transmission of attachments
Failure of temporary saving and storing document data received from
the printer driver
Failure of storing document data received from the fax driver
Failure of syslog transfer
Page 73 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Audit Events
Deletion of user job data
Start and end of printing temporarily-saved document data, fax
transmission documents, fax reception documents, stored print
documents, and Document Server documents
Start and end of downloading scanned documents, fax transmission
documents, and fax reception documents
Start and end of sending scanned documents by e-mail transmission
of attachments
Start and end of sending scanned documents by folder transmission
Start and end of sending fax transmission documents by fax
transmission
Deletion of temporarily-saved document data, scanned documents, fax
transmission documents, fax reception documents, stored print
documents, and Document Server documents
Table 29: List of Audit Log Data Items
Audit Log Items Setting Values of Audit Log
Items
Audit Events to Record Audit Logs
Basic
Log
Items
Starting date/time
of an event
Values of the TOE system
clock at an event
occurrence
- All auditable events shown in Table 28
Ending date/time
of an event
Values of the TOE system
clock at an event
termination
Event types Audit event identity
Subject identity Login user name of the
user who caused the audit
event
Outcome Audit event outcome (*1)
Page 74 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Audit Log Items Setting Values of Audit Log
Items
Audit Events to Record Audit Logs
Expanded
Log
Items
Job type Print, download, fax
transmission, e-mail
transmission of
attachments, folder
transmission, deletion of
document data, and
deletion of user job data.
(For deletion of user job
data, the values are
recorded in the
cancellation details field.)
- Start and end of printing temporarily-saved
document data, fax transmission documents,
fax reception documents, stored print
documents, and Document Server
documents
- Start and end of downloading scanned
documents, fax transmission documents,
and fax reception documents
- Sending scanned documents by e-mail
transmission of attachments
- Sending scanned documents by folder
transmission
- Sending fax transmission documents by fax
transmission
- Deletion of temporarily-saved document
data, scanned documents, fax transmission
documents, fax reception documents, stored
print documents, and Document Server
documents
- Deletion of user job data
Login user name All login user names that
attempted the user
identification
- Success and failure of login operations
Communicating
devices
Communicating IP address - Failure of WIM communication
- Failure of folder transmission
- Failure of temporary saving and storing
document data received from the printer
driver
- Failure of storing document data received
from the fax driver
- Failure of syslog transfer
Communicating e-mail
address for E-mail
transmission of
attachments
- Failure of e-mail transmission of
attachments
Lockout operation
type
Information to identify
starting lockout and
releasing lockout
- Starting and releasing lockout
Locked out user Login user name of a user
who is locked out
- Starting and releasing lockout
Locked out user
who is to be
released
Login user name of a user
who is released from
lockout
- Starting and releasing lockout
Page 75 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
(*1): Either "success" or "failure" will be recorded. If an audit event is "deletion of document data", only
"success" will be recorded.
For the following audit events, "failure" will be recorded.
- Failure of WIM communication
- Failure of folder transmission
- Failure of temporary saving and storing document data received from the printer driver
- Failure of storing document data received from the fax driver
- Failure of syslog transfer
- Failure of e-mail transmission of attachments
FAU_GEN.2 (User identity association)
The TOE records the login user name in the audit log so that it can identify who caused the audit event.
FPT_STM.1 (Reliable time stamps)
The date (year/month/day) and time (hour/minute/second) recorded in the audit log are derived from the system
clock of the TOE.
FAU_SAR.1 (Audit review)
The TOE provides the MFP administrators with all audit logs in a text format. The TOE allows the MFP
administrator to download audit logs with the WIM only when the MFP administrator accesses it.
FAU_SAR.2 (Restricted audit review)
The TOE does not provide an interface for downloading audit logs to all users except the MFP administrators.
FAU_STG.1 (Protected audit trail storage)
The TOE allows only the MFP administrators to delete audit logs. To delete audit logs, the WIM or the
Operation Panel will be used. The TOE does not provide an interface for making partial changes to audit logs.
FAU_STG.4 (Prevention of audit data loss)
The TOE writes the newest audit log over the oldest audit log when there is insufficient space in the audit log
file to append the newest audit log data.
7.2 Identification and Authentication Function
The Identification and Authentication Function is to verify whether a person who attempts to use the TOE is
an authorised user based on the login user name and login password entered by the user, so that the TOE can
allow only the authenticated users to use the TOE and reject the users when the authentication fails. The lockout
function, password protection function, and auto logout function are also included in this function.
Page 76 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1 (User authentication and identification)
The TOE identifies and authenticates a user with the login user name and login password.
Before the Operation Panel or the WIM is used, the TOE displays the login screen and prompts the user to
enter the login user name and login password. In addition, when the TOE receives a request from the printer
driver or fax driver, the TOE receives the login user name and login password entered by a user at the same
time as the request. The TOE performs identification and authentication by checking whether the login user
name and login password entered by the user match the login user name and login password registered in the
TOE in advance.
If the identification and authentication is successful, the user is allowed to use the TOE. If it fails, the user is
not allowed to use it. However, regarding the viewing of the list of user job data, WIM Help, system status,
counter, and information of inquiries, and execution of fax reception, the identification and authentication is
not required for the use of the TOE.
FIA_USB.1 (User-subject binding)
Based on the result of FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1, the TOE assigns the login user name and user privilege
to processes performed by the authorised user.
FIA_ATD.1 (User attribute definition)
The TOE retains the login user name and user privilege based on settings for each user. User privilege is set
for each user according to the role to which the user is classified at the time of registration. The login user
name assigned to the user can be changed for each user.
FTA_SSL.3 (TSF-initiated termination)
The TOE automatically logs out the users when they are logged in and do not operate the TOE for a certain
period of time specified by the MFP administrator.
The TOE works as follows depending on the interface to which the user is logged-in.
- For the Operation Panel, the user is logged out of the TOE automatically when the time that elapses since
their final operation reaches the Operation Panel auto logout time (10 to 999 seconds).
- For the WIM, the user is logged out of the TOE automatically when the time that elapses since their final
operation reaches the WIM auto logout time (3 to 60 minutes).
The TOE also performs identification and authentication for the requests from the printer driver and the fax
driver. At this time, there is no continuous interactive session that shall be automatically logged out because
the user is logged out when the reception of the document data is completed.
FIA_UAU.7 (Protected authentication feedback)
Regarding login passwords entered by persons who attempt to use the Operation Panel or the WIM, the TOE
does not display the entered letters, instead, it displays a sequence of dummy letters with same number of
characters as the entered password on the login screen.
Page 77 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
FIA_AFL.1 (Authentication failure handling)
If the user enters a wrong password in succession when logging in, the lockout function will work and the TOE
will prohibit the user from logging in with that login user name.
When the login fails due to entering a wrong password, the user is locked out when the number of attempts
before lockout for the password (1 to 5 times) set by the MFP administrator is reached or exceeded.
The number of authentication failures is added up even if the login destination (Operation Panel, WIM, printer
driver, and fax driver) varies.
With the locked-out login user name, authentication will fail even if the user enters the correct password. The
user cannot use the TOE until the lockout is released after a certain period of time elapses or the MFP
administrator or supervisor unlocks the lockout.
If a user name is locked out, the user with that user name is not allowed to log in unless any of the following
conditions is fulfilled:
- For normal users, until the lockout time set by the MFP administrator elapses
- For locked out users listed in Table 30, until an unlocking administrator releases the lockout
- For MFP administrators and supervisors, 60 seconds elapse since the MFP becomes executable after its
power is turned on
Table 30 : Relationships regarding Lockout Release
Locked Out User Unlocking Administrator
Normal user MFP administrator
MFP administrator Supervisor
Supervisor MFP administrator
FIA_SOS.1 (Verification of secrets)
Login passwords for users can be registered only if these passwords meet the given conditions. Passwords
cannot be registered if they do not satisfy the conditions.
Usable characters and types are as follows. The password complexity which determines the conditions for the
number of combination of characters (two or more types, or three or more types) is set by the MFP
administrator.
- Upper-case letters: [A-Z] (26 letters)
- Lower-case letters: [a-z] (26 letters)
- Numbers: [0-9] (10 digits)
- Symbols: SP (spaces) ! " # $ % & ' ( ) * + , - . / : ; < = > ? @ [ ¥ ] ^ _ ` { | } ~ (33 symbols)
The conditions for registrable password length differ depending on normal users, MFP administrators, and
supervisors, as shown below. The minimum character number of login password (i.e. minimum login password
length) is set by the MFP administrator in the range of 8 to 32 characters.
- For normal users: Equal to or longer than the minimum character number, and 128 characters or less
Page 78 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
- For MFP administrators and supervisors: Equal to or longer than the minimum character number, and 32
characters or less
7.3 Document Access Control Function
The Document Access Control Function is to authorise operations for document data and user job data by the
authorised TOE users who are authenticated by the Identification and Authentication Function. It allows user's
operation on the document data and user job data based on the privileges for the user role, or the operation
permissions for each user.
FDP_ACC.1, FDP.ACF (Subset access control and Security attribute based access control)
The TOE provides the Document Access Control Function by enforcing the user data access control SFPs.
Rules of user data access control SFPs are divided into (1) access control rules on document data and (2) access
control rules on user job data. According to them, the TOE restricts operations on document data and user job
data by users.
(1) Access control rules on document data
Table 31 describes the access control rules on document data. The TOE restricts the operations of deleting
or reading document data to normal users, MFP administrators, and supervisors. No interface for
modifying document data is provided. In particular, Table 32 describes the normal user operations, and
no interface is provided for operations other than those described in Table 32.
Table 31: Access Control Rules on Document Data
User privilege Document Data Access Control Rule
Normal user Temporarily-saved
document data
Normal users who have the same login user name as
that registered in the "document data owner
information" of the temporarily-saved document
data are allowed read and delete operations.
Other normal users cannot display the document
data in the list, and they are not allowed the read
and delete operations.
Page 79 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
User privilege Document Data Access Control Rule
Scanned document
Fax transmission document
Stored print document
Document Server
document
Normal users who have the same login user name as
that registered in the "document data owner
information" are allowed read and delete
operations.
Normal users who have the same login user name as
that registered in the "list of users who have been
granted access permission for the document data"
are allowed read operation.
Other normal users cannot display the document
data in the list, and they are not allowed the read
and delete operations.
Fax reception document Normal users registered in the "fax reception
document user" are allowed read and delete
operations.
Other normal users cannot display the document
data in the list, and they are not allowed the read
and delete operations.
MFP
administrator
Temporarily-saved
document
Stored print document
MFP administrators are allowed the delete operation
through the Operation Panel or WIM.
No interface for reading document data is provided.
Scanned document
Fax transmission document
Document Server
document
MFP administrators are allowed the delete
operation through the Operation Panel or WIM.
MFP administrators are allowed the preview
operation through the WIM. (No other interface for
reading document data is provided.)
Fax reception document No interfaces for deleting and reading document
data are provided.
Supervisor Temporarily-saved
document
Scanned document
Fax transmission document
Stored print document
Document Server
document
Fax reception document
No interfaces for deleting and reading document
data are provided.
Page 80 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Table 32: Normal User Operations on Document Data
No. Object Operations Operation
Interface
MFP Application
1 Temporarily-saved
document data
Delete
Print
Preview
Operation
Panel
Printer Function
2 Temporarily-saved
document data
Delete WIM Printer Function
3 Scanned document Delete (*1)
E-mail transmission of
attachments
Folder transmission
Preview
Operation
Panel
Scanner Function
4 Scanned document Delete (*1)
E-mail transmission of
attachments
Folder transmission
Preview
Download
WIM Document Server
Function
5 Fax transmission
document
Delete (*1)
Fax transmission
Preview
Operation
Panel
Fax Function
6 Fax transmission
document
Delete (*1)
Print
Preview
Operation
Panel
Document Server
Function
7 Fax transmission
document
Delete (*1)
Fax transmission
Preview
Download
WIM Document Server
Function
8 Fax reception document Delete (*1)
Print
Preview
Operation
Panel
Fax Function
Page 81 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
No. Object Operations Operation
Interface
MFP Application
9 Fax reception document Delete
Preview
Download
WIM Fax Function
10 Stored print document Delete (*1)
Print
Preview
Operation
Panel
Printer Function
11 Stored print document Delete (*1) WIM Printer Function
12 Document Server
document
Delete (*1)
Print
Preview
Operation
Panel
Document Server
Function
13 Document Server
document
Delete (*1)
Preview
WIM Document Server
Function
(*1) The document data owner is allowed to delete the document data. Other users who are allowed access
(viewing) the document data by the owner are not allowed to delete the document data.
(2) Access control rules on user job data
The TOE provides users with the interface for deleting user job data (cancelling the job). However, no
interface for operating user job data of fax reception is provided.
No interface for modifying user job data is provided.
- For normal user: The normal user whose login user name matches the login user name registered in
the user job data owner information is allowed to delete the user job data. Other normal users are
allowed to display the user job data, but are not allowed to delete the user job data.
- For MFP administrator: MFP administrators are allowed to delete the user job data.
- For supervisor: No interface for operating the user job data is provided.
7.4 Network Protection Function
The Network Protection Function is to prevent information leakage due to network monitoring and detect
alteration by providing encrypted communication when communicating with trusted IT products.
Communication with the client computer when using WIM, printer driver, or fax driver is encrypted by TLS,
and communication with SMB server and FTP server when using folder transmission is protected by IPsec.
Also, communication with mail server when using e-mail transmission of attachments is protected by S/MIME,
and communication with syslog server when the audit log transfer setting is enabled is encrypted by TLS.
Page 82 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
FTP_ITC.1 (Inter-TSF trusted channel)
The TOE provides different encrypted communications depending on communicating devices when the TOE
communicates with trusted IT products (WIM communication, folder transmission, e-mail transmission of
attachments, temporary saving or storing document data received from the printer driver, storing document
data received from the fax driver, and transfer to the syslog server). The TOE allows the client computer's Web
browser, printer driver, or fax driver to initiate encrypted communication. The TOE can initiate encrypted
communication with the mail server, SMB server, FTP server, or syslog server. Table 33 lists the encrypted
communications provided by the TOE.
When using the WIM, encrypted communication with the client computer is performed by specifying a URL
for which encrypted communication is valid on a Web browser. When using the Printer Function, encrypted
communication with the client computer (IPP over SSL) is performed when document data is sent from the
printer driver to the TOE. When using the Fax Function, encrypted communication with the client computer
(IPP over SSL) is performed when document data is sent from the fax driver to the TOE. When using the e-
mail transmission of attachments, encrypted communication with the mail server (S/MIME) is performed.
When using the folder transmission, encrypted communication with the FTP server or SMB server (IPsec) is
performed. When using the syslog transfer function, encrypted communication with the syslog server protected
by TLS is performed by using the syslog protocol.
Table 33: Encrypted Communications Provided by the TOE
Communicating Devices
Encrypted Communications Provided by the TOE
Protocols Cryptographic Algorithms
Client computer (*1) TLS1.2 AES (128bits, 256bits)
TLS1.3 AES (128 bits, 256 bits), ChaCha20 (256 bits)
FTP server IPsec AES (128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits)
SMB server IPsec AES (128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits)
Mail server S/MIME AES (128 bits, 256 bits)
syslog server TLS1.2 AES (128 bits, 256 bits)
TLS1.3 AES (128 bits, 256 bits), ChaCha20 (256 bits)
(*1) When communication uses the printer driver or fax driver, the TLS version of the supporting protocol
depends on the OS version of the client computer.
7.5 Stored Data Protection Function
The Stored Data Protection Function is to encrypt data to be written to the eMMC in order to protect data
recorded in the eMMC from data leakage.
FCS_CKM.1 (Cryptographic key generation)
The TOE generates a 256-bit eMMC cryptographic key using the CTR_DRBG (AES-128) algorithm when
encrypting the eMMC upon operation by the MFP administrator.
Page 83 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
At this time, the TOE generates random numbers using an algorithm that is compliant with the standard NIST
SP 800-90A.
FCS_CKM.4 (Cryptographic key destruction)
When decrypting the eMMC, the cryptographic key is overwritten with 0.
FCS_COP.1 (Cryptographic operation)
The TOE encrypts the data to be written to/read from the eMMC before writing it and decrypts the data after
reading it. The TOE conforms to the standard FIPS197, and encrypts and decrypts data using the AES
algorithm with a key of 256-bit cryptographic key size.
7.6 Security Management Function
The Security Management Function is to control the operation of TSF data and the behaviour of the Security
Functions based on the user privileges or the login user name. This function includes a function to maintain
the role of operating the Security Management Function and associate the role with the user, and a function to
set appropriate default values for the security attributes.
FMT_SMR.1 (Security roles)
The TOE user has the role of normal user, MFP administrator, or supervisor. The role is associated with the
login user name registered in the TOE. The TOE associates the logged-in user with the role corresponding to
the login user name.
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MTD.1(a), FMT_MTD.1(b) (Specification of Management
Function, Control of the behaviour of the Security Functions, Management of security
attributes, Management of TSF data)
The TOE performs the following management functions:
- The TOE provides only the MFP administrators with an interface for setting the syslog transfer function to
stop or operate.
- TOE restricts operations on the TSF data according to the role of the user. As shown in Table 34, it allows
users who have user privilege corresponding to the role for which operations are allowed to operate the
TSF Data.
Page 84 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Table 34: Management of TSF Data
Category TSF Data Operations Roles (User
Privileges) for Which
Operations are
Allowed
Operation
Interface
TSF
protected
data
Lockout settings Modify MFP administrator WIM
Date/time settings Modify MFP administrator Operation Panel
WIM
Password quality settings Modify MFP administrator Operation Panel
WIM
Auto logout settings Modify MFP administrator Operation Panel
WIM
S/MIME user information Newly create
Modify
Delete
MFP administrator Operation Panel
(*2)
WIM
Destination folder Newly create
Modify
Delete
MFP administrator
Operation Panel
WIM
Audit log settings Modify MFP administrator Operation Panel
WIM
Cryptographic communication
settings
Modify MFP administrator Operation Panel
WIM
Login user name
[When associated with a normal user]
Newly create
Modify
Delete
MFP administrator
Operation Panel
WIM
Login user name
[When associated with an MFP
administrator]
Newly create MFP administrator
Operation Panel
WIM
Modify MFP administrator
in question
Login user name
[When associated with a supervisor]
Modify Supervisor Operation Panel
WIM
User privilege Modify (*1) None None
Document data owner information Modify (*1) None None
List of users who have been granted
access permission for the document
data
Modify
MFP administrator
Document data
owner (Normal
user)
Operation Panel
(*3)
WIM
Change_default
MFP administrator Operation Panel
WIM
Fax reception document user Modify
MFP administrator Operation Panel
WIM
Page 85 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Category TSF Data Operations Roles (User
Privileges) for Which
Operations are
Allowed
Operation
Interface
User job data owner information Modify (*1) None None
TSF
confidential
data
Login password
[When associated with a normal user]
Newly create MFP administrator Operation Panel
WIM
Modify Normal user in
question
MFP administrator
Operation Panel
WIM
Query (*1) None None
Login password
[When associated with an MFP
administrator]
Newly create MFP administrator Operation Panel
WIM
Modify MFP administrator
in question
Supervisor
Operation Panel
WIM
Query (*1) None None
Login password
[When associated with a supervisor]
Modify Supervisor Operation Panel
WIM
Query (*1) None None
eMMC cryptographic key
Query
Delete
Newly create
MFP administrator
Operation Panel
(*1): No interface is provided
(*2): Operation that can be performed from the Operation Panel is only the operation of the e-mail addresses
that is the item set for each user, included in the S/MIME user information.
(*3): For stored print document, the list of users who have been granted access permission for the document
data cannot be operated by using the Operation Panel. It can be operated only by using WIM.
FMT_MSA.3 (Static attribute initialisation)
Table 35 describes the list of static initialisation for security attributes, and Table 36 describes security
attributes for each case of document data generation.
The TOE sets default values of security attributes for objects according to the rules described in Table 35 and
Table 36 when those objects are generated. Overwriting the default values of the security attributes is allowed
only in limited cases, and "None" is indicated when no overwriting interface is provided.
Page 86 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Table 35: List of Static Initialisation for Security Attributes
Object Security Attribute Default Value Overwriting Default
Value
Document data Document data owner
information
See Table 36. See Table 36.
List of users who have
been granted access
permission for the
document data
See Table 36. See Table 36.
User job data User job data owner
information
Login user names of
normal users who created
the user job data
None
Table 36: Security Attributes for Each Case of Document Data Generation
Object Generation Security Attribute Default Value Overwriting Default
Value
Specify the print method as
temporary saving print and
temporarily save document data as
temporarily-saved document from
the printer driver.
Document data
owner
information
Login user names of normal
users who created the
document data
None
Specify the print method as stored
print and store document data as
stored print document from the
printer driver.
Document data
owner
information
Login user names of normal
users who created the
document data
None
List of users who
have been granted
access permission
for the document
data
Default values in the list of
users who have been granted
access permission for the
document data (the list of
login user names) for the
document data creator
None
Specify the print method as
Document Server storage and store
Document data
owner
information
Login user names of normal
users who created the
document data
None
Page 87 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Object Generation Security Attribute Default Value Overwriting Default
Value
document data as Document
Server document from the printer
driver.
List of users who
have been granted
access permission
for the document
data
Default values in the list of
users who have been granted
access permission for the
document data (the list of
login user names) for the
document data creator
None
Store document data as fax
transmission document from the
fax driver.
Document data
owner
information
Login user names of normal
users who created the
document data
None
List of users who
have been granted
access permission
for the document
data
Default values in the list of
users who have been granted
access permission for the
document data (the list of
login user names) for the
document data creator
None
Scan a paper document and store it
as Document Server document
from the Operation Panel (Copy
Function or Document Server
Function).
Document data
owner
information
Login user names of normal
users who created the
document data
None
List of users who
have been granted
access permission
for the document
data
Default values in the list of
users who have been granted
access permission for the
document data (the list of
login user names) for the
document data creator
Values that the
document data
creator has allowed
access (viewing)
from the Operation
Panel (the list of
login user names)
can be overwritten.
Scan a paper document and store it
as scanned document from the
Operation Panel (Scanner
Function).
Document data
owner
information
Login user names of normal
users who created the
document data
None
List of users who
have been granted
access permission
for the document
data
Default values in the list of
users who have been granted
access permission for the
document data (the list of
login user names) for the
document data creator
Values that the
document data
creator has allowed
access (viewing)
from the Operation
Panel (the list of
login user names)
can be overwritten.
Scan a paper document and store it
as fax transmission document from
Document data
owner
information
Login user names of normal
users who created the
document data
None
Page 88 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Object Generation Security Attribute Default Value Overwriting Default
Value
the Operation Panel (Fax
Function).
List of users who
have been granted
access permission
for the document
data
Default values in the list of
users who have been granted
access permission for the
document data (the list of
login user names) for the
document data creator
Values that the
document data
creator has allowed
access (viewing)
from the Operation
Panel (the list of
login user names)
can be overwritten.
Store document data received by
fax via the telephone line as fax
reception document.
Fax reception
document user
List in which access to the
fax reception document is set
(the list of login user names)
None
7.7 Integrity Verification Function
The Integrity Verification Function is a self-test function that verifies the integrity of execution code in the
MFP Control Software and the Operation Panel control software.
FPT_TST_EXP.1 (TSF testing)
The TOE performs the integrity verification of control software during the initial start-up.
By comparing the hash value or verifying digital signature for the MFP Control Software and the Operation
Panel control software, the TOE verifies the integrity of control software.
If the hash value for the integrity verification obtained at startup does not match the correct value, or if the
digital signature is not verified, the TOE will display an error message on the Operation Panel and will not
accept the operation. If the obtained hash value matches the correct value and the digital signature is verified,
the TOE will become available.
7.8 Fax Line Separation Function
The Fax Line Separation Function is to prohibit communication via a fax interface, except for transmission or
reception of user data using a fax protocol, in order to prevent intrusion from the telephone line into the LAN.
FDP_FXS_EXP.1 (Fax separation)
By communicating only with the G3 standard on the telephone line and not using other communications, the
TOE prohibits communication via a fax interface, except for transmission or reception of user data using a fax
protocol.
Page 89 of 89
Copyright (c) 2024 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
8 Glossary
In this section, the meanings of specific terms used in this ST are defined below.
Table 37: Specific Terms Related to This ST
Terms Definitions
MFP Control Software A software component installed in the TOE. This is stored in the control board
of the main unit.
Operation Panel Control
Software
A software component installed in the TOE. This is stored in the Operation
Panel Control Board.
Lockout A type of behaviour to deny login of particular users.
Auto logout A function for automatic user logout if no access is attempted from the
Operation Panel or the WIM for the predetermined period of time.
eMMC Abbreviation for Embedded Multi Media Card. A storage device that is non-
volatile memory. In this document, unless otherwise specified, "eMMC"
indicates the eMMC installed on the TOE.
Job A sequence of operations of each TOE function (Copy Function, Scanner
Function, Printer Function, Document Server Function, Fax Transmission
Function, and Fax Reception Function) from beginning to end.
MFP application General term for functions provided by the TOE (Copy Function, Scanner
Function, Printer Function, Document Server Function, Fax Transmission
Function, and Fax Reception Function).
Operation Panel A panel that consists of a touch screen LCD and key switches. The Operation
Panel is used by users to operate the TOE.
WIM Web Image Monitor function. This is a function for TOE users to remotely
operate the TOE from the client computer's Web browser.
E-mail transmission of
attachments
A function that scans paper documents from the Operation Panel by using the
Scanner Function and then sends scanned image data or the stored scanned
document in e-mail format. S/MIME protects the communication for
enforcing this function.
Folder transmission A function that scans paper documents from the Operation Panel by using the
Scanner Function and then sends scanned image data or stored scanned
document from the MFP via networks to a shared folder in an SMB server by
using SMB protocol, or sends document data to a folder in an FTP server by
using FTP protocol. IPsec protects the communication for enforcing this
function.
SPDF A type of Auto Document Feeder (ADF) that feeds the originals set on the
device one by one to the exposure glass. When scanning both sides of the
original, both sides are scanned simultaneously.
Responsible manager of
MFP
A person who is indirectly involved in the TOE and responsible for
appointment of the TOE administrators in the organisation where the TOE is
used.