KECS-CR-13-24
SNIPER IPS-G V8.0
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-NISS-0455-2013
2013. 6. 21
IT Security Certification Center
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History of Creation and Revision
No. Date
Revised
Pages
Description
00 2013.06.21 -
Certification report for SNIPER IPS-G V8.0
- First documentation
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This document is the certification report for SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 of
Wins Technet Co., Ltd..
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea Testing Laboratory (KTL)
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................5
2. Identification.........................................................................................................7
3. Security Policy .....................................................................................................9
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..........................................................10
5. Architectural Information .................................................................................. 11
6. Documentation...................................................................................................12
7. TOE Testing........................................................................................................12
8. Evaluated Configuration....................................................................................13
9. Results of the Evaluation ..................................................................................13
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................13
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ......................................................14
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD).................................................15
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV) ..............................................................15
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE).............................................................................16
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)..............................................................17
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary ...................................................................17
10. Recommendations.............................................................................................18
11. Security Target ...................................................................................................19
12. Acronyms and Glossary....................................................................................19
13. Bibliography.......................................................................................................20
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL4 evaluation of SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 with reference to the Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter) [1]. It
describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is network intrusion prevention system (IPS) which
protects the internal network assets by detecting and blocking intrusions from the
external network. The TOE provides security features such as network intrusion
detection and response, security management, security audit, user identification and
authentication and updates to the IPS signature.
The TOE SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 is composed of the following components:
 SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 Server (“IPS Server” hereinafter) with SNIPER OS V2.0,
and
 SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 Client (“IPS Client” hereinafter).
The IPS Server provides major security features including network intrusion prevention,
and the IPS Client provides user interfaces to the authorized administrators to securely
manage the TOE.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea Testing Laboratory (KTL) and
completed on June 4, 2013. This report grounds on the evaluation technical report
(ETR) KTL had submitted [5] and the Security Target (ST) [6][7].
The ST claims no conformance to the Protection Profile (PP). All Security Assurance
Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component in CC Part
3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4. Therefore the
ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, and
the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC
Part 2 conformant.
[Figure 1] and [Figure 2] show the operational environment of the TOE. The TOE
should be installed and operated in the in-line mode (see [Figure 1].) so that all traffic
between external and internal networks passes the TOE. The organization who deploy
can choose HA (High Availability) mode (see [Figure 2].) in accordance with the
organizational policies in case of hardware failures.
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INTERNE
T
INTETNAL
.
.
USER
Web Server
SNIPER IPS
Client (TOE)
Web Zone
USER
ROUTE
R
Mail Server
Update
Server
SecureCAST
SWITC
H
Time
Server
SNIPER IPS
Server
(TOE)
ESM Server
Security Zone
Mail
Server
[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE – In-line configuration
INTERNE
T
INTETNAL
.
.
USER
Web Server
SNIPER IPS
Client (TOE)
SNIPER IPS
Server
(TOE)
Web Zone
USER
ROUTE
R
Mail Server
Update
Server
SecureCAS
T
L4
SWITC
H
L4
SWITC
H
H A
Time
Server
SNIPER IPS
Server
(TOE)
ESM Server
Security Zone
Mail
Server
[Figure 2] Operational environment of the TOE – HA configuration
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report Page 7
2. Identification
The TOE is software consisting of the following components and related guidance
documents.
Type Identifier Version Delivery Form
SW SNIPER IPS-G V8.0
Server
2011.07.01R Installed on the
appliance device
- SNIPER OS V2.0
(Kernel 2.6.37)
SW SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 Client GLOBAL_20130115
(20130115_1428)
Downloaded from the
IPS Server to
administrator’s PC when
it access to the IPS
Server for the first time
DOC SNIPER IPS-G V8.0
Installation Guidance
V1.02 Hardcopy
SNIPER IPS-G V8.0
Administrator Manual
V1.02
[Table 1] TOE identification
The SNIPER OS is customized version of Fedora 14 by upgrading its kernel with
Kernel 2.6.37 provided by Kernel.org, removing unnecessary services, and applying
configurations necessary for the TOE.
[Table 2] shows underlying platform specifications for the IPS Server.
Model Contents
SNIPER
IPS 10G
CPU Intel Xeon Quad 2.66 * 2
Memory 12GB
HDD 1TB * 2
Compact Flash (CF) 2GB
NIC 10/100/1000Mbps Ethernet Port * 2
Serial Port RS232C Serial Port * 1
Basic Configuration NIC: 10Gbps Ethernet Port * 2
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Model Contents
Expansion Slot Option 1 NIC expansion slot
- 10Gbps Ethernet Port * 2
Max Configuration Basic + Expansion configuration
- 10Gbps Ethernet Port * 2
- 10Gbps Ethernet Port * 2
[Table 2] Underlying platform specifications for the IPS Server
The SNIPER OS is installed on memory storage device, Compact Flash (CF) of IPS
server platform, and the IPS server is installed on HDD, and it is used for log data and
backup data storage. The IPS Server utilize SQLite V3 to store audit records and the
TSF data.
The IPS server provides one 10/100/1000Mbps Ethernet Port for monitoring and the
other 10/100/1000Mbps Ethernet Port for HA configuration as a management ports.
And another two 10Gbps Ethernet Ports are provided for packet gathering as a default
option, and therefore four ports are provided in case of expansion.
[Table 3] shows underlying platform specifications for the IPS Client.
Items Contents
Hardware CPU Intel Xecon Quad 2.66 * 2
Memory 12GB
HDD 1TB * 2
NIC 10/100/1000Mbps Ethernet Port * 2
OS Microsoft Windows 7 (32bit/64bit) SP1
Microsoft Windows Server 2008 (32bit/64bit) SP2
Web Browser Internet Explorer 8.0, 9.0
[Table 3] Underlying platform specifications for the IPS Client
The IPS Client is automatically installed by downloading OCXs from IPS server to
administrator PC through the Internet Explorer. When generating the IPS Client
installation package, Techchart V8 and Fast Report V4 which are 3rd
party software are
included to provide features such as statistics and reports resulting from audit records.
[Table 4] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
Certification Report Page 9
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(September 1, 2009)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(November 1, 2012)
TOE SNIPER IPS-G V8.0
- SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 Server 2011.07.01R with SNIPER
OS V2.0 (Kernel 2.6.37)
- SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 Client GLOBAL_20130115
(20130115_1428)
Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-001 ~
CCMB-2009-07-003, July 2009
EAL EAL4
Developer Wins Technet Co., Ltd.
Sponsor Wins Technet Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility Korea Testing Laboratory (KTL)
Completion Date of
Evaluation
June 4, 2013
Certification Body IT Security Certification Center
[Table 4] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The TOE complies security policies defined in the ST [6], [7] as follows:
 Intrusion prevention, protects protected network by ensuring network intrusion
detection, analysis, and response functionality. The TOE gathers information
for network intrusion detection, determines intrusion based on the detection
rules and take response actions in accordance with predefined policies. And
the TOE provides ability to review results to the authorized administrators by
storing them.
 Security audit, ensures ability to generate and review audit records related to
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security events.
 Identification and authentication, ensures ability to identify and authenticate
administrators based on the IP address, ID, and password. The TOE also
identifies external IT entities which requests services passing through the TOE
based on the IP address and port number.
 Security management, ensures ability to securely manage the TOE itself and
the TSF data including security attributes.
 TSF protection, ensures ability to protect stored TSF data and TSF executable
codes, TSF data transmitted between the IPS Server and the IPS Client, and
IPS signatures transmitted from update server to the IPS Server.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the operational
environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used (for the detailed
and precise definition of the assumption refer to the ST [6][7], chapter 3.3):
 The IPS Server is located in a physically secure environment that only the
authorized users can access.
 Network configuration changes, an increase or decrease of the host, and when
the internal network environment changes such as an increase or decrease of
service to reflect the changed environment and security policy the TOE
operational policy to maintain the same level of security as before.
 Authorized administrator of the TOE possesses no malicious intention, and
received proper training on the TOE management, and performs duties in
accordance with the administrative guideline.
 To ensure the reliability and stability of the operating system. Remove
unnecessary services on the operating system or by any means, and perform
reinforcement on the vulnerabilities of the operating system.
 The TOE allows the separation of the external and internal network, and all
communication between the external and internal network is done through the
TOE.
 Server for the transmission of text messages, e-mail, and server to provide
reliable time-stamp provided by the TOE are located at external professional
organization’s physically secure environment.
 Service for update server used by the TOE is provided by WINS Technet Co.,
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Ltd. And, to ensure the reliability and stability of the data that is transmitted to
the TOE from these servers, the servers to operate ESM server, SecureCAST
server, TOE for HA are located in internally / externally secure environment.
5. Architectural Information
[Figure 3] show the scope of the TOE.
SNIPER IPS Client (GUI)
SNIPER IPS Server
Security Audit (WFAU)
Security Audit Generation
(WFAU_GEN)
Security Audit Inquiry
(WFAU_SAR)
TSF Protection[WFPT)
Transmitted Data
Protection(WFPT_TDP)
Condition
Check(WFPT_CHECK)
Time Out(WFPT_TIME)
Identification and
Certification(WFIA)
User Data
Protection[WFDP]
Security Management (WFMT)


Intrusion Detection
(WFDP_DET)
Intrusion Blocking
(WFDP_BLK)
Intrusion Response
(WFDP_ACT)
User Identification and
Certification(WFIA_ACCESS)
Configuration(WFMT_CONFIG)
Policy Setup(WFMT_POLICY)
Login Failure
management(WFMT_LOGIN)
Storage Device
Management(WFMT_DBM)
Live Update(WFMT_UPDATE)
Time
synchronization(WFMT_SYNC)
Update Server/ Time Server/ ESM / SecureCast
TOE Range
Management Interface
Configuration(WFMT_CONFIG)
Policy Setup(WFMT_POLICY)
Login Failure
management(WFMT_LOGIN)
Storage Device
Management(WFMT_DBM)
Live Update(WFMT_UPDATE)
Time
syschronization(WFMT_SYNC)
Security Audit Inquriy
(WFAU_SAR)
User Identification and
Certification(WFIA_ACCESS)
network
network
network
network
Data Network
Interface
SNIPER OS V2.0(kernel 2.6.37)
Downloader/Tools/Configuration/Help
(Non-TSF)
[Figure 3] Scope of the TOE
The IPS Server provides major security features including network intrusion prevention,
and the IPS Client provides user interfaces to the authorized administrators to securely
manage the TOE.
For the detailed description is referred to the ST [6][7].
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6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier Release Date
SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 Installation Guidance V1.02 JAN 15, 2013
SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 Administrator Manual V1.02 JAN 3, 2013
[Table 5] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer’s testing was performed on the final TOE. The developer tested 134
tests for basic functions of the TOE, 2,031 tests against rules based on IPS signatures,
131 module tests.
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results according to the
assurance component ATE_COV.2. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined for each life cycle state of the TOE, and demonstrated that the TSFI behaves
as described in the functional specification.
The developer tested subsystems (including their interactions), and analyzed testing
results according to the assurance component ATE_DPT.1.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator performed all the developer’s tests, and conducted independent testing
based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The TOE and test configuration are
identical to the developer’s tests. The tests cover preparative procedures, according to
the guidance.
Also, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases devised by
the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities. These
test cases cover testing SQL injection, known network protocol attacks, source code
weakness analysis, invalid input parameters, and so on. No exploitable vulnerabilities
by attackers possessing Enhanced-Basic attack potential were found from penetration
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testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [5].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is SNIPER IPS-G V8.0. The TOE is consisting of the following components:
 SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 Server 2011.07.01R with SNIPER OS V2.0 (Kernel 2.6.37)
 SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 Client GLOBAL_20130115 (20130115_1428)
The operational mode of the TOE is shown in [Figure 1] and [Figure 2] of this report.
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 5] were evaluated
with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [5] which references
Single Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components of EAL4.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore the verdict PASS is
Certification Report Page 14
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security problem
definition and the division of this problem between the TOE and its operational
environment is clearly defined. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.2.
The Extended Components Definition has no extended components. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_LCD.1.
The developer has used well-defined development tools (e.g. programming languages
or computer-aided design (CAD) systems) that yield consistent and predictable results.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_TAT.1.
The developer has clearly identified the TOE and its associated configuration items,
and the ability to modify these items is properly controlled by automated tools, thus
making the CM system less susceptible to human error or negligence. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.4.
The configuration list includes the TOE, the parts that comprise the TOE, the TOE
implementation representation, security flaws, and the evaluation evidence. These
configuration items are controlled in accordance with CM capabilities. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.4.
The developer's security controls on the development environment are adequate to
provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation that is
necessary to ensure that secure operation of the TOE is not compromised. Therefore
the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_DVS.1.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
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TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_DEL.1.
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the life-cycle model
used by the developer, the configuration management, the security measures used
throughout TOE development, the tools used by the developer throughout the life-cycle
of the TOE, the handling of security flaws, and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The TOE design provides a description of the TOE in terms of subsystems sufficient to
determine the TSF boundary, and provides a description of the TSF internals in terms
of modules. It provides a detailed description of the SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting
modules and enough information about the SFR-non-interfering modules for the
evaluator to determine that the SFRs are completely and accurately implemented; as
such, the TOE design provides an explanation of the implementation representation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_TDS.3.
The developer has completely described all of the TSFI in a manner such that the
evaluator was able to determine whether the TSFI are completely and accurately
Certification Report Page 16
described, and appears to implement the security functional requirements of the ST.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.4.
The TSF is structured such that it cannot be tampered with or bypassed, and TSFs that
provide security domains isolate those domains from each other. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ADV_ARC.1.
The implementation representation made available by the developer is suitable for use
in other analysis activities. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_IMP.1.
Thus, the design documentation is adequate to understand how the TSF meets the
SFRs and how the implementation of these SFRs cannot be tampered with or
bypassed. Design documentation consists of a functional specification (which
describes the interfaces of the TSF), a TOE design description (which describes the
architecture of the TSF in terms of how it works in order to perform the functions
related to the SFRs being claimed), an implementation description (a source code level
description). In addition, there is a security architecture description (which describes
the architectural properties of the TSF to explain how its security enforcement cannot
be compromised or bypassed).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and that the developer's test coverage
evidence shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation
and the TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_COV.2.
The developer has tested all the TSF subsystems against the TOE design and the
security architecture description. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_DPT.1.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the design documentation, and had confidence in the
developer's test results by performing all of the developer's tests. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
Certification Report Page 17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing Enhanced-Basic attack potential in the
operational environment of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
AVA_VAN.3.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or
quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security
mechanisms), don’t allow attackers possessing Enhanced-Basic attack potential to
violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
ASE ASE_INT.1 ASE_INT.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E PASS
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_CCL.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_SPD.1 ASE_SPD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_OBJ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1 ASE_ECD.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E PASS
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_REQ.2.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1 ASE_TSS.1.1E PASS PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E PASS
ALC ALC_LCD.1 ALC_LCD.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
ALC_TAT.1 ALC_TAT.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMS.4 ALC_CMS.4.1E PASS PASS
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMC.4.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.1 ALC_DVS.1.1E PASS PASS
ALC_DVS.1.2E PASS
ALC_DEL.1 ALC_DEL.1.1E PASS PASS
Certification Report Page 18
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Verdict
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Assurance
Component
Assurance
Class
AGD AGD_PRE.1 AGD_PRE.1.1E PASS PASS PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E PASS PASS
AGD_OPE.1 AGD_OPE.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV ADV_TDS.3 ADV_TDS.3.1E PASS PASS PASS
ADV_TDS.3.2E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.4 ADV_FSP.4.1E PASS PASS
ADV_FSP.4.2E PASS
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_ARC.1.1E PASS PASS
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_IMP.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE ATE_COV.2 ATE_COV.2.1E PASS PASS PASS
ATE_DPT.1 ATE_DPT.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_FUN.1.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2 ATE_IND.2.1E PASS PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E PASS
ATE_IND.2.3E PASS
AVA AVA_VAN.3 AVA_VAN.3.1E PASS PASS PASS
AVA_VAN.3.2E PASS
AVA_VAN.3.3E PASS
AVA_VAN.3.4E PASS
[Table 6] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:
 The administrator must ensure when operating any internal / external network
communication it should be done via TOE. It is recommended to apply a
security policy for the system accordingly to grasp the amount of normal traffic.
Certification Report Page 19
 The TOE is installed in the form of in-line mode between the outside Internet
and the internal network or the main networking point for network intrusion
prevention. It is recommended to operate with the network boundary protection
devices such as DDOS protection device to protect the internal network.
 The TOE provides SSL communication for security management using web-
based access, and HTTPS must be used for SSL communication. The
certificate for SSL communication must be unique throughout the organization,
it is recommended to securely manage that certificate.
 The TOE provides update feature to upgrade the maintenance of up-to-date list
of signatures and a new type of intrusion detection. The administrator is
recommended to check for updates periodically.
 The TOE is provided by time stamp from external NTP server for audit data
generation. The TOE administrator must appropriately manage NTP service to
use the TOE accurately.
 The administrator should set only the necessary IPS rules, and delete the
unused rules to avoid introduction of potential vulnerabilities.
11. Security Target
SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 Security Target V1.07, JUN 3, 2013 [6][7] is included in this report
by reference. For the purpose of publication, it can be provided as sanitized version [7]
according to the CCRA supporting document ST sanitising for publication [8].
12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC Common Criteria
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
Certification Report Page 20
In-line mode The TOE is configured like bridge, so that all network
traffic is passing through the TOE.
HA
(High Availability)
Two TOEs are configured, so that, if one of them is
brought down, the second one assumes the workload of
both of them.
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-001 ~ CCMB-2009-07-003, July 2009
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-004, July 2009
[3] Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (September 1,
2009)
[4] Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (November 1, 2012)
[5] 12-402-002 SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 Evaluation Technical Report V1.30, June 4,
2013
[6] SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 Security Target V1.07, June 3, 2013 (Korean Version)
[7] SNIPER IPS-G V8.0 Security Target V1.07, June 3, 2013 (English Version,
Sanitized)
[8] ST sanitising for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006