Ärendetyp 5.3 Diarienummer: 24FMV6700-47
Dokument ID CSEC2024028
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2026-02-10
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including
APM
Issue: 2.0, 2026-feb-10
Authorisation: Theodora Arvanitidis, Junior Certifier , CSEC
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 2 (22)
Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 6
3.1 Security Audit 6
3.2 Cryptographic Support 6
3.3 Identification and Authentication 6
3.4 Security Function Management 6
3.5 Protection of the TSF 7
3.6 TOE Access 7
3.7 Trusted Path / Channels 7
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
4.1 Usage Assumptions 8
4.2 Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 12
6 Documentation 14
7 IT Product Testing 15
7.1 Evaluator Testing 15
7.2 Penetration Testing 15
8 Evaluated Configuration 16
9 Results of the Evaluation 17
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 19
11 Glossary 20
12 Bibliography 21
Appendix A Scheme Versions 22
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 22
A.2 Scheme Notes 22
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 3 (22)
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Networking Device. When running on iSeries
and VIPRION devices, the TOE is a physical Network Device. When running on hy-
pervisors or on F5OS on rSeries or VELOS devices, the TOE is a virtual Network De-
vice. The TOE claiming conformance to ST_1761 is identified as BIG-IP Version
17.5.0 including APM (Build Hotfix-BIGIP-17.5.0.0.189.15-ENG, also referred to as
17.5). The TOE consists of following:
Supported Physical Network Devices:
• I15000 model series, including I15600, I15800 and I15820-DF
• C2400 model series, including C2400-AC and C2400B
• C2400 with B2250
• C4480 model series, including C4480-AC and C4400B
• C4480 with B4450
Supported Virtual Network Devices:
• R4000 model series, including R4600 and R4800
• R5000 model series, including R5600, R5800, R5900 and R5920-DF
• R10000 model series, including R10600, R10800, R10900 and R10900-DF
• R12000 model series, including R12600DSB, R12800DSB and R12900DSB
• CX410 model series, including CX410-AC
• BX110 with CX410
• CX1610 model series, including CX1610-AC
• BX520 with CX1610
The TOE is also available for the following hypervisors:
• VMWare ESXi 8.0.3 (build 24414501)
• Hyper-V version 10.0.20348.1 on Windows Server 2022 Standard
• KVM: qemu-system-x86 version 1:6.2+dfsg-2ubuntu6.6 on Ubuntu 22.04.2 LTS
The Security Target [ST] claims exact conformance to the Collaborative Protection
Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), version 3.0e (2023-12-06). The [ST] claims
exact conformance to the Functional Package for Secure Shell (SSH) (PKG_SSH),
version 1.0 (2021-05-13).
A list of the NIT technical decisions considered during the evaluation is available in
the ST.
There are eleven assumptions being made in the ST regarding the secure usage and the
operational environment of the TOE. The TOE relies on these to counter the nine
threats and comply with the one organisational security policy (OSP) in the ST.
The assumptions, threats, and the OSP are described in chapter 4 Assumptions and
Clarification of Scope.
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB and was com-
pleted in 2026-01-28, with additional testing 2026-03-02. The evaluation was con-
ducted in accordance with the requirements of Common Criteria, version 3.1, revision
5.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 4 (22)
atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria
under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec infor-
mation security AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body SWEDAC
according to ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria evaluation.
The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports. The certifier determined that the evaluation results
confirm the security claims in the Security Target [ST].
The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target and the Final
Evaluation Report (FER) produced by atsec information security AB.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are
met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other or-
ganisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the
IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 5 (22)
2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2024028
Name and version of the cer-
tified IT product
F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM (build Hotfix-
BIGIP-17.5.0.0.189.15-ENG)
Security Target Identification F5 BIG-IP® 17.5.0 including APM Security Target,
F5, Inc., 2026-March-05, version 17.63
EAL NDcPP v.3.0e
Sponsor F5, Inc.
Developer F5, Inc.
ITSEF atsec information security AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 5
CEM version 3.1 revision 5
QMS version 2.6.1
Scheme Notes Release 22.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, EA-MLA
Certification date 2026-02-10
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 6 (22)
3 Security Policy
The TOE provides the following security services:
• Security Audit
• Cryptographic Support
• Identification and Authentication
• Security Function Management
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access
• Trusted Path / Channels
3.1 Security Audit
BIG-IP implements syslog capabilities to generate audit records for securityrelevant
events. In addition, the BIG-IP protects the audit trail from unauthorized modifications
and loss of audit data due to insufficient space.
3.2 Cryptographic Support
In BIG-IP, cryptographic functionality is provided by the OpenSSL cryptographic
module. The BIG-IP provides a secure shell (SSH) to allow administrators to connect
over a dedicated network interface. BIG-IP also implements the TLS protocol to allow
administrators to remotely manage the TOE. BIG-IP implements a TLS client for in-
teractions with other TLS servers. These cryptographic implementations utilize the
cryptographic module which provides random number generation, key generation, key
establishment, key storage, key destruction, hash operations, encryption/decryption
operations, and digital signature operations.
3.3 Identification and Authentication
An internal password-based repository is implemented for authentication of manage-
ment users. BIG-IP enforces a strong password policy and disabling user accounts af-
ter a configured number of failed authentication attempts.
3.4 Security Function Management
A command line interface (available via the traffic management shell "tmsh"), web-
based GUI ("Configuration utility" or “TMUI”), a SOAP-based API ("iControl API"),
and a REST-based API (“iControl REST API”) are offered to administrators for all
relevant configuration of security functionality. The TOE manages configuration ob-
jects in a partition which includes users, server pools, etc. This includes the authenti-
cation of administrators by user name and password, as well as access control based
on pre-defined roles and, optionally, groups of objects ("Profiles"). "Profiles" can be
defined for individual servers and classes of servers that the TOE forwards traffic
from clients to, and for traffic that matches certain characteristics, determining the
kind of treatment applicable to that traffic. Management capabilities offered by the
TOE include the definition of templates for certain configuration options. The man-
agement functionality also implements roles for separation of duties.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 7 (22)
3.5 Protection of the TSF
BIG-IP implements many capabilities to protect the integrity and management of its
own security functionality. These capabilities include the protection of sensitive data,
such as passwords and keys, self-tests, product update verification, and reliable time
stamping.
3.6 TOE Access
Prior to interactive user authentication, the BIG-IP can display an administrative-
defined banner. BIG-IP terminates interactive sessions after an administrator-defined
period of inactivity and allows users to terminate their own authenticated session.
3.7 Trusted Path / Channels
The TOE protects remote connections to its management interfaces with TLS and
SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with audit servers using TLS.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 8 (22)
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes eleven assumptions on the usage and the operational
environment of the TOE.
A.PHYSICAL_PROTECTION
The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environ-
ment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security or interfere with
the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is as-
sumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the
cPP will not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical
attack mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend against physical ac-
cess to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other con-
trols, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to the
physical platform on which the VM runs.
A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY
The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not
provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing.
For example the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose
applications (unrelated to networking functionality).
If a virtual TOE evaluated as a pND, following Case 2 vNDs as specified in Section
1.2, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only one vND instance for each physi-
cal hardware platform. The exception being where components of a distributed TOE
run inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. In Case 2 vND, no
non-TOE guest VMs are allowed on the platform.
A.NO_THRU_TRAFFIC_PROTECTION
A standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the pro-
tection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the Network Device to protect data
that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and
audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network
entity, is not covered by the NDcPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered
by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of Network Devices (e.g., firewall)
A.TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR
The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and
to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropri-
ately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administra-
tors are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy
and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is
not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that ac-
tively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device. For TOEs supporting
X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to
fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or inter-
mediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE’s trust store (aka 'root store', ' trusted CA
Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline verification).
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 9 (22)
A.REGULAR_UPDATES
The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Adminis-
trator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known
vulnerabilities.
A.ADMIN_CREDENTIALS_SECURE
The Administrator’s credentials (private key) used to access the Network Device are
protected by the platform on which they reside.
A.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensi-
tive residual information (e.g., cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords,
etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its
operational environment.
A.VS_TRUSTED_ADMINISTRATOR (applies to vNDs only)
The Security Administrators for the VS are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best
interest of security for the organization. This includes not interfering with the correct
operation of the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of defend-
ing against a malicious VS Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise
the security of the device.
A.VS_REGULAR_UPDATES (applies to vNDs only)
The VS software is assumed to be updated by the VS Administrator on a regular basis
in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.
A.VS_ISOLATON (applies to vNDs only)
For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS provides, and is configured to provide sufficient
isolation between software running in VMs on the same physical platform. Further-
more, it is assumed that the VS adequately protects itself from software running inside
VMs on the same physical platform.
A.VS_CORRECT_CONFIGURATION (applies to vNDs only)
For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS and VMs are correctly configured to support ND
functionality implemented in VMs
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 10 (22)
4.2 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains eight threats, which have been considered during the
evaluation.
T.UNAUTHORIZED_ADMINISTRATOR_ACCESS
Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the Network Device by ne-
farious means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading
as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety,
or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide
access to the administrative session, or sessions between Network Devices. Success-
fully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the secu-
rity functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.
T.WEAK_CRYPTOGRAPHY Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algo-
rithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen en-
cryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the al-
gorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized access al-
lowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.
T.UNTRUSTED_COMMUNICATION_CHANNELS Threat agents may attempt to
target Network Devices that do not use standardized secure tunnelling protocols to
protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed
protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks,
replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity
of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the Net-
work Device itself.
T.WEAK_AUTHENTICATION_ENDPOINTS
Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to au-
thenticate the endpoints – e.g., shared password that is guessable or transported as
plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker
could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert
themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The re-
sult is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidential-
ity and integrity, and potentially the Network Device itself could be compromised.
T.UPDATE_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firm-
ware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates
or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firm-
ware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.
T.UNDETECTED_ACTIVITY
Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality
of the Network Device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the at-
tacker finding an avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise
the device and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been
compromised.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 11 (22)
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_COMPROMISE
Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access
to the Network Device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials includes
replacing existing credentials with an attacker’s credentials, modifying existing cre-
dentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.
Threat agents may also be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to
gain privileged access to the device.
T.SECURITY_FUNCTIONALITY_FAILURE
An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or compromised security
functionality and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions without
prior authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or
security functionality of the device.
The Security Target contains one Organisational Security Policy (OSP), which have
been considered during the evaluation.
P.ACCESS_BANNER
The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agree-
ments, or any other appropriate information to which Administrators consent by ac-
cessing the TOE.
.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 12 (22)
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is separated into two (2) distinct planes, the control plane and the data plane.
The control plane validates, stores, and passes configuration data to all necessary sys-
tems. It also provides all administrative access to the TOE. The data plane passes user
traffic through the TOE.
The TOE implements and supports the following network protocols: TLS (client and
server), SSH, HTTPS, FTP. The TOE protects remote connections to its management
interfaces with TLS and SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with
audit servers using TLS. The cryptographic functionality implemented in the TOE is
provided by OpenSSL.
The TOE is divided into the following subsystems:
• F5 Device Hardware,
• F5 platform layer for rSeries and VELOS devices,
• Hardware for hypervisor deployments,
• Hypervisor for hypervisor deployments,
• Traffic Management Operating System (TMOS),
• Traffic Management Micro-kernel (TMM),
• Access Policy Manager (APM), and
• Local Traffic Manager (LTM).
BIG-IP Subsystems for F5 iSeries and VIPRION Devices
BIG-IP subsystems for F5 rSeries and VELOS Devices
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 13 (22)
BIG-IP subsystems Hypervisors
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 14 (22)
6 Documentation
[ECG] BIG-IP Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide BIG-IP
Release 17.5.0
The [ST], section 1.6.3.2 provides a full list of the guidance documents that are part of
the TOE.
The TOE documentation is collected in an ISO file that can be downloaded via https
from the F5 website.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 15 (22)
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Evaluator Testing
The cryptographic algorithm testing is covered by Cryptographic Algorithm Valida-
tion System (CAVS). The CAVS certificates covers all TOE hardware appliances, and
the following third party hypervisor configurations:
- VMWare ESXi 8.0.3 on Intel® Xeon® Gold 6330N CPU @ 2.20GHz processor
- Hyper-V version 10.0 om Windows Server 2022 and Intel ® Xeon® Silver 4309Y
CPU @ 2.80GHz processor
- KVM on Ubutu 22.04.2 LTS and on Intel ® Xeon® Silver 4309Y CPU @
2.80GHz processor
All other tests were performed on the i15820, r10920, and the r12900 models, on the
VELOS Controller: Intel Atom CPU C3758 and Blade: Intel Xeon D-2177NT, and a
virtual deployment on VMWare ESXi 8.0.3, all with the software version 17.5.0 build
0.189.15.
The evaluator testing was successful and did not reveal any errors.
There was additional testing added due to technical decision TD0967, performed
2026-03-02.
All test verdicts were successful and did not reveal any errors.
7.2 Penetration Testing
Port scanning was performed to find open ports that should not be open on the i15820,
r10920, and the r12900 models, on the VELOS Controller: Intel Atom CPU C3758
and Blade: Intel Xeon D-2177NT, and a virtual deployment on VMWare ESXi 8.0.3,
all with the software version 17.5.0 build 0.189.15.
No discrepancies were found during the penetration testing
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 16 (22)
8 Evaluated Configuration
The following configuration specifics apply to the evaluated configuration of the
TOE:
• Appliance mode is licensed. Appliance mode disables root access to the TOE operat-
ing system and disables bash shell.
• Certificate validation is performed using CRLs.
• Disabled interfaces:
- All command shells other than tmsh are disabled. For example, bash and other
user-serviceable shells are excluded.
- Management of the TOE via SNMP is disabled.
- Management of the TOE via the appliance's LCD display is disabled. (applica-
ble to F5 devices)
- Remote (i.e., SSH) access to the Lights Out / Always On Management2 capa-
bilities of the system is disabled. (applicable to F5 devices)
- TLS v1.1
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 17 (22)
9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The evaluators also applied all assurance activities implied by the collaborative PP
[NDcPP].
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC] and the evaluation ac-
tivities implied by the collaborative PP [NDcPP]
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class/Family Short name Verdict
Security Target Evaluation ASE PASS
ST Introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Conformance Claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Security Objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
Extended Components Definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
Security Requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Security Problem Definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
TOE Summary Specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
ASE_NDCPP.1 PASS
ASE_SSHPKG.1 PASS
Development ADV PASS
Functional Specification ADV_FSP.1 PASS
ADV.NDCPP.1 PASS
Guidance documents AGD PASS
Operational User Guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
AGD_NDCPP.1 PASS
AGD_SSHPKG.1 PASS
Life-cycle Support ALC PASS
CM Capabilities ALC_CMC.1 PASS
CM Scope ALC_CMS.1 PASS
Tests ATE PASS
Independent Testing ATE_IND.1 PASS
ATE_NDCPP.1 PASS
ATE_SSHPKG.1 PASS
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 18 (22)
Vulnerablity Assessment AVA PASS
Vulnerability Analysis AVA_VAN.1 PASS
AVA_NDCPP.1 PASS
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 19 (22)
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
None.
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 20 (22)
11 Glossary
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
LTM Local Traffic Manager
PP Protection Profile
SSH Secure Shell
ST Security Target
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TLS Transport Layer Security
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSFI TSF Interface
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 21 (22)
12 Bibliography
ST F5 BIG-IP® 17.5.0 including APM Security Target, F5 Inc., 2026-03-
05, document version 17.63
NDcPP collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, 2023-12-06,
document version 3.0e
SD NDcPP Supporting Document - Evaluation Activities for Network Device
cPP, 2023-12-06, document version 3.0e
CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 1, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001
CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 2, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Part 3, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evalua-
tion, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report F5 BIG-IP 17.5.0 including APM
24FMV6700-47 2.0 2026-02-10
CSEC2024028 22 (22)
Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
2.6.1 2025-10-16 None
2.6 2025-03-27 None
2.5.2 Application Original version
A.2 Scheme Notes
The following Scheme Notes have been considered during the evaluation:
• Scheme Note 15 – Testing
• Scheme Note 18 – Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target
• Scheme Note 21 – NIAP PP Certifications
• Scheme Note 22 – Vulnerability assessment
• Scheme Note 23 – Evaluation reports for NIAP PPs and cPPs
• Scheme Note 25 – Use of CAVP-tests in CC
• Scheme Note 27 – ST Requirements at the Time of Application for
Certification
• Scheme Note 28 – Updated procedures for application, evaluation and
Certification
Scheme Note 31 – New procedures for site visit oversight and testing over-
sight