



Certification Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-1029-2017

for

RACF for z/OS, Version 2 Release 2

from

IBM Corporation

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Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik

Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-1029-2017 (*)

Access Control System

RACF for z/OS
Version 2 Release 2

from IBM Corporation
PP Conformance: None
Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_FLR.3



SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4



The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.

(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 4

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 25 August 2017

For the Federal Office for Information Security

Joachim Weber
Head of Branch

L.S.



Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4



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Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG¹ Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

¹ Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| A. Certification..... | 7 |
| 1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure..... | 7 |
| 2. Recognition Agreements..... | 7 |
| 3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..... | 9 |
| 4. Validity of the Certification Result..... | 9 |
| 5. Publication..... | 10 |
| B. Certification Results..... | 11 |
| 1. Executive Summary..... | 12 |
| 2. Identification of the TOE..... | 13 |
| 3. Security Policy..... | 14 |
| 4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope..... | 14 |
| 5. Architectural Information..... | 15 |
| 6. Documentation..... | 18 |
| 7. IT Product Testing..... | 18 |
| 8. Evaluated Configuration..... | 22 |
| 9. Results of the Evaluation..... | 22 |
| 10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE..... | 23 |
| 11. Security Target..... | 24 |
| 12. Definitions..... | 24 |
| 13. Bibliography..... | 26 |
| C. Excerpts from the Criteria..... | 27 |
| CC Part 1:..... | 27 |
| CC Part 3:..... | 28 |
| D. Annexes..... | 35 |

A. Certification

1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- Act on the Federal Office for Information Security²
- BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance³
- BSI Schedule of Costs⁴
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
- BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-Produkte) [3]
- BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1⁵ [1] also published as ISO/IEC 15408.
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published as ISO/IEC 18045.
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]

2. Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

2.1. European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS Technical Domains only.

² Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

³ Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December 2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231

⁴ Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

⁵ Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

The new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at <https://www.sogisportal.eu>.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

This certificate is recognized according to the rules of SOGIS-MRA, i.e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3, and AVA_VAN.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the SOGIS MRA. For mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.

2.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08 September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP) (exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).

The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.

As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA-2014 are government representatives from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States.

The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

As this certificate is a re-certification of a certificate issued according to CCRA-2000 this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up to and including CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3, and AVA_VAN.4 that are

not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of these assurance families are relevant.

3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product RACF for z/OS, Version 2 Release 2 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0875-2015. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0875-2015 were re-used.

The evaluation of the product RACF for z/OS, Version 2 Release 2 was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 21 August 2017. atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)⁶ recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: IBM Corporation.

The product was developed by: IBM Corporation.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

4. Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report or in the CC itself.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 25 August 2017 is valid until 24 August 2022. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.

The owner of the certificate is obliged:

⁶ Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be informed.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

5. Publication

The product RACF for z/OS, Version 2 Release 2 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <https://www.bsi.bund.de> and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer⁷ of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

⁷ IBM Corporation
2455 South Road P328
Poughkeepsie NY 12601
USA

B. Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

1. Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the RACF component of the z/OS operating system. RACF is the component that is called within z/OS from any component that wants to perform user authentication, access control to protected resources and the management of user security attributes and access rights.

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified Protection Profile.

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5 augmented by ALC_FLR.3.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 7. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functionality:

| TOE Security Functionality | Modes of Operation |
|--|-----------------------|
| Identification and Authentication of Users | All Modes |
| Discretionary Access Control | All Modes |
| Mandatory Access Control and Support for Security Labels | Labeled Security Mode |
| Auditing | All Modes |
| Security management | All Modes |

Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.

This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2. Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

RACF for z/OS, Version 2 Release 2

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

| No | Type | Identifier | Release | Form of Delivery |
|---|-------|---|--------------|------------------|
| <i>z/OS Version 2 Release 2 (z/OS V2.2, program number 5650-ZOS) Common Criteria Evaluated Base Package</i> | | | | |
| 1 | HW/SW | z/OS V2.2 Common Criteria Evaluated Base (IBM program number 5650-ZOS) | V2R2 | Tape |
| 2 | DOC | z/OS V2.2 Program Directory | GI11-9848-01 | Hardcopy |
| 3 | DOC | z/OS V2.2 Documentation Collection Hashsums for download (ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/eserver/zseries/zos/racf/pdf/k4t49497.zip) SHA224: a45700d0b1ad27ea62974ecd8ad4370257e162c260af238ff97e9355 SHA256: ce4f5440ed2767d2ec60a93f0b22dc4666750ac611fd35c54af1833a176add58 SHA384: 847ba2dd9a55b724ce828aac16af81d840bb59be681c8aa2be913c02473ab91cb86810a3dc5e564799d06635754a2218 SHA512: 5e5989170184f71b37e2c8db8b31e2d55bb913e76effe365be2c6f15a3431a8434cadf04a24ae867b6ca39e78fa31a54fbfbfc08f715a75a864f6e820914457 | | |
| 4 | DOC | ServerPac: IYO (Installing Your Order) | n/a | Hardcopy |
| 5 | DOC | Memo to Customers of z/OS V2.2 Common Criteria Evaluated Base | n/a | Hardcopy |
| 6 | DOC | z/OS V2.2 Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria | GA32-0891-01 | Hardcopy |
| <i>IBM Print Services Facility™ Version 4 Release 4 for z/OS (PSF V4.4.0, program number 5655-M32)</i> | | | | |
| 7 | DOC | IBM Print Services Facility™ Version 4 Release 4 for z/OS (PSF V4.4.0, program number 5655-M32) | V4R4 | Tape |
| 8 | DOC | PSF V4.4 CDROM Library Collection | SK5T-8814-00 | CD-ROM |
| <i>OGL/370 V1.1.0 (program number 5688-191)</i> | | | | |
| 9 | DOC | Overlay Generation Language Version 1 (OGL V1R1, program number 5688-191) | V1R1 | Tape |
| 10 | DOC | OGL/370 V1.1.0: Getting Started | G544-3691-00 | Hardcopy |
| 11 | DOC | OGL/370 V1.1.0: LPS | G544-3697-00 | Hardcopy |
| 12 | DOC | OGL: Command Summary and Quick Reference | S544-3703-01 | Hardcopy |
| 13 | DOC | Program Directory OGL/370 | GI10-0212-01 | Hardcopy |
| <i>Additional Media</i> | | | | |
| 14 | SW | PTFs for the following APARs (required): OA48557, OA49499, OA49703, PI53376, PI53852, PI54933 to be obtained electronically from ShopzSeries (https://www.ibm.com/software/shopzseries) | n/a | Electronic |

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

2.1. Overview of Delivery Procedure

The evaluated version of z/OS can be ordered via an IBM sales representative or via the ShopzSeries web application (<http://www.ibm.com/software/shopzseries>). When filing an order via (secured) internet services, IBM requires customers to have an account with a login name and password. Registration for such an account in turn requires a valid customer ID from IBM.

The delivery of the tapes, DVDs, CDs and Documentation occurs in one package, which is manufactured specifically for this customer and shipped via courier services. Additional maintenance then needs to be downloaded by the customer via the ShopzSeries web site, following the instructions delivered with the package.

Verification of the correct z/OS version as described above implies that the correct version of the TOE is installed.

2.2. Identification of the TOE by the User

The media and documents delivered to the customer are labeled with the product, document and version numbers as indicated in the table above and can be checked by the users installing the system.

The TOE reference can be verified by the administrator during initial program load (IPL), when the system identification is displayed on the system console. The operator can also issue the operator command D IPLINFO, to display the z/OS version. The string "z/OS 02.02.00" should be displayed among other information.

3. Security Policy

The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:

- Identification and Authentication
- Discretionary Access Control
- in Labeled Security Mode: mandatory access control and Support for Security Labels
- Auditing
- Security Management

4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: Trained and trustworthy administrators, environmental support for protection of information, correct TOE setup, maintenance, prevention of physical attacks, recovery procedures, correct implementation of security protocols by the environment, only trusted programs to be executed with privileges, and cryptographic support from the underlying processing unit. Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2 and 6.

5. Architectural Information

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the RACF component of the z/OS operating system. RACF is the component that is called within z/OS from any component that wants to perform user authentication, access control to protected resources and the management of user security attributes and access rights.

RACF is designed as an authentication and access manager component that manages both user security attributes and access management attributes in its own database. Users are represented within RACF by user profiles and protected resources are represented by resource profiles. Users can be members of groups where each group is represented by a group profile.

Resource profiles are structured into classes, which represent the different types of resources. Within such a class an individual profile is represented by the name of the resource, which is unique within its class. Resource manager will then query RACF whenever they need to check a user's access rights to a resource. In this query they will specify the resource class, the name of the resource within the class, the type of access requested and the internal representation of the user that requests access. RACF is also called when a component within z/OS needs to authenticate a user. In this case the z/OS component will call RACF and will pass the identity of the user, the authentication credentials presented, the name of the component requesting user authentication and several other parameters to RACF. Based on this information RACF will authenticate the user and, if successful, create a control block representing the user with the security attributes assigned. This control block is later used when a component of z/OS calls RACF for checking access rights.

RACF also provides interfaces that allow the management of user profiles, digital certificates assigned to users, group profiles, resource profiles, access rights, security labels and general RACF attributes. RACF also provides an interface that z/OS components can call to generate a security related audit record.

Note: The RACF Remote Sharing Facility (RRSF) is not considered as a part of this evaluation and therefore must not be used in an evaluated system configuration.

5.1. Intended method of use

RACF is designed to be used by z/OS components to perform user authentication, validate a user's access to a resource, audit security critical events, and manage RACF profiles, access rights to resources and RACF security parameters. It also provides interfaces to extract RACF status information. This interface is a programming interface implemented by the RACROUTE macro. RACF will check if the calling application has the right to use the function called. In addition RACF exports a command interface that can be used by appropriately authorized users directly to perform management operations.

The Security Target specifies two modes of operation: a "normal" mode where labeled security features are not configured as required and a "Labeled Security Mode" where labeled security is configured as described. In "Labeled Security Mode" additional security functionality is active, which is marked with "Labeled Security Mode" in this document. Note that when functions of labeled security are configured differently than specified in the Security Target, the security functionality defined for the "normal" mode still works but additional restrictions may be imposed due to the way the functions for labeled security are configured.

These primary security features are supported by the domain separation and reference mediation properties of the other parts of the z/OS operating system, which ensure that the RACF functions are invoked when required and cannot be bypassed. RACF itself is protected by the architecture of the z/OS operating system from unauthorized tampering with the RACF functions and the RACF database.

RACF uses the z/OS mechanisms for establishing error recovery routines which allows RACF to handle errors or exceptions detected by z/OS or the hardware and either recover from the error, perform any necessary clean-up operation and signal the error to the calling program, or (in the extreme case when RACF is not able to maintain its integrity e. g. when the RACF database is full or compromised) terminate RACF itself.

5.2. Identification and authentication

RACF provides support for the identification and authentication of users by the means of

- an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a system-encrypted password or password phrase.
- an alphanumeric RACF user ID and a PassTicket, which is a cryptographically-generated password substitute encompassing the user ID, the requested application name, and the current date/time.
- an x.509v3 digital certificate presented to a server application in the TOE environment that uses System SSL or TCP/IP Application Transparent TLS (AT-TLS) to provide TLS-based client authentication, and then “mapped” (using TOE functions) by that server application or by AT-TLS to a RACF user ID.
- a Kerberos™ v5 ticket presented to a server application in the TOE environment that supports the Kerberos mechanism, and then mapped by that application through the GSS-API programming services. The TOE also provides functions (specifically the R_ticketServ, and R_GenSec services) that enable the application server to validate the Kerberos ticket, and thus the authentication of the principal. The application server then translates (or maps) the Kerberos principal (using the TOE provided function of R_userMap) to a RACF user ID.

The TOE security functions authenticate the claimed identity of the user by verifying the password/phrase (or other mechanism, as listed above) and returning the result to the trusted program that used the RACF functions for user identification and authentication. It is up to the trusted program to determine what to do when the user identification and authentication process fails. When a user is successfully identified and authenticated RACF creates control blocks containing the user's security attributes as managed by RACF. Those control blocks are used later when a resource manager calls RACF to determine the user's right to access resources or when the user calls RACF functions that require the user to hold specific RACF managed privileges.

The required password quality can be tailored to the policies of the installation using various parameters. When creating users, administrators are required to choose an initial password and optionally a password phrase, that must usually be changed by the user during the initial logon that uses the password/phrase.

5.3. Discretionary access control

RACF implements the functions allowing resource managers within z/OS to control access to the resources they want to protect. Resources protected by RACF fall into two categories, based on the mechanisms used within RACF to describe them: Standard (e.g.,

MVS data sets, or general resources in classes defined by RACF or the system administrator), and UNIX (e.g., UNIX files, directories, and IPC objects instantiated by a UNIX file system). Discretionary access control (DAC) rules allow resource managers to differentiate access of users to resources based on different access types.

5.4. Mandatory access control and support for security labels

In addition to DAC, RACF provides mandatory access control (MAC) functions that are required for Labeled Security Mode, which impose additional access restrictions on information flow on security classification. Users and resources can have a security label specified in their profile.

Security labels contain a hierarchical classification (security level), which specify the sensitivity (for example: public, internal use, or secret), and zero or more non-hierarchical security categories (for example: PROJECTA or PROJECTB).

The access control enforced by the TOE ensures that users can only read labeled information if their security labels dominate the label of the information, and that they can only write to labelled information containers if the label of the container dominates the subject's label, thus implementing the Bell-LaPadula model of information flow control. The system can also be configured to allow write-down for certain authorized users.

5.5. Auditing

RACF provides an auditing capability that allows generating audit records for security-critical events. RACF provides a number of logging and reporting functions that allow resource owners and auditors to identify users who attempt to access resources. Audit records are generated by RACF and submitted to another component of z/OS (System Management Facilities (SMF)), which collects them into an audit trail.

RACF always generates audit records for such events as unauthorized attempts to access the system or changes to the status of the RACF database. The security administrator, auditors, and other users with appropriate authorization can configure which additional optional security events are to be logged. In addition to writing records to the audit trail, messages can be sent to the security console to immediately alert operators of detected policy violations. RACF provides SMF records for all RACF-protected resources (either "traditional" or z/OS UNIX-based).

For reporting, auditors can unload all or selected parts of the SMF data for further analysis in a human-readable format and can then upload the data to a query or reporting package, such as DFSORT™ if desired.

5.6. Security management

RACF provides a set of commands and options to adequately manage the security functions of the TOE. Additionally, RACF provides the capability of managing users, groups of users, general resource profiles, and RACF SETROPTS options.

RACF recognizes several authorities that are able to perform the different management tasks related to the security of the TOE:

- General security options are managed by security administrators.
- In Labeled Security Mode: management of MAC attributes is performed by security administrators.

- Management of users and their security attributes is performed by security administrators. Management of groups (and to some extent users) can be delegated to group security administrators.
- Users can change their own passwords or password phrases, their default groups, and their user names (but not their user IDs).
- In Labeled Security Mode: users can choose their security labels at login, for some login methods. (Note: this also applies in normal mode if the administrator chooses to activate security label processing.)
- Auditors manage the parameters of the audit system (a list of audited events, for example) and can analyze the audit trail.
- Security administrators can define what audit records are captured by the system.
- Discretionary access rights to protected resources are managed by the owners of the applicable profiles (or UNIX objects) or by security administrators.

6. Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7. IT Product Testing

The Security Target requires the software packages comprising the TOE to be run on an abstract machine implementing the z/Architecture machine interface as defined in the “z/Architecture Principles of Operation”. The hardware platforms implementing this abstract machine are:

- IBM zEnterprise 114 with CPACF DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 active, optionally with CryptoExpress3 card, and with or without the zEnterprise BladeCenter Extension (zBX).
- IBM zEnterprise 196 with CPACF DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 active, optionally with CryptoExpress3 card, and with or without the zEnterprise BladeCenter Extension (zBX).
- IBM zEnterprise zEC12 with CPACF DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 active, optionally with Crypto Express3 or Crypto Express4s card, and with or without the zEnterprise BladeCenter Extension (zBX).
- IBM z13 with CPACF DES/TDES Enablement Features 3863 active, optionally with Crypto Express4, Crypto Express4S and Crypto Express5S cards, with or without the zEnterprise BladeCenter Extension (zBX).

The TOE may be running on those machines within a logical partition provided by a certified version of IBM PR/SM. In addition, the TOE may run on a virtual machine provided by a certified version of IBM z/VM.

For the peripherals that can be used with the TOE, please refer to the Security Target, [6].

IBM has tested the platforms (hardware and combinations of hardware with IBM PR/SM and/or IBM z/VM) for z/OS individually for their compliance to the z/Architecture using the Systems Assurance Kernel (SAK) suite of tests. These tests ensure that every platform provides the abstract machine interface that z/OS requires.

The test systems were running z/OS Version 2 Release 2 in the evaluated configuration. Due to the massive amount of tests, testing was performed throughout the development of the TOE. To ensure proper testing of all security relevant behavior of the TOE, the evaluators verified that all tests that might have been affected by any security-relevant change introduced late in the development cycle had been run on the evaluated configuration.

7.1. Developer Testing

RACF testing is tightly integrated into the testing of the z/OS operating system, which has been evaluated under BSI-DSZ-CC-0948. Therefore, the z/OS test setup and test framework also applies to RACF testing and can be summarized as follows:

- FVT for z/OS is largely performed on the VICOM test system. This is an enhanced z/VM system implementing the z/Architecture abstract machine interface. It allows testers to bring up individual, virtual test machines running z/OS with access to virtualized peripherals such as disks and network connections. For the purpose of the security function tests, this environment is fully equivalent to the machines running z/OS. This environment was also used by the evaluator for their independent testing.
- IBM has provided a common test framework for tests that can be automated. COMSEC is an environment that can be operated in standard mode or Labeled Security mode. The BERD (Background Environment Random Driver) test driver submits the testcases as JES2 jobs. IBM's intention is to move more and more tests to this automated environment, which will ease the test effort required for the evaluations substantially. Starting with V1R9 a substantial number of tests has been ported to this environment. Additionally, most test teams ran their manual tests in the COMSEC test environment, which provides a complete test environment in the evaluated configuration of the TOE in the different modes of operation.
- The test systems were running z/OS version 2 release 2 in the evaluated configuration. The SDF team provided a pre-installed system image for VICOM and for the machines running the COMSEC tests, thus ensuring that the CCEB software version was used for all tests. The additional PTFs were applied to the VICOM and COMSEC systems as they became available, with any security-relevant tests for the PTFs being successfully re-run. For some APARs claimed by the ST, which have not been installed on the test systems, an analysis of their security impact revealed that they actually have no effect at all on the TOE functionality being tested.

The developer chooses the following test approach:

- IBM's general test approach is defined in the process for Integrated Product Development (IPD) with developer tests, functional verification tests (FVT), and system verification tests (SVT). Per release, an overall effort of more than 100 person years is spent on FVT and SVT for the z/OS components, including the RACF component. FVT and SVT is performed by independent test teams, with testers being independent from the developers. The different test teams have

developed their own individual test and test documentation tools, but all implement the requirements set forth in the IPD documentation.

- For the purpose of the evaluation, FVT is of interest to the evaluator, since the single security functions claimed in the [6] are tested here. IBM decided to create a test bucket with the tests for the security functions, summarizing the tests in individual test plans, so that the evaluator had a chance to deal with the otherwise overwhelming complexity of the z/OS testing.
- IBM's test strategy for the evaluation of z/OS, and therefore RACF, has three cornerstones:
 - In z/OS testing, the major internal security interface was the interface to RACF, which is tested exhaustively by the RACF test group. This testing mostly serves for RACF as the testing of RACF's external interfaces.
 - Components requiring Identification and Authentication or Access Control services call RACF (with the exception of LDAP LDBM, which implements its own access control). For most of these services, it is sufficient to demonstrate that these interfaces call RACF, once the testing of the RACF interface (see above) has established confidence in the correct inner workings of RACF.
 - Due to the design of z/OS, a large number of internal interfaces is also visible externally, although the interfaces are not intended to be called by external, unprivileged subjects. For these interfaces, which are basically authorized programs, operator commands, certain callable services, SVC and PC routines, testing established only that these interfaces cannot be called by unauthorized callers.

For components providing cryptographic functions, testing was performed with and without hardware cryptographic support in order to test the correct usage of the hardware cryptographic functions, if present, and the correct implementation of the software implementation within the TOE.

These are the test results:

- The test results provided by the sponsor were generated on the configurations as described above. Although different test teams used different tools and test tracking databases, the evaluator verified that all provided results showed that tests had executed successfully and yielded the expected results.
- The testing provided was valid for both the standard mode and the Labeled Security mode of operation, with the exception of tests for multilevel security features, which were relevant to Labeled Security mode only. The test systems configured for Labeled Security mode are compliant to standard mode as well, so that tests run on these systems were always applicable to both modes of operation. For COMSEC, all applicable tests were run in dedicated Labeled Security mode and standard mode configurations.

The evaluator verified that testing was performed on configurations conformant to the ST. The evaluator was able to follow and fully understand the test approach based on the information provided by the developer. With this test environment, the developer was able to provide proof of the necessary coverage and test depth to the evaluator.

7.2. Evaluator Testing

The independent evaluator testing followed the CEM guidance to test every security function, without striving for exhaustive testing. For their own tests, the evaluators decided to focus on the most important security functions of the TOE in order to provide independent verification of their correct operation:

- Identification and authentication: The evaluators would only devise some basic, mostly implicit testing of the Identification and authentication functions in TSO/E, ftp, su and JES, since these functions would be exercised extensively during the test activity by the testers. The testers' tests focused on the Kerberos based authentication mechanisms. In addition the testers exercised the newly added sudo function with regard to I&A.
- Discretionary access control: The evaluators focused on UNIX System Services ACLs, which also implicitly test UNIX permission bits. Other DAC tests involved
 - DAC for different USS objects (device special files, IPC objects, directories)
 - z/OS dataset access
 - Security-relevant USS system calls which are interfacing RACF internally
- Mandatory Access Control: The evaluators re-ran their own tests on mandatory access control checks for data sets and Unix System Services files as their own regression tests. Testing of the write down override capability provided by FACILITY class profiles was also performed.
- Audit: Tests were used to check auditing of changes to the system clock.
- Security Management: The evaluators decided to devise no special tests here, since the setup of the test environment and the setup/cleanup of the tests would already include a major portion of the TSF found here.
- TOE Self Protection: The only function to be suitably testable is object re-use, where the evaluators decided to focus on the issue of memory pages probably containing left-over information. All other self-protection features are properties that could not be easily be "challenged" by evaluator tests.

For the set of developer tests to be re-run and observed, the evaluators chose an approach supplementing their own tests and focusing on functionality changed since the previous evaluation.

The evaluators decided to focus on security functions claimed in the Security Target and not to run tests demonstrating that functions requiring authorization would fail when invoked unprivileged. This was in part due to the fact that the evaluators had experienced already sufficient issues with protection of security functions while bringing up the system in its evaluated configuration, following the guidance.

Apart from the tests re-run by the evaluators or during dedicated sessions set up for the evaluators to observe the testers running those tests, the evaluators gained confidence in the developers' test efforts during their extended stay at the developer site, where they discussed with testers issues of testing or interpretations of the CC requirements, and were witnessing test executions while the test bucket was being created. The evaluators had already interviewed testers during the site visits and examined the test databases with test cases and test results and test execution records.

All tests were run on the VICOM test system that had been set up by the evaluators according to the specifications found in the guidance, and on the COMSEC system set up by IBM and verified by the evaluators to be in the evaluated configuration.

During their testing, the evaluators could verify that the test functions behaved as expected.

The evaluator focused on the new functionality introduced with z/OS V2R2 like the new read-only auditor role and the enhanced functions for password security. The new read-only auditor role was tested with respect to potentials for privilege escalation associated with the new role. No such problem was identified. With the new policy to allow for additional special characters in passwords tests have been performed to test the behavior of the TOE when an administrator changes the password policy resulting in users that have passwords not compliant with the new policy. No vulnerability (also no denial-of service) was encountered.

8. Evaluated Configuration

The Target of Evaluation is IBM RACF for z/OS, Version 2 Release 2. The TOE is software only and is accompanied by guidance documentation. The items listed in table 2 of this report represent the TOE.

The following configuration of the TOE is covered by this certification:

The z/OS V2R2 Common Criteria Evaluated Base package must be installed according to the directions delivered with the media and configured according to the instructions as item 6 in table 2.

All required PTFs as listed as item 14 in Table 2 above must be installed.

9. Results of the Evaluation

9.1. CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0875-2015, re-use of specific evaluation tasks was possible.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- for the Functionality: Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended

- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_FLR.3

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (<https://www.bsi.bund.de>).

The TOE contains the following Cryptographic Functionality:

SHA256withRSAEncryption with key length 1024, 2048, 4096 as defined in PKCS#1 V2.1, June 14, 2002 and SHA-256 as defined in NIST FIPS 180-2, August 2002 (as defined by the OID SHA256withRSAEncryption).

RSA with key length 1024 achieves a security level of lower than 100 bits (in general context).

10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or take additional measures in order to maintain system security.

The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.

In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:

The developer provided an updated APAR as described in item 14 in table 2. This APAR corrects the statements in item 6 in table 2 regarding the ported tools as follows:

“The z/OS Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria (GA32-0891-01) erroneously includes the IBM Ported Tools for z/OS V1.2.0 FMID HOS1120, program number 5655-M23.”

And

“The following technical update was made to the z/OS V2R2 Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria (GA32-0891-01): OpenSSH is now part of z/OS (FMID HOS2220). References to the IBM Ported Tools for z/OS have been deleted. All security recommendations for OpenSSH from z/OS Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria (GA32-0891-01) apply to HOS2220.”

This remediation of the APAR and thus indirectly the referenced guide in item 6 in table 2 make this guide consistent with [6] again.

11. Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.

12. Definitions

12.1. Acronyms

| | |
|--------------|--|
| AIS | Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme |
| BERD | Background Environment Random Driver |
| BSI | Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany |
| BSIG | BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security |
| CCRA | Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement |
| CC | Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation |
| CEM | Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation |
| CPACF | Central Processor Assist for Cryptographic Functions |
| cPP | Collaborative Protection Profile |
| EAL | Evaluation Assurance Level |
| ETR | Evaluation Technical Report |
| IT | Information Technology |
| ITSEF | Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility |
| PP | Protection Profile |
| PR/SM | Processor Resource/System Manager |
| RACF | Resource Access Control Facility |
| SAR | Security Assurance Requirement |
| SFP | Security Function Policy |
| SFR | Security Functional Requirement |
| ST | Security Target |
| TOE | Target of Evaluation |
| TSF | TOE Security Functionality |

12.2. Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.

Discretionary Access Control - An access control policy that allows authorized users and authorized administrators to control access to objects based on individual user identity or membership in a group (PROJECTA, for example).

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Mandatory Access Control - An access control policy that determines access based on the sensitivity (SECRET, for example) and category (PERSONNEL or MEDICAL, for example) of the information that is being accessed and the clearance of the user who is trying to gain access to that information.

Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements

Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.

TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.

13. Bibliography

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
<http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>
- [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012,
<http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>
- [3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), <https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung>
- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE⁸
<https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS>
- [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also on the BSI Website, <https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsberichte>
- [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1029-2017, Version 4.13, 19.06.2017, Security Target for IBM RACF for z/OS V2R2, IBM
- [7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, Date 17.08.2017, Final Evaluation Technical Report, atsec information security GmbH, (confidential document)
- [8] Configuration list for the TOE, 08.03.2016, Configuration List (confidential document)
- [9] Guidance documentation for the TOE, GA32-0891-01, February 2016, z/OS Version 2 Release 2 - Planning for Multilevel Security and the Common Criteria

⁸specifically

- [AIS01]: "Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers", version 13 as of 2008-08-14.
- [AIS14]: "Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt von Einzelprüfberichten für Evaluationen nach CC", version 7 as of 2010-08-03.
- [AIS19]: "Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt der Zusammenfassung des ETR (Evaluation Technical Report) für Evaluationen nach CC (Common Criteria)", version 9 as of 2014-11-03.
- [AIS23]: "Zusammentragen von Nachweisen der Entwickler (Collection of Developer Evidence)", version 4 as of 2017-03-15.
- [AIS32]: "CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema", version 7 as of 2011-06-08.
- [BSI7125]: "Anforderungen an Antragsteller zur Anerkennung als Prüfstelle im Bereich Common Criteria, CC-Prüfstellen (löst das Prog-Stellen und BSI 7125 ab)", version 1.0.1 as of 2016-08-08.
- [GER]: "Guidelines for Evaluation Reports according to Common Criteria version 3.1", version 2.0 as of 2010-07-01.
- [JIL01]: "Joint Interpretation Library: Collection of Developer Evidence", version 1.5 as of January 2012

C. Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part 1:

Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)

“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC conformance claim that:

- describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
 - **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
 - **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
 - **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
 - **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g. EAL) if:
 - the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
 - the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
- Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if:
 - the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package.
 - the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the package.

Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.

Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection Profiles:

- PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.
- Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”

CC Part 3:

Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)

“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent, and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.

| Assurance Class | Assurance Components |
|--|--|
| Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation | APE_INT.1 PP introduction |
| | APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims |
| | APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition |
| | APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives |
| | APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition |
| | APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements |

APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”

Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)

“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”

| Assurance Class | Assurance Components |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| Class ASE: Security Target evaluation | ASE_INT.1 ST introduction |
| | ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims |
| | ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition |
| | ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives |
| | ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition |
| | ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements |
| | ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary |

ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition

Security assurance components (chapter 7)

“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance classes, families, and components.”

“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”

“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”

The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.

| Assurance Class | Assurance Components |
|----------------------------|---|
| ADV: Development | ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description |
| | ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification |
| | ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF |
| | ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals |
| | ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model |
| | ADV_TDS.1 Basic design ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-level design presentation |
| AGD: Guidance documents | AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance |
| | AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures |
| ALC: Life cycle support | ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support |
| | ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage |
| | ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures |
| | ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures |
| | ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation |
| | ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model |

| Assurance Class | Assurance Components |
|-------------------------------|---|
| | ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model |
| | ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts |
| | ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage |
| ATE: Tests | ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation |
| | ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing |
| | ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete |
| | |
| AVA: Vulnerability assessment | AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis |

Assurance class decomposition

Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)

“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE’s assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one

component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended assurance requirements.

Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)

“Objectives

EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through security objectives.

EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation.”

Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)

“Objectives

EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)

“Objectives

EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practises.

EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”

Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed (chapter 8.6)

“Objectives

EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)

“Objectives

EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested (chapter 8.8)

“Objectives

EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter 8.9)

“Objectives

EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”

| Assurance Class | Assurance Family | Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|------------------|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | EAL 1 | EAL 2 | EAL 3 | EAL 4 | EAL 5 | EAL 6 | EAL 7 |
| Development | ADV_ARC | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | ADV_FSP | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| | ADV_IMP | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| | ADV_INT | | | | | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| | ADV_SPM | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| | ADV_TDS | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| Guidance Documents | AGD_OPE | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | AGD_PRE | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Life cycle Support | ALC_CMC | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| | ALC_CMS | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| | ALC_DEL | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | ALC_DVS | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| | ALC_FLR | | | | | | | |
| | ALC_LCD | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| | ALC_TAT | | | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Security Target Evaluation | ASE_CCL | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | ASE_ECD | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | ASE_INT | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | ASE_OBJ | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| | ASE_REQ | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| | ASE_SPD | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| | ASE_TSS | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Tests | ATE_COV | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| | ATE_DPT | | | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| | ATE_FUN | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| | ATE_IND | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Vulnerability assessment | AVA_VAN | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 |

Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”

Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)

“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”

Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)

“Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate the SFRs.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”

D. Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.

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