# Security Target for Mobile FeliCa OS 3.0 on T6NE1

Version 1.70 Public No. F03T-ASEP01-E01-70

FeliCa Networks, Inc

# Introduction

This document is the Security Target for CC evaluation of "Mobile FeliCa OS 3.0 on T6NE1".

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## **1. Introducing the Security Target**

This Security Target is provided in accordance with "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation" [CC].

For definitions of the terms, abbreviations, and literary references used in this document, see Chapter 7, "Glossary and references

## **1.1. ST and TOE identification**

This section provides the information necessary to identify and control this Security Target and its TOE, FeliCa Embedded Secure Element Mobile FeliCa OS 3.0 on T6NE1.

#### **Table 1: ST identification**

ST attribute	Value
Name	Security Target for Mobile FeliCa OS 3.0 on T6NE1
Version	1.70
Reference	F03T-ASEP01-E01-70
Issue Date	June 2016

#### **Table 2: TOE identification**

Value
Mobile FeliCa OS 3.0 on T6NE1
0115_432B
Mobile FeliCa IC Chip
Unsawn wafer form
Plastic package form (T6NE6)

## 1.2. Conformance claims

This section describes the conformance claims.

## 1.2.1. CC Conformance Claim

The evaluation is based on the following:

- "Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation", Version 3.1 (composed of Parts1-3, [CC Part 1], [CC Part 2], and [CC Part 3])
- "Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Evaluation Methodology", Version 3.1 [CC CEM]

This Security Target claims the following conformances:

- [CC Part 2] extended
- [CC Part 3] conformant

## 1.2.2. Package claim

The chosen level of assurance is:

• Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) augmented with ALC\_DVS.2, ATE\_DPT.2 and AVA\_VAN.4

## 1.2.3. PP claim

This security target does not claim conformance to a Protection Profile (PP).

## **1.2.4.** PP claim rationale

This ST does not conform to a Protection Profile, but is written to be fully consistent with the Protection Profile:

• "Security IC Platform Protection Profile", Version 1.0 [BSI-PP-0035]


This ST does not conform to this protection profile because conformance would require a higher claim for AVA\_VAN in this ST.

The TOE type defined in section 2.2 of this Security Target is an integrated circuit including software package, together with guidance manuals. This is consistent with the TOE type defined in section 1.2.2 of [BSI-PP-0035].

## 1.3. TOE overview

The TOE is an integrated circuit with an embedded smartcard operating system. The operating system is the FeliCa Networks Mobile FeliCa Operating System (referred to in this document as FeliCa OS) and the integrated circuit is Toshiba CORPORATION (referred to in this document as Toshiba) chip T6NE1.

The TOE manages several data sets, each having a different purpose, on a single TOE. The TOE has a file system consisting of Areas and FeliCa Services, which organise files in a tree structure (as shown in Figure 1). Multiple Service Providers can use an Area or a FeliCa Service. Access keys enable access to data, via the Areas and FeliCa Services. This prevents unauthorised access to the User Services of other Service Providers. By organising these keys in a specific manner, multiple Area and FeliCa Services can be authenticated simultaneously.



File System

#### Figure 1 : The FeliCa file system

The security measures of the TOE aim at protecting the access to the User Services (including associated user data), and to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the user data. The User Services are defined by Service Providers. For example, a public transport Service Provider can incorporate the TOE into a ticketing system, to offer a ticket-payment User Service. A single TOE can be used by multiple Service Providers. A Service Provider can provide multiple User Services.

To set up the User Services and the access to those services, the Administrator (also known as a Personaliser) configures the TOE. This configuration work enables the TOE to offer various User Services, such as cash-purse and transport-payment solutions. After the TOE is personalised, the Users are allowed only to access the FeliCa Services defined by the Administrator.

The card reader and the TOE authenticate each other, and only then shall the TOE allow the card reader access, according to the access policy defined by the Administrator. After authentication the communication between the TOE and the card reader is encrypted.

The TOE has several self-protection mechanisms sufficient to satisfy all requirements for self-protection, non-bypassability, and domain separation as described by the CC supporting documents for the smartcard security evaluations [AAPS].

# 2. TOE description


This chapter describes the following aspects of the TOE:

- physical scope
- delivery
- logical scope
- lifecycle
- Evaluated configurations

## 2.1. Physical scope

The TOE is an integrated circuit with the Security IC Embedded Software. The Security IC Embedded Software is the FeliCa OS and the integrated circuit is the Toshiba chip T6NE1.

The following figure illustrates the physical scope of the TOE, which is indicated in yellow:




#### Figure 2 : TOE physical scope

The components of the TOE are explained as follows:

- "FeliCa OS" constitutes the part of the TOE that is responsible for managing and providing access to the Areas and FeliCa Services.
- The CPU of the hardware platform "T6NE1" has a 32-bit architecture. The hardware platform includes

ROM, RAM, EEPROM and the cryptographic co-processor which supports AES and DES<sup>1</sup> operations. The hardware platform also includes security detectors, sensors and circuitry to protect the TOE.

The ESE (the abbreviation of Embedded Secure Element) IF that is SPI compliant interface enables the exchange of FeliCa commands, which are processed by the FeliCa OS.



#### Figure 3 : Connection Description between T6NE1 and CLF

#### **Table 3: Pins Description**

Description
ESE-IF Slave Select
ESE-IF Master Out Slave In data
ESE-IF Master In Slave Out data
ESE-IF Serial data clock
ESE-IF Interrupt request

The CLF (the abbreviation of Contactless Front End) chip provides contact and contactless communication among the TOE, the contactless card reader and the host controller. Host controller controls the CLF chip. It is equivalent with main processor of mobile phone. The ESE-IF, the CLF chip, the Host controller and the antenna are out of scope of the TOE.

All components of the TOE including guidance manuals are listed in the following section.

## 2.2. Delivery

The TOE delivery items are listed in the following table:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> TOE does not implement any Security Functional Requirement using DES operation. Therefore, the functionality implemented from using DES is part of the evaluation but the security in this functionality is not claimed.

#### Table 4: TOE delivery items

Delivery item type	Identifier	Version	Medium
Hardware	Toshiba T6NE1	4.0	Unsawn wafer or plastic package
			Plastic package called T6NE6
Software	Mobile FeliCa OS Version 3.0	0115_432B	Embedded in hardware
Manuals	Mobile FeliCa OS Version 3.0 User Manual	1.00	Document
	Mobile FeliCa OS Version 3.0 Users Manual - Cautions for Operational Usage -	1.10	Document
	Product Acceptance Procedure	1.20	Document
	3rd Generation Mobile FeliCa IC Chip System SAM Chip Pre-Issuance Requirements Specification	1.04	Document
	Security Reference Manual – Group Key Generation (AES 128bit)	1.21	Document
	Security Reference Manual – Mutual Authentication & Secure Communication (AES 128bit)	1.21	Document
	Security Reference Manual – Package Generation (AES 128bit)	1.21	Document
	Security Reference Manual – Changing Key Package Generation (AES 128bit)	1.21	Document

## 2.3. Logical scope

The TOE offers the following features:

- it can receive FeliCa formatted commands from the contact and contactless interface
- it can send FeliCa formatted responses to the contact and contactless interface
- it enables the set-up and maintenance of FeliCa Services by Service Providers
- it enables the use of FeliCa Services (e.g., decrement, cash-back)
- it provides reader/writer SAM authentication function.<sup>2</sup>
- it provides the SAM utility functions<sup>3</sup>.
   The TOE offers the following security features:
- authentication of users (AES and DES<sup>4</sup>)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The security in the Reader/Writer function is not claimed in this ST.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The security in the SAM Utility function is not claimed in this ST.

- controlled access to data stored internally in the TOE
- secure communication with the smartcard Reader/Writer (AES and DES<sup>4</sup>)
- protection of integrity of data stored internally in the TOE
- anti-tearing and rollback
- protection against excess environment conditions
- protection against information leakage
- protection against probing and alteration
   The security features are provided partly by the underlying hardware and partly by the FeliCa OS.

## 2.4. Lifecycle

The lifecycle of the TOE is explained using the smartcard lifecycle as defined in "Security IC Platform Protection Profile" [BSI-PP-0035], which includes the phases listed in the following table:

Phase	Description
Phase 1	IC embedded software development
Phase 2	IC development
Phase 3	IC manufacturing
Phase 4	IC packaging
Phase 5	Composite product integration
Phase 6	Personalisation
Phase 7	Operational usage

#### Table 5: Phases of the TOE lifecycle

The TOE is delivered at the end of **Phase 3 or Phase 4**.

An explanation of each phase of the TOE lifecycle follows:

**Phase 1:** The TOE contains the Security IC Embedded Software, which is developed in Phase 1 by FeliCa Networks. At the end of this phase, FeliCa Networks delivers the Security IC Embedded Software and its pre-personalisation data to Toshiba.

Phase 2: The IC is developed in Phase 2 by Toshiba.

**Phase 3:** The IC is manufactured in Phase 3 by Toshiba. In this phase, the Security IC Embedded Software and its pre-personalisation data are injected. The TOE in Unsawn wafer form is delivered to the Packaging Manufacturer at the end of the Phase 3.

Note: In Phase 3, the Manufacture ID (IDm) is written to the TOE by Toshiba, but the process of writing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> TOE does not implement any Security Functional Requirement using DES operation. Therefore, the functionality implemented from using DES is part of the evaluation but the security in this functionality is not claimed.

IDm is not part of the evaluation.

**Phase 4:** In case of the TOE in Unsawn wafer form, the IC is packaged by the Packaging Manufacturer in Phase 4. In case of the TOE in Plastic package form, the IC is packaged in Phase 4 by Toshiba. At the end of the Phase 4, the TOE is delivered to the Mobile Phone Manufacturer.

**Phase 5:** The Mobile Phone Manufacture integrates the TOE into its mobile phone product and then delivers that product to the Administrator.

**Phase 6:** The Administrator performs the personalisation.

**Phase 7:** The product is delivered to the Mobile phone holder for operational use.

## 2.5. Evaluated configurations

The TOE provides a very flexible access control configuration system that allows the system administrator to choose from several options when creating the services. The administrator may create (i) unprotected files (i.e., public access files), (ii) files that are protected by advanced high-grade encryption, (iii) files that are protected by low-grade encryption and (iv) files that are protected by both advanced high-grade encryption and low-grade encryption. In the above case (iv), the files are practically regarded as being protected by low-grade encryption.

The TOE provides two distinct modes of operation – Advanced and Backward-Compatible – to ensure that the TOE can provide the required level of protection.

In the Advanced operation mode, the TOE is accessed via a channel using advanced high-grade encryption for the protected data, or no encryption for public data.

In the Backward-Compatible operation mode the TOE is accessed via a channel using low-grade encryption for the protected data, or no encryption for public data.

The TOE is evaluated in the Advanced operation mode.

## **3. Security problem definition**

The statement of the security problem describes the assets that the TOE is expected to protect and the security measures that are to be enforced by the TOE or its operational environment. To this end, the security problem definition (this chapter) identifies and lists the following:

- primary and secondary assets
- the threats to be countered by the TOE
- the assumptions about the TOE environment
- the organisational security policies with which the TOE is designed to comply.

### 3.1. Assets

The assets that the TOE is expected to protect are as follows:

- the primary asset of the TOE is the sensitive user data (i.e., data from Users and Service Providers) loaded into the volatile and non-volatile memory
- all assets employed to protect the primary assets are secondary assets (such as cryptographic keys, the operating system code, data, and so on).

In addition to the above assets, since this Security Target is written to be fully consistent with "Security IC Platform Protection Profile" [BSI-PP-0035], the assets defined in section 3.1 of the Protection Profile are also expected to be protected.

## 3.2. Threats

The threats are directed against the assets and the security functions of the TOE. Since this Security Target is written to be fully consistent with "Security IC Platform Protection Profile" [BSI-PP-0035], the threats defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile are applied for this Security Target. The following table shows the threats of the Protection Profile.

Threats	Titles
T.Phys-Manipulation	Physical Manipulation
T.Phys-Probing	Physical Probing
T.Malfunction	Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
T.Leak-Inherent	Inherent Information Leakage
T.Leak-Forced	Forced Information Leakage
T.Abuse-Func	Abuse of Functionality
T.RND	Deficiency of Random Numbers

#### **Table 6: Threats defined in the Protection Profile**

## 3.3. Assumptions

The customer is responsible for the secure administration of the TOE. It is assumed that security procedures are used between delivery of the TOE by the TOE manufacturer and delivery to the customer, to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data. So the following assumption defined in section 3.4 of the Protection Profile [BSI-PP-0035] is applied for this Security Target.

#### **Table 7: Assumption defined in the Protection Profile**

Assumption	Title
A.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation

In addition to the above assumption, the Protection Profile defines the assumption A.Resp-Appl and A.Plat-Appl which are intended to the developer of the Security IC Embedded Software. These assumptions are re-assigned to the organisational security policies P.Resp-Appl and P.Plat-Appl because the TOE does include the Security IC Embedded Software which fulfils these assumptions.

### 3.4. Organisational security policies

To record the security problem definition in terms of policies, we state what protection the TOE shall afford to the user, as follows:

# P.Confidentiality The TOE shall provide the means to protect the confidentiality of the stored assets.

The TOE shall have some security measures that can protect the stored user data from unauthorised disclosure. We do not expect the TOE to enforce these security measures on any or all user data, but those measures shall be available when the user decides that they shall be used for some of the user data.

# P.Integrity The TOE shall provide the means to protect the integrity of the stored assets.

The integrity of the stored assets shall be protected during operation in a hostile environment. The possibility of attacks trying to alter specific data cannot be discounted but, for a contactless smart card, there are other considerations that already make the integrity a prime concern, such as the very real possibility of power cut-off at any point during processing. To ensure the integrity, the TOE shall have some security measures that can protect the stored user data from unauthorised modification and destruction.

# P.TransferSecret The TOE shall provide the means to protect the confidentiality of assets during transfer from the outside of TOE.

At the user's discretion, user data that is sent or received through the communication channel needs protection from unauthorised disclosure. The TOE shall provide the capabilities to provide such measures.

#### P.TransferIntegrity The TOE shall provide the means to protect the integrity of assets during

#### transfer from the outside of TOE.

The integrity of the messages on the communication channel shall take into account both the possibility of benign interference and malicious interference in various forms, such as: RF noise, spikes in the field, short removals of the field, ghost transmissions, replay, and injection of data into the channel. The TOE shall provide the means to ensure the integrity of user data transferred.

# P.Configure The TOE shall provide the means to configure the level of protection for each of the assets.

The TOE is a tool to be used by the user in a system that shall implement specific business rules. The TOE may not assume the level of protection required for any asset. The TOE shall provide the means for the level of protection to be specified explicitly by the user for each asset.

#### P.Keys

# The keys generated for TOE use shall be secure. The keys for use by the TOE shall be generated and handled in a secure manner.

Some keys for TOE use are generated outside the TOE, by the supporting system in a controlled environment. This system shall check that all such keys are suitably secure by, for example, weeding out weak keys. The secure keys are then loaded into the TOE. The process of key generation and management shall be suitably protected and shall occur in a controlled environment.

In addition to the above organisational security policies, since this Security Target is written to be fully consistent with "Security IC Platform Protection Profile" [BSI-PP-0035], the organisational security policies defined in section 3.3 of the Protection Profile are applied for this Security Target. The following table shows the organisational security policies of the Protection Profile:

#### Table 8: Organisational security policies defined in the Protection Profile

Policy	Title
P.Process-TOE	Protection during TOE Development and Production

The TOE includes Security IC Embedded Software which fulfils the assumption A.Resp-Appl and A.Plat-Appl defined in [BSI-PP-0035] and thereby these assumptions are re-assigned to the following organisational security policy for this Security Target.

#### P.Resp-Appl Treatment of user data of the Composite TOE

The Security IC Embedded Software of the TOE shall treat user data according to the assumption A.Resp-Appl defined in [BSI-PP-0035].

#### P.Plat-Appl Usage of hardware platform

The Security IC Embedded Software of the TOE shall be designed so that the requirements from the hardware platform of the TOE are met according to the assumption A.Plat-Appl defined in [BSI-PP-0035].

## 4. Security objectives

This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment in response to the security needs identified in Chapter 3, "Security problem definition".

Security objectives for the TOE are to be satisfied by technical countermeasures implemented by the TOE. Security objectives for the environment are to be satisfied either by technical measures implemented by the IT environment, or by non-IT measures.

## 4.1. TOE security objectives

The following TOE Security Objectives have been identified for the TOE, as a result of the discussion of the Security Problem Definition. Each objective is stated in bold type font. It is followed by an application note, in regular font, which provides additional information and interpretation.

O.AC The TOE shall provide a configurable access control system to prevent unauthorised access to stored user data.

The TOE shall provide its users with the means of controlling and limiting access to the objects and resources they own or are responsible for in a configurable and deterministic manner. This objective combines all aspects of authentication and access control.

O.SC The TOE shall provide configurable secure channel mechanisms for the protection of user data when transferred between the TOE and an outside entity.

The TOE receives and sends user data over a wireless interface, which is considered easy to tap and alter. Therefore, the TOE shall provide mechanisms that allow the TOE and an external entity to communicate with each other in a secure manner. The secure channel mechanisms shall include protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the transferred user data.

O.Integrity The TOE shall provide mechanisms for detecting integrity errors in stored user data.

The TOE operates in a highly unstable and hostile environment. All precautions shall be taken to ensure that all user data stored in the TOE (and any associated security data) are always in a consistent and secure state.

In addition to the above security objectives, since this Security Target is written to be fully consistent with "Security IC Platform Protection Profile" [BSI-PP-0035], the security objectives defined in section 4.1 of the Protection Profile are valid for this Security Target. The following table shows the security objectives of the Protection Profile:

Table 9: Security objectives defined in the Protection Profile

Security objectives	Titles
O.Leak-Inherent	Protection against Inherent Information Leakage

Security objectives	Titles
O.Phys-Probing	Protection against Physical Probing
O.Malfunction	Protection against Malfunctions
O.Phys-Manipulation	Protection against Physical Manipulation
O.Leak-Forced	Protection against Forced Information Leakage
O.Abuse-Func	Protection against Abuse of Functionality
O.Identification	TOE Identification
O.RND	Random Numbers

## 4.2. TOE operational environment security objectives

This section identifies the IT security objectives that are to be satisfied by the imposing of technical or procedural requirements on the TOE operational environment. These security objectives are assumed by the Security Target to be permanently in place in the TOE environment. They are included as necessary to support the TOE security objectives in addressing the security problem defined in Chapter 3, "Security problem definition". Each objective is stated in **bold type** font; it is followed by an application note, in regular font, which supplies additional information and interpretation.

# OE.Keys The handling of the keys outside the TOE shall be performed in accordance to the specified policies.

Specific keys for use by the TOE are generated externally (that is, beyond control of the TOE). The generation and control of the keys shall be performed in strict compliance to the specific policies set for such operations.

In addition to the above environment objectives, since this Security Target is written to be fully consistent with "Security IC Platform Protection Profile" [BSI-PP-0035], the objectives defined in section 4.2 and 4.3 of the Protection Profile are valid for this Security Target. The following table shows the environment objectives of the Protection Profile:

#### Table 10: Security objectives for the environment defined in the Protection Profile

Security objectives	Titles
OE.Process-Sec-IC	Protection during composite product manufacturing

The environment objective OE.Resp-Appl and OE.Plat-Appl which are defined in the Protection Profile is re-assigned to the security objectives O.AC, O.SC and O.Integrity because the TOE does include the Security IC Embedded Software which fulfils this environment objective.

## 4.3. Security objectives rationale

This section demonstrates the suitability of the choice of security objectives and that the stated security objectives counter all identified threats, policies, or assumptions.

The following table maps the security objectives to the security problem, which is defined by the

relevant threats, policies, and assumptions. This illustrates that each threat, policy, or assumption is covered by at least one security objective.

Policy	Policy text	Objective	Objective text
P.Confidentiality	The TOE shall provide the	O.AC	The TOE shall provide a
	means to protect the		configurable access control
	confidentiality of the		mechanism to prevent
	stored assets.		unauthorised access to stored user
			data.
P.Integrity	The TOE shall provide the	O.AC	The TOE shall provide an access
	means to protect the		control mechanism to protect
	integrity of the stored		integrity of the stored user data
	assets.		from unauthorised access.
		O.Integrity	The TOE shall provide mechanisms
			for detecting integrity errors in
			stored user data.
P.TransferSecret	The TOE shall provide the	O.SC	The TOE shall provide configurable
	means to protect the		secure channel mechanisms for the
	confidentiality of assets		protection of user data transferred
	during transfer to and		between the TOE and an external
	from the TOE.		entity.
P.TransferIntegrity	The TOE shall provide the	O.SC	The TOE shall provide a
	means to protect the		configurable secure channel
	integrity of assets during		mechanism for the protection of
	transfer to and from the		user data transferred between the
	TOE.		TOE and an external entity.
P.Configure	The TOE shall provide the	O.AC	The TOE shall provide a
	means to configure the		configurable access control
	level of protection for		mechanism to prevent
	each of the assets.		unauthorised access to stored user
			data.
P.Keys	The keys generated for	OE.Keys	The handling of the keys outside
	the use of the TOE shall		the TOE shall be performed in
	be secure. The keys for		accordance with the specified
	the use of the TOE shall		policies.
	be generated and		
	handled in a secure		
	manner.		

## **Table 11: Policies versus Security Objectives**

The following explanation shows that the chosen security objectives are sufficient and suitable to address the identified threats, assumptions, and policies.

The policies for the TOE call for protection of user data when stored in the TOE and when in transit between the TOE and an external security product. Also, the policies require that the system used for protection of the assets when stored within the TOE be flexible and configurable. These policies are upheld by defining the following two objectives for the TOE: O.AC and O.SC. The O.AC objective makes sure that the TOE implements an access control system that protects the stored user data from illegal access (as required by the P.Confidentiality policy), while providing the capability to configure the access rules and operations for the authorised users (as required by the P.Configure policy). The O.SC objective provides a secure channel that shall be established between the TOE and an external entity; this secure channel shall protect all transmitted user data from disclosure (as required by P.TransferSecret) and from integrity errors, whether as a result of an attack or environmental conditions (such as loss of power), as required by P.TransferIntegrity.

The policy P.Integrity requires that user data shall be protected from integrity errors when stored in the TOE. It is upheld by two objectives for the TOE: O. AC and O.Integrity. The O.AC objective provides the access control system, which allows only authorised users to access stored user data and protects the integrity of stored user data from illegal access. The O.Integrity objective provides an integrity-monitoring mechanism to detect errors in stored user data.

The policy for the environment that requires secure generation and handling of keys, P.Keys, is similarly directly translated into the objective for the environment OE.Keys for the secure handling of keys and generation of secure keys.

The following table maps the security problem to the security objectives defined in the Protection Profile [BSI-PP-0035]. The section 4.4 of the Protection Profile gives the rationale of showing that the security objectives are sufficient and suitable to address the threats, assumptions, and policies.

Assumption, threat or policy	Objective	Notes
P.Resp-Appl	O.AC	Phase 1
(re-assigned from A.Resp-Appl)	O.SC	See discussion below
	O.Integrity	
	(re-assigned from OE.Resp-Appl)	
P.Plat-Appl	O.AC	Phase 1
(re-assigned from A.Plat-Appl)	O.SC	See discussion below
	O.Integrity	
	(re-assigned from OE.Plat-Appl)	
P.Process-TOE	O.Identification	Phase 2 – 4
A.Process-Sec-IC	OE.Process-Sec-IC	Phase 5 – 6
T.Leak-Inherent	O.Leak-Inherent	
T.Phys-Probing	O.Phys-Probing	
T.Malfunction	O.Malfunction	
T.Phys-Manipulation	O.Phys-Manipulation	
T.Leak-Forced	O.Leak-Forced	
T.Abuse-Func	O.Abuse-Func	
T.RND	O.RND	

#### Table 12: Assumptions, Threats or Policies versus Security Objectives defined in the PP

The following explanation shows the reason why the re-assigned policies P.Plat-Appl and P.Resp-Appl are sufficiently addressed by O.AC, O.SC and O.Integrity respectivelies.

The policy P.Plat-Appl requires that the Security IC Embedded Software shall be designed so that the requirements from the hardware platform are met according to the assumption A.Plat-Appl defined in [BSI-PP-0035]. This policy is directly covered by the security objectives O.AC, O.SC and O. Integrity for secure usage of hardware platform. In the Protection Profile, the Phase 1 (Security IC Embedded Software development) is identified as the operational environment. However this TOE includes the Security IC Embedded Software, the requirements from the hardware platform of the TOE are taken into account and therefore the security objective for the environment is fulfilled.

The policy P.Resp-Appl requires that the Security IC Embedded Software shall treat user data according to the assumption A.Resp-Appl defined in [BSI-PP-0035]. This policy is directly covered by the security objectives O.AC, O.SC and O.Integrity which require the Security IC Embedded Software to treat the security relevant user data as required by the security needs. In the Protection Profile, the Phase 1 is identified as the operational environment. However this TOE includes the Security IC Embedded Software development in the scope. The Security IC Embedded Software implements measures for secure treatment of user data through the security objectives O.AC, O.SC and O.Integrity, and therefore the security objective for the environment is fulfilled.

The following table maps all security objectives defined in this Security Target and Protection Profile to the relevant threats, policies, and assumptions. This illustrates that each security objective covers at least one threat, policy or assumption.

Objectives	Assumptions, threats or policies
O.AC	P.Confidentiality
	P.Integrity
	P.Configure
	P.Resp-Appl (re-assigned from A.Resp-Appl)
O.SC	P.TransferSecret
	P.TransferIntegrity
	P.Resp-Appl (re-assigned from A.Resp-Appl)
O.Integrity	P.Integrity
	P.Resp-Appl (re-assigned from A.Resp-Appl)
OE.Keys	P.Keys
O.Leak-Inherent	T.Leak-Inherent
O.Phys-Probing	T.Phys-Probing
O.Malfunction	T.Malfunction
O.Phys-Manipulation	T.Phys-Manipulation
O.Leak-Forced	T.Leak-Forced
O.Abuse-Func	T.Abuse-Func
O.Identification	P.Process-TOE

#### Table 13: Security Objectives versus Assumptions, Threats or Policies

Objectives	Assumptions, threats or policies
O.RND	T.RND
OE.Plat-Appl	P.Plat-Appl(re-assigned from A.Plat-Appl)
OE.Resp-Appl	P.Resp-Appl(re-assigned from A.Resp-Appl)
OE.Process-Sec-IC	A.Process-Sec-IC

# 5. IT security requirements

IT security requirements include the following:

- TOE security functional requirements (SFRs) That is, requirements for security functions such as information flow control, identification and authentication.
- TOE security assurance requirements (SARs)
   Provide grounds for confidence that the TOE meets its security objectives (such as configuration management, testing, vulnerability assessment.)
- This chapter discusses these requirements in detail. It also explains the rationales behind them, as follows:
- Security functional requirements rationale
- Security assurance requirements rationale

## 5.1. TOE security functional requirements

The TOE Security Objectives result in a set of Security Functional Requirements (SFRs).

The following section 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 separately describe the SFRs defined in this Security Target and Protection Profile [BSI-PP-0035].

About the notation used for Security Functional Requirements (SFRs):

Selections appear in *Italic bold* font.

Assignments appear in **Tahoma bold** font.

## 5.1.1. SFRs defined in the Security Target

This section describes the SFRs which are defined in the Security Target. All of the SFRs described in this section are taken from [CC Part2].

#### FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles

- FMT\_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles **User and Administrator**.
- FMT\_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

#### FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification

FIA\_UID.1.1The TSF shall allow Polling, Requests, Public\_read, Public\_write, Echo Back,<br/>Reset Mode on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.

FIA\_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

#### FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

- FIA\_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow Polling, Requests, Public\_read, Public\_write, Echo Back, Reset Mode on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
   FIA\_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
- FIA\_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
- FIA\_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to **all authentication mechanisms**.

#### FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control

•

FDP\_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the **Service Access Policy** on **the following**:

- Subjects:
  - > User
  - > Administrator
- Objects: Files
- Operations:
  - > Authentication
  - > Read
  - > Write
  - > Reset Mode

#### FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP\_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the **Service Access Policy** to objects based on the following:

#### • Subjects:

- > User with security attribute authentication
- > Administrator with security attribute authentication
- **Objects: Files with security attributes ACL**
- FDP\_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
  - A Subject can do this operation on an Object when: the Subject is successfully authenticated, and the operation is listed in the Object's ACL.
- FDP\_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: **none**.
- FDP\_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules:
  - no additional explicit rules.

#### FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes

FMT\_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the **Service Access Policy** to restrict the ability to *perform any* 

operation on the security attributes authentication and ACL to Administrator.

#### FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

- FMT\_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: management of security attributes.
- FDP\_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
- FDP\_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for **bit corruption** on all objects, based on the following attributes: **data integrity checksum**.
- FDP\_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall **return an error code**.

#### FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

- FTP\_ITC.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
- FTP\_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit *another trusted IT product* to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
- FTP\_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for **no functions**.

### 5.1.2. SFRs from the Protection Profile

This section describes the SFRs which are directly taken from the Protection Profile [BSI-PP-0035]. Some of the SFRs are CC Part 2 extended and defined in the Protection Profile. All assignment and selection operations on these SFRs are completely specified in the Protection Profile except the following SFRs.

- FAU\_SAS Audit storage
- FCS\_RNG Random number generation

#### FRU\_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance

- FRU\_FLT.2.1 The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE's capabilities when the following failures occur: exposure to operating conditions which are not detected according to the requirement Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT\_FLS.1).
- Refinement: The term "failure" above means "circumstances". The TOE prevents failures for the "circumstances" defined above.

#### FPT\_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state

- FPT\_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: exposure to operating conditions which may not be tolerated according to the requirement Limited fault tolerance (FRU\_FLT.2) and where therefore a malfunction could occur.
- Refinement: The term "failure" above also covers "circumstances". The TOE prevents failures for the "circumstances" defined above.

#### FMT\_LIM.1 Limited capabilities

FMT\_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT\_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow user data of the Composite TOE to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.

#### FMT\_LIM.2 Limited availability

FMT\_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT\_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow user data of the Composite TOE to be disclosed or manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and no substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.

#### FAU\_SAS.1 Audit storage

FAU\_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the test process before TOE Delivery with the capability to store the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data and/or supplements of the Security IC Embedded Software in the EEPROM.

#### FPT\_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack

- FPT\_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist **physical manipulation and physical probing** to the **TSF** by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
- Refinement: The TSF will implement appropriate mechanisms to continuously counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TSF can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that security functional requirements are enforced. Hence, "automatic response" means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.

#### FDP\_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection

- FDP\_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the **Data Processing Policy** to prevent the *disclosure* of user data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.
- Refinement: The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as physically-separated parts of the TOE.
- FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
- FDP\_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the **Data Processing Policy** on **all confidential data when** they are processed or transferred by the TOE or by the Security IC Embedded Software.

#### FPT\_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection

- FPT\_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from *disclosure* when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.
- Refinement: The different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the TOE (e.g. a cryptographic co-processor) are seen as separated parts of the TOE.

#### FCS\_RNG.1 Random number generation

- FCS\_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a *deterministic* random number generator that implements: (DRG.2.1) If initialized with a random seed using the PTRNG of the TOE as a random number source, the internal state of the RNG shall have at least 200 bits of Shannon-entropy. (DRG.2.2) The RNG provides forward secrecy.
  - (DRG.2.3) The RNG provides backward secrecy.
- FCS\_RNG.1.2The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet:<br/>(DRG.2.4) The RNG initialized with a random seed that passes the total failure test<br/>and online test of the PTRNG as a random source generates output for which  $2^{48}$ <br/>strings of bit length 128 are mutually different with probability  $1 2^{-24}$ .

## 5.2. Security functional requirements rationale

The following table presents both the rationale for choosing specific Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and how those requirements correspond to the specific Security Objectives:

#### Table 14: TOE Security Functional Requirements versus Security Objectives

Objective	TOE Security Functional Requirements
O.AC	- FMT_SMR.1 "Security roles"
	- FIA_UID.1 "Timing of identification"
	- FIA_UAU.1 "Timing of authentication"
	- FIA_UAU.4 "Single-use authentication mechanisms"
	- FDP_ACC.1 "Subset access control
	<ul> <li>FDP_ACF.1 "Security attribute based access control"</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>FMT_MSA.1 "Management of security attributes"</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>FMT_SMF.1 "Specification of Management Functions"</li> </ul>
0.SC	- FTP_ITC.1 "Inter-TSF trusted channel"
O.Integrity	- FDP_SDI.2 "Stored data integrity monitoring and action"

The objective O.AC is achieved through inclusion of the SFRs FDP\_ACC.1 and FDP\_ACF.1, which together specify the access control policy. The operation of the access control system is supported by the SFR FIA\_UAU.4 to make sure that unique authentication sessions shall be used every time. The SFRs FIA\_UID.1 and FIA\_UAU.1 complement the access control system operation by allowing very specific functions to be used without mutual authentication. The SFRs FMT\_SMR.1 and FMT\_MSA.1 in conjunction with the SFR FMT\_SMF.1 allow for the implementation of a flexible, configurable access control system and specify the roles that shall be allowed to utilise the access control system that, as required by the O.AC objective, is precisely specified, allows for very specific exceptions, and supports very flexible configuration.

The objective O.SC is directly realised through the requirement for the secure channel SFR FTP\_ITC.1 between the TOE and the external device.

The objective O.Integrity is directly addressed through both the use of the SFR FDP\_SDI.2 for the monitoring of the stored user data and the requirement that an action is taken when any integrity error occurs.

The following table presents the list of the SFRs with the associated dependencies.

ID	SFR	Dependencies	Notes
FMT_SMR.1	Security roles	FIA_UID.1	Included
FIA_UID.1	Timing of identification	None	
FIA_UAU.1	Timing of authentication	FIA_UID.1	Included
FIA_UAU.4	Single-use authentication	None	
	mechanisms		
FDP_ACC.1	Subset access control	FDP_ACF.1	Included
FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute based	FDP_ACC.1	Included
	access control	FMT_MSA.3	Not satisfied
FMT_MSA.1	Management of security	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	Included (FDP_ACC.1)
	attributes	FMT_SMR.1	Included
		FMT_SMF.1	Included

#### Table 15: Security Functional Requirements dependencies (except SFRs from the PP)

ID	SFR	Dependencies	Notes
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management	None	
	Functions		
FDP_SDI.2	Stored data integrity	None	
	monitoring and action		
FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF trusted channel	None	

The SFR "FMT\_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation" is a dependency for the SFR FDP\_ACF.1. In the TOE, however, the security attributes are always explicitly set and the notion of "default value" for a security attribute simply does not exist. The security attributes are always set explicitly by the Administrator to a value appropriate for each asset without exception, so it is our opinion that the system is no less secure in the absence of the SFR FMT\_MSA.3. Therefore, there is no need to include the SFR FMT\_MSA.3 in the ST.

Regarding the Security Objectives defined in the Protection Profile, the section 6.3.1 of [BSI-PP-0035] provides both the rationale for choosing specific SFRs and how those requirements correspond to the specific Security Objectives. The following table gives an overview, how the SFRs are combined to meet the security objectives.

Objective	TOE Security Functional Requirements	
O.Leak-Inherent	- FDP_ITT.1 "Basic internal transfer protection"	
	- FPT_ITT.1 "Basic internal TSF data transfer protection"	
	- FDP_IFC.1 "Subset information flow control"	
O.Phys-Probing	- FPT_PHP.3 "Resistance to physical attack"	
O.Malfunction	- FRU_FLT.2 "Limited fault tolerance	
	- FPT_FLS.1 "Failure with preservation of secure state"	
O.Phys-Manipulation	- FPT_PHP.3 "Resistance to physical attack"	
O.Leak-Forced	All requirements listed for O.Leak-Inherent	
	- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1	
	plus those listed for O.Malfunction and O.Phys-Manipulation	
	- FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.3	
O.Abuse-Func	- FMT_LIM.1 "Limited capabilities"	
	- FMT_LIM.2 "Limited availability"	
	plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction,	
	O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced	
	- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1	
O.Identification	- FAU_SAS.1 "Audit storage"	
O.RND	- FCS_RNG.1 "Quality metric for random numbers"	
	plus those for O.Leak-Inherent, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction,	
	O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced	
	- FDP_ITT.1, FPT_ITT.1, FDP_IFC.1, FPT_PHP.3, FRU_FLT.2, FPT_FLS.1	

#### Table 16: TOE Security Functional Requirements versus Security Objectives defined in the PP

The dependencies of SFRs defined in Protection Profile are listed in section 6.3.2 in [BSI-PP-0035]. The

ID	SFR	Dependencies	Notes
FRU_FLT.2	Limited fault tolerance	FPT_FLS.1	Included
FPT_FLS.1	Failure with preservation of	None	
	secure state		
FMT_LIM.1	Limited capabilities	FMT_LIM.2	Included
FMT_LIM.2	Limited availability	FMT_LIM.1	Included
FAU_SAS.1	Audit storage	None	
FPT_PHP.3	Resistance to physical attack	None	
FDP_ITT.1	Basic internal transfer	FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1	Included (FDP_ACC.1)
	protection		
FDP_IFC.1	Subset information flow	FDP_IFF.1	See section 6.3.2 in
	control		[BSI-PP-0035]
FPT_ITT.1	Basic internal TSF data	None	
	transfer protection		
FCS_RNG.1	Quality metric for random	None	
	numbers		

following table gives their dependencies and how they are satisfied.

#### Table 17: Security Functional Requirements dependencies taken from the PP

## 5.3. Security assurance requirements rationale

To meet the assurance expectations of customers, the assurance level EAL4 and the augmentation with the requirements ALC\_DVS.2, ATE\_DPT.2 and AVA\_VAN.4 are chosen. The assurance level of EAL4 is selected because it provides a sufficient level of assurance for this type of TOE, which is expected to protect high value assets. Explanation of the security assurance component ALC\_DVS.2, ATE\_DPT.2 and AVA\_VAN.4 follows:

- ALC\_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures: This Security Target selects ALC\_DVS.2 instead of ALC\_DVS.1 because it verifies the security measures that provide the necessary level of protection to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its user data.
- ATE\_DPT.2 Highly assurance: It is required in the [BSI-PP-0035] and is therefore included in this Security Target.
- AVA\_VAN.4 Moderate resistant: The TOE might be in danger of moderate-level attacks. Therefore, AVA\_VAN.4 is augmented to confirm that TOE has a moderate level of resistance against such attacks.

The dependencies of SARs added to EAL4 are described in [CC Part 3]. The following table gives their dependencies and how they are satisfied.

ID	SFR	Dependencies	Notes
ALC_DVS.2	Sufficiency of security measures	None	
ATE_DPT.2	Testing: security enforcing modules	ADV_ARC.1 ADV_TDS.3 ATE_FUN.1	Dependencies are covered by the assurance components of EAL4 (ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.3 and ATE_FUN.1)
AVA_VAN.4	Methodical vulnerability analysis	ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.4 ADV_TDS.3 ADV_IMP.1 AGD_OPE.1 AGD_PRE.1 ATE_DPT.2	Dependencies are covered by the assurance components of EAL4 (ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.4, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_IMP.1, AGD_OPE.1 and AGD_PRE.1).

### Table 18: Security Assurance Requirements dependencies added to EAL4

## 6. TOE Summary Specification

This chapter describes the TOE summary specification by summarising the architectural design. The TOE summary specification includes the following:

 TOE summary specification rationale Describe how the TOE meets each SFR.

## 6.1. TOE summary specification rationale

This section describes how the TOE is intended to comply with the Security Functional Requirements. The TOE must satisfy the requirements for secure storage, transfer and management of user data. Therefore, the TOE is implemented as a software platform on a secure chip.

The TOE includes the functions for creating secure storage containers and management of the security attributes of those containers. The TOE provides functions for populating the containers with user data in various ways that are functionally required by the customers, retrieval of the data or updating the data in situ.

The transfer of data during the operations on secure containers is performed in a secure way, where the external security product and the TOE are mutually authenticated before the operation and then connected with each other via an encrypted session. The session allows the bilateral transfer of data in a manner protected from eavesdropping and alteration.

In compliance with the requirements, the TOE also provides a capability for the unsecured storage and retrieval of user data. The security attributes can be set up in such a manner that the data can be retrieved insecurely, but updated only in a secure manner, allowing for a flexible and fully-configurable access-control system.

- "FMT\_SMR.1 Security roles" is met by providing an ability to distinguish between the roles of "Administrator" and "User", where the different roles allow the subject to execute different kinds of operations. The TOE has built-in rules for distinguishing between the operations and required security attributes for various TOE and TSF data. The Administrator of the TOE specifies the security attributes for the TOE data and the TSF data. The role of the authenticated entity is assigned after the authentication has succeeded (in accordance with the requirements of FDP\_ACC.1).
- "FIA\_UID.1 Timing of identification" and "FIA\_UAU.1 Timing of authentication" are intended to
  provide a possibility to configure a publically-accessible container. The TOE provides access to such
  specifically-configured containers based on the security attributes of the container. The container
  must be configured, by the Administrator, with special attributes that allow the specified mode of
  access before authentication.
- The TOE uses random numbers in the authentication mechanism to comply with the "FIA\_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms" requirement; these numbers are generated by the random number generator (FCS\_RNG.1). The random numbers are generated anew each time the authentication is started, according to the requirements of FDP\_ACC.1, and are discarded each time

the TOE exits the authenticated state.

- "FDP\_ACC.1 Subset access control" and "FDP\_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control" are satisfied by providing an access-control mechanism based on the attributes of security containers. The TOE grants access to the TOE data stored in the containers, based on the security attributes during the authentication phase. If the correct security attributes are used during the authentication for the requested mode of access to the specified container, the requested mode of access is granted. The granularity of access control is based on a single mode of access and a single container. A request for access may combine attributes for several containers and several modes of access in a single request. The security attributes are assigned to the containers by the Administrator. The TOE allows the Administrator to access the security attributes for configuration purposes, based on the security attributes (in accordance with FMT\_MSA.1 and FMT\_SMR.1).
- "FMT\_MSA.1 Management of security attributes" and "FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions" are met by providing configuration capabilities accessible to the Administrator. The configuration capabilities are granted based on the security attributes and allow the changing of these security attributes to new values after successful authentication and privilege verification (in accordance with FDP\_ACC.1 and FMT\_SMR.1).
- "FDP\_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action" is satisfied through the monitoring of user data stored in secure containers for bit integrity errors. The TOE uses a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) based on CRC-16-CCITT to verify the correctness of the stored data at each start-up and at each access. If an error is detected, the TOE takes the appropriate action to ensure the security of the data.
- "FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel" requires the secure channel to be protected against attackers with High attack potential this is provided by the TOE using the AES algorithm, which is calculated by the hardware, for encrypting and authenticating data that is sent or received through the link.
- "FRU\_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance" and "FPT\_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state" are satisfied by a group of security measures that guarantee correct operation of the TOE.

The TOE ensures its correct operation and prevents any malfunction while the Security IC Embedded Software is executed and utilizes standard functions offered by the micro-controller (standard CPU instruction set including usage of standard peripherals such as memories, registers, I/O interfaces, timers etc.) and of all other specific security functionality.

This is achieved through an appropriate design of the TOE and the implementation of filters for high-frequency pulse, sensors/detectors for supplied voltage, frequency, temperature, light and glitch signal, and address area monitoring and integrity monitoring. In case that any malfunction occurred or may likely occur, the TOE stops operation or triggers system reset to preserve a secure state.

- "FDP\_ITT.1 Basic internal transfer protection", "FDP\_IFC.1 Subset information flow control" and "FPT\_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection" are satisfied by implementing several measures that provides logical protection against leakage. The TOE ensures the prevention of the disclosure of user data or TSF data through the measurement of the power consumption, electromagnetic emission or calculation time, and subsequent signal processing. This is achieved through the measures to eliminate/limit the secret information contained in power consumption, electromagnetic emission or calculation time, and small-space implementation by advanced CMOS process, and variable timing noise to randomly delay the critical operation.
- "FPT\_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack" is satisfied by implementing security measures that

provides physical protection against physical probing and manipulation. The protection of the TOE is achieved through measures which comprise passive/active shield, specific encryption for the memory blocks, data scrambling between the blocks, glue logic layout of multiple blocks, sensor signal monitoring and address area monitoring. If the physical manipulation or physical probing attack is detected, the TOE stops operation.

- "FMT\_LIM.1 Limited capabilities", "FMT\_LIM.2 Limited availability" and "FAU\_SAS.1 Audit storage" are satisfied by implementing of a complicated test mode control mechanism that prevents abuse of test functionality delivered as part of the TOE. The test functionality is not available to the user after Phase 3 IC Manufacturing as defined in the Protection Profile [BSI-PP-0035]. The TOE has complicated access control mechanisms in place to prevent using this functionality.
- "FCS\_RNG.1 Random number generation" is satisfied by providing a random number generator. The TOE contains the random number generator which comprises a physical noise source, total failure tests and online quality test on this noise source and a deterministic random number generator based on the AES algorithm. The seed data is input to the deterministic random number generator. The random number generator fulfils the requirements of functionality using PTRNG of class PTG.2 as random source and class DRG.2 as random number generation [BSI-AIS-20].

## 7. Glossary and references

This chapter explains the terms, definitions and literary references (bibliography) used in this document. The list entries in this chapter are ordered alphabetically.

## 7.1. Terms and definitions

The following list defines the product-specific terms used in this document:

#### Administrator

The entity responsible for personalisation of the TOE. In most cases, this is a representative of a Service Provider. Synonymous with Personaliser. See also User.

- Area
  - A part of the FeliCa file system. An area is similar to a directory in a general file system.

#### • Contactless card reader (CL\_Term)

A contactless smartcard Reader/Writer that interacts with the TOE.

FeliCa file system

The structure of data in the TOE.

FeliCa Service

The part of the FeliCa file system that contains information that stipulates the method of access to data. In this context, a service is similar to a file in a general file system.

#### Mobile phone holder

A person who uses User Service.

- Personaliser
  - See Administrator.
- Service Provider

An entity that provides a specific service to a User.

• User

For this product, an entity using any FeliCa Service that a personalised TOE offers. See also Administrator.

User Service

A specific service to a Mobile phone holder that is made technically possible by the TOE. Each User Service is provided by a Service Provider to a Mobile phone holder. An example of a User Service is a virtual train ticket or an electronic purse.

## 7.2. Acronyms

The following table lists and defines the product-specific abbreviated terms (acronyms) that appear in this document:

Definition
Access Control List
Contactless Front End
Embedded Secure Element Interface
Identification
Operating System
Protection Profile
Radio Frequency
Secure Application Module
Security Assurance Requirement
Security Functional Requirement
Serial Peripheral Interface
Security Target
Target of Evaluation
TOE Security Functions

#### Table 19: Abbreviated terms and definitions

## 7.3. Bibliography

The following list defines the literature referenced in this document:

[AAPS]	"Common Criteria Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document Application
[, ]	of Attack Potential to Smartcards", Version 2.9, May 2013
[BSI-AIS-20]	"A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators", Version 2.0, 18
	September 2011
[BSI-PP-0035]	"Security IC Platform Protection Profile", Version 1.0, June 2007
[CC]	"Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation", Version 3.1
	(composed of Parts1-3, [CC Part 1], [CC Part 2], and [CC Part 3])
[CC Part 1]	"Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction
	and general model", Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
[CC Part 2]	"Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
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[CC Part 3]	"Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
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