Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0356-2006
for
Astaro Security Gateway (ASG)
Version 6.300
from
Astaro AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0356-2006
Astaro Security Gateway (ASG)
Version 6.300
from
Astaro AG Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) or conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Traffic-Filter Firewall Protection Profile for Low-Risk Environments,
Version 1.1, April 1999
Functionality: PP conformant (plus product specific extensions)
Common Criteria Part 2 conformant
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, September 25th, 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-5455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0356-2006 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0356-2006
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0356-2006 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0356-2006 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Astaro Security Gateway (ASG), Version 6.300 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Astaro Security Gateway (ASG), Version 6.300
was conducted by atsec information security GmbH. The atsec information
security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The vendor and developer is:
Astaro AG
Amalienbadstraße 36
76227 Karlsruhe, Germany
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on September 25th, 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-18.
The product Astaro Security Gateway (ASG), Version 6.300 has been included
in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Astaro AG
Amalienbadstraße 36
76227 Karlsruhe, Germany
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0356-2006 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 8
3 Security Policy 9
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 10
5 Architectural Information 10
6 Documentation 14
7 IT Product Testing 14
8 Evaluated Configuration 14
9 Results of the Evaluation 15
10 Comments/Recommendations 16
11 Annexes 16
12 Security Target 16
13 Definitions 16
14 Bibliography 18
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1 Executive Summary
The TOE Astaro Security Gateway (ASG), Version 6.300 is a packet filtering
firewall based on a Linux Operating System environment.
The Astaro Security Gateway resides between the network which it is protecting
and an external network such as the Internet. It can be used in a wide range of
network environments from the small and home office to large enterprises.
A separate management console called WebAdmin is the web-based GUI
administering Astaro Security Gateway.
The Astaro Security Gateway is either available as ASG Software (delivered as
a CD package or by download from the Astaro website), or as a hardware unit
called ASG Appliance, having ASG Software preinstalled. For more information
about the packages being part of the TOE and the appliances itself please refer
to chapter 2 of this report.
The IT product Astaro Security Gateway (ASG), Version 6.300 was evaluated
by atsec information security GmbH. The evaluation was completed on
September 11th, 2006. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The vendor and developer is
Astaro AG
Amalienbadstraße 36
76227 Karlsruhe, Germany
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL2 (Evaluation Assurance Level augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw
remediation).
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 conformant as shown in the following tables.
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0356-2006
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FAU Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
FDP User data protection
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_SOS.1 Specification of secrets
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Table 1: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.1.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0356-2006 Certification Report
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FDP User data protection
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FPT Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Table 2: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.3.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.HMI The TOE provides the administrator with the capability to 5
perform Human-Machine-Interface (HMI) functions in order to
administer the TOE and review the audit records.
F.AUDEVT Generation of audit records.
F.AUDINF Necessary information a audit record has to contain
F.AUDRPT Authorized access to the audit records
F.AUDSTO Protection of audit records
F.FWRULES Use of a security policy to restrict the ability of
unauthenticated external IT entities to pass information to one
another through the TOE.
F.FWINVOKED The TOE ensures that all information flows provided to the
TOE by external entities for transfer to other entities are
subjected to the defined security policies and conform to them
before they are allowed to proceed toward the destination
entity.
F.ADMIN Access to the TOE is restricted to administrators only. Each
administrator has a set of privileges consistent with F.HMI
which only allow the administrators to perform those tasks
associated with their duties.
F.I&A Authentication based on passwords and a password policy.
F.NORESID The TOE ensures that no information from previously
processed information flows is transferred to subsequent
information flows.
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TOE Security Function Addressed issue
F.INIT The TOE provides restrictive default values for information
flow security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP, and
allows the administrator to override the default values when
an object or information is created.
Table 3: Security Functions of the TOE
Only a short summary of the Security Functions has been provided in the table
above. For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.2.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘basic’ (SOF-basic) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target chapter 5.1.1.2 and 8.5. It is
claimed for the Security Function F.I&A which is concerned with the password
based authentication.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats discussed below are all taken from the Protection Profile the TOE
claims conformance to. The threat agents are either unauthorized persons or
external IT entities not authorized to use the TOE itself. The threat agent is
assumed to be an independent attacker with a low level of sophistication who is
attacking simply for the thrill of doing so, without a specific agenda. The
resources are assumed to include only those attack tools that are publicly
available.
T.NOAUTH An unauthorized person may attempt to bypass the security of
the TOE so as to access and use security functions and/or
non-security functions provided by the TOE.
T.REPEAT An unauthorized person may repeatedly try to guess
authentication data in order to use this information to launch
attacks on the TOE.
T.REPLAY An unauthorized person may use valid identification and
authentication data obtained to access functions provided by
the TOE.
T.ASPOOF An unauthorized person may carry out spoofing in which
information flow through the TOE into a connected network by
using a spoofed source address.
T.MEDIAT An unauthorized person may send impermissible information
through the TOE which results in the exploitation of resources
on the internal network.
T.OLDINF Because of a flaw in the TOE’s functioning, an unauthorized
person may gather residual information from a previous
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information flow or internal TOE data by monitoring the
padding of the information flows from the TOE.
T.PROCOM An unauthorized person or unauthorized external IT entity may
be able to view, modify, and/or delete security related
information that is sent between a remotely located authorized
administrator and the TOE.
T.AUDACC Persons may not be accountable for the actions that they
conduct because the audit records are not reviewed, thus
allowing an attacker to escape detection.
T.SELPRO An unauthorized person may read, modify, or destroy security
critical TOE configuration data.
T.AUDFUL An unauthorized person may cause audit records to be lost or
prevent future records from being recorded by taking actions
to exhaust audit storage capacity, thus masking an attacker’s
actions.
Please note that no Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) have been claimed
in the Security Target.
1.5 Special configuration requirements
The TOE software runs on top of a Linux operating system, which is delivered
with the ASG product, but considered to be part of the TOE environment.
Certain Linux modules have been altered to provide specialized functionality for
ASG. In addition, the TOE also comprises security enforcing packages created
by Astaro. For a detailed listing of the TOE packages please refer to chapter 2
of this report.
The Linux OS is automatically hardened and configured by the installation
scripts of the ASG software. Whereas the configuration scripts and their effect
are part of the TOE, the services and files configured are, with the exceptions of
the TOE packages as listed in chaper 2 of this report, part of the TOE
environment.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The operational environment has to meet the following assumptions. They are
given by the Protection Profile the TOE claims conformance to.
In general the PP assumes that conformant TOEs are intended to be used
either in environments in which, at most, sensitive but unclassified information is
processed or the sensitivity level of information in both the internal and external
networks is equivalent. Although language of the PP is aimed at government
environments the TOE is also intended to be used in commercial environments.
A.PHYSEC The TOE is physically secure.
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A.LOWEXP The threat of malicious attacks aimed at discovering
exploitable vulnerabilities is considered low.
A.GENPUR There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., the
ability to execute arbitrary code or applications) and storage
repository capabilities on the TOE.
A.PUBLIC The TOE does not host public data.
A.NOEVIL Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all
administrator guidance; however, they are capable of error.
A.SINGEN Information can not flow among the internal and external
networks unless it passes through the TOE.
A.DIRECT Human users within the physically secure boundary protecting
the TOE may attempt to access the TOE from some direct
connection (e.g., a console port) if the connection is part of the
TOE.
A.NOREMO Human users who are not authorized administrators can not
access the TOE remotely from the internal or external
networks.
In addition to the assumptions of the PP the following is assumed for the
operational environemtn by the ST:
A.CONSOLE A securely-configured management console, in the same
physically-secure location as the TOE, is directly connected to
the TOE via a dedicated link entirely within a controlled area of
the environment. The console is expected to correctly transmit
the information entered on it to the TOE; and to correctly
display the information sent to it by the TOE.
1.7 Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Astaro Security Gateway (ASG), Version 6.300
The TOE is software and runs on top of a Linux operating system, which is
delivered with the ASG product, but considered to be part of the TOE
environment. Certain Linux modules have been altered to provide specialized
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functionality for the TOE. In addition, the TOE also comprises security enforcing
packages created by Astaro. The follwing packages are relevant in that respect:
• iptables-1.3.1-13.i686.rpm
• netfilter-tools-6.1-11.i686.rpm
• syslog-ng-1.6.7-7.i686.rpm
• ulogd-1.23-9.i686.rpm
• ep-aua-6.2-67.i686.rpm
• ep-webadmin-6.3-88.i686.rpm
The Linux OS the TOE is running on is automatically hardened and configured
by the installation scripts of the ASG software. Whereas the configuration
scripts and their effect are part of the TOE, the services and files configured
are, with the above exceptions, part of the TOE environment.
The Astaro Security Gateway is either available as ASG Software (delivered as
a CD package or by download from the Astaro website), or as a hardware unit
called ASG Appliance, having ASG Software preinstalled.
The following models of ASG Appliances running the ASG Software exist:
ASG110, ASG120, ASG220, ASG320, ASG425, ASG525, ASG525F. For more
details on the appliances and the Interfaces they offer, please refer to the ST
chapter 1.2.
If the TOE is downloaded via the Astaro website the customer has to ensure the
authenticity and integrity of the download package by verifing a cryptograpghic
checksum. This procedure is described as part of the CC Guidance
Documentation [1] also beeing part of the TOE (for more information about
guidance documents please refer to chapter 6 of this report).
3 Security Policy
The TOE implements a single information flow control Security Function Policy
(SFP). The information flow control SFP is called the UNAUTHENTICATED
SFP. The subjects under control of this policy are external IT entities on an
internal or external network sending information through the TOE to other
external IT entities. The information flowing between subjects in the policy is
traffic with attributes, defined in the SFR element FDP_IFF.1.2, including source
and destination addresses. The rules that define each information flow control
SFP are found in FDP_IFF.1.2. The security functional requirement
FMT_MSA.3 demands that these rules be assigned restrictive initial values.
FMT_MSA.1 ensures that the rules are subsequently managed only by the
authorized administrator.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Please refer to chapter 1.6 for a complete listing of the assumptions which has
to be met by the TOE environment. All assumptions except A.CONSOLE are
defined by the Protection Profile the TOE is claiming conformance to.
4.2 Environmental assumptions
Please refer to chapter 1.6 for a complete listing of the assumptions which has
to be met by the TOE environment. All assumptions except A.CONSOLE are
defined by the Protection Profile the TOE is claiming conformance to.
4.3 Clarification of scope
The following threat has to be countered by the TOE environment:
T.TUSAGE The TOE may be inadvertently delivered, configured, used
and administered in an insecure manner by either authorized
or unauthorized persons.
5 Architectural Information
General Overview:
ASG Software is a network security application which includes a firewall in order
to control network access. The firewall is used for perimeter security in which it
controls the data transferred between two networks of which one is called to be
“external” and the other one which is called “internal”. The internal network and
its assets are also protected by the firewall from unauthorized access. ASG
Software is also capable of controlling the data stream between multiple
networks or segments.
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The following figure shows a typical scenario in which ASG Software is
deployed between an external and internal network.
Figure 1: Typical ASG Network Configruation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) consists of the ASG Software firewall
components which manage data traffic between networks according to
configurable rule-based procedures (the Packet Filter).
The Packet Filter allows for selective passing or blocking of data packets as
they pass through network interfaces.
The following picture shows the overall ASG architecture and the relation of
TOE to non-TOE components. The TOE that has been subject to the evaluation
encompasses the core firewall functionality and its management components:
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Figure 2: ASG Architecture
ASG Software is designed to be installed and used in an environment which is
configured and controlled in accordance with the administrator’s and CC guide
([10] and [9]) that is shipped together with the software.
ASG software is administered from a console directly connected to the firewall
within the secure area. No remote administration is anticipated.
TOE Boundary and Runtime Environment:
The figure above presents an abstract overview of the TOE, its general IT
environment, and identifies the TOE boundary. The following will give a more
detailed overview of the technology that has been used to build the TOE and
the underlying system that is expected to provide the runtime environment for
the TOE.
The Management Server consists of a set of web pages and CGI scripts that
provide the GUI to the administrator working at the locally attached console,
and translate the administrator’s actions initiated at this GUI into the appropriate
commands and configuration file updates in the ASG. Administrator actions may
affect the TOE itself (e.g. when changing firewall rules or viewing audit logs), or
the runtime environment (e.g. when setting the system’s clock). The HTTP
service itself is provided by an underlying web server, which is not part of the
TOE, but belongs to the TOE environment.
The packet filtering functionality of ASG is provided by the iptables module of
the kernel. Based on the standard iptables component of the Linux Kernel,
Astaro has modified this component to provide a more robustness and better
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performance. In addition to the kernel module, this component also provides the
iptables userspace command necessary to configure all aspects of the kernel
module. Iptables is considered a (logical) interface to the TOE through which
the IP packets arrive at the TOE.
Additionally two logging components are part of the TOE: ulogd is the
userspace logging daemon for all netfilter/iptables related logging. It is part of
the netfilter/iptables framework. The standard syslog-ng is required for all
logging and has been added to the TOE because it has not yet been part of an
evaluation of Linux.
For the underlying operating system, which is part of the TOE environment,
ASG uses a standard Linux kernel. ASG is based on the SuSE Linux Enterprise
Server version 9 (SLES9) distribution, which has already been successfully
evaluated at the Common Criteria assurance level EAL4. The main differences
between the already evaluated components and the components distributed by
ASG are as follows:
• ASG only includes the components absolutely necessary to support the
ASG functions
• During installation, the components are automatically configured in a secure
manner.
• Some components not relevant to security have been modified to tailor the
system to its special purpose as a security gateway rather than a
generalpurpose computing system, and to enhance its performance.
TOE Security Functionality
The TOE provides the following security functionality:
• Access Control
The TOE provides a role based access control capability that ensures that
only authorized administrators are able to access and administer the TOE.
• Information Flow Control
The information flow is restricted by default but permitted by set of rules that
have to be defined by an authorized administrator, thus implementing
stateful inspection.
• Logging
The TOE performs logging and data is either stored in memory or written to
a hard disk. Events that are recorded consist of the following:
• Administrative events, such as system configuration changes
• Network anomalies, which may be associated with attacks
• Traffic events, associated with session establishment and packet
information flow
• Administration
On all gateways a direct x-over Ethernet cable can be connected to an
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Ethernet port that has been configured for administrative use. When
connected to an appropriate computer this port provides direct local access
to the GUI and allows an authorized administrator to configure ASG
Software, monitor its operation, examine the audit logs that are created, and
perform backup and archive activities.
Administration handling is provided by a separate user authentication
daemon called AUA which operating system independently processes all
authentication requests.
6 Documentation
To install and configure the TOE such that it matches the configuration
described in the Security Target the user has to follow the guidance provided in
[10] and [9]:
• The CC-guide [9] represents an additional document especially written to
install, configure and operate the TOE in the CC compliant mode. If
functions are described in [10] and [9] the instructions in the [9] have to be
followed first.
• The Web-Administration Guide [10] is the general guidance document for
administrators to install, configure and operate the Firewall developed by
Astaro AG.
7 IT Product Testing
The test platform was set up by the developer according to the ST and all
relevant guidance, ensuring that the evaluated configuration as defined in the
ST was tested. This among other things means that the software only version of
the TOE and the TOE running on the appliances as listed in the ST have been
tested during the evaluation.
The developer test scrips were performed successfully on the evaluated
configuration of the TOE. Test coverage as required by the CC for EAL 2 was
achieved. The overall test depth of the developer tests comprises the functional
specification also as required for the assurance level of the evaluation.
A selected subset from the developer tests have been successfully repeated by
the evaluation facility. In some areas the test coverage of the developer was
supplemented by independent evaluator testing. The achieved test results
matched the expected results as documented by the developer in the developer
test documentation.
Furthermore, a set of independent penetration tests has been performed by the
evaluation facility without being able to successfully penetrating the TOE.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The Target of Evaluation Astaro Security Gateway (ASG), Version 6.300 runs
on top of a Linux operating system, which is delivered with the ASG product, but
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considered to be part of the TOE environment. Certain Linux modules have
been altered to provide specialized functionality for the TOE. More details about
those modules can be found in chapter 2 of this report or in chapter 2.3 of the
ST.
The Astaro Security Gateway is either available as ASG Software (delivered as
a CD package or by download from the Astaro website), or as a hardware unit
called ASG Appliance, having ASG Software preinstalled. More details about
the appliances and the steps required for the downloading of the software are
provided in chapter 2 of this report.
The guidance documentation [9] and [10] have to be followed to securely install
and configure the TOE.
9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL2.
All CC, Part 3 assurance components according to EAL2 (refer to [1], part 3,
chapter 11) augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation and the class
ASE for the Security Target evaluation) have been assessed with a PASS
verdict.
The evaluation has shown that:
• the TOE is conformant to the PP [8]
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 conformant
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL2
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation.
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
SF F.I&A (Authentication based on Passwords): SOF-basic
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as specified by
chapter 2 of this report in the configuration as detailed by the ST and the user
guidance documents as listed in chapter 6 of this report.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
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10 Comments/Recommendations
The guidance documents [9] and [10] as well as the Security Target [6] contain
necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein
have to be considered.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
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Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0356, Version 2.08, September 4th, 2006,
Security Target for Astaro Security Gateway Software V6.300 CC
Compliant Software, Astaro AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0356, 2.0, September 10th,
2006, atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
[8] U.S. Government Traffic-Filter Firewall Protection Profile for Low-Risk
Environments, Version 1.1, April 1999
[9] CC-Guide for Astaro Security Gateway V6.3, File: CC_Guide.pdf
[10] Astaro Security Gateway V6.300 WebAdmin User Manual, File: ASG-V6-
300-SW-UserManual-EN.pdf, Version: 3.00
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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