BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019
for
S3CS9AB 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Cards, Revision 0 with specific IC Dedicated
Software
from
Samsung Electronics
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.24
BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019 (*)
Smartcard Controller
S3CS9AB 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards, Revision 0 with
specific IC Dedicated Software
from Samsung Electronics
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 11 December 2019
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................13
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................15
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................15
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................17
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................18
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................18
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................18
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................19
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................22
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................23
5 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
6 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product S3CS9AB 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards, Revision 0 with
specific IC Dedicated Software has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-2013. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-2013 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product S3CS9AB 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards,
Revision 0 with specific IC Dedicated Software was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 10 December 2019. TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Samsung Electronics.
The product was developed by: Samsung Electronics.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 11 December
2019 is valid until 10 December 2024. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product S3CS9AB 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards, Revision 0 with
specific IC Dedicated Software has been included in the BSI list of certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Samsung Electronics
17th Floor, B Tower DSR building
Samsungjeonja-ro 1-1 Hwaseong-si, Gyeonggi-do
South Korea 445-330
9 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
10 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the S3CS9AB 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Cards, Revision 0 with specific IC Dedicated Software, is a smartcard integrated circuit
which is composed of a processing unit, security components, the ESE interface,
hardware circuit for testing purpose during the manufacturing process and volatile and
non-volatile memories (hardware). The TOE also includes any IC Designer/Manufacturer
proprietary IC Dedicated Software as long as it physically exists in the smartcard
integrated circuit after being delivered by the IC Manufacturer. Such software (also known
as IC firmware) is used for testing purpose during the manufacturing process but also
provides additional services to facilitate the usage of the hardware and/or to provide
additional services, including an AIS31 compliant random number generator.
The TOE is intended to be used in smart cards for particularly security relevant
applications and for its previous use as developing platform for smart card operating
systems. The TOE is the platform for the Smartcard Embedded Software, at which the
term Smartcard Embedded Software is used for all operating systems and applications
stored and executed on the TOE.
The TOE is dedicated to applications such as:
● Banking and finance applications for credit or debit cards, electronic purse (stored value
cards) and electronic commerce.
● Network based transaction processing such a mobile phones (GSM SIM cards), pay TV
(subscriber and pay-per-view cards), communication highways (Internet access and
transaction processing).
● Transport and ticketing applications (access control cards).
● Governmental cards (ID cards, health cards, driving licenses).
● Multimedia applications and Digital Right Management protection.
As security features it provides:
● Security sensors or detectors including High and Low Temperature detectors, High
Frequency filter, High and Low Supply Voltage detectors, Supply Voltage Glitch
detectors, Light detector and the Passivation Removing Detector.
● Active Shields against physical intrusive attacks.
● Dedicated tamper-resistant design based on synthesizable glue logic and secure
topology.
● Dedicated hardware mechanisms against side-channel attacks such as Internal Variable
Clock, Random Wait Generator, Random Current Generator, RAM and EEPROM
encryption mechanisms.
● Secure DES and AES Symmetric Cryptography support.
● The IC Dedicated Software includes:
• A True Random Number Generator (DTRNG) for AIS31-compliant Random Number
Generation.
11 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-
CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SFR1 Failure with preservation of secure state
SFR2 Limited fault tolerance
SFR3 Resistance to physical attacks
SFR4 Subset access control
SFR5 Security attribute based access control
SFR6 Static attribute initialization
SFR7 Management of security attributes
SFR8 Specification of management functions
SFR9 Audit Storage
SFR10 Limited capabilities
SFR11 Limited availabilities
SFR12 Subset information flow control
SFR13 Basic internal transfer protection
SFR14 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
SFR15 Random number generation
SFR16 Cryptographic operation
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.1 to 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
12 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019 Certification Report
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
S3CS9AB 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards, Revision 0 with specific IC
Dedicated Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Version Form of delivery
1 HW S3CS9AB 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card 0 Wafer or Module
2 SW DTRNG 1.0 Object file in
electronic form
3 SW Test ROM Code 1.0 Included in
S3CS9AB Test
ROM
4 DOC S3CS9AB Chip Delivery Specification [15] 1.3 Softcopy
5 DOC S3CS9AB 32-Bit CMOS Microcontroller for Smart Card
User’s Manual [12]
1.0 Softcopy
6 DOC Security Application Note S3CS9AB [13] 1.9 Softcopy
7 DOC S3CS9AB HW DTRNG and DTRNG Library Application
Note [14]
1.3 Softcopy
8 DOC SC100 Reference Manual [11] 0.0 Softcopy
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is identified by S3CS9AB Revision 0. Another characteristic of the TOE is the
product code. This information is stored in the EEPROM and can be read out by the user
of the card via the normal EEPROM read command. For the format of the product code
see [15] chapter 4.
There are three different delivering procedures have to be taken into consideration:
● Delivery of the IC dedicated software components (IC dedicated SW, guidance) from the
TOE manufacturer to the IC Embedded Software Developer.
● Delivery of the IC Embedded Software (SW object file, ROM data) from the IC
Embedded Software Developer to the TOE Manufacturer.
● Delivery of the TOE (wafer or module) from the TOE Manufacturer to the Composite
Product Manufacturer.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
13 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to
support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a True Random Number
Generator (DTRNG).
The TOE includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during Triple-DES and AES cryptographic functions performed by the
TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and
against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: OE.Plat-Appl, OE.Resp-Appl and OE.Process-Sec-IC. Details can be found
in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.2.
5. Architectural Information
The S3CS9AB 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards, Revision 0 with specific IC
Dedicated Software provides a platform to a smart card operating system and smart card
application software. A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found
within the TOE description of the Security Target Lite [9], chapter 1.2.2. The complete
hardware description and the complete instruction set of the TOE is to be found in
guidance documents delivered to the customer, see table 2.
The TOE consists of the 19 subsystems (17 hardware / 2 software). For the
implementation of the TOE security functionalities basically the components processing
unit (CPU) with ROM, RAM, I/O, EEPROM, BUS, Power Control, Timers, ESE_IF,
Detectors and Security Control, True Random Number Generator (DTRNG), DES, AES,
CRC, ACC, Reset, Clock, Testrom_code and the DTRNG Library are used. Security
measures for physical protection are realised within the layout of the whole circuitry. The
Special Function Registers, the CPU instructions and the various on-chip memories
provide the interface to the software using the security functionalities of the TOE. For more
details refer to [9], chapter 1.2.3.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
14 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019 Certification Report
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
The developer tests cover all security functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer by using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developer’s
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. For the developer tests, repeated by the evaluator, other test
parameters were used and the test equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE
realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during
layout inspections both in design data and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities. The penetration tests considered
both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not modify the TOE
physically. The penetration tests results confirm that the TOE is resistant to attackers with
high attack potential in the intended environment for the TOE.
8. Evaluated Configuration
In the broadest sense, the production of the mask sets for the chip production may be
looked upon as the procedure for the system generation. The TOE is delivered in the
following configuration:
• Smartcard IC S3CS9AB Revision 0.
No further generation takes place after delivery to the customer. After delivery the TOE
only features one fixed configuration (NORMAL mode), which cannot be altered by the
user. The TOE was tested in this configuration. All the evaluation and certification results
therefore are only effective for this mode of operation of the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i) The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
15 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019
(ii) Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii) Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-
evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-2013, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The TOE hardware and software is identical to the once in BSI-DSZ-
CC-0882-2013. The user guidance documents and the TOE life cycle were updated.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June
2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 extended
EAL 5 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
16 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size
in Bits
Security
Level
above 100
Bits
Comments
1. Confidentiality Encryption and
decryption with 2-key
Triple DES in ECB
Mode
[SP800-67],
[SP800-38A]
112 No -
2. Encryption and
decryption with 3-key
Triple DES in ECB
Mode
[SP800-67],
[SP800-38A]
168 No -
3. Encryption and
decryption with AES in
ECB Mode
[FIPS-197],
[SP800-38A]
128 No -
4. Encryption and
decryption with AES in
CBC and OFB Mode
[FIPS-197],
[SP800-38A]
128 Yes -
5. Cryptographic
Primitives
Physical RNG PTG.2 Conformant to
[AIS31]
N/A Yes Supports
cryptographic
implementations
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
Reference of Legislatives and Standards quoted above:
[SP800-67] NIST Special Publication 800-67 – Revision 2, Recommendation for
the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, November
2017, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
[SP800-38A] NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).
[FIPS-197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197,
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), November 2001,
U.S. department of Commerce / National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).
[AIS31] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
31, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
17 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Some security measures are partly implemented in this certified TOE, but require
additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by a product layer on
top, e.g. the IC Dedicated Support Software and/or Embedded Software] using the TOE.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
obligations and guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely
use this certified TOE and which measures have to be implemented in order to fulfil the
security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE. In the course of the evaluation of
the composite product or system it must be examined if the required measures have been
correctly and effectively implemented by the product layer on top. Additionally, the
evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the evaluation results as
outlined in the document "ETR for composite evaluation" [10].
At the point in time when evaluation and certification results are reused there might be an
update of the document "ETR for composite evaluation" available. Therefore, the certified
products list on the BSI website has to be checked for latest information on
reassessments, recertifications or maintenance result available for the product.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
18 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019 Certification Report
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
19 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target of S3CS9AB 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards with
specific IC Dedicated Software, BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019, Version 2.2, 14-10-
2019, Samsung Electronics (confidential document)
[7] Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-
0035-2007
[8] Evaluation Technical Report Summary (ETR Summary), BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2,
S3CS9AB Revision 0, Version 3, 02-12-2019, TÜViT (confidential document)
[9] Security Target Lite of S3CS9AB 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards with
specific IC Dedicated Software, BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019, Version 2.1, 15-10-
2019, Samsung Electronics (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product S3CS9AB
Revision 0, Version 3, 02-12-2019, TÜViT (confidential document)
[11] SC100 Reference Manual, Version 0.0, 15-07-2013, Samsung Electronics
[12] S3CS9AB 32-Bit CMOS Microcontroller for Smart Card User’s Manual, Version 1.0,
April 2013, Samsung Electronics
[13] Security Application Note S3CS9AB, Version 1.9, 14-10-2019, Samsung Electronics
7
specifically
• AIS 25, Version 9, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
• AIS 26, Version 10, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 36, Version 5, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
• AIS 38, Version 2, Reuse of evaluation results
• AIS 47, Version 1.1, Regelungen zu Site Certification
20 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019 Certification Report
[14] S3CS9AB HW DTRNG and DTRNG Library Application Note, Version 1.3, 30-05-
2019, Samsung Electronics
[15] S3CS9AB Chip Delivery Specification, Version 1.2, July 2013, Samsung Electronics
[16] SITE TECHNICAL AUDIT REPORT (STAR), PKL Co., Ltd., Cheonan, Version 4, 02-
12-2019, TÜViT (confidential document)
[17] SITE TECHNICAL AUDIT REPORT (STAR), Toppan Photomasks Korea Ltd., Korea
Icheon, Version 1, 19-10-2019, TÜViT (confidential document)
21 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019
C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailled definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3, Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
22 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019 Certification Report
D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
23 / 25
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product S3CS9AB 32-Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards, Revision 0 with
specific IC Dedicated Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 11 December 2019, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site Address Function
Samsung
Giheung /
Hwaseong (DSR
Building)
Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd. (Giheung) 1, Samsung-
ro, Giheung-gu, Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do, 17113 Korea,
Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd.(Hwaseong) 1,
Samsung-jeonja-ro, Hwaseong-si, Gyeonggi-do, 18448
Korea
Development (IC and Test
Programs).
Samsung
Electronics
Giheung &
Hwaseong
Factory (FAB 1,
FAB 2, FAB 6,
FAB S1)
Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd. (Giheung) 1, Samsung-
ro, Giheung-gu, Yongin-si, Gyeonggi-do, 17113 Korea,
Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd.(Hwaseong) 1,
Samsung-jeonja-ro, Hwaseong-si, Gyeonggi-do, 18448
Korea
Giheung: Wafer Fabrication,
Inking, DC test, Inspection,
Grinding, Scrap, Stock.
Hwaseong: Receipt of GDS file
provided by clients (i.e. IC
manufacturers), GDS file
checking and optimisation for
mask data generation, Mask
Data Preparation, Data Center /
IT (Server room).
Samsung Onyang Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd.
158, Baebang-ro, Baebang-eup, Asan-si,
Chungcheongnam-do, 31489 Korea
Warehouse / Delivery, Grinding,
Sawing, Assembly, Module
testing.
PKL Cheonan PKL Co., Ltd.
493-3 Sungsung-Dong, Cheonan-City,
Choongcheongnam-Do, 330-300, Korea
Mask house.
Toppan Icheon Toppan Photomasks Korea Ltd.
91, Wonjeok-ro 290 beon-gil, Sindun-myeon
Icheon-Si, Gyeonggi-do 467-842
Korea
Mask house.
24 / 25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0882-V2-2019 Certification Report
Site Address Function
HANA Micron
Asan
HANA Micron Inc.
77 Yeonamyulgeum-ro, Umbong-Myeon, Asan-Si,
Chung-Nam, 336-864 Korea
Grinding, Sawing, Assembly,
Module testing.
Inesa Shanghai Inesa Co., Ltd.
No. 818 Jin Yu Road, Jin Qiao Export Processing Zone
Pudong, Shanghai, China
Grinding, Sawing, Assembly,
Warehouse / Delivery.
Tesna
Pyeungtaek
TESNA Co., Ltd.
No. 450-2 Mogok-Dong, Pyeungtaek-City, Gyeonggi,
Korea
Wafer testing, Initialization, Pre-
personalization.
ASE Korea ASE Korea Inc.
Sanupdanjigil 76, Paju, Korea
Grinding, Sawing, Packaging.
SFA Semicon SFA Semicon Co. Ltd.
Bumping Factory, 30, 2gongdan 7-gil, Seobuk-gu,
Cheonan-si, Chungcheongnam-do, Korea 31075
Wafer Bumping.
Table 4: Relevant development/production sites for the TOE
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
Note: End of report
25 / 25