Risk Management System 3.2.06.12
Security Target
Version 1.0
June 26, 2006
SecureInfo Risk Management System Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target
DOCUMENT INTRODUCTION
Prepared By: Prepared For:
COACT, Inc.
9140 Guilford Road, Suite L
Columbia, Maryland 21046-2587
SecureInfo Corporation
211 North Loop 1604 East
Suite 200
San Antonio, TX 78232
This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), the
SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target. This Security
Target (ST) defines a set of assumptions about the aspects of the environment, a list of threats
that the product intends to counter, a set of security objectives, a set of security requirements and
the IT security functions provided by the TOE which meet the set of requirements.
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SecureInfo Risk Management System Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target
Table of Contents
1. Security Target Introduction....................................................................................................1
1.1 Security Target Reference......................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Security Target Name ............................................................................................................... 1
1.2.1 TOE Reference........................................................................................................................1
1.2.2 Security Target Evaluation Status...........................................................................................1
1.2.3 Evaluation Assurance Level ...................................................................................................1
1.2.4 Keywords................................................................................................................................1
1.3 TOE Overview.......................................................................................................................... 1
1.3.1 Security Target Organization..................................................................................................1
1.4 Common Criteria Conformance................................................................................................ 2
1.5 Protection Profile Conformance ............................................................................................... 2
2. TOE Description ........................................................................................................................3
2.1 SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12 TOE Description................ 3
2.2 SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12 Physical and Logical
Boundaries ...................................................................................................................................... 3
2.2.1 Physical Boundary ..................................................................................................................3
2.2.2 Logical Boundary....................................................................................................................4
2.3 SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12 Evaluated Configuration.... 6
2.3.1 Operational Environment........................................................................................................6
3. TOE Security Environment ......................................................................................................7
3.1 Assumptions.............................................................................................................................. 7
3.1.1 Physical Assumptions.............................................................................................................7
3.1.2 Personnel Assumptions...........................................................................................................7
3.1.3 IT Environment Assumptions.................................................................................................7
3.2 Threats....................................................................................................................................... 7
3.2.1 Threats Addressed by the TOE...............................................................................................7
3.2.2 Threats Addressed by the Operating Environment.................................................................8
3.3 Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................... 8
4. Security Objectives ....................................................................................................................9
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE............................................................................................... 9
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operating Environment................................................................. 9
4.3 Rationale for Security Objectives for the TOE......................................................................... 9
4.4 Rationale for Security Objectives for the Operating Environment........................................... 9
5. IT Security Requirements.......................................................................................................12
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements................................................................................. 12
5.2 IT Security Requirements ....................................................................................................... 13
5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements................................................................................. 13
5.3.1 User Data Protection (FDP)..................................................................................................13
5.3.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA) ...............................................................................15
5.3.3 Security Management (FMT) ...............................................................................................16
5.4 TOE Security Assurance Requirements.................................................................................. 18
5.5 Security Requirements for the IT Environment...................................................................... 18
5.6 Rationale for TOE Security Functions.................................................................................... 18
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SecureInfo Risk Management System Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target
5.7 SFR to Security Objectives Rationale..................................................................................... 20
5.8 Rationale for IT Security Requirement Dependencies ........................................................... 22
5.9 Rationale for Security Assurance Requirements of the TOE ................................................. 23
5.10 Strength of Function (SOF) .................................................................................................. 24
5.10.1 Strength of Function Claims...............................................................................................24
5.10.2 Strength of Function Rationale...........................................................................................24
5.10.3 SOF Analysis ......................................................................................................................24
6. TOE Summary Specification ..................................................................................................26
6.1 TOE Security Functions.......................................................................................................... 26
6.2 Assurance Measures................................................................................................................ 26
6.2.1 Rationale for TOE Assurance Requirements........................................................................31
7. Protection Profile Claims ........................................................................................................32
7.1 Protection Profile Reference................................................................................................... 32
7.2 Protection Profile Refinements............................................................................................... 32
7.3 Protection Profile Additions ................................................................................................... 32
7.4 Protection Profile Rationale.................................................................................................... 32
8. Rationale...................................................................................................................................33
8.1 Security Objectives Rationale................................................................................................. 33
8.2 Security Requirements Rationale............................................................................................ 33
8.3 TOE Summary Specification (TSS) Rationale ....................................................................... 33
8.4 Protection Profile Claims Rationale........................................................................................ 33
List of Figures
Figure 1 - RMS TOE Physical Boundary.................................................................................... 4
Figure 2 - RMS TOE Logical Boundary ..................................................................................... 5
List of Tables
Table 1 - Client Hardware/Software Requirements .............................................................................. 6
Table 2 - Database Server Hardware/Software Requirements.............................................................. 6
Table 3 - Mappings Between Threats and Security Objectives for the TOE...................................... 11
Table 4 - Mappings Between Threats, Assumptions, and Security Objectives for the Environment. 11
Table 5 - Security Functional Requirements (SFRs)........................................................................... 12
Table 6 - Assurance Requirements...................................................................................................... 18
Table 7 - Mapping of Security Functional Requirements to Security Functions................................ 20
Table 8 - Mappings between Security Functional Requirements and Security Objectives for the TOE
22
Table 9 - Security Functional Requirements....................................................................................... 22
Table 10 -Assurance Measures............................................................................................................. 27
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SecureInfo Risk Management System Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target
ACRONYMS LIST
CC ............................................................................................................. Common Criteria
EAL2..................................................................................... Evaluation Assurance Level 2
I&A .................................................................................. Identification and Authentication
IT....................................................................................................Information Technology
NIAP .............................................................. National Information Assurance Partnership
PP..............................................................................................................Protection Profile
SF..............................................................................................................Security Function
SFP................................................................................................ Security Function Policy
SFR .................................................................................. Security Functional Requirement
SOF ...................................................................................................... Strength of Function
ST................................................................................................................. Security Target
TOE...................................................................................................... Target of Evaluation
TSC ....................................................................................................TSF Scope of Control
TSF................................................................................................. TOE Security Functions
TSFI ................................................................................................................ TSF Interface
TSP.......................................................................................................TOE Security Policy
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SecureInfo Risk Management System Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target
CHAPTER 1
1. Security Target Introduction
This Security Target (ST) describes the objectives, requirements and rationale for the SecureInfo
Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12. The language used in this Security Target
is consistent with the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
2.2, the ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC27, Guide for the Production of PPs and STs, Version 0.9 and all
National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) and International Interpretations through
February 2, 2005. As such, the spelling of terms is presented using internationally accepted
English.
1.1 Security Target Reference
This section provides identifying information for the SecureInfo Risk Management System
(RMS) Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target by defining the Target of Evaluation (TOE).
1.2 Security Target Name
SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target.
1.2.1 TOE Reference
SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12
1.2.2 Security Target Evaluation Status
This ST is currently under evaluation.
1.2.3 Evaluation Assurance Level
Functional and assurance claims conform to EAL2 (Evaluation Assurance Level 2) from the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.2.
1.2.4 Keywords
Keywords – Common Criteria (CC), Security Target (ST), Evaluation Assurance Level 2
(EAL2), Security Function (SF), Security Function Policy (SFP), Target of Evaluation (TOE),
TOE Security Functions (TSF), TOE Security Policy (TSP).
1.3 TOE Overview
This Security Target defines the requirements for the SecureInfo Risk Management System
(RMS) Version 3.2.06.12. RMS is the Target of Evaluation (TOE). RMS is a software tool that
generates security Certification and Accreditation (C&A) document templates that a customer
can tailor to become compliant with government and other regulatory mandates. The TOE
logical boundary is described in Chapter 2 along with the evaluated configuration of the TOE.
1.3.1 Security Target Organization
Chapter 1 of this ST provides introductory and identifying information for the TOE.
Chapter 2 describes the TOE and provides some guidance on its use.
Chapter 3 provides a security environment description in terms of assumptions, threats and
organizational security policies.
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SecureInfo Risk Management System Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target
Chapter 4 identifies the security objectives of the TOE and of the Information Technology (IT)
Environment.
Chapter 5 provides the TOE security and functional requirements, as well as requirements on the
IT Environment.
Chapter 6 is the TOE Summary Specification, a description of the functions provided by the
SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12 to satisfy the security functional
and assurance requirements.
Chapter 7 identifies claims of conformance to a registered Protection Profile (PP).
Chapter 8 provides a rationale for the security objectives, requirements, TOE summary
specification and PP claims.
1.4 Common Criteria Conformance
The SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target is compliant
with the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.2,
functional requirements (Part 2) conformant, assurance requirements (Part 3) conformant for
EAL2.
1.5 Protection Profile Conformance
The SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12 does not claim conformance
to any registered Protection Profile.
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SecureInfo Risk Management System Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target
CHAPTER 2
2. TOE Description
This section provides the context for the TOE evaluation by identifying the product type and
describing the evaluated configuration.
2.1 SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12 TOE Description
This section provides a description of the SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version
3.2.06.12 TOE. RMS is a software tool that generates security Certification and Accreditation
(C&A) document templates that a customer can tailor to become compliant with government and
other regulatory mandates. It provides a formal network C&A process to determine the level-of-
risk and maintain overall security posture of an organization’s enterprise information
infrastructure. This process allows end users to comply with all federal and corporate
regulations, using a proven methodology to ensure that a required combination of security
measures are implemented in order to address and measure relevant risk and vulnerability.
Using RMS, a user develops all required security documentation necessary to perform a
complete C&A.
Using RMS, organizations can develop the security documentation needed to comply with a
variety of US Federal certification and corporate regulatory compliance processes (DITSCAP,
NIACAP, FISMA), including:
A) Detailed Outlines and Templates
B) Specialized Instructions
C) Working Examples
D) Documentation Creation and Maintenance
E) Consistent Compliance Deliverables
As regulations change, C&A-compliant documents are made available to customers.
Access to RMS is a simple client/server relationship using the Internet Explorer web browser on
the client system. The client is not part of the TOE and is outside the scope of this evaluation.
Due to the potential sensitivity of the information contained, RMS was developed to limit
accessibility to those with a need-to-know. Therefore, RMS supports identification and
authentication, access control, and role management features. These features limit access to
RMS, RMS data elements, and support three roles: RMS system administrator, domain manager,
and user.
2.2 SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12 Physical and Logical
Boundaries
This section describes the physical and logical boundaries of the SecureInfo Risk Management
System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12 TOE.
2.2.1 Physical Boundary
This section provides context for the TOE evaluation by describing the physical boundaries of
the TOE. The TOE is the SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12
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SecureInfo Risk Management System Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target
product. The TOE runs on a Windows 2000 operating system and relies on the operating system
and the hardware in the IT Environment for operation. The operating system and hardware are
addressed by the IT Environment descriptions. The operating system and hardware are included
by inference and are not part of the TOE.
The RMS TOE physical boundaries are depicted in Figure 1. Those items that are out of the
scope of evaluation are the underlying operating system and hardware, MS SQL 2000, Java
Runtime Environment SE and Apache Tomcat Web Server.
Figure 1 - RMS TOE Physical Boundary
RMS
MS SQL Server
Operating System
Java Runtime Environment
SE
Apache Tomcat Web
Server
Client PC
TOE Physical Boundary
Client PC
Client PC
Network
Network
Network
2.2.2 Logical Boundary
This section provides context for the TOE evaluation by describing the logical boundaries of the
TOE. The TOE is the SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12 product.
The TOE runs on a Windows 2000 operating system and relies on the operating system and the
hardware in the IT Environment for operation. The operating system and hardware are
addressed by the IT Environment descriptions. The operating system and hardware are included
by inference and are not part of the TOE. The RMS logical boundaries are depicted in Figure 2.
The rectangle represented by the dash lines indicates the RMS TOE logical boundary.
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SecureInfo Risk Management System Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target
Figure 2 - RMS TOE Logical Boundary
TOE Boundary
RMS
MS SQL
Server
Operating System and Hardware
Java Runtime
Environment
SE
Apache
Tomcat Web
Server
The RMS logical TOE boundaries are defined by the security functions provided by the TOE and
are described in the following sections.
A) Identification and Authentication (I&A): The TOE requires users to identify and
authenticate themselves before accessing the TOE, and therefore, by default,
before viewing any TSF data or configuring any portion of the TOE. No action
can be initiated before proper identification and authentication. Each TOE user
has security attributes associated with their account that defines the functionality
the user is allowed to perform.
B) Access Control: The TOE uses access control to address security attribute usage
and characteristics of policies and may have the ability to explicitly authorize or
deny access to an object based upon security attributes. Specifically, security
attribute-based access control allows the TOE to enforce access based upon
security attributes and named groups of attributes.
C) Role Management: The TOE supports three security roles: Authorized RMS
System Administrator, Domain Manager, and Authorized User. These roles are
defined within the TOE. An authorized RMS System Administrator has the
ability to define groups and other roles to assist in the management of access
rights and privileges. A Domain Manager has full access to and has the ability to
create user accounts in his or her domain. Authorized Users are users that are
authorized to use some TOE resources.
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2.3 SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) Version 3.2.06.12 Evaluated
Configuration
The evaluated configuration of the TOE is depicted in Figure 1 - RMS TOE Boundary above.
The parameters of the TOE that are outside the scope of evaluation are the underlying operating
system and associated hardware, MS SQL Server 2000, Java Runtime Environment SE and
Apache Tomcat Web Server. The Operational Environment is addressed in Table 1 and 2 below.
It should be noted that the Client hardware/software is outside the scope of this evaluation.
2.3.1 Operational Environment
The evaluated configuration will follow the password guidance as stated in the RMS
administrative guidance and as detailed below:
A) Passwords must be a minimum length of eight characters and include at least one
alphabetic character, one numeric character, and one special character.
B) Passwords shall not be reusable by the same user identifier.
C) The TSF shall not indicate to the user if he/she has chosen a password already
associated with another user.
D) The TSF shall, by default, prohibit the use of null passwords during normal
operation.
The following tables specify the hardware and software required for the operation of the TOE.
Table 1 - Client Hardware/Software Requirements
Hardware Software
Intel platform or compatible
Intel Pentium 3 800 MHz or higher
256 MB RAM
1 GB Hard Drive
Network connection
MS Windows 2000 (all editions)
MS Internet Explorer 6.0 or higher
Table 2 - Database Server Hardware/Software Requirements
Hardware Software
Intel platform or compatible
Intel Pentium 4 2.0 GHz or higher
1 GB RAM
40 GB Hard Drive
Network connection
MS Windows 2000 Server or Windows 2003 Server with
current Service Packs and Hot fixes
MS Internet Explorer 6.0 or higher
Sun Java 2 SE SDK 1.4.2_04
MS SQL Server 2000 SP3a
Apache Tomcat 4.1.30
MS SQL Server 2000 Driver for JDBC SP2, The driver must
be installed in the <Tomcat base>\ common\ lib folder.
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SecureInfo Risk Management System Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target
CHAPTER 3
3. TOE Security Environment
This chapter identifies Assumptions (AE), Threats Addressed by the TOE (T), and Threats to be
Addressed by the Operating Environment (TE) related to the TOE. Assumptions detail the
expected environment and operating conditions of the system. Threats are those that are
addressed by the TOE and operating environment.
3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions are ordered into three groups. They are physical assumptions, personnel
assumptions, and IT environment assumptions.
A) Personnel assumptions describe characteristics of personnel who are relevant to
the system.
B) Physical environment assumptions describe characteristics of the non-IT
environment that the system is deployed in.
C) IT environment assumptions describe the technology environment within which
the TOE is operating.
3.1.1 Physical Assumptions
AE.LOCATE The processing resources of the TOE will be located within
controlled access facilities that will prevent unauthorized physical
access.
3.1.2 Personnel Assumptions
3.1.3 IT Environment Assumptions
AE.CONNECT Any other systems with which the TOE directly and interactively
communicates is under the management control of the organization
in which the system is deployed and operates under the same
security policy constraints as the TOE.
AE.PROTECT The hardware and software critical to the execution of the TOE
will be protected from unauthorized access.
AE.JUSTAPPS Applications executing on the RMS server are limited to the TOE
and applications that the TOE is dependent on for proper and
secure execution. No other application will be installed, generated,
or executed on the RMS server.
3.2 Threats
The threats identified in the following subsections are addressed by the TOE and IT
environment, respectively.
3.2.1 Threats Addressed by the TOE
T.ACCESS An unauthorized individual may attempt to gain access to the TOE,
a TOE resource, or to information directly controlled by the TOE,
via user error, system error, or an unsophisticated, technical attack.
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T.NOAUTH An authorized user may attempt to access information specific to
the RMS System Administrator, Domain Manager or another user
that is stored by the TOE by circumventing the access control
function.
3.2.2 Threats Addressed by the Operating Environment
TE.ACCESS An unauthorized individual may gain access to information not
protected by the TOE in the operating environment, including TOE
data stored outside the TOE.
3.3 Organizational Security Policies
There are no Organizational Security Policies identified for this TOE.
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CHAPTER 4
4. Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
O.ACCESS The TOE identifies and authenticates users prior to allowing access
to TOE functions and resources.
O.IDAUTHORIZE The TOE provides access by authenticated users to those TOE
resources and actions for which they have been authorized. The
TOE must provide the ability to specify and manage user access
rights to individual data elements under its control.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operating Environment
OE.ACCESS The TOE physical and operating environment must guard against
unauthorized access to information not protected by the TOE in the
operating environment, including TOE data stored outside the
TOE.
4.3 Rationale for Security Objectives for the TOE
This section provides the rationale that all security objectives are traced back to aspects of the
addressed threats.
O.ACCESS - O.ACCESS addresses T.ACCESS because the TOE identifies and authenticates
users prior to allowing access to TOE functions and resources and protects unauthorized access
to information by unauthorized individuals through either malicious or accidental means.
O.IDAUTHORIZE - O.IDAUTHORIZE addresses T.NOAUTH because the TOE must
ensure that all users are identified and authenticated before being granted access to the TOE
mediated resources. The TOE provides the ability to specify and manage user access rights to
the RMS System Administrator and Domain Manager.
4.4 Rationale for Security Objectives for the Operating Environment
This section provides the rationale that all security objectives are traced back to aspects of the
addressed assumptions and threats.
OE.ACCESS - OE.ACCESS addresses TE.ACCESS by ensuring that the operating
environment protects against unauthorized access to information not protected by the TOE in the
operating environment, including TOE data stored outside the TOE.
OE.ACCESS - OE.ACCESS addresses AE.LOCATE by ensuring that physical access
controls are in place to prevent unauthorized access to the TOE.
OE.ACCESS - OE.ACCESS addresses AE.CONNECT by ensuring that TOE users with
physical access to the TOE have the privileges necessary to access the connected networks and
operate the TOE in a secure manner.
OE.ACCESS - OE.ACCESS addresses AE.PROTECT by ensuring that the hardware and
software critical to the execution of the TOE will be protected from unauthorized access and
physical modification of information not protected by the TOE in the operating environment,
including TOE data stored outside the TOE.
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OE.ACCESS - OE.ACCESS addresses AE.JUSTAPPS by ensuring that TOE users with
physical access to the TOE have the privileges necessary to access the applications executing on
the RMS server and that these privileges are limited to the TOE and applications that the TOE is
dependent on for proper and secure execution.
ST Author’s Note: The TOE is a software tool executing on its own server. It is assumed the
TOE will be housed and managed in a similar manner with other servers. Commonly servers
are managed in protected environments usually referred to as ‘server farms’. While the RMS
System Administrator is responsible for the management and secure operation of the TOE, non-
users of the TOE may manage the operating system, the database, and perhaps other
applications required by the TOE. In addition, because the TOE is attached to a computer
network environment, non-users of the TOE will be responsible for the secure management of
systems providing the computer network.
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Table 3 - Mappings Between Threats and Security Objectives for the TOE
Threat/Objective
T.ACCESS
T.NOAUTH
O.ACCESS X
O.IDAUTHORIZE X
Table 4 - Mappings Between Threats, Assumptions, and Security Objectives for the
Environment
Threat/Assumption/
Security Objective
TE.ACCESS
AE.LOCATE
AE.CONNECT
AE.PROTECT
AE.JUSTAPPS
OE.ACCESS X X X X X
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SecureInfo Risk Management System Version 3.2.06.12 Security Target
CHAPTER 5
5. IT Security Requirements
This section contains the security requirements that are satisfied by the TOE. These
requirements consist of functional components from Part 2 of the CC and an Evaluation
Assurance Level (EAL) containing assurance components from Part 3 of the CC. The following
table summarizes the security functional requirements claimed for the TOE and the IT
Environment.
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The functional requirements are described in detail in the following subsections. Additionally,
these requirements are derived verbatim from Part 2 of the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.2 with the exception of the items within the
functional requirements identified as operations that are TOE specific.
The CC defines four operations on security functional requirements. The font conventions listed
below identify the conventions for the operations defined by the CC.
A) Assignment: indicated in italics
B) Selection: indicated in underlined text
C) Assignments within selections: indicated in italics and underlined text
D) Refinement: indicated with bold text
Table 3 identifies the functional requirements that are provided by the TOE and the IT
Environment.
Table 5 - Security Functional Requirements (SFRs)
SFR Component SFR Name
TOE SFRs Derived Verbatim from Part 2 of the CC
FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets
FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication Before any Action
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UID.2 User Identification before any Action
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
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5.2 IT Security Requirements
This section contains the security requirements that are satisfied by the TOE. These
requirements consist of functional components from Part 2 of the CC and an Evaluation
Assurance Level (EAL) containing assurance components from Part 3 of the CC. The following
table summarizes the security functional requirements claimed for the TOE and the IT
Environment.
5.3 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The TOE security functional requirements for this Security Target consist of the following
components from Part 2 of the CC.
5.3.1 User Data Protection (FDP)
5.3.1.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
5.3.1.2 Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Security Function Policy (SFP) on
A) Subjects – users
B) Objects – Object types as specified in the table below.
C) Operations – Operations are specific to the object type, as specified in the following
table:
Object Type
Add
Attach
Configure
Copy
Create
Delete
Display
Edit
Execute
Move
Read
Set
Project
Default
Show/Hide
View
View
at
Domain
Level
View
at
Enterprise
Level
View
at
Package
Level
View
at
User
Level
Audit Log X X
Bundle X X X X
Content Library (Execute
RMS) X
Deprecated Content X
Enterprise Administration
Module X
Image X X X X X
Image Folder X X
Milestone X X X X
Milestone Folder X X
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View
at
Enterprise
Level
View
at
Package
Level
View
at
Domain
Level
Set
Project
Default
View
at
User
Level
Show/Hide
Configure
Execute
Display
Create
Attach
Delete
Move
Copy
Read
View
Edit
Add
Object Type
Passwords X
Project (C&A Package) X X X X X X
Project Folder (C&A
Package Folder) X X
Questionnaire X X X X X
Questionnaire Folder X X
Regulation X X X X X
Regulation Folder X X
Requirement X X X X X
Requirement Folder X X
RTF (Attachment) X X X
RTM View X X X X X
Standard Template X X X X X X
Standard Template
Folder X X
Standard Template Sub-
Document X X X X
Test X X X X X
Test Folder X X
Utilization Reports X X X
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control.
5.3.1.3 FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following:
A) Subjects – Permissions, Domain
B) Objects – none.
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FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
A) Users may only access objects in their Domain (Enterprise Administrators belong to all
Domains)
B) The operation is allowed if the user’s permission for the operation being attempted
against the specific object type is set.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: None.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: None.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control.
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization.
5.3.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.3.2.1 FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet the password policy
constraints defined by the following attributes:
1) Passwords must be a minimum length of eight characters and include at least one
alphabetic character, one numeric character, and one special character.
2) Passwords shall not be reusable by the same user identifier.
3) The TSF shall not indicate to the user if he/she has chosen a password already
associated with another user.
4) The TSF shall, by default, prohibit the use of null passwords during normal
operation.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.3.2.2 FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication Before any Action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication.
FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification.
5.3.2.3 FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the user while the
authentication is in progress.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication.
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5.3.2.4 FIA_UID.2 User Identification before any Action
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to identify itself before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.3.3 Security Management (FMT)
5.3.3.1 FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the access control SFP to restrict the ability to
change_default, query, modify, delete, and create the security attributes: permissions to RMS
System Administrator and Domain Managers.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
5.3.3.2 FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the access control SFP to provide restrictive default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the RMS System Administrator and Domain Managers to
specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
5.3.3.3 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1 (1) The TSF shall restrict the ability to create, query, modify, and delete the
following TSF relevant data:
a. RMS Group,
b. Permissions for a RMS Group,
c. RMS Client Account from a RMS Group,
d. Permissions for a RMS Client Account,
to the authorized RMS System Administrator.
Iteration:
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FMT_MTD.1.1 (2) The TSF shall restrict the ability to create, query, modify, and delete under
that specific domain the following security-relevant TSF data:
a. RMS Group,
b. Permission for a RMS Group,
c. RMS Client Account from a RMS Group,
d. Permissions for a RMS Client Account,
to the authorized Domain Manager.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
5.3.3.4 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management
functions:
a. Management of RMS Groups
b. Management of Permissions for a RMS Group
c. Management of RMS Client Accounts from an RMS Group
d. Management of Permissions for a RMS Client Account
Dependencies: No Dependencies
5.3.3.5 FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:
A. Authorized RMS System Administrators
B. Domain Managers
C. Authorized users
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification.
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5.4 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The TOE meets the assurance requirements for EAL2. These requirements are summarized in
Table 4.
Table 6 - Assurance Requirements
Assurance Class Component ID Component Title
Configuration Management ACM_CAP.2 Configuration Items
Delivery and Operation ADO_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures
Delivery and Operation ADO_IGS.1 Installation, Generation,
and Start-Up Procedures
Development ADV_FSP.1 Informal Functional
Specification
Development ADV_HLD.1 Descriptive High-Level
Design
Development ADV_RCR.1 Informal Correspondence
Demonstration
Guidance Documents AGD_ADM.1 Administrator Guidance
Guidance Documents AGD_USR.1 User Guidance
Tests ATE_COV.1 Evidence of Coverage
Tests ATE_FUN.1 Functional Testing
Tests ATE_IND.2 Independent Testing -
Sample
Vulnerability Assessment AVA_SOF.1 Strength of TOE Security
Function Evaluation
Vulnerability Assessment AVA_VLA.1 Developer Vulnerability
Analysis
5.5 Security Requirements for the IT Environment
There are no Security Functional Requirements for the IT Environment.
5.6 Rationale for TOE Security Functions
FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control. The Access Control feature supports FDP_ACC.1 by
ensuring that access control is enforced on users, files, and operations between users and files.
FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control. The Access Control feature supports
FDP_ACF.1 by ensuring that objects cannot be accessed or modified without the proper
authorizations.
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FIA_SOS.1 Verification of Secrets. The Identification and Authentication feature supports
FIA_SOS.1 by ensuring that the use of a password minimum length of eight characters with at
least one alphabetic character, one numeric character, and one special character will make brute
force attacks difficult for the assumed threat level of SOF-basic.
FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication Before any Action. The Identification and Authentication
feature supports FIA_UAU.2 by ensuring that users are authenticated before accessing TOE
security functions.
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback. The Identification and Authentication
feature supports FIA_UAU.7 by ensuring that protected authentication feedback is provided
using obscured feedback while authentication is in progress.
FIA_UID.2 User Identification before any Action. The Identification and Authentication
feature supports FIA_UAU.7 by ensuring that users are identified before accessing TOE security
functions.
FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes. The Role Management feature supports
FMT_MSA.1.1 by enforcing the Access Control SFP to restrict the ability to change_default,
query, modify, delete, or create the security attributes of domain access, read, and read-write to
RMS System Administrator and Domain Managers.
FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization. The Role Management feature supports
FMT_MSA.3 by ensuring the enforcement of the security policy is made at initialization and that
only authorized roles can modify the initial values.
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data. The Access Control feature and the Role
Management feature support FMT_MTD.1 by restricting operations that can be performed on
TSF data to the authorized roles.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions. The Role Management feature
supports FMT_SMF.1 by describing the security management functions that can be configured
by the authorized roles.
FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles. The Role Management feature supports FMT_SMF.1 by ensuring
that the security management functions are authorized to the proper roles.
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The following table shows the mapping between the Security Functional Requirements and the
security functions provided by the TOE.
Table 7 - Mapping of Security Functional Requirements to Security Functions
SFR/Security Function
Identification
and
Authentication
(I&A)
Access
Control
Role
Management
FDP_ACC.1 X
FDP_ACF.1 X
FIA_SOS.1 X
FIA_UAU.2 X
FIA_UAU.7 X
FIA_UID.2 X
FMT_MSA.1 X X
FMT_MSA.3 X X
FMT_MTD.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 X
FMT_SMR.1 X
5.7 SFR to Security Objectives Rationale
This section provides the rationale for the functional requirements and demonstrates how each
security objective is enforced by the functional requirements.
FDP_ACC.1 FDP_ACC.1 supports both O.ACCESS and O.IDAUTHORISE
because it ensures that users are identified and authenticated before
access is granted and that the security policy between subjects,
objects, and operations is enforced.
FDP_ACF.1 FDP_ACF.1 supports O.IDAUTHORISE because it ensures that
access and operations to objects is limited to user identity and the
operations they are authorized to perform.
FIA_SOS.1 FIA_SOS.1 supports O.ACCESS by ensuring that the use of a
password minimum length of eight characters with at least one
alphabetic character, one numeric character, and one special
character will make brute force attacks difficult for the assumed
threat level of SOF-basic.
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FIA_UAU.2 FIA_UAU.2 supports O.ACCESS because it ensures that access to
the TOE and access to objects cannot be accomplished before
successful user authentication.
FIA_UAU.2 supports O.IDAUTHORISE by ensuring that users
are authenticated to those TOE resources and actions for which
they have been authorized before accessing the security
functionality of the TOE.
FIA_UAU.7 FIA_UAU.7 supports O.ACCESS because it ensures that
passwords are not visible when being entered.
FIA_UID.2 FIA_UID.2 supports O.ACCESS because it ensures that access to
the TOE and access to objects cannot be accomplished before
successful user identification.
FIA_UID.2 supports O.IDAUTHORISE by ensuring that users are
authenticated to those TOE resources and actions for which they
have been authorized before accessing the security functionality of
the TOE.
FMT_MTD.1 FMT_MTD.1 supports O.ACCESS because it ensures that access
to TSF functions are restricted to authorized user roles.
FIA_MTD.1 supports O.IDAUTHORISE because it restricts
operations on TSF data to the authorized roles.
FMT_MSA.1 FMT_MSA.1 supports O.IDAUTHORISE because it ensures that
the TSF enforces the Access Control SFP to restrict the ability to
change_default, query, modify, delete, or create the security
attributes of domain access, read, and read-write to RMS System
Administrator and Domain Managers.
FMT_MSA.3 FMT_MSA.3 supports O.IDAUTHORISE because it allows the
authorized role to override default values for security attributes.
FMT_SMF.1 FMT_SMF.1 supports O.ACCESS and O.IDAUTHORIZE
because it ensures that the TOE must provide access by authorized
users to the specified security management functions.
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMR.1 supports O.IDAUTHORIZE because it ensures that
the TOE must provide access by Authorized RMS System
Administrators, Domain Managers, and Authorized users and be
able to associate users with roles.
The following table contains a mapping of the TOE security functional requirements and the
security objectives each requirement enforces.
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Table 8 - Mappings between Security Functional Requirements and Security Objectives
for the TOE
SFR/Security Objective
O.ACCESS
O.IDAUTHORIZE
FDP_ACC.1 X X
FDP_ACF.1 X
FIA_SOS.1 X
FIA_UAU.2 X
FIA_UAU.7 X
FIA_UID.2 X
FMT_MSA.1 X
FMT_MSA.3 X
FMT_MTD.1 (all iterations) X X
FMT_SMF.1 X X
FMT_SMR.1 X
5.8 Rationale for IT Security Requirement Dependencies
The following table lists the claimed TOE and IT Environment security requirements and their
dependencies.
Table 9 - Security Functional Requirements
Claim Hierarchical to Dependencies
FDP_ACC.1 None FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1 None FDP_ACC.1 – FMT_MSA.3
FIA_SOS.1 None None
FIA_UAU.2 FIA.UAU.1 FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.7 None FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.2 FIA_UID.1 None
FMT_MSA.1 None FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1 and
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1
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FMT_MSA.3 None FMT.MSA.1 and FMT.SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1 None FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 None None
FMT_SMR.1 None FIA_UID.1
5.9 Rationale for Security Assurance Requirements of the TOE
The TOE meets the assurance requirements for EAL2. The CC states that EAL2 requires the co-
operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but
should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good
commercial practice. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost
or time.
The SecureInfo Risk Management System (RMS) is a software tool that generates security
Certification and Accreditation (C&A) document templates that a customer can tailor to become
compliant with government and other regulatory mandates. It provides a formal network C&A
process to determine the level-of-risk and maintain overall security posture of an organization’s
enterprise information infrastructure.
Recent explanatory discussions with NIAP indicate that no software tool is capable of obtaining
more than an EAL2 rating because of the requisite partial evaluation on associated operating
systems and hardware.
The RMS Certification and Accreditation (C&A) process is independent of the actual
informational content of the information system and owner organization being sampled. Actual
content is not present. The TOE consists of a Software Application that is not using
dependencies from the associated Operating System or Underlying Hardware. As a result, the
TOE can also operate on assets that have a stronger EAL rating providing both logical and
physical assurance if needed.
EAL2 was chosen based on the statement of the security environment (assumptions, threats and
organizational policy) and the security objectives defined in this ST. EAL2 is, therefore,
applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of
independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development
record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.
EAL2 provides assurance by an analysis of the security functions, using a functional and
interface specification, guidance documentation and the high-level design of the TOE, to
understand the security behavior. The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TOE
security functions, evidence of developer testing based on the functional specification, selective
independent confirmation of the developer test results, strength of function analysis, and
evidence of a developer search for obvious vulnerabilities (e.g. those in the public domain).
EAL2 also provides assurance through a configuration list for the TOE, and evidence of secure
delivery procedures.
This EAL represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL1 by requiring developer
testing, a vulnerability analysis, and independent testing based upon more detailed TOE
specifications.
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5.10 Strength of Function (SOF)
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General model, August 1999, defines “Strength of Function (SOF)” in terms of the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat the expected security behavior of a TOE security function.
5.10.1 Strength of Function Claims
The only probabilistic or permutational mechanism in the TOE is the password mechanism used
to authenticate all users. The claimed minimum strength of function is SOF-basic. FIA_SOS.1
and FIA_UAU.2 are the only TOE security functional requirements that depend on this
permutational function.
5.10.2 Strength of Function Rationale
The claimed minimum strength of function is SOF-basic. All user authentication requirements in
FIA_SOS.1 and FIA_UAU.2 contain a permutational function requiring a SOF analysis. SOF-
basic is defined in CC Part 1 section 2.3 as: "A level of the TOE strength of function where
analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential." The rationale for the chosen level is
based on the low attack potential of the threat agents identified in this ST and the strength of the
minimum password length. Based on the SOF Analysis below, the SOF-basic strength level is
sufficient to meet the objectives of the TOE given the security environment described in the ST.
The SecureInfo RMS installer will set the initial RMS System Administrator password to a
minimum length of eight characters and include at least one alphabetic character, one numeric
character, and one special character as per SecureInfo recommendations found in the RMS
Installation procedures. The RMS System Administrator, following the SecureInfo password
recommendation found in the Administrator Guide, will change the password to a minimum
length of eight characters and include at least one alphabetic character, one numeric character,
and one special character. Following the administrative guidance, the RMS System
Administrator will also set up the Domain and User accounts following the same SecureInfo
password recommendation. The Domain Manager will use the same guidance as found in the
Domain Manager guidance.
5.10.3 SOF Analysis
One second was selected as a conservative length of time required to enter a user id and
password into RMS. The password space is calculated as follows:
Numeric characters: n=10
Special characters: x=33
Six character length dictionary words: a=14163
Password length: (n*x*a) = 8 (multiplying the three together gives you the possible
combinations of a six character word plus a numeral plus a special character)
Seconds per attempt: s = 1
Average length of successful attack in days =
= (s * (n*x*a)) / (2 assuming attacker only needs half the space * (60 * 60 * 24
seconds per day))
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= (1 * (10*33*14163)) / (2 * (60 * 60 * 24))
= 4673790 / 2 (half the space)
= 2336895 / 60 seconds
= 38948 seconds / 60 minutes
= 649 minutes / 24 hours
= 27 days
Using the approach detailed in the CEM Part 2 Annex B, the values for “Identifying Value” and
"Exploiting Value" in Table B.3 for each factor were summed. Given the simplicity of a brute
force attack, all the values are 0 except for the Exploiting Value for Elapsed Time (5) and Access
to TOE (6) for a total of 11. As shown in Table B.4, values between 10 and 17 indicate the
mechanism is sufficient for a SOF Rating of ‘Basic’, resistant to an attack potential of ‘Low’.
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CHAPTER 6
6. TOE Summary Specification
6.1 TOE Security Functions
TOE Security Functions
This section presents the TOE security functions (TSFs) and a mapping of security functions to
security functional requirements. The major functions implemented by the TOE are as follows:
A) Access Control: The TOE uses access control to address security attribute usage
and characteristics of policies and may have the ability to explicitly authorize or
deny access to an object based upon security attributes. Specifically, security
attribute-based access control allows the TOE to enforce access and operations
based upon security attributes and named groups of attributes.
B) Identification and Authentication (I&A): The TOE requires users to identify and
authenticate themselves before accessing the TOE and, therefore, by default,
before viewing any TSF data or configuring any portion of the TOE. No action
can be initiated before proper identification and authentication. Each TOE user
has security attributes associated with their user account that defines the
functionality the user is allowed to perform.
C) Role Management: The TOE supports three security roles: Authorized RMS
System Administrator, Domain Manager, and Authorized User. These roles are
managed within the TOE. An Authorized RMS System Administrator has the
ability to define groups and other roles to assist in the management of access
rights and privileges. A Domain Manager has full access to and has the ability to
create user accounts in his or her domain. Authorized Users are users that are
authorized to use some TOE resources.
6.2 Assurance Measures
The assurance measures provided by the TOE satisfy all of the assurance requirements listed in
Chapter 5, Table 4. Table 7 below provides a reference between each TOE assurance
requirement and the related vendor documentation that satisfies each requirement.
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Table 10 - Assurance Measures
Assurance
Component
Documentation
Satisfying
Component
Rationale
ACM_CAP.2 Configuration
Management Plan
Measures Used to Meet Component:
ACM_CAP.2
This requirement will be met by
documentation describing the Configuration
Management system used during the
development of the TOE.
The Configuration Management Plan
describes the CM measures to ensure that the
configuration items are uniquely identified
and changes are accurately tracked. The
documentation describes the processes and
procedure followed and automated tools that
are utilized in the tracking and monitoring the
changes to the CM items and the generation
of the TOE.
ADO_DEL.1 Delivery Procedures Measures Used to Meet Component:
ADO_DEL.1
This requirement will be met by
documentation describing the delivery of the
TOE. This delivery and operations data
describes the methods and procedures used to
distribute and identify the TOE. The
administrative guidance describes the
interfaces and procedures that are used by the
administrator to operate and administer the
TOE.
ADO_IGS.1 Installation,
Generation and Start-
up Documentation
Measures Used to Meet Component:
ADO_IGS.1
This requirement will be met by
documentation describing the Installation,
Generation and Start-up of the TOE. This
documentation describes procedures to
identify the TOE, allow detection of
unauthorized modifications of the TOE and
installation and generation instructions at
start-up.
It provides authorized administrator and user
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Documentation
Assurance
Component
Satisfying Rationale
Component
guidance on how to perform the TOE security
functions. It also provides warnings to
authorized administrators and users about
actions that can compromise the security of
the TOE.
ADV_FSP.1 Functional
Specification
Used to Meet Component: ADV_FSP.1
This requirement will be met by the
Functional Specification for the TOE
supported by the Security Target and
Administration Guidance documentation.
The Functional Specification provides all TSF
interface specifications fully describing all
interfaces to the TSF.
ADV_HLD.1 High Level Design
Document
Measures Used to Meet Component:
ADV_HLD.1
This requirement will be met by the high level
design for the TOE supported by the Security
Target and Functional Specification.
ADV_RCR.1 Security Target,
Functional
Specification, and
related Design
Documentation
Measures Used to Meet Component:
ADV_RCR.1
This requirement will be met by the Security
Target, Functional Specification, and related
Design Documentation for the TOE. The
Representation Correspondence requirement
is satisfied by providing a mapping of the
security functions and requirements to the
descriptions provided in the design
documentation.
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator
Guidance
documentation
Measures Used to Meet Component:
AGD_ADM.1
This requirement will be met by the
Administration Guidance documentation
supported by the Security Target; Functional
Specification; High-Level Design; and
Installation, Generation and Start-up
documentation.
The Administrative Guidance documentation
also describes the interfaces and procedures
that are used by the administrator to operate
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Documentation
Assurance
Component
Satisfying Rationale
Component
and administer the TOE. It documents the
security functions and the interfaces that are
utilized to configure the functions
AGD_USR.1 User Guidance
documentation
Measures Used to Meet Component:
AGD_USR.1
The user guidance describes the interfaces
and procedures that are used to operate the
TOE. This guidance documents the security
functions, warnings and the interfaces that are
utilized to configure the security functions. It
also describes actions that can compromise
the security of the TOE.
User guidance is documented in the RMS
3.2.06 User Guide.
ATE_COV.1 Security Target,
Functional
Specification, Test
documentation and
Test Coverage
Analysis.
Measures Used to Meet Component:
ATE_COV.1
The TOE test documentation describes how
all security relevant APIs are tested,
specifically describing all test cases and
variations necessary to demonstrate that all
security checks and effects related to the API
are correctly implemented. The test
documentation provides correspondence
between the security-relevant APIs and
applicable tests and test variations. The test
documentation describes the actual tests,
procedures to successfully execute the tests,
and expected results of the tests. The test
documentation also includes results in the
form of logs resulting from completely
exercising all of the security test procedures.
ATE_FUN.1 Security Target,
Functional
Specification, Test
documentation and
procedures.
Measures Used to Meet Component:
ATE_FUN.1
The TOE test documentation describes the
security functions to be tested, how to
successfully test all of them, the expected
results, and the actual test results after
exercising all of the tests.
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Documentation
Assurance
Component
Satisfying Rationale
Component
ATE_IND.2 Developer Test
Documentation
Evaluation Lab
Independent Testing
Evaluation
Deliverables.
Measures Used to Meet Component:
ATE_IND.2
This assurance requirement will be met by the
functional and penetration tests performed
with their test results and a TOE suitable for
testing.
AVA_SOF.1 Strength of Function
Analysis and
Evaluation
Deliverables.
Measures Used to Meet Component:
AVA_SOF.1
This assurance requirement will be met by
Strength of Function Analysis and evaluation
deliverables. The strength of TOE security
function analysis demonstrates that the SOF
claims made in the ST for all probabilistic or
permutation mechanisms are correct.
Vulnerability analyses of the TOE are
performed to identify weaknesses that can be
exploited in the TOE. These analyses
document the status of identified
vulnerabilities and demonstrate that a given
vulnerability cannot be exploited in the
intended environment and that the TOE is
resistant to obvious penetration attacks.
AVA_VLA.1 Vulnerability
Analysis, and
Evaluation
Deliverables
Measures Used to Meet Component:
AVA_VLA.1
This assurance requirement will be met by the
Vulnerability Analysis, the other evaluation
deliverables and a copy of the TOE suitable
for testing.
The Vulnerability Analysis will identify the
vulnerabilities in the TOE. The analysis
provides the status of each identified
vulnerability and demonstrates that a given
vulnerability cannot be exploited in the
intended environment and that the TOE is
resistant to obvious penetration attacks.
Misuse Analysis shows that the administrative
and user guidance completely addresses
managing the TOE in a secure configuration.
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6.2.1 Rationale for TOE Assurance Requirements
The TOE stresses assurance through vendor actions that are within the bounds of current best
commercial practice. The TOE provides, primarily via review of vendor-supplied evidence,
independent confirmation that these actions have been competently performed.
The general level of assurance for the TOE is:
A) Consistent with current best commercial practice for IT development and provides
a product that is competitive against non-evaluated products with respect to
functionality, performance, cost, and time-to-market.
B) The TOE assurance also meets current constraints on widespread acceptance, by
expressing its claims against EAL2 from Part 3 of the Common Criteria.
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CHAPTER 7
7. Protection Profile Claims
This chapter provides detailed information in reference to the Protection Profile conformance
identification that appears in Chapter 1, Section 1.4 Protection Profile Conformance.
7.1 Protection Profile Reference
This Security Target does not claim conformance to any registered Protection Profile.
7.2 Protection Profile Refinements
This Security Target does not claim conformance to any registered Protection Profile.
7.3 Protection Profile Additions
This Security Target does not claim conformance to any registered Protection Profile.
7.4 Protection Profile Rationale
This Security Target does not claim conformance to any registered Protection Profile.
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CHAPTER 8
8. Rationale
This Security Target does not claim conformance to any Protection Profiles.
8.1 Security Objectives Rationale
Sections 4.3 - 4.4 provide the security objectives rationale.
8.2 Security Requirements Rationale
Section 5.6 provides the security function rationale.
8.3 TOE Summary Specification (TSS) Rationale
Section 6.2 provides the TSS rationale.
8.4 Protection Profile Claims Rationale
This Security Target does not claim conformance to any Protection Profiles
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