NXP JCOP8.x on SE310 A0
Secure Element
Security Target Lite
Rev. 0.2.0 — 24 November 2023 Product evaluation document
NSCIB-2200042-01 PUBLIC
Document information
Information Content
Keywords NXP, ASE, NXP JCOP8.x on SE310 A0 Secure Element, Single Chip Secure
Element, JCOP, Common Criteria, EAL5 augmented
Abstract This document is the Security Target Lite of NXP NXP JCOP8.x on SE310
A0 Secure Element, developed and provided by NXP Semiconductors. The
TOE complies with Evaluation Assurance Level 5 of the Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 3.1 with augmentations.
NXP Semiconductors NXP JCOP8.x on SE310 A0 Secure Element
Security Target Lite
Revision History
Revision
number
Date Description
0.2.0 2023-11-24 Derived from full Security Target.
Revision history
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1 ST Introduction (ASE_INT)
1.1 ST Reference
"NXP JCOP8.x on SE310 A0 Secure Element", Security Target Lite, Revision 0.2.0,
24 November 2023.
1.2 TOE Reference
Content Version
Product Type Java Card
TOE name NXP JCOP8.x on SE310 A0 Secure Element
TOE version(s) JCOP 8.0 R1.38.0.1
Table 1. TOE Reference
1.3 TOE Overview
1.3.1 Usage and Major Security Features of the TOE
The NXP JCOP8.x on SE310 A0 Secure Element combines a Java Card Operating
System on an Embedded Secure Element with a general purpose management system
on a single die. It also provides a Power Management Unit and IC specific software
services.
The Main Operating System creates separate and independently updatable secondary
Operating Systems providing a converged product .
All Secondary OSs at the platform level are underpinned by the same Java Card and
Global Platform technology, but are dedicated to their own application.
The TOE is the Java Card eSE OS embedded on the SE310 Secure Element with IC
Dedicated Software. It excludes the SYS Domain, the Power Management Unit.
The component of the SE310 on which the TOE executes is the embedded Secure
Element, abbreviated to SE310_SE. Figure 1 provides an overview of the TOE and the
place in the system.
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Figure 1. Place in the System
The TOE communicates, via the CommOS, with the Host Processor through an I2C
interface and with the integrated SYS Domain through the System Mailbox. The
integrated SYS Domain is not in scope of this evaluation.
The usage of the TOE is focused on security critical applications in small form factors.
One main usage scenario is the use in mobile phones, which can use the TOE to enable
mobile payment or mobile ticketing with the phone based on the security of the TOE.
The TOE provides a variety of security features. The hardware of the Micro Controller
already protects against physical attacks by applying various sensors to detect
manipulations. Hardware accelerators process data in ways protected against leakage
by side channel analysis. With the software stack the TOE provides many cryptographic
primitives for encryption, decryption, signature generation, signature verification, key
generation, secure management of PINs and secure storage of confidential data (e.g.
keys, PINs). Also the software stack implements several countermeasures to protect the
TOE against attacks.
Secure Element Hardware:
The TOE incorporates an high frequency clocked ARM Cortex M33 processor
augmented with its dedicated coprocessor (SYM-lite), a secure copy machine (SMA),
and a Public-Key Cryptography (PKC) coprocessor, which are all connected to a
bus system. This bus system gives access to memories, hardware peripherals and
communication interfaces. The PKC coprocessor provides large integer arithmetic
operations, which can be used by Security IC Embedded Software for asymmetric-
key cryptography. Hardware peripherals include coprocessors for symmetric-key
cryptography and for calculation of error-detecting codes, and also a random number
generator. On-chip memories are Flash memory, ROM and RAMs. The Flash memory
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can be used to store data and code of Security IC Embedded Software. It is designed for
reliable non-volatile storage.
The security functionality of the TOE is designed to act as an integral part of a security
system composed of hardware and Security IC Embedded Software to strengthen it
as a whole. Several security mechanisms of the TOE are completely implemented in
and controlled by the SE310 Secure Element. Other security mechanisms is treated by
Security IC Embedded Software. All security functionality is targeted for use in a potential
insecure environment, in which the TOE maintains
• correct operation of the security functionality
• integrity and confidentiality of data and code stored to its memories and processed in
the device
• controlled access to memories and hardware components supporting separation of
different applications.
This is ensured by the construction of TOE and its security functionality.
The following list contains the main features of the TOE:
• hardware to perform computations on multiprecision integers, which are suitable for
public-key cryptography
• hardware to calculate the Data Encryption Standard with up to three keys
• hardware to calculate the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with different key
lengths
• hardware to support Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB) and
Counter (CTR) modes of operation for symmetric-key cryptographic block ciphers
• hardware to support Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation for symmetric-key
cryptographic block ciphers
• hardware to calculate Cyclic Redundancy Checks (CRC)
• hardware to serve with True Random Numbers
• hardware to control access to memories and hardware components
In addition, the hardware embeds sensors, which ensure proper operating conditions
of the device. Integrity protection of data and code involves error correction and error
detection codes, EMFI detector, light sensing and other security functionality. Memory
encryption and masking mechanisms are implemented to preserve confidentiality of data.
The IC hardware is shielded against physical attacks.
Cryptographic algorithms and functionality:
• AES
• Triple-DES (3DES)
• RSA for en-/decryption and signature generation and verification
• RSA key generation
• ECDSA signature generation and verification
• ECDH key exchange
• ECC key generation
• ECC point operations and key validation
• Diffie Hellman key exchange on Montgomery Curves over GF(p)
• Key generation for the Diffie Hellman key exchange on Montgomery Curves over
GF(p))
• EdDSA signature verification
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• EdDSA key generation
• SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 algorithms
• HMAC algorithms
• Multi-precision arithmetic operations including exact division, modular addition, modular
subtraction, modular multiplication, modular inversion, arithmetic comparison and exact
addition and subtraction.
• Data Protection Module for a secure storage of the the sensitive data.
• Random number generation according to class DRG.3 or DRG.4 of AIS20 [5] and
initialized (seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the TOE.
Java Card 3.1 functionality:
• Executing Java Card bytecodes.
• Managing memory allocation of code and data of applets.
• Enforcing access rules between applets and the JCRE.
• Mapping of Java method calls to native implementations of e.g. cryptographic
operation.
• Garbage Collection fully implemented with complete memory reclamation including
compactification.
• Support for Extended Length APDUs.
• Support for Extended CAP file format.
• Persistent Memory Management and Transaction Mechanism.
• Optional JC3.1 Cryptographic APIs [12] are not implemented. A call to those APIs
throw an exception of type ISO7816.SW_FUNC_NOT_SUPPORTED in this case.
GlobalPlatform 2.3.1 functionality:
• Loading of Java Card packages.
• Instantiating applet instances.
• Java package deletion.
• Java applet instance deletion.
• Creating Supplementary Security Domains.
• Associating applets to Security Domains.
• Installation of keys.
• Verification of signatures of signed applets.
• CVM Management (Global PIN) fully implemented.
• Secure Channel Protocol is supported (SCP03).
• Delegated Management, DAP (RSA 1024 and ECC 256).
• Supported Amendments A, C, D, E, J.
NXP Proprietary Functionality
• Runtime Configuration Interface: Config Applet that can be used for configuration of the
TOE.
• OS Update: Proprietary functionality that can update JCOP OS, Shared Code
(including Crypto Lib), FlashOS, SystemOS, CommOS, SMK. This component allows
only NXP authorised updates to the product.
• Applet Migration: Keep User Data, Key Data or PIN Data after updating an applet.
• Restricted Mode: In Restricted Mode only very limited functionality of the TOE is
available such as reading logging information or resetting the Attack Counter.
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• Image4 (IM4) : Software which ensures the customer authorisation of any product
updates using OS update or Applet Migration features, and provides features to make
the update management easier.
• Error Detection Code (EDC) API.
Functionality without specific security claims
• 5G features as per SIM Alliance 2.3
• Programmable Timeout for SMB with Limitations in UGM [34] Section 6
• CPLC data made available through SystemInfo, see UGM [34] Section 1.3.3.
• Proprietary Bytecode Compression applied after BCV. Some standard bytecodes are
replaced by optimized byte codes (one to one) with exactly the same operation.
• Compliance to Secure Element configuration, Common Implementation Configuration.
The TOE is offered with the NXP Trust Provisioning Service, which involves secure
reception, generation, treatment and insertion of customer data and code at NXP.
1.3.2 TOE Type
The TOE is the eSE Java Card Operating System and the SE310 Secure Element
(including Dedicated Software) on which it is running. It excludes the SYS Domain, the
Power Management Unit, as well as other Guest Operating Systems (like CommOS) that
are considered as domains external to the TOE.
The eSE Java Card Operation System includes GP functionality. It can be used to load,
install, instantiate and execute off-card verified Java Card applets. The eSE, which is
externally accessible via SPI or by the System mailbox connected to the Integrated SYS
Domain.
1.3.3 Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/Firmware
As a subsystem of a physical chip, the TOE needs the other subsystems of the chip
(Power Management Unit, SYS Domain) and the CommOS to behave properly and
communicate with the external world.
Three groups of users with their requirements shall be distinguished here.
1. End-users group, which uses the TOE with one or more loaded applets in the
final form factor as an embedded Secure Element. These users only require a
communication device to be able to communicate with the TOE.
The eSE domain of the TOE communicates via the Secure Mail Box, which is
connected to the Integrated SYS Domain and via SPI direct interface. The SYS
Domain facilitates wired interfaces supporting:
• Wired Mode by using the APDUCard Gate according to ETSI 102 622 [25]. The
wired interface is expected to be connected to an applications processor.
2. Administrators of cards can configure the TOE by using the Config Applet or install
additional applets. These users require the same equipment as end-users.
3. Applet developers which develop Java Card applets and executes them on the
TOE. These applet developers need in addition to the communication device a set of
tools for the development of applets. This set of tools can be obtained from the TOE
vendor and comprises elements such as PC development environment, byte code
verifier, compiler, linker and debugger.
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1.4 TOE Description
The NXP JCOP8.x on SE310 A0 Secure Element consists of the following components
that are part of the TOE:
• SE310 Secure Element excluding SYS Domain (see Section 1.4.1)
• SMK (see Section 1.4.5)
• JCOP eSE (see Section 1.4.6)
• SystemOS (see Section 1.4.4)
• FlashOS (see Section 1.4.3)
• Shared Code
– Crypto Library (see Section 1.4.2.1)
– Other Shared Code (see Section 1.4.2)
Furthermore there are components on the platform that are not part of the TOE:
• SYS Domain
• Power Management Unit
• JCOP xxx (optional - not present in this TOE)
• CommOS
All components and the TOE boundaries are depicted in Figure 2. The components are
described in more detail in the following sections.
Figure 2. Components of the TOE
The certification of this TOE is a composite certification[8]. This means that for the
certification of this TOE other certifications of components which are part of this TOE
are re-used. In the following sections more detailed descriptions of the components of
Figure 2 are provided. In the description it is also made clear whether a component is
covered by a previous certification or whether it is covered in the certification of this TOE.
1.4.1 Secure Element Subsystem
The SE310 is a hardware platform designed to meet the developing needs of the
mobile communications market. It embeds a Secure Element Subsystem (SE310_SE),
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supported by an integrated SYS Domain (SE310_SYS) and Power Management Unit
(SE310_PMU).
The hardware part of the SE310_SE is referred to as Secure Element Hardware in the
following.
The SE310 Secure Element has been certified in a previous certification and the results
are reused for this certification. The exact reference to the previous certification is given
in the following Table 2:
Hardware Commercial Name SE310 Series
Certified HW version SE310_SE A0.1.000 J2
Certification ID NSCIB-2200031-01
Security Target Reference NXP SE310 secure Element Security Target, Revision 0.1.1, 22
May 2023 [42]
Table 2. Reference to certified Secure Element Hardware
1.4.1.1 Hardware Description
The separation of operating systems is based on the ARM Trustzone-M concept.
One Main OS operates in secured privileged state, several Guest OSs operate in
separated non-secured states. Each state comes along with an assigned "Context".
This Context aware system allows for Virtualization of its components to build an
access control mechanism for memories and peripherals that can also be used to share
software components between different Operating systems. The separation is enforced
throughout the whole system by the Memory Protection Unit, Secure Cache Controller
and peripheral bridges.
The SE310 Secure Element implements 512 Kbytes ROM, 1.5 Mbytes Flash, 96 Kbytes
System RAM, 5 Kbytes PKC RAM and a Buffer RAM for Flash erase/programming
and for Flash read caching. All these memories are accessible over the bus system
on data/address busses, and the PKC RAM can also be directly accessed by the PKC
coprocessor on a separate data/address bus.
The hardware controls write, read and execute access to the memories over the bus
system against system operation modes. Context information is attached to all bus
transactions throughout the whole system. Any peripheral on the bus can use the context
information to check if access is allowed for the actual context, apply context specific
cyphering or to assign associated errors or interrupts to a particular context.
The SE310 Secure Element implements a wide range of hardware components. It
embeds the Fast Accelerator for Modular Exponentiation of 3rd Generation (Fame3.5),
which can be utilized by the software to accelerate computations required for public-key
cryptography like such related to RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) .
The Secure Generic Interface (SGI) is a symmetric crypto engine that serves the IC
Security Embedded Software with interfacing to a DES coprocessor, an AES coprocessor
and a GCM coprocessor. The DES coprocessor provides Triple-DES encryption and
decryption in 2-key or 3-key operation with cryptographic key sizes 112 and 168 bits. The
AES coprocessor performs AES encryption and decryption calculations with key lengths
of 128, 192 or 256 bits. The GCM coprocessor implements a Galois Field Multiplier to
support Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM) of operation performed by the Crypto Library.
Besides ECB mode, the SGI hardware supports chaining mode for e.g. Cipher Block
Chaining Mode (CBC), Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) and Counter Mode (CTR).
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The SYM-Lite is a CPU co-processor providing crypto-supporting general purpose
operations over sensitive data, outside - but under control of - the CPU.
The Secure Copy Machine (SMA) is a secure DMA. Purpose of the SMA is to copy data
between memories and between memories and peripherals in a secure way.
Two CRC coprocessors each serve with checksum computation based on CRC
generation polynomials CRC-16 and CRC-32. The Random Number Generator
generates true random numbers, which are compliant to AIS31 and FIPS 140-3.
SE310 Secure Element also implements a watchdog counter with time-out mechanism
that can be utilized by the software to abort irregular program executions, and provides
a CPU Guard with several security functionality, which can be utilized by the software to
secure its execution.
The Hardware components can be controlled by the IC Security Embedded Software via
Special Function Registers, which are accessible over the bus system on two separate
busses. The peripheral control bus is provided for communication and thus gives access
to the Special Function Registers of the DMA controller, the communication interfaces,
the I/O switch matrix and a component for checksum computations over data streams
of the communication interfaces. The Special Function Registers of all other hardware
components are accessed on the control bus.
The SE310 Secure Element implements complex security functionality to protect code
and data during processing and while stored to the device. This includes appropriate
memory encryptions and masking schemes to preserve confidentiality. This also includes
error detection codes (the Flash Secure Fetch Plus) to protect against integrity and
manifold light sensing with EMFI detector integrated to detect perturbations which
can lead to integrity violation. Active shielding is present and operating conditions are
monitored by sensors on temperature, power supplies and frequencies.
The TOE hardware operates with a power supply provided by the shared Power
Management Unit ("SE310_PMU"). The device can be set into sleep and power-down
modes, which have different levels of reduced availability of hardware components with
appropriately reduced power consumption.
1.4.1.2 IC Dedicated Support Software
The IC Dedicated Support Software of the SE310_SE comprises:
• Test software named FactoryOS
• Boot software named BootOS
• Memory Driver software named Flash Driver Software
BootOS, FactoryOS and Flash Driver Software are stored to ROM. Patches to the
BootOS are stored to Flash.
The BootOS is executed during start-up after power-on or reset of the TOE. It sets up the
device and its configuration, and finally jumps to a start address in either Mission Mode
or Test Mode (if not finally locked).
The FactoryOS is used during manufacturing to load the whole software stack into Flash.
The FactoryOS also provides controlled access to different levels of testing capabilities
of SE310 Secure Element. Full testing capabilities are under restricted access to NXP for
production testing of the TOE and also for in-depth analysis of field returns. In addition,
limited testing capabilities are accessible to NXP for basic analysis of field returns,
which target to preserve the product in its original condition. Beyond that, the FactoryOS
provides some basic functional testing of the SE310 Secure Element and also with a
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readout of the TOE IC hardware identification flags (if enabled via OEF option). The
FactoryOS implements security functionality to protect from unauthorized access and
ensures that also authorized access cannot compromise confidentiality of content stored
to access controlled Flash areas as well as System Pages. Factory OS implements
security functionality against unauthorized access in the field.
Flash Driver Software provides a Hardware Abstraction Layer that is stored to ROM. It
supports basic operation of the Flash memory to enable usage of the Flash during Boot
Mode and Test Mode.
1.4.2 Shared Code
The Shared Code Subsystem is a software layer containing software components that
can be accessed by several OSs. This Shared Code is executed by inheriting the access
rights from the caller OS.
The Shared Code of the JCOP OSes comprises the following components:
• Common Native Code (JCOP and Crypto Library Section 1.4.2.1)
• Common JavaCard implementation
• Common GlobalPlatform implementation
• Common JCOPX implementation
1.4.2.1 Crypto Library
The Crypto Library (or parts thereof) comprises a set of cryptographic functions.
AES
• The AES algorithm is intended to provide encryption and decryption functionality.
• The following modes of operation are supported for AES: ECB, CBC, CFB, CTR, GCM,
XTS, CBC-MAC, CCM and CMAC.
TDES
• The Triple-DES (TDES) algorithm is intended to provide encryption and decryption
functionality.
• The following modes of operation are supported for Triple-DES: ECB, CBC, CFB, CTR,
CBC-MAC, RetailMAC and CMAC.
RSA Plain/CRT
• The RSA algorithm can be used for encryption and decryption as well as for signature
generation, signature verification, message and signature encoding EME-OAEP,
EMSA-PSS, EME-PKCS1- v1_5, EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and EMSA- ISO/IEC9796-2.
• The RSA decryption/signature generation can be calculated using keys either in
"Straight Forward" format or in CRT format.
• The RSA key generation can be used to generate key pairs either in "Straight Forward"
format (i.e. using the "Simple Straight Forward Method") or in CRT format (i.e. using the
"Chinese-Remainder-Theorem" method).
• The RSA public key generation can be used to compute the public key that belongs to
a given private CRT key.
The TOE supports various key sizes for RSA from 512 to 4096 bits.
ECDSA (ECC over GF(p))
• The ECDSA algorithm can be used for signature generation and signature verification.
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• The ECC key generation algorithm can be used to generate key pairs for ECDSA and
ECDH.
• The ECDH key exchange algorithm can be used to establish cryptographic keys. It can
be also used as secure point multiplication.
• Provide ECC point operations and key validation.
The TOE supports various key sizes for ECC over GF(p) from 128 to 640 bits.
EdDSA & MontDH
• The EdDSA and MontDH over GF(p) library component implements the EdDSA and
MontDH over GF(p) related functions:
– EdDSA key generation and signature verification (generalization of Ed25519 and
Ed448), support for filling of EdDSA domain parameters
– MontDH key generation and key exchange for the DH key exchange scheme
MontDH (generalization of Curve25519 and Curve448).
The TOE supports various key sizes for EdDsa and MontDH from 128 to 640 bits.
SHA
• The SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 algorithms can be used for
different purposes such as computing hash values in the course of digital signature
creation or key derivation.
• The Crypto Library implements two versions of each algorithm with different security
level: Standard SHA and Secured SHA. The difference between the standard and high
security level of the SHA implementations is that the high security level is protected
against differential side channel attacks.
HMAC
• The HMAC algorithm can be used to calculate Keyed-Hash Authentication code. The
TOE supports the calculation of HMAC authentication code with SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 hash algorithms. The HMAC algorithm can use either
the high security level or standard security level version of SHA, depending on required
security level.
Random number generation
• Library component to access random numbers generated by a software pseudo
random number generator (DRNG). The DRNG is used to fulfill the random numbers
Java Card API. It is used as a general purpose random source, i.e. for the generation
of cryptographical challenges, generation of session keys, generation of random IVs,
etc. A hardware TRNG is used to seed the DRNG internally to the crypto library with no
other usage.
Multi-precision Arithmetic
• The Crypto Library provides functions to implement various arithmetic operations
including exact division, secure modular addition, secure modular subtraction, secure
modular multiplication, secure modular inversion, secure arithmetic comparison and
secure exact addition.
Data Protection Module
• The Crypto Library provides functions to store sensitive data, e.g. symmetric and
asymmetry keys, required by the Crypto Library components.
Resistance of cryptographic algorithms against attacks
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The cryptographic algorithms are resistant against attacks as described in JIL [6], which
include Side Channel Attacks, Perturbation attacks, Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) and
timing attacks, except for standard/high security level SHA and HMAC, which are only
resistant against Side Channel Attacks and timing attacks.
1.4.3 FlashOS
The FlashOS subsystem consists of the following components
• Service Core
The Services Software comprises the Flash Services Software, the Services Framework
Software and the part of the Services HAL (Hardware Abstraction Layer) that is not
stored to ROM.
Flash Services Software
• The Flash Services Software manages technical demands of the Flash memory and
serves the Security IC Embedded Software with an interface for Flash erase and/or
programming.
• The Flash Services Software maintains the Flash with re-freshing, tearing-safe updates
of Flash contents and wear leveling techniques to ensure integrity and consistency of
its content and optimize its endurance.
Services Framework Software
• The Services Framework Software provides the utility functionality and interface for
actual services. This comprises the control of services related functionality such as the
resource management, patch handling, service and system configurations functionality.
1.4.4 SystemOS
The SystemOS is a standalone operating system. The SystemOS Component can
be used by NXP (or by the customer through Image4 - IM4) to update any software
component (JCOP eSE, FlashOS, CommOS, Shared code, SMK, SystemOS). It is
accessed as decribed in [39] and its version can be queried independently. SystemOS
shares parts of its code with other OSs.
The SystemOS is always booted by SMK, while JCOP eSE is booted (by the SMK) only if
it is activated. The SystemOS contains the following functionalities:
• OS updater
• Common Log Interface providing all the logging information supported by the system
• Get Log Status providing status indicators of the logs
• Reset Attack Counters providing an interface to reset the attack counters of the system
• Get Data Commands of system properties
• Runtime Configuration Interface providing read and write access the configuration
items of the system
1.4.4.1 OS Updater Feature
The OS updater provides the following functionalities:
• it handles APDUs to write a new OS (including Shared Code and SMK) to flash.
• it verifies integrity of the new OS before updating.
• it decrypts the new OS before updating.
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• it checks if the new OS can be authenticated and checks if the update can be
authorized.
• it ensures that the activation and setting of the information that identifies the new OS is
done atomically.
• if the update fails the system stays in a secure state.
1.4.4.2 Image4 (IM4) Feature
The IM4 feature provides control over the Applet Migration and OS update processes.
This control consists in enforcing that
• Applet Migration and OS update steps can be performed only in a particular state of the
TOE.
• only allowed OS update plans can be applied to the TOE.
No security claims are made for IM4. The use of IM4 does not compromise any of the
security of the OS update or the Applet Migration mechanisms and all restrictions implied
by these mechanisms remain in force. The IM4 implementation does not replace or
modify the existing mechanisms by which the SE decrypts, authenticates and authorizes
JCOP updates.
1.4.5 SMK
The SMK is a secure microkernel. It is responsible to schedule several Guest Operating
Systems. The arrangement of operating systems is determined by a static system
configuration passed to the SMK. The SMK is in charge of:
• Providing messaging and scheduling APIs to guest OSs (eSE, FlashOS, SystemOS,
CommOS,..)
• Providing services APIs to Guest OSs (like Memory Management, Fault/Errors
handling...)
• Providing specific APIs available to SystemOS, CommOS, or FlashOS
• Providing APIs for Hardware Peripherals virtualization
Messaging and scheduling allows Guest OSs to exchange messages, recieve signals,
handle interrupts, and manage their background activity. The scheduling consists of
evaluating the priority of the Guest OSs and the messages, transmitting the message,
and switching the context.
The virtualization APIs provide a complete virtualisation of the hardware peripherals like
Random Number Generator (TRNG), symmetric/asymmetric crypto accelerators, PUF,...
1.4.6 JCOP eSE
JCOP OS consists of Native OS, JCVM, JCRE, JCAPI, Extension API, GP framework
and Config Applet, Applet Migration. JCVM, JCRE, JCAPI and GP framework are
implemented according to the Java Card Specification listed in Table 3 and the applicable
Global Platform Specification and Amendments are listed in Table 4.
Name Version
JCVM and JCRE version Version 3.1 Classic Edition [13] [14]
JC API version Version 3.1 Classic Edition [12]
Table 3. Java Card Specification Version
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Name Version
GP Framework Version 2.3.1 [17]
Amendment A, Confidential Card Content
Management
Version 1.1.1 [18]
Amendment C, Contactless Services Version 1.2.1 [19]
Amendment D, Secure Channel Protocol 03 Version 1.1.2 [20]
Amendment E, Security Upgrade for Card
Content Management
Version 1.1 [21]
Amendment J, Broker Interface Version 1.0 [22]
Common Implementation Configuration Version 2.1 [23]
GP Card API Version 1.7 [24]
Table 4. Global Platform and Amendments
JCOP 8.x eSE OS identification is obtained using the Version Query command that
provides the Platform ID and the Platform Release (a.k.a. Platform String; see UGM
[34]). The Platform Identification data, which includes the Hardware Type, JCOP Version,
Build Number, Mask ID, a Patch ID and Non-Volatile Memory Size, identifies the JCOP
8.x platform (combination of HW and SW). The Platform Release is a data string that
allows to identify the eSE OS component. Table 7 in Section 1.6 lists all possible values
for the Platform ID that are valid for this TOE.
1.4.6.1 Applet Migration
Applet migration can be performed in the following way(s):
1. Using NXP proprietary feature of JCOP that allows to update an applet to a newer
version while keeping the (personalization) data of the applet
2. Using Global Platform Amd-H.
Card Content Management and Applet Migration can be combined in a sequence of
commands which are distributed to the secure elements, this is called Distributed Card
Content Management.
1.4.7 Interfaces of the TOE
Electrical interface
The electrical interface of the TOE are the lines between the I/O interface of the
SE310_SE and the communication pads, that are exclusively used by the SE310_SE
subsystem. The interface can be configured to establish communication with the TOE via
the following interfaces:
• Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)
• 2x I
2
C interfaces
• GPIO interface by use of Special Function Registers
• 5x GP3v3 interfaces
The TOE also provides an electrical interface to the SE310_PMU subsystem, which
connects power supply voltage input and ground as reference voltage, and an interface
to the Power-Clock-Reset Module of the SE310_SYS subsystem. Communication
between SE310_SE and SE310_SYS supported by System Mailbox interface.
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Logical interface
The logical interface of the TOE accessible to the Security IC Embedded Software is
implemented via the CommOS. It provides the following communication channels:
• Secure System Mailbox interface for data exhange with SE310_SYS subsystem
• interface to each Guest JCOP for data exchange
• external interface to access Host Processor
Physical interface
The chip surface must be considered as an interface of the TOE as well. This interface
could be exposed to environmental stress or physically manipulated by an attacker.
1.5 TOE Life Cycle
The life cycle for this Java Card is based on the general smart card life cycle defined
in the Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration [10], see Figure 3. Authentic
delivery of the TOE is supported by the NXP Trust provisioning Service.
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Figure 3. TOE Life Cycle within Product Life Cycle
Phase Name Description
1 Security IC Embedded
Software Development
The IC Embedded Software Developer is in charge of
• smartcard embedded software development including
the development of Java Card applets and
• specification of IC pre-personalization requirements,
though the actual data for IC pre-personalization comes
from phase 4, 5, or 6.
Table 5.
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Phase Name Description
2 Security IC Development The IC Developer
• designs the IC,
• develops IC Dedicated Software,
• provides information, software or tools to the IC
Embedded Software Developer, and
• receives the embedded software from the developer,
through trusted delivery and verification procedures.
From the IC design, IC Dedicated Software and
Smartcard Embedded Software, the IC Developer
• constructs the smartcard IC database, necessary for
the IC photomask fabrication.
3 Security IC Manufacturing The IC Manufacturer is responsible for
• producing the IC through three main steps: IC
manufacturing, IC testing, and IC pre-personalization.
The IC Mask Manufacturer
• generates the masks for the IC manufacturing based
upon an output from the smarcard IC database.
Configuration items may be changed/deleted.
The NXP Trust Provisioning Service ensures
confidentiality and integrity of any customer data in this
phase. This includes secure treatment and insertion of
data and code received from the customer as well as
random or derived data, which are generated by NXP.
4 Security IC Packaging The IC Packaging Manufacturer is responsible for
• IC packaging and testing.
The delivery processes between all involved sites provide
accountability and traceability of the dies. Authentic
delivery of the TOE is supported by its NXP Trust
Provisioning Service.
5 Composite Product
Integration
The Composite Product Manufacturer is responsible for
the smartcard product finishing process.
6 Personalization The Personalizer is responsible for
• smartcard (including applet) personalization and final
tests. User Applets may be loaded onto the chip at the
personalization process and configuration items may be
changed/deleted. The Config Applet can be used to set
Configuration Items.
7 Operational Usage The Consumer (e.g. Original Equipment Manufacturer) of
Composite Product is responsible for
• smartcard product delivery to the smartcard end-user,
and the end of life process.
• applets may be loaded onto the chip.
• triggering an OS update.
• Applet Migration.
• Config Applet: changing Config Items.
• perform card content management according to Global
Platform and Amendments specifications.
8 OS Update The IC Developper is responsible for providing an
updated IC Dedicated Software. The OS update in the
field is performed by the consumer as per step 7.
Table 5. ...continued
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The TOE is delivered to the customer at the end of Phase 4, meaning the evaluation
process is limited to phases 1 to 4. User Applet development is outside the scope of this
evaluation. Applets can be loaded into Flash memory. Applet loading into Flash memory
can be done in phases 3, 4, 5, and 6. Applet loading in phase 7 is also allowed. This
means post-issuance loading of applets is allowed. The certification is only valid for
platforms that return the Platform Identifier as stated in Table 6. The delivery process
from NXP to their customers (to phase 4 or phase 5 of the life cycle) guarantees, that
the customer is aware of the exact versions of the different parts of the TOE as outlined
above. TOE documentation is delivered in electronic form (encrypted according to
defined mailing procedures).
Note: Phases 1 to 4 are under the TOE developer scope of control. Therefore, the
objectives for the environment related to phase 1 to 4 are covered by Assurance
measures, which are materialized by documents, process and procedures evaluated
through the TOE evaluation process. During phases 5 to 7 the TOE is no more under
the developer control. In this environment, the TOE protects itself with its own Security
functions. But some additional usage recommendation must also be followed in order
to ensure that the TOE is correctly and securely handled, and protected against
damage or comprimission. This ST assumes (A.USE_DIAG, A.USE_KEYS) that
users handle securely the TOE and related Objectives for the environment are defined
(OE.USE_DIAG, OE.USE_KEYS).
1.6 TOE Identification
The delivery comprises the following items:
Type Name Identification Delivery form
IC Hardware NXP SE310 - Secure Element SE310_SE
A0.1.000 J2 (see
UGM, Table 10,
and Table 2)
Package WLCSP
Embedded
Software
JCOP 8.0 OS including Shared
Code (with Cryptolib), FlashOS,
CommOS
[1]
, SystemOS, and
SMK.
1.38.0.1 (see UGM
below and Table 7)
On-chip software stored
into the FLASH area of the
TOE.
Byte Code
Optimizer
Tool
nxp-cap-optimizer nxp-cap-optimizer-
1.0.1
Jar file
Document JCOP 8.0 User Guidance Manual [34] Electronic Document (PDF
via NXP Docstore)
Document JCOP 8.0 User Guidance Manual
Addendum
[35] Electronic Document (PDF
via NXP Docstore)
Document JCOP 8.0 Anomaly Sheet [36] Electronic Document (PDF
via NXP Docstore)
Document JCOP 8.0 R1.38.0.1 (JCOP 8.0
19.5-1.38) User Guidance Manual
for JCOP eSE
[37] Electronic Document (PDF
via NXP Docstore)
Document JCOP 8.0 User Guidance Manual
Addendum for JCOP eSE
[38] Electronic Document (PDF
via NXP Docstore)
Table 6. Delivery items for JCOP 8.0
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Type Name Identification Delivery form
Document JCOP 8.0 UGM Addendum for
Non-standard Optimized Byte
Codes
[41] Electronic Document (PDF
via NXP Docstore)
Document JCOP 8.0 User Guidance Manual
Addendum System Management
[39] Electronic Document (PDF
via NXP Docstore)
Document NXP Cap Optimizer User Manual [40] Electronic Document (PDF
via NXP Docstore)
Table 6. Delivery items for JCOP 8.0...continued
[1] the CommOS is part of the delivered software but is not part of the TOE.
1.6.1 Platform Identifier
The Platform can be identified by the Platform ID and the Platform String. See Table 7.
When JCOP eSE OS is addressed, the Platform ID and the Platform String can be
obtained by using the Version Query command (GET DATA command with tag 0xDF4C).
See UGM [34] chapter 1.3.5 and [37]).
The TOE is JCOP 8.x on SE310 and has one configuration:
• JCOP 8.0 R1.38.0.1
Product Name Version Platform ID (Tag
0x82)
Platform String (Tag
0x83, 0x84)
NXP JCOP8.x on
SE310 A0
JCOP 8.0 R1.38.0.1
[1]
N5E0000000990000 8013801
Table 7. Product Identification
[1] includes CryptoLib v1.3.0 and FlashOS v130.53.4. CommOS is part of the delivery but is not part of the TOE.
The Platform ID has the following form: Nabcccxxxxxxyyzz
The "N" is constant, the other letters are variables. For a detailed description of these
variables, please see Table 8.
Variable Meaning Value Parameter Settings
a Hardware Type 5 NFC hardware
b JCOP OS Version E JCOP 8.0
ccc None - fixed 000 Fixed to 000
xxxxxx Build Number
(hexadecimal)
000099 svn revision number
JCOP 8.0 OS
yy Mask ID 00 Mask 00
zz Patch ID 00 Patch 00
Table 8. Platform ID Format
The Platform String has the following form wxyzzvc and is to be interpreted as "JCOP
w.x Ry.zz.v.c"
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Variable Meaning Value Parameter Settings
w JCOP Major version 8
x JCOP Minor version 0
JCOP 8.0
y JCOP OS Major
release
1
zz JCOP OS Minor
release
38
v Variant identifier 0
R1.38.0
c JCOP instance 1 eSE
Table 9. Platform String Format
1.6.1.1 Sequence Number
Additionally to the Platform Identifier the TOE can also be identified by its sequence
number:
1. If SystemOS is active then the "SELECT OS Update AID" command will return the
Current Sequence Number of SystemOS and the Reference Sequence Number.
2. If JCOP OS is active then the "Get OS Info" command will return the Current
Sequence Number of JCOP OS (Final Sequence Number).
1.6.1.2 IC Identifier
When the SystemOS is addressed, the Version Query command can be used to retrieve
the identifier of the different components of the SE software and hardware. The Version
Query Command is a proprietary GET DATA command with tag 0xDF4C. The Data
returned by the Version Query includes the Tag for Hardware ID (tag 0x8C), which is 2
bytes long.
Tag Length Value (MSB only) Comment
0x8C 2 0x51 SE310 A0.1
Table 10. Hardware ID Data Format
The MSB of the Hardware ID provides physical identification of the IC (including ROM
contents). Note that the Hardware ID together with the Platform ID uniquely identity the
SE310 A0.1.000 J2 (including SE310 dedicated Flash content).
1.7 Evaluated Package Types
The TOE is delivered as a packaged device. The security of the TOE does not rely on the
way the pads are connected to the package. Therefore the security functionality of NXP
JCOP8.x on SE310 A0 is not affected by the delivered package type.
The only available package type is "Wafer Level Chip Scale Package" (WLCSP). This
package is a thin fine-pitch ball grid array package. All (enabled) pins of the TOE are
externally accessible. Any additional security provided by the plastic package is ignored
for the security of the TOE.
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2 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL)
This chapter is divided into the following sections: "CC Conformance Claim", "PP Claim",
and "Conformance Claim Rationale".
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This Security Target claims conformance to version 3.1 of Common Criteria for
Information Technology Security Evaluation according to
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001, April 2017 [1].
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002, April 2017 [2].
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017 [3].
The following methodology will be used for the evaluation:
• Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017 [4].
This Security Target claims to be CC Part 2 extended and CC Part 3 conformant.
Section 7 of this Security Target defines the extended Security Functional Requirements,
and also demonstrates that they are consistent with the above conformance claims.
This Security Target claims conformance to the assurance package EAL5 augmented.
The augmentations to EAL5 are
• AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”
• ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures”
• ALC_FLR.1 “Basic flaw remediation”
• ASE_TSS.2 “TOE summary specification with architectural design summary”
As demonstrated in Section 8, this claim includes or exceeds the minimum assurance
level for the Protection Profile identified in Section 2.2.
2.2 PP Claim
This Security Target claims conformance to the following Protection Profiles.
2.2.1 Java Card - Open Configuration (BSI-CC-PP-0099-V2-2020)
This Security Target claims demonstrable conformance to the Java Card Protection
Profile - Open Configuration [10], with "Sensitive Result" augmentation package. Other
packages of the PP are not supported.
This ST is more restrictive than the PP [10] which Section 2.3 provides a rationale for.
2.3 Conformance Claim Rationale
2.3.1 TOE Type
The TOE type as stated in Section 1.3 of this ST corresponds to the TOE type of the
Java Card Platform PP [10] , implementing the Java Card Specification Version 3.1 [13]
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[14] [12] with a co-existing eUICC Application, also underpinned by the Java Card and
Global Platform Technologies, but accessible via separate, independent communications
channels.
2.3.2 Java Card - Open Configuration
2.3.2.1 SPD Statement for Java Card Component
The SPD statement that is presented in Section 4 includes the threats as presented in
the PP [10], but also includes additional threats. The additional threats are:
• T.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
• T.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
• T.UNAUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE
• T.INTERRUPT-OSU
• T.CONFIG
• T.COM_EXPLOIT
• T.LIFE_CYCLE
• T.UNAUTHORIZED_CARD_MNGT
• T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA[REFINED]
• T.RESTRICTED-MODE
• T.AM_DATASTORE_ACCESS
• T.CONFID-CONT
• T.INTEG-CONT
• T.EXE-CONT
• T.CONT-DOS
• T.CONT-SID
• T.RND
The threats
• T.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
• T.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
• T.UNAUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE
• T.INTERRUPT-OSU
are included for the OS Update which is additional functionality the PP allows.
The threats
• T.CONFID-CONT
• T.INTEG-CODE
• T.EXE-CONT
• T.CONT-DOS
• T.CONT-SID
are introduced for multiple Guest OSs embeded on the same product inside and outside
the TOE boundaries.
The threat T.CONFIG is an additional threat to cover unauthorized modifications and read
access of the configuration area in the TOE. It is an addition to the threats defined in the
PP [10]. The threat T.RESTRICTED-MODE is included for the Restricted Mode which is
additional functionality the PP allows. The threat T.COM_EXPLOIT is included to cover
communication channels attacks and it is an addition to the threats in the PP [10].
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The threat T.LIFE_CYCLE is included to cover content management attacks and it is an
addition to the threats in the PP [10].
The threat T.UNAUTHORIZED_CARD_MNGT refines the threats T.INSTALL and
T.DELETION from the PP [10].
The threat T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA[REFINED] refines the threat T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA in
the PP [10].
The threat T.AM_DATASTORE_ACCESS is included for Applet Migration which is
additional functionality the PP allows.
The threat T.RND is to cover the weak random numbers.
Note that the threat T.EXE-CODE-REMOTE is not included, since the TOE does not
support Java Card RMI. The Java Card Protection Profile [10] makes the use of Java
Card RMI optional.
The SPD statement presented in Section 4, copies the OSP from the PP [10], and adds
the following additional OSPs:
• OSP.PROCESS-TOE
• OSP.KEY-CHANGE
• OSP.SECURITY-DOMAINS
The OSP OSP.PROCESS-TOE is introduced for the pre-personalisation feature of
the TOE and is an addition to the OSPs in PP [10]. The OSP OSP.KEY-CHANGE is
introduced for the SD feature of the TOE and is an addition to the OSPs in PP [10]. The
OSP OSP.SECURITY-DOMAINS is introduced for the SD feature of the TOE and is an
addition to the OSPs in PP [10].
The SPD statement includes two of the three assumptions from the PP [10]. The
assumption A.Deletion is excluded. The Card Manager is part of the TOE and therefore
the assumption is no longer relevant. Leaving out the assumption, makes the SPD of this
ST more restrictive than the SPD in the PP [10]. As the Card Manager is part of the TOE,
it is ensuring that the deletion of applets through the Card Manager is secure, instead of
assuming that it is handled by the Card Manager in the environment of the TOE.
Besides the assumptions from the PP [10], the following assumptions are added:
• A.PROCESS-SEC-IC
• A.USE_DIAG
• A.USE_KEYS
• A.APPS-PROVIDER
• A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY
• A.TRUSTED-GUESTOS
The assumption A.PROCESS-SEC-IC is taken from the underlying Security IC Platform
PP [9].
The assumptions A.USE_DIAG and A.USE_KEYS are included because the Card
Manager is part of the TOE and no longer part of the environment.
The assumptions A.APPS-PROVIDER and A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY are added
because Security Domains from the GlobalPlatform Specification are introduced. All
the applets and packages are signed by the APSD and the correctness is verified
on the TOE by VASD before the package or applet is installed or loaded. A.APPS-
PROVIDER and A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY are additions to PP [10] for card content
management environment.
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The assumptions A.TRUSTED-GUESTOS is included because the Guest Operating
Systems that are hosted in external contexts are provided by a trusted actor.
2.3.2.2 Security Objectives Statement for Java Card Component
The statement of security objectives in the ST presented in Section 5 includes all security
objectives as presented in the PP [10], but also includes a number of additional security
objectives. The additional security objectives are:
• OT.IDENTIFICATION
• OT.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
• OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE
• OT.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE
• OT.SECURE_AC_ACTIVATION
• OT.TOE_IDENTIFICATION
• OT.CARD-CONFIGURATION
• OT.ATTACK-COUNTER
• OT.RESTRICTED-MODE
• OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS
• OT.APPLI-AUTH
• OT.COMM_AUTH
• OT.COMM_INTEGRITY
• OT.COMM_CONFIDENTIALITY
• OT.DATASTORE_ACCESS
• OT.CONT_SEP
• OT.CONT_PRIV
• OT.CONT_DOS
• OT.RND
The security objectives OT.IDENTIFICATION is part of the security objectives of the
Secure Element Hardware (see Section 1.4.1), component of this composite evaluation,
but is also relevent for the pre-personalisation feature of the TOE, which is additional
functionality the PP allows.
The security objectives
• OT.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
• OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE
• OT.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE
• OT.SECURE_AC_ACTIVATION
• OT.TOE_IDENTIFICATION
are included for the OS Update which is additional functionality the PP allows.
The security objectives
• OT.CONT_SEP
• OT.CONT_PRIV
• OT.CONT_DOS
are included for the protection and separation of the contexts inside and outside the TOE
boundaries.
The security objectives OT.CARD-CONFIGURATION is included for the Config Applet
which is additional functionality the PP allows.
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The security objectives OT.ATTACK-COUNTER and OT.RESTRICTED-MODE are
included for the restricted mode which is additional functionality the PP allows.
The security objectives
• OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS
• OT.APPLI-AUTH
• OT.COMM_AUTH
• OT.COMM_INTEGRITY
• OT.COMM_CONFIDENTIALITY
are objectives for the TOE as the GlobalPlatform API and the definitions for Secure
Channel, Security Domains and Card Content Management are used from it.
The ST contains OE.CAP_FILE, OE.VERIFICATION and OE.CODE-EVIDENCE from
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment from [10]. Additionally, some of the
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment from [10] are listed as TOE Security
Objectives in this ST:
• OT.SCP.RECOVERY instead of OE.SCP.RECOVERY
• OT.SCP.SUPPORT instead of OE.SCP.SUPPORT
• OT.SCP.IC instead of OE.SCP.IC
• OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT instead of OE.CARD-MANAGEMENT
OT.SCP.RECOVERY, OT.SCP.SUPPORT, and OT.SCP.IC are objectives for the
TOE as the Smart Card Platform belongs to the TOE for this evaluation. OT.CARD-
MANAGEMENT is an objective for the TOE as the Card Manager belongs to the TOE
for this evaluation. Moving objectives from the environment to the TOE, adds objectives
to the TOE without changing the overall objectives. The statement of security objectives
is therefore equivalent to the security objectives in the PP [10] to which conformance
is claimed. The security objective OT.DATASTORE_ACCESS addresses the need for
access control policy to be enforced for the Applet Migration feature.
The security objectives OT.INSTALL, OT.LOAD, and OT.DELETION from the PP [10]
are not included since these functionality and objectives are covered by the refined
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT.
The security objective OT.RND is included for the random number quality.
Note that the following objectives are defined as optional in the Protection Profile and are
not included in the TOE, therefore are not included in the Security Target:
• O.REMOTE
• O.BIO-MNGT
• O.EXT-MEM
• O.SENSITIVE_ARRAYS_INTEG
The optional O.SENSITIVE_RESULTS_INTEG is included as
OT.SENSITIVE_RESULTS_INTEG using the rationale defined in the PP.
The ST introduces eight additional security objectives for the environment. The additional
objectives for the environment are:
• OE.USE_DIAG
• OE.USE_KEYS
• OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC
• OE.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.CREATE
• OE.APPS-PROVIDER
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• OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY
• OE.KEY-CHANGE
• OE.SECURITY-DOMAINS
• OE.TRUSTED-GUESTOS
The security objective for the environment OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC is from the hardware
platform (see Section 1.4.1) that is part of this composite product evaluation. Therefore
the statement of security objectives for the environment is equivalent to the statement in
the Security IC PP [9].
OE.USE_KEYS and OE.USE_DIAG are included because the Card Manager is part of
the TOE and not a security objective for the environment as in PP [10].
The security objective for the environment OE.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.CREATE is to
cover the confidentiality during creation and transmission phase of D.UPDATE_IMAGE
and therfore partly covers the threats introduced by the update mechanism which is
additional functionality.
OE.APPS-PROVIDER and OE.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY cover trusted actors which
enable the creation, distribution and verification of secure applications.
OE.KEY-CHANGE covers the switch to trusted keys for the AP. OE.SECURITY-
DOMAINS covers the management of security domains in the context of the
GlobalPlatform Specification.
OE.TRUSTED-GUESTOS covers the trusted and secure development of external Guest
OSs that are outside the TOE boundaries. The external Guest OSs are secured and not
threatening.
The statement of security objectives for the environment is therefore considered to be
equivalent to the security objectives in the PP [10] to which conformance is claimed.
2.3.2.3 SFRs Statement for Java Card Component
The Security Functional Requirements Statement copies most SFRs as defined in the
PP [10], with the exception of a number of options. For the copied set of SFRs the ST is
considered equivalent to the statement of SFRs in the PP [10]. Moreover as requested
by the PP [10] the ST adds additional threats, objectives and SFRs to fully cover and
describe additional security functionality implemented in the TOE.
The TOE restricts remote access from the CAD to the services implemented by the
applets on the card to none, and as a result the SFRs concerning Java Card RMI
(FDP_ACF.1[JCRMI], SFRs FDP_IFC.1/JCRMI, FDP_IFF.1/JCRMI, FMT_MSA.1/
EXPORT, FMT_MSA.1/REM_REFS, FMT_MSA.3/JCRMI, FMT_SMF.1/JCRMI,
FMT_REV.1/JCRMI, and FMT_SMR.1/JCRMI) are not included in the ST. In the PP [10]
the use of the Java Card RMI is optional. The TOE does not implement Java Card RMI.
The TOE does not allow external memory access to the services implemented by the
applets on the card, and as a result the SFRs concerning "Management of External
Memory (EXT-MEM)" (FDP_ACC.1/EXT_MEM, FDP_ACF.1/EXT_MEM, FMT_MSA.1/
EXT_MEM, FMT_MSA.3/EXT_MEM and FMT_SMF.1/EXT_MEM) are not included in
the ST. In the PP [10] the use of the "Management of External Memory (EXT-MEM)" is
optional. The TOE does not implement "Management of External Memory (EXT-MEM)".
The SFR FDP_ITC.2/INSTALLER from the PP [10] is replaced by FDP_ITC.2[CCM]
which enforces the Firewall access control policy and the Secure Channel Protocol
information flow policy and which is more restrictive than the PACKAGE LOADING
information flow control SFP from PP [10].
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The set of SFRs that define the card content management mechanism CarG are partly
replaced or refined and are considered to be equivalent or more restrictive because of
the newly introduced SFPs:
1. Security Domain access control policy
2. Secure Channel Protocol information flow policy
These SFPs provide a concrete and more restrictive implementation of the PACKAGE
LOADING information flow control SFP from PP [10] by following the information flow
policy defined by Global Platform specifications. The table below lists the SFRs from
CarG of PP [10] and their corresponding refinements in this ST.
SFR from PP [10] Refinement
FCO_NRO.2/CM FCO_NRO.2[SC]
FDP_IFC.2/CM FDP_IFC.2[SC]
FDP_IFF.1/CM FDP_IFF.1[SC]
FDP_UIT.1/CM FDP_UIT.1[CCM]
FIA_UID.1/CM FIA_UID.1[SC]
FMT_MSA.1/CM FMT_MSA.1[SC]
FMT_MSA.3/CM FMT_MSA.3[SC]
FMT_SMF.1/CM FMT_SMF.1[SC]
FMT_SMR.1/CM FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FTP_ITC.1/CM FTP_ITC.1[SC]
Table 11. CarG SFRs refinements
The following SFRs realize refinements of SFRs from PP [10] and add functionality to the
TOE making the Security Functional Requirements Statement more restrictive than the
PP [10]:
FDP_ROL.1[CCM], FPT_FLS.1[CCM] and FPT_PHP.3 realize additional security
functionality for the card manager which is allowed by the PP [10].
The set of SFRs that define the security domains mechanism as specified by
GlobalPlatform, realize refinements of SFRs from PP [10] (see above Table 11) and
additional security functionality which is allowed by the PP [10]. This set of SFRs
comprise
• FDP_ACC.1[SD]
• FDP_ACF.1[SD]
• FMT_MSA.1[SD]
• FMT_MSA.3[SD]
• FMT_SMF.1[SD]
• FMT_SMR.1[SD]
The set of SFRs that define the secure channel mechanism as specified by
GlobalPlatform, realize refinements of SFRs from PP [10] (see above Table 11) and
additional security functionality which is allowed by the PP [10]. This set of SFRs
comprise
• FCO_NRO.2[SC]
• FDP_IFC.2[SC]
• FDP_IFF.1[SC]
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• FMT_MSA.1[SC]
• FMT_MSA.3[SC]
• FMT_SMF.1[SC]
• FIA_UID.1[SC]
• FIA_UAU.1[SC]
• FIA_UAU.4[SC]
• FTP_ITC.1[SC]
The set of SFRs belonging to the CoreG_LC group related to the Java Card API, which
are refined multiple times, comprise
• FCS_CKM.1
• FCS_COP.1
The SFRs FAU_SAS.1[SCP], FIA_AFL.1[PIN] and FCS_RNG.1 realize additional
security functionality which is allowed by the PP [10].
The set of SFRs that define the Config Applet realize additional security functionality,
which is allowed by the PP [10]. This set of SFRs comprise FDP_IFC.2[CFG],
FDP_IFF.1[CFG], FIA_UID.1[CFG], FMT_MSA.1[CFG], FMT_MSA.3[CFG],
FMT_SMF.1[CFG], FMT_SMR.1[CFG].
The set of SFRs that define the OS Update realize additional security functionality, which
is allowed by the PP [10]. This set of SFRs comprise FDP_IFC.2[OSU], FDP_IFF.1[OSU],
FMT_MSA.3[OSU], FMT_MSA.1[OSU], FMT_SMR.1[OSU], FMT_SMF.1[OSU],
FIA_UID.1[OSU], FIA_UAU.1[OSU], FIA_UAU.4[OSU] and FPT_FLS.1[OSU].
The set of SFRs that define the Restricted Mode realize additional security functionality,
which is allowed by the PP [10]. This set of SFRs comprise FDP_ACC.2[RM],
FDP_ACF.1[RM], FMT_MSA.3[RM], FMT_MSA.1[RM], FMT_SMF.1[RM], FIA_UID.1[RM]
and FIA_UAU.1[RM].
The set of SFRs that define the Applet Migration realize additional security functionality,
which is allowed by the PP [10]. This set of SFRs comprise FDP_ACC.1[AMD],
FDP_ACF.1[AMD], FMT_MSA.3[AMD], FMT_MSA.1[AMD], FMT_SMF.1[AMD],
FMT_SMR.1[AMD] and FIA_UID.1[AMD].
The set of SFRs that define the Context Separation realize additional security
functionality, which is allowed by the PP [10]. This set of SFRs comprise
FDP_ACC.2[CONTSEP], FDP_ACF.1[CONTSEP], FMT_MSA.3[CONTSEP],
FMT_MSA.1[CONTSEP], FMT_SMF.1[CONTSEP], FMT_SMR.1[CONTSEP] and
FIA_UID.1[CONTSEP].
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3 Security Aspects
This chapter describes the main security issues of the Java Card System and its
environment addressed in this ST, called "security aspects", in a CC-independent way.
In addition to this, the security aspects also give a semi-formal framework to express
the CC security environment and objectives of the TOE. They can be instantiated as
assumptions, threats, objectives (for the TOE and the environment) or organizational
security policies. The description is based on [10].
3.1 Confidentiality
SA.CONFID-UPDATE
-IMAGE
Confidentiality of Update Image
The update image must be kept confidential. This concerns the non
disclosure of the update image in transit to the card.
SA.CONFID-APPLI-D
ATA
Confidentiality of Application Data
Application data must be protected against unauthorized disclosure.
This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain read access to
other application’s data. This must also consider that applets receiving
an ArrayView must not be able to access beyond the boundaries and
access rights defined during the creation of the ArrayView.
SA.CONFID-JCS-CO
DE
Confidentiality of Java Card System Code
Java Card System code must be protected against unauthorized
disclosure. Knowledge of the Java Card System code may allow
bypassing the TSF. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order
to gain a read access to executable code, typically by executing an
application that tries to read the memory area where a piece of Java
Card System code is stored.
SA.CONFID-JCS-DAT
A
Confidentiality of Java Card System Data
Java Card System data must be protected against unauthorized
disclosure. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain a
read access to Java Card System data. Java Card System data includes
the data managed by the Java Card RE, the Java Card VM and the
internal data of Java Card platform API classes as well.
3.2 Integrity
SA.INTEG-UPDATE-I
MAGE
Integrity of Update Image
The update image must be protected against unauthorized modification.
This concerns the modification of the image in transit to the card.
SA.INTEG-APPLI-CO
DE
Integrity of Application Code
Application code must be protected against unauthorized modification.
This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain write access
to the memory zone where executable code is stored. In post-issuance
application loading, this threat also concerns the modification of
application code in transit to the card.
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SA.INTEG-APPLI-DA
TA
Integrity of Application Data
Application data must be protected against unauthorized modification.
This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain unauthorized
write access to application data. In post-issuance application loading,
this threat also concerns the modification of application data contained
in a CAP file in transit to the card. For instance, a CAP file contains the
values to be used for initializing the static fields of the CAP file. This
must also consider the Integrity of data accessed through the use of
ArrayView.
SA.INTEG-JCS-CODE Integrity of Java Card System Code
Java Card System code must be protected against unauthorized
modification. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain
write access to executable code.
SA.INTEG-JCS-CODE Integrity of Java Card System Data
Java Card System data must be protected against unauthorized
modification. This concerns logical attacks at runtime in order to gain
write access to Java Card System data. Java Card System data includes
the data managed by the Java Card RE, the Java Card VM and the
internal data of Java Card API classes as well.
3.3 Unauthorized Execution
SA.EXE-APPLI-CODE Execution of Application Code
Application (byte)code must be protected against unauthorized
execution. This concerns:
1. invoking a method outside the scope of the accessibility rules
provided by the access modifiers of the Java programming language
([15])
2. jumping inside a method fragment or interpreting the contents of a
data memory area as if it was executable code.
3. unauthorized execution of a remote method from the CAD (if the
TOE provides JCRMI functionality).
SA.EXE-JCS-CODE Execution of Java Card System Code
Java Card System bytecode must be protected against unauthorized
execution. Java Card System bytecode includes any code of the Java
Card RE or API. This concerns:
1. invoking a method outside the scope of the accessibility rules
provided by the access modifiers of the Java programming language
([15])
2. jumping inside a method fragment or interpreting the contents of a
data memory area as if it was executable code. Note that execute
access to native code of the Java Card System and applications is
the concern of SA.NATIVE.
SA.FIREWALL Firewall
The Firewall shall ensure controlled sharing of class instances
[1]
, and
isolation of their data and code between CAP files (that is, controlled
execution contexts) as well as between CAP files and the JCRE context.
An applet shall not read, write, compare a piece of data belonging to an
applet that is not in the same context, or execute one of the methods of
an applet in another context without its authorization.
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SA.NATIVE Native Code Execution
Because the execution of native code is outside of the JCS TSF scope,
it must be secured so as to not provide ways to bypass the TSFs of
the JCS. Loading of native code, which is as well outside those TSFs,
is submitted to the same requirements. Should native software be
privileged in this respect, exceptions to the policies must include a
rationale for the new security framework they introduce.
[1] This concerns in particular the arrays, which are considered as instances of the Object class in the Java programming
language.
3.4 Bytecode Verification
SA.VERIFICATION Bytecode Verification
Bytecode must be verified prior to being executed. Bytecode verification
includes:
1. how well-formed CAP file is and the verification of the typing
constraints on the bytecode,
2. binary compatibility with installed CAP files and the assurance that
the export files used to check the CAP file correspond to those that
will be present on the card when loading occurs.
3.5 Card Management
SA.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Card Management
1. The card manager (CM) shall control the access to card
management functions such as the installation, update or deletion of
applets.
2. The card manager shall implement the card issuer’s policy on the
card.
SA.INSTALL Installation
1. The TOE must be able to return to a safe and consistent state
when the installation of a CAP file or an applet fails or be cancelled
(whatever the reasons).
2. Installing an applet must have no effect on the code and data of
already installed applets. The installation procedure should not be
used to bypass the TSFs. In short, it is an atomic operation, free of
harmful effects on the state of the other applets.
3. The procedure of loading and installing a CAP file shall ensure its
integrity and authenticity. In case of Extended CAP files, installation
of a CAP shall ensure installation of all the packages in the CAP file.
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SA.SID Subject Identification
1. Users and subjects of the TOE must be identified.
2. The identity of sensitive users and subjects associated with
administrative and privileged roles must be particularly protected;
this concerns the Java Card RE, the applets registered on the card,
and especially the default applet and the currently selected applet
(and all other active applets in Java Card System). A change of
identity, especially standing for an administrative role (like an applet
impersonating the Java Card RE), is a severe violation of the SFR.
Selection controls the access to any data exchange between the
TOE and the CAD and therefore, must be protected as well. The
loading of a CAP file or any exchange of data through the APDU
buffer (which can be accessed by any applet) can lead to disclosure
of keys, application code or data, and so on.
SA.OBJ-DELETION Object Deletion
1. Deallocation of objects should not introduce security holes in the
form of references pointing to memory zones that are not longer in
use, or have been reused for other purposes. Deletion of collection
of objects should not be maliciously used to circumvent the TSFs.
2. Erasure, if deemed successful, shall ensure that the deleted class
instance is no longer accessible.
SA.DELETION Deletion
1. Deletion of installed applets (or CAP files) should not introduce
security holes in the form of broken references to garbage collected
code or data, nor should they alter integrity or confidentiality of
remaining applets. The deletion procedure should not be maliciously
used to bypass the TSFs.
2. Erasure, if deemed successful, shall ensure that any data owned
by the deleted applet is no longer accessible (shared objects
shall either prevent deletion or be made inaccessible). A deleted
applet cannot be selected or receive APDU commands. CAP file
deletion shall make the code of the CAP file is no longer available
for execution. In case of Extended CAP files, deletion of a CAP shall
ensure that code and data for all the packages in the CAP file is no
longer available for execution.
3. Power failure or other failures during the process shall be taken into
account in the implementation so as to preserve the SFRs. This
does not mandate, however, the process to be atomic. For instance,
an interrupted deletion may result in the loss of user data, as long as
it does not violate the SFRs.
The deletion procedure and its characteristics (whether deletion is
either physical or logical, what happens if the deleted application was
the default applet, the order to be observed on the deletion steps) are
implementation-dependent. The only commitment is that deletion shall
not jeopardize the TOE (or its assets) in case of failure (such as power
shortage).
Deletion of a single applet instance and deletion of a whole CAP file
are functionally different operations and may obey different security
rules. For instance, specific CAP files or packages can be declared
to be undeletable (for instance, the Java Card API packages), or the
dependency between installed CAP files may forbid the deletion (like a
CAP file using super classes or super interfaces declared in another CAP
file).
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3.6 Services
SA.ALARM Alarm
The TOE shall provide appropriate feedback upon detection of a
potential security violation. This particularly concerns the type errors
detected by the bytecode verifier, the security exceptions thrown by the
Java Card VM, or any other security-related event occurring during the
execution of a TSF.
SA.OPERATE Operate
1. The TOE must ensure continued correct operation of its security
functions.
2. In case of failure during its operation, the TOE must also return to a
well-defined valid state before the next service request.
SA.RESOURCES Resources
The TOE controls the availability of resources for the applications and
enforces quotas and limitations in order to prevent unauthorized denial
of service or malfunction of the TSFs. This concerns both execution
(dynamic memory allocation) and installation (static memory allocation)
of applications and CAP files.
SA.CIPHER Cipher
The TOE shall provide a means to the applications for ciphering sensitive
data, for instance, through a programming interface to low-level, highly
secure cryptographic services. In particular, those services must support
cryptographic algorithms consistent with cryptographic usage policies
and standards.
SA.KEY-MNGT Key Management
The TOE shall provide a means to securely manage cryptographic keys.
This includes:
1. Keys shall be generated in accordance with specified cryptographic
key generation algorithms and specified cryptographic key sizes,
2. Keys must be distributed in accordance with specified cryptographic
key distribution methods,
3. Keys must be initialized before being used,
4. Keys shall be destroyed in accordance with specified cryptographic
key destruction methods.
SA.PIN-MNGT PIN Management
The TOE shall provide a means to securely manage PIN objects. This
includes:
1. Atomic update of PIN value and try counter,
2. No rollback on the PIN-checking function,
3. Keeping the PIN value (once initialized) secret (for instance, no
clear-PIN-reading function),
4. Enhanced protection of PIN’s security attributes (state, try
counter ...) in confidentiality and integrity.
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SA.SCP Smart Card Platform
The smart card platform must be secure with respect to the SFRs. Then:
1. After a power loss, RF signal loss or sudden card removal prior to
completion of some communication protocol, the SCP will allow
the TOE on the next power up to either complete the interrupted
operation or revert to a secure state.
2. It does not allow the SFRs to be bypassed or altered and does not
allow access to other low-level functions than those made available
by packages of Java Card API. That includes the protection of its
private data and code (against disclosure or modification) from the
Java Card System.
3. It provides secure low-level cryptographic processing to the Java
Card System.
4. It supports the needs for any update to a single persistent object
or class field to be atomic, and possibly a low-level transaction
mechanism.
5. It allows the Java Card System to store data in a ”persistent
technology memory” or in volatile memory, depending on its needs
(for instance, transient objects must not be stored in non-volatile
memory). The memory model is structured and allows for low-level
control accesses (segmentation fault detection).
6. It safely transmits low-level exceptions to the TOE (arithmetic
exceptions, checksum errors), when applicable.
7. Finally, it is required that the IC is designed in accordance with
a well-defined set of policies and standards (for instance, those
specified in [9]), and will be tamper resistant to actually prevent an
attacker from extracting or altering security data (like cryptographic
keys) by using commonly employed techniques (physical probing
and sophisticated analysis of the chip). This especially matters to the
management (storage and operation) of confidential application data
such as cryptographic keys.
SA.TRANSACTION Transaction
The TOE must provide a means to execute a set of operations
atomically. This mechanism must not jeopardise the execution of the
user applications. The transaction status at the beginning of an applet
session must be closed (no pending updates).
3.7 Config Applet
SA.CONFIG-APPLET Config Applet
The Config Applet is a JCOP functionality which allows to:
1. Read and modify configuration items in the configuration area of the
TOE,
2. Disable Access to configuration item.
3.8 OS Update
SA.OSU OS Update
The SystemOS allows to update JCOP eSE, FlashOS, CommOS,
Shared code, SMK, and the SystemOS itself. It ensures that only valid
updates can be installed on the TOE.
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3.9 Restricted Mode
SA.RM Restricted Mode
If the Attack Counter reaches its limit the TOE goes into Restricted
Mode. In this mode it is possible to perform a limited set of functions, like
authenticate against the ISD, reset the Attack Counter or read logging
information. The GlobalPlatform state of the ISD is not changed.
3.10 Applet Migration
SA.APPLET-MIGR Applet Migration
In case an applet gets updated it can keep its User Data: Keys, PIN
and byte arrays. The data is exported by the applet instances to be
updated in a datastore and is imported by the new applet instance. Card
Content management may be combined with Applet Migration to create
Distributed Card Content Management.
3.11 Context Separation
SA.CONTEXT-SEPAR
ATION
Context Separation
The hardware enforced Context Separation ensures that all the operating
systems hosted on the secure element are running in dedicated
contexts. The external operating systems that are outside the boudaries
of the TOE (typically CommOS, JCOP xxx) cannot interact (read/write
data, fetch unshared code, impersonate) with the TOE in an uncontrolled
and unauthorized way. The communications between the TOE and
external Operating systems is allowed through dedicated communication
channels under the control of the SMK.
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4 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD)
The following sections list the assets, threats, organisational security policies and
assumptions of the TOE.
These are listed separately for each component to allow tracing of the conformance to
the corresponding Protection Profile.
4.1 SPD for Java Card System
4.1.1 Assets for Java Card System
Assets are security-relevant elements to be directly protected by the TOE. Confidentiality
of assets is always intended with respect to un-trusted people or software, as various
parties are involved during the first stages of the smart card product life-cycle. Details
concerning the threats are given in Section 4.1.2 hereafter.
Assets have to be protected, some in terms of confidentiality and some in terms of
integrity or both integrity and confidentiality. These assets might get compromised by the
threats that the TOE is exposed to.
The assets of the Security IC Embedded Software to be protected by the TOE are listed
below. They are grouped according to whether it is data created by and for the user (User
data) or data created by and for the TOE (TSF data). This definition of grouping is taken
from Section 5.1 of PP [10] .
4.1.1.1 User data
D.APP_CODE The code of the applets and libraries loaded on the card. To be protected
from unauthorized modification.
D.APP_C_DATA Confidential sensitive data of the applications, like the data contained
in an object, an array view, a static field, a local variable of the currently
executed method, or a position of the operand stack. To be protected
from unauthorized disclosure.
D.APP_I_DATA Integrity sensitive data of the applications, like the data contained in
an object, an array view, a static field, a local variable of the currently
executed method, or a position of the operand stack. To be protected
from unauthorized modification.
D.APP_KEYS Cryptographic keys owned by the applets. To be protected from
unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.PIN Any end-user’s PIN. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and
modification.
D.APSD_KEYS Refinement of D.APP_KEYS of [10]. Application Provider Security
Domains cryptographic keys needed to establish secure channels with
the AP. These keys can be used to load and install applications on
the card if the Security Domain has the appropriate privileges. To be
protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.ISD_KEYS Refinement of D.APP_KEYS of [10]. Issuer Security Domain
cryptographic keys needed to perform card management operations on
the card. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
Table 12. User Data Assets
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D.VASD_KEYS Refinement of D.APP_KEYS of [10]. Verification Authority Security
Domain cryptographic keys needed to verify applications Mandated
DAP signature. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and
modification.
D.CARD_MNGT_
DATA
The data of the card management environment, like for instance, the
identifiers, the privileges, life cycle states, the memory resource quotas
of applets and security domains. To be protected from unauthorized
modification.
Table 12. User Data Assets...continued
4.1.1.2 TSF data
D.API_DATA Private data of the API, like the contents of its private fields. To be
protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.CRYPTO Cryptographic data used in runtime cryptographic computations, like
a seed used to generate a key. To be protected from unauthorized
disclosure and modification.
D.JCS_CODE The code of the Java Card System. To be protected from unauthorized
disclosure and modification.
D.JCS_DATA The internal runtime data areas necessary for the execution of the
JCVM, such as, for instance, the frame stack, the program counter, the
class of an object, the length allocated for an array, any pointer used to
chain data-structures. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure or
modification.
D.SEC_DATA The runtime security data of the JCRE, like, for instance, the AIDs used
to identify the installed applets, the currently selected applet, the current
context of execution and the owner of each object. To be protected from
unauthorized disclosure and modification.
D.UPDATE_IMAGE Can be an update for JCOP 8.0 OS and SystemOS. It is sent to
the TOE, received by the SystemOS. It includes executable code,
configuration data, as well as a Sequence Number (Received Sequence
Number) and Image Type. To be protected from unauthorized disclosure
and modification. It is decrypted using the Package Decryption Key and
its signature is verified using the Verification Key. Is also referred to as
Additional Code, see [7].
D.CONFIG_ITEM A configuration that can be changed using the Config Applet.
D.RESTRICTED_
MODE_STATE
The Restricted Mode is entered when the attack counter reaches its limit
(the Attack Counter is incremented when a potential attack is detected
and decrements after sufficient time in a powered state without detecting
any new attacks). Once the Restricted Mode is entered, it shall not be
possible to exit without the approval of authorized users.
D.TOE_IDENTIFIER Identification Data to identify the TOE.
Table 13. TSF Data Assets
4.1.2 Threats for Java Card System
The threats for the Security IC Embedded Software are listed below. The definition of the
grouping is taken from Section 5.2 of PP [10].
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4.1.2.1 Confidentiality
T.CONFID-APPLI-DA
TA
Confidentiality of Application Data
The attacker executes an application to disclose data belonging to
another application. See SA.CONFID-APPLI-DATA for details. Directly
threatened asset(s): D.APP_C_DATA, D.PIN and D.APP_KEYS.
T.CONFID-JCS-CODE Confidentiality of Java Card System Code
The attacker executes an application to disclose the Java Card System
code. See SA.CONFID-JCS-CODE for details. Directly threatened
asset(s): D.JCS_CODE.
T.CONFID-JCS-DATA Confidentiality of Java Card System Data
The attacker executes an application to disclose data belonging to the
Java Card System. See SA.CONFID-JCS-DATA for details. Directly
threatened asset(s): D.API_DATA, D.SEC_DATA, D.JCS_DATA and
D.CRYPTO.
4.1.2.2 Integrity
T.INTEG-APPLI-COD
E
Integrity of Application Code
The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) its own code or
another application’s code. See SA.INTEG-APPLI-CODE for details.
Directly threatened asset(s): D.APP_CODE.
T.INTEG-APPLI-COD
E.LOAD
Integrity of Application Code - Load
The attacker modifies (part of) its own or another application code
when an application CAP file is transmitted to the card for installation.
See SA.INTEG-APPLI-CODE for details. Directly threatened asset(s):
D.APP_CODE.
T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA
[REFINED]
Integrity of Application Data
The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) another
application’s data. See SA.INTEG-APPLI-DATA for details. Directly
threatened asset(s): D.APP_I_DATA, D.PIN, D.APP_KEYS,
D.ISD_KEYS, D.VASD_KEYS and D.APSD_KEYS. This threat is a
refinement of the Threat T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA from [10].
T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA
.LOAD
Integrity of Application Data - Load
The attacker modifies (part of) the initialization data contained in an
application CAP file when the CAP file is transmitted to the card for
installation. See SA.INTEG-APPLI-DATA for details. Directly threatened
asset(s): D.APP_I_DATA and D.APP_KEYS.
T.INTEG-JCS-CODE Integrity of Java Card System Code
The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) the Java Card
System code. See SA.INTEG-JCS-CODE for details. Directly threatened
asset(s): D.JCS_CODE.
T.INTEG-JCS-DATA Integrity of Java Card System Data
The attacker executes an application to alter (part of) Java Card System
or API data. See SA.INTEG-JCS-DATA for details. Directly threatened
asset(s): D.API_DATA, D.SEC_DATA, D.JCS_DATA and D.CRYPTO.
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4.1.2.3 Identity Usurpation
T.SID.1 Subject Identification 1
An applet impersonates another application, or even the Java Card
RE, in order to gain illegal access to some resources of the card or with
respect to the end user or the terminal. See SA.SID for details. Directly
threatened asset(s): D.SEC_DATA (other assets may be jeopardized
should this attack succeed, for instance, if the identity of the JCRE is
usurped), D.PIN and D.APP_KEYS.
T.SID.2 Subject Identification 2
The attacker modifies the TOE’s attribution of a privileged role (e.g.
default applet and currently selected applet), which allows illegal
impersonation of this role. See SA.SID for further details. Directly
threatened asset(s): D.SEC_DATA (any other asset may be jeopardized
should this attack succeed, depending on whose identity was forged).
4.1.2.4 Unauthorized Execution
T.EXE-CODE.1 Code Execution 1
An applet performs an unauthorized execution of a method. See
SA.EXE-JCS-CODE and SA.EXE-APPLI-CODE for details. Directly
threatened asset(s): D.APP_CODE.
T.EXE-CODE.2 Code Execution 2
An applet performs an execution of a method fragment or arbitrary data.
See SA.EXE-JCS-CODE and SA.EXE-APPLI-CODE for details. Directly
threatened asset(s): D.APP_CODE.
T.NATIVE Native Code Execution
An applet executes a native method to bypass a TOE Security Function
such as the firewall. See SA.NATIVE for details. Directly threatened
asset(s): D.JCS_DATA.
4.1.2.5 Denial of Service
T.RESOURCES Consumption of Resources
An attacker prevents correct operation of the Java Card System through
consumption of some resources of the card: RAM or NVRAM. See
SA.RESOURCES for details. Directly threatened asset(s): D.JCS_DATA.
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4.1.2.6 Card Management
T.UNAUTHORIZED_
CARD_MNGT
Unauthorized Card Management
The attacker performs unauthorized card management operations (for
instance impersonates one of the actor represented on the card) in order
to take benefit of the privileges or services granted to this actor on the
card such as fraudulent:
• load of a CAP file
• installation of a CAP file
• extradition of a CAP file or an applet
• personalization of an applet or a Security Domain
• deletion of a CAP file or an applet
• privileges update of an applet or a Security Domain
Directly threatened asset(s): D.ISD_KEYS, D.APSD_KEYS, D.APP_C_
DATA, D.APP_I_DATA, D.APP_CODE, D.SEC_DATA, and D.CARD_
MNGT_DATA (any other asset may be jeopardized should this attack
succeed, depending on the virulence of the installed application).
This security objective is a refinement of the Threats T.INSTALL and
T.DELETION from [10].
T.COM_EXPLOIT Communication Channel Remote Exploit
An attacker remotely exploits the communication channels established
between a third party and the TOE in order to modify or disclose
confidential data. All assets are threatened.
T.LIFE_CYCLE Life Cycle
An attacker accesses to an application outside of its expected availability
range thus violating irreversible life cycle phases of the application (for
instance, an attacker repersonalizes the application). Directly threatened
asset(s): D.APP_I_DATA, D.APP_C_DATA, and D.CARD_MNGT_DATA.
4.1.2.7 Services
T.OBJ-DELETION Object Deletion
The attacker keeps a reference to a garbage collected object in order to
force the TOE to execute an unavailable method, to make it to crash, or
to gain access to a memory containing data that is now being used by
another application. See SA.OBJ-DELETION for further details. Directly
threatened asset(s): D.APP_C_DATA, D.APP_I_DATA and D.APP_
KEYS.
4.1.2.8 Miscellaneous
T.PHYSICAL Physical Tampering
The attacker discloses or modifies the design of the TOE, its sensitive
data or application code by physical (opposed to logical) tampering
means. This threat includes IC failure analysis, electrical probing,
unexpected tearing, and DPA. That also includes the modification of
the runtime execution of Java Card System or SCP software through
alteration of the intended execution order of (set of) instructions through
physical tampering techniques. This threatens all the identified assets.
This threat refers to the point (7) of the security aspect SA.SCP, and all
aspects related to confidentiality and integrity of code and data.
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4.1.2.9 Random Numbers
T.RND Deficiency of Random Numbers
An attacker may predict or obtain information about random numbers
generated by the TOE for instance because of a lack of entropy of the
random numbers provided. An attacker may gather information about the
produced random numbers which might be a problem because they may
be used for instance to generate cryptographic keys. Here the attacker
is expected to take advantage of statistical properties of the random
numbers generated by the TOE without specific knowledge about the
TOE’s generator. Malfunctions or premature ageing are also considered
which may assist in getting information about random numbers.
4.1.2.10 Config Applet
T.CONFIG Unauthorized configuration
The attacker tries to change configuration items without authorization.
Directly threatened asset(s): D.CONFIG_ITEM.
4.1.2.11 OS Update
T.CONFID-UPDATE-I
MAGE.LOAD
Confidentiality of Update Image - Load
The attacker discloses (part of) the image used to update the TOE in
the field while the image is transmitted to the card for installation. See
SA.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE for details. Directly threatened asset(s):
D.UPDATE_IMAGE, D.JCS_CODE, and D.JCS_DATA.
T.UNAUTH-LOAD-UP
DATE-IMAGE
Load unauthorized version of Update Image
The attacker tries to upload an unauthorized Update Image. Directly
threatened asset(s): D.JCS_CODE, D.JCS_DATA, D.UPDATE_IMAGE.
T.INTEG-UPDATE-IM
AGE.LOAD
Integrity of Update Image - Load
The attacker modifies (part of) the image used to update the TOE in
the field while the image is transmitted to the card for installation. See
SA.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE for details. Directly threatened asset(s):
D.UPDATE_IMAGE, D.JCS_CODE, and D.JCS_DATA.
T.INTERRUPT-OSU OS Update procedure interrupted
The attacker tries to interrupt the OS Update procedure (Load Phase
through activation of additional code) leaving the TOE in a partially
functional state. Directly threatened asset(s): D.JCS_CODE, D.JCS_
DATA, D.UPDATE_IMAGE, D.TOE_IDENTIFIER.
4.1.2.12 Restricted Mode
T.RESTRICTED-MOD
E
UNOTHAURIZED ESCAPE FROM RESTRICTED MODE
The attacker tries to exit the Restricted Mode without authorization.
Directly threatened asset: D.RESTRICTED_MODE_STATE.
4.1.2.13 Applet Migration
T.AM_DATASTORE_
ACCESS
Unauthorized access to applet datastore
An attacker tries to import illegally data to an applet to which this data
does not belong to. Directly threatened assets: D.APP_C_DATA, D.APP_
I_DATA, D.APP_KEYS, D.PIN.
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4.1.2.14 Context Separation
T.CONFID-CONT Disclosure of Context data and code
An attacker from one context discloses data or code belonging to
another context (like Application Data, Java Card System Code,
Java Card System Data). This threat extends the threats T.CONFID-
APPLI-DATA, T.CONFID-JCS-DATA, T.CONFID-JCS-CODE to multiple
contexts.
T.INTEG-CONT Modification of Context data and code
An attacker from one context alters data or code belonging to another
context (like application code, application data, transmitted application
package, Java Card System code, Java Card System Data). This
threat extends the threats T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE, T.INTEG-APPLI-
CODE.LOAD, T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA, T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA.LOAD,
T.INTEG-JCS-CODE, T.INTEG-JCS-DATA to multiple contexts.
T.EXE-CONT Code execution from another context
An attacker from one context performs an unauthorized execution of
a method, method fragment, arbitrary data, or native code of another
context. This threat extends the threats T.EXE-CODE.1, T.EXE-CODE.2,
T.NATIVE to multiple contexts.
T.CONT-DOS Deny of service between Contexts
An attacker from one context prevents the correct execution of SMK
or another context through consumption of some critical resources of
the TOE. This threat extends the threats T.RESOURCES to multiple
contexts.
T.CONT-SID Subject Identification between Contexts
An Attacker impersonates one context with an OS running in another
context. This Threat extends the threats T.SID.1, T.SID.2 to multiple
contexts.
4.1.3 OSPs for Java Card System
The organizational security policies to be enforced with respect to the TOE environment
that are related to the Security IC Embedded Software are listed below. The definition of
the grouping is taken from Section 5.3 of PP [10].
OSP.VERIFICATION File Verification
This policy shall ensure the consistency between the export files used
in the verification and those used for installing the verified file. The
policy must also ensure that no modification of the file is performed in
between its verification and the signing by the verification authority. See
SA.VERIFICATION for details.
If the application development guidance provided by the platform
developer contains recommandations related to the isolation property of
the platform, this policy shall also ensure that the verification authority
checks that these recommandations are applied in the application code.
OSP.PROCESS-TOE Identification of the TOE
An accurate identification must be established for the TOE. This requires
that each instantiation of the TOE carries this identification.
OSP.KEY-CHANGE Security Domain Keys Change
The AP shall change its initial security domain keys (APSD) before any
operation on its Security Domain.
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OSP.SECURITY-DOM
AINS
Security Domains
Security domains can be dynamically created, deleted and blocked
during usage phase in post-issuance mode.
4.1.4 Assumptions for Java Card System
The assumptions for the Security IC Embedded Software are listed below. The definition
of the grouping is taken from Section 5.4 of PP [10].
Note that the assumption A.DELETION as defined in PP [10] is excluded. The Card
Manager is part of the TOE and therefore the assumption is no longer relevant.
A.CAP_FILE Applets without Native Methods
CAP Files loaded post-issuance do not contain native methods. The
Java Card specification explicitly ”does not include support for native
methods” ([13]) outside the API.
A.VERIFICATION Bytecode Verification
All the bytecodes are verified at least once, before the loading, before the
installation or before the execution, depending on the card capabilities, in
order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution time.
A.USE_DIAG Usage of TOE’s Secure Communication Protocol by OE
It is assumed that the operational environment supports and uses the
secure communication protocols offered by the TOE.
A.USE_KEYS Protected Storage of Keys Outside of TOE
It is assumed that the keys which are stored outside the TOE and which
are used for secure communication and authentication between Smart
Card and terminals are protected for confidentiality and integrity in their
own storage environment. This is especially true for D.APSD_KEYS,
D.ISD_KEYS, and D.VASD_KEYS.
Info: This is to assume that the keys used in terminals or systems
are correctly protected for confidentiality and integrity in their own
environment, as the disclosure of such information which is shared with
the TOE but is not under the TOE control, may compromise the security
of the TOE.
A.PROCESS-SEC-IC Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation
It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE
by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end consumer to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and
test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or
unauthorised use). This means that the Phases after TOE Delivery are
assumed to be protected appropriately. The assets to be protected are:
The information and material produced and/or processed by the Security
IC Embedded Software Developer in Phase 1 and by the Composite
Product Manufacturer can be grouped as follows:
1. the Security IC Embedded Software including specifications,
implementation and related documentation,
2. pre-personalisation and personalisation data including specifications
of formats and memory areas, test related data,
3. the User Data and related documentation, and
4. material for software development support
as long as they are not under the control of the TOE Manufacturer.
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A.APPS-PROVIDER Application Provider
The AP is a trusted actor that provides basic or secure applications. He
is responsible for his security domain keys (D.APSD_KEYS).
Info: An AP generally refers to the entity that issues the application. For
instance it can be a financial institution for a payment application such as
EMV or a transport operator for a transport application.
A.TRUSTED-GUESTO
S
Trusted Guest OS
The external Guest OS provider is a trusted actor that is responsible for
the security and trust of his OS.
Info: This mitigates the risk of an hostile external guest OS.
A.VERIFICATION-AU
THORITY
Verification Authority
The VA is a trusted actor who is able to verify bytecode of an application
loaded on the card, guarantee and generate the digital signature
attached to an application and ensure that its public key for verifying the
application signature is on the TOE.
Info: As a consequence, it guarantees the success of the application
validation upon loading.
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5 Security Objectives
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
5.1.1 Security Objectives for Java Card System
5.1.1.1 Identification
OT.SID Subject Identification
The TOE shall uniquely identify every subject (applet, or CAP file) before
granting it access to any service.
5.1.1.2 Execution
OT.FIREWALL Firewall
The TOE shall ensure controlled sharing of data containers owned by
applets of different CAP files or the JCRE and between applets and the
TSFs. See SA.FIREWALL for details.
OT.GLOBAL_
ARRAYS_CONFID
Confidentiality of Global Arrays
The TOE shall ensure that the APDU buffer that is shared by all
applications is always cleaned upon applet selection. The TOE shall
ensure that the global byte array used for the invocation of the install
method of the selected applet is always cleaned after the return from the
install method.
OT.GLOBAL_
ARRAYS_INTEG
Integrity of Global Arrays
The TOE shall ensure that only the currently selected applications may
have a write access to the APDU buffer and the global byte array used
for the invocation of the install method of the selected applet.
OT.ARRAY_VIEW_
CONFID
Confidentiality of Array View
The TOE shall ensure that no application can read elements of an array
view not having array view security attribute ATTR_READABLE_VIEW.
The TOE shall ensure that an application can only read the elements of
the array view within the bounds of the array view.
OT.ARRAY_VIEW_
INTEG
Integrity of Array View
The TOE shall ensure that no application can write to an array view not
having array view security attribute ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW. The TOE
shall ensure that an application can only write within the bounds of the
array view.
OT.SENSITIVE_
RESULTS_INTEG
Sensitive Result
The TOE shall ensure that the sensitive results
(com.nxp.id.jcopx.security.SensitiveResultX) of sensitive operations
executed by applications through the Java Card API are protected in
integrity specifically against physical attacks.
OT.NATIVE Native Code
The only means that the Java Card VM shall provide for an application to
execute native code is the invocation of a method of the Java Card API,
or any additional API. See SA.NATIVE for details.
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OT.OPERATE Correct Operation
The TOE must ensure continued correct operation of its security
functions. See SA.OPERATE for details.
OT.REALLOCATION Secure Re-Allocation
The TOE shall ensure that the re-allocation of a memory block for the
runtime areas of the Java Card VM does not disclose any information
that was previously stored in that block.
OT.RESOURCES Resources availability
The TOE shall control the availability of resources for the applications.
See SA.RESOURCES for details.
5.1.1.3 Services
OT.ALARM Alarm
The TOE shall provide appropriate feedback information upon detection
of a potential security violation. See SA.ALARM for details.
OT.CIPHER Cipher
The TOE shall provide a means to cipher sensitive data for applications
in a secure way. In particular, the TOE must support cryptographic
algorithms consistent with cryptographic usage policies and standards.
See SA.CIPHER for details.
OT.KEY-MNGT Key Management
The TOE shall provide a means to securely manage cryptographic
keys. This concerns the correct generation, distribution, access and
destruction of cryptographic keys. See SA.KEY-MNGT.
OT.PIN-MNGT PIN Management
The TOE shall provide a means to securely manage PIN objects. See
SA.PIN-MNGT for details.
AppNote: PIN objects may play key roles in the security architecture of
client applications. The way they are stored and managed in the memory
of the smart card must be carefully considered, and this applies to the
whole object rather than the sole value of the PIN.
OT.TRANSACTION Transaction
The TOE must provide a means to execute a set of operations
atomically. See SA.TRANSACTION for details.
5.1.1.4 Object Deletion
OT.OBJ-DELETION Object Deletion
The TOE shall ensure the object deletion shall not break references to
objects. See SA.OBJ-DELETION for further details.
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5.1.1.5 Applet Management
OT.APPLI-AUTH Application Authentication
The card manager shall enforce the application security policies
established by the card issuer by requiring application authentication
during application loading on the card. This security objective is a
refinement of the Security Objective O.LOAD from [10].
AppNote: Each application loaded onto the TOE has been signed by
a VA. The VA will guarantee that the security policies established by
the card issuer on applications are enforced. For example this authority
(DAP) or a third party (Mandated DAP) can be present on the TOE as
a Security Domain whose role is to verify each signature at application
loading.
OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS Domain Rights
The Card issuer shall not get access or change personalized AP Security
Domain keys which belong to the AP. Modification of a Security Domain
keyset is restricted to the AP who owns the security domain.
AppNote: APs have a set of keys that allows them to establish a secure
channel between them and the platform. These keys sets are not known
by the TOE issuer. The security domain initial keys are changed before
any operation on the SD (OE.KEY-CHANGE).
OT.COMM_AUTH Communication Mutual Authentication
The TOE shall authenticate the origin of the card management requests
that the card receives, and authenticate itself to the remote actor.
OT.COMM_
INTEGRITY
Communication Request Integrity
The TOE shall verify the integrity of the card management requests that
the card receives.
OT.COMM_
CONFIDENTIALITY
Communication Request Confidentiality
The TOE shall be able to process card management requests containing
encrypted data.
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5.1.1.6 Card Management
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Card Management
The TOE shall provide card management functionalities (loading,
installation, extradition, deletion of applications and GP registry updates)
in charge of the life cycle of the whole device and installed applications
(applets). The card manager, the application with specific rights
responsible for the administration of the smart card, shall control the
access to card management functions. It shall also implement the card
issuer’s policy on card management.
The Security Objective from [10] for the environment OE.CARD-
MANAGEMENT is listed as TOE Security Objective OT.CARD-
MANAGEMENT for the TOE as the Card Manager belongs to the TOE
for this evaluation. This security objective is a refinement for the Security
Objectives O.INSTALL, O.LOAD, and O.DELETION from [10]. Thus, the
following objectives are also covered:
• The TOE shall ensure that the installation of an applet performs as
expected (See SA.INSTALL for details).
• The TOE shall ensure that the loading of a package into the card is
secure.
• The TOE shall ensure that the deletion of a package from the TOE is
secure.
AppNote: The card manager will be tightly connected in practice with
the rest of the TOE, which in return shall very likely rely on the card
manager for the effective enforcement of some of its security functions.
The mechanism used to ensure authentication of the TOE issuer, that
manages the TOE, or of the Service Providers owning a Security Domain
with card management privileges is a secure channel. This channel will
be used afterwards to protect commands exchanged with the TOE in
confidentiality and integrity. The platform guarantees that only the ISD
or the Service Providers owning a Security Domain with the appropriate
privilege (Delegated Management) can manage the applications on the
card associated with its Security Domain. This is done accordingly with
the card issuer’s policy on card management. The actor performing the
operation must beforehand authenticate with the Security Domain. In the
case of Delegated Management, the card management command will be
associated with an electronic signature (GlobalPlatform token) verified by
the ISD before execution.
The Security Objective from [10] for the environment OE.CARD-
MANAGEMENT is listed as TOE Security Objective OT.CARD-
MANAGEMENT for the TOE as the Card Manager belongs to the TOE
for this evaluation. This security objective is a refinement for the Security
Objectives O.INSTALL, O.LOAD, and O.DELETION from [10]. Thus, the
following AppNote applicable to O.DELETION applies also:
• Usurpation of identity resulting from a malicious installation of
an applet on the card may also be the result of perturbing the
communication channel linking the CAD and the card. Even if the CAD
is placed in a secure environment, the attacker may try to capture,
duplicate, permute or modify the packages sent to the card. He may
also try to send one of its own applications as if it came from the card
issuer. Thus, this objective is intended to ensure the integrity and
authenticity of loaded CAP files.
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5.1.1.7 Smart Card Platform
OT.SCP.IC IC Physical Protection
The IC shall provide all security features against physical attacks.
This security objective for the environment refers to the point (7) of the
security aspect SA.SCP.
AppNote: The Security Objectives from [10] for the environment
OE.SCP.RECOVERY, OE.SCP.SUPPORT, and OE.SCP.IC are listed
as TOE Security Objectives (OT.SCP.RECOVERY, OT.SCP.SUPPORT,
and OT.SCP.IC) in this section as the IC belongs to the TOE for this
evaluation.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY SCP Recovery
If there is a loss of power, or if the smart card is withdrawn from the
CAD while an operation is in progress, the SCP must allow the TOE to
eventually complete the interrupted operation successfully, or recover to
a consistent and secure state. This security objective for the environment
refers to the security aspect SA.SCP
AppNote: The Security Objectives from [10] for the environment
OE.SCP.RECOVERY, OE.SCP.SUPPORT, and OE.SCP.IC are listed
as TOE Security Objectives (OT.SCP.RECOVERY, OT.SCP.SUPPORT,
and OT.SCP.IC) for the TOE in this section as the Smart Card Platform
belongs to the TOE for this evaluation.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT SCP Support
The SCP shall support the TSFs of the TOE. This security objective
refers to the security aspects 2, 3, 4 and 5 of SA.SCP
AppNote: The Security Objectives from [10] for the environment
OE.SCP.RECOVERY, OE.SCP.SUPPORT, and OE.SCP.IC are listed
as TOE Security Objectives (OT.SCP.RECOVERY, OT.SCP.SUPPORT,
and OT.SCP.IC) for the TOE in this section as the Smart Card Platform
belongs to the TOE for this evaluation.
OT.IDENTIFICATION TOE identification
The TOE must provide means to store Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data in its non-volatile memory. The Initialization Data (or
parts of them) are used for TOE identification.
5.1.1.8 Random Numbers
OT.RND Quality of random numbers
The TOE will ensure the cryptographic quality of random number
generation. For instance random numbers shall not be predictable and
shall have sufficient entropy. The TOE will ensure that no information
about the produced random numbers is available to an attacker since
they might be used for instance to generate cryptographic keys.
5.1.1.9 OS Update Mechanism
OT.CONFID-UPDATE-
IMAGE.LOAD
Confidentiality of Update Image - Load
The TOE shall ensure that the encrypted image transferred to the device
is not disclosed during the installation. The keys used for decrypting the
image shall be kept confidential.
OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPD
ATE-IMAGE
Authorization of Update Image - Load
The TOE shall ensure that it is only possible to load an authorized image.
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The following Security Objectives have been added to comply to JIL "Security
requirements for post-delivery code loading" [7].
OT.SECURE_LOAD_
ACODE
Secure loading of the Additional Code
The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity
and integrity of the loaded Additional Code. The Loader enforces that
only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be loaded on the
Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not
intended to be assembled with the Initial TOE. During the Load Phase of
an Additional Code, the TOE shall remain secure.
OT.SECURE_AC_
ACTIVATION
Secure activation of the Additional Code
Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data
shall be performed at the same time in an Atomic way. All the operations
needed for the code to be able to operate as in the Final TOE shall be
completed before activation. If the Atomic Activation is successful, then
the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case of interruption
or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE
shall remain in its initial state or fail secure.
OT.TOE_
IDENTIFICATION
Secure identification of the TOE
The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code.
The TOE provides means to store Identification Data in its non-volatile
memory and guarantees the integrity of these data. After Atomic
Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the Final TOE
allows identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user shall
be able to uniquely identify Initial TOE and Additional Code(s) which are
embedded in the Final TOE.
5.1.1.10 Config Applet
OT.CARD-CONFIGUR
ATION
Card Configuration
The TOE shall ensure that the customer can only configure customer
configuration items and that NXP can configure customer and NXP
configuration items. Additionally, the customer can only disable the
customer configuration and NXP can disable customer and NXP
configuration.
5.1.1.11 Restricted Mode
OT.ATTACK-COUNT
ER
Attack Counter Reset
The TOE shall ensure that the Attack Counter can only be decremented
in a controled way, either by reset from user with appropriate
authorization, or by regular self decrementation after time elapse.
OT.RESTRICTED-MO
DE
Restricted Mode
The TOE shall ensure that in Restricted Mode all operations return an
error except for the limited set of commands that are allowed by the TOE
when in Restricted Mode.
5.1.1.12 Applet Migration
OT.DATASTORE_
ACCESS
Datastore Access
The TOE shall ensure that only an authorized applet instance can access
data from the datastore based on its AID. An applet instance is triggered
to import/export data in the datastore only by authentic commands
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5.1.1.13 Context Separation
OT.CONT_SEP Context separation
The TOE shall prevent a software running in one context from
unauthorized access (read/write/execute) to another context memory,
peripherals or resources. Any exchange between contexts (like OS or
Services) shall be controlled by the TOE.
OT.CONT_PRIV Privileges management
The TOE shall ensure that its kernel, also known as SMK, has the
highest privileges with regard to any other software-parts running in
contexts inside or outside the TOE boundaries.
OT.CONT_DOS Deny of Service
The TOE shall prevent Deny of Service by managing the scheduling
of the contexts according to their priorities. Only SMK shall be able to
define and modify the priorities.
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
5.2.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment of Java Card System
OE.CAP_FILE Applet
No CAP file loaded post-issuance shall contain native methods.
OE.VERIFICATION Bytecode Verification
All the bytecodes shall be verified at least once, before the loading,
before the installation or before the execution, depending on the card
capabilities, in order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution
time. See SA.VERIFICATION for details.
Additionally, the applet shall follow all the recommendations, if any,
mandated in the platform guidance for maintaining the isolation property
of the platform.
Application Note:
Constraints to maintain the isolation property of the platform are provided
by the platform developer in application development guidance. The
constraints apply to all application code loaded in the platform.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE Code Evidence
For application code loaded pre-issuance, evaluated technical measures
implemented by the TOE or audited organizational measures must
ensure that loaded application has not been changed since the code
verifications required in OE.VERIFICATION.
For application code loaded post-issuance and verified off-card
according to the requirements of OE.VERIFICATION, the verification
authority shall provide digital evidence to the TOE that the application
code has not been modified after the code verification and that he is the
actor who performed code verification.
For application code loaded post-issuance and partially or entirely
verified on-card, technical measures must ensure that the verification
required in OE.VERIFICATION are performed. On-card bytecode verifier
is out of the scope of this Protection Profile.
Application Note: For application code loaded post-issuance and verified
off-card, the integrity and authenticity evidence can be achieved by
electronic signature of the application code, after code verification, by the
actor who performed verification.
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OE.APPS-PROVIDER Application Provider
The AP shall be a trusted actor that provides applications. The AP is
responsible for its security domain keys.
OE.TRUSTED-GUEST
OS
Trusted Guest OS
The external Guest OS provider is a trusted actor that is responsible
for the security and trust of his OS. An external CommOS forwards the
APDU correctly from the I/O interface to the configured destination.
OE.VERIFICATION-A
UTHORITY
Verification Authority
The VA should be a trusted actor who is able to verify bytecode of an
application loaded on the card, guarantee and generate the digital
signature attached to an application and ensure that its public key for
verifying the application signature is on the TOE.
Application Note: The Byte Code Optimizer tool is used by the role
Verification Authority.
OE.KEY-CHANGE Security Domain Key Change
The AP must change its security domain initial keys before any operation
on it.
OE.SECURITY-DOMA
INS
Security Domains
Security domains can be dynamically created, deleted and blocked
during usage phase in post-issuance mode.
OE.USE_DIAG Secure TOE communication protocols
Secure TOE communication protocols shall be supported and used by
the environment.
OE.USE_KEYS Protection of OPE keys
During the TOE usage, the terminal or system in interaction with the
TOE, shall ensure the protection (integrity and confidentiality) of their
own keys by operational means and/or procedures.
OE.PROCESS_SEC_
IC
Protection during composite product manufacturing
Security procedures shall be used after TOE Delivery up to delivery to
the end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE
and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use). This means that
Phases after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 must be protected
appropriately.
OE.CONFID-UPDATE-
IMAGE.CREATE
Confidentiality of Update Image - CREATE
The off-card Update Image Creator ensures that the image is signed
and transferred encrypted to the device and is not disclosed during the
creation and transfer. The keys used for signing and encrypting the
image are kept confidential.
5.3 Security Objectives Rationale
In this section each threat, Organizational Security Policy, and assumption identified in
Section 4 is traced to the security objectives with a rationale.
The security objectives for the TOE defined in Section 5.1 are traced back to the threats
countered by them, and to the organisational security policies enforced by them. The
security objectives for the operational environment defined in Section 5.2 are traced back
to the assumptions they uphold.
5.3.1 Security Objective Rationale related to the Java Card System
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5.3.1.1 Rationale for Threats
This chapter provides the Security Objectives rationale for Java Card System.
The mappings in Section 5.3.1.1.1 (Confidentiality), Section 5.3.1.1.2 (Integrity),
Section 5.3.1.1.3 (Identity Usurpation), Section 5.3.1.1.4 (Unauthorized Execution) and
Section 5.3.1.1.5 (Denial Of Service) are not augmented with the Context Separation
Objectives in order to stay eSE context centric and to maintain modularity, clarity and
alignment with the JavaCard Protection Profile [10]. The inter-context protection is then
covered in Section 5.3.1.1.14 which also covers, by extension, the threats of the above
mentioned chapter with regards to external contexts.
5.3.1.1.1 Confidentiality
T.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
Objective Rationale
OT.CONFID-UPDATE-
IMAGE.LOAD
Counters the threat by ensuring the confidentiality of D.UPDATE_IMAGE
during installing it on the TOE.
OE.CONFID-UPDATE-
IMAGE.CREATE
Counters the threat by ensuring that the D.UPDATE_IMAGE is not
transfered in plain and that the keys are kept secret.
T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA
Objective Rationale
OT.SID Counters this threat by providing correct identification of applets.
OT.FIREWALL Counters this threat by providing the Java Card Virtual Machine Firewall
as specified in [14].
OT.GLOBAL_
ARRAYS_CONFID
Counters this threat by preventing the disclosure of the information
stored in the APDU buffer.
OT.ARRAY_VIEWS_
CONFID
Counters this threat by preventing the disclosure of the information
shared by applets using array views.
OT.OPERATE Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall, which is dynamically
enforced, shall never stop operating.
OT.REALLOCATION Counters this threat by preventing any attempt to read a piece of
information that was previously used by an application but has been
logically deleted. It states that any information that was formerly stored in
a memory block shall be cleared before the block is reused.
OT.ALARM Counters this threat by obtaining clear warning and error messages from
the firewall, which is a software tool automating critical controls, so that
the appropriate countermeasure can be taken.
OT.CIPHER Contributes to counter this threat by protecting the data shared or
information communicated between applets and the CAD using
cryptographic functions.
OT.KEY-MNGT Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PIN’s
which are particular cases of an application’s sensitive data.
OT.PIN-MNGT Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PIN’s
which are particular cases of an application’s sensitive data.
OT.TRANSACTION Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PIN’s
which are particular cases of an application’s sensitive data.
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Objective Rationale
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card
management functions.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the
TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute
to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the
TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute
to counter.
OE.VERIFICATION Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode.
T.CONFID-JCS-CODE
Objective Rationale
OT.NATIVE Counters this threat by ensuring that no native applications can be run to
modify a piece of code.
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card
management functions.
OE.VERIFICATION Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode.
T.CONFID-JCS-DATA
Objective Rationale
OT.SID Counters this threat by providing correct identification of applets.
OT.FIREWALL Contributes to counter this threat by providing means of separating data.
OT.OPERATE Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall, which is dynamically
enforced, shall never stop operating.
OT.ALARM Contributes to counter this threat by obtaining clear warning and error
messages from the firewall, which is a software tool automating critical
controls, so that the appropriate countermeasure can be taken.
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card
management functions.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the
TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute
to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the
TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute
to counter.
OE.VERIFICATION Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode.
5.3.1.1.2 Integrity
T.INTEG-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
Objective Rationale
OT.SECURE_LOAD_
ACODE
Counters the threat directly by ensuring the authenticity and integrity of
D.UPDATE_IMAGE.
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T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE
Objective Rationale
OT.NATIVE Counters this threat by ensuring that no native code can be run to modify
a piece of code.
OE.VERIFICATION Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode. Bytecode
verification ensures that each of the instructions used on the Java Card
platform is used for its intended purpose and in the intended scope of
accessibility. As none of these instructions enables modifying a piece of
code, no Java Card applet can therefore be executed to modify a piece
of code.
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card
management functions.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE The objective OE.CODE-EVIDENCE contributes to counter this threat by
ensuring that integrity and authenticity evidences exist for the application
code loaded into the platform.
T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE.LOAD
Objective Rationale
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card
management functions such as the installation, update or deletion of
applets.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code
loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification,
which ensures code integrity and authenticity.
OT.APPLI-AUTH Counters this threat by ensuring that the loading of packages is done
securely and thus preserves the integrity of packages code.
T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA[REFINED]
Objective Rationale
OT.SID Counters this threat by providing correct identification of applets.
OT.FIREWALL Contributes to counter this threat by providing means of separating data.
OT.GLOBAL_
ARRAYS_INTEG
Counters this threat by ensuring the integrity of the information stored
in the APDU buffer. Application data that is sent to the applet as clear
text arrives in the APDU buffer, which is a resource shared by all
applications.
OT.ARRAY_VIEWS_
INTEG
Counters this threat by preventing the modification of the information
shared by applets using array views.
OT.OPERATE Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall, which is dynamically
enforced, shall never stop operating.
OT.REALLOCATION Counters the threat by preventing any attempt to read a piece of
information that was previously used by an application but has been
logically deleted. It states that any information that was formerly stored in
a memory block shall be cleared before the block is reused.
OT.ALARM Contributes to counter this threat by obtaining clear warning and error
messages from the firewall, which is a software tool automating critical
controls, so that the appropriate countermeasure can be taken.
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Objective Rationale
OT.CIPHER Contributes to counter this threat by protecting the data shared or
information communicated between applets and the CAD using
cryptographic functions.
OT.KEY-MNGT Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PINs
which are particular cases of an application’s sensitive data.
OT.PIN-MNGT Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PINs
which are particular cases of an application’s sensitive data.
OT.TRANSACTION Counters this threat by providing appropriate management of keys, PINs
which are particular cases of an application’s sensitive data.
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card
management functions.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the
TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute
to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the
TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute
to counter.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code
loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification,
which ensures code integrity and authenticity.
OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that personalization of the
application by its associated security domain is only performed by the
authorized AP.
OE.VERIFICATION Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode.
T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA.LOAD
Objective Rationale
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card
management functions such as the installation, update or deletion of
applets.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code
loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification,
which ensures code integrity and authenticity.
OT.APPLI-AUTH Counters this threat by ensuring that the loading of packages is done
securely and thus preserves the integrity of packages code.
T.INTEG-JCS-CODE
Objective Rationale
OT.NATIVE Counters this threat by ensuring that no native code can be run to modify
a piece of code.
OE.VERIFICATION Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecode. Bytecode
verification ensures that each of the instructions used on the Java Card
platform is used for its intended purpose and in the intended scope of
accessibility. As none of these instructions enables modifying a piece of
code, no Java Card applet can therefore be executed to modify a piece
of code.
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Objective Rationale
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card
management functions.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code
loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification,
which ensures code integrity and authenticity.
T.INTEG-JCS-DATA
Objective Rationale
OT.SID Counters this threat by providing correct identification of applets.
OT.FIREWALL Contributes to counter this threat by providing means of separation.
OT.OPERATE Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall shall never stop
operating.
OT.ALARM Contributes to counter this threat by obtaining clear warning and error
messages from the firewall so that the appropriate countermeasure can
be taken.
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card
management functions.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the
TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute
to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.ALARM objectives of the
TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute
to counter.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that the application code
loaded into the platform has not been changed after code verification,
which ensures code integrity and authenticity.
OE.VERIFICATION Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecodes.
5.3.1.1.3 Identity Usurpation
T.SID.1
Objective Rationale
OT.SID Counters this threat by providing unique subject identification.
OT.FIREWALL Counters the threat by providing separation of application data (like
PINs).
OT.GLOBAL_
ARRAYS_CONFID
Counters this threat by preventing the disclosure of the installation
parameters of an applet (like its name). These parameters are loaded
into a global array that is also shared by all the applications. The
disclosure of those parameters could be used to impersonate the applet.
OT.GLOBAL_
ARRAYS_INTEG
Counters this threat by preventing the disclosure of the installation
parameters of an applet (like its name). These parameters are loaded
into a global array that is also shared by all the applications. The
disclosure of those parameters could be used to impersonate the applet.
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Contributes to counter this threat by preventing usurpation of identity
resulting from a malicious installation of an applet on the card.
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T.SID.2
Objective Rationale
OT.SID Counters this threat by providing unique subject identification.
OT.FIREWALL Contributes to counter this threat by providing means of separation.
OT.OPERATE Counters the threat by ensuring that the firewall shall never stop
operating.
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that installing an applet has
no effect on the state of other applets and thus can’t change the TOE’s
attribution of privileged roles.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and objectives of the TOE,
thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives contribute to
counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and objectives of the TOE, thus
indirectly related to the threats that these latter objectives contribute to
counter.
5.3.1.1.4 Unauthorized Execution
T.EXE-CODE.1
Objective Rationale
OT.FIREWALL Counters the threat by preventing the execution of non-shareable
methods of a class instance by any subject apart from the class instance
owner.
OE.VERIFICATION Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecodes. Bytecode
verification ensures that each of the instructions used on the Java Card
platform is used for its intended purpose and in the intended scope of
accessibility. As none of these instructions enables modifying a piece of
code, no Java Card applet can therefore be executed to modify a piece
of code.
T.EXE-CODE.2
Objective Rationale
OE.VERIFICATION Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecodes. Bytecode
verification ensures that each of the instructions used on the Java Card
platform is used for its intended purpose and in the intended scope of
accessibility. Especially the control flow confinement and the validity of
the method references used in the bytecodes are guaranteed.
T.NATIVE
Objective Rationale
OT.NATIVE Counters this threat by ensuring that a Java Card applet can only access
native methods indirectly that is, through an API.
OE.CAP_FILE Contributes to counter this threat by ensuring that no native applets shall
be loaded in post-issuance.
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Objective Rationale
OE.VERIFICATION Contributes to counter the threat by checking the bytecodes. Bytecode
verification also prevents the program counter of an applet to jump
into a piece of native code by confining the control flow to the currently
executed method.
5.3.1.1.5 Denial of Service
T.RESOURCES
Objective Rationale
OT.OPERATE Counters the threat by ensuring correct working order.
OT.RESOURCES Counteres the threat directly by objectives on resource-management.
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Counters this threat by controlling the consumption of resources during
installation and other card management operations.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.RESOURCES objectives
of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives
contribute to counter.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT Intended to support the OT.OPERATE and OT.RESOURCES objectives
of the TOE, thus indirectly related to the threats that these objectives
contribute to counter.
5.3.1.1.6 Card Management
T.UNAUTHORIZED_CARD_MNGT
Objective Rationale
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card
management functions such as the loading, installation, extradition or
deletion of applets.
OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS Contributes to counter this threat by restricting the modification of an AP
security domain keyset to the AP who owns it.
OT.COMM_AUTH Contributes to counter this threat by preventing unauthorized users from
initiating a malicious card management operation.
OT.COMM_
INTEGRITY
Contributes to counter this threat by protecting the integrity of the card
management data while it is in transit to the TOE.
OT.APPLI-AUTH Counters this threat by ensuring that the loading of a package is safe.
T.COM_EXPLOIT
Objective Rationale
OT.COMM_AUTH Contributes to counter this threat by preventing unauthorized users from
initiating a malicious card management operation.
OT.COMM_
INTEGRITY
Contributes to counter this threat by protecting the integrity of the card
management data while it is in transit to the TOE.
OT.COMM_
CONFIDENTIALITY
Contributes to counter this threat by preventing from disclosing
encrypted data transiting to the TOE.
T.LIFE_CYCLE
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Objective Rationale
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Contributes to counter this threat by controlling the access to card
management functions such as the loading, installation, extradition or
deletion of applets.
OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS Contributes to counter this threat by restricting the use of an AP security
domain keysets, and thus the management of the applications related to
this SD, to the AP who owns it.
5.3.1.1.7 Services
T.OBJ-DELETION
Objective Rationale
OT.OBJ-DELETION Counters this threat by ensuring that object deletion shall not break
references to objects.
5.3.1.1.8 Miscellaneous
T.PHYSICAL
Objective Rationale
OT.SCP.IC Counters phyiscal attacks. Physical protections rely on the underlying
platform and are therefore an environmental issue.
OT.RESTRICTED-MO
DE
Contributes to counter the threat by ensuring that if the limit of the Attack
Counter is reached only limited functionality is available.
OT.SENSITIVE_
RESULTS_INTEG
If the sensitive result is supported by the TOE, this threat is partially
covered by the security objective OT.SENSITIVE_RESULTS_INTEG
which ensures that sensitive results are protected against unauthorized
modification by physical attacks.
5.3.1.1.9 Random Numbers
T.RND
Objective Rationale
OT.RND Counters the threat by ensuring the cryptographic quality of random
number generation. For instance random numbers shall not be
predictable and shall have sufficient entropy. Furthermore, the TOE
ensures that no information about the produced random numbers is
available to an attacker.
5.3.1.1.10 Config Applet
T.CONFIG
Objective Rationale
OT.CARD-CONFIGUR
ATION
Counters the threat by ensuring that the customer can only read and
write customer configuration items using the Customer Configuration
Token and NXP can read and write configuration items using the NXP
Configuration Token. If access is disabled configuration items can not be
read or written.
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5.3.1.1.11 OS Update
T.UNAUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE
Objective Rationale
OT.SECURE_LOAD_
ACODE
Counters the threat directly by ensuring that only authorized (allowed
version) images can be installed.
OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPD
ATE-IMAGE
Counters the threat directly by ensuring that only authorized (allowed
version) images can be loaded.
T.INTERRUPT-OSU
Objective Rationale
OT.SECURE_LOAD_
ACODE
Counters the threat directly by ensuring that the TOE remains in a
secure state after interruption of the OS Update procedure (Load Phase).
OT.TOE_
IDENTIFICATION
Counters the threat directly by ensuring that D.TOE_IDENTIFICATION is
only updated after successful OS Update procedure.
OT.SECURE_AC_
ACTIVATION
Counters the threat directly by ensuring that the update OS is only
activated after successful (atomic) OS Update procedure.
5.3.1.1.12 Restricted Mode
T.RESTRICTED-MODE
Objective Rationale
OT.ATTACK-COUNTE
R
Counters the threat by ensuring that only the ISD can reset the Attack
Counter.
OT.RESTRICTED-MO
DE
Counters the threat by ensuring that only the ISD can reset the Attack
Counter.
5.3.1.1.13 Applet Migration
T.AM_DATASTORE_ACCESS
Objective Rationale
OT.DATASTORE_
ACCESS
Counters the threat by verifying that only an authorized applet instance
is able to import data from the datastore. The verification is based on the
AID of the applet. Data import from the datastore by an applet instance
can be done only by a trusted entity authenticated either by sending the
import command via a scp or via untrusted channel using signature and
chained hashes.
5.3.1.1.14 Context Separation
T.CONFID-CONT
Objective Rationale
OT.CONT_SEP Counters the threat by preventing one context to disclose code or data
belonging to another context.
T.INTEG-CONT
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Objective Rationale
OT.CONT_SEP Counters the threat by preventing one context to alter code or data
belonging to another context.
T.CONT-SID
Objective Rationale
OT.CONT_SEP Counters the threat by maintaining a context differentiation for each
Guest OS.
OT.CONT_PRIV Counters the threat by preventing execution of code belonging to a
Guest OS with kernel privileges.
T.EXE-CONT
Objective Rationale
OT.CONT_SEP Counters the threat by preventing one context to execute code belonging
to another context.
OT.CONT_PRIV Counters the threat by preventing execution of code belonging to a
Guest OS with kernel privileges.
T.CONT-DOS
Objective Rationale
OT.CONT_PRIV Counters the threat by ensuring that the kernel has always the highest
privilege.
OT.CONT_DOS Counters the threat by ensuring that all the contexts will always remain
accesible according the configured context management strategy
maintained by SMK.
OT.CONT_SEP Counters the threat by preventing a context accessing the hardware
peripherals and resources of another context without authorization.
5.3.1.2 Rationale for OSPs
OSP.VERIFICATION
Objective Rationale
OE.VERIFICATION Enforces the OSP by guaranteeing that all the bytecodes shall be
verified at least once, before the loading, before the installation or before
the execution in order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution
time.
OT.CARD-MANAGEM
ENT
Contributing to enforce the OSP by ensuring that the loading of a CAP
file into the card is safe.
OT.APPLI-AUTH Contributing to enforce the OSP by ensuring that the loading of a CAP
file into the card is safe.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE This policy is enforced by the security objective of the environment
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE which ensures that evidences exist that the
application code has been verified and not changed after verification.
OSP.PROCESS-TOE
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Objective Rationale
OT.IDENTIFICATION Enforces this organisational security policy by ensuring that the TOE can
be uniquely identified.
OSP.KEY-CHANGE
Objective Rationale
OE.KEY-CHANGE Enforces the OSP by ensuring that the initial keys of the security domain
are changed before any operation on them are performed.
OSP.SECURITY-DOMAINS
Objective Rationale
OE.SECURITY-DOMA
INS
Enforces the OSP by dynamically create, delete, and block the security
domain during usage phase in post-issuance mode.
5.3.1.3 Rationale for Assumptions
A.CAP_FILE
Objective Rationale
OE.CAP_FILE Upholds the assumption by ensuring that no CAP file loaded post-
issuance shall contain native methods.
A.VERIFICATION
Objective Rationale
OE.VERIFICATION Upholds the assumption by guaranteeing that all the bytecodes shall be
verified at least once, before the loading, before the installation or before
the execution in order to ensure that each bytecode is valid at execution
time.
OE.CODE-EVIDENCE This assumption is also upheld by the security objective of the
environment OE.CODE-EVIDENCE which ensures that evidences
exist that the application code has been verified and not changed after
verification.
A.USE_DIAG
Objective Rationale
OE.USE_DIAG Directly upholds this assumption.
A.USE_KEYS
Objective Rationale
OE.USE_KEYS Directly upholds this assumption.
A.PROCESS-SEC-IC
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Objective Rationale
OE.PROCESS_SEC_
IC
Directly upholds this assumption.
A.APPS-PROVIDER
Objective Rationale
OE.APPS-PROVIDER Directly upholds this assumption.
A.TRUSTED-GUESTOS
Objective Rationale
OE.TRUSTED-GUES
TOS
Directly upholds this assumption.
A.VERIFICATION-AUTHORITY
Objective Rationale
OE.VERIFICATION-A
UTHORITY
Directly upholds this assumption.
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6 Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD)
6.1 Extended Components Definition for Java Card System
All the extended components defined in the JavaCard Open Configuration PP [10]
have been taken with no modification and are listed in Table 14, except the extended
component FCS_CKM.5 only used for optional "Key Derivation" feature defined in the
JavaCard Open Configuration PP [10] that is not selected in this evaluation.
Name Title
FCS_RNG.1 Generation of random numbers
Table 14. Extended components defined in the JavaCard Open Configuration PP
6.1.1 Audit Data Storage (FAU_SAS)
This section has been taken over from the certified Smartcard IC Platform Protection
Profile [9]. To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family
(”Audit Data Storage (FAU_SAS)”) of the Class ”Security audit (FAU)” is defined here.
This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a
more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data
to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the
content of the audit records.
6.1.1.1 Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component Leveling:
Figure 4. SAS Component
FAU_SAS Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: list of subjects] with the
capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the
[assignment: type of persistent memory].
6.1.2 TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)
This section has been taken over from the certified (BSI-PP-0055) Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application, Basic Access Control [11].
The additional family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT - ’Protection of
the TSF’ is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE.
The TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack
is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such
attacks are evaluation of TOEs electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA),
differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional
requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed
by any other component of Common Criteria part 2 [2].
6.1.2.1 Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component Leveling:
Figure 5. EMSEC Component
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emandation has two constituents:
• FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to net emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
• FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation
enabling access to TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foressen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions identified that shall be auditable if FAU_GEN (Security audit data
generation) is included in a PP or ST using FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emission] in
excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list
of types of user data]
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TOE shall ensure [assignment: types of users] are unable
to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection]
to gain access [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data]}
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7 Security Functional Requirements (ASE_REQ)
7.1 Security Functional Requirements for Java Card System
7.1.1 Security Functional Requirements
This section states the security functional requirements for the JCOP component of the
TOE. For readability requirements are arranged into groups taken from [10]. Further
groups are added to cover additional security functional requirements.
In this chapter, the assignment and selection operations of the SFRs are marked within
[ ] with the keywords "assignment" or "selection" printed in bold. There is no distinction
between the opertions preformed in the PP and the operations performed in the ST. The
iterations are marked by an identifier within [ ] appended to the name of the SFR. The
refinments coming from the PP are reproduced as they are in the PP. Some additional
refinements are introduced and are explicitly identified in a dedicated "Refinment"
paragraph just after the SFR statement. Finally, a refinment for a group of SFRs is
provided and justified in Section 2.3.2.3 around Table 11. Note that this convention only
applies to the current chapter.
Group Description
Core with Logical
Channels (CoreG_LC)
The CoreG_LC contains the requirements concerning the runtime
environment of the Java Card System implementing logical channels.
This includes the firewall policy and the requirements related to the Java
Card API.
Installation (InstG) The InstG contains the security requirements concerning the installation
of post-issuance applications. It does not address card management
issues in the broad sense, but only those security aspects of the
installation procedure that are related to applet execution.
Applet deletion
(ADELG)
The ADELG contains the security requirements for erasing installed
applets from the card.
Remote Method
Invocation (RMIG)
The RMIG contains the security requirements for the remote method
invocation feature, which provides a new protocol of communication
between the terminal and the applets. This feature is not supported by
the TOE.
Object deletion
(ODELG)
The ODELG contains the security requirements for the object deletion
capability. This provides a safe memory recovering mechanism.
Secure carrier (CarG) The CarG group contains minimal requirements for secure downloading
of applications on the card. This group contains the security
requirements for preventing, in those configurations that do not support
on-card static or dynamic bytecode verification, the installation of a CAP
file that has not been bytecode verified, or that has been modified after
bytecode verification.
External Memory
(EMG)
The EMG contains the security requirements for the external memory
feature. This feature is not supported by the TOE.
Further Security
Functional
Requirements
This group contains further security requirements not covered by the PP
[10].
Table 15. Requirement Groups
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Group Description
Configuration (ConfG) This group contains security requirements related to NXP Proprietary
product configuration feature.
OS Update This group contains security requirements related to NXP Proprietary
product OS Update feature.
Restricted Mode This group contains security requirements related to NXP Proprietary
Restricted Mode feature.
Applet Migration This group contains security requirements related to NXP Proprietary
Restricted Applet Migration feature.
Context Separation
(CONTSEP)
The CONTSEP group contains the requirements for context separation
between SMK (kernel) and hosted Guest OSs, and between each hosted
Guest OSs themselves.
Table 15. Requirement Groups...continued
Subjects are active components of the TOE that (essentially) act on the behalf of users.
The users of the TOE include people or institutions (like the applet developer, the card
issuer, the verification authority), hardware (like the CAD where the card is inserted or
the PCD) and software components (like the application packages installed on the card).
Some of the users may just be aliases for other users. For instance, the verification
authority in charge of the bytecode verification of the applications may be just an alias for
the card issuer. Subjects (prefixed with an "S") are described in the following table:
Subjects Descriptions
S.ADEL The applet deletion manager which also acts on behalf of the card issuer.
It may be an applet ([14], §11), but its role asks anyway for a specific
treatment from the security viewpoint.
S.CAD The CAD represents the actor that requests services by issuing
commands to the card. It also plays the role of the off-card entity that
communicates with the S.INSTALLER.
S.INSTALLER The installer is the on-card entity which acts on behalf of the card issuer.
This subject is involved in the loading of CAP files and installation of
applets.
S.JCRE The runtime environment under which Java programs in a smart card are
executed.
S.JCVM The bytecode interpreter that enforces the firewall at runtime.
S.LOCAL Operand stack of a JCVM frame, or local variable of a JCVM frame
containing an object or an array of references.
S.SD A GlobalPlatform Security Domain representing on the card a off-
card entity. This entity can be the Issuer, an Application Provider, the
Controlling Authority or the Verification Authority.
S.MEMBER Any object’s field, static field or array position.
S.PACKAGE A package is a namespace within the Java programming language that
may contain classes and interfaces, and in the context of Java Card
technology, it defines either a user library, or one or several applets.
Table 16. Java Card Subject Descriptions
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Subjects Descriptions
S.CAP_FILE A CAP file may contain multiple Java language packages. A package is
a namespace within the Java programming language that may contain
classes and interfaces. A CAP file may contain packages that define
either user library, or one or several applets. A CAP file compliant
with Java Card Specifications version 3.1 may contain multiple Java
language packages. An EXTENDED CAP file as specified in Java Card
Specifications version 3.1 may contain only applet packages, only library
packages or a combination of library packages. A COMPACT CAP file as
specified in Java Card Specifications version 3.1 or CAP files compliant
to previous versions of Java Card Specification, MUST contain only a
single package representing a library or one or more applets.
S.OSU OSU provides secure functionality to update the TOE operating
system with an image created by a trusted off-card entity
(S.UpdateImageCreator)
S.UpdateImageCreator The off-card Update Image Creator ensures that the image is signed
and transferred encrypted to the device and is not disclosed during the
creation and transfer. The keys used for signing and encrypting the
image are kept confidential.
S.Archive_Manager Handles incoming Applet Migration APDU Commands and access to the
O.APPLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE.
S.Customer The subject that has the Customer Configuration Token generation key.
S.NXP The subject that has the NXP Configuration Token generation key.
S.ACAdmin The subject that has the Attack Counter Token Key.
S.ConfigurationMecha
nism
On card entity which can read and write configuration items.
S.SMK SMK operating system (secured privileged state) that is in the
boundaries of the TOE.
S.GuestOS One or several Guest Operating System (non-secured state) inside or
outside the boundaries of the TOE. S.GuestOS includes the specific
code of the Guest OS but also the Shared Code that is executed by the
GuestOS and executed with the inherited access rights of this GuestOS.
Table 16. Java Card Subject Descriptions...continued
Objects (prefixed with an "O") are described in the following table:
Objects Descriptions
O.APPLET Any installed applet, its code and data.
O.CODE_CAP_FILE The code of a CAP file, including all linking information. On the Java
Card platform, a CAP file is the installation unit.
O.JAVAOBJECT Java class instance or array. It should be noticed that KEYS, PIN, arrays
and applet instances are specific objects in the Java programming
language.
Table 17. Object Groups
Objects specific to APPLET MIGRATION (prefixed with an "O") are described in the
following table:
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Objects Descriptions
O.APPLET_
MIGRATION_
DATASTORE
Saves User Data: byte arrays, Key Data and PIN Data in the datastore.
O.APPLET_CURRENT The Applet instance on the TOE that is to be updated.
O.APPLET_LOADED The new Applet that is loaded and installed onto to TOE and updates
O.APPLET_CURRENT.
O.APPLET_
MIGRATION_PLAN
The migration plan which maps the AID of the exporting applet instance
to the AID of the importing applet instance.
Table 18. Applet Migration Object Groups
Objects specific to DOMAIN SEPARATION (prefixed with an "O") are described in the
following table:
Objects Descriptions
O.GuestOS_Memory_
Region
Memory region (addressable memory cells or registers) that is allocated
to S.GuestOS (i.e. a context) though the Access Control Table. Some
memory regions are in the boundaries of the TOE and some other not.
O.SMK_Memory_
Region
Memory region (addressable memory cells or registers) that is allocated
to S.SMK and that is in the boundaries of the TOE.
Table 19. Domain Separation Object Groups
Information (prefixed with an "I") is described in the following table:
Information Description
I.DATA JCVM Reference Data: objectref addresses of APDU buffer, JCRE-
owned instances of APDU class and byte array for install method.
Table 20. Information Groups
Security attributes linked to these subjects, objects and information are described in the
following table:
Security attributes Description
Active Applets The set of the active applets’ AIDs. An active applet is an applet that is
selected on at least one of the logical channels.
Applet Selection Status ”Selected” or ”Deselected”.
Applet’s Version
Number
The version number of an applet indicated in the export file.
Attack Counter Attack Counter
CAP File AID The AID of a CAP file.
Context CAP file AID or ”Java Card RE ”.
Currently Active
Context
CAP file AID or ”Java Card RE”.
Current Sequence
Number
The current number of a valid OS installed on the TOE or current number
of a OS update step during update process.
Dependent Package
AID
Allows the retrieval of the Package AID and applet’s version number.
Table 21. Security attribute description
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Security attributes Description
Final Sequence
Number
The sequence number which is reached after completing the update
process. This is uniquely linked to the JCOP version of the final TOE.
Image Type Type of D.UPDATE_IMAGE. Can be either Upgrade, Self Update or
Downgrade.
LC Selection Status Multiselectable, Non-multiselectable or ”None”.
LifeTime CLEAR_ON_DESELECT or PERSISTENT.
Note: Transient objects of type CLEAR_ON_RESET behave like
persistent objects in that they can be accessed only when the Currently
Active Context is the object’s context.
Owner The Owner of an object is either the applet instance that created the
object or the CAP file (library) where it has been defined (these latter
objects can only be arrays that initialize static fields of the CAP file). The
owner of a remote object is the applet instance that created the object.
Package AID The AID of each package indicated in the export file.
Reference Sequence
Number
Is the sequence number which the TOE has before the update process is
started. This is uniquely linked to the JCOP version of the initial TOE.
Registered Applets The set of AID of the applet instances registered on the card.
Remote An object is Remote if it is an instance of a class that directly or indirectly
implements the interface java.rmi.Remote. It applies only if the TOE
provides JCRMI functionality.
Resifdent CAP files The set of AIDs of the CAP files already loaded on the card.
Resident Packages The set of AIDs of the packages already loaded on the card.
Selected Applet
Context
CAP file AID or ”None”.
Sharing Standards, SIO, Array View, Java Card RE Entry Point or global array.
Static References Static fields of a CAP file may contain references to objects. The Static
References attribute records those references.
Address Space Accessible memory portion.
Verification Key Key to verify integrity of D.UPDATE_IMAGE.
Decryption Key Key for decrypting D.UPDATE_IMAGE.
Customer
Configuration Token
generation key
The customer key to generate tokens for product configuration.
NXP Configuration
Token generation key
The NXP key to generate tokens for product configuration.
Attack Counter Token
Key
The key to generate tokens for Attack Counter Reset.
NXP Configuration
Access
The NXP Configuration Access can either be enabled or disabled.
Customer
Configuration Access
The Customer Configuration Access can either be enabled or disabled.
Access privilege For each configuration item the access privilege attribute defines who
(Customer and/or NXP) is allowed to read/write the item.
Table 21. Security attribute description...continued
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Security attributes Description
Key Set Key Set for Secure Channel.
Received Sequence
Number
Sequence number of the uploaded D.UPDATE_IMAGE.
Security Level Secure Communication Security Level defined in Section 10.6 of [17].
Secure Channel
Protocol
Secure Channel Protocol version used.
Session Key Secure Channel’s session key.
Sequence Counter Secure Channel Session’s Sequence Counter.
ICV Secure Channel Session’s ICV.
Card Life Cycle Defined in Section 5.1.1 of [17].
Privileges Defined in Section 6.6.1 of [17].
Loaded Applet AID AID of O.APPLET_LOADED.
Current Instance AID The AID of O.APPLET_CURRENT that is to be updated.
New Instance AID The AID of O.APPLET_LOADED that is loaded onto the TOE and
replaces O.APPLET_CURRENT.
Life-cycle Status Defined in Section 5.3.2 of [17]
Access Control Table Security attributes used to define the access control of S.GuestOS and
S.SMK to objects O.GuestOS_Memory_Region and O.SMK_Memory_
Region.
Table 21. Security attribute description...continued
Operations (prefixed with "OP") are described in the following table. Each operation has
parameters given between brackets, among which there is the "accessed object", the first
one, when applicable. Parameters may be seen as security attributes that are under the
control of the subject performing the operation.
Operations Description
OP.ARRAY_ACCESS
(O.JAVAOBJECT, field)
Read/Write an array component.
OP.ARRAY_LENGTH
(O.JAVAOBJECT, field)
Get length of an array component.
OP.ARRAY_T_ALOAD
(O.JAVAOBJECT, field)
Read from an Array component
OP.ARRAY_
T_ASTORE
(O.JAVAOBJECT, field)
Write to an Array component
OP.ARRAY_AASTORE
(O.JAVAOBJECT, field)
Store into reference array component.
OP.CREATE (Sharing,
LifeTime)(*)
[1]
Creation of an object (new, makeTransient or createArrayView call).
OP.DELETE_APPLET
(O.APPLET,...)
Delete an installed applet and its objects, either logically or physically.
Table 22. Operation Description
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Operations Description
OP.DELETE_CAP_
FILE (O.CODE_CAP_
FILE,...)
Delete a CAP file, either logically or physically.
OP.DELETE_CAP_
FILE_APPLET
(O.CODE_CAP_
FILE,...)
Delete a CAP file and its installed applets, either logically or physically.
OP.INSTANCE_FIELD
(O.JAVAOBJECT, field)
Read/Write a field of an instance of a class in the Java programming
language.
OP.INVK_VIRTUAL
(O.JAVAOBJECT,
method, arg1,...)
Invoke a virtual method (either on a class instance or an array object).
OP.INVK_INTERFACE
(O.JAVAOBJECT,
method, arg1,...)
Invoke an interface method.
OP.JAVA (...) Any access in the sense of [14], §6.2.8. It stands for one of
the operations OP.ARRAY_ACCESS, OP.INSTANCE_FIELD,
OP.INVK_VIRTUAL, OP.INVK_INTERFACE, OP.THROW,
OP.TYPE_ACCESS.
OP.PUT (S1,S2,I) Transfer a piece of information I from S1 to S2.
OP.THROW
(O.JAVAOBJECT)
Throwing of an object (athrow, see [14], §6.2.8.7).
OP.TYPE_ACCESS
(O.JAVAOBJECT,
class)
Invoke checkcast or instanceof on an object in order to access to classes
(standard or shareable interfaces objects).
OP.READ_CONFIG_
ITEM
Reading a Config Item from the configuration area.
OP.MODIFY_
CONFIG_ITEM
Writing of a Config Item.
OP.USE_CONFIG_
ITEM
Operational usage of Config Items by subjects inside the TOE.
OP.TRIGGER_
UPDATE
APDU Command that initializes the OS Update procedure.
OP.EXPORT_
APPLET_DATA
Access O.APPLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE to write User Data: byte
array, PIN and Key Data and the corresponding Current Instance AID.
Also Loaded Applet AID is saved to identify the Applet instance that can
import the data.
OP.IMPORT_
APPLET_DATA
Access O.APPLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE to retrieve previously
exported applet data: byte array, PIN and Key Data.
OP.CONT_ACCESS Any Read/Write/Execute CPU or DMA (not Execute for DMA) operation
performed by S.GuestOS, S.SMK
OP.Modifiction_Of_
Access_Control_Table
Modifiction of the Access Control Table
Table 22. Operation Description...continued
[1] For this operation, there is no accessed object. This rule enforces that shareable transient objects are not allowed. For
instance, during the creation of an object, the JavaCardClass attribute’s value is chosen by the creator.
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7.1.1.1 COREG_LC Security Functional Requirements
The list of SFRs of this category are taken from [10].
7.1.1.1.1 Firewall policy
FDP_ACC.2
[FIREWALL]
Complete access control (FIREWALL)
Hierarchical to: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
FDP_ACC.2.1
[FIREWALL]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: FIREWALL access
control SFP] on [assignment: S.CAP_FILE, S.JCRE, S.JCVM,
O.JAVAOBJECT] and all operations among subjects and objects
covered by the SFP.
Refinement The operations involved in the policy are:
• OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(*),
• OP.INVK_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...),
• OP.INVK_VIRTUAL(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...),
• OP.JAVA(...),
• OP.THROW(O.JAVAOBJECT),
• OP.TYPE_ACCESS(O.JAVAOBJECT, class),
• OP.ARRAY_LENGTH(O.JAVAOBJECT, field),
• OP.ARRAY_T_ALOAD(O.JAVAOBJECT, field),
• OP.ARRAY_T_ASTORE(O.JAVAOBJECT, field),
• OP.ARRAY_AASTORE(O.JAVAOBJECT, field).
FDP_ACC.2.2
[FIREWALL]
The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject
controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are
covered by an access control SFP.
Application Note It should be noticed that accessing array’s components of a static
array, and more generally fields and methods of static objects, is
an access to the corresponding O.JAVAOBJECT.
FDP_ACF.1
[FIREWALL]
Security attribute based access control (FIREWALL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialisation.
FDP_ACF.1.1
[FIREWALL]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: FIREWALL access
control SFP] to objects based on the following [assignment:
• S.CAP_FILE: security attributes LC Selection Status
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• S.JCVM: security attributes Active Applets, Currently Active
Context
• S.JCRE: security attributes Selected Applet Context
• O.JAVAOBJECT: security attributes Sharing, Context, LifeTime
].
FDP_ACF.1.2
[FIREWALL]
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: [assignment:
• R.JAVA.1 ([14], §6.2.8): S.CAP_FILE may freely perform
– OP.INVK_VIRTUAL(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)
– OP.INVK_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)
– OP.THROW(O.JAVAOBJECT)
– OP.TYPE_ACCESS(O.JAVAOBJECT, class)
upon any O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute has value
”JCRE entry point” or ”global array”.
• R.JAVA.2 ([14], §6.2.8): S.CAP_FILE may freely perform
– OP.ARRAY_ACCESS
– OP.INSTANCE_FIELD
– OP.INVK_VIRTUAL(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)
– OP.INVK_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)
– OP.THROW(O.JAVAOBJECT)
upon any O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute has
value ”Standard” and whose LifeTime attribute has value
”PERSISTENT” only if O.JAVAOBJECT’s Context attribute has
the same value as the active context.
• R.JAVA.3 ([14], §6.2.8.10): S.CAP_FILE may perform
– OP.TYPE_ACCESS(O.JAVAOBJECT, class)
upon an O.JAVAOBJECT with Context attribute different from
the current active context, whose Sharing attribute has value
”SIO” only if O.JAVAOBJECT is being cast into (checkcast) or is
being verified as being an instance of (instanceof) an interface
that extends the Shareable interface.
• R.JAVA.4 ([14], §6.2.8.6): S.CAP_FILE may perform
– OP.INVK_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)
upon an O.JAVAOBJECT with Context attribute different from
the currently active context, whose Sharing attribute has the
value ”SIO”, and whose Context attribute has the value ”CAP
File AID”, only if the invoked interface method extends the
Shareable interface and one of the following conditions applies:
– The value of the attribute LC Selection Status of the CAP file
whose AID is ”CAP File AID” is ”Multiselectable”,
– The value of the attribute LC Selection Status of the CAP file
whose AID is ”CAP File AID” is ”Non-multiselectable”, and
either ”Package AID” is the value of the currently selected
applet or otherwise ”CAP File AID” does not occur in the
attribute Active Applets.
• R.JAVA.5: S.CAP_FILE may perform
– OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(*)
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upon O.JAVAOBJECT only if the value of the Sharing
parameter is ”Standard” or ”SIO”.
• R.JAVA.6 ([14], §6.2.8.10): S.CAP_FILE may freely perform
– OP.ARRAY_ACCESS(O.JAVAOBJECT, field)
– OP.ARRAY_LENGTH(O.JAVAOBJECT, field)
upon any O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute has value
”global array”.
].
FDP_ACF.1.3
[FIREWALL]
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: [assignment:
• The subject S.JCRE can freely perform OP.JAVA(...) and
OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(*), with the exception given in
FDP_ACF.1.4 [FIREWALL], provided it is the Currently Active
Context.
• The only means that the subject S.JCVM shall provide for an
application to execute native code is the invocation of a Java
Card API method (through
– OP.INVK_INTERFACE(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...)
– OP.INVK_VIRTUAL(O.JAVAOBJECT, method, arg1, ...))
].
FDP_ACF.1.4
[FIREWALL]
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules:[assignment:
• Any subject with OP.JAVA(...) upon an O.JAVAOBJECT whose
LifeTime attribute has value ”CLEAR_ON_DESELECT” if
O.JAVAOBJECT’s Context attribute is not the same as the
Selected Applet Context.
• Any subject attempting to create an object by the
means of OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(*) and a
”CLEAR_ON_DESELECT” LifeTime parameter if the active
context is not the same as the Selected Applet Context.
• S.CAP_FILE performing
OP.ARRAY_AASTORE(O.JAVAOBJECT, field) of the reference
of an O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute has value
”global array” or ”Temporary”.
• S.CAP_FILE performing OP.PUTFIELD or OP.PUTSTATIC of
the reference of an O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute
has value ”global array” or ”Temporary”.
• R.JAVA.7 ([14], §6.2.8.2): S.CAP_FILE performing
OP.ARRAY_T_ASTORE into an array view without
ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW access attribute.
• R.JAVA.8 ([14], §6.2.8.2): S.CAP_FILE performing
OP.ARRAY_T_ALOAD into an array view without
ATTR_READABLE_VIEW access attribute.
].
Application Note FDP_ACF.1.4 [FIREWALL]:
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• The deletion of applets may render some O.JAVAOBJECT
inaccessible, and the Java Card RE may be in charge of
this aspect. This can be done, for instance, by ensuring that
references to objects belonging to a deleted application are
considered as a null reference.
In the case of an array type, fields are components of the array
([16], §2.14, §2.7.7), as well as the length; the only methods of an
array object are those inherited from the Object class.
The Sharing attribute defines five categories of objects:
• Standard ones, whose both fields and methods are under the
firewall policy,
• Shareable interface Objects (SIO), which provide a secure
mechanism for inter-applet communication,
• JCRE entry points (Temporary or Permanent), who have freely
accessible methods but protected fields,
• Global arrays, having both unprotected fields (including
components; refer to JavaCardClass discussion above) and
methods.
• Array Views, having fields/elements access controlled by
access control attributes, ATTR_READABLE_VIEW and
ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW and methods.
When a new object is created, it is associated with the Currently
Active Context. But the object is owned by the applet instance
within the Currently Active Context when the object is instantiated
([14], §6.1.3). An object is owned by an applet instance, by the
JCRE or by the library where it has been defined (these latter
objects can only be arrays that initialize static fields of CAP files).
([14], Glossary) Selected Applet Context. The Java Card RE
keeps track of the currently selected Java Card applet. Upon
receiving a SELECT command with this applet’s AID, the Java
Card RE makes this applet the Selected Applet Context. The
Java Card RE sends all APDU commands to the Selected Applet
Context.
While the expression ”Selected Applet Context” refers to a
specific installed applet, the relevant aspect to the policy is the
context (CAP file AID) of the selected applet. In this policy, the
”Selected Applet Context” is the AID of the selected CAP file.
([14], §6.1.2.1) At any point in time, there is only one active
context within the Java Card VM (this is called the Currently
Active Context).
It should be noticed that the invocation of static methods (or
access to a static field) is not considered by this policy, as there
are no firewall rules. They have no effect on the active context as
well and the ”acting CAP File” is not the one to which the static
method belongs to in this case.
It should be noticed that the Java Card platform, version 2.2.x
and version 3.x.x Classic Edition, introduces the possibility for an
applet instance to be selected on multiple logical channels at the
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same time, or accepting other applets belonging to the same CAP
file being selected simultaneously. These applets are referred to
as multiselectable applets. Applets that belong to a same CAP file
are either all multiselectable or not ([13], §2.2.5). Therefore, the
selection mode can be regarded as an attribute of CAP file. No
selection mode is defined for a library CAP file.
An applet instance will be considered an active applet instance
if it is currently selected in at least one logical channel. An
applet instance is the currently selected applet instance only if
it is processing the current command. There can only be one
currently selected applet instance at a given time. ([14], §4).
FDP_IFC.1 [JCVM] Subset information flow control (JCVM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes
FDP_IFC.1.1 [JCVM] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: JCVM information
flow control SFPs] on [assignment: S.JCVM, S.LOCAL,
S.MEMBER, I.DATA and OP.PUT(S1,S2,I)].
Application note It should be noticed that references of temporary Java Card RE
entry points, which cannot be stored in class variables, instance
variables or array components, are transferred from the internal
memory of the Java Card RE (TSF data) to some stack through
specific APIs (Java Card RE owned exceptions) or Java Card RE
invoked methods (such as the process(APDU apdu)); these are
causes of OP.PUT(S1,S2,I) operations as well.
FDP_IFF.1 [JCVM] Simple security attributes (JCVM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation.
FDP_IFF.1.1 [JCVM] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: JCVM information
flow control SFP] based on the following types of subject and
information security attributes [assignment:
• S.JCVM: security attributes Currently Active Context
].
FDP_IFF.1.2 [JCVM] The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled
subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the
following rules hold: [assignment:
• An operation OP.PUT(S1, S.MEMBER, I.DATA) is allowed if
and only if the Currently Active Context is ”Java Card RE”.
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• other OP.PUT operations are allowed regardless of the
Currently Active Context’s value.
].
FDP_IFF.1.3 [JCVM] The TSF shall enforce[assignment:no additional information
flow control SFP rules].
FDP_IFF.1.4 [JCVM] The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on
the following rules: [assignment:none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 [JCVM] The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the
following rules: [assignment: none].
Application note The storage of temporary Java Card RE-owned objects
references is runtime-enforced ([14], §6.2.8.1-3).
It should be noticed that this policy essentially applies to the
execution of bytecode. Native methods, the Java Card RE itself
and possibly some API methods can be granted specific rights
or limitations through the FDP_IFF.1.3 [JCVM] to FDP_IFF.1.5
[JCVM] elements. The way the Java Card virtual machine
manages the transfer of values on the stack and local variables
(returned values, uncaught exceptions) from and to internal
registers is implementation dependent. For instance, a returned
reference, depending on the implementation of the stack frame,
may transit through an internal register prior to being pushed
on the stack of the invoker. The returned bytecode would cause
more than one OP.PUT operation under this scheme.
FDP_RIP.1
[OBJECTS]
Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1
[OBJECTS]
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: allocation
of the resource to] the following objects: [assignment: class
instances and arrays].
Application note The semantics of the Java programming language requires for
any object field and array position to be initialized with default
values when the resource is allocated [16], §2.5.1.
FMT_MSA.1 [JCRE] Management of security attributes (JCRE)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control], FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MSA.1.1
[JCRE]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: FIREWALL access
control SFP] to restrict the ability to [selection:modify] the
security attributes [assignment: Selected Applet Context] to
[assignment:S.JCRE].
Application note The modification of the Selected Applet Context should be
performed in accordance with the rules given in [14], §4 and [13],
§3.4.
FMT_MSA.1
[JCVM]
Management of security attributes (JCVM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control], FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MSA.1.1
[JCVM]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: FIREWALL access
control SFP and the JCVM information flow control SFP] to
restrict the ability to [selection:modify] the security attributes
[assignment: Currently Active Context and Active Applets] to
[assignment:S.JCVM].
Application note The modification of the Selected Applet Context should be
performed in accordance with the rules given in [14], §4 and [13],
§3.4.
FMT_MSA.2
[FIREWALL-JCVM]
Secure security attributes (FIREWALL-JCVM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control], FMT_MSA.1 Management of security
attributes, FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FMT_MSA.2.1
[FIREWALL-JCVM]
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted
for [assignment: all the security attributes of subjects and
objects defined in the FIREWALL access control SFP and the
JCVM information flow control SFP].
Application note The following rules are given as examples only. For instance, the
last two rules are motivated by the fact that the Java Card API
defines only transient arrays factory methods. Future versions
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may allow the creation of transient objects belonging to arbitrary
classes; such evolution will naturally change the range of ”secure
values” for this component.
• The Context attribute of an O.JAVAOBJECT must correspond to
that of an installed applet or be ”Java Card RE”.
• An O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute is a Java Card RE
entry point or a global array necessarily has ”Java Card RE” as
the value for its Context security attribute.
• An O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute value is a
global array necessarily has ”array of primitive type” as a
JavaCardClass security attribute’s value.
• Any O.JAVAOBJECT whose Sharing attribute value is not
”Standard” has a PERSISTENT-LifeTime attribute’s value.
• Any O.JAVAOBJECT whose LifeTime attribute value is not
PERSISTENT has an array type as JavaCardClass attribute’s
value.
FMT_MSA.3
[FIREWALL]
Static attribute initialisation (FIREWALL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles.
FMT_MSA.3.1
[FIREWALL]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: FIREWALL access
control SFP] to provide [selection: restrictive] default values
for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
[FIREWALL-
EditoriallyRefined]
The TSF shall not allow [assignment: any role] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an
object or information is created.
Application note FMT_MSA.3.1 [FIREWALL]
• Objects’ security attributes of the access control policy
are created and initialized at the creation of the object
or the subject. Afterwards, these attributes are no longer
mutable (FMT_MSA.1 [JCRE]). At the creation of an object
(OP.CREATE), the newly created object, assuming that the
FIREWALL access control SFP permits the operation, gets
its Lifetime and Sharing attributes from the parameters of
the operation; on the contrary, its Context attribute has a
default value, which is its creator’s Context attribute and AID
respectively ([14], §6.1.3). There is one default value for the
Selected Applet Context that is the default applet identifier’s
Context, and one default value for the Currently Active Context
that is ”Java Card RE”.
• The knowledge of which reference corresponds to a temporary
entry point object or a global array and which does not is
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solely available to the Java Card RE (and the Java Card virtual
machine).
FMT_MSA.3.2 [FIREWALL]
• The intent is that none of the identified roles has privileges with
regard to the default values of the security attributes. It should
be noticed that creation of objects is an operation controlled
by the FIREWALL access control SFP. The operation shall fail
anyway if the created object would have had security attributes
whose value violates FMT_MSA.2.1 [FIREWALL-JCVM].
FMT_MSA.3
[JCVM]
Static attribute initialisation (JCVM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles.
FMT_MSA.3.1
[JCVM]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: JCVM information flow
control SFP] to provide [selection: restrictive] default values
for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
[JCVM-
EditoriallyRefined]
The TSF shall not allow [assignment: any role] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an
object or information is created.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions:[assignment:
1. modify the Currently Active Context, the Selected Applet
Context and the Active Applets
].
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment:
• Java Card RE (JCRE),
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• Java Card VM (JCVM).
].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
7.1.1.1.2 Application Programming Interface
The following SFRs are related to the Java Card API. The whole set of cryptographic
algorithms is generally not implemented because of limited memory resources and/or
limitations due to exportation. Therefore, the following requirements only apply to the
implemented subset. It should be noticed that the execution of the additional native
code is not within the TSF. Nevertheless, access to API native methods from the Java
Card System is controlled by TSF because there is no difference between native and
interpreted methods in their interface or invocation mechanism.
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation] FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction.
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm
[assignment:JCOP RNG] and specified cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: DES: Key lengths - LENGTH_DES3_2KEY,
LENGTH_DES3_3KEY bit, AES: Key lengths -
LENGTH_AES_128, LENGTH_AES_192, LENGTH_AES_256
bit that meet the following: [assignment: FCS_RNG.1 or
FCS_RNG.1[HDT]].
FCS_CKM.1.1[RSA] The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment:
RSA and RSA-CRT key generation algorithm] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: from 512 to 4096 bits by
steps of 256 bits] that meet the following: [assignment: [28]
and [32]].
FCS_CKM.1.1[ECC] The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment:
ECC key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key
sizes [assignment: any length from 128 to 528 bits] that meet
the following: [assignment: [29] and [32]].
FCS_CKM.1.1[EdDSA]
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment:
EdDSA key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic
key sizes [assignment: any length from 128 to 528 bits] that
meet the following: [assignment: [26]].
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FCS_CKM.1.1[Mont] The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment:
MontDH Key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic
key sizes [assignment: any length from 128 to 528 bits] that
meet the following: [assignment: [27]].
Application Note • The keys can be generated and diversified in accordance with
[12] specification in class KeyBuilder.
• This component shall be instantiated according to the version
of the Java Card API applying to the security target and the
implemented algorithms ([12]).
Application Note • The keys can be generated and diversified in accordance with
[34] specification in class KeyBuilderX.
• This component shall be instantiated according to the version
of the Java Card API applying to the security target and the
implemented algorithms ([34].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation].
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment:
physically overwriting the keys in a randomized manner] that
meets the following: [assignment: none].
Application Note • The keys are reset as specified in [12] Key class, with the
method clearKey(). Any access to a cleared key for ciphering or
signing shall throw an exception.
• This component shall be instantiated according to the version
of the Java Card API applicable to the security target and the
implemented algorithms ([12]).
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction.
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FCS_COP.1.1
[GCM]
The TSF shall perform [assignment: encryption and
decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment: AES in GCM mode] and cryptographic
key sizes [assignment: 128 bits, 192 and 256 bits] that meet
the following: [assignment: FIPS 197 [33], NIST Special
Publication 800-38D Recommendation for BlockCipher [31]].
FCS_COP.1.1 [CCM] The TSF shall perform [assignment: encryption and
decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment: AES in CCM mode] and cryptographic
key sizes [assignment: 128 bits, 192 and 256 bits] that meet
the following: [assignment: FIPS 197 [33], NIST Special
Publication 800-38C Recommendation for BlockCipher [30]].
FCS_COP.1.1
[TripleDES]
The TSF shall perform [assignment: encryption and
decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm in [assignment:
• ALG_DES_CBC_ISO9797_M1
• ALG_DES_CBC_ISO9797_M2
• ALG_DES_CBC_NOPAD
• ALG_DES_ECB_ISO9797_M1
• ALG_DES_ECB_ISO9797_M2
• ALG_DES_ECB_NOPAD
• ALG_DES_CBC_PKCS5
• ALG_DES_ECB_PKCS5
• ALG_DES_CBC_PKCS7
• ALG_DES_ECB_PKCS7
] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
LENGTH_DES3_2KEY, LENGTH_DES3_3KEY] that meet the
following: [assignment: for ALG_DES_ECB_ISO9797_M2
see Java Card API Spec [12], for the rest see both [12] and
JCOPX API [34]].
FCS_COP.1.1 [AES] The TSF shall perform [assignment: encryption and
decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment:
• ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD
• ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD_STANDARD
• ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_ECB_NOPAD
• ALG_AES_CBC_ISO9797_M1
• ALG_AES_CBC_ISO9797_M2
• ALG_AES_CBC_ISO9797_M2_STANDARD
• ALG_AES_ECB_ISO9797_M1
• ALG_AES_ECB_ISO9797_M2
• ALG_AES_CBC_PKCS5
• ALG_AES_ECB_PKCS5
• ALG_AES_CBC_PKCS7
• ALG_AES_ECB_PKCS7
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• AES CTR
• AES CFB
] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: LENGTH_AES_128,
LENGTH_AES_192 and LENGTH_AES_256
bit] that meet the following: [assignment: for
ALG_AES_BLOCK_128_CBC_NOPAD_STANDARD,
ALG_AES_CBC_ISO9797_STANDARD,
ALG_AES_CBC_PKCS7, ALG_AES_ECB_PKCS7,
ALG_AES_CFB see API specified in JCOPX [34], for the rest
see Java Card API Spec [12]].
FCS_COP.1.1
[RSACipher]
The TSF shall perform [assignment: encryption
and decryption] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [assignment: ALG_RSA_NOPAD,
ALG_RSA_PKCS1, ALG_RSA_PKCS1_OAEP] and
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: any key length that is
amultiple of 32 between 512 and 4096 bits] that meet the
following: [assignment: Java Card API Spec [12] and for the
32 bit step range see API specified in JCOPX [34]].
FCS_COP.1.1
[ECDH_P1363]
The TSF shall perform [assignment: Diffie-Hellman Key
Agreement] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment:
• ALG_EC_SVDP_DH
• ALG_EC_SVDP_DH_KDF
• ALG_EC_SVDP_DH_PLAIN
• ALG_EC_SVDP_DHC
• ALG_EC_SVDP_DHC_KDF
• ALG_EC_SVDP_DHC_PLAIN
• ALG_EC_SVDP_DH_PLAIN_XY
] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
LENGTH_EC_FP_128, LENGTH_EC_FP_160,
LENGTH_EC_FP_192, LENGTH_EC_FP_224,
LENGTH_EC_FP_256,LENGTH_EC_FP_384,
LENGTH_EC_FP_528 and from 128 bit to 528 bit in 1 bit
steps] that meet the following: [assignment: Java Card API
Spec [12] and for ALG_EC_SVDP_DH_PLAIN_XY 1 bit step
range key size see API specified in JCOPX [34]].
FCS_COP.1.1
[ECDH_25519]
The TSF shall perform [assignment: Diffie-Hellman Key
Agreement] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment: ALG_MONT_DH_25519] and
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 256 bits] that meet the
following: [assignment: see API specified in JCOPX [34]].
FCS_COP.1.1
[DESMAC]
The TSF shall perform [assignment: MAC generation and
verification] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment: Triple-DES in outer CBC for Mode:
• ALG_DES_MAC4_ISO9797_1_M1_ALG3
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• ALG_DES_MAC4_ISO9797_1_M2_ALG3
• ALG_DES_MAC4_ISO9797_M1
• ALG_DES_MAC4_ISO9797_M2
• ALG_DES_MAC8_ISO9797_1_M1_ALG3
• ALG_DES_MAC8_ISO9797_1_M2_ALG3
• ALG_DES_MAC8_ISO9797_M1
• ALG_DES_MAC8_ISO9797_M2
• ALG_DES_MAC8_NOPAD
• ALG_DES_MAC4_PKCS5
• ALG_DES_MAC8_PKCS5
] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
LENGTH_DES3_2KEY, LENGTH_DES3_3KEY] that meet the
following: [assignment: Java Card API Spec [12] and JCOPX
API [34] ].
FCS_COP.1.1
[AESMAC]
The TSF shall perform [assignment: 16 byte MAC
generation and verification] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [assignment: AES in CBC Mode
ALG_AES_MAC_128_NOPAD] and cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: LENGTH_AES_128, LENGTH_AES_192 and
LENGTH_AES_256 bit] that meet the following: [assignment:
Java Card API Spec [12]].
FCS_COP.1.1
[RSASignaturePKCS1]
The TSF shall perform [assignment: digital signature
generation and verification] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
• ALG_RSA_SHA_224_PKCS1
• ALG_RSA_SHA_224_PKCS1_PSS
• ALG_RSA_SHA_256_PKCS1
• ALG_RSA_SHA_256_PKCS1_PSS
• ALG_RSA_SHA_384_PKCS1
• ALG_RSA_SHA_384_PKCS1_PSS
• ALG_RSA_SHA_512_PKCS1
• ALG_RSA_SHA_512_PKCS1_PSS
• ALG_RSA_SHA_ISO9796
• ALG_RSA_SHA_ISO9796_MR
• SIG_CIPHER_RSA in combination
with MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_256
or MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_384 or
MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_512 and in combination with
Cipher.PAD_PKCS1_OAEP
] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: any key length that
is a multiple of 32 between 512 and 4096 bits] that meet the
following: [assignment: Java Card API Spec [12] and for the
32 bit step range see API specified in JCOPX [34]].
FCS_COP.1.1
[ECSignature]
The TSF shall perform [assignment: digital signature
generation and verification] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
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• ALG_ECDSA_SHA_224
• ALG_ECDSA_SHA_256
• ALG_ECDSA_SHA_384
• ALG_ECDSA_SHA_512
• SIG_CIPHER_ECDSA in combination
with MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_256
or MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_384 or
MessageDigest.ALG_SHA_512]
] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
LENGTH_EC_FP_128,LENGTH_EC_FP_160,
LENGTH_EC_FP_192, LENGTH_EC_FP_224,
LENGTH_EC_FP_256, LENGTH_EC_FP_384,
LENGTH_EC_FP_528 and from 128 bit to 528 bit in 1 bit
steps] that meet the following: [assignment: Java Card API
Spec [12] and for 1 bit step range key size see API specified
in JCOPX [34]].
FCS_COP.1.1
[EdDSA]
The TSF shall perform [assignment: digital signature
verification] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment: ALG_ED25519PH_SHA_512 ] and
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: 256 bit for private key,
256 bit for public key] that meet the following: [assignment:
API specified in JCOPX [34]].
FCS_COP.1.1 [SHA] The TSF shall perform [assignment: secure hash
computation] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment:
• ALG_SHA
1
• ALG_SHA_224
• ALG_SHA_256
• ALG_SHA_384
• ALG_SHA_512
] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: LENGTH_SHA,
LENGTH_SHA_224, LENGTH_SHA_256, LENGTH_SHA_384,
LENGTH_SHA_512, ] that meet the following: [assignment:
Java Card API Spec [12] and JCOPX API specified in [34]].
FCS_COP.1.1
[AES_CMAC]
The TSF shall perform [assignment: CMAC generation and
verification] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment:
• ALG_AES_CMAC8
• ALG_AES_CMAC16
• SIG_CIPHER_AES_CMAC8
• SIG_CIPHER_AES_CMAC16
• SIG_CIPHER_AES_CMAC128
• ALG_AES_CMAC16_STANDARD
1 Due to mathematical weakness only resistant against AVA_VAN.5 for temporary data (e.g. as used for
generating session keys), but not if repeatedly applied to the same input data.
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• ALG_AES_CMAC_128
] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: LENGTH_AES_128,
LENGTH_AES_192 and LENGTH_AES_256 bit] that meet the
following: [assignment: see Java Card API Spec [12] and the
JCOPX API specified in [34]].
FCS_COP.1.1
[HMAC]
The TSF shall perform [assignment: HMAC generation and
verification] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment:
• ALG_HMAC_SHA_256
• ALG_HMAC_SHA_384
• ALG_HMAC_SHA_512
] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
LENGTH_SHA_256,LENGTH_SHA_384 and
LENGTH_SHA_512 bit] that meet the following: [assignment:
Java Card specification [12] and JCOPX API [34]].
FCS_COP.1.1
[TDES_CMAC]
The TSF shall perform [assignment: message authentication
and verification] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm [assignment:
• ALG_DES_CMAC8
• SIG_CIPHER_DES_CMAC8
] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
LENGTH_DES3_2KEY and LENGTH_DES3_3KEY bit] that
meet the following: [assignment: see API specified in JCOPX
[34]].
FCS_COP.1.1 [DAP] The TSF shall perform [assignment: verification of the DAP
signature attached to Executable Load Applications]
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
[assignment:
• ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1
• ALG_ECDSA_SHA_256
] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
LENGTH_RSA_1024, LENGTH_EC_FP_256] that meet the
following: [assignment: GP Spec [21] and JCOPX API [34]].
FCS_RNG.1 Random Number Generation.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [selection: deterministic] random
number generator [selection: DRG.3][AIS20]that implements:
[assignment:
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• (DRG.3.1) If initialized with a random seed using a PTRNG of
class PTG.2 (as defined in [5]) as random source, the internal
state of the RNG shall have at least 256 bit of entropy.
• (DRG.3.2) The RNG provides forward secrecy (as defined in
[5]).
• (DRG.3.3) The RNG provides enhanced backward secrecy
even if the current internal state is known (as defined in [5])
].
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [assignment:
• (DRG.3.4) The RNG, initialized with a random seed using a
PTRNG of class PTG.2 (as defined in [5]) as random source,
generates output for which 2
48
strings of bit length 128 are
mutually different with probability at least 1-2
24
• (DRG.3.5) Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish
the random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG.
The random numbers must pass test procedure A (as defined in
[5]).
].
Application Note • This functionality is provided by the Crypto Library.
• FCS_RNG.1 and FCS_RNG.1[HDT] both apply to the same
Random Number Generator.
FCS_RNG.1 [HDT] Random Number Generation.
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1 [HDT] The TSF shall provide a [selection: hybrid deterministic]
random number generator that implements: [assignment:
• (DRG.4.1) The internal state of the RNG shall use PTRNG of
class PTG.2 (as defined in [5]) as random source
• (DRG.4.2) The RNG provides forward secrecy (as defined in
[5]).
• (DRG.4.3) The RNG provides backward secrecy even if the
current internal state is known (as defined in [5])
• (DRG.4.4) The RNG provides enhanced forward secrecy on
demand (as defined in [5])
• (DRG.4.5) The internal state of the RNG is seeded by an
PTRNG of class PTG.2 (as defined in [5])
].
FCS_RNG.1.2 [HDT] The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [assignment:
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• (DRG.4.6) The RNG generates output for which 2
48
strings
of bit length 128 are mutually different with probability at least
1-2
24
• (DRG.4.7) Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish
the random numbers from output sequences of an ideal RNG.
The random numbers must pass test procedure A (as defined in
[5]).
].
Application Note • This functionality is provided by the Crypto Library.
• FCS_RNG.1 and FCS_RNG.1[HDT] both apply to the same
Random Number Generator.
• For DRG.4.5: The Hardware PTRNG of class PTG.2 generates
random data used as an input for the derivation function. The
result of the derivation function is used as the seed.
FDP_RIP.1
[ABORT]
Subset residual information protection (ABORT)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1
[ABORT]
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: de-allocation
of the resource from] the following objects: [assignment: any
reference to an object instance created during an aborted
transaction].
Application Note The events that provoke the de-allocation of a transient object are
described in [14], §5.1.
FDP_RIP.1 [APDU] Subset residual information protection (APDU)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 [APDU] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of
the resource to] the following objects: [assignment: the APDU
buffer].
Application Note The allocation of a resource to the APDU buffer is typically
performed as the result of a call to the process() method of an
applet.
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FDP_RIP.1
[GlobalArray]
Subset residual information protection (GlobalArray)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1
[GlobalArray-Refined]
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: deallocation
of the resource from] the applet as a result of returning from
the process method the following objects: [assignment: a user
Global Array]
Application Note An array resource is allocated when a call to the API method
JCSystem.makeGlobalArray is performed. The Global Array is
created as a transient JCRE Entry Point Object ensuring that
reference to it cannot be retained by any application. On return
from the method which called JCSystem.makeGlobalArray, the
array is no longer available to any applet and is deleted and the
memory in use by the array is cleared and reclaimed in the next
object deletion cycle.
FDP_RIP.1 [bArray] Subset residual information protection (bArray)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1
[bArray]
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: deallocation
of the resource from] the following objects: [assignment: the
bArray object].
Application Note A resource is allocated to the bArray object when a call to
an applet’s install() method is performed. There is no conflict
with FDP_ROL.1 here because of the bounds on the rollback
mechanism (FDP_ROL.1.2[FIREWALL]): the scope of the
rollback does not extend outside the execution of the install()
method, and the de-allocation occurs precisely right after the
return of it.
FDP_RIP.1 [KEYS] Subset residual information protection (KEYS)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 [KEYS] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: deallocation
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of the resource from] the following objects: [assignment: the
cryptographic buffer (D.CRYPTO)].
Application Note • The javacard.security and javacardx.crypto packages do
provide secure interfaces to the cryptographic buffer in a
transparent way. See javacard.security.KeyBuilder and Key
interface of [12].
FDP_RIP.1
[TRANSIENT]
Subset residual information protection (TRANSIENT)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1
[TRANSIENT]
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: deallocation
of the resource from] the following objects: [assignment: any
transient object].
Application Note • The events that provoke the de-allocation of any transient
object are described in [14], §5.1.
• The clearing of CLEAR_ON_DESELECT objects is not
necessarily performed when the owner of the objects is
deselected. In the presence of multiselectable applet instances,
CLEAR_ON_DESELECT memory segments may be attached
to applets that are active in different logical channels.
Multiselectable applet instances within a same CAP file must
share the transient memory segment if they are concurrently
active ([14], §4.2.).
FDP_ROL.1
[FIREWALL]
Basic rollback (FIREWALL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FDP_ROL.1.1
[FIREWALL]
The TSF shall enforce [assignment: the FIREWALL access
control SFP and the JCVM information flow control SFP] to
permit the rollback of the [assignment: operations OP.JAVA(...)
and OP.CREATE(Sharing, LifeTime)(*)] on the [assignment:
object O.JAVAOBJECT.].
FDP_ROL.1.2
[FIREWALL]
The TSF shall permit operations to be rolled back within the
[assignment: scope of a select(), deselect(), process(),
install() or uninstall() call, notwithstanding the restrictions
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given in [14], §7.7, within the bounds of the Commit Capacity
([14], §7.8), and those described in [12]].
Application Note Transactions are a service offered by the APIs to applets. It is
also used by some APIs to guarantee the atomicity of some
operation. This mechanism is either implemented in Java Card
platform or relies on the transaction mechanism offered by
the underlying platform. Some operations of the API are not
conditionally updated, as documented in [12] (see for instance,
PIN-blocking, PIN-checking, update of Transient objects).
7.1.1.1.3 Card Security Management
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis.
FAU_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [assignment: one of the following actions:
• throw an exception,
• lock the card session (after a predefined number of resetted
sessions the card might switch to Restricted Mode),
• reinitialize the Java Card System and its data,
• response with error code to S.CAD
] upon detection of a potential security violation.
Refinement The ”potential security violation” stands for one of the following
events:
• CAP: CAP file inconsistency (response with error code to
S.CAD),
• LFC: applet life cycle inconsistency (throw an exception),
• CHP: card tearing (unexpected removal of the Card out of the
CAD) and power failure (reset the card session),
• ABT: abort of a transaction in an unexpected context (throw an
exception),
• FWL: violation of the Firewall or JCVM SFPs (throw an
exception),
• RSC: unavailability of memory (throw an exception),
• OFL: array overflow (throw an exception),
• EDC: checksum mismatch of EDC arrays (throw an exception),
• assignment:
– Physical Tampering
– CLC: Card Manager Life Cycle inconsistency (reset the
card session),
– CHP: General Fault Injection Detection (reset the card
session)
– CHP: Memory defects (reset the card session),
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– CHP: Integrity protected persistent data inconsistency (reset
the card session),
– CHP: Integrity protected transient data inconsistency (reset
the card session),
– Memory Access Violation
– CHP: Others (reset the card session)
FDP_SDI.2 [DATA] Stored data integrity monitoring and action (Data)
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1 [DATA] The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled
by the TSF for [assignment: integrity errors] on all objects,
based on the following attributes: [assignment: integrity
protected data].
FDP_SDI.2.2 [DATA] Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
[assignment: reset the card session for integrity errors].
Refinement The following data elements have the user data attribute ”integrity
protected data”:
• D.APP_KEYs
• D.PIN
• D.TOE_IDENTIFIER
Application Note • Although no such requirement is mandatory in the Java Card
specification, at least an exception shall be raised upon integrity
errors detection on cryptographic keys, PIN values and their
associated security attributes. Even if all the objects cannot
be monitored, cryptographic keys and PIN objects shall be
considered with particular attention by ST authors as they play
a key role in the overall security.
• For integrity sensitive application, their data shall be monitored
(D.APP_I_DATA): applications may need to protect information
against unexpected modifications, and explicitly control
whether a piece of information has been changed between
two accesses. For example, maintaining the integrity of an
electronic purse’s balance is extremely important because
this value represents real money. Its modification must be
controlled, for illegal ones would denote an important failure of
the payment system.
• A dedicated library is implemented and made available to
developers to achieve better security for specific objects,
following the same pattern that already exists in cryptographic
APIs.
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FPR_UNO.1 Unobservability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPR_UNO.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that [assignment: all users] are unable
to observe the operation [assignment: all operations] on
[assignment: D.APP_KEYs, D.PIN] by [assignment: another
user].
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following
types of failures occur: [assignment: those associated to the
potential security violations described in FAU_ARP.1].
Application Note The Java Card RE Context is the Current context when the Java
Card VM begins running after a card reset ([14], §6.2.3) or after
a proximity card (PICC) activation sequence ([14]). Behavior of
the TOE on power loss and reset is described in [14], §3.6 and
§7.1. Behavior of the TOE on RF signal loss is described in [14],
§3.6.1.
Refinement: The term “failure” above also covers “circumstances” for
assignments taken from [9]. The TOE prevents failures for the
“circumstances” defined above.
FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_TDC.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret
[assignment: the CAP files, the bytecode and its data
arguments] when shared between the TSF and another trusted
IT product.
FPT_TDC.1.2 The TSF shall use [assignment:
• the rules defined in [13] specification
• the API tokens defined in the export files of reference
implementation
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] when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.
Application Note Concerning the interpretation of data between the TOE and the
underlying Java Card platform, it is assumed that the TOE is
developed consistently with the SCP functions, including memory
management, I/O functions and cryptographic functions.
7.1.1.1.4 AID Management
FIA_ATD.1 [AID] User attribute definition (AID)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1 [AID] The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes
belonging to individual users: [assignment:
• CAP File AID,
• Package AID,
• Applet’s Version Number,
• Registered Applet AID,
• Applet Selection Status ([14], §4.6)
].
Refinement ”Individual users” stands for applets.
FIA_UID.2 [AID] User identification before any action (AID)
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.2.1 [AID] The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Application Note • By users here it must be understood the ones associated to
the CAP files (or applets) that act as subjects of policies. In
the Java Card System, every action is always performed by
an identified user interpreted here as the currently selected
applet or the CAP file that is the subject’s owner. Means of
identification are provided during the loading procedure of the
CAP file and the registration of applet instances.
• The role Java Card RE defined in FMT_SMR.1 is attached
to an IT security function rather than to a ”use” of the CC
terminology. The Java Card RE does not ”identify” itself to the
TOE, but it is part of it.
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FIA_USB.1 [AID] User-subject binding (AID)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition.
FIA_USB.1.1 [AID] The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with
subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [assignment: CAP file
AID].
FIA_USB.1.2 [AID] The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association
of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of
users: [assignment: Each uploaded package is associated
with an unique Package AID].
FIA_USB.1.3 [AID] The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to
the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the
behalf of users: [assignment: The initially assigned Package
AID is unchangeable].
Application Note The user is the applet and the subject is the S.CAP_FILE. The
subject security attribute Context shall hold the user security
attribute "CAP file AID".
FMT_MTD.1 [JCRE] Management of TSF data (JCRE)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions.
FMT_MTD.1.1
[JCRE]
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: modify] the
[assignment: list of registered applets’ AIDs] to [assignment:
S.JCRE].
Application Note • The installer and the Java Card RE manage other TSF data
such as the applet life cycle or CAP files, but this management
is implementation specific. Objects in the Java programming
language may also try to query AIDs of installed applets
through the lookupAID(...) API method.
• The installer, applet deletion manager or even the card
manager may be granted the right to modify the list of
registered applets’ AIDs in specific implementations (possibly
needed for installation and deletion; see #.DELETION and
#.INSTALL).
FMT_MTD.3 [JCRE] Secure TSF data (JCRE)
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data.
FMT_MTD.3.1
[JCRE]
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for
[assignment: the registered applet AIDs].
7.1.1.2 INSTG Security Functional Requirements
The list of SFRs of this category are taken from [10]. The SFR FDP_ITC.2[INSTALLER]
has been refined and is now part of the card management SFRs (FDP_ITC.2[CCM]) in
Section 7.1.1.6).
FMT_SMR.1
[INSTALLER]
Security roles (INSTALLER)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1
[INSTALLER]
The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: Installer].
FMT_SMR.1.2
[INSTALLER]
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FPT_FLS.1
[INSTALLER]
Failure with preservation of secure state (INSTALLER)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1
[INSTALLER]
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types
of failures occur: [assignment: the installer fails to load/install
a CAP file/applet as described in [14], §11.1.5].
Application Note The TOE may provide additional feedback information to the card
manager in case of potential security violations (see FAU_ARP.1).
FPT_RCV.3
[INSTALLER]
Automated recovery without undue loss (INSTALLER)
Hierarchical to: FPT_RCV.2 Automated recovery.
Dependencies: AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance.
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FPT_RCV.3.1
[INSTALLER]
When automated recovery from [assignment: none] is not
possible, the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the
ability to return to a secure state is provided.
FPT_RCV.3.2
[INSTALLER]
For [assignment: a failure during load/installation of a
package/applet and deletion of a package/applet/object], the
TSF shall ensure the return of the TOE to a secure state using
automated procedures.
FPT_RCV.3.3
[INSTALLER]
The functions provided by the TSF to recover from failure or
service discontinuity shall ensure that the secure initial state is
restored without exceeding [assignment: 0%] for loss of TSF
data or objects under the control of the TSF.
FPT_RCV.3.4
[INSTALLER]
The TSF shall provide the capability to determine the objects that
were or were not capable of being recovered.
Application Note FPT_RCV.3.1[Installer]:
• This element is not within the scope of the Java Card
specification, which only mandates the behavior of the
Java Card System in good working order. Further details
on the ”maintenance mode” shall be provided in specific
implementations. The following is an excerpt from [2], p298: In
this maintenance mode normal operation might be impossible
or severely restricted, as otherwise insecure situations might
occur. Typically, only authorised users should be allowed
access to this mode but the real details of who can access
this mode is a function of FMT: Security management. If FMT:
Security management does not put any controls on who can
access this mode, then it may be acceptable to allow any user
to restore the system if the TOE enters such a state. However,
in practice, this is probably not desirable as the user restoring
the system has an opportunity to configure the TOE in such a
way as to violate the SFRs.
FPT_RCV.3.2[Installer]:
• Should the installer fail during loading/installation of a CAP
file/applet, it has to revert to a ”consistent and secure state”.
The Java Card RE has some clean up duties as well; see
[14], §11.1.5 for possible scenarios. Precise behavior is left to
implementers. This component shall include among the listed
failures the deletion of a CAP file/applet. See ([14], §11.3.4) for
possible scenarios. Precise behavior is left to implementers.
• Other events such as the unexpected tearing of the card,
power loss, and so on, are partially handled by the underlying
hardware platform (see [9]) and, from the TOE’s side, by events
”that clear transient objects” and transactional features. See
FPT_FLS.1.1, FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT], FDP_RIP.1[ABORT]
and FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL].
FPT_RCV.3.3[Installer]:
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• The quantification is implementation dependent, but some
facts can be recalled here. First, the SCP ensures the atomicity
of updates for fields and objects, and a power-failure during
a transaction or the normal runtime does not create the loss
of otherwise permanent data, in the sense that memory on a
smart card is essentially persistent with this respect (EEPROM).
Data stored on the RAM and subject to such failure is intended
to have a limited lifetime anyway (runtime data on the stack,
transient objects’ contents). According to this, the loss of data
within the TSF scope should be limited to the same restrictions
of the transaction mechanism.
7.1.1.3 ADELG Security Functional Requirements
The list of SFRs of this category are taken from [10].
FDP_ACC.2 [ADEL] Complete access control (ADEL)
Hierarchical to: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
FDP_ACC.2.1
[ADEL]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: ADEL access
control SFP] on [assignment: S.ADEL, S.JCRE, S.JCVM,
O.JAVAOBJECT, O.APPLET and O.CODE_CAP_FILE] and all
operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2
[ADEL]
The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject
controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are
covered by an access control SFP.
Refinement The operations involved in the policy are:
• OP.DELETE_APPLET,
• OP.DELETE_CAP_FILE,
• OP.DELETE_CAP_FILE_APPLET.
FDP_ACF.1 [ADEL] Security attribute based access control (ADEL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialisation.
FDP_ACF.1.1
[ADEL]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: ADEL access control
SFP] to objects based on the following [assignment:
• S.JCVM: security attributes Active Applets
• S.JCRE: security attributes Selected Applet Context,
Registered Applets, Resident CAP files
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• O.CODE_CAP_FILE: security attributes CAP file AID, AIDs of
packages within a CAP file, Dependent Package AID, Static
References
• O.APPLET: security attributes Applet Selection Status
• O.JAVAOBJECT: security attributes Owner, Remote
].
FDP_ACF.1.2
[ADEL]
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: [assignment:
In the context of this policy, an object O is reachable if and only if
one of the following conditions hold:
1. the owner of O is a registered applet instance A (O is
reachable from A),
2. a static field of a resident package P contains a reference to
O (O is reachable from P),
3. there exists a valid remote reference to O (O is remote
reachable),
4. there exists an object O’ that is reachable according to either
(1) or (2) or (3) above and O’ contains a reference to O (the
reachability status of O is that of O’).
The following access control rules determine when an operation
among controlled subjects and objects is allowed by the policy:
• R.JAVA.14 ([14], §11.3.4.2, Applet Instance Deletion): S.ADEL
may perform OP.DELETE_APPLET upon an O.APPLET only if,
– S.ADEL is currently selected,
– there is no instance in the context of O.APPLET that is active
in any logical channel and
– there is no O.JAVAOBJECT owned by O.APPLET such that
either O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from an applet instance
distinct from O.APPLET, or O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable
from a package P, or ([14], §8.5) O.JAVAOBJECT is remote
reachable.
• R.JAVA.15 ([14], §11.3.4.2.1, Multiple Applet Instance Deletion):
S.ADEL may perform OP.DELETE_APPLET upon several
O.APPLET only if,
– S.ADEL is currently selected,
– there is no instance of any of the O.APPLET being deleted
that is active in any logical channel and
– there is no O.JAVAOBJECT owned by any of the O.APPLET
being deleted such that either O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable
from an applet instance distinct from any of those O.APPLET,
or O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from a CAP file P, or ([14],
§8.5) O.JAVAOBJECT is remote reachable.
• R.JAVA.16 ([14], §11.3.4.3, Applet/Library CAP file Deletion):
S.ADEL may perform OP.DELETE_CAP_FILE upon an
O.CODE_CAP_FILE only if,
– S.ADEL is currently selected,
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– no reachable O.JAVAOBJECT, from a CAP file distinct from
O.CODE_CAP_FILE that is an instance of a class that
belongs to O.CODE_CAP_FILE, exists on the card and
– there is no resident package on the card that depends on
O.CODE_CAP_FILE.
• R.JAVA.17 ([14], §11.3.4.4, Applet CAP file and
Contained Instances Deletion): S.ADEL may
perform OP.DELETE_CAP_FILE_APPLET upon an
O.CODE_CAP_FILE only if,
– S.ADEL is currently selected,
– no reachable O.JAVAOBJECT, from a CAP file distinct from
O.CODE_CAP_FILE, which is an instance of a class that
belongs to O.CODE_CAP_FILE exists on the card,
– there is no package loaded on the card that depends on
O.CODE_CAP_FILE, and
– for every O.APPLET of those being deleted it holds that: (i)
there is no instance in the context of O.APPLET that is active
in any logical channel and (ii) there is no O.JAVAOBJECT
owned by O.APPLET such that either O.JAVAOBJECT is
reachable from an applet instance not being deleted, or
O.JAVAOBJECT is reachable from a CAP file not being
deleted, or ([14], §8.5) O.JAVAOBJECT is remote reachable.
].
FDP_ACF.1.3
[ADEL]
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: [assignment: none].
FDP_ACF.1.4
[ADEL]
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules:[assignment: any subject but
S.ADEL to O.CODE_CAP_FILE or O.APPLET for the purpose
of deleting them from the card].
Application Note FDP_ACF.1.2[ADEL]:
• This policy introduces the notion of reachability, which provides
a general means to describe objects that are referenced from a
certain applet instance or CAP file.
• S.ADEL calls the ”uninstall” method of the applet instance to be
deleted, if implemented by the applet, to inform it of the deletion
request. The order in which these calls and the dependencies
checks are performed are out of the scope of this protection
profile.
FDP_RIP.1 [ADEL] Subset residual information protection (ADEL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FDP_RIP.1.1 [ADEL] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: de-allocation
of the resource from] the following objects: [assignment:
applet instances and/or CAP files when one of the deletion
operations in FDP_ACC.2.1[ADEL] is performed on them].
Application Note Deleted freed resources (both code and data) may be reused,
depending on the way they were deleted (logically or physically).
Requirements on de-allocation during applet/CAP file deletion are
described in [14], §11.3.4.1, §11.3.4.2 and §11.3.4.3.
FMT_MSA.1 [ADEL] Management of security attributes (ADEL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control], FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MSA.1.1
[ADEL]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: ADEL access control
SFP] to restrict the ability to [selection: modify] the security
attributes [assignment: Registered Applets and Resident CAP
files] to [assignment: S.JCRE].
FMT_MSA.3 [ADEL] Static attribute initialisation (ADEL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles.
FMT_MSA.3.1
[ADEL]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: ADEL access control
SFP] to provide [restrictive] default values for security attributes
that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
[ADEL]
The TSF shall allow the [assignment: none] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an
object or information is created.
FMT_SMF.1 [ADEL] Specification of Management Functions (ADEL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FMT_SMF.1.1
[ADEL]
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions: [assignment: modify the list of
registered applets’ AIDs and the Resident CAP files].
FMT_SMR.1 [ADEL] Security roles (ADEL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1
[ADEL]
The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: applet deletion
manager].
FMT_SMR.1.2
[ADEL]
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FPT_FLS.1 [ADEL] Failure with preservation of secure state (ADEL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 [ADEL] The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types
of failures occur: [assignment: the applet deletion manager
fails to delete a CAP file/applet as described in [14], §11.3.4].
Application Note • The TOE may provide additional feedback information to
the card manager in case of potential security violation (see
FAU_ARP.1).
• The CAP file/applet instance deletion must be atomic. The
”secure state” referred to in the requirement must comply with
Java Card specification ([14], §11.3.4.).
7.1.1.4 RMIG Security Functional Requirements
Not used in this ST because RMI is optional in PP [10] and the TOE does not support
RMI.
7.1.1.5 ODELG Security Functional Requirements
The list of SFRs of this category are taken from [10].
FDP_RIP.1 [ODEL] Subset residual information protection (ODEL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FDP_RIP.1.1 [ODEL] The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content
of a resource is made unavailable upon the [selection: de-
allocation of the resource from] the following objects:
[assignment: the objects owned by the context of an applet
instance which triggered the execution of the method
javacard.framework.JCSystem.requestObjectDeletion()].
Application Note • Freed data resources resulting from the invocation of the
method javacard.framework.JCSystem.requestObjectDeletion()
may be reused. Requirements on de-allocation after the
invocation of the method are described in [12].
• There is no conflict with FDP_ROL.1 here because of
the bounds on the rollback mechanism: the execution of
requestObjectDeletion() is not in the scope of the rollback
because it must be performed in between APDU command
processing, and therefore no transaction can be in progress.
FPT_FLS.1 [ODEL] Failure with preservation of secure state (ODEL)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1
[ODEL]
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types
of failures occur: [assignment: the object deletion functions
fail to delete all the unreferenced objects owned by the
applet that requested the execution of the method].
Application Note • The TOE may provide additional feedback information to the
card manager in case of a potential security violation (see
FAU_ARP.1).
• The Package/applet instance deletion must be atomic. The
”secure state” referred to in the requirement must comply with
Java Card specification ([14], §11.3.4.).
7.1.1.6 CarG Security Functional Requirements
The card management SFRs from the PP [10] are refined and replaced by the following
SFRs.
FDP_UIT.1 [CCM] Data exchange integrity (CCM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path].
FDP_UIT.1.1 [CCM] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy and the Security
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Domain access control policy] to [selection:receive] user data
in a manner protected from [selection:modification, deletion,
insertion and replay] errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 [CCM] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion, replay of some of
the pieces of the application sent by the CAD has occurred.
Application Note Modification errors should be understood as modification,
substitution, unrecoverable ordering change of data and any
other integrity error that may cause the application CAP file to be
installed on the card to be different from the one sent by the CAD.
FDP_ROL.1 [CCM] Basic rollback (CCM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control].
FDP_ROL.1.1
[CCM]
The TSF shall enforce [assignment: Security Domain access
control policy] to permit the rollback of the [assignment:
installation operation] on the [assignment: executable files
and application instances].
FDP_ROL.1.2
[CCM]
The TSF shall permit operations to be rolled back within the
[assignment: boundaries of available memory before the
card content management function started].
FDP_ITC.2 [CCM] Import of user data with security attributes (CCM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control] [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF basic TSF data
consistency.
FDP_ITC.2.1 [CCM] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Security Domain
access control policy and the Secure Channel Protocol
information flow policy] when importing user data, controlled
under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.2.2 [CCM] The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the
imported user data.
FDP_ITC.2.3 [CCM] The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the
unambiguous association between the security attributes and the
user data received.
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FDP_ITC.2.4 [CCM] The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes
of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user
data.
FDP_ITC.2.5 [CCM] The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing
user data controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE:
[assignment: CAP file loading is allowed only if, for each
dependent package, its AID attribute is equal to a resident
package AID attribute, the major version attribute associated
to the dependent package file is equal to the major version
attribute of the resident package and the minor version
attribute is equal to or less than the minor version attribute
associated to the resident package ([13], §4.5.2).].
Application Note This SFR also covers security functionality required by
Amendment A of the GP specification [18], i.e. personalizing SDs
and loading ciphered load files.
FPT_FLS.1 [CCM] Failure with preservation of secure state (CCM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 [CCM] The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types
of failures occur: [assignment: the Security Domain fails
to load/install an Executable File/application instance as
described in [14], Section 11.1.5].
FDP_ACC.1 [SD] Subset access control (SD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
FDP_ACC.1.1 [SD] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Security Domain
access control policy] on [assignment:
• Subjects: S.INSTALLER, S.ADEL, S.CAD (from [10]) and S.SD
• Objects: Delegation Token, DAP Block and Load File
• Operations: GlobalPlatform’s card content management APDU
commands and API methods
].
FDP_ACF.1 [SD] Security attribute based access control (SD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1 [SD] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Security Domain
access control policy] to objects based on the following
[assignment:
• Subjects:
– S.INSTALLER, defined in [10] and represented by the
GlobalPlatform Environment (OPEN) on the card, the Card
Life Cycle attributes (defined in Section 5.1.1 of [17])
– S.ADEL, also defined in [10] and represented by the
GlobalPlatform Environment (OPEN) on the card
– S.SD receiving the Card Content Management commands
(through APDUs or APIs) with a set of Privileges (defined in
Section 6.6.1 of [17]), a Life-cycle Status (defined in Section
5.3.2 of [17]) and a Secure Communication Security Level
(defined in Section 10.6 of [17])
– S.CAD, defined in [10], the off-card entity that communicates
with the S.INSTALLER and S.ADEL through S.SD
• Objects:
– The Delegation Token, in case of Delegated Management
operations, with the attributes Present or Not Present
– The DAP Block, in case of application loading, with the
attributes Present or Not Present
– The Load File or Executable File, in case of application
loading, installation, extradition or registry update, with a set
of intended privileges and its targeted associated SD AID.
• Mapping subjects/objects to security attributes:
– S.INSTALLER: Security Level, Card Life Cycle, Life-cycle
Status, Privileges, Resident Packages, Registered Applets
– S.ADEL: Active Applets, Static References, Card Life Cycle,
Life-cycle Status, Privileges, Applet Selection Status, Security
Level
– S.SD: Privileges, Life-cycle Status, Security Level
– S.CAD: Security Level
].
FDP_ACF.1.2 [SD] The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: [assignment: Runtime behavior rules defined by
GlobalPlatform for:
• loading (Section 9.3.5 of [17])
• installation (Section 9.3.6 of [17])
• extradition (Section 9.4.1 of [17])
• registry update (Section 9.4.2 of [17])
• content removal (Section 9.5 of [17])
].
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FDP_ACF.1.3 [SD] The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: [assignment: none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 [SD] The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules:[assignment: when at least one
of the rules defined by GlobalPlatform does not hold].
FMT_MSA.1 [SD] Management of security attributes (SD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control], FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MSA.1.1 [SD] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Security Domain
access control policy] to restrict the ability to [selection:
modify] the security attributes [assignment:
• Card Life Cycle,
• Privileges,
• Life-cycle Status,
• Security Level.
] to [assignment: the Security Domain and the application
instance itself].
FMT_MSA.3 [SD] Static attribute initialisation (SD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles.
FMT_MSA.3.1 [SD] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Security Domain
access control policy] to provide [restrictive] default values for
security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 [SD] The TSF shall allow the [assignment: Card Issuer or the
Application Provider] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is
created.
Refinement Alternative initial values shall be at least as restrictive as the
default values defined in FMT_MSA.3.1[SD].
FMT_SMF.1 [SD] Specification of Management Functions (SD)
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 [SD] The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions: [assignment:
• Management functions specified in GlobalPlatform
specifications [GP]:
– card locking (Section 9.6.3 of [17])
– application locking and unlocking (Section 9.6.2 of [17])
– card termination (Section 9.6.4 of [17])
– card status interrogation (Section 9.6.6 of [17])
– application status interrogation (Section 9.6.5 of [17])
].
FMT_SMR.1 [SD] Security roles (SD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1 [SD] The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: ISD, SSD].
FMT_SMR.1.2 [SD] The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FCO_NRO.2 [SC] Enforced proof of origin (SC)
Hierarchical to: FCO_NRO.1 Selective proof of origin.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FCO_NRO.2.1 [SC] The TSF shall enforce the generation of evidence of origin for
transmitted [assignment: Executable load files] at all times.
FCO_NRO.2.2 [SC] The TSF shall be able to relate the [assignment: DAP Block] of
the originator of the information, and the [assignment: identity]
of the information to which the evidence applies.
FCO_NRO.2.3 [SC] The TSF shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin
of information to [selection: originator] given [assignment:
at the time the Executable load files are received as no
evidence is kept on the card for future verification].
Application Note FCO_NRO.2.1[SC]:
• Upon reception of a new application CAP file for installation,
the card manager shall first check that it actually comes from
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the verification authority. The verification authority is the entity
responsible for bytecode verification.
FCO_NRO.2.3[SC]:
• The exact limitations on the evidence of origin are
implementation dependent. In most of the implementations, the
card manager performs an immediate verification of the origin
of the CAP file using an electronic signature mechanism, and
no evidence is kept on the card for future verifications.
FDP_IFC.2 [SC] Complete information flow control (SC)
Hierarchical to: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes.
FDP_IFC.2.1 [SC] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy] on [assignment:
• the subjects S.CAD and S.SD, involved in the exchange of
messages between the TOE and the CAD through a potentially
unsafe communication channel,
• the information controlled by this policy are the card content
management commands, including personalization commands,
in the APDUs sent to the card and their associated responses
returned to the CAD
• [assignment: none]
] and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from
subjects covered by the SFP.
FDP_IFC.2.2 [SC] The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any
information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE
are covered by an information flow control SFP.
FDP_IFF.1 [SC] Simple security attributes (SC)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation.
FDP_IFF.1.1 [SC] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy] based on the
following types of subject and information security attributes
[assignment: :
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• Subjects:
– S.SD receiving the Card Content Management commands
(through APDUs or APIs).
– S.CAD the off-card entity that communicates with the S.SD.
• Information:
– executable load file, in case of application loading;
– applications or SD privileges, in case of application
installation or registry update;
– personalization keys and/or certificates, in case of application
or SD personalization.
• [assignment: none]
].
FDP_IFF.1.2 [SC] The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled
subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the
following rules hold: [assignment:
• Runtime behavior rules defined by GlobalPlatform for:
– loading (Section 9.3.5 of [17]);
– installation (Section 9.3.6 of [17]);
– extradition (Section 9.4.1 of [17]);
– registry update (Section 9.4.2 of [17]);
– content removal (Section 9.5 of [17])
].
FDP_IFF.1.3 [SC] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: none].
FDP_IFF.1.4 [SC] The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on
the following rules: [assignment:none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 [SC] The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the
following rules: [assignment:].
• When none of the conditions listed in the element FDP_IFF.1.4
of this component hold and at least one of those listed in the
element FDP_IFF.1.2 does not hold
].
Application note The subject S.SD can be the ISD or APSD.
Application note The on-card and the off-card subjects have security attributes
such as MAC, Cryptogram, Challenge, Key Set, Static Keys, etc.
FMT_MSA.1 [SC] Management of security attributes (SC)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control], FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MSA.1.1 [SC] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy] to restrict the ability
to [selection: modify] the security attributes [assignment:
• Key Set,
• Security Level,
• Secure Channel Protocol,
• Session Keys,
• Sequence Counter,
• ICV.
] to [assignment: the actor associated with the according
security domain:
• The Card Issuer for ISD,
• The Application Provider for APSD
].
Application note The key data used for setting up a secure channel is according to
GP spec [17], and Amendment D [20].
FMT_MSA.3 [SC] Static attribute initialisation (SC)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles.
FMT_MSA.3.1 [SC] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy] to provide
[restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 [SC] The TSF shall allow the [assignment: Card Issuer, Application
Provider] to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_SMF.1 [SC] Specification of Management Functions (SC)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 [SC] The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions: [assignment:
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• Management functions specified in GlobalPlatform
specifications [GP]:
– loading (Section 9.3.5 of [17])
– installation (Section 9.3.6 of [17])
– extradition (Section 9.4.1 of [17])
– registry update (Section 9.4.2 of [17])
– content removal (Section 9.5 of [17])
].
Application note All management functions related to secure channel protocols
shall be relevant.
FIA_UID.1 [SC] Timing of Identification (SC)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 [SC] The TSF shall allow [assignment:
• application selection
• initializing a secure channel with the card
• requesting data that identifies the card or the Card Issuer
] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 [SC] The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Application Note The GlobalPlatform TSF mediated actions listed in [GP] such as
selecting an application, requesting data, initializing, etc.
FIA_UAU.1 [SC] Timing of authentication (SC)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA_UAU.1.1 [SC] The TSF shall allow [assignment: the TSF mediated actions
listed in FIA_UID.1[SC]] on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 [SC] The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
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FIA_UAU.4 [SC] Single-use authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1 [SC] The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
[assignment: the authentication mechanism used to open a
secure communication channel with the card].
FTP_ITC.1 [SC] Inter-TSF trusted channel(SC)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1 [SC] The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 [SC] The TSF shall permit [selection: another trusted IT product] to
initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 [SC] The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
[assignment: all card management functions including:
• loading;
• installation;
• extradition;
• registry update;
• content removal;
• changing the Application Life Cycle or Card Life Cycle;
].
7.1.1.7 EMG Security Functional Requirements
Not used in this ST because EMG is optional in PP [10] and the TOE does not support
EMG.
7.1.1.8 Further Security Functional Requirements
The SFRs in this section provide additional proprietary features.
FAU_SAS.1 [SCP] Audit Data Storage (SCP)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1 [SCP] The TSF shall provide [assignment: the test process before
TOE Delivery] with the capability to store [selection: the
Initialisation Data, Prepersonalisation Data, [assignment:
supplements of the Smartcard Embedded Software]] in the
[assignment: audit records].
Application Note This SFR performs selection and assignment operations on
FAU_SAS.1 as defined in the Security IC Platform Protection
Profile [9]. The test process is running under control of the test-
personnel.
FIA_AFL.1 [PIN] Basic Authentication Failure Handling (PIN)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA_AFL.1.1 [PIN] The TSF shall detect when [selection: an administrator
configurable positive integer within [1 and 127]] unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: any user
authentication using D.PIN].
FIA_AFL.1.2 [PIN] When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been [selection: surpassed], the TSF shall
[assignment: block the authentication with D.PIN].
Application Note The dependency with FIA_UAU.1 is not applicable. The TOE
implements the firewall access control SFP, based on which
access to the object implementing FIA_AFL.1[PIN] is organized.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: variations in power
consumption or timing during command execution] in exess
of [assignment: non-useful information] enabling access to
[assignment: TSF data: D.CRYPTO] and [assignment: User
data: D.PIN, D.APP_KEYs].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TOE shall ensure [assignment: that unauthorized
users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment:
electrical contacts or RF field] to gain access to [assignment:
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TSF data D.CRYPTO] and [assignment: User data D.PIN,
D.APP_KEYS].
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist [assignment: physical manipulation and
physical probing] to the [assignment: TSF] by responding
automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Refinement The TSF will implement appropriate mechanisms to continuously
counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the
nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TSF can
by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore,
permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring
that security functional requirements are enforced. Hence,
”automatic response” means here (i) assuming that there might
be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at
any time.
Application Note This SFR is taken from the certified Security IC Platform
Protection Profile [9].
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes,
or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction.
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key distribution method [assignment:
methods: set keys and components of DES, AES, RSA, RSA-
CRT, ECC, ECDH, HMAC, XEC, GenericSecret keys] that
meets the following: [assignment: [12], [34]].
Application Note • The keys can be accessed as specified in [12] Key class and
[34] for proprietary classes.
• This component shall be instantiated according to the version
of the Java Card API applying to the security target and the
implementated algorithms [12] and [34] for proprietary classes.
FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes,
or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation] FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction.
FCS_CKM.3.1 The TSF shall perform [assignment: management of
DES, AES, RSA, RSA-CRT, ECC, ECDH, HMAC, XEC,
and GenericSecret Keys] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key access method [assignment: methods/
commands defined in packages javacard.security of [12]
and [34] for proprietary classes] that meets the following:
[assignment: [12] and [34]].
Application Note • The keys can be accessed as specified in [12] and [34] for
proprietary classes.
• This component shall be instantiated according to the version
of the Java Card API applying to the security target and the
implemented algorithms [12] and [34] for proprietary classes.
FDP_SDI.2
[SENSITIVE_
RESULT]
Stored data integrity monitoring and action (Sensitive Result)
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1
[SENSITIVE_
RESULT]
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled
by the TSF for [assignment: integrity errors] on all objects,
based on the following attributes: [assignment: sensitive API
result stored in the javacardx.security.SensitiveResult class].
FDP_SDI.2.2
[SENSITIVE_
RESULT]
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
[assignment: throw an exception].
7.1.1.9 Configuration Security Functional Requirements
FDP_IFC.2 [CFG] Complete information flow control (CFG)
Hierarchical to: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes.
FDP_IFC.2.1 [CFG] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: CONFIGURATION
information flow control SFP] on [assignment: S.Customer,
S.NXP, S.ConfigurationMechanism, and D.CONFIG_ITEM]
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and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from
subjects covered by the SFP.
FDP_IFC.2.2 [CFG] The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any
information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE
are covered by an information flow control SFP.
FDP_IFF.1 [CFG] Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation.
FDP_IFF.1.1 [CFG] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: CONFIGURATION
information flow control SFP] based on the following types of
subject and information security attributes [assignment:
• S.Customer: security attributes Customer Configuration Token
generation key
• S.NXP: security attributes NXP Configuration Token generation
key
• S.ConfigurationMechanism: security attributes NXP
Configuration Access, Customer Configuration Access
• D.CONFIG_ITEM: security attributes access privilege
].
FDP_IFF.1.2 [CFG] The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled
subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the
following rules hold: [assignment:
• Read and write operations of D.CONFIG_ITEM between
S.ConfigurationMechanism and S.NXP shall only be possible
when S.NXP is authenticated with its token using the NXP
Configuration Token generation key.
• Read and write operations of D.CONFIG_ITEM between
S.ConfigurationMechanism and S.Customer shall only be
possible when S.Customer is authenticated with its token using
the Customer Configuration Token generation key and if access
privilege allows it.
• Enabling or disabling of NXP Configuration Access between
S.ConfigurationMechanism and S.NXP shall only be possible
when S.NXP is authenticated with its token using the NXP
Configuration Token generation key.
].
FDP_IFF.1.3 [CFG] The TSF shall enforce the additional information flow control SFP
rules [assignment: none].
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FDP_IFF.1.4 [CFG] The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on
the following rules: [assignment: none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 [CFG] The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the
following rules: [assignment:
• If the NXP Configuration Access is disabled then nobody can
read or write D.CONFIG_ITEM.
• If the Customer Configuration Access is disabled then
S.Customer can not read or write D.CONFIG_ITEM.
].
Application note GlobalPlatform Framework authentication mechnism is used to
authenticate the tokens.
FIA_UID.1 [CFG] Timing of Identification (CFG)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 [CFG] The TSF shall allow [assignment: to select the Runtime
Configuration Interface] on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 [CFG] The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
FMT_MSA.1 [CFG] Management of security attributes (CFG)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control], FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MSA.1.1 [CFG] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: CONFIGURATION
information flow control SFP] to restrict the ability to
[selection: modify] the security attributes [assignment: NXP
Configuration Access and Customer Configuration Access]
to [assignment: S.NXP and S.Customer] respectively.
FMT_MSA.3 [CFG] Static attribute initialisation (CFG)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles.
FMT_MSA.3.1 [CFG] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: CONFIGURATION
information flow control SFP] to provide [restrictive] default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 [CFG] The TSF shall allow the [assignment: nobody] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an
object or information is created.
FMT_SMF.1 [CFG] Specification of Management Functions (CFG)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 [CFG] The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions: [assignment: disable the NXP
Configuration Access, disable the Customer Configuration
Access].
FMT_SMR.1 [CFG] Security roles (CFG)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1
[CFG]
The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: S.NXP and
S.Customer].
FMT_SMR.1.2
[CFG]
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note The roles of the CONFIGURATION information flow control SFP
are defined by the NXP Configuration Token generation key and
the Customer Configuration Token generation key.
7.1.1.10 OS Update Security Functional Requirements
The SFRs in this section provide JCOP proprietary features.
FDP_IFC.2 [OSU] Complete information flow control (OSU)
Hierarchical to: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes.
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FDP_IFC.2.1 [OSU] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: OS Update
information flow control SFP] on [assignment: S.OSU and
D.UPDATE_IMAGE].
FDP_IFC.2.2 [OSU] The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any
information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE
are covered by an information flow control SFP.
FDP_IFF.1 [OSU] Simple security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation.
FDP_IFF.1.1 [OSU] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: OS Update
information flow control SFP] based on the following types of
subject and information security attributes [assignment:
• S.OSU: security attributes Current Sequence Number,
Verification Key, Package Decryption Key
• D.UPDATE_IMAGE: security attributes Received Sequence
Number, Image Type
].
FDP_IFF.1.2[OSU] The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled
subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the
following rules hold: [assignment:
• S.OSU shall only accept D.UPDATE_IMAGE which signature
can be verified with Verification Key.
• S.OSU shall only accept D.UPDATE_IMAGE for the update
process that can be decrypted with Package Decryption Key.
].
FDP_IFF.1.3 [OSU] The TSF shall enforce the additional information flow control
SFP rules [assignment: S.OSU shall only authorize
D.UPDATE_IMAGE for the update process if the following
rules apply:
• If Image Type equals Reset then Received Sequence Number
shall equal Current Sequence Number.
• If Image Type equals Upgrade then Received Sequence
Number shall be higher than Current Sequence Number.
• If Image Type equals Downgrade then Received Sequence
Number shall be lower than Current Sequence Number.
].
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FDP_IFF.1.4 [OSU] The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on
the following rules: [assignment: none].
FDP_IFF.1.5[OSU] The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the
following rules: [assignment: D.UPDATE_IMAGE which is not
included in the pre-loaded OS Update plan].
Application note The on-card S.OSU role interacts with the off-card
S.UpdateImageCreator via OSU commands. The
D.UPDATE_IMAGE is split up into smaller chunks and
transmitted as payload within the OSU Commands to the TOE.
Application note Decrypting the D.UPDATE_IMAGE with the Package Decryption
Key prevents the authorization of the D.UPDATE_IMAGE for
the update process on a not certified system. The Package
Decryption Key is only available on a certified TOE.
FMT_MSA.3 [OSU] Static attribute initialisation (OSU)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles.
FMT_MSA.3.1
[OSU]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: OS Update
information flow control SFP] to provide [restrictive] default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
[OSU]
The TSF shall allow the [assignment: S.OSU] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an
object or information is created.
FMT_MSA.1 [OSU] Management of security attributes (OSU)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control], FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MSA.1.1
[OSU]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: OS Update
information flow control SFP] to restrict the ability to
[selection: modify] the security attributes [assignment: Current
Sequence Number] to [assignment: S.OSU].
FMT_SMR.1 [OSU] Security roles (OSU)
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1
[OSU]
The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: S.OSU].
FMT_SMR.1.2
[OSU]
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note The roles of the CONFIGURATION information flow control SFP
are defined by the NXP Configuration Token generation key and
the Customer Configuration Token generation key.
FMT_SMF.1 [OSU] Specification of Management Functions (OSU)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 [OSU] The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions: [assignment:
• query Current Sequence Number
• query Reference Sequence Number
].
Application note After the atomic activation of the additional code the Final
Sequence Number is returned on querying the Current Sequence
Number.
FIA_UID.1 [OSU] Timing of Identification (OSU)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 [OSU] The TSF shall allow [assignment: OP.TRIGGER_UPDATE] on
behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 [OSU] The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
FIA_UAU.1 [OSU] Timing of authentication (OSU)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA_UAU.1.1 [OSU] The TSF shall allow [assignment: OP.TRIGGER_UPDATE]
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 [OSU] The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
FIA_UAU.4 [OSU] Single-use authentication mechanisms (OSU)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1[OSU] The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
[assignment: the authentication mechanism used to load
D.UPDATE_IMAGE].
FPT_FLS.1 [OSU] Failure with preservation of secure state (OSU)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1 [OSU] The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types
of failures occur: [assignment:
• Corrupted D.UPDATE_IMAGE is received.
• Unauthorized D.UPDATE_IMAGE is received.
• The OS Update Process is interrupted.
• The activation of the additional code failed.
].
7.1.1.11 Restricted Mode Security Functional Requirements
The SFRs in this section provide JCOP proprietary features.
FDP_ACC.2 [RM] Complete access control (RM)
Hierarchical to: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
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FDP_ACC.2.1 [RM] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Restricted Mode
access control SFP] on [assignment: S.ACAdmin] and all
operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2 [RM] The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject
controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are
covered by an access control SFP.
FDP_ACF.1 [RM] Security attribute based access control (RM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialisation.
FDP_ACF.1.1 [RM] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Restricted Mode
access control SFP] to objects based on the following
[assignment:
• S.ACAdmin: security attribute Attack Counter
].
FDP_ACF.1.2 [RM] The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: [assignment:The Attack Counter can be reset by
S.ACAdmin].
FDP_ACF.1.3 [RM] The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: [assignment: none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 [RM] The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules:[assignment: Deny all
operations on all objects when the TOE is in restricted mode,
except for operations listed in FMT_SMF.1[RM]].
FMT_MSA.3 [RM] Static attribute initialisation (RM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles.
FMT_MSA.3.1 [RM] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Restricted Mode
access control SFP] to provide [restrictive] default values for
security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
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FMT_MSA.3.2 [RM] The TSF shall allow the [assignment: nobody] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an
object or information is created.
FMT_MSA.1 [RM] Management of security attributes (RM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control], FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MSA.1.1 [RM] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Restricted
Mode access control] to restrict the ability to [selection:
change_default, [assignment: reset]] the security attributes
[assignment: Attack Counter] to [assignment: S.ACAdmin].
FMT_SMF.1 [RM] Specification of Management Functions (RM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 [RM] The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions: [assignment:
• reset Attack Counter.
• select ISD.
• authentication against the ISD.
• initialize a Secure Channel with the card.
• query the Serial Number (Unique ID for chip).
• read Platform Identifier.
• query the logging information.
• read Secure Channel Sequence Counter.
• read Current Sequence Number.
].
FIA_UID.1 [RM] Timing of Identification (RM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 [RM] The TSF shall allow [assignment:
• select ISD
• identify the card
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• query the debug logging information
• send Restricted Mode Unlock Request
] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 [RM] The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
FIA_UAU.1 [RM] Timing of authentication (RM)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA_UAU.1.1 [RM] The TSF shall allow [assignment:
• OP.TRIGGER_UPDATE
• identify the card
• query the debug logging information
• send Restricted Mode Unlock Request
] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 [RM] The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
7.1.1.12 Applet Migration Security Functional Requirements
The SFRs in this section cover "Applet Migration" JCOP proprietary features.
FDP_ACC.1 [AMD] Subset access control (AMD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
FDP_ACC.1.1[AMD] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment:
Applet Migration Data access control SFP]
on [assignment: subject S.ArchiveManager
object O.APPLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE,
O.APPLET_CURRENT, O.APPLET_LOADED and operations
OP.EXPORT_APPLET_DATA, OP.IMPORT_APPLET_DATA ].
FDP_ACF.1 [AMD] Security attribute based access control (AMD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialisation.
FDP_ACF.1.1 [AMD] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Applet Migration
Data access control SFP] to objects based on the following
[assignment:
• O.APPLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE: security attributes
Current Instance AID, New Instance AID
• O.APPLET_CURRENT: Security attributes Current Instance
AID
• O.APPLET_LOADED: Security attributes Loaded Applet AID
].
FDP_ACF.1.2 [AMD] The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: [assignment:
• S.ArchiveManager shall only perform
OP.EXPORT_APPLET_DATA if an applet with Current Instance
AID is installed.
• S.ArchiveManager shall delete O.APPLET_CURRENT after
OP.EXPORT_APPLET_DATA has finished.
• S.ArchiveManager shall perform OP.IMPORT_APPLET_DATA
if Loaded Applet AID of O.APPLET_LOADED is equal to New
Instance AID in O.APPLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE.
• S.ArchiveManager shall delete
O.APPLET_MIGRATION_DATASTORE Upon completion of
OP.IMPORT_APPLET_DATA.
].
FDP_ACF.1.3 [AMD] The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: [assignment: none].
FDP_ACF.1.4 [RM] The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules:[assignment: none].
FMT_MSA.3 [AMD] Static attribute initialisation (AMD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles.
FMT_MSA.3.1
[AMD]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Applet Migration
access control SFP] to provide [assignment: restrictive]
default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the
SFP.
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FMT_MSA.3.2
[AMD]
The TSF shall allow the [assignment: S.ArchiveManager] to
specify alternative initial values to override the default values
when an object or information is created.
FMT_MSA.1 [AMD] Management of security attributes (AMD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control], FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MSA.1.1
[AMD]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Applet Migration
access control] to restrict the ability to [selection: set] the
security attributes [assignment: Current Instance AID and New
Instance AID] to [assignment: the S.ArchiveManager].
FMT_SMF.1 [AMD] Specification of Management Functions (AMD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1 [AMD] The TSF shall be capable of performing
the following management functions:
[assignment:OP.EXPORT_APPLET_DATA,
OP.IMPORT_APPLET_DATA].
FMT_SMR.1 [AMD] Security roles (AMD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1
[AMD]
The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment:
S.ArchiveManager].
FMT_SMR.1.2
[AMD]
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FIA_UID.1 [AMD] Timing of Identification (AMD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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FIA_UID.1.1 [AMD] The TSF shall allow [assignment: OP.TRIGGER_UPDATE or
Select ISD and Initiate Secure Channel] on behalf of the user to
be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 [AMD] The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
FDP_IFC.2 [AMD] Complete Information flow control (AMD)
Hierarchical to: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control.
Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes.
FDP_IFC.2.1 [AMD] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Applet Migration
information flow control SFP] on [assignment:
S.ArchiveManager and O.APPLET_MIGRATION_PLAN] and
all operations that cause that information to flow to and from
subjects covered by the SFP.
FDP_IFC.2.2 [AMD] The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any
information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE
are covered by an information flow control SFP.
FDP_IFF.1 [AMD] Simple security attributes (AMD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation.
FDP_IFF.1.1 [AMD] The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Applet Migration
information flow control SFP] based on the following types of
subject and information security attributes: [assignment:
• S.ArchiveManager: Security attribute Verification key
• O.APPLET_MIGRATION_PLAN: Security attribute Applet
Migration Plan Signature
].
FDP_IFF.1.2 [AMD] The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled
subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the
following rules hold: [assignment:
• S.ArchiveManager shall only accept
O.APPLET_MIGRATION_PLAN transmitted either via a secure
channel or via unsecured channel where in the latter case the
APDUs commands are protected for integrity and authenticity
by an electronic signature verified by the Verification Key.
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FDP_IFF.1.3 [AMD] The TSF shall enforce the additional information flow control SFP
rules [assignment: none].
FDP_IFF.1.4 [AMD] The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on
the following rules [assignment: none].
FDP_IFF.1.5 [AMD] The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the
following rules [assignment: none].
Application Note The operations OP.EXPORT_APPLET_DATA and
OP.IMPORT_APPLET_DATA are triggered by proprietary Applet
Migration APDU Commands that are transmitted via a Secure
Channel with authentication against the ISD or a proprietary
protocol which uses a signature based authentication.
FIA_UAU.5 [AMD] Timing of authentication (AMD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5.1 [AMD] The TSF shall provide [assignment: secure channel
protocol or a proprietary communication protocol using a
cryptographic signature] to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 [AMD] The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according
to the [assignment: secure channel protocol mutual
authentication phase, or proprietary communication protocol
where in the latter case the APDUs commands are protected
for integrity and authenticity by an electronic signature
verified by the Verification Key].
Application Note The operations OP.EXPORT_APPLET_DATA and
OP.IMPORT_APPLET_DATA are triggered by proprietary Applet
Migration APDU Commands that are transmitted via a Secure
Channel with authentication against the ISD or a proprietary
protocol which uses a signature based authentication.
FPT_FLS.1 [AMD] Failure with preservation of secure state (AMD)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1 [AMD] The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types
of failures occur: [assignment:
• the applet data export phase or the applet data import phase
are interrupted or fail.
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].
7.1.1.13 Context Separation Security Functional Requirements
The SFRs in this section provide JCOP proprietary features.
FDP_ACC.2
[CONTSEP]
Complete access control (CONTSEP)
Hierarchical to: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
FDP_ACC.2.1
[CONTSEP]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Context Separation
SFP] on [assignment: subject S.SMK, S.GuestOS and object
O.SMK_Memory_region, O.GuestOS_Memory_Region] and all
operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2
[CONTSEP]
The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject
controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are
covered by an access control SFP.
FDP_ACF.1
[CONTSEP]
Security attribute based access control (CONTSEP)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialisation.
FDP_ACF.1.1
[CONTSEP]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Context Separation
SFP] to objects based on the following [assignment:
• Subjects: S.SMK, S.GuestOS
• Objects: O.SMK_Memory_Region,
O.GuestOS_Memory_Region
• Security Attributes: Access Control Table
].
FDP_ACF.1.2
[CONTSEP]
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: [assignment:
• One S.GuestOS can perform operation OP.CONT_ACCESS
over its own O.GuestOS_Memory_Region.
• One S.GuestOS can perform operation OP.CONT_ACCESS
over O.GuestOS_Memory_Region of another S.GuestOS only if
so authorized by S.SMK according to the Access Control Table.
• S.GuestOS cannot perform operation OP.CONT_ACCESS over
O.SMK_Memory_Region.
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• S.SMK can perform operation OP.CONT_ACCESS over its own
O.SMK_Memory_Region.
• S.SMK can perform operation OP.CONT_ACCESS over
O.GuestOS_Memory_Region only if so authorized in Access
Control Table.
].
FDP_ACF.1.3
[CONTSEP]
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: [assignment:
• S.GuestOS can perform operation OP.CONT_ACCESS over
O.SMK_Memory_Region only through dedicated call gates
mechanism.
].
FDP_ACF.1.4
[CONTSEP]
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules:[assignment: None].
FMT_MSA.3
[CONTSEP]
Static attribute initialisation (CONTSEP)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles.
FMT_MSA.3.1
[CONTSEP]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Context Separation
SFP] to provide [assignment: restrictive] default values for
security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
[CONTSEP]
The TSF shall allow the [assignment: S.SMK] to specify
alternative initial values to override the default values when an
object or information is created.
FMT_MSA.1
[CONTSEP]
Management of security attributes (CONTSEP)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control], FMT_SMR.1 Security roles, FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions.
FMT_MSA.1.1
[CONTSEP]
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: Context Separation
SPF] to restrict the ability to [selection: modify] the security
attributes [assignment: Access Control Table] to [assignment:
S.SMK].
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FMT_SMF.1
[CONTSEP]
Specification of Management Functions (CONTSEP)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1
[CONTSEP]
The TSF shall be capable of performing the
following management functions: [assignment:
OP.Modifiction_Of_Access_Control_Table].
FMT_SMR.1
[CONTSEP]
Security roles (CONTSEP)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1
[CONTSEP]
The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment:
• One S.SMK running in O.SMK_Memory_Region
• Several S.GuestOS running in there own
O.GuestOS_Memory_Region
].
FMT_SMR.1.2
[CONTSEP]
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FIA_UID.1
[CONTSEP]
Timing of Identification (CONTSEP)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1
[CONTSEP]
The TSF shall allow [assignment: no action] on behalf of the
user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2
[CONTSEP]
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
7.1.2 Security Requirements Rationale
7.1.2.1 Identification
OT.SID
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SFR Rationale
FIA_UID.2[AID] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages and CAP files) and
is met by the SFR. Installation procedures ensure protection against
forgery (the AID of an applet is under the control of the TSFs) or re-use
of identities and is met by the SFR.
FIA_USB.1[AID] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR. Installation procedures ensure protection against forgery (the AID
of an applet is under the control of the TSFs) or re-use of identities and is
met by the SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[JCRE] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[JCVM] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[ADEL] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FMT_
MSA.3[FIREWALL]
Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FMT_MSA.3[JCVM] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FMT_MSA.3[ADEL] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FMT_MTD.1[JCRE] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FMT_MTD.3[JCRE] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FMT_SMF.1[ADEL] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FIA_ATD.1[AID] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FDP_ITC.2[CCM] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[SC] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FMT_MSA.3[SC] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FMT_SMF.1[SC] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FMT_MSA.1[AMD] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FMT_MSA.3[AMD] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
FMT_SMF.1[AMD] Subjects’ identity is AID-based (applets, packages) and is met by the
SFR.
7.1.2.2 Execution
OT.FIREWALL
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SFR Rationale
FDP_
ACC.2[FIREWALL]
The FIREWALL access control policy contributes to meet this objective.
FDP_
ACF.1[FIREWALL]
The FIREWALL access control policy contributes to meet this objective.
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM] The JCVM information flow control policy contributes to meet this
objective.
FDP_IFF.1[JCVM] The JCVM information flow control policy contributes to meet this
objective.
FMT_MSA.1[JCRE] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.1[JCVM] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.1[ADEL] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_
MSA.2[FIREWALL-
JCVM]
Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_
MSA.3[FIREWALL]
Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.3[JCVM] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.3[ADEL] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MTD.1[JCRE] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MTD.3[JCRE] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMF.1 Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMF.1[ADEL] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMR.1 Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_
SMR.1[INSTALLER]
Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMR.1[ADEL] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FDP_ITC.2[CCM] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMR.1[SD] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.1[SC] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.3[SC] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMF.1[SC] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.1[AMD] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_MSA.3[AMD] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
FMT_SMF.1[AMD] Contributes indirectly to meet this objective.
OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID
SFR Rationale
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM] The JCVM information flow control policy meets the objective by
preventing an application from keeping a pointer to a shared buffer,
which could be used to read its contents when the buffer is being used
by another application.
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SFR Rationale
FDP_IFF.1[JCVM] The JCVM information flow control policy meets this objective by
preventing an application from keeping a pointer to a shared buffer,
which could be used to read its contents when the buffer is being used
by another application.
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS] Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters of
remotely invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general
initialization of method parameters.
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT] Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters of
remotely invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general
initialization of method parameters.
FDP_RIP.1[APDU] Contributes to meet this objective by fulfilling the clearing requirement of
these arrays.
FDP_
RIP.1[GlobalArray]
Contributes to meet this objective by fulfilling the clearing requirement of
these arrays.
FDP_RIP.1[bArray] Contributes to meet this objective by fulfilling the clearing requirement of
these arrays.
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS] Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters
of invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general
initialization of method parameters.
FDP_
RIP.1[TRANSIENT]
Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters
of invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general
initialization of method parameters.
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL] Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters
of invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general
initialization of method parameters.
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL] Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the array parameters
of invoked methods, which are global as well, through the general
initialization of method parameters.
OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG
SFR Rationale
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM] Contributes to meet the objective by preventing an application from
keeping a pointer to the APDU buffer of the card or to the global byte
array of the applet’s install method. Such a pointer could be used
to access and modify it when the buffer is being used by another
application.
FDP_IFF.1[JCVM] Contributes to meet the objective by preventing an application from
keeping a pointer to the APDU buffer of the card or to the global byte
array of the applet’s install method. Such a pointer could be used
to access and modify it when the buffer is being used by another
application.
OT.ARRAY_VIEWS_CONFID
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SFR Rationale
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM] The JCVM information flow control policy meets the objective by
preventing an application from storing a reference to the array view or
reading the content of an array view that don't have ATTR_READABLE_
VIEW security attribute.
FDP_IFF.1[JCVM] The JCVM information flow control policy meets the objective by
preventing an application from storing a reference to the array view or
reading the content of an array view that don't have ATTR_READABLE_
VIEW security attribute.
FDP_
ACC.2[FIREWALL]
The FIREWALL access control SFP meets the objective by enforcing
access control to array views without ATTR_READABLE_VIEW access
attributes.
FDP_
ACF.1[FIREWALL]
The FIREWALL access control SFP meets the objective by enforcing
access control to array views without ATTR_READABLE_VIEW access
attributes.
OT.ARRAY_VIEWS_INTEG
SFR Rationale
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM] The JCVM information flow control policy meets the objective by
preventing an application from storing a reference to the array view or
altering the content of an array view that don't have ATTR_WRITABLE_
VIEW security attribute.
FDP_IFF.1[JCVM] The JCVM information flow control policy meets the objective by
preventing an application from storing a reference to the array view or
altering the content of an array view that don't have ATTR_WRITABLE_
VIEW security attribute.
FDP_
ACC.2[FIREWALL]
The FIREWALL access control SFP meets the objective by enforcing
access control to array views without ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW access
attributes.
FDP_
ACF.1[FIREWALL]
The FIREWALL access control SFP meets the objective by enforcing
access control to array views without ATTR_WRITABLE_VIEW access
attributes.
OT.NATIVE
SFR Rationale
FDP_
ACF.1[FIREWALL]
Covers this objective by ensuring that the only means to execute native
code is the invocation of a Java Card API method. This objective mainly
relies on the environmental objective OE.CAP_FILE, which uphold the
assumption A.CAP_FILE.
OT.OPERATE
SFR Rationale
FAU_ARP.1 Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various
failures or security violations during usual working.
FDP_
ACC.2[FIREWALL]
Contributes to meet this objective by protecting the TOE through the
FIREWALL access control policy.
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SFR Rationale
FDP_
ACF.1[FIREWALL]
Contributes to meet this objective by protecting the TOE through the
FIREWALL access control policy.
FDP_
ROL.1[FIREWALL]
Contributes to meet this objective by providing support for cleanly abort
applets’ installation, which belongs to the category security-critical parts
and procedures protection.
FIA_AFL.1[PIN] Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the authentication.
FIA_USB.1[AID] Contributes to meet this objective by controlling the communication with
external users and their internal subjects to prevent alteration of TSF
data.
FPT_TDC.1 Contributes to meet this objective by protection in various ways against
applets’ actions.
FPT_
RCV.3[INSTALLER]
Contributes to meet this objective by providing safe recovery from failure,
which belongs to the category of security-critical parts and procedures
protection.
FIA_ATD.1[AID] Contributes to meet this objective by controlling the communication with
external users and their internal subjects to prevent alteration of TSF
data.
FPT_FLS.1 Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various
failures or security violations during usual working.
FPT_
FLS.1[INSTALLER]
Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various
failures or security violations during usual working.
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL] Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various
failures or security violations during usual working.
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL] Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various
failures or security violations during usual working.
FDP_ITC.2[CCM] Contributes to meet this objective by detecting and blocking various
failures or security violations during usual working.
OT.REALLOCATION
SFR Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS] Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-
allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT] Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-
allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[APDU] Only arrays can be designated as global, and the only global arrays
required in the Java Card API are the APDU buffer and the global byte
array input parameter (bArray) to an applet’s install method. Contributes
to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated
block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_
RIP.1[GlobalArray]
Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-
allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[bArray] Only arrays can be designated as global, and the only global arrays
required in the Java Card API are the APDU buffer and the global byte
array input parameter (bArray) to an applet’s install method. Contributes
to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-allocated
block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
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SFR Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS] Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-
allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_
RIP.1[TRANSIENT]
Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-
allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL] Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-
allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL] Contributes to meet the objective by imposing that the contents of the re-
allocated block shall always be cleared before delivering the block.
OT.RESOURCES
SFR Rationale
FAU_ARP.1 Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows
during execution of applications.
FDP_
ROL.1[FIREWALL]
Contributes to meet this objective by preventing that failed installations
create memory leaks.
FMT_MTD.1[JCRE] Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory
management.
FMT_MTD.3[JCRE] Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory
management.
FMT_SMF.1 Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory
management.
FMT_SMF.1[ADEL] Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory
management.
FMT_SMR.1 Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory
management.
FMT_
SMR.1[INSTALLER]
Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory
management.
FMT_SMR.1[ADEL] Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory
management.
FPT_
RCV.3[INSTALLER]
Contributes to meet this objective by preventing that failed installations
create memory leaks.
FPT_FLS.1 Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows
during execution of applications.
FPT_
FLS.1[INSTALLER]
Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows
during execution of applications.
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL] Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows
during execution of applications.
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL] Contributes to meet this objective by detecting stack/memory overflows
during execution of applications.
FMT_SMR.1[SD] Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory
management.
FMT_SMF.1[SC] Contributes to meet this objective since the TSF controls the memory
management.
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7.1.2.3 Services
OT.ALARM
SFR Rationale
FAU_ARP.1 Contributes to meet this objective by defining TSF reaction upon
detection of a potential security violation.
FPT_FLS.1 Contributes to meet the objective by providing the guarantee that a
secure state is preserved by the TSF when failures occur.
FPT_
FLS.1[INSTALLER]
Contributes to meet the objective by providing the guarantee that a
secure state is preserved by the TSF when failures occur.
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL] Contributes to meet the objective by providing the guarantee that a
secure state is preserved by the TSF when failures occur.
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL] Contributes to meet the objective by providing the guarantee that a
secure state is preserved by the TSF when failures occur.
OT.CIPHER
SFR Rationale
FCS_CKM.1 Covers the objective directly.
FCS_CKM.2 Covers the objective directly.
FCS_CKM.3 Covers the objective directly.
FCS_CKM.4 Covers the objective directly.
FCS_COP.1 Covers the objective directly.
FPR_UNO.1 Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the observation of the
cryptographic operations which may be used to disclose the keys.
OT.KEY-MNGT
SFR Rationale
FCS_CKM.1 Covers the objective directly.
FCS_CKM.2 Covers the objective directly.
FCS_CKM.3 Covers the objective directly.
FCS_CKM.4 Covers the objective directly.
FCS_COP.1 Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS] Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT] Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[APDU] Covers the objective directly.
FDP_
RIP.1[GlobalArray]
Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[bArray] Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS] Covers the objective directly.
FDP_
RIP.1[TRANSIENT]
Covers the objective directly.
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SFR Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL] Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL] Covers the objective directly.
FDP_SDI.2[DATA] Covers the objective directly.
FPR_UNO.1 Contributes to meet objective by controlling the observation of the
cryptographic operations which may be used to disclose the keys.
OT.PIN-MNGT
SFR Rationale
FDP_
ACC.2[FIREWALL]
Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the access to private and
internal data of the objects.
FDP_
ACF.1[FIREWALL]
Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the access to private and
internal data of the objects.
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS] Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT] Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_RIP.1[APDU] Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_
RIP.1[GlobalArray]
Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_RIP.1[bArray] Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS] Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_
RIP.1[TRANSIENT]
Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL] Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL] Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_
ROL.1[FIREWALL]
Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_SDI.2[DATA] Contributes to meet the objective.
FPR_UNO.1 Contributes to meet the objective.
FIA_AFL.1[PIN] Directly contributes to meet the objective.
OT.TRANSACTION
SFR Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS] Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT] Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[APDU] Covers the objective directly.
FDP_
RIP.1[GlobalArray]
Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[bArray] Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS] Covers the objective directly.
FDP_
RIP.1[TRANSIENT]
Covers the objective directly.
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SFR Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL] Covers the objective directly.
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL] Covers the objective directly.
FDP_
ROL.1[FIREWALL]
Covers the objective directly.
7.1.2.4 Object Deletion
OT.OBJ-DELETION
SFR Rationale
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL] Contributes to meet the objective.
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL] Contributes to meet the objective.
7.1.2.5 Applet Management
OT.APPLI-AUTH
SFR Rationale
FCS_COP.1 Refinement: applies to FCS_COP.1[DAP]. Contributes to meet the
security objective by ensuring that the loaded Executable Application is
legitimate by specifying the algorithm to be used in order to verify the
DAP signature of the Verification Authority.
FDP_ROL.1[CCM] Contributes to meet this security objective by ensures that card
management operations may be cleanly aborted.
FPT_FLS.1[CCM] Contributes to meet the security objective by preserving a secure state
when failures occur.
OT.DOMAIN-RIGHTS
SFR Rationale
FDP_ACC.1[SD] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security
Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a
secure card content management.
FDP_ACF.1[SD] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security
Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a
secure card content management.
FMT_MSA.1[SD] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security
Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a
secure card content management.
FMT_MSA.3[SD] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security
Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a
secure card content management.
FMT_SMF.1[SD] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security
Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a
secure card content management.
FMT_SMR.1[SD] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security
Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a
secure card content management.
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SFR Rationale
FTP_ITC.1[SC] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FCO_NRO.2[SC] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FDP_IFC.2[SC] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FDP_IFF.1[SC] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_MSA.1[SC] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_MSA.3[SC] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_SMF.1[SC] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UID.1[SC] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UAU.1[SC] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UAU.4[SC] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
OT.COMM_AUTH
SFR Rationale
FCS_COP.1 Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying secure
cryptographic algorithm that shall be used to determine the origin of the
card management commands.
FMT_SMR.1[SD] Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the authorized
identified roles enabling to send and authenticate card management
commands.
FTP_ITC.1[SC] Contributes to meet the security objective by ensuring the origin of card
administration commands.
FDP_IFC.2[SC] Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the authorized
identified roles enabling to send and authenticate card management
commands.
FDP_IFF.1[SC] Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the authorized
identified roles enabling to send and authenticate card management
commands.
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SFR Rationale
FMT_MSA.1[SC] Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying security
attributes enabling to authenticate card management requests.
FMT_MSA.3[SC] Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying security
attributes enabling to authenticate card management requests.
FIA_UID.1[SC] Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the actions
that can be performed before authenticating the origin of the APDU
commands that the TOE receives.
FIA_UAU.1[SC] Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the actions
that can be performed before authenticating the origin of the APDU
commands that the TOE receives.
OT.COMM_INTEGRITY
SFR Rationale
FCS_COP.1 Contributes to meet the security objective by by specifying secure
cryptographic algorithm that shall be used to ensure the integrity of the
card management commands.
FMT_SMR.1[SD] Contributes to cover this security objective by defining the roles enabling
to send and authenticate the card management requests for which the
integrity has to be ensured.
FTP_ITC.1[SC] Contributes to meet the security objective by ensuring the integrity of
card management commands.
FDP_IFC.2[SC] Contributes to cover the security objective by enforcing the Secure
Channel Protocol information flow control policy to guarantee the
integrity of administration requests.
FDP_IFF.1[SC] Contributes to cover the security objective by enforcing the Secure
Channel Protocol information flow control policy to guarantee the
integrity of administration requests.
FMT_MSA.1[SC] Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying security
attributes enabling to guarantee the integrity of card management
requests.
FMT_MSA.3[SC] Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying security
attributes enabling to guarantee the integrity of card management
requests.
FMT_SMF.1[SC] Contributes to meet the security objective by specifying the actions
activating the integrity check on the card management commands.
OT.COMM_CONFIDENTIALITY
SFR Rationale
FCS_COP.1 Contributes to meet this objective by specifying secure cryptographic
algorithm that shall be used to ensure the confidentiality of the card
management commands.
FMT_SMR.1[SD] Contributes to cover the security objective by defining the roles enabling
to send and authenticate the card management requests for which the
confidentiality has to be ensured.
FTP_ITC.1[SC] Contributes to cover the security objective by ensuring the confidentiality
of card management commands.
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SFR Rationale
FDP_IFC.2[SC] Contributes to cover the security objective by enforcing the Secure
Channel Protocol information flow control policy to guarantee the
confidentiality of administration requests.
FDP_IFF.1[SC] Contributes to cover the security objective by enforcing the Secure
Channel Protocol information flow control policy to guarantee the
confidentiality of administration requests.
FMT_MSA.1[SC] Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying security
attributes enabling to guarantee the confidentiality of card management
requests by decrypting those requests and imposing management
conditions on that attributes.
FMT_MSA.3[SC] Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying security
attributes enabling to guarantee the confidentiality of card management
requests by decrypting those requests and imposing management
conditions on that attributes.
FMT_SMF.1[SC] Contributes to cover the security objective by specifying the actions
ensuring the confidentiality of the card management commands.
7.1.2.6 Card Management
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT
SFR Rationale
FDP_ACC.2[ADEL] Contributes to meet the objective by the ADEL access control policy
which ensures the non-introduction of security holes. The integrity and
confidentiality of data that does not belong to the deleted applet or
package is a by-product of this policy as well.
FDP_ACF.1[ADEL] Contributes to meet the objective by the ADEL access control policy
which ensures the non-introduction of security holes. The integrity and
confidentiality of data that does not belong to the deleted applet or
package is a by-product of this policy as well.
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL] Contributes to meet the objective by ensuring the non-accessibility of
deleted data.
FMT_MSA.1[ADEL] Contributes to meet the objective by enforcing the ADEL access control
SFP.
FMT_MSA.3[ADEL] Contributes to meet the objective by enforcing the ADEL access control
SFP.
FMT_SMR.1[ADEL] Contributes to meet the objective by maintaing the role applet deletion
manager.
FPT_
RCV.3[INSTALLER]
Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the TSFs against
possible failures of the deletion procedures.
FPT_
FLS.1[INSTALLER]
Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the TSFs against
possible failures of the installer.
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL] Contributes to meet the objective by protecting the TSFs against
possible failures of the deletion procedures.
FDP_UIT.1[CCM] Contributes to meet the objective by enforcing the Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy and the Security Domain access
control policy which controls the integrity of the corresponding data.
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SFR Rationale
FDP_ROL.1[CCM] Contributes to meet this security objective by ensures that card
management operations may be cleanly aborted.
FDP_ITC.2[CCM] Contributes to meet the security objective by enforcing the Firewall
access control policy and the Secure Channel Protocol information flow
policy when importing card management data.
FPT_FLS.1[CCM] Contributes to meet the security objective by preserving a secure state
when failures occur.
FDP_ACC.1[SD] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security
Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a
secure card content management.
FDP_ACF.1[SD] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security
Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a
secure card content management.
FMT_MSA.1[SD] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security
Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a
secure card content management.
FMT_MSA.3[SD] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security
Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a
secure card content management.
FMT_SMF.1[SD] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security
Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a
secure card content management.
FMT_SMR.1[SD] Contributes to cover this security objective by enforcing a Security
Domain access control policy (rules and restrictions) that ensures a
secure card content management.
FTP_ITC.1[SC] Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FCO_NRO.2[SC] Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FDP_IFC.2[SC] Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FDP_IFF.1[SC] Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_MSA.1[SC] Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_MSA.3[SC] Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FMT_SMF.1[SC] Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
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SFR Rationale
FIA_UID.1[SC] Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UAU.1[SC] Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
FIA_UAU.4[SC] Contributes to meet this security objective by enforcing Secure Channel
Protocol information flow control policy that ensures the integrity and the
authenticity of card management operations.
7.1.2.7 Smart Card Platform
OT.SCP.IC
SFR Rationale
FAU_ARP.1 Contributes to the coverage of the objective by resetting the card session
or terminating the card in case of physical tampering.
FPR_UNO.1 Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring leakage
resistant implementations of the unobservable operations.
FPT_EMSEC.1 Contributes to meet the objective.
FPT_PHP.3 Contributes to the coverage of the objective by preventing bypassing,
deactivation or changing of other security features.
OT.SCP.RECOVERY
SFR Rationale
FAU_ARP.1 Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring reinitialization of
the Java Card System and its data after card tearing and power failure.
FPT_FLS.1 Contributes to the coverage of the objective by preserving a secure state
after failure.
OT.SCP.SUPPORT
SFR Rationale
FCS_CKM.1 Contributes to meet the objective.
FCS_CKM.4 Contributes to meet the objective.
FCS_COP.1 Contributes to meet the objective.
FDP_
ROL.1[FIREWALL]
Contributes to meet the objective.
OT.IDENTIFICATION
SFR Rationale
FAU_SAS.1[SCP] Covers the objective.The Initialisation Data (or parts of them) are used
for TOE identification
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7.1.2.8 Random Numbers
OT.RND
SFR Rationale
FCS_RNG.1 Covers the objective by providing random numbers of good quality by
specifying class DRG.3 of AIS 20. It was chosen to define FCS_RNG.1
explicitly, because Part 2 of the Common Criteria does not contain
generic security functional requirements for Random Number generation.
(Note that there are security functional requirements in Part 2 of the
Common Criteria, which refer to random numbers. However, they define
requirements only for the authentication context, which is only one of the
possible applications of random numbers).
FCS_RNG.1[HDT] Covers the objective by providing random numbers of good quality by
specifying class DRG.4 of AIS 20
7.1.2.9 Config Applet
OT.CARD-CONFIGURATION
SFR Rationale
FDP_IFC.2[CFG] Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify
configuration items.
FDP_IFF.1[CFG] Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify
configuration items.
FMT_MSA.3[CFG] Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify
configuration items.
FMT_MSA.1[CFG] Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify
configuration items.
FMT_SMR.1[CFG] Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify
configuration items.
FMT_SMF.1[CFG] Contributes to meet the objective by controlling the ability to modify
configuration items.
FIA_UID.1[CFG] Contributes to meet the objective by requiring identification before
modifying configuration items.
7.1.2.10 OS Update Mechanism
OT.CONFID-UPDATE-IMAGE.LOAD
SFR Rationale
FPR_UNO.1 Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring the
unobservability of the S.OSU decryption key.
FIA_UID.1[OSU] Contributes to the coverage of the objective by requiring identification.
FIA_UAU.1[OSU] Contributes to the coverage of the objective by requiring authentication.
OT.AUTH-LOAD-UPDATE-IMAGE
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SFR Rationale
FDP_IFC.2[OSU] Contributes to the coverage of the objective by applying the rules of the
Information Flow Control policy.
FDP_IFF.1[OSU] Contributes to the coverage of the objective by applying the rules of the
Information Flow Control policy.
FMT_MSA.3[OSU] Contributes to the coverage of the objective by enforcing restrictive
default values for the attributes of the OS Update information flow control
SFP.
FMT_SMR.1[OSU] Contributes to the coverage of the objective by letting S.OSU handle the
OS Update procedure.
FIA_UID.1[OSU] Contributes to the objective by requiring identification of the authorized
images.
FIA_UAU.1[OSU] Contributes to the objective by requiring authentication of the authorized
images.
OT.SECURE_LOAD_ACODE
SFR Rationale
FDP_IFC.2[OSU] Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring that only
allowed versions of the D.UPDATE_IMAGE are accepted and by
checking the evidence data of authenticity and integrity.
FMT_SMR.1[OSU] Contributes to the coverage of the objective by letting S.OSU handle the
OS Update procedure.
FPT_FLS.1[OSU] Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring a secure state
after interruption of the OS Update procedure (Load Phase).
FIA_UAU.4[OSU] Contributes to meet the objective by enforcing authenticity and integrity
of D.UPDATE_IMAGE (i.e. Additional Code).
OT.SECURE_AC_ACTIVATION
SFR Rationale
FMT_MSA.1[OSU] Contributes to the coverage of the objective by allowing to modify the
Current Sequence Number only after successful OS Update procedure.
FMT_SMR.1[OSU] Contributes to the coverage of the objective by letting S.OSU handle the
OS Update procedure.
FMT_SMF.1[OSU] Contributes to the objective by providing information on the currently
activated software (Current Sequence Number).
FPT_FLS.1[OSU] Contributes to the coverage of the objective by ensuring atomicity of the
OS Update procedure (Load Phase).
OT.TOE_IDENTIFICATION
SFR Rationale
FDP_SDI.2 Contributes to cover the objective by storing the identification data
(D.TOE_IDENTIFICATION) in an integrity protected store.
FMT_SMF.1[OSU] Contributes to cover the objective by providing the ability to query the
identification data (Current Sequence Number, Reference Sequence
Number, Final Sequence Number) of the TOE.
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7.1.2.11 Applet Migration Mechanism
OT.DATASTORE_ACCESS
SFR Rationale
FDP_ACC.1[AMD] Contributes to meet the objective by applying access control rules to the
datastore.
FDP_ACF.1[AMD] Contributes to meet the objective by applying access control rules to the
datastore.
FMT_MSA.1[AMD] Contributes to meet the objective by ensuring that only the
ArchiveManager sets the respective AID couples of the exporting and
importing applets.
FMT_MSA.3[AMD] Contributes to meet the objective by providing access only to
ArchiveManager to read/write the datastore and the respective exporting
and importing applet AID.
FMT_SMF.1[AMD] Contributes to meet the objective by providing import and export
functions from/to the datastore.
FDP_IFC.2[AMD] This SFR contributes to the objective by accepting migration plans only
from an authentified off card entity
FDP_IFF.1[AMD] This SFR contributes to the objective by accepting migration plans only
from an authentified off card entity.
FMT_SMR.1[AMD] Contributes to cover the objective by letting S.ArchiveManager handle
the Applet Migration process
FPT_FLS.1[AMD] Enforces the security objective by preserving a secure state in case the
applet migration is not performed successfully.
FIA_UAU.5[AMD] This SFR contributes to the objective by accepting migration plans only
from an authentified off card entity
FIA_UID.1[AMD] Contributes to the coverage of the objective by requiring identification.
7.1.2.12 Restricted Mode
OT.ATTACK-COUNTER
SFR Rationale
FMT_MSA.3[RM] Contributes to cover the objective by restricting the initial value of the
Attack Counter and allowing nobody to change the initial value.
FMT_MSA.1[RM] Contributes to cover the objective by only allowing the S.ACAdmin to
modify the Attack Counter.
FIA_UAU.1[RM] Contributes to cover the objective by requiring authentication before
resetting the Attack Counter.
FIA_UID.1[RM] Contributes to cover the objective by requiring identification before
resetting the Attack Counter.
OT.RESTRICTED-MODE
SFR Rationale
FDP_ACC.2[RM] Contributes to the coverage of the objective by defining the subject of the
Restricted Mode access control SFP.
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SFR Rationale
FDP_ACF.1[RM] Contributes to cover the objective by controlling access to objects for all
operations.
FMT_SMF.1[RM] Contributes to cover the objective by defining the management functions
of the restricted mode.
FIA_UAU.1[RM] Contributes to cover the objective by requiring authentication before
resetting the Attack Counter.
FIA_UID.1[RM] Contributes to cover the objective by requiring identification before
resetting the Attack Counter.
7.1.2.13 Package Sensitive Result
OT.SENSITIVE_RESULTS_INTEG
SFR Rationale
FDP_
SDI.2[SENSITIVE_
RESULT]
The security objective is covered directly by the SFR FDP_
SDI.2[SENSITIVE_RESULT] which ensures that integrity errors related
to the senstive API result are detected by the TOE.
7.1.2.14 Context Separation
OT.CONT-SEP
SFR Rationale
FDP_
ACC.2[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by defining the context separation
SFP.
FDP_
ACF.1[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by defining the rules of the context
separation SFP.
FMT_
MSA.3[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by providing restrictive default values
for the Access Control Table and by allowing only the SMK to create new
entries.
FMT_
MSA.1[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by allowing only SMK to modify the
Memory Region Access Control Table.
FMT_
SMR.1[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by maintaining the roles S.SMK,
S.GuestOS.
FMT_
SMF.1[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by defining a management function for
the Memory Region Access Control Table.
FIA_UID.1[CONTSEP] Contributes to cover the objective by ensuring that no user can access
the TOE before the context separation SFP has been set up
OT.CONT-PRIV
SFR Rationale
FDP_
ACC.2[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by defining the context separation
SFP.
FDP_
ACF.1[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by defining the rules that makes SMK
the most privileged.
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SFR Rationale
FMT_
MSA.3[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by providing restrictive default values
for the Access Control Table and by allowing only the SMK to create new
entries.
FMT_
MSA.1[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by allowing only SMK to modify the
Memory Region Access Control Table.
FMT_
SMR.1[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by maintaining the roles S.SMK,
S.GuestOS.
FMT_
SMF.1[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by defining a management function for
the Memory Region Access Control Table.
FIA_UID.1[CONTSEP] Contributes to cover the objective by ensuring that no user can access
the TOE before the context separation SFP has been set up
OT.CONT-DOS
SFR Rationale
FDP_
ACC.2[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by defining the context separation
SFP.
FDP_
ACF.1[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by defining the rules that ensure that
SMK stays the leader and manages context switching.
FMT_
MSA.3[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by providing restrictive default values
for the Access Control Table and by allowing only the SMK to create new
entries.
FMT_
MSA.1[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by allowing only SMK to modify the
Memory Region Access Control Table.
FMT_
SMR.1[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by maintaining the roles S.SMK,
S.GuestOS.
FMT_
SMF.1[CONTSEP]
Contributes to cover the objective by defining a management function for
the Memory Region Access Control Table.
FIA_UID.1[CONTSEP] Contributes to cover the objective by ensuring that no user can access
the TOE before the context separation SFP has been set up
7.1.3 Security Requirements Dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied dependencies
FAU_ARP.1 FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation
analysis
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FAU_SAS.1[SCP] No other components.
FCO_NRO.2[SC] FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
FIA_UID.1[SC]
FCS_CKM.1 [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic
key distribution, or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation] FCS_
CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
Table 23. SFRs Dependencies.
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Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied dependencies
FCS_CKM.2 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data without security attributes,
or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes,
or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation] FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.3 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data without security attributes,
or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes,
or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation] FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data without security attributes,
or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FCS_COP.1 [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data without security attributes,
or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes,
or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation] FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction.
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FCS_RNG.1 No dependencies
FCS_RNG.2[HDT] No dependencies
FDP_ACC.1[AMD] FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control
FDP_ACF.1[AMD]
FDP_ACC.1[SD] FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control
FDP_ACF.1[SD]
FDP_ACC.2[FIREWALL] FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FDP_ACC.2[ADEL] FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FDP_ACC.2[RM] FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control
FDP_ACF.1[RM]
FDP_ACC.2[CONTSEP] FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control
FDP_ACF.1[CONTSEP]
FDP_ACF.1[FIREWALL] FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FDP_ACF.1[ADEL] FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
Table 23. SFRs Dependencies....continued
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Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied dependencies
FDP_ACF.1[AMD] FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation
FDP_ACC.1[AMD]
FMT_MSA.3[AMD]
FDP_ACF.1[SD] FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation
FDP_ACC.1[SD]
FMT_MSA.3[SD]
FDP_ACF.1[RM] FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation
FDP_ACC.2[RM]
FMT_MSA.3[RM]
FDP_ACF.1[CONTSEP] FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation
FDP_ACC.2[CONTSEP]
FMT_MSA.3[CONTSEP]
FDP_IFC.1[JCVM] FDP_IFF.1 Simple security
attributes
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FDP_IFC.2[SC] FDP_IFF.1 Simple security
attributes
FDP_IFF.1[SC]
FDP_IFC.2[OSU] FDP_IFF.1 Simple security
attributes
FDP_IFF.1[OSU]
FDP_IFC.2[CFG] FDP_IFF.1 Simple security
attributes
FDP_IFF.1[CFG]
FDP_IFC.2[CFG] FDP_IFF.1 Simple security
attributes
FDP_IFF.1[CFG]
FDP_IFC.2[AMD] FDP_IFF.1 Simple security
attributes
FDP_IFF.1[AMD]
FDP_IFF.1[JCVM] FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FDP_IFF.1[SC] FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation
FDP_IFC.2[SC]
FMT_MSA.3[SC]
FDP_IFF.1[OSU] FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation
FDP_IFC.2[OSU]
FMT_MSA.3[OSU]
FDP_IFF.1[CFG] FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation
FDP_IFC.2[CFG]
FMT_MSA.3[CFG]
FDP_IFF.1[AMD] FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control FMT_MSA.3 Static
attribute initialisation
FDP_IFC.2[AMD]
FMT_MSA.3[AMD]
FDP_ITC.2[CCM] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted
path] FPT_TDC.1 Inter-TSF
basic TSF data consistency
FDP_ACC.1[SD]
FTP_ITC.1[SC]
FDP_RIP.1[OBJECTS] No dependencies
Table 23. SFRs Dependencies....continued
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Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied dependencies
FDP_RIP.1[ABORT] No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1[APDU] No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1[bArray] No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1[KEYS] No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1[TRANSIENT] No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1[ADEL] No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1[ODEL] No dependencies
FDP_ROL.1[FIREWALL] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FDP_ROL.1[CCM] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FDP_ACC.1[SD]
FDP_SDI.2[DATA] No dependencies
FDP_UIT.1[CCM] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted
path]
FDP_ACC.1[SD]
FTP_ITC.1[SC]
FIA_AFL.1[PIN] FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication
see AppNote in FIA_
AFL.1[PIN]
FIA_ATD.1[AID] No dependencies
FIA_UID.1[SC] No dependencies
FIA_UID.1[OSU] No dependencies
FIA_UID.1[AMD] No dependencies
FIA_UID.1[CFG] No dependencies
FIA_UID.1[RM] No dependencies
FIA_UID.1[CONTSEP] No dependencies
FIA_UID.2[AID] No dependencies
FIA_USB.1[AID] FIA_ATD.1 User attribute
definition
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FIA_UAU.1[SC] A_UID.1 Timing of identification FIA_UID.1[SC]
FIA_UAU.5[AMD] No dependencies
FIA_UAU.1[RM] FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
FIA_UID.1[RM]
FIA_UAU.1[OSU] FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
FIA_UID.1[OSU]
FIA_UAU.4[SC] No dependencies
FIA_UAU.4[OSU] No dependencies
Table 23. SFRs Dependencies....continued
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Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied dependencies
FMT_MSA.1[JCRE] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FMT_MSA.1[JCVM] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FMT_MSA.1[ADEL] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FMT_MSA.1[SC] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
FDP_ACC.1[SD]
FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FMT_SMF.1[SC]
FMT_MSA.1[OSU] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
FDP_IFC.2[OSU]
FMT_SMR.1[OSU]
FMT_SMF.1[OSU]
FMT_MSA.1[CFG] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
FDP_IFC.2[CFG]
FMT_SMR.1[CFG]
FMT_SMF.1[CFG]
FMT_MSA.1[SD] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
FDP_ACC.1[SD]
FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FMT_SMF.1[SD]
FMT_MSA.1[RM] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
FDP_ACC.2[RM]
FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FMT_SMF.1[RM]
Table 23. SFRs Dependencies....continued
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Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied dependencies
FMT_MSA.1[AMD] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
FDP_ACC.1[AMD] & FDP_
IFC.2[AMD]
FMT_SMR.1[AMD]
FMT_SMF.1[AMD]
FMT_MSA.1[CONTSEP] [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
FDP_ACC.2[CONTSEP]
FMT_SMR.1[CONTSEP]
FMT_SMF.1[CONTSEP]
FMT_MSA.2[FIREWALL-
JCVM]
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FMT_MSA.3[FIREWALL] FMT_MSA.1 Management of
security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FMT_MSA.3[JCVM] FMT_MSA.1 Management of
security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FMT_MSA.3[ADEL] FMT_MSA.1 Management of
security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FMT_MSA.3[AMD] FMT_MSA.1 Management of
security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MSA.1[AMD]
FMT_SMR.1[AMD]
FMT_MSA.3[OSU] FMT_MSA.1 Management of
security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MSA.1[OSU]
FMT_SMR.1[OSU]
FMT_MSA.3[CFG] FMT_MSA.1 Management of
security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MSA.1[CFG]
FMT_SMR.1[CFG]
FMT_MSA.3[SD] FMT_MSA.1 Management of
security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MSA.1[SD]
FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FMT_MSA.3[SC] FMT_MSA.1 Management of
security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MSA.1[SC]
FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FMT_MSA.3[RM] FMT_MSA.1 Management of
security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MSA.1[RM]
FMT_SMR.1[SD]
FMT_MSA.3[CONTSEP] FMT_MSA.1 Management of
security attributes FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MSA.1[CONTSEP]
FMT_SMR.1[CONTSEP]
Table 23. SFRs Dependencies....continued
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Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied dependencies
FMT_MTD.1[JCRE] FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FMT_MTD.3[JCRE] FMT_MTD.1 Management of
TSF data
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FMT_SMF.1 No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1[ADEL] No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1[AMD] No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1[OSU] No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1[CFG] No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1[SD] No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1[SC] No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1[RM] No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1[CONTSEP] No dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FMT_SMR.1[INSTALLER] FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FMT_SMR.1[ADEL] FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FMT_SMR.1[OSU] FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
FIA_UID.1[OSU]
FMT_SMR.1[AMD] FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
FIA_UID.1[AMD]
FMT_SMR.1[CFG] FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
FIA_UID.1[CFG]
FMT_SMR.1[SD] FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
FIA_UID.1[SC]
FMT_SMR.1[CONTSEP] FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
FIA_UID.1[CONTSEP]
FPR_UNO.1 No dependencies
FPT_EMSEC.1 No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1 No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1[INSTALLER] No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1[ADEL] No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1[ODEL] No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1[OSU] No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1[AMD] No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1[CCM] No dependencies
FPT_TDC.1 No dependencies
Table 23. SFRs Dependencies....continued
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Requirements CC Dependencies Satisfied dependencies
FPT_RCV.3[INSTALLER] AGD_OPE.1 Operational user
guidance
see §7.4.3.1 of [10]
FPT_PHP.3 No dependencies
FTP_ITC.1[SC] No dependencies
Table 23. SFRs Dependencies....continued
7.1.4 Rationale for Exclusion of Dependencies
The dependency FIA_UID.1 of FMT_SMR.1[INSTALLER] is unsupported. This ST
does not require the identification of the "installer" since it can be considered as part of
the TSF.
The dependency FIA_UID.1 of FMT_SMR.1[ADEL] is unsupported. This ST does not
require the identification of the "deletion manager" since it can be considered as part of
the TSF.
The dependency FMT_SMF.1 of FMT_MSA.1[JCRE] is unsupported. The
dependency between FMT_MSA.1[JCRE] and FMT_SMF.1 is not satisfied because no
management functions are required for the Java Card RE.
The dependency FAU_SAA.1 of FAU_ARP.1 is unsupported. The dependency of
FAU_ARP.1 on FAU_SAA.1 assumes that a "potential security violation" generates
an audit event. On the contrary, the events listed in FAU_ARP.1 are self-contained
(arithmetic exception, ill-formed bytecodes, access failure) and ask for a straightforward
reaction of the TSFs on their occurrence at runtime. The JCVM or other components
of the TOE detect these events during their usual working order. Thus, there is no
mandatory audit recording in this ST.
The dependency FIA_UAU.1 of FIA_AFL.1[PIN] is unsupported. The TOE
implements the firewall access control SFP, based on which access to the object
Implementing FIA_AFL.1[PIN] is organized.
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8 Security Assurance Requirements (ASE_REQ)
8.1 Security Assurance Requirements
The assurance requirements of this evaluation are EAL5, augmented by AVA_VAN.5,
ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2, and ALC_FLR.1. The assurance requirements ensure, among
others, the security of the TOE during its development and production.
8.2 Rationale for the Security Assurance Requirements
This Security Target augments from EAL4 to EAL5 in order to meet increasing assurance
expectations on the resistance to attackers with high attack potential.
This Security Target augments EAL5 with ALC_FLR.1 to cover policies and procedures
that are applied to track and correct flaws and to support surveillance of the TOE.
Furthermore, ASE_TSS.2 is chosen to give architectural information on the security
functionality of the TOE, which enhances comprehensibility.
The assurance level EAL5 is an elaborated pre-defined level of the CC, part 3 [3]. The
assurance components in an EAL level are chosen in a way that they build a mutually
supportive and complete set of components. The additional requirements chosen for
augmentation do not add any dependencies, which are not already fulfilled for the
corresponding requirements contained in EAL5. Therefore, the components AVA_VAN.5,
ALC_DVS.2, ASE_TSS.2 and ALC_FLR.1 serve additional assurance to EAL5, but the
mutual support of the requirements is still guaranteed.
8.3 Dependencies of Security Assurance Requirements
The dependencies of the Security Assurance Requirements are given in Table 24. They
are derived from Appendix C of CC [3] . The table indicates whether the SAR is directly
or indirectly required. Only applicable dependencies from the highest level assurance
components are considered.
Name Directly required Indirectly required
ADV_ARC.1 ADV_FSP.1, ADV_TDS.1 ADV_FSP.2
ADV_FSP.5 ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.1 ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1
ADV_IMP.1 ADV_TDS.3, ALC_CMC.4, ALC_TAT.1 ADV_FSP.4, ALC_CMS.1, ALC_DVS.1,
ALC_LCD.1
ADV_INT.2 ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1 ADV_FSP.4,
ADV_TDS.4 ADV_FSP.5 ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1
AGD_OPE.1 ADV_FSP.1 none
AGD_PRE.1 none none
ALC_CMC.4 ALC_CMS.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1 none
ALC_CMS.5 none none
ALC_DEL.1 none none
ALC_DVS.2 none none
ALC_FLR.1 none none
Table 24. Dependencies of the Security assurance requirements
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Name Directly required Indirectly required
ALC_LCD.1 none none
ALC_TAT.2 ADV_IMP.1 ADV_FSP.4, ADV_TDS.3
ASE_CCL.1 ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.1 none
ASE_ECD.1 none none
ASE_INT.1 none none
ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1 none
ASE_REQ.2 ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2 ASE_SPD.1
ASE_SPD.1 none none
ASE_TSS.2 ADV_ARC.1, ASE_INT.1, ASE_REQ.1 ADV_FSP.2, ADV_TDS.1, ASE_ECD.1
ATE_COV.2 ADV_FSP.2, ATE_FUN.1 ADV_TDS.1, ATE_COV.1
ATE_DPT.3 ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4, ATE_FUN.1 ADV_FSP.5, ADV_IMP.1, ALC_TAT.1,
ARE_COV.1
ATE_FUN.1 ATE_COV.1 ADV_FSP.2, ADV_TDS.1, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2 ADV_FSP.2, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_
PRE.1, ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1
ADV_TDS.1
AVA_VAN.5 ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP4, ADV_IMP.1,
ADV_TDS.3, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_
PRE.1, ATE_DPT.1
ALC_TAT.1, ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1
Table 24. Dependencies of the Security assurance requirements ...continued
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9 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
9.1 Introduction
The Security Functions (SF) and Security Services (SS) introduced in this section realize
the SFRs of the TOE. Each SF/SS consists of components spread over several TOE
modules to provide a security functionality and fulfill SFRs.
9.2 Security Functionality of Java Card System
The Security Functions (SF) introduced in this section realize the SFRs of the TOE. See
Table 25 for list of all Security Functions. Each SF consists of components spread over
several TOE modules to provide a security functionality and fulfill SFRs.
Name Title
SF.JCVM Java Card Virtual Machine
SF.AM Applet Migration
SF.CONFIG Configuration Management
SF.OPEN Card Content Management
SF.CRYPTO Cryptographic Functionality
SF.RNG Random Number Generator
SF.DATA_STORAGE Secure Data Storage
SF.OSU Operating System Update
SF.OM Java Object Management
SF.MM Memory Management
SF.PIN PIN Management
SF.PERS_MEM Persistent Memory Management
SF.EDC Error Detection Code API
SF.HW_EXC Hardware Exception Handling
SF.RM Restricted Mode
SF.PID Platform Identification
SF.SMG_NSC No Side-Channel
SF.SENS_RES Sensitive Result
SF.CONT_SEP Context Separation
Table 25. Overview of Security Functionality
SF.JCVM Java Card Virtual Machine
SF.JCVM provides the Java Card Virtual Machine including byte code
interpretation and the Java Card Firewall according to the specifications
[14], [13].
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SF.AM Applet Migration
The SF.AM enables applet update while applet personalization data
is preserved. In particular, the implementation of the Applet Migration
feature supports the functions for export and import of applet data.
SF.CONFIG Configuration Management
SF.CONFIG provides means to store Initialization Data and Pre-
personalization Data before TOE delivery.
SF.CONFIG provides means to change configurations of the card. Some
configurations can be changed by the customer and some can only be
changed by NXP.
Additionally, SF.CONFIG provides proprietary commands to select the
OS update mechanism SF.OSU and to reset the OS to an initial state.
SF.OPEN Card Content Management
SF.OPEN provides the card content management functionality according
the GlobalPlatform Specification [17] and GlobalPlatform Amendments A
[18], C [19], D [20], E [21] and J [22]. In addition to the GP specification,
the Java Card Runtime Environment specification [14] is followed for
application loading, installation, and deletion.
AID management is provided by SF.OPEN according to the
GlobalPlatform Specification [17], the Java Card Runtime Environment
Specification [14], and the Java Card API Specification [12].
SF.OPEN is part of the TOE runtime environment and thus separated
from other applications.
SF.CRYPTO Cryptographic Functionality
SF.CRYPTO provides key creation, key management, key deletion and
cryptographic functionality. It provides the API in accordance to the Java
Card API Specification [12]. Proprietary solutions (e.g., key lengths not
supported by the Java Card API) are supported following the Java Card
API. SF.CRYPTO uses SF.DATA_STORAGE.
This TSF enforces protection of Key material during cryptographic
functions processing and Key Generation, against state-of-the-art
attacks, including IC power consumption analysis.
SF.RNG Random Number Generator
SF.RNG provides secure random number generation. Random numbers
are generated by the Security Software certified with the TOE hardware.
SF.RNG provides an API according to the Java Card API Specification
[12] to generate random numbers.
SF.DATA_STORAGE Secure Data Storage
SF.DATA_STORAGE provides a secure data storage for confidential
data. It is used to store cryptographic keys and to store PINs. All data
stored by SF.DATA_STORAGE is CRC32 integrity protected. The stored
data is AES encrypted.
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SF.OSU Operating System Update
SF.OSU provides secure functionality to update the JCOP 8.0 OS
or SystemOS itself with an image created by a trusted off-card
entity. SF.OSU allows an authenticated OSU command to upload
an integrity and confidentiality protected update image to update to
another operating system version. User authentication is based on
the verification of signed OSU commands. Integrity protection of OSU
commands uses ECDSA, SHA-256 and CRC verification. Confidentiality
of the update image is ensured by ECDH and AES encryption. SF.OSU
ensures that the system stays in a secure state in case of invalid or
aborted update procedures and ensures that the information identifying
the currently running OS is modified and the updated code is activated
only after successfull OS Update procedure.
SF.OM Java Object Management
SF.OM provides the object management for Java objects which are
processed by SF.JCVM. It provides object creation and garbage
collection according to the Java Card Runtime Environment Specification
[14]. SF.OM throws an Java Exception in case an object cannot be
created as requested due to too less available memory.
SF.MM Memory Management
SF.MM provides deletion of memory for transient arrays, global
arrays, and logical channels according to the Java Card Runtime
Environment Specification [14] by granting access to and erasing of
CLEAR_ON_RESET and CLEAR_ON_DESELECT transient arrays, by
clearing the APDU buffers for new incoming data, by clearing the bArray
during application installation, or by any Global Array after uage.
SF.PIN PIN Management
SF.PIN provides secure PIN management by using SF.DATA_STORAGE
for PIN objects specified in the Java Card API Specification [12] and the
GlobalPlatform Specification [17].
SF.PERS_MEM Persistent Memory Management
SF.PERS_MEM provides atomic write operations and transaction
management according to the Java Card Runtime Environment
Specification [14].
SF.PERS_MEM supports SF.JCVM by halting the system in case of
object creation in aborted transactions.
Low level write routines to persistent memory in SF.PERS_MEM perform
checks for defect memory cells.
SF.EDC Error Detection Code API
SF.EDC provides an Java API for user applications to perform integrity
checks based on a checksum on Java arrays [34]. The API throws a
Java Exception in case the checksum in invalid.
SF.HW_EXC Hardware Exception Handling
SF.HW_EXC provides software exception handler to react on unforeseen
events captured by the hardware (hardware exceptions). SF.HW_EXC
catches the hardware exceptions, to ensure the system goes to a secure
state, as well as to increase the attack counter in order to resist physical
manipulation and probing.
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SF.RM Restricted Mode
SF.RM provides a restricted mode that limits the functionality of the TOE.
Only the S.ACAdmin is able to reset the Attack Counter to leave the
restricted mode. SF.RM only allows a limited set of operations to not
identified and not authenticated users when in restricted mode. All other
operations require identification and authentication
SF.PID Platform Identification
SF.PID provides a platform identifier. For elements that can be identified
see Section 1.6.
SF.SMG_NSC No Side-Channel
The TSF ensures that during command execution there are no usable
variations in power consumption (measurable at e.g. electrical contacts)
or timing (measurable at e.g. electrical contacts) that might disclose
cryptographic keys or PINs. All functions of SF.CRYPTO except for SHA
are resistant to side-channel attacks (e.g. timing attack, SPA, DPA, DFA,
EMA, DEMA).
SF.SENS_RES Sensitive Result
SF.SENS_RES ensures that sensitive methods of the Java Card API
store their results so that callers of these methods can assert their return
values. If such a method returns abnormally with an exception then the
stored result is tagged as Unassigned and any subsequent assertion of
the result will fail.
SF.CONT_SEP Context Separation
The product supports several contexts of operation that guaranty code
execution, data storage, and hardware virtualization in a completely
isolated way from other contexts. For that, the whole address space is
organized in regions. Each region is assigned access rights based on
Context and Access Type (read/write/execute) thus allowing a complete
control of the MPU over the entire memory space . The default context
separation will be applied at boot by SMK and only SMK can change the
context separation setting after that. One specific Context is reserved for
SMK whereas other Contexts are reserved for Guest Operating Systems.
The State information and the Context number are applied to all bus
transactions for checking access control by the MPU. Any tentative to
perform a forbiden access will be prevented and will trigger a security
alarm.
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10 Bibliography
10 . 1 Evaluation documents
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001, April
2017
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002, April 2017
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003, April 2017
[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004, April 2017
[5] AIS20: Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS),
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 15.05.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI),
[6] JIL-ATT-SC: Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Joint
Interpretation Library, Version 2.4, January 2020
[7] JIL: Security requirements for post-delivery code loading, Joint Interpretation
Library, Version 1.0, February 2016.
[8] JIL: Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Joint
Interpretation Library, Version 1.5.1, May 2018.
[9] Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages, Registered
and Certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under
the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0, 13 January 2014.
[10] Java card protection profile - open configuration, published by oracle, inc.,
Registered and Certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0099-V2-2020, Version 3.1.
[11] Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”,
Basic Access Control (BAC PP), certified under the reference BSI-CC-
PP-0055-2009, Version 1.10, BSI-CC-PP-0055.
10 . 2 Standards
[12] Published by Oracle. Java Card Platform, Application Programming Interface,
Classic Edition, Version 3.1, November 2019.
[13] Published by Oracle. Java Card Platform, Virtual Machine Specification, Classic
Edition, Version 3.1, November 2019.
[14] Published by Oracle. Java Card Platform, Runtime Environment Specification,
Classic Edition, Version 3.1, November 2019.
[15] Gosling, Joy, Steele and Bracha. The Java Language Specification. Third Edition,
May 2005. ISBN 0-321-24678-0.
[16] Tim Lindholm, Frank Yellin. The Java Virtual Machine Specification. Lindholm,
Yellin. ISBN 0-201-43294-3.
[17] GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.3.1, GPC_SPE_034, March 2018.
[18] GlobalPlatform Confidential Card Content Management - Amendment A v1.1.1,
GPC_SPE_007, September 2018.
[19] GlobalPlatform Contactless Services - Amendment C v1.2.1, GPC_SPE_025, July
2018.
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[20] GlobalPlatform Card Technology Secure Channel Protocol ’03’ - Amendment D
v1.1.2, GPC_SPE_014, March 2019.
[21] GlobalPlatform Security Upgrade for Card Content Management - Amendment E
v1.1, GPC_SPE_042, October 2016.
[22] GlobalPlatform Broker Interface - Amendment J v1.0, GPC_SPE_157, July 2020.
[23] GlobalPlatform common Implementation Configuration - v2.1, GPC_GUI_080,
August 2018.
[24] GlobalPlatform Card API (org.globalplatform), v1.7, July 2019.
[25] ETSI. ETSI TS 102 622 v12.1.0 Smart Cards; UICC - Contactless Front-end (CLF)
Interface; Host Controller Interface (HCI), 10 2014.
[26] IETF RFC 8032. Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA).
[27] IETF RFC 7748. Elliptic Curves for Security.
[28] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.2, October 27, 2012, RSA
Laboratories
[29] ANSI X9.62-2005: Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: the
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), American National Standards
Institute (ANSI), 2005.
[30] NIST SP 800-38C: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The
CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, July 2007, Morris Dworkin,
National Institute of Standards and Technology
[31] NIST SP 800-38D: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/
Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, November 2007, Morris Dworkin, National
Institute of Standards and Technology
[32] FIPS PUB 186-4-2013: Digital Signature Standard, Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication, 2013, July, National Institute of Standards and Technology
[33] FIPS PUB 197-2001: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication 197, US Department of Commerce/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 26 November 2001.
10 . 3 Developer documents
[34] NXP. JCOP 8.0 User Guidance Manual, Rev. 2.7.3, date 2023-10-06 .
[35] NXP. JCOP 8.0 User Guidance Manual Addendum, Rev. 2.6.0, date 2023-03-27 .
[36] NXP. JCOP 8.0 Anomaly Sheet, Rev. 2.6.1, date 2023-10-06 .
[37] NXP. JCOP 8.0 R1.38.0.1 (JCOP 8.0 19.5-1.38) User Guidance Manual for JCOP
eSE, Rev. 2.7.5, date 2023-10-06 .
[38] NXP. JCOP 8.0 User Guidance Manual Addendum for JCOP eSE, Rev. 2.6.1, date
2023-04-19 .
[39] NXP. JCOP 8.0 User Guidance Manual Addendum System Management, Rev.
2.6.2, date 2023-07-10 .
[40] NXP Cap Optimizer User Manual, Rev. 1.0.1, date 2021-02-12 .
[41] NXP. JCOP 8.0 UGM Addendum for Non-standard Optimized Byte Codes, Rev.
2.6.0, date 2023-04-05 .
[42] NXP SE310 Series - Secure Element Security Target, rev. 0.1.1, 22 May 2023.
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11 Legal information
11.1 Definitions
Draft — A draft status on a document indicates that the content is still
under internal review and subject to formal approval, which may result
in modifications or additions. NXP Semiconductors does not give any
representations or warranties as to the accuracy or completeness of
information included in a draft version of a document and shall have no
liability for the consequences of use of such information.
11.2 Disclaimers
Limited warranty and liability — Information in this document is believed
to be accurate and reliable. However, NXP Semiconductors does not give
any representations or warranties, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy
or completeness of such information and shall have no liability for the
consequences of use of such information. NXP Semiconductors takes no
responsibility for the content in this document if provided by an information
source outside of NXP Semiconductors.
In no event shall NXP Semiconductors be liable for any indirect, incidental,
punitive, special or consequential damages (including - without limitation -
lost profits, lost savings, business interruption, costs related to the removal
or replacement of any products or rework charges) whether or not such
damages are based on tort (including negligence), warranty, breach of
contract or any other legal theory.
Notwithstanding any damages that customer might incur for any reason
whatsoever, NXP Semiconductors’ aggregate and cumulative liability
towards customer for the products described herein shall be limited in
accordance with the Terms and conditions of commercial sale of NXP
Semiconductors.
Right to make changes — NXP Semiconductors reserves the right to
make changes to information published in this document, including without
limitation specifications and product descriptions, at any time and without
notice. This document supersedes and replaces all information supplied prior
to the publication hereof.
Suitability for use — NXP Semiconductors products are not designed,
authorized or warranted to be suitable for use in life support, life-critical or
safety-critical systems or equipment, nor in applications where failure or
malfunction of an NXP Semiconductors product can reasonably be expected
to result in personal injury, death or severe property or environmental
damage. NXP Semiconductors and its suppliers accept no liability for
inclusion and/or use of NXP Semiconductors products in such equipment or
applications and therefore such inclusion and/or use is at the customer’s own
risk.
Applications — Applications that are described herein for any of these
products are for illustrative purposes only. NXP Semiconductors makes no
representation or warranty that such applications will be suitable for the
specified use without further testing or modification.
Customers are responsible for the design and operation of their
applications and products using NXP Semiconductors products, and NXP
Semiconductors accepts no liability for any assistance with applications or
customer product design. It is customer’s sole responsibility to determine
whether the NXP Semiconductors product is suitable and fit for the
customer’s applications and products planned, as well as for the planned
application and use of customer’s third party customer(s). Customers should
provide appropriate design and operating safeguards to minimize the risks
associated with their applications and products.
NXP Semiconductors does not accept any liability related to any default,
damage, costs or problem which is based on any weakness or default
in the customer’s applications or products, or the application or use by
customer’s third party customer(s). Customer is responsible for doing all
necessary testing for the customer’s applications and products using NXP
Semiconductors products in order to avoid a default of the applications
and the products or of the application or use by customer’s third party
customer(s). NXP does not accept any liability in this respect.
Limiting values — Stress above one or more limiting values (as defined in
the Absolute Maximum Ratings System of IEC 60134) will cause permanent
damage to the device. Limiting values are stress ratings only and (proper)
operation of the device at these or any other conditions above those
given in the Recommended operating conditions section (if present) or the
Characteristics sections of this document is not warranted. Constant or
repeated exposure to limiting values will permanently and irreversibly affect
the quality and reliability of the device.
Terms and conditions of commercial sale — NXP Semiconductors
products are sold subject to the general terms and conditions of commercial
sale, as published at http://www.nxp.com/profile/terms, unless otherwise
agreed in a valid written individual agreement. In case an individual
agreement is concluded only the terms and conditions of the respective
agreement shall apply. NXP Semiconductors hereby expressly objects to
applying the customer’s general terms and conditions with regard to the
purchase of NXP Semiconductors products by customer.
No offer to sell or license — Nothing in this document may be interpreted
or construed as an offer to sell products that is open for acceptance or
the grant, conveyance or implication of any license under any copyrights,
patents or other industrial or intellectual property rights.
Quick reference data — The Quick reference data is an extract of the
product data given in the Limiting values and Characteristics sections of this
document, and as such is not complete, exhaustive or legally binding.
Export control — This document as well as the item(s) described herein
may be subject to export control regulations. Export might require a prior
authorization from competent authorities.
Suitability for use in non-automotive qualified products — Unless
this data sheet expressly states that this specific NXP Semiconductors
product is automotive qualified, the product is not suitable for automotive
use. It is neither qualified nor tested in accordance with automotive testing
or application requirements. NXP Semiconductors accepts no liability for
inclusion and/or use of non-automotive qualified products in automotive
equipment or applications.
In the event that customer uses the product for design-in and use in
automotive applications to automotive specifications and standards,
customer (a) shall use the product without NXP Semiconductors’ warranty
of the product for such automotive applications, use and specifications, and
(b) whenever customer uses the product for automotive applications beyond
NXP Semiconductors’ specifications such use shall be solely at customer’s
own risk, and (c) customer fully indemnifies NXP Semiconductors for any
liability, damages or failed product claims resulting from customer design and
use of the product for automotive applications beyond NXP Semiconductors’
standard warranty and NXP Semiconductors’ product specifications.
Translations — A non-English (translated) version of a document, including
the legal information in that document, is for reference only. The English
version shall prevail in case of any discrepancy between the translated and
English versions.
Security — Customer understands that all NXP products may be subject to
unidentified vulnerabilities or may support established security standards or
specifications with known limitations. Customer is responsible for the design
and operation of its applications and products throughout their lifecycles
to reduce the effect of these vulnerabilities on customer’s applications
and products. Customer’s responsibility also extends to other open and/or
proprietary technologies supported by NXP products for use in customer’s
applications. NXP accepts no liability for any vulnerability. Customer should
regularly check security updates from NXP and follow up appropriately.
Customer shall select products with security features that best meet rules,
regulations, and standards of the intended application and make the
ultimate design decisions regarding its products and is solely responsible
for compliance with all legal, regulatory, and security related requirements
concerning its products, regardless of any information or support that may be
provided by NXP.
NXP has a Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) (reachable
at PSIRT@nxp.com) that manages the investigation, reporting, and solution
release to security vulnerabilities of NXP products.
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11.3 Trademarks
Notice: All referenced brands, product names, service names, and
trademarks are the property of their respective owners.
NXP — wordmark and logo are trademarks of NXP B.V.
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Tables
Tab. 1. TOE Reference ................................................. 3
Tab. 2. Reference to certified Secure Element
Hardware ...........................................................9
Tab. 3. Java Card Specification Version ......................14
Tab. 4. Global Platform and Amendments .................. 15
Tab. 5. ..........................................................................17
Tab. 6. Delivery items for JCOP 8.0 ............................19
Tab. 7. Product Identification .......................................20
Tab. 8. Platform ID Format ..........................................20
Tab. 9. Platform String Format ....................................21
Tab. 10. Hardware ID Data Format ...............................21
Tab. 11. CarG SFRs refinements ..................................28
Tab. 12. User Data Assets ............................................37
Tab. 13. TSF Data Assets .............................................38
Tab. 14. Extended components defined in the
JavaCard Open Configuration PP ...................66
Tab. 15. Requirement Groups .......................................69
Tab. 16. Java Card Subject Descriptions ...................... 70
Tab. 17. Object Groups .................................................71
Tab. 18. Applet Migration Object Groups ...................... 72
Tab. 19. Domain Separation Object Groups ................. 72
Tab. 20. Information Groups ..........................................72
Tab. 21. Security attribute description ...........................72
Tab. 22. Operation Description ......................................74
Tab. 23. SFRs Dependencies. .................................... 157
Tab. 24. Dependencies of the Security assurance
requirements ..................................................165
Tab. 25. Overview of Security Functionality ................ 167
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Figures
Fig. 1. Place in the System ..........................................4
Fig. 2. Components of the TOE ................................... 8
Fig. 3. TOE Life Cycle within Product Life Cycle ........ 17
Fig. 4. SAS Component ............................................. 66
Fig. 5. EMSEC Component ........................................67
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Contents
1 ST Introduction (ASE_INT) .................................3
1.1 ST Reference .................................................... 3
1.2 TOE Reference ..................................................3
1.3 TOE Overview ................................................... 3
1.3.1 Usage and Major Security Features of the
TOE ....................................................................3
1.3.2 TOE Type .......................................................... 7
1.3.3 Required non-TOE Hardware/Software/
Firmware ............................................................7
1.4 TOE Description ................................................ 8
1.4.1 Secure Element Subsystem .............................. 8
1.4.1.1 Hardware Description ........................................ 9
1.4.1.2 IC Dedicated Support Software ....................... 10
1.4.2 Shared Code ................................................... 11
1.4.2.1 Crypto Library ..................................................11
1.4.3 FlashOS ...........................................................13
1.4.4 SystemOS ........................................................13
1.4.4.1 OS Updater Feature ........................................ 13
1.4.4.2 Image4 (IM4) Feature ......................................14
1.4.5 SMK ................................................................. 14
1.4.6 JCOP eSE ....................................................... 14
1.4.6.1 Applet Migration ...............................................15
1.4.7 Interfaces of the TOE ...................................... 15
1.5 TOE Life Cycle ................................................ 16
1.6 TOE Identification ............................................ 19
1.6.1 Platform Identifier .............................................20
1.6.1.1 Sequence Number ...........................................21
1.6.1.2 IC Identifier ...................................................... 21
1.7 Evaluated Package Types ............................... 21
2 Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL) .................... 22
2.1 CC Conformance Claim ...................................22
2.2 PP Claim ..........................................................22
2.2.1 Java Card - Open Configuration (BSI-CC-
PP-0099-V2-2020) ...........................................22
2.3 Conformance Claim Rationale .........................22
2.3.1 TOE Type ........................................................ 22
2.3.2 Java Card - Open Configuration ......................23
2.3.2.1 SPD Statement for Java Card Component ...... 23
2.3.2.2 Security Objectives Statement for Java
Card Component ............................................. 25
2.3.2.3 SFRs Statement for Java Card Component .....27
3 Security Aspects ...............................................30
3.1 Confidentiality .................................................. 30
3.2 Integrity ............................................................ 30
3.3 Unauthorized Execution ...................................31
3.4 Bytecode Verification ....................................... 32
3.5 Card Management ...........................................32
3.6 Services ........................................................... 34
3.7 Config Applet ...................................................35
3.8 OS Update .......................................................35
3.9 Restricted Mode .............................................. 36
3.10 Applet Migration ...............................................36
3.11 Context Separation ..........................................36
4 Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD) ......... 37
4.1 SPD for Java Card System ............................. 37
4.1.1 Assets for Java Card System .......................... 37
4.1.1.1 User data .........................................................37
4.1.1.2 TSF data ..........................................................38
4.1.2 Threats for Java Card System .........................38
4.1.2.1 Confidentiality .................................................. 39
4.1.2.2 Integrity ............................................................ 39
4.1.2.3 Identity Usurpation ...........................................40
4.1.2.4 Unauthorized Execution ...................................40
4.1.2.5 Denial of Service ............................................. 40
4.1.2.6 Card Management ...........................................41
4.1.2.7 Services ........................................................... 41
4.1.2.8 Miscellaneous .................................................. 41
4.1.2.9 Random Numbers ............................................42
4.1.2.10 Config Applet ...................................................42
4.1.2.11 OS Update .......................................................42
4.1.2.12 Restricted Mode .............................................. 42
4.1.2.13 Applet Migration ...............................................42
4.1.2.14 Context Separation ..........................................43
4.1.3 OSPs for Java Card System ........................... 43
4.1.4 Assumptions for Java Card System .................44
5 Security Objectives ...........................................46
5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ...................... 46
5.1.1 Security Objectives for Java Card System .......46
5.1.1.1 Identification .....................................................46
5.1.1.2 Execution ......................................................... 46
5.1.1.3 Services ........................................................... 47
5.1.1.4 Object Deletion ................................................ 47
5.1.1.5 Applet Management .........................................48
5.1.1.6 Card Management ...........................................49
5.1.1.7 Smart Card Platform ........................................50
5.1.1.8 Random Numbers ............................................50
5.1.1.9 OS Update Mechanism ................................... 50
5.1.1.10 Config Applet ...................................................51
5.1.1.11 Restricted Mode .............................................. 51
5.1.1.12 Applet Migration ...............................................51
5.1.1.13 Context Separation ..........................................52
5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment .....................................................52
5.2.1 Security Objectives for the Operational
Environment of Java Card System .................. 52
5.3 Security Objectives Rationale ..........................53
5.3.1 Security Objective Rationale related to the
Java Card System ...........................................53
5.3.1.1 Rationale for Threats .......................................54
5.3.1.2 Rationale for OSPs ..........................................63
5.3.1.3 Rationale for Assumptions ...............................64
6 Extended Components Definition (ASE_
ECD) ....................................................................66
6.1 Extended Components Definition for Java
Card System ....................................................66
6.1.1 Audit Data Storage (FAU_SAS) .......................66
6.1.1.1 Family behaviour ............................................. 66
6.1.2 TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC) ...................... 67
6.1.2.1 Family behaviour ............................................. 67
7 Security Functional Requirements (ASE_
REQ) ................................................................... 69
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7.1 Security Functional Requirements for Java
Card System ....................................................69
7.1.1 Security Functional Requirements ...................69
7.1.1.1 COREG_LC Security Functional
Requirements ...................................................76
7.1.1.2 INSTG Security Functional Requirements ..... 101
7.1.1.3 ADELG Security Functional Requirements ....103
7.1.1.4 RMIG Security Functional Requirements .......107
7.1.1.5 ODELG Security Functional Requirements ....107
7.1.1.6 CarG Security Functional Requirements ........108
7.1.1.7 EMG Security Functional Requirements ........118
7.1.1.8 Further Security Functional Requirements .....118
7.1.1.9 Configuration Security Functional
Requirements .................................................121
7.1.1.10 OS Update Security Functional
Requirements .................................................124
7.1.1.11 Restricted Mode Security Functional
Requirements .................................................128
7.1.1.12 Applet Migration Security Functional
Requirements .................................................131
7.1.1.13 Context Separation Security Functional
Requirements .................................................136
7.1.2 Security Requirements Rationale .................. 138
7.1.2.1 Identification ...................................................138
7.1.2.2 Execution ....................................................... 139
7.1.2.3 Services ......................................................... 145
7.1.2.4 Object Deletion .............................................. 147
7.1.2.5 Applet Management .......................................147
7.1.2.6 Card Management .........................................150
7.1.2.7 Smart Card Platform ......................................152
7.1.2.8 Random Numbers ..........................................153
7.1.2.9 Config Applet ................................................. 153
7.1.2.10 OS Update Mechanism ................................. 153
7.1.2.11 Applet Migration Mechanism ......................... 155
7.1.2.12 Restricted Mode .............................................155
7.1.2.13 Package Sensitive Result ..............................156
7.1.2.14 Context Separation ........................................156
7.1.3 Security Requirements Dependencies ...........157
7.1.4 Rationale for Exclusion of Dependencies ...... 164
8 Security Assurance Requirements (ASE_
REQ) ................................................................. 165
8.1 Security Assurance Requirements .................165
8.2 Rationale for the Security Assurance
Requirements .................................................165
8.3 Dependencies of Security Assurance
Requirements .................................................165
9 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) ....... 167
9.1 Introduction .................................................... 167
9.2 Security Functionality of Java Card System ...167
10 Bibliography .................................................... 171
10.1 Evaluation documents ................................... 171
10.2 Standards .......................................................171
10.3 Developer documents ....................................172
11 Legal information ............................................173
Please be aware that important notices concerning this document and the product(s)
described herein, have been included in section 'Legal information'.
© NXP B.V. 2023. All rights reserved.
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Date of release: 24 November 2023
Document identifier: NXP-ST01-SN300-Jxxxx