National Information Assurance Partnership
®
TM
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Sidewinder G2 Security Appliance Models
EAL4+ with Basic and Medium PP Compliance
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-05-0099
Dated: May 16, 2005
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6740
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6740
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Kathy Cunningham
NSA
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Science Applications International Corporation
Columbia, Maryland
Commercial Licensed Evaluation Facility (CLEF)
BT Syntegra
United Kingdom
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary.................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Evaluation Details............................................................................................... 2
1.2 Interpretations ..................................................................................................... 2
1.3 Threats to Security.............................................................................................. 3
2 Identification............................................................................................................... 4
2.1 ST and TOE Identification.................................................................................. 4
2.2 TOE Overview.................................................................................................... 4
2.3 IT Security Environment..................................................................................... 5
2.3.1 Physical Boundaries.................................................................................... 5
2.3.2 Logical Boundaries..................................................................................... 5
3 Security Policy............................................................................................................ 7
4 Assumptions................................................................................................................ 7
4.1 TOE Assumptions............................................................................................... 7
4.2 Environment Assumptions.................................................................................. 8
5 Architectural Information ........................................................................................... 8
6 Documentation............................................................................................................ 9
7 IT Product Testing ...................................................................................................... 9
8 Evaluated Configuration........................................................................................... 10
8.1 BT Syntegra Evaluation Configuration ........................................................ 10
8.2 The NSA Evaluation Team Configuration ................................................... 11
9 Results of the Evaluation .......................................................................................... 11
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .............................................................. 12
11 Annexes................................................................................................................. 12
12 Security Target...................................................................................................... 12
13 Glossary ................................................................................................................ 13
14 Abbreviations........................................................................................................ 14
15 Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 15
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1 Executive Summary
The Delta Evaluation of Sidewinder G2 Security Appliance Models EAL4+ with Basic and
Medium PP Compliance was performed by Science Applications International Corporation
(SAIC) in the United States and was completed on May 10, 2005. The evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Common Criteria, Version 2.2 and
the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 2.2.
The Delta Evaluation consisted of an assessment of the evaluation efforts perform in the
United Kingdom by BT Syntegra CLEF to confirm the mutual recognition claim, and the
associated U.S. Department of Defense Application-level Firewall Protection Profiles for
Basic and Medium Robustness modifications to the Security Target to include the
additional AVA_VLA.3 and ALC_FLR.3 requirements.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at
an accredited testing laboratory using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 2.2) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (Version 2.2). This Validation Report applies only to the specific version of the
TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of
the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the
testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Sidewinder G2 Security
Appliance Models EAL4+ with Medium PP Compliance product by any agency of the US
Government and no warranty of the product is either expressed or implied.
The validation team reviewed the activities of the evaluation teams, the SAIC Delta ETR,
the National Security Agency (NSA) testing results, and provided guidance on technical
issues and evaluation processes. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing
laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results
are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are
consistent with the evidence produced.
The SAIC evaluation team concluded that the evaluation completed by BT Syntegra in the
UK supports the mutual recognition claims and that the Common Criteria requirements for
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.3 and AVA_VLA.3) have
been met.
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1.1 Evaluation Details
Evaluation Completion: May 10, 2005
Evaluated Product: Sidewinder G2 Security Appliance Models EAL4+ with Medium
PP Compliance
Software: Sidewinder G2 Software Version 6.1.0.05.E51
Sidewinder G2 6.1 Management Tools
Hardware: Model 2150: SW61-2UA-8/S rev A
Developer: Secure Computing Corporation
2675 Long Lake Road
Saint Paul, Minnesota 55113
CCTL: Science Applications International Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive, Suite 300
Columbia, MD 21046
CLEF: BT Syntegra
Sentinel House, Harvest Crescent
Ancells Park, Fleet
Hampshire, GU51 2UZ
Validation Team: Kathy Cunningham
National Security Agency (NSA)
9800 Savage Rd
Ft. Meade, MD 20755
Evaluation Class: EAL 4 augmented with ALC_FLR.3 and AVA_VLA.3
Completion Date: May 10, 2005
1.2 Interpretations
The Evaluation Team determined that no CCIMB Interpretations were applicable to this
evaluation.
The Validation Team concurred with the Evaluation Team that no CCIMB Interpretations
were applicable to this evaluation.
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1.3 Threats to Security
The Security Target identifies the following threats for the evaluated product.
T.NOAUTH An unauthorized person may attempt to bypass the security of the TOE
so as to access and use security functions and/or non-security functions
provided by the TOE.
T.ASPOOF An unauthorized person on an external network may attempt to by-pass
the information flow control policy by disguising authentication data
(e.g., spoofing the source address) and masquerading as a legitimate
user or entity on an internal network.
T.MEDIAT An unauthorized person may send impermissible information through
the TOE, which results in the exploitation of resources on the internal
network.
T.OLDINF Because of a flaw in the TOE functioning, an unauthorized person may
gather residual information from a previous information flow or
internal TOE data by monitoring the padding of the information flows
from the TOE.
T.AUDACC Persons may not be accountable for the actions that they conduct
because the audit records are not reviewed, thus allowing an attacker to
escape detection.
T.SELPRO An unauthorized person may read, modify, or destroy security critical
TOE configuration data.
T.AUDFUL An unauthorized person may cause audit records to be lost or prevent
future records from being recorded by taking actions to exhaust audit
storage capacity, thus masking an attacker's actions.
T. MODEXP An attacker with moderate attack potential may attempt to bypass the
TSF to gain access to the TOE or the assets it protects.
The Security Target also identifies the following threats for the IT environment of the
TOE:
TE.DOMSEP An unauthorized person may attempt to bypass the security
mechanism in order to launch attacks on the TOE.
TE.REPEAT An unauthorized person may repeatedly try to guess authentication
data in order to use this information to launch attacks on the TOE.
TE.REPLAY An unauthorized person may use valid identification and
authentication data obtained to access functions provided by the TOE.
TE.TUSAGE The TOE may be inadvertently configured, used, and administered in
an insecure manner by either authorized or unauthorized persons.
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2 Identification
•
2.1 ST and TOE Identification
ST: Sidewinder G2 Security Appliance Models EAL4+ with Medium PP Compliance
Security Target
TOE Identification:
Software:
• Sidewinder G2 Software Version 6.1.0.05.E51
• Sidewinder G2 6.1 Management Tools
Hardware for Sidewinder G2 Security Appliances:
Model 2150: SW61-2UA-8/S rev A
CC Identification – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.2, January 2004, ISO/IEC 15408.
Protection Profile (PP) Identification – The TOE claims conformance to PP’s:
• U.S. Department of Defense Application-level Firewall Protection Profile for Basic
Robustness Environments, Version 1.0, June 22, 2000
• U.S. Department of Defense Application-level Firewall Protection Profile for
Medium Robustness Environments, Version 1.0, June 28, 2000
CEM Identification – Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology
Security, January 2004, version 2.2, CCIMB-2004-01-004
2.2 TOE Overview
The TOE is any Sidewinder G2 Security Appliance Model with Sidewinder G2 Software
Version 6.1.0.05.E51. Sidewinder is a firewall and access control security platform for the
enterprise. Enabling the implementation of “safe, secure extranets for e-business,”
Sidewinder configured in its operational environment delivers strong security while
maintaining performance and scalability. It provides access control of communication and
information flow between two or more networks using application-level proxy and packet
filtering technology. The operational environment for the Sidewinder software is a typical
Intel-based architecture Pentium PC computing platform. The configured Sidewinder
provides the highest levels of security by using SecureOS™, an enhanced UNIX operating
system that employs Secure Computing's patented Type Enforcement™ security
technology. Type Enforcement technology protects Sidewinder by separating all processes
and services on the firewall.
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Sidewinder is a network security gateway that allows an organization to connect to the
Internet while protecting the systems on its internal network from unauthorized users and
network attackers. Sidewinder is aware of application-specific protocols and can filter data
based on content. It also has packet filter capability to restrict traffic based upon source and
destination. Sidewinder provides a comprehensive set of Internet services and proxies.
Section 2.3.2 of the ST identifies the proxies included in the Sidewinder evaluated
configuration.
2.3 IT Security Environment
Sidewinder operates in an environment where it provides a single point of connectivity
between at least two networks. Typically one network is viewed as the inside of an
organization, where there is some assumption of control over access to the computing
network. The other network is typically viewed as an external network, similar to the
Internet, where there is no practical control over the actions of its processing entities.
Sidewinder's role is to limit and control all information flow between the networks.
2.3.1 Physical Boundaries
The TOE consists of a Sidewinder G2 Security Appliance with Sidewinder Software
Version 6.1.0.05.E51. The TOE also includes the Admin Console client software (the
Sidewinder G2 6.1 Management Tools). This software is provided with every Sidewinder
G2 Security Appliance; it is also provided as a separate part of every Sidewinder Software
version 6.1 product distribution. The administration client software runs on a local, generic
computing platform with a Windows operating system; however, the platform and
Windows OS are not part of the TOE.
2.3.2 Logical Boundaries
The logical boundaries of the TOE can be described in the terms of the security functions
that the TOE provides.
Security Management
An administrator uses the Sidewinder Admin Console client (part of the TOE) running on a
Windows computer (part of the IT environment) to perform management functions on the
Sidewinder. This administrative workstation communicates with the Sidewinder via one of
the networks connected to the Sidewinder.
Identification and Authentication
The Sidewinder TOE, along with support from the IT environment, supports standard
UNIX password authentication and the use of several single-use authentication
mechanisms, including the SafeWord Premier Access Authentication Server. Identification
attributes are assigned to each administrative user and each user of authenticated protocol
services through the firewall.
In either the case of a one time or reusable password, Sidewinder gathers data from the user
and the associated service connection and consults the ACL rules to determine if and what
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form of authentication is required for the service. In the case of passwords, Sidewinder
consults its stored user information, determines the password’s validity, and enforces the
result of the validity check. In the case of single-use authentication, Sidewinder interacts
with the appropriate external authentication server and enforces the results of the password
check performed by the remote authentication server.
User Data Protection
For the Sidewinder TOE, user data refers only to a user's communication that is transferred
through the firewall via one of the many TCP/IP protocols. Sidewinder's Access Control
List (ACL) is the key mechanism that implements a site's security policy and, ultimately,
determines what user data is allowed to flow. The ACL database establishes the rules for
data movement, including both authenticated and unauthenticated security policies.
User data is protected by different facilities depending upon the protocol and stage of
processing. While user data is within the network stack, it is part of the kernel memory
space and, as such, is protected from all user state processing elements on the system.
While user data is in the control of a proxy process, it is protected by the SecureOS
processing model and type enforcement facilities.
Sidewinder network stack processing ensures that there is no leakage of residual
information from previous packets to new packets as they are transferred through the
firewall. The memory and file handling systems zero storage blocks as they are reused to
prevent residual information leakage.
Protection of Security Functions
Sidewinder, with its SecureOS operating system, has been designed to be highly resistant to
both malicious and accidental attack. It includes system elements that provide several
levels of protection for its security functions.
The lowest level of protection is provided by the computing platform Central Processing
Unit (CPU). The CPU provides a two state processing model that limits access to certain
privileged instructions to the SecureOS kernel. The SecureOS kernel provides a second
layer of protection by limiting user mode access to kernel memory. SecureOS also extends
the normal BSD UNIX network stack processing with additional separation control to
restrict inter-process communication to certain interfaces.
SecureOS includes Secure Computing Corporation's patented Type Enforcement facilities
that enforce mandatory security policy control over all user state processing. The Type
Enforcement policy data is loaded onto the system during installation and cannot be
modified on an operational system. Type Enforcement ensures that critical data is
accessible only via programs designed to use the data and that the impact of any failure will
be confined in scope.
The last layer of protection is the controlled access to system services. Administrators must
be authenticated to gain access to the system before they are allowed to perform any
administrative functions, including the establishment of access control policy for
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Sidewinder's network services. Subsequent attempts to access Sidewinder via network
connections are controlled by that policy.
Audit
SecureOS supplements the normal UNIX Syslog Facilities by providing an audit device to
which all processes and the kernel may write audit data. The SecureOS audit device
increases the integrity of the audit data, by adding security relevant information, such as the
time and the identity of the generating process, to the audit data when it passes through the
device within the kernel.
Only those entities with a "need-to-know" are allowed to read the audit data stream. Audit
logging daemons are provided to read the audit data stream and log it to a database to
facilitate subsequent administrator review and report generation. Also, special
administrator configurable daemons, called audit-bots, monitor the audit data stream for
specified events and initiate defined response actions. Sidewinder provides an administrator
with great flexibility to define an extensive set of security "alarms", each with its
corresponding "strikeback" responses. Type Enforcement is used to prevent the stored
audit data from being modified by anyone, including administrators.
Sidewinder provides facilities to generate a variety of standard reports as well as a means to
produce custom reports, or to view selected audit events. Sidewinder also includes facilities
to monitor and free up audit space at appropriate times.
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4 Assumptions
Security Policy
The Security Target does not identify any Security Policies for the evaluated product.
4.1 TOE Assumptions
The following TOE assumptions are identified in the Security Target:
A.PHYSEC The TOE is physically secure.
A.MODEXP The threat of malicious attacks aimed at discovering exploitable
vulnerabilities is considered moderate.
A.PUBLIC The TOE does not host public data.
A.NOEVIL Authorized administrators are non-hostile and follow all administrator
guidance; however, they are capable of error.
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A.SINGEN Information can not flow among the internal and external networks
unless it passes through the TOE.
A.PROLIN The communication path between the TOE (i.e., authentication client)
and the single-use authentication server is physically protected. The
communication path between the TOE and the administrator Windows
computer is physically protected, also.
4.2 Environment Assumptions
The following assumptions are identified for the Authentication server and the local
administration platform in the Security Target:
A.ASPHYSEC The authentication server and local administration platform are
physically secure.
A.ASMODEXP The threat of malicious attacks aimed at discovering exploitable
vulnerabilities in the authentication server and local administration
platform is considered moderate.
A.ASGENPUR There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., the ability
to execute arbitrary code or applications) and storage repository
capabilities on the authentication server or on the local administration
platform.
A.ASPUBLIC The authentication server and local administration platform do not
host public data.
A.ASNOEVIL Authorized administrators of the authentication server and local
administration platform are non-hostile and follow all administrator
guidance; however, they are capable of error.
A.ASNOREMO Human users who are not authorized administrators cannot directly or
locally access the authentication server or the local administration
platform.
A.BENIGN The Windows OS running on the local administration platform will
provide necessary computing services to the TOE, but will not tamper
with it.
5 Architectural Information
Sidewinder operating with three network interfaces provides a hybrid firewall solution that
supports both application-level proxy and packet filtering. The Sidewinder software
consists of a collection of integrated components. The base component is SecureOSTM
, a
secure operating system. This OS is an extended version of the BSD UNIX operating
system. It includes Secure Computing's patented Type Enforcement security technology,
additional network separation control, network-level packet filtering support and improved
auditing facilities. SecureOS also provides the secured computing environment in which all
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Sidewinder firewall application layer processing is done. The application layer firewall
components include the network service monitor processes, network proxy applications,
the firewall Access Control List (ACL) daemon, audit monitors and the system
management functions.
Sidewinder is configured to control the flow of TCP/IP traffic between two network
interfaces. Its Pentium processor-based computing platform includes at least three network
interfaces, floppy drive and CD ROM drive. The environment includes a commercially
available, single-use authentication server that is compatible with Sidewinder such as
SafeWord PremierAccess1 or any RADIUS server. The environment also includes a
generic administrative workstation running the Sidewinder 6.1 Admin Console software on
a Windows operating system.
6 Documentation
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Purchasers of Sidewinder G2 v 6.1.0.05.E51 will receive the following documentation:
• Administrative Guidance for receiving, installing and managing the TOE
• Startup Guide Sidewinder G2 Firewall, PN SWOP-MN-STRT61-A, February
2004
• Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide, PN 00-0943795-G, May
2005
• Sidewinder G2 Firewall Administration Guide, PN SWOP-MN-ADMN61-A,
February 2004
IT Product Testing
Evaluation team testing at NSA, heretofore referred to as “the NSA evaluation team,” was
completed in May 10, 2005. Using the results of the VLA.2 evaluation by the BT Syntegra
evaluation team, the NSA evaluation team performed the following activities during
testing:
1. Installation of the TOE in its evaluation configuration
2. Vulnerability Testing (AVA_VLA.3)
Tools employed by the NSA evaluation team for independent testing included the same
category of tools employed by the BT Syntegra evaluation team, as well as in-house
developed tools, which assisted in determining that the TOE was resistant to penetration
attacks performed by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential. Numerous In-house
tools were developed to stress network protocols. The tools developed specifically targeted
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the application layer of the protocol stack. The team also developed packet generators,
(TCP, UDP, ICMP), denial of service (DoS) tools, small programs, and shells designed for
a specific purpose.
The results of the evaluation team tests and the evaluation penetration tests demonstrated
the Sidewinder G2 Appliance behaved as claimed in the Security Target. The testing found
that the product was implemented as described in the functional specification.
8 Evaluated Configuration
8.1 BT Syntegra Evaluation Configuration
The TOE version 6.1 software was provided on a CD. The evaluators installed it on the
specified hardware platforms. The TOE was also supplied as hardware appliances, onto
which the TOE version 6.1 software was installed. Figure 3-1 below shows the
architectural layout of the test environment used by the evaluators.
Developer test environment network diagram
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The specific configurations of the hardware platforms used during evaluator tests were as
follows:
Hardware CPU RAM Hard Disk Network Interfaces
Dell PowerEdge
1750
Two 2.8 GHz
CPUs
2 Gbytes memory 36 Gbytes 2 Embedded 4 Intel
Pro/1000 MT
Dell PowerEdge
2650
Two 3.066 GHz
CPUs
2 Gbytes memory 4 x 36 Gbytes 2 Embedded 8 Intel
Pro/1000 MT
Dell PowerEdge
6650
Four 2.5 GHz
CPUs
2 Gbytes memory 4 x 36 Gbytes 2 Embedded 12
Intel Pro/1000 MT
Appliance 210 One 2.6 GHz CPU 512 Mbytes
memory
40 Gbytes 1 Embedded 2 Intel
Pro/1000 MT
Appliance 310 One 2.8 GHz CPU 512 Mbytes
memory
36 Gbytes 2 Embedded 4 Intel
Pro/1000 MT
Appliance 515 Two 2.8 GHz CPU 2 Gbytes memory 2 x 36 Gbytes 2 Embedded 4 Intel
Pro/1000 MT
Appliance 2150 Two 3.066 GHz
CPU
2 Gbytes memory 4 x 36 Gbytes 2 Embedded 8 Intel
Pro/1000 MT
Appliance 4150 Four 2.5 GHz CPU 2 Gbytes memory 4 x 36 Gbytes 2 Embedded 24
Intel Pro/1000 MT
8.2 The NSA Evaluation Team Configuration
A Sidewinder G2 Model 2150, preloaded with Version 6.1.0.05.E51 of the software was
tested for security vulnerabilities. The testing environment consisted of two networks, one
a protected internal network and the other an external network comprised of attacking
machines. Each network had a mix of machines, running an assortment of operating
systems. These networks were separated by a Sidewinder G2 firewall. The firewall was
configured to allow FTP, TELNET, HTTP, DAYTIME (UDP/TCP), and SMTP traffic to
traverse the firewall. All other services were blocked.
9 Results of the Evaluation
SAIC reviewed the Secure Computing Corporation (SCC) provided Evaluation Technical
Reports produced by the Syntegra U.K. Commercial Laboratory Evaluation Facility
(CLEF) and associated U.S. Department of Defense Application-level Firewall Protection
Profiles for Basic and Medium Robustness modifications to the Security Target for the
Customer’s Sidewinder G2 Security Appliance v6.1. SAIC reviewed the Syntegra
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) to assess if the evaluation conclusions for each work
unit appear to be correct and substantiated by the rationale provided to support each
conclusion. Additionally SAIC evaluated the updated Security Target to ensure compliance
with the Basic and Medium Robustness Application-level Firewall Protection Profiles.
The Evaluation Team accomplished the Delta Evaluation by providing Notes, Comments,
or Vendor Actions to the developer. The Evaluation Team also communicated with the
developer by telephone and electronic mail. If applicable, the Evaluation Team re-
performed the work unit or units affected. In this way, the Evaluation Team assigned an
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overall Pass verdict to the assurance component only when all of the work units for that
component had been assigned a Pass verdict.
Section 4 SAIC Assessment Team Observations in the Evaluation Team’s CCEVS report
states”
“Overall ETR Descriptions – For the most part, SAIC found the amount of
evaluator rationale to be very similar to the amount of rationale its evaluation
team’s put into ETRs. The rationale varied on particular work units but the overall
trend was similar. This supports the mutual recognition claims”
The validation team followed the procedures outlined in the Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) publication number 3 for Technical Oversight and
Validation Procedures. The validation team has observed the evaluation and all of its
activities were in accordance with the Common Criteria, the Common Evaluation
Methodology, and the CCEVS. The validation team therefore concludes that the evaluation
and its results of pass are complete.
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims
in the ST are met. Additionally, the NSA evaluation team applied the AVA_VLA.3 CEM
work units. The NSA evaluation team ensured that the TOE does not contain exploitable
flaws or weaknesses in the TOE based upon the developer strength of function analysis, the
developer vulnerability analysis, the developer misuse analysis, and the NSA evaluation
team’s misuse analysis, vulnerability analysis, and the performance of penetration tests
demonstrates the accuracy of the claims in the ST.
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11 Annexes
12
Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validator had no recommendations concerning the TOE.
Not applicable.
Security Target
The Security Target is identified as Sidewinder G2 Security Appliance Models EAL4+ with
Medium PP Compliance Security Target.
The document identifies the security functional requirements necessary to implement
Information Flow Protection and TOE Self Protection security policies. Additionally, the
Security Target specifies the security assurance requirements necessary for EAL 4
augmented with ALC_FLR.3 and AVA_VLA.3
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
User: Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the
TOE.
Human User: Any person who interacts with the TOE.
External IT entity: Any IT product or system, untrusted or trusted, outside the TOE that
interacts with the TOE.
Role: A predefined set of rules establishing the allowed interactions between a user and the
TOE
Identity: A representation (e.g., a string) uniquely identifying an authorized user, which can
either be the full or abbreviated name of that user or a pseudonym.
Authentication Data: Information used to verify the claimed identity of a user.
Authorized Administrator: A role which human users may be associated with to administer
the security parameters of the TOE.
Authorized External IT entity: Any IT product or system, outside the scope of the TOE
that may administer the security parameters of the TOE.
Password: A string of characters (letters, numbers, and other symbols) used to authenticate
an identity or to verify access authorization.
Software: The programs and associated data that can be dynamically written and modified.
Target of Evaluation (TOE): An information technology product or system and its
associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of
an evaluation.
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14 Abbreviations
Abbreviations Long Form
ACL Access Control List
CC Common Criteria
CCEVS Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
CCIMB Common Criteria Interpretations Management Board
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
CM Configuration Management
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IATF Information Assurance Technical Framework
IGS Installation, Generation and Startup
IT Information Technology
ITSEC IT Security Evaluation Criteria
I&A Identification and Authentication
NIAP National Information Assurance Partnership
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA National Security Agency
OR Observation Report
OS Operating System
OSP Organizational Security Policy
PP Protection Profile
QA Quality Assurance
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSE TOE Security Environment
TSF TOE Security Function
TSFI TOE Security Function Interface
TSP TOE Security Policy
TSS TOE Summary Specification
TTAP/CCEVS Trusted Technology Assessment Program / Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation
Scheme
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15
15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and
general model, dated January 2004, Version 2.2.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security
functional requirements, dated January 2004, Version 2.2.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, dated January 2004, Version 2.2.
[4] Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, dated
January 2004, version 2.2, CCIMB-2004-01-004.
[5] NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme for IT Security, Guidance to
Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, Version 1.0, March 20, 2001.
[6] U.S. Department of Defense Application-level Firewall Protection Profile for Basic
Robustness Environments, Version 1.0, June 22, 2000
[7] U.S. Department of Defense Application-level Firewall Protection Profile for Medium
Robustness Environments, Version 1.0, June 28, 2000