BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024
for
Swissbit Cloud SMAERS Version 1.0.5
from
Swissbit AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.48
BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024 (*)
Fiscalization
Swissbit Cloud SMAERS
Version 1.0.5
from Swissbit AG
PP Conformance: Common Criteria Protection Profile Security
Module Application for Electronic Record-keeping
Systems (SMAERS) Version 1.0, 15 July 2020,
BSI-CC-PP-0105-V2-2020
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_LCD.1 and
ALC_CMS.3
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
Scheme Interpretations and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM
are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For
details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 29 November 2024
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Director-General
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
for components up to
EAL 4
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification.....................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication...................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary...................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy........................................................................................................... 13
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................13
5. Architectural Information............................................................................................13
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................14
7. IT Product Testing......................................................................................................14
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................15
9. Results of the Evaluation...........................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................17
11. Security Target.........................................................................................................18
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................18
13. Definitions................................................................................................................18
14. Bibliography.............................................................................................................20
C. Excerpts from the Criteria.............................................................................................21
D. Annexes........................................................................................................................ 22
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat (Federal
Ministry of the Interior and Community)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including CC
part 3 EAL 2 and ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat of 12 February 2007 in the
Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Swissbit Cloud SMAERS, Version 1.0.5 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Swissbit Cloud SMAERS, Version 1.0.5 was conducted by
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 20
November 2024. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Swissbit AG.
The product was developed by: Swissbit AG.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 29
November 2024 is valid until 28 November2032. Validity can be re-newed by re-
certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024 Certification Report
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product Swissbit Cloud SMAERS, Version 1.0.5 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Swissbit AG
Industriestraße 4
9552 Bronschhofen
Schweiz
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Swissbit Cloud SMAERS, Version 1.0.5 by Swissbit AG
which is a Security Module application for Electronic Record-keeping Systems
implemented as software. The TOE implements the client-server architecture running on a
platform supporting secure storage of assets.
The TOE relies on the Swissbit Cloud CSP-L (BSI-DSZ-CC-1238) as a Cryptographic
Service Provider Light (CSPL) for all cryptographic operations except for the TOE sided
implementation of the Trusted Channel which is implemented using the Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) protocol by the TOE itself. This CSP-L is
not part of this TOE.
The TOE claims conformance to the Common Criteria Protection Profile Security Module
Application for Electronic Recordkeeping Systems (SMAERS) [8].
The TOE provides the following functions:
Generation and export of time-stamped and signed log messages, audit logs and

system logs
Secure Channel between SMAERS and CSPL

Provision of Security Management of the TSF for administrators

Support of receiving and integrity verification of Update Code Packages (UCPs)

Self-test functionality

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Common Criteria Protection Profile Security Module Application for
Electronic Record-keeping Systems (SMAERS) Version 1.0, 15 July 2020, BSI-CC-PP-
0105-V2-2020 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_CMS.3 .
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Reference
SF.Log Security Target [6], chapter 8.1
SF.Crypto Security Target [6], chapter 8.2
SF.Management Security Target [6], chapter 8.3
SF.Audit Security Target [6], chapter 8.4
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Swissbit Cloud SMAERS, Version 1.0.5
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW The delivered item is a .jar
file containing the TOE.
Smaers-1.0.5.jar Since the TOE integrator and
the TSE Operator are the same
as the developer and sponsor of
the TOE (Swissbit AG), the
signed jar file is stored in the git
repository of Swissbit and the
corresponding commit is tagged
with smaers-v1.0.5. This
completes the delivery process.
2 DOC Swissbit Cloud SMAERS –
Guidance Documentation,
Version: 1.0.5, Date: 2024-
11-13, Swissbit AG [10]
SHA256:
caa7c2bbc8ab24
857a59bf24a9c5
acd7bbc05de733
e215bef0271791
4e089e4f
The in-house delivery is done by
storing the software and
guidance documents in the
corresponding git repository and
tagging it accordingly.
3 DOC digital signature file smaers-
1.0.5.jar.sig
Delivery method as above.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
For its operation, the TOE needs the following hardware and software requirements
fulfilled in its environment:
● Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPLight or CSPL) with CC EAL2
certification. The CSPL used with the TOE is the Swissbit Cloud CSP-L.
● The TOE is to be integrated into the Swissbit Cloud-TSE 2 of Swissbit AG which
runs on a Google cloud server.
● Mass storage device for persisting signed transaction logs.
● Secure mass storage device for persisting internally stored data.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024 Certification Report
Swissbit AG describes a single delivery procedure for the TOE as the delivery of a pure
software TOE.
The TOE integrator (which integrates the TOE into the TSE) and the TSE Operator (the
entity which will operate the TOE) are the same as the developer and sponsor of the TOE
(Swissbit AG). Therefore, no external delivery process of the TOE to a customer takes
place. The in-house delivery is done by storing the software and guidance documentation
in the corresponding git repository and tagging it accordingly.
The Swissbit Cloud SMAERS is provided as a pure software TOE. The integrator shall
check its authenticity as follows:
To accept the TOE check that the version number in the jar file name matches the version
in the tag and verify the jar file’s signature with the code signing public key of Swissbit.
This can be done with the command:
openssl dgst -sha256 -signature smaers-VERSION.jar.sig -verify
/smaers
/smaers_code_signing_public_key.pem smaers-VERSION.jar
Note that version has to be replaced accordingly with the current TOE version, i.e. 1.0.5.
If these checks succeed, the TOE binary can be accepted and integrated as final TOE
version.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. The TOE implements policies pertaining to the security
functional classes as described in chapter 6.1 of the Security Target [6].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The topics listed in
chapter 4.2 of the ST [6] are of relevance.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a software TOE running as part of a TSE on dedicated non-TOE hardware
(Google Cloud server) as well as dedicated non-TOE software (Docker, Ubuntu 24.04),
building the non-TOE platform. It consists of multiple SMAERS units which operate
independently from each other. The platform is expected to provide protection against
physical intrusion and tampering, the protection mechanisms by the environment and non-
TOE hardware platform are described in [12].
The SFR-enforcing subsystems of the TOE are:
● CommandHandler,
● Storage,
● CSP Handler,
● Crypto,
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024
● network.
The subsystem CommandHandler provides the following security functionality:
● Execution of the TOE’s selftest, authentication and management operations,
● Provision and retrieval of log message information,
● Permission checks, identification and authentication state of external entities,
● Tracking of the TOE internal state.
The subsystem Storage provides functionality to store and retrieve data from the storage
of the host platform. The subsystem CSP Handler provides management of the
communication of the SMAERS-Units with the CSP-L. The subsystem Crypto provides an
implementation of the cryptographic functionality of the TOE (PACE, hashing of
authentication data, integrity checks, hash with LastRoundOnCard). The subsystem
network provides management of the network connection of the SMAERS with the
external CSP-L.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
TOE Test configuration
The TOE test configuration is defined as Swissbit Cloud SMAERS, Version 1.0.5.
The tests are performed on a test system running the Ubuntu 24.04 operating system with
Docker installed. The tests are run in a Docker image of the test suite. A fully operational
Swissbit Cloud CSP-L instance version 1.0.7 is set up to the CSP-L specifications and
connected to the test system.
The TOE version as stated in the ST [6] is 1.0.5. The evaluator verified that the TOE
version is compliant with the documentation according to the guidance in [10].
Developer Testing
The test environment is configured by the developer and does not need any actions by the
evaluator to run the tests. This means that all necessary configuration is done by the
developer.
The developer tests TSFIs by sending the respective command to the external IPC in-
terface of the TOE. The tests consist of 222 distinct test cases and include positive and
negative tests in the form of wrong or missing prerequisites and wrong or missing
parameters.
All developer test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected
result.
Independent Testing
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024 Certification Report
All developer tests were repeated by the evaluator and several independent tests were
performed using the resources of the test environment. As the developer tests did not
cover all of the interfaces of the TOE, the evaluators tested the missing interfaces in the
independent test cases.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
Penetration Testing
The evaluators examined publicly available information to find hints for potential
vulnerabilities in the TOE. This includes gathering information about the TOE type and
common attacks against it as well as collect CVEs of the libraries used in the TOE and the
environment. Then the evaluators conducted a focused search of ST, guidance and all
other developer deliverables for the various evaluation aspects, to find potential
vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, penetration testing was carried out in the evaluation lab on a test system set
up by the evaluators after the specifications of the developer. For this the approach was to
try to inject arbitrary data into the TOE by a fuzzing attack on the HTTP interface.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential Basic was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment provided that all measures required by
the developer are applied.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following version of the TOE: Swissbit Cloud SMAERS,
Version 1.0.5. It is defined by the items in table 2 of this report and by descriptions in the
security target [6]. The components of the TOE are defined by the TOE configuration list [9].
The TOE is part of a TSE and requires a platform to be executed. Swissbit as TSE operator
sets up the platform, which is hosted in a cloud by a cloud service provider. In addition, the
TOE requires a CSP-L, which has to be hosted according to the requirements of the CSP-L.
The CSP-L shall export audit records in form of system logs. The TOE has to be integrated
into Swissbit Cloud-TSE 2 to build a complete TSE. To operate the TOE according to the
certification, the operator has to fullfil all requirements of the guidance documents, including
especially the Umgebungschutzkonzept [12] of the Swissbit Cloud-TSE 2.
The TOE as part of its TSE protects accounts and records of one or more ERS. The TOE
contains multiple SMAERS units, each of which has its own private signature key and
certificate. Each SMAERS unit uses one signature key exclusively. So there is a 1:1 relation
between SMAERS units and signature keys. Each of the signatures keys is stored in one
CSP-L, so the SMAERS unit does not directly use it, but utilizes the CSP-L to perform the
corresponding cryptographic operation.
As part of a cloud TSE, the TOE shall be configured so that it will only accept connections from
ERS in the same cloud environment.
The TOE integrator (which integrates the TOE into the TSE) and the TSE Operator (the entity
which will operate the TOE) are the same as the developer and sponsor of the TOE (Swissbit AG).
Therefore no external delivery process of the TOE to a customer takes place.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
The Supporting Document for Common Criteria Protection Profile SMAERS, Version 1.0,
16.05.2023 [11] was used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_CMS.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance:Common Criteria Protection Profile Security Module Application for
Electronic Record-keeping Systems (SMAERS) Version 1.0, 15 July 2020, BSI-CC-
PP-0105-V2-2020 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_CMS.3
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view.
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Comments
1 Authentica-
tion/
Authenticity
ECDSA Digital
Signature generation
with SHA
[FIPS 186-4] P-256 FMT_MSA.4
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024 Certification Report
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Comments
2 Key
Agreement
(for PACE)
EC-DH [FIPS 186-4] P-256 FCS_CKM.1
3 Integrity CMAC with AES [NIST-SP800-38B] 256 FCS_COP.1
4 Trusted
Channel
PACE [TR-03110-2]
(PACE)
see above for ‘Key
Agreement’
FCS_CKM.1
5 Crypto-
graphic
Primitive
RNG DRG.3 according to
[AIS20], NTG.1
according to [AIS20]
≥ 125 bits of
entropy
FCS_RNG.1
Seed length 32 byte
entropy + 16 byte
nonce + 256 bits
personalization
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
Reference details for table 3:
[FIPS 186-4]: Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital
Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department of Commerce / National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST-SP800-38B]: NIST SP800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, The
CMAC Mode for Authentication, 2005-05, National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).
[TR-03110-2]: BSI - Technical Guideline, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable
Travel Documents and eIDAS Token – Part 2: Protocols for electronic IDentification,
Authentication and trust Services (eIDAS), Version 2.21, 2016-12-21, Bundesamt f
ür Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[AIS20]: Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, AIS20, Version 3, 15.05.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik
For all applicable entries of cryptographic algorithms listed in the table above, the Security
Level provided is greater than 100 bit.
The strength of the these cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this
certification procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
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If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
The environmental protection concept [12] is a guide to set up the environmental platform for
the TOE. It addresses the SMAERS administrator role in the context of the assumption
A.Admin and the Security Objectives for the Operational Environment. The SMAERS
administrator role is therefore responsible to ensure that the platform is set up securely
according to the environmental protection concept [12].
The CTSS shall be installed according to the environmental protection concept [12].
Therefore, the document shall be delivered to the SMAERS administrator installing the
CTSS as required in the guidance [10] together with the CTSS that integrates the TOE.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CA Certification Authority
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CSP Cryptographic Service Provider
CSPL Cryptographic Service Provider Light
CTSS Certified Technical Security System
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ERS Electronic Record-keeping Systems
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
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HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
SMAERS Security Module Application for Electronic-keeping Systems
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TLS Transport Layer Security
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Swissbit Cloud SMAERS - Common Criteria Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-
2024, Version 1.0.11, 2024-11-13, Swissbit AG
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1239-2024, Swissbit Cloud SMAERS
1.0.5, Version 0.9, Date: 15.11.2024, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH,
(confidential document)
[8] Common Criteria Protection Profile Security Module Application for Electronic
Record-keeping Systems (SMAERS) Version 1.0, 15 July 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0105-
V2-2020, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[9] Configuration list for the TOE, source code configuration list of the Swissbit Cloud
SMAERS, TOE Version 1.0.5, Document date 13.11.2024, file name: smaers-v1.0.5-
konfiguration-sliste.txt, Swissbit AG, (confidential document)
[10] Swissbit Cloud SMAERS – Guidance Documentation, Version: 1.0.5, Date: 2024-
11-13, Swissbit AG, file name: swissbit-Cloud-SMAERS-AGD-1.0.5.pdf, Swissbit
AG, (confidential document)
[11] Supporting Document for Common Criteria Protection Profile SMAERS, Version 1.0,
2023-05-16, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[12] Swissbit Cloud-TSE 2 - Secure Platform Concept (Umgebungsschutzkonzept,
USK), Version 1.0.2, 09.07.2024, file name: swissbit-TSE-USK-1.0.2.pdf, Swissbit
AG, (confidential document)
7
specifically
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Note: End of report
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