BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
for
cryptovision CSP – Java Card applet providing
Cryptographic Service Provider version 2.0
from
cv cryptovision GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V2.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 (*)
cryptovision CSP – Java Card applet providing Cryptographic Service
Provider version 2.0
from cv cryptovision GmbH
PP Conformance: Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) Version 0.9.8,
19 February 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0104-2019,
Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic
Service Provider – Time Stamp Service and Audit
(PPC-CSP-TS-Au) Version 0.9.5, 8 April 2019, BSI-
CC-PP-0107-2019
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by Scheme Interpretations , by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and
CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and
Notification. For details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 24 January 2023
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................15
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................15
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................15
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................16
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................25
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................26
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................26
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................26
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................27
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................30
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................31
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BSI Schedule of Costs3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 3 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 519
6 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product cryptovision CSP – Java Card applet providing Cryptographic Service
Provider version 2.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product cryptovision CSP – Java Card applet providing
Cryptographic Service Provider version 2.0 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 17 January 2023. TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: cv cryptovision GmbH.
The product was developed by: cv cryptovision GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited.
The certificate issued on 24 January 2023 is valid until 23 January 2028.
Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 Certification Report
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product cryptovision CSP – Java Card applet providing Cryptographic Service
Provider version 2.0 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
cv cryptovision GmbH
Munscheidstr. 14
45886 Gelsenkirchen
Deutschland
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a composite TOE, is named “cryptovision CSP – Java
Card applet providing Cryptographic Service Provider” and was evaluated in version 2.0. It
is based on a Java Card and provides cryptographic services according to protection
profile and respective configuration [8].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profiles Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) Version 0.9.8, 19 February 2019,
BSI-CC-PP-0104-2019,
Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider – Time Stamp Service and
Audit (PPC-CSP-TS-Au) Version 0.9.5, 8 April 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0107-2019 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
TSF_Access Access Control
TSF_Admin Administration
TSF_Secret Secret key management
TSF_Crypto Cryptographic operations
TSF_Secure Messaging Secure Messaging
TSF_Auth Authentication protocols
TSF_Integrity Integrity protection
TSF_OS Javacard OS Security Functionalities
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 1.3.6.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
cryptovision CSP – Java Card applet providing Cryptographic Service Provider
version 2.0.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
Production and delivery variant 1 (high volume)
1 cryptovision CSP software
layer package
2.0, Identification
according to [16]
sec. 3.2
PGP encrypted and signed e-
mail to NXP.
2 JCOP 4.7 (Hardware + IC
Embedded Software)
4.7, Identification
according to
[18] / [17].
The configuration
of the SE051 is
0x045A (cf. table
4.10 in [17]).
The module
configuration is
0x0815 (cf. table
5.3 [17]).
Delivery as mandated by the
certification of JCOP 4.7.
(Cert.-ID: NSCIB-CC-0095534-
2MA)
3 cryptovision CSP – Java
Card configuration providing
a Cryptographic Service
Provider (CSP) –
Preparation Guidance
(AGD_PRE)
(see [16])
v1.0.19,
SHA-256:
621F34024754A
8F833D6FAC6B
8EC558598D9E8
C2789615DA2A
CEB96C5BF9F8
DB
PGP encrypted and signed e-
mail.
4 cryptovision CSP v2.0 - Java
Card configuration providing
a Cryptographic Service
Provider (CSP) -
Operational Guidance
(AGD_OPE)
(see [15])
v1.0.26
SHA256:
C32C7EF0B11D
3C05A04FE6744
1B03FC37BC71
EAB8BC4EB391
8C31797E91E97
4A
PGP encrypted and signed e-
mail.
5 Cryptographic Keys (see
[14] sec.4)
-- Transport according to NXP
application note “P71 Trust
Provisioning – PGP Key import
for P71 products”.
Keys are transferred via PGP
encrypted and signed e-mail to
NXP.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 Certification Report
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
Production and delivery variant 2 (local)
6 cryptovision CSP software
layer package
2.0, Identification
according to [16]
sec. 3.2
Encrypted and signed APDUs
delivered by PGP encrypted and
signed e-mail.
7 JCOP 4.7 (Hardware + IC
Embedded Software)
4.7, Identification
according to
[18] / [17].
The configuration
of the SE051 is
0x045A (cf. table
4.10 in [17]).
The module
configuration is
0x0815 (cf. table
5.3 [17]).
Delivery as mandated by the
certification of JCOP 4.7.
(Cert.-ID: NSCIB-CC-0095534-
2MA)
8 cryptovision CSP – Java
Card configuration providing
a Cryptographic Service
Provider (CSP) –
Preparation Guidance
(AGD_PRE)
(see [16])
v1.0.19,
SHA-256:
621F34024754A
8F833D6FAC6B
8EC558598D9E8
C2789615DA2A
CEB96C5BF9F8
DB
PGP encrypted and signed e-
mail.
9 cryptovision CSP v2.0 - Java
Card configuration providing
a Cryptographic Service
Provider (CSP) -
Operational Guidance
(AGD_OPE)
(see [15])
v1.0.25
SHA256:
C8FE7BE95B28
9BC7D06F7F2E
3B3A0336BA98
C79D78CB8A7D
036EC93AD191
D075
PGP encrypted and signed e-
mail.
10 Cryptographic Keys (see
[14] sec.4)
-- Keys are transferred via PGP
encrypted and signed e-mail.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Regarding delivery of the TOE:
There are two variants for production and delivery of the TOE. The first variant is the
standard high volume production at NXP and the second variant is called local production
at a third party.
In both variants the transfer of the CSP application and guidance is done via encrypted
and signed e-mail which maintains confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of these
deliverables. The delivery of the hardware is covered by the NXP JCOP platform
certification. The JCOP 4.7 SE051 is protected by the platform mechanisms.
Also, the mandatory CSP guidance is always provided to the integrator (by the developer).
Regarding identification of the TOE:
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
The TOE can be identified in accordance with the described processes in [6] and [9]
sec.1.3.5 referring to [16] sec.3.2. The identification of the underlying platform is done by
command GET DATA (IDENTIFY) and described in the guidance as well.
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● Key management,
● Data encryption,
● Hybrid encryption with MAC for user data,
● Data integrity mechanisms,
● Authentication and attestation of the TOE, trusted channel,
● User identification and authentication,
● Access control,
● Security management,
● Protection of the TSF,
● Import and verification of Update Code Package,
● Time stamp,
● Access control on time stamp service, and
● Security Audit.
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled and measures to be taken by the IT environment,
the user or the risk manager. The following topics are of relevance,
● OE.CommInf: Communication infrastructure,
● OE.AppComp: Support of the Application component,
● OE.SecManag: Security management,
● OE.SecComm: Protection of communication channel,
● OE.SUCP: Signed Update Code Packages,
● OE.Audit: Review and availability of audit records, and
● OE.TimeSource: External time source.
They are considered in the guidance documentation [15] sec.3.4.1.
5. Architectural Information
Details on the TOE architecture can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9].
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 Certification Report
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
Developer’s testing approach:
The developer considered the following aspects when designing his test approach:
● Tests to cover all TSFI defined in developer documents,
● Good case and bad case tests for each interface defined in the respective developer
document and executable on the TOE,
● Tests covering all TSF subsystems in the TOE design.
Verdict for the activity:
All test cases in each test suite were run successfully on this TOE version.
The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE operates as expected.
Evaluator tests (ATE_IND):
Independent testing according to ATE_IND was conducted.
The TOE was tested in the one configuration in scope of the certification.
The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the
actual test results.
Evaluator tests (AVA):
Penetration testing according to AVA was also conducted.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in [6] and [9] provided that all
measures required by the developer are applied.
The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the
actual test results.
8. Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated TOE configuration is identical with the one described in table 2, which in
turn is the delivered product. There is only one configuration of the TOE. For all tests the
TOE is configured and parameterized, if necessary, according to the guidance documents.
The cryptovision CSP TOE configuration is loaded and installed on the underlying CSP
platform. The cryptovision CSP TOE needs to be installed and personalised according to
the guidelines given in [15] and [16].
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used and guidance specific for the technology
of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the scheme and technology was used:
AIS:
● Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung, AIS 1, Version 14,
11.10.2017, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
● Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt von Einzelprüfberichten für Evaluationen nach CC,
AIS14, Version 7, 03.08.2010, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
● Gliederung des ETR, AIS19, Version 9, 03.11.2014, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
● Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, AIS20, Version 3, 15.05.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik
● Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, AIS26, Version 10,
03.07.2017, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
● Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, AIS31, Version 3, 15.05.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik
● CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema, AIS32, Version 7, 08.06.2011,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
● Öffentliche Fassung eines Security Target (ST-lite), AIS35, Version 2, 12.11.2007,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
● ETR-Zusatz zur Unterstützung von Smartcard Kompositionszertifizierungen (ETR for
composition), AIS36, Version 5, 15.03.2017, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
● Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen, AIS37, Version 3,
17.05.2010, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
● Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und ergänzende
Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren, AIS46, Version 3,
04.12.2013, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Other relevant evaluation guidance or documentation:
● JIL Minimum Site Security Requirements, Version 3.0 , February 2020
● Joint Interpretation Library, Application of Attack Potential to Smart-cards, Joint
Interpretation Working Group, Version 3.1, 06-2020.
● Joint Interpretation Library, Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Joint
Interpretation Working Group, Version 2.4, January 2020
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 Certification Report
● Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices, Joint Interpretation
Working Group, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformances: Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) Version 0.9.8, 19
February 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0104-2019,
Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider
– Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPC-CSP-TS-Au) Version
0.9.5, 8 April 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0107-2019 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The following table gives an overview of the cryptographic functionalities inside the TOE to
enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from cryptographic point of view.
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Application
standard
Comments
1 Authenticity RSA signature
generation with
RSASSA-PSS with
SHA-256, SHA-384,
SHA-512
[ISO_14888-2],
[PKCS #1], [FIPS
PUB 180-4]
2000-4096 [8] Completely
implemented
by certified
platform
functionality.
2 Authenticity ECDSA signature
generation with SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-
512
[RFC5639], [TR-
03111] Section
4.1.3, [FIPS186-4]
Section B.4 and
D.1.2.3
ECC Key
sizes
correspondin
g to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP25
6r1,
brainpoolP38
4r1,
[8] Completely
implemented
by certified
platform
functionality.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Application
standard
Comments
brainpoolP51
2r, Curve P-
256, Curve P-
384, Curve P-
521
3 Authenticity ECDSA signature
verification with
brainpoolP256r1,
Curve P-256
[RFC5639], [TR-
03111] Section
4.1.3, [FIPS186-4]
Section B.4 and
D.1.2.3
256 [23] Completely
implemented
by certified
platform
functionality.
4 Authenticatio
n
Terminal
Authentication
Version 2
[TR-03110] Section
3.3
Key sizes
according to
ECDSA
signature
verification
(#31 below)
or RSA
signature
verification
(#33 below)
[8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
5 Authenticatio
n
Terminal
Authentication
Version 2 with the
TOE in ICC context
and user in PCD
context modified by
omitting the
verification of the
certificate chain
[TR-03110] Section
3.3
Key sizes
according to
ECDSA
signature
verification
(#31 below)
or RSA
signature
verification
(#33 below)
[8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
6 Authenticatio
n
Message
authentication by
MAC verification of
received messages
[FIPS197], [NIST-
SP800-38B]
128, 256 [8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
7 Authenticate
d Key
Agreement
PACE in ICC role with
AES with Generic
Mapping
[ICAO-Doc9303]
Section 4.4
ECC Key
sizes
correspondin
g to the used
elliptic curve:
brainpoolP25
6r1,
brainpoolP38
4r1,
brainpoolP51
2r1, Curve P-
256, Curve P-
384
AES key
sizes: 128,
256
[8] Implemented
mostly in Java
Card using
platform
functionality.
Remaining
parts
assessed by
the ITSEF.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 Certification Report
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Application
standard
Comments
Length of
the nonce:
16 byte.
8 Authenticate
dKey
Agreement
Chip Authentication
Version 2
[TR-03110] Section
3.4
ECC Key
sizes
correspondin
g to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP25
6r1,
brainpoolP38
4r1,
brainpoolP51
2r1, Curve P-
256, Curve P-
384
AES key
sizes: 128,
256
[8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
9 Confidentialit
y
AES encryption and
decryption, CBC
mode
[FIPS197], [NIST
SP800-38A]
128, 256 [8], [23] for
FCS_COP.1
/DecUCP
Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
(For
FCS_COP.1/D
ecUCP
assessment
by ITSEF).
10 Integrity AES CMAC
generation and
verification
[FIPS197], [NIST
SP800-38B]
128, 256 [8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
11 Trusted
Channel
Secure messaging in
ENC_MAC mode,
established after
PACE or CA version 2
(optional with TA
version 2) or based
on permanently
stored session keys,
with AES in CBC
mode and CMAC.
[ICAO-Doc9303],
[FIPS197] Section
4.4, [NIST-SP800-
38A], [NIST-SP800-
38B]
128, 256 [8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
12 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
Deterministic RNG
DRG.3
acc. to [AIS20] None. [8] Completely
implemented
by certified
platform
functionality.
13 Cryptographi Hash function SHA- [FIPS180-4] None. [8] Completely
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Application
standard
Comments
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
256, SHA-384, SHA-
512
implemented
by certified
platform
functionality.
14 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
AES Key generation [ISO_18033-3] 128, 256 [8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
15 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
AES Key derivation [NIST SP800-56C] 128 [8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
16 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
ECC key pair
generation with
brainpoolP256r1,
brainpoolP384r1,
brain-poolP512r1,
Curve P-256, Curve
P-384, Curve P-521
[RFC5639], [TR-
03111] Section
4.1.3, [FIPS186-4]
Section B.4 and
D.1.2.3
ECC Key
sizes
correspondin
g to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP25
6r1,
brainpoolP38
4r1,
brainpoolP51
2r1, Curve P-
256, Curve P-
384, Curve P-
521
[8] Completely
implemented
by certified
platform
functionality.
17 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
ECC key pair
derivation
[RFC5639], [TR-
03111] Section
4.1.3, [FIPS186-4]
Section B.4 and
D.1.2.3
ECC Key
sizes
correspondin
g to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP25
6r1,
brainpoolP38
4r1,
brainpoolP51
2r1, Curve P-
256, Curve P-
384
[8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
See [15] for
notes on
usage.
18 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
RSA key pair
generation
[PKCS #1] 2000 bit to
4096 bit in
one bit steps
[8] Completely
implemented
by certified
platform
functionality.
19 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman ephemeral
key agreement
[RFC5903],
[RFC6954], [TR-
03111] Section 4.3.3
ECC Key
sizes
correspondin
g to the used
elliptic curve
[8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 Certification Report
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Application
standard
Comments
brainpoolP25
6r1,
brainpoolP38
4r1,
brainpoolP51
2r1, Curve P-
256, Curve P-
384
AES keys:
128, 256
See [15] for
notes on
usage.
20 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
ECKA-EG key
generation
[RFC5903], [TR-
03111] Section
4.1.3, [FIPS186-4]
Section B.4 and
D.1.2.3
ECC Key
sizes
correspondin
g to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP25
6r1,
brainpoolP38
4r1,
brainpoolP51
2r1, Curve P-
256, Curve P-
384.
[8] Completely
implemented
by certified
platform
functionality.
21 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
ECKA-EG key
derivation (for Elliptic
Curve Integrated
Encryption)
[RFC5639], [TR-
03111] Section 4.1.3
and 4.3.2.2,
[FIPS186-4] Section
B.4 and D.1.2.3,
[ANSI-X9.63]
ECC Key
sizes
correspondin
g to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP25
6r1,
brainpoolP38
4r1,
brainpoolP51
2r1, Curve P-
256, Curve P-
384.
AES keys:
128, 256
[8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
See [15] for
notes on
usage.
22 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
AES/RSA key
generation and
encryption with RSA
EME-OAEP
[ANS X9.63],
[ISO_18033-3],
[PKCS #1]
RSA key:
2000 – 4096
AES keys:
128, 256
Seed length:
256, 512 bit
[8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
23 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
AES/RSA key
derivation and
decryption with RSA
EME-OAEP
[ANS X9.63],
[ISO_18033-3],
[PKCS #1], [NIST
SP800-56C]
RSA key:
2000 –4096
AES keys:
128, 256
[8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
See [15] for
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Application
standard
Comments
notes on
usage.
24 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
AES Key wrap KWP [NIST SP800-38F] 128 [8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
25 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
AES Key unwrap
KWP
[NIST SP800-38F] 128 [8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
26 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
AES encryption and
decryption, CBC
mode
[NIST SP800-38A] 128, 256 [8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
27 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
Hybrid data
encryption/decryption
and MAC
calculation/verification
: ECIES or RSA with
AES-CBC and AES-
CMAC
[FIPS197], [NIST
SP800-38A], [NIST
SP800-38B], [TR-
02102-1] Section
3.4
128, 256 [8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
28 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
AES CMAC
generation and
verification
[FIPS197], [NIST
SP800-38A]
128, 256 [8] Implemented
in Java Card
using certified
platform
functionality.
29 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
HMAC generation
and verification,
HMAC-SHA256
[RFC2104],
[ISO_9797-2]
256 [8] See [15] for
notes on
usage.
30 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
ECDSA signature
creation with
brainpoolP256r1,
brainpoolP384r1,
brainpoolP512r1,
Curve P-256, Curve
P-384, Curve P-521
[RFC5639], [TR-
03111] Section
4.1.3, [FIPS186-4]
Section B.4 and
D.1.2.3
ECC Key
sizes
correspondin
g to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP25
6r1,
brainpoolP38
4r1,
brainpoolP51
2r1, Curve P-
256, Curve P-
384, Curve P-
521.
[8] Completely
implemented
by certified
platform
functionality.
31 Cryptographi ECDSA signature [RFC5639], [TR- ECC Key [8] Completely
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 Certification Report
# Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Application
standard
Comments
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
verification with
brainpoolP256r1,
brainpoolP384r1,
brainpoolP512r1,
Curve P-256, Curve
P-384, Curve P-521
03111] Section
4.1.3, [FIPS186-4]
Section B.4 and
D.1.2.3
sizes
correspondin
g to the used
elliptic curve
brainpoolP25
6r1,
brainpoolP38
4r1,
brainpoolP51
2r1, Curve P-
256, Curve P-
384, Curve P-
521.
implemented
by certified
platform
functionality.
32 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
RSASSA and EMSA-
PSS signature
creation
[ISO_14888-2],
[PKCS #1]
2000-4096 [8] Completely
implemented
by certified
platform
functionality.
33 Cryptographi
c primitive
(as service
of the TOE)
RSA and EMSAPSS
signature verification
[ISO_14888-2],
[PKCS #1]
2000-4096 [8] Completely
implemented
by certified
platform
functionality.
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
List of referenced documents and standards:
[ISO_14888-2] Information technology – Security techniques, Digital signatures with
appendix – Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms, 2008
[PKCS #1] PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, Version 2.2, October 27,
2012, RSA Laboratories.
[FIPS PUB 180-4] FIPS PUB 180-4 Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication Secure Hash Standard (SHS), August 2015, Information
Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and
Technology.
[RFC5639] RFC 5639 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard
Curves and Curve Generation, IETF Trust and the persons identified
as the document authors, March 2010
(http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt).
[TR-03111] BSI - Technical Guideline, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 2.1,
2018-06-01, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[FIPS186-4] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 186-
4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), July 2013, U.S. department of
Commerce / National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[TR-03110-2] BSI - Technical Guideline TR-03110-2, Advanced Security
Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents - Part 2 -
23 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
Extended Access Control Version 2 (EACv2), Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment (PACE), and Restricted Identification (RI),
Version 2.21, 2012-12-21, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
[FIPS197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197,
Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES),
2001-11-26, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[NIST-SP800-38A] NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, The CMAC Mode for Authentication, 2016-10, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
[ICAO-Doc9303] Machine Readable Travel Documents, ICAO Doc9303, Part 11:
Security Mechanisms for MRTDSs, seventh edition, 2015[ISO_14888-
2] Information technology – Security techniques, Digital signatures
with appendix – Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms, 2008
[NIST SP800-38A] NIST SP800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation, Methods and Techniques, 2001, National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).
[AIS20] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS) – AIS
20, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 3, 2013-05-15,
Herausgeber: Zertifizierungsstelle des BSI im Rahmen des
Zertifizierungsschemas, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik.
[ISO_18033-3] ISO 18033-3: Information technology - Security techniques –
Encryption algorithms – Part 3: Block ciphers, ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010.
[NIST SP800-56C] NIST, Recommendation for Key Derivation through Extraction-then-
Expansion, Special Publication SP800-56C, November 2011
[RFC5903] RFC5903, Elliptic Curve Groups modulo a Prime (ECP Groups) for
IKE and IKEv2, June 2010 (https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5903.txt)
[RFC6954] RFC6954, Using the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool
Curves for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), July
2013 (https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6954.txt)
[ANS X9.63] American National Standard for Financial Services X9.63-2011, Public
Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry – Key
Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography,
December 21, 2011, American National Standards Institute.
[NIST SP800-38F] NIST, SP800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, 2012
[TR-02102-1] BSI - Technische Richtlinie TR-02102-1, Kryptographische Verfahren:
Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen, Version 2021-01, 2021-03-24,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[RFC2104] RFC2104, HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication,
February 1997 (https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2104.txt)[RFC5639] RFC
24 / 32
BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 Certification Report
5639 - Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves
and Curve Generation, IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors, March 2010 (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt).
[ISO_9797-2] Information Technology - Security techniques, Message Authentication
Codes (MACs), Part 2: Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-function,
2011
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
Also note that the UCP (Update Code Package) mechanism is certified according to this
certificate’s evaluation assurance level and the respective Security Target’s Security
Functional Requirements, not the update deployment procedure itself. Installation and
usage of other TOE configuration items than specified in the Security Target ([6]) (and thus
evaluated during the course of this certification) could void the certification status of the
used device. Thus, recertifications could be required in order to maintain a valid
certification status in cases where such TOE changes are to be applied. As a
consequence, only certified updates of the TOE should be used via a respective UCP
deployment procedure (which is not in scope of this certification). If non-certified Update
Code Packages are available, TOE user’s discretion is advised on whether the sponsor
should provide a re-certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the
system using the TOE should examine and decide on the usage of not yet certified
updates and patches. Or take additional measures in order to maintain overall system
security.
Some security measures require additional configuration or control or measures to be
followed by a product layer on top. For this reason the TOE includes usage- and
configuration guidance documentation (see table 2) which contain obligations and
guidelines for the developer of the product layer on top on how to securely use this
certified TOE and which measures have to be taken. In the course of the inclusion of the
TOE into the top layer product or system it must be ensured that the required measures
have been correctly and effectively followed according to the rules laid out by the
certification procedure of the top layer product, for example the JIL rules or [11].
Overall, for usage of the product, the information provided for TOE users/administrators in
the guidance documentation [15] and [16], especially for the secure module application
([15] sec.3.5.1), the cryptographic functionality (see [16] sec.3.5.2), the ACL table ([15]
sec. 3.5.3) and the integration ([15] sec.3.5.4) is to be followed. In case special attention
regarding certain functionality shall be applied, the [9] already refers to the user guidance
[15] in a Developer Note.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
The TOE is based on a certified Java Card and provides a Java Card interface for any
application which is loaded on the chip. The CSP functionality can be used together with
the basic Java Card functionality of the underlying Java Card OS by an application loaded
on the chip. Due to this architectural structure an application developer has to follow the
guidance documentation of the CSP (i.e. [15] and [16]) as well as the guidance
documentation of the Java Card (i.e. [17]). An evaluator of such an application has to
consider the obligations in the ETR for Composition of the CSP as well as the obligations
in the ETR for Composition of the underlying Java Card (i.e. [10]).
In general, all security hints and requirements of [13] – [24] need to be considered during
usage of the TOE or composite product development, if applicable.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None.
13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
SFR Security Functional Requirement
ST Security Target
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023 Certification Report
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
27 / 32
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023, Version 1.16, 2022-11-17, “cryptovision –
Java Card applet providing Cryptographic Service Provider – Security Target”, cv
Cryptovision GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 2022-11-22, ”EVALUATION TECHNICAL
REPORT SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY)”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
(confidential document)
[8] Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) Version 0.9.8, 19 February 2019, BSI-CC-
PP-0104-2019,
Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider – Time Stamp
Service and Audit (PPC-CSP-TS-Au) Version 0.9.5, 8 April 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0107-
2019, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
and
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configurations “Cryptographic Service Provider
– Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPC-CSP-TS-Au), Protection Profile-Module CSP
Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPM-TS-Au)”, BSI-CC-PP-0107-2019, Version
0.9.5, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
[9] Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023, Version 1.16, 2022-11-21,
„cryptovision – Java Card applet providing Cryptographic Service Provider –
Security Target Lite“, cv Cryptovision GmbH (sanitised public document)
[10] ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 Version 2, 2022-11-29,
”EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR
COMP)”, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[11] “Evaluation Methodology for Protection Profiles Security Elements with Application
Separation”, v0.1.3, 21.12.2017, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (document can be requested from BSI)
[12] “Configuration list”, 2022-11-22, cv Cryptovision GmbH
[13] Lebenszyklus von SMAERS, CSP und TSE sowie User/Rollen bei SMAERS und
CSP, Version 1.6, 2022-09-02, cv Cryptovision GmbH
[14] cryptovision CSP 2.0, cryptovision SMAERS 2.0, Life cycle definition, configuration
management and development security at cv cryptovision (Document class ALC),
Version 2.7, 2022-09-27, cv Cryptovision GmbH
[15] Cryptovision CSP v2.0 - Java Card configuration providing a Cryptographic Service
Provider (CSP) - Operational Guidance (AGD_OPE), Version 1.0.26, 2022-11-21, cv
Cryptovision GmbH
[16] cryptovision CSP – Java Card configuration providing a Cryptographic Service
Provider (CSP) – Preparation Guidance (AGD_PRE), Version 1.0.19, 2022-11-17,
cv Cryptovision GmbH
[17] JCOP 4.7 SE051 User manual for JCOP 4.7 SE051, Revision 1.5, 2022-06-14, NXP
Semiconductors
7
See secton 9.1 for list of used AIS
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[18] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition NXP “JCOP 4.7 SE051” – EAL6+,
Report nr. 21-RPT-1132, NSCIB-CC-0095534_2, version 2.0, 2021-11-22,
Brightsight
[19] JCOP 4.7 SE051 Anomaly Sheet, Rev. 1.3, 2021-07-01, NXP Semiconductors
[20] Certification Report JCOP 4.7 SE051, NSCIB-CC-0095534-CR2, v1, 2021-11-25,
TÜV Rheinland
and
Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report JCOP 4.7 SE051, NSCIB-CC-0095534-
2MA, v1, 2022-07-05, TÜV Rheinland
[21] JCOP 4.7 SE051 Security Target Lite, Revision 2.1, 2022-06-29, NSCIB-CC-
0095534, NXP Semiconductors
[22] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021 for NXP Smart Card Controller N7121
with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2) from NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH, 2021-02-10, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
and
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1136—V2-2022 for NXP Smart Card Controller
N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3) from NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 2022-06-07, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
[23] Security Upgrade for Card Content Management Card Specification v2.2 -
Amendment E, version 1.0, November 2011, GlobalPlatform Inc.
[24] cryptovision CSP v2.0 – Security Implementation Guideline and Overview of
Security Mechanism, Version 1.0.5, 2022-08-29, cv Cryptovision GmbH
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1119-2023
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product cryptovision CSP – Java Card applet providing Cryptographic Service
Provider version 2.0 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM),
Version 3.1 extended by Scheme Interpretations, by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and CC Supporting Documents for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 24 January 2023, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1) are fulfilled for the development and production
sites of the TOE listed below:
Name of site /
Company name
Address Type of site
cv cryptovision GmbH Munscheidstr. 14, 45886
Gelsenkirchen, Germany
SW Development
Table 4: Relevant development/production sites
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
The development and production sites of the underlying JCOP platform with certification ID
NSCIB-CC-0095534-CR2 are listed in [18] sec.4.2. Therein it is further referred to the
development and production sites of the underlying platform (IC and cryptographic library)
with certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-2021 and BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-V2-2022. In summary,
the following delivery sites, as mentioned in [22], are also relevant (but evaluated in a
different procedure) and utilized within this composite certification procedure:
● NXP Hamburg TC: NXP Semiconductors, Germany GmbH, Troplowitzstr. 20, 22529
Hamburg, Germany.
● NXP ATBK: NXP Semiconductors Thailand (ATBK), 303 Moo 3 Chaengwattana Rd.,
Laksi, Bangkok 10210, Thailand.
● NXP ATKH: NXP Semiconductors Taiwan Ltd (ATKH), #10, Chin 5th Road, N.E.P.Z,
Kaohsiung 81170, Taiwan, R.O.C.
Note: End of report
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