# National Information Assurance Partnership

# Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
# Validation Report

# BEA WebLogic Platform V8.1 SP6

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|---|---|
| **Report Number:** | **CCEVS-VR-VID10030-2007** |
| **Dated:** | **19 October 2007** |
| **Version:** | **1.0** |

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# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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# 1 Executive Summary

This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) validation team of BEA WebLogic Platform V8.1 SP6 with BEA07-169.00 security advisory patch. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.

The evaluation was performed by the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, Maryland, United States of America, in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process. The criteria against which the WebLogic Platform V8.1 SP6 TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.2 and International Interpretations effective on 3 September, 2004. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.2. A validator on behalf of the CCEVS Validation Body monitored the evaluation carried out by SAIC. The information in this Validation Report is largely derived from the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports produced by the SAIC evaluation team. The evaluation was completed in September 2007.

The SAIC evaluation team determined that the product is Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Common Criteria Part 3 Conformant, and that the Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) for the product is EAL 2 augmented with ALC_FLR.1 family of assurance requirements.

BEA WebLogic Platform V8.1 SP6 with BEA07-169.00 security advisory patch is an application server platform for building, extending, integrating, deploying, and managing software applications. It comprises the following components that are used in combination to support end-user developed applications: WebLogic Server; WebLogic Portal; and WebLogic Integration.

The TOE is supported on the following Java 2 environments: BEA JRockit 1.4.2_10 SDK; and Sun Java 2 SDK 1.4.2_11 with Java HotSpot™ Client VM. The TOE is dependent on the correct operation of the Java 2 environment and on its underlying operating system, neither of which are included within the scope of the evaluation. It should also be noted that the access control policy implemented by the TOE is enforced only on access attempts made through the TOE's interfaces. The TOE does not and cannot control attempts to access data directly (e.g., via the underlying operating system).

The product, when configured as specified in the guidance documentation, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the BEA WebLogic Platform 8.1 Security Target.

The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, examined evaluation testing procedures, provided guidance on technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory's findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory in the ETR are consistent with the evidence produced.

## 1.1 Evaluation Details

**Table 1 – Evaluation Details**

| | |
|---|---|
| **Evaluated Product:** | BEA WebLogic Platform V8.1 SP6 with BEA07-169.00 security advisory patch |
| **Sponsor:** | BEA Systems, Inc<br>2315 North First Street<br>San Jose, CA 95131 |
| **Developer:** | BEA Systems, Inc<br>2315 North First Street<br>San Jose, CA 95131 |
| **CCTL:** | Science Applications International Corporation<br>7125 Columbia Gateway Drive, Suite 300<br>Columbia, MD 21046 |
| **Kickoff Date:** | September 3 2004 |
| **Completion Date:** | 11 September 2007 |
| **CC:** | Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.2 |
| **Interpretations:** | RI-137 |
| **CEM:** | Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security, Part 1: Introduction and General Model, Version 0.6, January 1997; Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.2, August 1999. |
| **Evaluation Class:** | EAL 2 |
| **Description:** | BEA WebLogic Platform V8.1 SP6 with BEA07-169.00 security advisory patch comprises an application server platform for building, extending, integrating, deploying, and managing software applications. The TOE consists of the following subsystems that are used in combination to support an end-user developed application: WebLogic Server, WebLogic Portal, and WebLogic Integration. |
| **Disclaimer:** | The information contained in this Validation Report is not an endorsement of the BEA WebLogic Platform V8.1 SP6 product by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the WebLogic Platform product is either expressed or implied. |
| **PP:** | None |

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|---|---|
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## 1.2 Interpretations

| Interpretation ID | Impact on CC Requirements | Impact on CEM Work Units | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| RI-137 | FIA_USB.1 changed | None | Applied |

## 1.3 Threats to Security

The following are the threats that the evaluated product addresses:

**Table 2 – Threats**

| Threat Identifier | Threat Description |
|---|---|
| T.BYPASS | An attacker may be able to bypass TOE protection mechanisms through unprotected interfaces in order to inappropriately access protected data and services. |
| T.EXCESS_AUTHORITY | An unauthorized user may be able to exercise administrator authorities to inappropriately manage the TOE. |
| T.NO_TIME | Those responsible for the TOE may not be able to determine the sequence of audited security relevant events. |
| T.NOCRYPTO | An attacker may be able to observe authentication data transmitted in the clear due to cryptographic services not being available. |
| T.STORAGE | An attacker may be able to cause the loss or destruction of Audit and other TSF data. |
| T.TAMPER | An attacker may be able to inappropriately modify or otherwise tamper with TSF programs and data. |
| T.TSF_COMPROMISE | A user or process may cause TSF data or executable code to be inappropriately accessed (viewed, modified, or deleted). |
| T.UNACCOUNTABLE | Users of the TOE may not be held accountable for their security-relevant actions. |

| Threat Identifier | Threat Description |
|---|---|
| T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS | A user may gain access to user data for which they are not authorized according to the TOE security policies. |
| T.UNDETECTED_ACTIONS | The administrator may not have the ability to detect potential security violations, thus limiting the administrator's ability to identify and take action against a possible security breach. |
| T.UNIDENTIFIED_USERS | An attacker may gain access to the TOE without being reliably identified allowing them to gain unauthorized access to data or TOE resources. |

# 2 Identification

The evaluated product is **BEA WebLogic Platform V8.1 SP6 with BEA07-169.00 security advisory patch**.

# 3 Security Policy

WebLogic Platform V8.1 SP6 enforces the following security policies as described in the Security Target.

> ***Note:*** *Much of the description of the WebLogic Integration V8.1 SP6 security policy has been extracted and reworked from the BEA WebLogic Integration Security Target and Final ETR.*

## 3.1 Access Control

Policies are created by administrators but use attributes maintained by the product: username, group membership, role, resource type, resource identity, and time of day. The resources to which access is permitted or denied include Java constructs (beans, APIs, jars, etc.), the administrative console, servers, WebLogic Portal objects, and WebLogic Integration objects.

## 3.2 Identification and Authentication

The TOE supports multiple identification and authentication mechanisms: username and password; token-based (using X.509 certificates, CORBA Common Secure Interoperability version 2 (CSIv2) identity assertion, or Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) assertions); RDBMS-based Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI) when accessing WebLogic Portal objects; and credential mapping, which provides a capability by which legacy applications use their own I&A mechanisms to authenticate to a WebLogic Server resource.

## 3.3 Auditing

The TOE generates audit records of security relevant events as they occur within the security framework. They are stored by the underlying operating system and, hence, the TOE is dependent upon that OS for proper protection of the audit trail.

### 3.4 Security Management

The TOE supports a number of security management or administrative roles, although from the security evaluation perspective, they are all considered equivalent to an 'administrator', regardless of any apparent limitations. The TOE restricts the ability to manage the access control policy, user accounts and user security attributes, and the configuration of the TOE to the administrator.

## 4 Assumptions

### 4.1 Physical Assumptions

The following physical assumptions are identified in the Security Target:

**Table 3 – Physical Assumptions**

| Assumption Identifier | Assumption Description |
|---|---|
| A.PHYSICAL | Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the IT environment. |

### 4.2 Personnel Assumptions

The following personnel assumptions are identified in the Security Target:

**Table 4 – Personnel Assumptions**

| Assumption Identifier | Assumption Description |
|---|---|
| A.NO_EVIL | Administrators are non-hostile, appropriately trained, and follow all administrator guidance. |

### 4.3 Operational Assumptions

The following operational assumptions are identified in the Security Target:

**Table 5 – Operational Assumptions**

| Assumption Identifier | Assumption Description |
|---|---|
| A.NO_UNTRUSTED | There are no untrusted user accounts or malicious software on the server platform. |

### 4.4 Clarification of Scope

The product being evaluated and consequently the TOE is entirely software. It runs utilizing the functionality (identical) of one of two Java runtime systems which, in turn run on a variety of operating systems. This makes the TOE entirely dependent upon the correct operation of the Java systems as well as the operating system, neither of which are included in the product and hence this evaluation. The access policy features implemented by the TOE are enforced only on access attempts generated by supported API's connected through the TOE. The TOE does not and cannot control access to data from other applications.  Administrators are advised not to authorize access to TOE data to other applications running on the server. If other applications must share TOE data sources, then the applications should be "trusted applications" only.

Note that certain resources allow access based upon the operation being requested.  This capability is not mentioned in the ST nor was any comprehensive testing of it performed; therefore no statements can be made regarding it in this Validation Report.

The adjudication provider is a mandatory security provider that provides functionality for dealing with multiple authorization providers. However, since the evaluated configuration includes only a single authorization provider, the adjudication provider's security functionality, while evaluated, is not fully utilized in the evaluated configuration.

# 5 Architectural Information

WebLogic Platform comprises three distinct subsystems: WebLogic Server (WLS); WebLogic Portal (WLP); and WebLogic Integration (WLI). The figure below shows a 'Security Service' which includes the basic 'Security Framework' of WLS and a series of security service provider 'modules' (note that the security provider modules in the figure are only examples). The Security Service and the associated modules form the core of the TOE, while the other entities in the figure depicted above the Security Service are examples of applications supported by the TOE. The WLP and WLI subsystems are 'BEA Layered Products' and represent the remainder of the TOE.

The following security providers are included in the evaluated configuration: WebLogic Auditing Provider; WebLogic Authorization Provider; WebLogic Role Mapping Provider; WebLogic Adjudication Provider; WebLogic Authentication Provider; RDBMS Authentication Provider; WebLogic Identity Assertion Provider; Web Services for Remote Portlets (WSRP) Identity Assertion Provider; and WebLogic Credential Mapping Provider.

In addition to the underlying Java 2 environments and their supporting operating systems, the TOE also relies on the availability of a relational database management system (RDBMS) to store and protect management data associated with trading partners, supported by the WLI subsystem.

Generally, user requests will come in from the network and will be handled by the security framework provided by WLS. If the user is attempting to access an application associated with WebLogic Portal or Web Logic Integration, those subsystems will be invoked in addition to the WLS security framework and hence serve to extend or add security features relative to resources within their control.

Customer applications are acquired and installed by WebLogic Platform administrators so that the appropriate controls are configured and subsequently enforced before the applications can be accessed.



Notice in the figure above that WebLogic Integration and WebLogic Portal serve as layered products adding their own security features to those of the underlying WebLogic Server.

# 6 Documentation

BEA provides an extensive set of documentation describing the installation, configuration, management and operation of the TOE. This set comprises documentation for the WebLogic Server, WebLogic Portal, and WebLogic Integration products, which together comprise the WebLogic Platform TOE. The WebLogic documentation is available from the BEA edocs website, as follows:

- WebLogic Server: http://edocs.bea.com/wls/docs81/index.html
- WebLogic Portal: http://e-docs.bea.com/wlp/docs81/index.html
- WebLogic Integration: http://edocs.bea.com/wli/docs81/index.html

Additionally, the installation guide for WebLogic Platform is available at http://edocs.bea.com/platform/docs81/install/index.html.

The guidance documentation examined during the course of the evaluation and therefore included in the TOE is as follows:

**Installation Guidance**

- Installing BEA WebLogic Platform.

**WebLogic Server Guidance**

- Administration Console Online Help
- Configuring and Managing WebLogic Server 8.1, 23 Sep 2005
- Developing Web Applications for WebLogic Server 8.1, 26 Sep 2005
- Introduction to WebLogic Security 8.1, Aug 2005
- Managing WebLogic Security 8.1, 9 Dec 2004
- Programming WebLogic Enterprise JavaBeans 8.1, 28 April 2006
- Programming WebLogic jCOM 8.1, 07 April 2006
- Programming WebLogic Security 8.1, Aug 2005
- Programming WebLogic Server J2EE Connectors 8.1, 1 Jul 2003
- Programming WebLogic Web Services 8.1, 25 Jun 2004
- Securing a Production Environment 8.1, 21 Jun 2004
- Securing WebLogic Resources 8.1, 13 Feb 2006
- WebLogic Server Command Reference 8.1, 15 Mar 2004.

**WebLogic Portal Guidance**

- WebLogic Administration Portal On-Line Help
- WebLogic Portal: Getting Started with Portal Administration 8.1,Dec 2004
- WebLogic Portal: User Management Guide 8.1,May 2005
- WebLogic Portal: Security 8.1, June 2006

**WebLogic Integration Guidance**

- Managing WebLogic Integration Solutions, 8.1, Oct 2005
- Deploying WebLogic Integration Solutions, 8.1 Oct 2005
- Introducing Application Integration, 8.1, Oct 2005
- Introducing Trading Partner Integration, 8.1, Oct 2005
- Using the Application Integration Design Console, 8.1, Oct 2005
- Using Integration Controls, 8.1, Jan 2005.

# 7 Product Testing

This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived from information contained in the Evaluation Team Test Report for BEA WebLogic Platform 8.1 SP6, Version 1.0, 11 September 2007.

## 7.1 Developer Testing

The goal of the WebLogic Platform tests is to show that its components – WebLogic Server, WebLogic Portal, and WebLogic Integration – can run together in a single, shared WebLogic domain using the same core security functionality. The developer's testing approach is to run manual tests against the WebLogic Platform End-to-End (E2E) Tour application, which runs in a single-server platform domain created in the "out-of-the-box" Platform installation. Using the E2E Tour application, authentication and authorization security functions are tested. Using the WLS Administration Console, WebLogic Administration Portal Console, and the WLI Administration Console interfaces running together in the E2E platform domain, security management functions are tested. Auditing is not tested directly, but is a by-product of exercising the security functions in the other tests.

Additionally, as further evidence that WebLogic Platform is the sum of its parts, the standard Portal tests used for the WLP 8.1 TOE testing are run against the E2E platform domain. This shows that the security functions exercised in a WLP-only domain are equally exercisable in a Platform domain. Furthermore, it shows that the presence of WLI-based resources in a Platform domain does not interfere with the security functions required for Portal.

The vendor ran the WLP automated test suite and Platform Manual Tests in various configurations, consistent with the test environment described in the Testing Documentation, and provided the evaluation team with the actual results. The test configurations were representative of both the operating systems supported and the application environment (JVM). All tests passed.

In addition, the evaluation team examined the results of testing the adjudication provider, whose function could not be fully tested without taking the TOE outside the evaluated configuration. Testing this functionality required the use of multiple authorization providers. Since the TOE only includes one authorization provider, the use of additional ones took the TOE outside of the evaluated configuration. The evaluators confirmed that those test results were in accordance with the behavior specified for the adjudication provider in the Security Target.

While performing the ATE_FUN work units, the evaluation team examined in detail a sample (amounting to slightly over 20%) of the vendor test cases and determined that all actual results matched the expected results. These results provided sufficient confidence that the entire test suite results match as well.

## 7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing

The evaluation team test configuration comprised a laptop and a workstation communicating over a Local Area Network (LAN). The laptop, which was configured and provided by BEA, supported the WLP Test Environment. The workstation, which is owned and configured by the SAIC CCTL, supported the Product Environment.

The WLP Test Environment was equipped with Windows XP and the following additional software:

- Cygwin – used to provide a Unix shell on Windows
- Apache Ant build tool – the test harness is driven by an Ant task
- Perl – used by perl scripts to set up the environment
- Python – used within the development test environment for scripting various build tools
- JUnit – a framework used to execute tests implemented in Java
- Cactus test framework.
- the test procedures.

The Product Environment was equipped with Windows Server 2003 (Enterprise Edition) Version 5.2 SP1 and the following additional software:

- BEA WebLogic Platform 8.1 (the TOE), comprising:
    - BEA WebLogic Server 8.1 SP6
    - BEA WebLogic Portal 8.1 SP6
    - BEA WebLogic Integration 8.1 SP6

- BEA JRockit 1.4.2_10 SDK
- Sun Java 2 SDK 1.4.2_11 with Java HotSpot™ Client VM
- Microsoft SQL Server 2000.

The evaluation team devised a test subset based on coverage of the security functions described in the ST. The Product Environment described above was used with team generated test procedures and team analysis to determine the expected results. All actual results matched the expected results.

The evaluation team performed the following additional functional tests:

- Generation of specified audit records: The vendor's Testing Documentation identifies the audit records generated by the various tests and the tests that contribute to the generation of audit records. The Testing Documentation identifies the following audit event that is specified in the ST but not specifically generated by the vendor's tests: USERLOCKOUTEXPIRED. The team tests showed the TSF generates all audit records specified in the ST
- Security management auditing: During the Final Validation Oversight Review for the TOE, the validators queried if any security management actions are audited, even though no claims for such auditing are made in the ST. The evaluation team examined the "Configuration Auditing" capability of the TOE, which is described in the functional specification evidence and the guidance documentation. Configuration Auditing provides for auditing of the security configuration of the TOE. The test demonstrated that the TSF generates Configuration Auditing events and information as described in the guidance documentation.
- Access to WLI resources: The ST identifies various resources that are provided by the WebLogic Integration component of the TOE and are subject to the WebLogic Server Access Control SFP, but are not clearly covered by the developer's testing. These resources are: Application Views; Trading Partner Profiles; Trading Partner Services. The test demonstrated that WebLogic Integration resources are protected according to the access control SFP
- Minimum password length: The vendor's strength of function analysis is based partly on the assumption that passwords have a minimum length of 8 characters, but it was unclear if this is an absolute minimum, or if it is configurable. The test demonstrated that the minimum password length has a default value of eight, but that an administrator can modify the minimum password length to be less than eight  Guidance documentation warns the administrator that a minimum length of 8 characters is required in the evaluated configuration.
- Password alphabet: The vendor's strength of function analysis is based partly on the assumption that the available password alphabet comprises 94 characters. The test demonstrated that all 94 printable characters of the standard typewriter keyboard can be used in a password
- Default configuration: The vendor's strength of function analysis is based partly on the assumption that by default the TOE is configured with User Lockout enabled and configured to lock users out after 5 failed login attempts within 5 minutes for 30 minutes duration. The test demonstrated that the default configuration for the User Lockout

mechanism is as specified in the documentation and that the mechanism operates as described

- Provided security management functions: The vendor's testing is primarily at the programmatic interfaces to the TSF. The vendor specifies some tests at the administrator interface, but these do not cover all the security management functions specified in FMT_SMF.1. The test demonstrated that the TSF provides all the security management functions specified in FMT_SMF.1.
- Console authorizations: The Platform TOE has eight built-in administrative roles. Four of these are from WebLogic Server (Admin, Deployer, Operator, Monitor), one from WebLogic Portal (PortalSystemAdministrator) and three from WebLogic Integration (IntegrationAdmin, IntegrationOperator, and IntegrationMonitor). The test demonstrated that the WLS Admin role has access to all three admin consoles, but that the WLI and WLP admin roles are restricted to their respective consoles. This seems reasonable, since WLS is the foundation component on which the other two components rely, while the WLI and WLP are mutually separate components.

### 7.3 Penetration Testing

The evaluation team conducted an open source search for vulnerabilities in the product and found none not already known to and addressed by the developer through security advisories and patches. They also examined the vendor's vulnerability assessment and identified one vulnerability relevant to the evaluated version of the TOE in its evaluated configuration. This vulnerability is addressed by the BEA07-169.00 security advisory patch that is part of the TOE evaluated configuration.

# 8 Evaluated Configuration

The evaluated configuration is the Java 2 environment. The BEA JRockit 1.4.2_10 SDK and Sun Java 2 SDK 1.4.2_11 with Java HotSpot™ Client VM are specifically supported. As customer applications and dataset sizes vary tremendously no configuration guidelines can be given here. Potential customers are encouraged to seek very competent assistance to size their hardware.

# 9 Results of the Evaluation

A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version 2.2 and CEM version 2.2. The evaluation determined the BEA TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the Part 3 Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL 2) requirements augmented with ALC_FLR.1. The rationale supporting each CEM work unit verdict is recorded in the **Evaluation Technical Report for WebLogic Platform V8.1 SP6 Part 2** which is considered proprietary.

# 10 Validator Comments/Recommendations

BEA WebLogic Platform is a product with functionality intended to provide a foundation for an enterprise to build and integrate applications and databases. As such its implementation has to be robust.

The validation team believes that the claims made and successfully evaluated for the product represent a set of requirements that are a reasonable selection covering, to a certain depth, the functionality of the product. The product, while extensive in functionality, only runs at the application level. It relies upon the underlying operating system for several types of support: audit review and storage, cryptographic facilities, security management, time stamps, and separation of the product and its users. Also, the usual training and physical assumptions apply. Because of this product construction, purchasers should be very careful to follow the configuration guidance. Controlling access, both physical and network, is very important; as is the injunction not to allow anything other than the TOE and its required supporting environment to run on the server machine.

The adjudication provider is part of the TOE but its primary security functionality consists of adjudicating decisions from multiple authorization providers. Since the TOE only includes one authorization provider in the evaluated configuration, this functionality cannot be effectively used without taking the TOE outside of the evaluated configuration. Testing and analysis confirmed that this functionality worked as claimed.

No claims are made for the network connections that must be in place between remote applications and the server or those between servers on different machines. It is up to the customer to put measures in place to appropriately secure these data paths.

# 11 Annexes

Not applicable.

# 12 Security Target

The security target for this product's evaluation is **BEA WebLogic Platform 8.1 Security Target, Version 1.0**, dated September 13, 2007.

# 13 Glossary

No definitions beyond those in the CC or CEM are supplied.

# 14 Bibliography

The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:

[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 1: Introduction and general model, Version 2.2, January 2004, CCIMB-2004-01-001.

[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 2: Security functional requirements, Version 2.2, January 2004, CCIMB-2004-01-002.

[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation – Part 3: Security assurance requirements, Version 2.2, January 2004, CCIMB-2004-01-003.

[4] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security: Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.2, January 2004, CCIMB-2004-01-004.

[5] Evaluation Technical Report for BEA WebLogic Platform V8.1 SP6 Part 1, Version 1.0, 11 September 2007.

[6] Evaluation Technical Report for BEA WebLogic Platform V8.1 SP6 Part 2, Version 1.0, 11 September 2007.

[7] Evaluation Team Test Report for BEA WebLogic Platform V8.1 SP6 ETR Part 2 Supplement, Version 1.0, 11 September 2007.

[8] BEA WebLogic Platform 8.1 Security Target, Version 1.0, 13 September 2007.

[9] NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme for IT Security, Guidance to Common Criteria Testing Laboratories, Version 1.0, March 20, 2001.