Getac MX50 (MDFPP20) Security
Target
Version 1.0
04/05/17
Prepared for:
Getac, Inc.
400 Exchange, Suite 100,
Irvine, CA 92602, U.S.A
Prepared By:
www.gossamersec.com
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1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................3
1.1 SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE......................................................................................................................3
1.2 TOE REFERENCE............................................................................................................................................3
1.3 TOE OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................................................4
1.4 TOE DESCRIPTION .........................................................................................................................................4
1.4.1 TOE Architecture...................................................................................................................................4
1.4.2 TOE Documentation ..............................................................................................................................6
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS..............................................................................................................................7
2.1 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE...........................................................................................................................7
3. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................................8
3.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .....................................................................8
4. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ..................................................................................................9
5. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................................................11
5.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................................11
5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)..............................................................................................................12
5.1.2 User data protection (FDP).................................................................................................................18
5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA) ...............................................................................................18
5.1.4 Security management (FMT) ...............................................................................................................20
5.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................................25
5.1.6 TOE access (FTA)................................................................................................................................27
5.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP) ...............................................................................................................27
5.2 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS...............................................................................................28
5.2.1 Development (ADV).............................................................................................................................28
5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)................................................................................................................29
5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC) .....................................................................................................................30
5.2.4 Tests (ATE) ..........................................................................................................................................30
5.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)...........................................................................................................31
6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION..............................................................................................................32
6.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT ...........................................................................................................................32
6.2 USER DATA PROTECTION ..............................................................................................................................36
6.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION.......................................................................................................44
6.4 SECURITY MANAGEMENT .............................................................................................................................46
6.5 PROTECTION OF THE TSF .............................................................................................................................46
6.6 TOE ACCESS.................................................................................................................................................48
6.7 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS ...........................................................................................................................49
7. TSF INVENTORY ............................................................................................................................................50
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 - TOE Security Functional Components....................................................................................................12
Table 2 - Security Management Functions..............................................................................................................25
Table 3 - Assurance Components.............................................................................................................................28
Table 4 - Algorithm Certificate Table......................................................................................................................32
Table 5 - Categories of System Services...................................................................................................................37
Table 6 - Power-up Cryptographic Algorithm Known Answer Tests...................................................................47
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1. Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST
conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is the Getac MX50 provided by Getac, Inc. The TOE is
being evaluated as a mobile device.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:
 Conformance Claims (Section 2)
 Security Objectives (Section 3)
 Extended Components Definition (Section 4)
 Security Requirements (Section 5)
 TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
 Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be
applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST,
iteration is indicated by a parenthetical number placed at the end of the component. For example
FDP_ACC.1(1) and FDP_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the
FDP_ACC.1 requirement.
o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using
bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that an assignment within a
selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [[selected-
assignment]]).
o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated
using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
o Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions,
and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big things …”).
 Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as
captions.
1.1 Security Target Reference
ST Title – MX50 (MDFPP20) Security Target
ST Version – Version 1.0
ST Date – 04/05/17
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Identification – Getac MX50
TOE Developer – Getac, Inc.
Evaluation Sponsor – Getac, Inc.
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1.3 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Getac, Inc. MX50, a ruggedized tablet featuring a 5.7” (1280x720 HD)
display; an Intel Atom Z8350 1.44 GHz x86 CPU (also known as Intel Cherry Trail); micro USB; Gleanair and AB
Military connector; microSD; 14-pin modular connector; WiFi/Bluetooth radio. The TOE runs Android 5.1.1.
The MX50 does not have a cellular chip for mobile broadband. The MX50 only has a WiFi/Bluetooth chip and
Ethernet (via military connector or USB-to-Ethernet) for networking (connecting to WiFi or Bluetooth networks).
1.4 TOE Description
The TOE is a ruggedized mobile device designed to support military and civil service users. Based upon Android
5.1.1, the TOE provides wireless and wired connectivity out of the box. Snapbacks are used to add optional
modules (e.g., cellular). The TOE includes a port to attach a snapback module that adds WWAN, USB, or a second
battery. The snapback module would likely be used to add USB storage encryption.
The evaluated TOE contains either 64GB/128GB of internal Flash storage and either 2GB/4GB of memory.
1.4.1 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides a rich Application Programming Interface to mobile applications and provides users installing an
application to either approve or reject an application based upon the API access that the application requires.
The TOE also provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest with AES encryption, including all user and
mobile application data stored in the user’s data partition. The TOE affords special protection to all user and
application cryptographic keys stored in the TOE. Moreover, the TOE provides users the ability to AES encrypt
data and files stored on an SD Card inserted into the device.
Finally, the TOE interacts with a Mobile Device Management to allow enterprise control of the configuration and
operation of the device so as to ensure adherence to enterprise-wide policies.
1.4.1.1 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure (without the rear access cover present, so
that one can access and replace the device’s battery).
1.4.1.2 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the MX50:
- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels
1.4.1.2.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic modules with CAVP validated algorithms for a wide range of cryptographic
functions including: asymmetric key generation and establishment, symmetric key generation,
encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are
supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation,
secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to
implement security protocols such as TLS and HTTPS and also to encrypt the media (including the generation and
protection of data, right, and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also
accessible as services to applications running on the TOE.
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1.4.1.2.2 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of the Trust Anchor
Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data using encryption so that even if a device is
physically lost, the data remains protected.
1.4.1.2.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a user perspective, except
for limited functions such as making phone calls to an emergency number and receiving notifications, a password
(i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even when the TOE is
unlocked the password must be re-entered to change the password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they
cannot be read from the TOE's display. The TOE limits the frequency of password entry and when a configured
number of failures occurs, the TOE takes an appropriate action such as performing a full wipe of protected content
or some other administrator-defined action. Passwords constructed using upper and lower cases characters, numbers,
and special characters and up to 14 characters are supported.
The TOE also serves as an 802.1X supplicant and to use X509v3 certificates and perform certificate validation for a
number of functions when applicable such as EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.
1.4.1.2.4 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions claimed in the corresponding
Security Target (and conforming to the MDFPP requirements) as well as other functions commonly found in mobile
devices. Some of the available functions might be available only to the mobile device users while many are
restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once the TOE has been
enrolled. Once the TOE has been enrolled and then un-enrolled, it will perform functions such as performing a ful
wipe of protected data to complete the unenrollment.
1.4.1.2.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features designed to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its
security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or
exportable. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for
cryptographic operations and perhaps user accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page
protections, use address space layout randomization, and use stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize
the potential to exploit application flaws. It also is designed to protect itself from modification by applications as
well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one another to protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect
when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-test fails, the TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also
includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be
updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation.
1.4.1.2.6 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by a user or after a configured interval of inactivity. The TOE also
has the capability to display an advisory message (banner) when users unlock the TOE for use.
The TOE is required to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
1.4.1.2.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS to secure communications channels between itself
and other trusted network devices.
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1.4.2 TOE Documentation
 Getac MX50 Administrator Guidance Instructions, version 0.8, 2017/04/02
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2. Conformance Claims
This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
 Part 2 Extended
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012.
 Part 3 Extended
 Package Claims:
 Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September 2014
(MDFPP20)
2.1 Conformance Rationale
The ST conforms to the MDFPP20. As explained previously, the security problem definition, security objectives,
and security requirements have been drawn from the PP.
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3. Security Objectives
The Security Problem Definition may be found in the MDFPP20 and this section reproduces only the corresponding
Security Objectives for operational environment for reader convenience. The MDFPP20 offers additional
information about the identified security objectives, but that has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP20 should
be consulted if there is interest in that material.
In general, the MDFPP20 has defined Security Objectives appropriate for mobile device and as such are applicable
to the MX50 TOE.
3.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
OE.CONFIG TOE administrators will configure the Mobile Device security functions correctly to create the
intended security policy.
OE.NOTIFY The Mobile User will immediately notify the administrator if the Mobile Device is lost or
stolen.
OE.PRECAUTION The Mobile User exercises precautions to reduce the risk of loss or theft of the Mobile
Device.
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4. Extended Components Definition
All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the MDFPP20. The MDFPP20 defines the
following extended requirements and since they are not redefined in this ST the MDFPP20 should be consulted for
more information in regard to those CC extensions.
Extended SFRs:
- FCS_CKM_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Support
- FCS_CKM_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Key Random Generation
- FCS_CKM_EXT.3: Extended: Cryptographic Key Generation
- FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Extended: Key Destruction
- FCS_CKM_EXT.5: Extended: TSF Wipe
- FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Extended: Salt Generation
- FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: Extended: HTTPS Protocol
- FCS_IV_EXT.1: Extended: Initialization Vector Generation
- FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
- FCS_SRV_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services
- FCS_STG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Storage
- FCS_STG_EXT.2: Extended: Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage
- FCS_STG_EXT.3: Extended: Integrity of encrypted key storage
- FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: Extended: EAP TLS Protocol
- FCS_TLSC_EXT.2: Extended: TLS Protocol
- FDP_ACF_EXT.1: Extended: Security access control
- FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Extended: Protected Data Encryption
- FDP_IFC_EXT.1: Extended: Subset information flow control
- FDP_STG_EXT.1: Extended: User Data Storage
- FDP_UPC_EXT.1: Extended: Inter-TSF user data transfer protection
- FIA_AFL_EXT.1: Authentication failure handling
- FIA_BLT_EXT.1: Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization
- FIA_PAE_EXT.1: Extended: PAE Authentication
- FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Extended: Password Management
- FIA_TRT_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication Throttling
- FIA_UAU_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication for Cryptographic Operation
- FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Extended: Timing of Authentication
- FIA_UAU_EXT.3: Extended: Re-Authentication
- FIA_X509_EXT.1: Extended: Validation of certificates
- FIA_X509_EXT.2: Extended: X509 certificate authentication
- FIA_X509_EXT.3: Extended: Request Validation of certificates
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- FMT_MOF_EXT.1: Extended: Management of security functions behavior
- FMT_SMF_EXT.1: Extended: Specification of Management Functions
- FMT_SMF_EXT.2: Extended: Specification of Remediation Actions
- FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)
- FPT_AEX_EXT.2: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page Permissions)
- FPT_AEX_EXT.3: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Overflow Protection)
- FPT_AEX_EXT.4: Extended: Domain Isolation
- FPT_BBD_EXT.1: Application Processor Mediation
- FPT_KST_EXT.1: Extended: Key Storage
- FPT_KST_EXT.2: Extended: No Key Transmission
- FPT_KST_EXT.3: Extended: No Plaintext Key Export
- FPT_NOT_EXT.1: Extended: Self-Test Notification
- FPT_TST_EXT.1: Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing
- FPT_TST_EXT.2: Extended: TSF Integrity Testing
- FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update: TSF version query
- FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Extended: Trusted Update Verification
- FTA_SSL_EXT.1: Extended: TSF- and User-initiated locked state
- FTA_WSE_EXT.1: Extended: Wireless Network Access
- FTP_ITC_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted channel Communication
Extended SARs:
- ALC_TSU_EXT.1: Timely Security Updates
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5. Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)
that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation
effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the MDFPP20. The refinements and operations already performed in the
MDFPP20 are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements have been copied from the MDFPP20
and any residual operations have been completed herein. Of particular note, the MDFPP20 made a number of
refinements and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the Common Criteria (CC) and that PP should be
consulted to identify those changes if necessary.
The SARs are also drawn from the MDFPP20 which includes all the SARs for EAL 1 augmented with
ALC_TSU_EXT.1. However, the SARs are effectively refined since requirement-specific 'Assurance Activities' are
defined in the MDFPP20 that serve to ensure corresponding evaluations will yield more practical and consistent
assurance than the EAL 1 augmented with ALC_TSU_EXT.1 assurance requirements alone. The MDFPP20 should
be consulted for the assurance activity definitions.
5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by MX50 TOE.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
FCS: Cryptographic support FCS_CKM.1(1): Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1(2): Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.2(1): Cryptographic key establishment
FCS_CKM.2(2): Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Support
FCS_CKM_EXT.2: Extended: Cryptographic Key Random
Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.3: Extended: Cryptographic Key Generation
FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Extended: Key Destruction
FCS_CKM_EXT.5: Extended: TSF Wipe
FCS_CKM_EXT.6: Extended: Salt Generation
FCS_COP.1(1): Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(2): Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(3): Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(4): Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1(5): Cryptographic operation
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: Extended: HTTPS Protocol
FCS_IV_EXT.1: Extended: Initialization Vector Generation
FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_SRV_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services
FCS_STG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_STG_EXT.2: Extended: Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage
FCS_STG_EXT.3: Extended: Integrity of encrypted key storage
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: Extended: EAP TLS Protocol
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2: Extended: TLS Protocol
FDP: User data protection FDP_ACF_EXT.1: Extended: Security access control
FDP_DAR_EXT.1: Extended: Protected Data Encryption
FDP_IFC_EXT.1: Extended: Subset information flow control
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FDP_STG_EXT.1: Extended: User Data Storage
FDP_UPC_EXT.1: Extended: Inter-TSF user data transfer protection
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_AFL_EXT.1: Authentication failure handling
FIA_BLT_EXT.1: Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization
FIA_PAE_EXT.1: Extended: PAE Authentication
FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Extended: Password Management
FIA_TRT_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication Throttling
FIA_UAU.7: Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UAU_EXT.1: Extended: Authentication for Cryptographic
Operation
FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Extended: Timing of Authentication
FIA_UAU_EXT.3: Extended: Re-Authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1: Extended: Validation of certificates
FIA_X509_EXT.2: Extended: X509 certificate authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.3: Extended: Request Validation of certificates
FMT: Security management FMT_MOF_EXT.1: Extended: Management of security functions
behavior
FMT_SMF_EXT.1: Extended: Specification of Management
Functions
FMT_SMF_EXT.2: Extended: Specification of Remediation Actions
FPT: Protection of the TSF FPT_AEX_EXT.1: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR)
FPT_AEX_EXT.2: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory
Page Permissions)
FPT_AEX_EXT.3: Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Overflow
Protection)
FPT_AEX_EXT.4: Extended: Domain Isolation
FPT_BBD_EXT.1: Application Processor Mediation
FPT_KST_EXT.1: Extended: Key Storage
FPT_KST_EXT.2: Extended: No Key Transmission
FPT_KST_EXT.3: Extended: No Plaintext Key Export
FPT_NOT_EXT.1: Extended: Self-Test Notification
FPT_STM.1: Reliable time stamps
FPT_TST_EXT.1: Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality
Testing
FPT_TST_EXT.2: Extended: TSF Integrity Testing
FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update: TSF version query
FPT_TUD_EXT.2: Extended: Trusted Update Verification
FTA: TOE access FTA_SSL_EXT.1: Extended: TSF- and User-initiated locked state
FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners
FTA_WSE_EXT.1: Extended: Wireless Network Access
FTP: Trusted path/channels FTP_ITC_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted channel Communication
Table 1 - TOE Security Functional Components
5.1.1 Cryptographic support (FCS)
5.1.1.1 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1(1))
FCS_CKM.1(1).1
The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
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cryptographic key generation algorithm [RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of [2048-bit
or greater] that meet the following: [ANSI X9.31-1998, Section 4.1], [ECC schemes] using
['NIST curves' P-256, P-384 and [P-521]] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)', Appendix B.4], [FFC schemes] using cryptographic key sizes of
[2048-bit or greater] that meet the following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard
(DSS)”, Appendix B.1]].
5.1.1.2 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1(2))
FCS_CKM.1(2).1
The TSF shall generate symmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [PRF-384] and specified cryptographic key sizes [128
bits] using a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1 that meet the following:
[IEEE 802.11-2012].
5.1.1.3 Cryptographic key establishment (FCS_CKM.2(1))
FCS_CKM.2(1).1
The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key establishment method: [- RSA-based key establishment schemes that meets the
following: NIST Special Publication 800-56B, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography',
- Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: [selection: NIST
Special Publication 800-56A, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes
Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography'],
- Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meets the following: NIST Special
Publication 800-56A, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography'] for the purposes of encrypting sensitive data received while
the device is locked. (TD0048 applied)
5.1.1.4 Cryptographic key distribution (FCS_CKM.2(2))
FCS_CKM.2(2).1
The TSF shall decrypt Group Temporal Key (GTK) in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key distribution method [AES Key Wrap in an EAPOL-Key frame] that meets the following:
[NIST SP 800-38F, IEEE 802.11-2012 for the packet format and timing considerations] and
does not expose the cryptographic keys.
5.1.1.5 Extended: Cryptographic Key Support (FCS_CKM_EXT.1)
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall support a [hardware-protected] REK with a [symmetric] key of strength [256 bits].
(TD0038 applied)
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.2
System software on the TSF shall be able only to request [NIST SP 800-108 key derivation] by
the key and shall not be able to read, import, or export a REK.
FCS_CKM_EXT.1.3
A REK shall be generated by a RBG in accordance with FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
5.1.1.6 Extended: Cryptographic Key Random Generation (FCS_CKM_EXT.2)
FCS_CKM_EXT.2.1
All DEKs shall be randomly generated with entropy corresponding to the security strength of AES
key sizes of [128, 256] bits.
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5.1.1.7 Extended: Cryptographic Key Generation (FCS_CKM_EXT.3)
FCS_CKM_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall use [asymmetric KEKs of [112 bits] security strength; symmetric KEKs of [256
bits] security strength] corresponding to at least the security strength of the keys encrypted by the
KEK. (TD0038 applied)
FCS_CKM_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall generate all KEKs using one or more of the following methods:
a) derive the KEK from a Password Authentication Factor using PBKDF and [Combine the
KEK from other KEKs in a way that preserves the effective entropy of each factor by
[encrypting one key with another] (Per TD0038)].
5.1.1.8 Extended: Key Destruction (FCS_CKM_EXT.4)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with the specified cryptographic key
destruction methods:
- by clearing the KEK encrypting the target key,
- in accordance with the following rules:
o For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct overwrite [consisting of
zeroes]. (TD0028 applied)
o For non-volatile EEPROM, the destruction shall be executed by a single direct overwrite
consisting of a pseudo random pattern using the TSF's RBG (as specified in FCS_RBG_EXT.1),
followed a read-verify.
o For non-volatile flash memory that is not wear-leveled, the destruction shall be executed [by a
single direct overwrite consisting of zeros followed by a read-verify]. (TD0057 applied)
o For non-volatile flash memory that is wear-leveled, the destruction shall be executed [by a
single direct overwrite consisting of zeros].
o For non-volatile memory other than EEPROM and flash, the destruction shall be executed by
overwriting three or more times with a random pattern that is changed before each write.
(TD0047 applied)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.2
The TSF shall destroy all plaintext keying material and critical security parameters when no
longer needed.
5.1.1.9 Extended: TSF Wipe (FCS_CKM_EXT.5)
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.1
The TSF shall wipe all protected data by [- Cryptographically erasing the encrypted DEKs
and/or the KEKs in non-volatile memory by following the requirements in
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1;].
FCS_CKM_EXT.5.2
The TSF shall perform a power cycle on conclusion of the wipe procedure.
5.1.1.10 Extended: Salt Generation (FCS_CKM_EXT.6)
FCS_CKM_EXT.6.1
The TSF shall generate all salts using a RBG that meets FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
5.1.1.11 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1(1))
FCS_COP.1(1).1
The TSF shall perform [encryption/decryption] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm
- AES-CBC (as defined in FIPS PUB 197, and NIST SP 800-38A) mode,
- AES-CCMP (as defined in FIPS PUB 197, NIST SP 800-38C and IEEE 802.11-2012), and
[- AES-GCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38D),
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- AES-CCM (as defined in NIST SP 800-38C),
- AES-CCMP-256 (as defined in NIST SP800-38C and IEEE 802.11ac-2013)]
and cryptographic key sizes 128-bit key sizes and [256-bit key sizes].
5.1.1.12 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1(2))
FCS_COP.1(2).1
The TSF shall perform [cryptographic hashing] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm SHA-1 and [SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and message digest sizes 160 and [256,
384, 512] that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 180-4].
5.1.1.13 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1(3))
FCS_COP.1(3).1
The TSF shall perform [cryptographic signature services (generation and verification)] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
- [RSA schemes] using cryptographic key sizes [of 2048-bit or greater] that meet the following:
[FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 4]
and [- [ECDSA schemes] using ['NIST curves' P-256, P-384 and [P-521]] that meet the
following: [FIPS PUB 186-4, 'Digital Signature Standard (DSS)', Section 5];].
5.1.1.14 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1(4))
FCS_COP.1(4).1
The TSF shall perform [keyed-hash message authentication] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm HMAC-SHA-1 and [HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-
512] and cryptographic key sizes [160, 256, 384, and 512] and message digest sizes 160 and [256,
384, 512] bits that meet the following: [FIPS Pub 198-1, 'The Keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code', and FIPS Pub 180-4, 'Secure Hash Standard'].
5.1.1.15 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1(5))
FCS_COP.1(5).1
The TSF shall perform [Password-based Key Derivation Functions] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-[SHA-256]], with [33333] iterations, and output cryptographic
key sizes [256] that meet the following: [NIST SP 800-132].
5.1.1.16 Extended: HTTPS Protocol (FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1)
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS (FCS_TLSC_EXT.2).
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall notify the application and [not establish the connection] if the peer certificate is
deemed invalid.
5.1.1.17 Extended: Initialization Vector Generation (FCS_IV_EXT.1)
FCS_IV_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall generate IVs in accordance with Table 14: References and IV Requirements for
NIST-approved Cipher Modes.
5.1.1.18 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) (FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with NIST
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Special Publication 800-90A using [NIST Special Publication 800-90A using [CTR_DRBG
(AES)]]. (TD0079 applied)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by an entropy source that accumulates entropy from [TSF-
hardware-based noise source] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the
greatest security strength (according to NIST SP 800-57) of the keys and hashes that it will
generate.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall be capable of providing output of the RBG to applications running on the TSF that
request random bits.
5.1.1.19 Extended: Cryptographic Algorithm Services (FCS_SRV_EXT.1)
FCS_SRV_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism for applications to request the TSF to perform the following
cryptographic operations:
- All mandatory and selected algorithms in FCS_CKM.2(1),
- The following algorithms in FCS_COP.1(1): AES-CBC, [AES-GCM, AES-CCM]
- All mandatory and selected algorithms in FCS_COP.1(3)
- All mandatory and selected algorithms in FCS_COP.1(2)
- All mandatory and selected algorithms in FCS_COP.1(4)
[- No other cryptographic operations].
5.1.1.20 Extended: Cryptographic Key Storage (FCS_STG_EXT.1)
FCS_STG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide [hardware-isolated] secure key storage for asymmetric private keys and
[symmetric keys].
FCS_STG_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall be capable of importing keys/secrets into the secure key storage upon request of
[the user] and [applications running on the TSF].
FCS_STG_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall be capable of destroying keys/secrets in the secure key storage upon request of [the
user].
FCS_STG_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall have the capability to allow only the application that imported the key/secret the
use of the key/secret. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [a common application
developer].
FCS_STG_EXT.1.5
The TSF shall allow only the application that imported the key/secret to request that the key/secret
be destroyed. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [a common application developer].
5.1.1.21 Extended: Encrypted Cryptographic Key Storage (FCS_STG_EXT.2)
FCS_STG_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall encrypt all DEKs and KEKs and [no other keys] by KEKs that are [2) Protected by
the REK and the password with [b. encryption by a KEK chaining to a REK and the password-
derived KEK]].
FCS_STG_EXT.2.2
DEKs and KEKs and [no other keys] shall be encrypted using one of the following methods:
[using AES in the [CBC mode]]. (TD0038 applied)
5.1.1.22 Extended: Integrity of encrypted key storage (FCS_STG_EXT.3)
FCS_STG_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall protect the integrity of any encrypted DEKs and KEKs and [no other keys] by [- a
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hash (FCS_COP.1(2)) of the stored key that is encrypted by a key protected by
FCS_STG_EXT.2].
FCS_STG_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall verify the integrity of the [hash] of the stored key prior to use of the key.
5.1.1.23 Extended: EAP TLS Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.1)
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall implement TLS 1.0 and [no other TLS version] supporting the following
ciphersuites:
- Mandatory Ciphersuites:
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
- [o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall verify that the server certificate presented for EAP-TLS [chains to one of the
specified CAs].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the peer certificate is invalid.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.
5.1.1.24 Extended: TLS Protocol (FCS_TLSC_EXT.2)
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) supporting the following ciphersuites:
- Mandatory Ciphersuites:
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
- [o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 5246,
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492,
o TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492,
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492,
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA as defined in RFC 4492,
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
o TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_ SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
o TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_ SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246,
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289,
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289,
o TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289].
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier according to
RFC 6125.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3
The TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the peer certificate is invalid.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.4
The TSF shall support mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.5
The TSF shall present the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension in the Client Hello with the
following NIST curves: [secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1] and no other curves.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.6
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This optional element was not selected.1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.7
This optional element was not selected.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.8
This optional element was not selected.
5.1.2 User data protection (FDP)
5.1.2.1 Extended: Security access control (FDP_ACF_EXT.1)
FDP_ACF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to restrict the system services that are accessible to an
application.
FDP_ACF_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide an access control policy that prevents [application processes] from
accessing [all] data stored by other [application processes]. Exceptions may only be explicitly
authorized for such sharing by [a common application developer].
5.1.2.2 Extended: Protected Data Encryption (FDP_DAR_EXT.1)
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.1
Encryption shall cover all protected data.
FDP_DAR_EXT.1.2
Encryption shall be performed using DEKs with AES in the [CBC] mode with key size [256] bits.
5.1.2.3 Extended: Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC_EXT.1)
FDP_IFC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall [provide an interface to VPN clients to enable all IP traffic (other than IP traffic
required to establish the VPN connection) to flow through the IPsec VPN client].
5.1.2.4 Extended: User Data Storage (FDP_STG_EXT.1)
FDP_STG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide protected storage for the Trust Anchor Database.
5.1.2.5 Extended: Inter-TSF user data transfer protection (FDP_UPC_EXT.1)
FDP_UPC_EXT.1.1
The TSF provide a means for non-TSF applications executing on the TOE to use TLS, HTTPS,
Bluetooth BR/EDR, and [Bluetooth LE] to provide a protected communication channel between
the non-TSF application and another IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels, provides assured identification of its end points, protects channel data
from disclosure, and detects modification of the channel data.
FDP_UPC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall permit the non-TSF applications to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
5.1.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)
5.1.3.1 Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL_EXT.1)
FIA_AFL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall detect when a configurable positive integer within [1-100] of unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to last successful authentication by that user.
1
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.6 is marked optional by TD0091.
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FIA_AFL_EXT.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been surpassed, the TSF
shall perform wipe of all protected data.
FIA_AFL_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall maintain the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts that have occurred
upon power off.
5.1.3.2 Extended: Bluetooth User Authorization (FIA_BLT_EXT.1)
FIA_BLT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall require explicit user authorization before pairing with a remote Bluetooth device.
5.1.3.3 Extended: PAE Authentication (FIA_PAE_EXT.1)
FIA_PAE_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall conform to IEEE Standard 802.1X for a Port Access Entity (PAE) in the
'Supplicant' role.
5.1.3.4 Extended: Password Management (FIA_PMG_EXT.1)
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall support the following for the Password Authentication Factor: 1. Passwords shall be
able to be composed of any combination of [upper and lower case letters], numbers, and special
characters: [ !”#$%&’()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_`{|}~, [all other printable ASCII characters]]; 2.
Password length up to [an integer greater than or equal to 16] characters shall be supported.
5.1.3.5 Extended: Authentication Throttling (FIA_TRT_EXT.1)
FIA_TRT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall limit automated user authentication attempts by [enforcing a delay between
incorrect authentication attempts]. The minimum delay shall be such that no more than 10
attempts can be attempted per 500 milliseconds.
5.1.3.6 Protected authentication feedback (FIA_UAU.7)
FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only [obscured feedback to the device's display] to the user while the
authentication is in progress.
5.1.3.7 Extended: Authentication for Cryptographic Operation (FIA_UAU_EXT.1)
FIA_UAU_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall require the user to present the Password Authentication Factor prior to decryption
of protected data and encrypted DEKs, KEKs and [no other keys] at startup.
5.1.3.8 Extended: Timing of Authentication (FIA_UAU_EXT.2)
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall allow [take screen shots (automatically named and stored internally by the TOE),
turn the TOE off, enable or disable airplane mode, change display brightness, configure
sound/vibrate/mute, choose the keyboard input method, use the flashlight, use a calculator app,
use a recorder app and change notification display level] on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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5.1.3.9 Extended: Re-Authentication (FIA_UAU_EXT.3)
FIA_UAU_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall require the user to enter the correct Password Authentication Factor when the user
changes the Password Authentication Factor, and following TSF- and user-initiated locking in
order to transition to the unlocked state, and [no other conditions].
5.1.3.10 Extended: Validation of certificates (FIA_X509_EXT.1)
FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:
- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation.
- The certificate path must terminate with a certificate in the Trust Anchor Database.
- The TSF shall validate a certificate path by ensuring the presence of the basicConstraints
extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE for all CA certificates.
- The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [a Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759].
- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
o Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the
Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with
OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
o (Conditional) Server certificates presented for EST shall have the CMC Registration Authority
(RA) purpose (id-kp-cmcRA with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
FIA_X509_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is
present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.
5.1.3.11 Extended: X509 certificate authentication (FIA_X509_EXT.2)
FIA_X509_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for
EAP-TLS exchanges, and [TLS, HTTPS], and [no additional uses].
FIA_X509_EXT.2.2
When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF
shall [not accept the certificate].
5.1.3.12 Extended: Request Validation of certificates (FIA_X509_EXT.3)
FIA_X509_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall provide a certificate validation service to applications.
FIA_X509_EXT.3.2
The TSF shall respond to the requesting application with the success or failure of the validation.
5.1.4 Security management (FMT)
5.1.4.1 Extended: Management of security functions behavior (FMT_MOF_EXT.1)
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions in column 3 of Table 2 - Security
Management Functions to the user.
FMT_MOF_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions in column 5 of Table 2 - Security
Management Functions to the administrator when the device is enrolled and according to the
administrator-configured policy.
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5.1.4.2 Extended: Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF_EXT.1)
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the functions in column 2 of Table 2 - Security
Management Functions.
FMT_SMF_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall be capable of allowing the administrator to perform the functions in column 4 of
Table 2 - Security Management Functions.
Management Function
Function
Implemented
Available
to
User
role
Available
to
Admin
role
can
use
Restricted
to
Admin
1. configure password policy:
a. minimum password length
b. minimum password complexity
c. maximum password lifetime
The administrator can configure the required password characteristics
(minimum length, complexity, and lifetime) using the Android MDM
APIs.
M M M
2. configure session locking policy:
a. screen-lock enabled/disabled
b. screen lock timeout
c. number of authentication failures
The administrator can configure the session locking policy using the
Android MDM APIs.
M M M
3. enable/disable the VPN protection:
a. across device
[ c. no other method]
The user can configure and then enable the TOE’s VPN to protect traffic.
The administrator (through an MDM Agent that utilizes the TOE’s MDM APIs)
can restrict the TOE’s ability to connect to a VPN.
M I I
4. enable/disable [Bluetooth, Wi-Fi]
The administrator can disable the radios using the TOE’s MDM APIs. Once
disabled, a user cannot enable the radio. The TOE’s radio’s operate at
frequencies of 2.4 GHz (Bluetooth), and 2.4/5 GHz (Wi-Fi).
M
Status Markers:
M – Mandatory
O – Optional/Objective
I – Implemented
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5. enable/disable [Camera and Microphone/Headphone]:
a. across device
[ c. no other method]
An administrator may configure the TOE (through an MDM agent utilizing the
TOE’s MDM APIs) to turn off the camera and or microphones. If the
administrator has disabled either the camera or the microphones, then the user
cannot use those capture devices.
M I I2
6. specify wireless networks (SSIDs) to which the TSF may connect 3
An administrator can specify a list of wireless network SSIDs to which the TOE
may connect and can restrict the TOE to only allow a connection to the specified
SSIDs.
M - M I
7. configure security policy for each wireless network:
a. [specify the CA(s) from which the TSF will accept WLAN
authentication server certificate(s)]
b. security type
c. authentication protocol
d. client credentials to be used for authentication
Both users and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can define wireless
connection policies for specific SSIDs.
M M
8. transition to the locked state
Both users and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can transition the
TOE into a locked state
M M
9. full wipe of protected data
Both users and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can force the TOE
to perform a full wipe (factory reset) of data.
M M
10. configure application installation policy by [
c. denying installation of applications]
The administrator using the TOE’s MDM APIs can configure the TOE so that
applications cannot be installed and can also block the use of the Google Market
Place.
M M M
11. import keys/secrets into the secure key storage
Both users and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can import secret
keys into the secure key storage.
M I
12. destroy imported keys/secrets and [selection: no other keys/secrets,
[assignment: list of other categories of keys/secrets]] in the secure key
storage
Both users and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can destroy secret
keys in the secure key storage.
M I
13. import X.509v3 certificates into the Trust Anchor Database M M
2
Changed from Mandatory to Optional by TD0044.
3
Changed from Mandatory to Optional per TD0064.
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Both users and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can import X.509v3
certificates into the Trust Anchor Database.
14. remove imported X.509v3 certificates and [default X.509v3 certificates] in
the Trust Anchor Database
Both users and administrators (using the TOE’s MDM APIs) can remove
imported X.509v3 certificates from the Trust Anchor Database as well as disable
any of the TOE’s default Root CA certificates (in the latter case, the CA
certificate still resides in the TOE’s read-only system partition; however, the TOE
will treat that Root CA certificate and any certificate chaining to it as untrusted).
M I
15. enroll the TOE in management 4
TOE users can enroll the TOE in management according to the instructions
specific to a given MDM. Presumably any enrollment would involve at least some
user functions (e.g., install an MDM agent application) on the TOE prior to
enrollment.
M M
16. remove applications
Users can uninstall applications on the TOE.
M M
17. update system software
Users can check for updates and cause the device to update if an update is
available. A wide range of possibilities exist for the administrator. Using the
MDM APIs, the administrator can query the version of the TOE and installed
applications, and an MDM agent on the TOE could issues pop-ups, initiate
updates, block communication, etc. until any necessary updates are completed.
M M
18. install applications
Users can install applications on the TOE.
M M
19. remove Enterprise applications
Users can uninstall applications on the TOE.
M M
20. configure the Bluetooth trusted channel:
a. disable/enable the Discoverable mode (for BR/EDR)
b. change the Bluetooth device name
[selection:
c. allow/disallow additional wireless technologies to be used with
Bluetooth,
d. disable/enable Advertising (for LE),
e. disable/enable the Connectable mode
f. disable/enable the Bluetooth services and/or profiles available on the
device,
g. specify minimum level of security for each pairing ,
h. configure allowable methods of Out of Band pairing
i. no other Bluetooth configuration]
TOE users can enable Bluetooth discoverable mode for a short period of time and
can also change the device name which is used for the Bluetooth name.
M
21. enable/disable display notification in the locked state of: [selection: M
4
Changed Mandatory/Optional values per TD0058.
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a. email notifications,
b. calendar appointments,
c. contact associated with phone call notification,
d. text message notification,
e. other application-based notifications,
f. all notifications]
TOE users can configure the TOE to allow or disallow notifications while in a
locked state.
22. enable/disable all data signaling over [assignment: list of externally accessible
hardware ports]
23. enable/disable [USB tethering, WiFi tethering, Bluetooth tethering] I I
24. enable/disable developer modes I I
25. enable data-at rest protection I I
26. enable removable media’s data-at-rest protection I I
27. enable/disable bypass of local user authentication
28. wipe Enterprise data
29. approve [selection: import, removal] by applications of X.509v3 certificates
in the Trust Anchor Database
30. configure whether to establish a trusted channel or disallow establishment if
the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate
31. enable/disable the cellular protocols used to connect to cellular network base
stations
32. read audit logs kept by the TSF
33. configure [selection: certificate, public-key] used to validate digital signature
on applications
34. approve exceptions for shared use of keys/secrets by multiple applications
35. approve exceptions for destruction of keys/secrets by applications that did not
import the key/secret
36. configure the unlock banner I - I I
37. configure the auditable items
38. retrieve TSF-software integrity verification values
39. enable/disable [
a. USB mass storage mode, ]
40. enable/disable backup to [selection: locally connected system, remote system]
41. enable/disable [
a. Hotspot functionality authenticated by [pre-shared key]
b. USB tethering authenticated by [no authentication]]
I I
42. approve exceptions for sharing data between [groups of application
processes]
43. place applications into application process groups based on [assignment:
application characteristics]
44. enable/disable location services:
a. across device
[ c. no other method]
M
45. [assignment: list of other management functions to be provided by the TSF
=
(a) enable/disable automatic transfer of diagnostic data to an
external device or service other than an MDM service with which the
device has enrolled;
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(b) enable/disable authentication mechanisms providing user access
to protected data other than a Password Authentication Factor (e.g.,
using a fingerprint).
(c) disenroll the TOE in management Application note: An acceptable
alternative to restricting a user’s ability to disenroll an MD in management is
for the MD to perform a wipe of protected data upon disenrollment.
(d) enable/disable multi-user modes
(e) enable/disable automatic updates of system software (see function 17)
(f) enable/disable access control policy (for FDP_ACF_EXT.1.2)
(g) wipe non-enterprise data]
Table 2 - Security Management Functions
5.1.4.3 Extended: Specification of Remediation Actions (FMT_SMF_EXT.2)
FMT_SMF_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall offer [wipe of protected data, wipe of sensitive data] upon unenrollment and [no
other triggers].
5.1.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.1.5.1 Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (ASLR) (FPT_AEX_EXT.1)
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide address space layout randomization (ASLR) to applications.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.2
The base address of any user-space memory mapping will consist of at least 8 unpredictable bits.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.3
This optional element was not selected.
FPT_AEX_EXT.1.4
This optional element was not selected.
5.1.5.2 Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Memory Page Permissions) (FPT_AEX_EXT.2)
FPT_AEX_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall be able to enforce read, write, and execute permissions on every page of physical
memory.
5.1.5.3 Extended: Anti-Exploitation Services (Overflow Protection) (FPT_AEX_EXT.3)
FPT_AEX_EXT.3.1
TSF processes that execute in a non-privileged execution domain on the application processor
shall implement stack-based buffer overflow protection.
5.1.5.4 Extended: Domain Isolation (FPT_AEX_EXT.4)
FPT_AEX_EXT.4.1
The TSF shall protect itself from modification by untrusted subjects.
FPT_AEX_EXT.4.2
The TSF shall enforce isolation of address space between applications.
5.1.5.5 Application Processor Mediation (FPT_BBD_EXT.1)
FPT_BBD_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall prevent code executing on any baseband processor (BP) from accessing application
processor (AP) resources except when mediated by the AP.
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5.1.5.6 Extended: Key Storage (FPT_KST_EXT.1)
FPT_KST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall not store any plaintext key material in readable non-volatile memory.
5.1.5.7 Extended: No Key Transmission (FPT_KST_EXT.2)
FPT_KST_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall not transmit any plaintext key material outside the security boundary of the TOE.
5.1.5.8 Extended: No Plaintext Key Export (FPT_KST_EXT.3)
FPT_KST_EXT.3.1
The TSF shall ensure it is not possible for the TOE user(s) to export plaintext keys.
5.1.5.9 Extended: Self-Test Notification (FPT_NOT_EXT.1)
FPT_NOT_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall transition to non-operational mode and [no other actions] when the following types
of failures occur:
- failures of the self-test(s)
- TSF software integrity verification failures
- [no other failures].
5.1.5.10 Reliable time stamps (FPT_STM.1)
FPT_STM.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
5.1.5.11 Extended: TSF Cryptographic Functionality Testing (FPT_TST_EXT.1)
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate the
correct operation of all cryptographic functionality.
5.1.5.12 Extended: TSF Integrity Testing (FPT_TST_EXT.2)
FPT_TST_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall verify the integrity of the bootchain up through the Application Processor OS
kernel, and [[all executable code within the Android system partition]], stored in mutable media
prior to its execution through the use of [a hardware-protected hash].
5.1.5.13 Extended: Trusted Update: TSF version query (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the TOE
firmware/software.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of the hardware
model of the device.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorized users the ability to query the current version of installed mobile
applications.
5.1.5.14 Extended: Trusted Update Verification (FPT_TUD_EXT.2)
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall verify software updates to the Application Processor system software and [no other
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processor system software] using a digital signature by the manufacturer prior to installing those
updates.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.2
The TSF shall [update only by verified software] the TSF boot integrity [key].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.3
The TSF shall verify that the digital signature verification key used for TSF updates [matches a
hardware-protected public key].
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.4
The TSF shall verify mobile application software using a digital signature mechanism prior to
installation.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.5
This optional element was not selected.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.6
This optional element was not selected.
FPT_TUD_EXT.2.7
The TSF shall verify that software updates to the TSF are a current or later version than the
current version of the TSF.
5.1.6 TOE access (FTA)
5.1.6.1 Extended: TSF- and User-initiated locked state (FTA_SSL_EXT.1)
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall transition to a locked state after a time interval of inactivity.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall transition to a locked state after initiation by either the user or the administrator.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall, upon transitioning to the locked state, perform the following operations:
a) clearing or overwriting display devices, obscuring the previous contents;
b) [no other actions].
5.1.6.2 Default TOE Access Banners (FTA_TAB.1)
FTA_TAB.1.1
Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an advisory warning message regarding
unauthorized use of the TOE.
5.1.6.3 Extended: Wireless Network Access (FTA_WSE_EXT.1)
FTA_WSE_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be able to attempt connections to wireless networks specified as acceptable
networks as configured by the administrator in FMT_SMF_EXT.1.
5.1.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
5.1.7.1 Extended: Trusted channel Communication (FTP_ITC_EXT.1)
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall use 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS and [TLS, HTTPS protocol] to provide a
communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct
from other communication channels, provides assured identification of its end points, protects
channel data from disclosure, and detects modification of the channel data.
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall permit the TSF to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for wireless access point
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connections, administrative communication, configured enterprise connections, and [no other
connections].
5.2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The SARs for the TOE are the components as specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria. Note that the SARs have
effectively been refined with the assurance activities explicitly defined in association with both the SFRs and SARs.
Requirement Class Requirement Component
ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1: Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance documents AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support ALC_CMC.1: Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMS.1: TOE CM coverage
ALC_TSU_EXT.1: Timely Security Updates
ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1: Independent testing - conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1: Vulnerability survey
Table 3 - Assurance Components
5.2.1 Development (ADV)
5.2.1.1 Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
ADV_FSP.1.1d
The developer shall provide a functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.2d
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
ADV_FSP.1.1c
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for each SFR-enforcing
and SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.2c
The functional specification shall identify all parameters associated with each SFR-enforcing and
SFR-supporting TSFI.
ADV_FSP.1.3c
The functional specification shall provide rationale for the implicit categorisation of interfaces as
SFR-non-interfering.
ADV_FSP.1.4c
The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.
ADV_FSP.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.1.2e
The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete
instantiation of the SFRs.
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5.2.2 Guidance documents (AGD)
5.2.2.1 Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
AGD_OPE.1.1d
The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and
privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate
warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces
provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3c
The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and
interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure
values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of security-
relevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including
changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5c
The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including
operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and implications for
maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6c
The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be
followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational environment as described in
the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7c
The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.2.2 Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
AGD_PRE.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.1c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the
delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2c
The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE
and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security
objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2e
The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared
securely for operation.
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5.2.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)
5.2.3.1 Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
ALC_CMC.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.1.1c
The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.3.2 TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
ALC_CMS.1.1d
The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.1.1c
The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; and the evaluation evidence
required by the SARs.
ALC_CMS.1.2c
The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.3.3 Timely Security Updates (ALC_TSU_EXT.1)
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1d
The developer shall provide a description in the TSS of how timely security updates are made to
the TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1c
The description shall include the process for creating and deploying security updates for the TOE
software/firmware.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.2c
The description shall express the time window as the length of time, in days, between public
disclosure of a vulnerability and the public availability of security updates to the TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.3c
The description shall include the mechanisms publicly available for reporting security issues
pertaining to the TOE.
ALC_TSU_EXT.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.2.4 Tests (ATE)
5.2.4.1 Independent testing - conformance (ATE_IND.1)
ATE_IND.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.1.2e
The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.
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5.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)
5.2.5.1 Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
AVA_VAN.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2e
The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities
in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3e
The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack
potential.
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6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions:
- Cryptographic support
- User data protection
- Identification and authentication
- Security management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE access
- Trusted path/channels
6.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE implements cryptographic algorithms in accordance with the following NIST standards and has received
the following CAVP algorithm certificates. It uses OpenSSL version 1.0.1k for encryption services and random
number generation, and it uses algorithms within the kernel for disk encryption and integrity. The TOE’s platform
supports the following algorithms:
Algorithm NIST Standard SFR Reference Cert#
AES 128/256 CBC, CCM, GCM FIPS 197, SP 800-38A/C/D/F FCS_COP.1(1) 4352
AES KW 128/256 SP800-38F FCS_COP.1(1) 4352
CVL KAS FFC/ECC SP 800-56A FCS_CKM.2(1) 1052
DRBG AES-256-CTR SP 800-90A FCS_RBG_EXT.1(1) 1389
DSA SIG(gen)/SIG(ver)/Key(gen) FIPS 186-4 FCS_CKM.2(1) 1155
ECDSA SIG(gen)/SIG(ver)/Key(gen) FIPS 186-4 FCS_COP.1(3) 1030
HMAC SHA-1/256/384 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 FCS_COP.1(4)
FCS_CKM.1(2)
2892
RSA SIG(gen)/SIG(ver)/Key(gen) FIPS 186-4 FCS_CKM.1(1)
FCS_CKM.1(2)
FCS_COP.1(3)
2350
SHS SHA-1/256/384/512 FIPS 180-4 FCS_COP.1(2) 3590
Table 4 – MX50 OpenSSL 1.0.1k Algorithm Certificate Table
Algorithm NIST Standard SFR Reference Cert#
AES 128/256 CBC, CCM FIPS 197, SP 800-38A/C/F FCS_COP.1(1) 4353
HMAC SHA-1/256/384 FIPS 198-1 & 180-4 FCS_COP.1(4) 2893
SHS SHA-1/256/384/512 FIPS 180-4 FCS_COP.1(2) 3591
Table 5 – MX50 Kernel Crypto Module Algorithm Certificate Table
The Cryptographic support function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
 FCS_CKM.1(1): The TOE provides asymmetric key generation for DH, RSA, and ECDH. The TOE
generates RSA and DH/ECDH (including P-256, P384 and P-521) keys in its OpenSSL software library
(which generates the keys in accordance with ANSI X9.31 and FIPS 186-4 respectively). The TOE
supports generating keys with a security strength of 112-bits and larger, thus supports 2048-bit RSA and
DH keys, and 256-bit ECDH keys. The Android Keymaster HAL (or Android keystore) offloads its key
generation to Intel’s TXE.
 FCS_CKM.1(2): The TOE adheres to 802.11-2012 for key generation. The TOE’s wpa_supplicant provides
the PRF384 for WPA2 derivation of 128-bit AES Temporal Key and also employs its OpenSSL AES-256
DRBG when generating random values (including nonces) use in the EAP-TLS and 802.11 4-way
handshake. The TOE has been designed for compliance, and the Device has successfully completed
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certification (including WPA2 Personal) and received a WiFi CERTIFIED Interoperability Certificate from
the WiFi Alliance (Certification ID: WFA67360). The WiFi Alliance maintains a website providing further
information about the testing program: http://www.wi-fi.org/certification.
 FCS_CKM.2(1): The TOE supports RSA (800-56B), DHE (FFC 800-56A), and ECDHE (ECC 800-56A)
methods in TLS key establishment/exchange (the sole secure channel the TOE provides). The user and
administrator need take no special configuration of the TOE as the TOE automatically generates the keys
needed for negotiated TLS ciphersuite. Because the TOE only acts as a TLS client, the TOE only performs
800-56B encryption (specifically the encryption of the Pre-Master Secret using the Server’s RSA public
key) when participating in TLS_RSA_* based TLS handshakes. Thus, the TOE does not perform 800-56B
decryption. However, the TOE’s TLS client correctly handles other cryptographic errors (for example,
invalid checksums, incorrect certificate types, corrupted certificates) by sending a TLS fatal alert.
 FCS_CKM.2(2): The TOE adheres to RFC 3394, SP 800-38F, and 802.11-2012 standards and unwraps the
GTK (sent encrypted with the WPA2 KEK using AES Key Wrap in an EAPOL-Key frame). The TOE,
upon receiving an EAPOL frame, will subject the frame to a number of checks (frame length, EAPOL
version, frame payload size, EAPOL-Key type, key data length, EAPOL-Key CCMP descriptor version,
and replay counter) to ensure a proper EAPOL message and then decrypt the GTK using the KEK, thus
ensuring that it does not expose the Group Temporal Key (GTK).
 FCS_CKM_EXT.1: The TOE supports a Root Encryption Key (REK) within the main (application)
processor. Requests for encryption or decryption chaining to the REK are only accessible through the
Trusted Execution Environment, or TEE (TrustZone). The REK lies in a series of 256-bit fuses, which the
TOE programs during manufacturing. The TEE does not allow direct access to the REK but provides
access to a derived HEK (Hardware Encryption Key) which is derived from the REK through a KDF
function for encryption and decryption.
 FCS_CKM_EXT.2: All data encryption keys (DEKs) used by the TOE are generated using its approved
RBGs. In all cases, the TOE generates DEKs using a compliant RBG seeded with entropy from the TOE’s
hardware entropy source. The RBGs generate DEKs corresponding to the security strength of AES key
sizes of 128 and 256-bits. The TOE utilizes the following DEKs:
Key Name Key
Type
Usage Algorithm / Size Generated From /
Derived from
Full-disk-encryption
(Data-at-rest)
DEK Encrypt / Decrypt user
data
AES-CBC 256-bits Generated from hardware
entropy
SD Card DEK DEK SD Card data
encryption/decryption key
AES-CBC 256-bit Generated from hardware
entropy
WPA2 keys DEK Encrypt/decryption Wi-
Fi/802.11
communications
32-byte nonce Generated from hardware
entropy
TLS/HTTPS session
keys
DEK Encryption/decryption of
TLS/HTTPS sessions
AES – 128/256
CBC
OpenSSL – Derived as
specified in TLS/HTTPS
protocol
Bluetooth EPR/LE DEK Encryption/decryption of
Bluetooth
communications
AES – 128 Generated within
Broadcom BT Chipset
Mobile application
keys
DEK Keys generated / used by
various mobile
applications
RSA – 2048 bits OpenSSL (if Android
interface is used)
 FCS_CKM_EXT.3: The TOE derives all password based KEKs from a user’s password using PBKDFv2.
Salts are stored in the crypto footer of the flash partition, along with the encrypted DEK.
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To protect the Data Encryption Keys (DEKs), first the user’s password is combined with a 256-bit salt
(generated via the Intel processor’s strong DRBG) using PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256 and 33333
iterations. The result of the first combination is an intermediate key (IK1) that is decrypted using the RSA-
2048 bit key blob from TXE, which results in another intermediate key (IK2). The resulting key is
combined again with a 256-bit salt (also generated via the Intel processor’s strong DRBG) using PBKDF2
with HMAC-SHA-256 and 33333 iterations, and the result is a 512-bit intermediate key (IK3). The 512-bit
value is passed through PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA-256 and 33333 iterations again to be stored in the
crypto footer of the Android partition. To create the DEK (data encryption key), this value is split into two
values, 256-bits each. One value is the KEK (key encryption key) and the other is an IV (initialization
vector). The KEK is used to encrypt the IV, and the result is a DEK used to protect user data.
 FCS_CKM_EXT.4: The TOE destroys cryptographic material (plaintext keys, authentication data, other
security parameters) when they are no longer in use by the system. No plaintext cryptographic keying
material resides in the TOE’s flash, because the TOE encrypts all keys stored in flash. Keys are destroyed
immediately when no longer needed. Keys stored in eMMC flash are destroyed by using the
BLKSECDISCARD command. When performing a full wipe of protected data, the TOE cryptographically
erases the protected data by clearing the DEK (which is stored in encrypted form in the cryptofooter
partition) that is used to encrypt the user data partition. Because the TOE’s keystore resides within the user
data partition, TOE effectively cryptographically erases those keys when clearing the Full disk encryption
DEK. In turn, the TOE clears the Full disk encryption DEK and SD Card DEK through a secure direct
overwrite (BLKSECDISCARD ioctl) of the Flash memory containing the key followed by a read-verify.
 FCS_CKM_EXT.5: The TOE stores all protected data in encrypted form within the user data partition.
Upon request, the TOE cryptographically erases the Full disk encryption DEK protecting the user data
partition, clears that key from memory, reformats the partition, and then power cycles. The TOE’s clearing
of the Full disk encryption DEK follows the requirements of FCS_CKM_EXT.4.
 FCS_CKM_EXT.6: The salts used by the TOE are obtained from a DRBG satisfying FCS_RBG_EXT.1.
These include the salts used to generate the KEK that is pre-cursor data to the DEK that used to protect the
full-disk-encryption and SD card encryption. The TOE utilizes the following salts:
- Salt used as part of derivation process of two intermediate keys
- TLS/HTTPS (c_random, pre-master secret, ECDHE_*, DHE_*)
- WPA2 nonces
 FCS_COP.1(1): The TOE performs encryption and decryption using AES in accordance with the standards,
key sizes and modes referenced in the tables above.
 FCS_COP.1(2): The TOE performs cryptographic hashing using SHA algorithms in accordance with the
standards and message digest sizes referenced in the tables above.
 FCS_COP.1(3): The TOE performs cryptographic signature generation and verification using either an
RSA or ECDSA scheme that is in accordance with standards referenced in the tables above. The TOE is
capable of generating RSA keys with key size of 2048-bits and ECDSA keys with curve sizes of P-256, P-
384, and P-521.
 FCS_COP.1(4): The TOE performs keyed-hash message authentication using the HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-
SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 algorithms, meeting the standards referenced in the
tables above. These include key sizes and message digest sizes of 160, 256, 384 and 512 bits. FIPS 198-1 &
180-4 dictate the block size used, and they specify block sizes of 512 bits for HMAC-SHA-1 and HMAC-
SHA256, and 1024 bits for HMAC-SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA-512.
 FCS_COP.1(5): The TOE conditions a user’s password per SP 800-132 using PBKDF2 using HMAC-
SHA-256 with 33333 iterations, to combine a 256-bit salt with the user’s password to obtain a 256-bit DEK
which is used to protect the full disk encryption and SD card encryption keys. The TOE utilizes several
mechanism to increase the computational complexity of the protections afforded by keys derived from
passwords. First, the TOE performs the HMAC-SHA-256 iterations during PBKDF2 key derivation. Then
the TOE signs the resulting key with the Keymaster key, which is then fed in to another PBKDF2 function
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to derive a KEK and IV. Afterwards, the KEK and IV are used to obtain the DEK. Finally, the TOE
enforces a maximum number of incorrect login attempts prior to wiping the device.
The time needed to derive keying material does not impact or lessen the difficulty faced by an attacker’s
exhaustive guessing matter as the combination of the password derived KEK with REK value entirely
prevents offline attacks. The TOE’s maximum incorrect login attempts (less than 100), password length
(between 4 and 16 characters) and password complexity rules prevent exhaustive online attacks because the
number of combinations of passwords that an adversary can attempt is much higher than the maximum
incorrect login attempts required before a device wipe is triggered.
 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: The TOE supports the HTTPS protocol (compliant with RFC 2818) using TLS as
described by FCS_TLSC_EXT.2 so that (mobile and system) applications executing on the TOE can act as
HTTPS clients and securely connect to external servers using HTTPS. Getac has also modified Android
APIs to ensure that certificate checking performed by the TOE satisfies FIA_X509_EXT.1,
FIA_X509_EXT.2 and FIA_X509_EXT.3.
 FCS_IV_EXT.1: The initialization vectors (IVs) used by the TOE for AES CBC encryption are generated
by a DRBG satisfying FCS_RBG_EXT.1. The IVs that are used to support the encryption of the DEKs for
full disk encryption and SD card encryption use output from the PBPKF2 function. This output would
meet SP800-38A section 5.3 for Key/IV pair uniqueness by virtue of the fact that for these IV (which are
deterministically established from the user’s password and the 256-bit salt) the collision probability would
not exceed 2-32
.
 FCS_RBG_EXT.1: The TOE provides a number of different RBGs including the following:
- An SP 800-90A AES-128 CTR_DRBG provided by the Intel processor.
- An SP 800-90A AES-256 CTR DRBG provided by OpenSSL.
The TOE initializes each RBG with sufficient entropy ultimately accumulated from a TOE-hardware-based
noise source. The hardware based AES CTR_DRBG is seeded from the hardware noise source. Output
from the hardware based AES CTR_DRBG provides seed material for all of the TOE’s SP 800-90A AES-
256-CTR DRBG (384-bits of entropy input). These sources for RBG all provide a security strength of at
least 256-bits.
The hardware based CTR-DRBG is also made available to Android applications through the RDRAND
instruction set. These sources for the RBG all provide a security strength of at least 128-bits. Getac follows
Intel’s recommendation of executing the RBG twice with a call to reseed the DRBG in between to achieve
a DRBG output that contains 256 bits of entropy.
 FCS_SRV_EXT.1: The TOE provides applications access to the cryptographic operations including
encryption (AES-CBC), hashing (SHA), signing and verification (RSA), key hashing (HMAC), password-
based key-derivation functions (PKBDFv2 HMAC-SHA-256), generation of asymmetric keys for key
establishment (RSA, DH, and ECDH), and generation of asymmetric keys for signature generation and
verification (RSA). The TOE provides access through the Android operating system’s Java API, through
the native OpenSSL API, and through the kernel.
 FCS_STG_EXT.1: The TOE provides the user, the administrator and mobile applications the ability to
import and use asymmetric public and private keys into the TOE’s hardware-isolated Secure Key Storage.
Additionally, the user and administrator can request the TOE to destroy the keys stored in the Secure Key
Storage. While normally mobile applications cannot use or destroy the keys of another application,
applications that share a common application developer (and are thus signed by the same developer key)
may do so. In other words applications with a common developer may use and destroy each other’s keys
located within the Secure Key Storage.
The TOE utilizes a TrustZone implementation of KeyMaster5
key storage service to provide hardware-
isolated secure key storage, for asymmetric private keys.
5
See https://source.android.com/security/keystore/ for more information about Keymaster key storage.
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 FCS_STG_EXT.2: KEKs derived from the RKEK are never stored in non-volatile memory. These KEKs
are derived (via PBKDF2) with a key derived from the user’s password to protect the DEK. Encryption of
the DEK is performed using AES-CBC with 256-bit keys, entirely within the TrustZone. All DEKs and
KEKs stored in non-volatile memory are encrypted using AES-CBC with 256-bit keys.
One KEK (which is generated from TXE) is used to protect asymmetric key pairs. These key pairs are
used with RSA and are in cleartext only within TXE. The private keys are encrypted with an encryption
key derived from the RKEK. The private keys are encrypted using AES-256 in CBC mode with a saved
hash to provide integrity.
Wi-fi keys are protected through the use of 802.11-2012 Key Confirmation Key (KCK) and Key
Encryption Key (KEK) keys. These keys unwrap the WPA2 GTK (Group Temporal Key) send by an
access point. Persistent wi-fi keys such as pre-shared keys or certificates are protected by storing them on
an encrypted user data partition which is protected by a KEK chained to both a user’s password and the
device REK.
 FCS_STG_EXT.3: See the description of FCS_STG_EXT.2 above.
 FCS_TLSC_EXT.1: The TSF supports TLS versions 1.0 and supports the pre-configured cipher suites
found in 5.1.1.23 use with EAP-TLS as part of WPA2.
The TOE does not support any other ciphersuites with EAP-TLS, as the TOE does not perform ECDHE in
EAP-TLS, and the remainder of selectable cipher suites are based on SHA256, which requires TLS v1.2.
The TOE supports mutual authentication by providing a certificate in response to a server's certificate
request message received during TLS negotiation. The TOE verifies X.509v3 certificates as per
FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2 and FIA_X509_EXT.3. When a certificate presented by a server
during TLS negotiation is deemed invalid, the TOE rejects the TLS channel negotiation (i.e., no connection
is established). The TOE offers the curves secp256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1 in the TLS Client Hello for
use when an ECDHE ciphersuite is selected.
 FCS_TLSC_EXT.2: The TOE provides mobile applications (through its Android API) the use of TLS
versions 1.0 and 1.2 including support for the pre-configured cipher suites found in 5.1.1.24.
Getac has also made modifications to the TLS API to allow for wildcard checking in hostnames.
 The TOE supports mutual authentication by providing a certificate in response to a server's certificate
request message received during TLS negotiation. The TOE verifies X.509v3 certificates as per
FIA_X509_EXT.1, FIA_X509_EXT.2 and FIA_X509_EXT.3. In addition to this verification, the TOE
implements identity verification that is consistent with RFC 6125. This includes checks of the Subject
Alternative Name fields, checks of the Common Name field, and check for acceptable use of wildcards in
names. When a certificate presented by a server during TLS negotiation is deemed invalid, the TOE rejects
the TLS channel negotiation (i.e., no connection is established). The TOE does not support certificate
pinning.
6.2 User data protection
The User data protection function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
 FDP_ACF_EXT.1: The TOE provides the following categories of system services to applications.
1. Normal - these are lower-risk services that the system automatically grants to a requesting application
at installation, without asking for the user’s explicit approval (though the user always has the option to
review these permissions before installing). The following table shows the set of ‘Normal’ android
permissions.
2. Dangerous - these are higher-risk services that would give a requesting application access to private
user data or control over the device that can negatively impact the user.
3. Signature - these are privileged services that the system grants only if the requesting application is
signed with the same certificate as the application that declared the permission. If the certificates
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match, the system automatically grants the permission without notifying the user or asking for the
user’s explicit approval.
4. Signature or System - these are privileged services that the system grants only to applications that are
in the Android system image or that are signed with the same certificate as the application that
declared the permission. Like the Signature permission, the system automatically grants the permission
without notifying the user.
An example of a Normal permission is the ability to vibrate the device: android.permission.VIBRATE.
This permission allows an application to make the device vibrate, and an application that does not declare
this permission would have its vibration requests ignored.
An example of a Dangerous privilege would be access to location services to determine the location of the
mobile device: android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION. The TOE controls access to Dangerous
permissions during the installation of the application. The TOE prompts the user to review the application’s
requested permissions (by displaying a description of each permission group, into which individual
permissions map, that an application requested access to). If the user approves, then the mobile device
continues with the installation of the application. Thereafter, the mobile device grants that application
during execution access to the set of permissions declared in its Manifest file.
An example of a Signature permission is the android.permission.BIND_VPN_SERVICE that an application
must declare in order to utilize the VpnService APIs of the device. Because the permission is a Signature
permission, the mobile device only grants this permission to an application that requests this permission
and that has been signed with the same developer key used to sign the application declaring the permission
(in the case of the example, the Android Framework itself).
When an application is installed, the TOE asks the user if the permissions being requested by the
application should be granted. Should the user agree, the permissions are given to the application, such that
each time the application is started, the TOE grants the permissions to the application. Refer to Error!
Reference source not found. for specific permissions associated with protection levels applicable to the
TOE.
Table 6 - Categories of System Services
Permission
Protection Level
Description
Group
android.permission.SEND_SMS dangerous MESSAGE
android.permission.SEND_RESPOND_VIA_MESSAGE signature|system MESSAGE
android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS dangerous MESSAGE
android.permission.RECEIVE_MMS dangerous MESSAGE
android.permission.CARRIER_FILTER_SMS signature|system MESSAGE
android.permission.RECEIVE_EMERGENCY_BROADCAST signature|system MESSAGE
android.permission.READ_CELL_BROADCASTS Dangerous MESSAGE
android.permission.READ_SMS Dangerous MESSAGE
android.permission.WRITE_SMS Dangerous MESSAGE
android.permission.RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH Dangerous MESSAGE
android.permission.RECEIVE_BLUETOOTH_MAP signature|system MESSAGE
android.permission.READ_CONTACTS dangerous SOCIAL_INFO
android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS dangerous SOCIAL_INFO
android.permission.BIND_DIRECTORY_SEARCH signature|system SOCIAL_INFO
android.permission.READ_CALL_LOG dangerous SOCIAL_INFO
android.permission.WRITE_CALL_LOG dangerous SOCIAL_INFO
android.permission.READ_SOCIAL_STREAM dangerous SOCIAL_INFO
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android.permission.WRITE_SOCIAL_STREAM dangerous SOCIAL_INFO
android.permission.READ_PROFILE dangerous Personal_info
android.permission.WRITE_PROFILE dangerous Personal_info
android.permission.BODY_SENSORS dangerous Personal_info
android.permission.READ_CALENDAR dangerous Personal_info
android.permission.WRITE_CALENDAR dangerous Personal_info
android.permission.READ_USER_DICTIONARY dangerous User_dictionary
android.permission.WRITE_USER_DICTIONARY normal Write_user_dictionar
y
com.android.browser.permission.READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS dangerous Bookmark
com.android.browser.permission.WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS dangerous Bookmark
com.android.alarm.permission.SET_ALARM normal Device_alarms
com.android.voicemail.permission.ADD_VOICEMAIL dangerous Voicemail
com.android.voicemail.permission.WRITE_VOICEMAIL system|signature Voicemail
com.android.voicemail.permission.READ_VOICEMAIL system|signature Voicemail
android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION Dangerous Location
android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION Dangerous Location
android.permission.ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION Dangerous System_tools
android.permission.ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS normal System_tools
android.permission.INSTALL_LOCATION_PROVIDER Signature|system None
android.permission.HDMI_CEC Signature|system None
android.permission.LOCATION_HARDWARE Signature|system location
android.permission.INTERNET Dangerous Network
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE Normal Network
android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE Normal Network
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE Normal Network
android.permission.READ_WIFI_CREDENTIAL Signature|system Network
android.permission.ACCESS_WIMAX_STATE Normal Network
android.permission.CHANGE_WIMAX_STATE Dangerous Network
android.permission.SCORE_NETWORKS Signature|system Network
android.permission.AURICFS_ADMIN Normal Auricsfs_admin
android.permission.BLUETOOTH Dangerous Bluetooth_network
android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN Dangerous Bluetooth_network
android.permission.BLUETOOTH_PRIVILEGED System|signature Bluetooth_network
android.permission.BLUETOOTH_MAP Signature Bluetooth_network
android.permission.BLUETOOTH_STACK Signature System_tools
android.permission.NFC Dangerous Network
android.permission.CONNECTIVITY_INTERNAL Signature|system Network
android.permission.RECEIVE_DATA_ACTIVITY_CHANGE Signature|system Network
android.permission.LOOP_RADIO Signature|system Network
android.permission.NFC_HANDOVER_STATUS Signature|system None
android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS normal Accounts
android.permission.AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS Dangerous Accounts
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android.permission.USE_CREDENTIALS Dangerous Accounts
android.permission.MANAGE_ACCOUNTS Dangerous Accounts
android.permission.ACCOUNT_MANAGER signature Accounts
android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE dangerous Affects_battery
android.permission.VIBRATE Normal Affects_battery
android.permission.FLASHLIGHT Normal Affects_battery
android.permission.WAKE_LOCK normal Affects_battery
android.permission.TRANSMIT_IR normal Affects_battery
android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS normal Audio_settings
android.permission.MANAGE_USB signature|system Hardware_control
android.permission.ACCESS_MTP signature|system Hardware_control
android.permission.HARDWARE_TEST signature Hardware_control
android.permission.ACCESS_FM_RADIO signature|system Hardware_control
android.permission.NET_ADMIN signature System_tools
android.permission.REMOTE_AUDIO_PLAYBACK signature System_tools
android.permission.TV_INPUT_HARDWARE signatureOrSystem None
android.permission.CAPTURE_TV_INPUT signatureOrSystem None
android.permission.OEM_UNLOCK_STATE signature System_tools
android.permission.ACCESS_PDB_STATE signature System_tools
android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO dangerous Microphone
android.permission.CAMERA dangerous Camera
android.permission.CAMERA_DISABLE_TRANSMIT_LED signature|system Camera
android.permission.PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS dangerous Phone_calls
android.permission.MODIFY_PHONE_STATE signature|system Phone_calls
android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE dangerous Phone_calls
android.permission.READ_PRECISE_PHONE_STATE signature|system Phone_calls
android.permission.READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE signature|system Phone_calls
android.permission.CALL_PHONE dangerous Phone_calls
android.permission.USE_SIP dangerous Phone_calls
android.permission.REGISTER_SIM_SUBSCRIPTION system|signature Phone_calls
android.permission.REGISTER_CALL_PROVIDER system|signature Phone_calls
android.permission.REGISTER_CONNECTION_MANAGER system|signature Phone_calls
android.permission.BIND_INCALL_SERVICE system|signature Phone_calls
android.permission.BIND_CONNECTION_SERVICE system|signature Phone_calls
android.permission.CONTROL_INCALL_EXPERIENCE system|signature Phone_calls
android.permission.RECEIVE_STK_COMMANDS system|signature None
android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE normal Storage
android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE dangerous Storage
android.permission.WRITE_MEDIA_STORAGE signature|system Storage
android.permission.MANAGE_DOCUMENTS Signature Storage
android.permission.DISABLE_KEYGUARD dangerous Screenlock
android.permission.GET_TASKS normal App_info
android.permission.REAL_GET_TASKS signature|system App_info
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android.permission.START_TASKS_FROM_RECENTS signature|system System_tools
android.permission.INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS signature|system|dev
elopment
System_tools
android.permission.INTERACT_ACROSS_USERS_FULL signature System_tools
android.permission.MANAGE_USERS signature|system System_tools
android.permission.GET_DETAILED_TASKS signature System_tools
android.permission.REORDER_TASKS normal App_info
android.permission.REMOVE_TASKS signature App_info
android.permission.MANAGE_ACTIVITY_STACKS signature|system App_info
android.permission.START_ANY_ACTIVITY signature System_tools
android.permission.RESTART_PACKAGES normal App_info
android.permission.KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES normal App_info
android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW dangerous Display
android.permission.SET_WALLPAPER Normal Wallpaper
android.permission.SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS Normal Wallpaper
android.permission.SET_TIME Signature|system System_clock
android.permission.SET_TIME_ZONE normal System_clock
android.permission.EXPAND_STATUS_BAR normal Status_bar
com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT dangerous System_tools
com.android.launcher.permission.UNINSTALL_SHORTCUT Dangerous System_tools
android.permission.READ_SYNC_SETTINGS normal Sync_settings
android.permission.WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS Normal Sync_settings
android.permission.READ_SYNC_STATS Normal Sync_settings
android.permission.SET_SCREEN_COMPATIBILITY signature System_tools
android.permission.ACCESS_ALL_EXTERNAL_STORAGE signature Development_toos
android.permission.CHANGE_CONFIGURATION signature|system|dev
elopment
Development_tools
android.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS normal System_tools
android.permission.WRITE_GSERVICES signature|system None
android.permission.FORCE_STOP_PACKAGES signature|system System_tools
android.permission.RETRIEVE_WINDOW_CONTENT signature|system Personal_info
android.permission.SET_ANIMATION_SCALE signature|system|dev
elopment
System_tools
android.permission.PERSISTENT_ACTIVITY normal App_info
android.permission.GET_PACKAGE_SIZE normal System_tools
android.permission.SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATIONS signature System_tools
android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED normal App_info
android.permission.BROADCAST_STICKY normal System_tools
android.permission.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS system|signature System_tools
android.permission.MOUNT_FORMAT_FILESYSTEMS system|signature System_tools
android.permission.ASEC_ACCESS signature System_tools
android.permission.ASEC_CREATE signature System_tools
android.permission.ASEC_DESTROY signature System_tools
android.permission.ASEC_MOUNT_UNMOUNT signature System_tools
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android.permission.ASEC_RENAME signature System_tools
android.permission.WRITE_APN_SETTINGS signature|system System_tools
android.permission.SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_READ normal System_tools
android.permission.SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_WRITE dangerous System_tools
android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE normal Network
android.permission.CLEAR_APP_CACHE dangerous System_tools
android.permission.ALLOW_ANY_CODEC_FOR_PLAYBACK signature|system None
android.permission.MANAGE_CA_CERTIFICATES signature|system None
android.permission.RECOVERY signature|system System_tools
android.permission.BIND_JOB_SERVICE signature None
android.permission.WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS signature|system|dev
elopment
Development_tools
android.permission.DUMP signature|system|dev
elopment
Development_tools
android.permission.READ_LOGS signature|system|dev
elopment
Development_tools
android.permission.SET_DEBUG_APP signature|system|dev
elopment
Development_tools
android.permission.SET_PROCESS_LIMIT signature|system|dev
elopment
Development_tools
android.permission.SET_ALWAYS_FINISH signature|system|dev
elopment
Development_tools
android.permission.SIGNAL_PERSISTENT_PROCESSES signature|system|dev
elopment
Development_tools
android.permission.DIAGNOSTIC signature System_tools
android.permission.STATUS_BAR signature|system None
android.permission.STATUS_BAR_SERVICE signature none
android.permission.FORCE_BACK signature None
android.permission.UPDATE_DEVICE_STATS signature|system None
android.permission.GET_APP_OPS_STATS signature|system|dev
elopment
System_tools
android.permission.UPDATE_APP_OPS_STATS signature|system None
android.permission.INTERNAL_SYSTEM_WINDOW signature None
android.permission.MANAGE_APP_TOKENS signature Noen
android.permission.FREEZE_SCREEN signature None
android.permission.INJECT_EVENTS signature None
android.permission.FILTER_EVENTS signature None
android.permission.RETRIEVE_WINDOW_TOKEN signature None
android.permission.FRAME_STATS signature None
android.permission.TEMPORARY_ENABLE_ACCESSIBILITY signature None
android.permission.SET_ACTIVITY_WATCHER signature None
android.permission.SHUTDOWN signature|system None
android.permission.STOP_APP_SWITCHES signature|system None
android.permission.GET_TOP_ACTIVITY_INFO signature None
android.permission.READ_INPUT_STATE signature None
android.permission.BIND_INPUT_METHOD signature None
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android.permission.BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE signature None
android.permission.BIND_PRINT_SERVICE signature None
android.permission.BIND_NFC_SERVICE signature None
android.permission.BIND_PRINT_SPOOLER_SERVICE signature None
android.permission.BIND_TEXT_SERVICE signature None
android.permission.BIND_VPN_SERVICE signature None
android.permission.BIND_WALLPAPER signature|system None
android.permission.BIND_VOICE_INTERACTION signature None
android.permission.MANAGE_VOICE_KEYPHRASES signature|system None
android.permission.BIND_REMOTE_DISPLAY signature None
android.permission.BIND_TV_INPUT signature|system None
android.permission.MODIFY_PARENTAL_CONTROLS signature|system None
android.permission.BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN signature None
android.permission.MANAGE_DEVICE_ADMINS signature|system None
android.permission.SET_ORIENTATION signature None
android.permission.SET_POINTER_SPEED signature None
android.permission.SET_INPUT_CALIBRATION signature None
android.permission.SET_KEYBOARD_LAYOUT signature None
android.permission.INSTALL_PACKAGES signature|system None
android.permission.CLEAR_APP_USER_DATA signature None
android.permission.DELETE_CACHE_FILES signature|system None
android.permission.DELETE_PACKAGES signature|system None
android.permission.MOVE_PACKAGE signature|system None
android.permission.CHANGE_COMPONENT_ENABLED_STATE signature|system None
android.permission.GRANT_REVOKE_PERMISSIONS signature None
android.permission.ACCESS_SURFACE_FLINGER signature None
android.permission.READ_FRAME_BUFFER signature|system None
android.permission.ACCESS_INPUT_FLINGER signature None
android.permission.CONFIGURE_WIFI_DISPLAY signature None
android.permission.CONTROL_WIFI_DISPLAY signature None
android.permission.CONTROL_VPN signature|system None
android.permission.CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT signature|system None
android.permission.CAPTURE_AUDIO_HOTWORD signature|system None
android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_ROUTING signature|system None
android.permission.CAPTURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT signature|system None
android.permission.CAPTURE_SECURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT signature|system None
android.permission.MEDIA_CONTENT_CONTROL signature|system None
android.permission.BRICK signature None
android.permission.REBOOT signature|system None
android.permission.DEVICE_POWER signature None
android.permission.USER_ACTIVITY signature|system None
android.permission.NET_TUNNELING signature System_tools
android.permission.FACTORY_TEST signature None
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android.permission.BROADCAST_PACKAGE_REMOVED signature System_tools
android.permission.BROADCAST_SMS signature Messages
android.permission.BROADCAST_WAP_PUSH signature Messages
android.permission.BROADCAST_NETWORK_PRIVILEGED signature|system Network
android.permission.MASTER_CLEAR signature|system None
android.permission.CALL_PRIVILEGED signature|system None
android.permission.PERFORM_CDMA_PROVISIONING signature|system None
android.permission.CONTROL_LOCATION_UPDATES signature|system None
android.permission.ACCESS_CHECKIN_PROPERTIES signature|system None
android.permission.PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS signature|developme
nt|appop
None
android.permission.BATTERY_STATS signature|system|dev
elopment
System_tools
android.permission.BACKUP signature|system None
android.permission.CONFIRM_FULL_BACKUP signature None
android.permission.BIND_REMOTEVIEWS signature|system None
android.permission.BIND_APPWIDGET signature|system Personal_info
android.permission.BIND_KEYGUARD_APPWIDGET signature|system Personal_info
android.permission.MODIFY_APPWIDGET_BIND_PERMISSIONS signature|system System_tools
android.permission.CHANGE_BACKGROUND_DATA_SETTING signature System_tools
android.permission.GLOBAL_SEARCH signature|system System_tools
android.permission.GLOBAL_SEARCH_CONTROL signature System_tools
android.permission.READ_SEARCH_INDEXABLES signature|system System_tools
android.permission.SET_WALLPAPER_COMPONENT signature|system System_tools
android.permission.READ_DREAM_STATE signature|system System_tools
android.permission.WRITE_DREAM_STATE signature|system System_tools
android.permission.ACCESS_CACHE_FILESYSTEM signature|system None
android.permission.COPY_PROTECTED_DATA signature None
android.permission.CRYPT_KEEPER signature|system None
android.permission.READ_NETWORK_USAGE_HISTORY signature|system None
android.permission.MANAGE_NETWORK_POLICY signature None
android.permission.MODIFY_NETWORK_ACCOUNTING signature|system None
android.intent.category.MASTER_CLEAR.permission.C2D_MESSA
GE
signature None
android.permission.PACKAGE_VERIFICATION_AGENT signature|system None
android.permission.BIND_PACKAGE_VERIFIER signature None
android.permission.SERIAL_PORT signature|system None
android.permission.ACCESS_CONTENT_PROVIDERS_EXTERNA
LLY
signature None
android.permission.UPDATE_LOCK signatureOrSystem None
android.permission.ACCESS_NOTIFICATIONS signature|system None
android.permission.ACCESS_KEYGUARD_SECURE_STORAGE signature None
android.permission.CONTROL_KEYGUARD signature None
android.permission.TRUST_LISTENER signature None
android.permission.PROVIDE_TRUST_AGENT signatureOrSystem None
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android.permission.LAUNCH_TRUST_AGENT_SETTINGS signatureOrSystem None
android.permission.BIND_TRUST_AGENT signature None
android.permission.BIND_NOTIFICATION_LISTENER_SERVICE signature None
android.permission.BIND_CONDITION_PROVIDER_SERVICE signature None
android.permission.BIND_DREAM_SERVICE signature None
android.permission.INVOKE_CARRIER_SETUP signature|system None
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_CONDITIONS signature|system None
android.permission.ACCESS_DRM_CERTIFICATES signature|system None
android.permission.MANAGE_MEDIA_PROJECTION signature None
android.permission.READ_INSTALL_SESSIONS none None
android.permission.REMOVE_DRM_CERTIFICATES signature|system None
android.permission.BIND_CARRIER_MESSAGING_SERVICE signature|system None
Android.permission.GETAC_MDM signature|system None
 FDP_DAR_EXT.1: The TOE provides user Data-At-Rest AES-256 CBC encryption for all data stored on
the TOE in the user data partition (which includes user data). Additionally, the TOE includes a read-only
file system in which the TOE’s system executables, libraries, and their configuration data reside. For its
Data-At-Rest encryption of the user data partition on the internal Flash (where the TOE stores all user data
and all application data), the TOE uses the AES-256 bit DEK in CBC mode to encrypt the entire partition.
The TOE also provides AES-256 CBC mode encryption of protected data stored on the external SD Card.
The TOE leverages dmcrypt for both internal flash and SD card encryption.
 FDP_IFC_EXT.1: The TOE provides mobile applications with an API to ensure IP routes are configured
to direct IP traffic through the VPN. The API ties IP routing table rules to processes with specific UIDs
(namely the UID of the currently logged in user).
 FDP_STG_EXT.1: The TOE’s Trusted Anchor Database consists of the built-in certs and any additional
user or admin/MDM loaded certificates. The built-in certs are (individually stored in device’s read-only
system image in the /system/etc/security/cacerts directory, and the user can individually disable through
Android’s user interface [Settings->Security-> Trusted Credentials]. Because the built-in CA certificates
reside on the read-only system partition, the TOE places a copy of any disabled built-in certificate into the
/data/misc/user/X/cacerts-removed/ directory, where “X” represents the user’s number (which starts at 0).
The TOE stores added CA certificates in the corresponding /data/misc/user/X/cacerts-added/ directory and
also stores a copy of the CA certificate in the user’s Secure Key Storage (residing in the
/data/misc/keystore/user_X/ directory).
 FDP_UPC_EXT.1: The TOE provides APIs allowing non-TSF applications (mobile applications) the
ability to establish a secure channel using TLS, HTTPS, and Bluetooth DR/EDR & LE. Mobile
applications can use the following Android APIs for TLS, HTTPS, and Bluetooth respectively:
javax.net.ssl.SSLContext:
http://developer.android.com/reference/javax/net/ssl/SSLContext.html
javax.net.ssl.HttpsURLConnection:
http://developer.android.com/reference/javax/net/ssl/HttpsURLConnection.html
android.bluetooth:
http://developer.android.com/reference/android/bluetooth/package-summary.html
6.3 Identification and authentication
The Identification and authentication function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
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 FIA_AFL_EXT.1: The TOE maintains, for each user, the number of failed logins since the last successful
login, and upon reaching the maximum number of incorrect logins, the TOE performs a full wipe of all
protected data (and in fact, wipes all user data). An administrator can adjust the number of failed logins
from the default of ten failed logins to a value between one and one hundred through an MDM. Turning
power to the device off, does not affect the count of failed logins maintained by the TOE, because this
count is saved in non-volatile storage. The lock screen failure count is maintained through a successful
cryptolock authentication.
 FIA_BLT_EXT.1: The TOE requires explicit user authorization before it will pair with a remote Bluetooth
device. The user can make the TOE visible to other Bluetooth enabled devices and can attempt, via explicit
user action, to pair with a visible device. Furthermore, the user must explicitly accept pairing attempts
from other devices.
 FIA_PAE_EXT.1: The TOE can join WPA2-802.1X (802.11i) wireless networks requiring EAP-TLS
authentication, acting as a client/supplicant (and in that role connect to the 802.11 access point and
communicate with the 802.1X authentication server).
 FIA_PMG_EXT.1: The TOE allows password for accounts to be composed of upper or lower case letters,
numbers, and special characters including !, @, #, $, %, ^, &, *, ( and ). The TOE defaults to requiring
passwords to have a minimum of four characters but no more than sixteen. However, an MDM application
can change these defaults.
 FIA_TRT_EXT.1: The TOE allows users to authenticate through external ports (either a USB keyboard or
a Bluetooth keyboard paired in advance of the login attempt). If not using an external keyboard, a user must
authenticate through the standard User Interface (using the TOE touchscreen). The TOE limits the number
of authentication attempts through the UI to no more than five attempts within 30 seconds (irrespective of
what keyboard the operator uses). Thus if the current [the nth] and prior four authentication attempts have
failed, and the n-4th attempt was less than 30 second ago, the TOE will prevent any further authentication
attempts until 30 seconds has elapsed. Note as well that the TOE will wipe itself when it reaches the
maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts (as described in FIA_AFL_EXT.1 above).
 FIA_UAU.7: The TOE allows the user to enter the user's password from the lock screen or from the
cryptolock screen. The TOE will, by default, display the most recently entered character of the password
briefly or until the user enters the next character in the password, at which point the TOE obscures the
character by replacing the character with a dot symbol.
 FIA_UAU_EXT.1: The TOE requires that a user enter their password in order for the TOE to derive a
master key that can be combined with a KEK chaining to the RKEK; thus allowing the TOE to decrypt the
DEK that protects the data stored in the user data partition.
 FIA_UAU_EXT.2: The TOE, when configured to require a user password, the TOE will allow a user to do
the following things before successfully authenticating: Screen shots, turn off, airplane mode, rotation,
hotspot, Bluetooth, wifi, brightness, and turn off touchscreen input. Beyond those actions, a user cannot
perform any other actions other than observing notifications displayed on the lock screen until after
successfully authenticating. The TOE allows a user to configure, on a per application basis, whether
notifications will be displayed.
 FIA_UAU_EXT.3: The TOE requires the user to enter their password in order to unlock the TOE.
Additionally the TOE requires the user to confirm their current password when accessing the “Settings-
>Security->LockScreen->Password” menu in the TOE’s user interface. Only after entering their current
user password can the user then elect to change their password.
 FIA_X509_EXT.1: The TOE checks the validity of all imported CA certificates by checking for the
presence of the basicConstraints extension and that the CA flag is set to TRUE as the TOE imports the
certificate (per RFC 5280). The TOE also checks certificate validity via a CRL server. Additionally the
TOE verifies the extendedKeyUsage Server Authentication purpose during WPA2/EAP-TLS negotiation.
The TOE's certificate validation algorithm examines each certificate in the path (starting with the peer's
certificate) and first checks for validity of that certificate (e.g., has the certificate expired or it not yet valid,
whether the certificate contains the appropriate X.509 extensions [e.g., the CA flag in the basic constraints
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extension for a CA certificate, or that a server certificate contains the Server Authentication purpose in the
ExtendedKeyUsagefield]), then verifies each certificate in the chain (applying the same rules as above, but
also ensuring that the Issuer of each certificate matches the Subject in the next rung 'up' in the chain and
that the chain ends in a self-signed certificate present in either the TOE's trusted anchor database or
matches a specified Root CA), and finally the TOE performs revocation checking for all certificates in the
chain using a Certificate Revocation List (per RFC 5759).
 FIA_X509_EXT.2: The TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as part of protocol processing for EAP-TLS, TLS
and HTTPS. The TOE comes with a built-in set of trusted certificates (a Trust Anchor Database). Users
cannot remove any of these built-in CA certificates, but can make any as ‘disabled’ (which prevents them
from being used to validate another certificate). Users and administrators can also import new trusted CA
certificates into the Trust Anchor Database.
If, during the process of certificate verification, the TOE cannot establish a connection with the server
acting as the CRL Distribution Point (CDP), the TOE will deem the server’s certificate as invalid and not
establish a TLS connection with the server.
 FIA_X509_EXT.3: The TOE’s Android operating system provides applications with several Java API
Class of methods for validating certification paths (certificate chains) that establishing a trust chain from a
certificate to a trust anchor.
6.4 Security management
The Security management function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
 FMT_MOF_EXT.1: The TOE provides the management functions described in Table 2 - Security
Management Functions. The table includes annotations describing the roles that have access to each
service and how to access the service.
 FMT_SMF_EXT.1: The TOE provides all management functions indicated as mandatory (“M”) or
implemented (“I”) by Table 2 - Security Management Functions.
 FMT_SMF_EXT.2: The TOE wipes all protected data as well as disabling CC mode when unenrolled from
an MDM. Though the wipe of protected data is not considered a full wipe, a device wipe ensures that the
TOE reverts to a state in which all configuration is reset to its factory settings.
6.5 Protection of the TSF
The Protection of the TSF function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
 FPT_AEX_EXT.1: The Linux kernel of the TOE's Android operating system provides address space layout
randomization utilizing the get_random_int(void) kernel random function to provide eight unpredictable
bits to the base address of any user-space memory mapping. The random function, though not
cryptographic, ensures that one cannot predict the value of the bits.
 FPT_AEX_EXT.2: The TOE's Android 5.1.1 operating system utilizes a 3.14 Linux kernel, whose memory
management unit (MMU) enforces read, write, and execute permissions on all pages of virtual memory.
The TOE includes ASLR-related config in kernel. The kernel image address is randomized with at most 9
bits entropy with RDRAND command.
The Android operating system (as of Android 2.3) sets the Intel eXecute Disable (XD) bit on memory
pages and the TOE’s Intel Application Processor’s Memory Management Unit (MMU) circuitry enforces
the XD bits. From Android’s documentation (https://source.android.com/devices/tech/security/index.html),
Android 2.3 forward supports “Hardware-based No eXecute (NX) to prevent code execution on the stack
and heap”. In Intel’s processors, the NX bit is known as the eXecute Disable bit (XD). Chapter 3 of the
Intel Architecture Software Developer’s Manual Volume 3 contains additional details about the MMU of
Intel-based processors:
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs/academic/class/15213-f01/docs/intel-sys.pdf
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 FPT_AEX_EXT.3: The TOE's Android operating system provides explicit mechanisms to prevent stack
buffer overruns in addition to taking advantage of hardware-based eXecute Disable to prevent code
execution on the stack and heap. Specifically, the vendor builds the TOE (Android and support libraries)
using gcc-fstack-protector compile option to enable stack overflow protection and Android takes advantage
of Intel x86 eXecute Disable to make the stack and heap non-executable. The vendor applies these
protections to all TSF executable binaries and libraries (refer to 7, TSF Inventory for a complete list).
 FPT_AEX_EXT.4: The TOE protects itself from modification by untrusted subjects using a variety of
methods. The first protection employed by the mobile device is a Secure Boot process that uses
cryptographic signatures to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the bootloader and kernel using data
fused into the device processor. The TOE protects the RKEK by securely storing it within hardware fuses
and making it accessible only to the Intel Trusted Execution Engine (TXE) software. The RKEK is used to
protect all other keys in the key hierarchy. The TOE ensures that all TXE software is cryptographically
signed and that the signature is verified when the TXE software is invoked.
Additionally, the TOE's Android operating system provides “sandboxing” that ensures that each third-party
mobile application executes with the file permissions of a unique Linux User ID, in a different virtual
memory space. This ensures that applications cannot access each other's memory space or files and cannot
access the memory space or files of other applications (notwithstanding access between applications with a
common application developer).
 FPT_KST_EXT.1: The TOE does not store any plaintext key material in its internal Flash or on external
SD cards. This ensures that irrespective of how the TOE powers down (e.g., a user commands the TOE to
power down, the TOE reboots itself, or battery depletes or is removed), all keys in internal Flash or on an
external SD Card are wrapped with a KEK. Please refer to section 6.1of the TSS for further information
(including the KEK used) regarding the encryption of keys stored in the internal Flash and on external SD
Cards. As the TOE encrypts all keys stored in Flash, upon boot-up, the TOE must first decrypt any keys in
order to utilize them.
 FPT_KST_EXT.2: The TOE itself (i.e., the mobile device) comprises a cryptographic module that utilizes
cryptographic libraries including OpenSSL, and the following system-level executables that utilize KEKs:
dm-crypt, libmincrypt, wpa_supplicant, and the KeyMaster HAL. The TOE ensures that plaintext key
material does not leave this cryptographic module by only allowing the system-level executables access to
the plaintext KEK values that protect all other keys in the TOE. The TSF software (the system-level
executables) protects the plaintext KEKs and any plaintext DEK values in memory both by not providing
any access to these values and by clearing them when no longer needed (in compliance with
FCS_CKM_EXT.4).
 FPT_KST_EXT.3: The TOE does not provide any way to export plaintext DEKs or KEKs (including all
keys stored in the Secure Key Store) as the TOE chains or directly encrypts all KEKs to the REK.
 FPT_NOT_EXT.1: When the TOE encounters a critical failure (either a self-test failure or TOE software
integrity verification failure), the TOE transitions to a non-operational mode. The user may attempt to
power-cycle the TOE to see if the failure condition persists, and if it does persist, the user may attempt to
boot to the recovery mode/kernel to wipe data and perform a factory reset in order to recover the device.
 FPT_STM.1: The TOE requires time for certificate validation, wpa_supplicant, and key store. These TOE
components obtain time from the TOE using system API calls [e.g., time() or gettimeofday()]. An
application cannot modify the system time as mobile applications need the android “SET_TIME”
permission to do so. Likewise, only a process with root privileges can directly modify the system time
using system-level APIs. The TOE uses its WiFi interface to obtain time and date from a trusted source;
however, the user can also manually set the time through the TOE's user interface.
 FPT_TST_EXT.1: The TOE utilizes a custom built service to do the power-up self-tests. When the services
receives a BOOT_COMPLETE message, the service will start up and perform the self-test for the crypto
modules (including OpenSSL and hardware crypto module). If the self-test failed, the TOE presents a
system dialog to user, and then goes into recovery mode once the user confirms the message. The self-test
includes all of the cryptographic algorithm known answer tests shown in table.
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Table 7 - Power-up Cryptographic Algorithm Known Answer Tests
Algorithm Implemented in Description
AES encryption/decryption OpenSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
ECDH key agreement OpenSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
DRBG random bit generation OpenSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
ECDSA sign/verify OpenSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
HMAC-SHA OpenSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
RSA sign/verify OpenSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
SHA hashing OpenSSL Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
AES encryption/decryption Linux Kernel Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
HMAC-SHA Linux Kernel Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
SHA hashing Linux Kernel Comparison of known answer to calculated valued
 FPT_TST_EXT.2: The TOE ensures a secure boot process in which the TOE verifies the digital signature
of the TXE, IFWI (Integrated FirmWare Image), UEFI Kernelflinger (fastboot), and Android OS (using a
public key whose hash resides in the processor’s internal fuses). TXE first checks the ODM public key
against the ODM public key hash that is stored in the processor’s fuses. The ODM public key is used to
verify the signature of the IFWI loader. Then, IFWI verifies the Kernelflinger’s signature using the Boot
Signer certificate that was retrieved from the Boot Database. After Kernelflinger is verified, it uses the
OEM public key to verify the OEM keystore. The keystore houses the Verity public key, which is used to
verify the Android OS (via dm-verity), and eventually the kernel and Android OS is loaded. The boot
process also verifies the executable code within the Android system partition. Although the system partition
is composed mainly of system files, it has some executable code that is loaded and executed during the OS
loading process. DM-verity also checks all executable code in the Android system partition.
 FPT_TUD_EXT.1: The TOE's user interface provides a method to query the current version of the TOE
software/firmware (Android version, baseband version, kernel version, and build number) and hardware
(model number). The TOE also uses Android’s default mechanism of checking for previous versions by
checking the timestamp of the update package. Additionally, the TOE provides users the ability to review
the currently installed apps (including 3rd party 'built-in' applications) and their version.
 FPT_TUD_EXT.2: When in CC mode, the TOE verifies all updates to the TOE software using a public key
chaining ultimately to the Root Public Key, a hardware protected value that resides inside the application
processor. The TOE uses the SHA-256 hash of the Getac OEM RSA public signing key that is in e-fuses
within the application processor when verifying the TSF boot integrity hash and digital signatures on TSF
updates. The Android OS on the TOE requires that all applications bear a valid signature before Android
will install the application. The TOE uses Android’s default method of checking for previous versions by
comparing the build timestamp on the update package.
 ALC_TSU_EXT: Getac will follow Google's Android security bulletin (monthly update) to apply patches
and release images timely. Bugs can be reported by contacting Getac, Inc. Getac’s contact information can
be found at http://us.getac.com/contact/contact.html.
6.6 TOE access
The TOE access function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
 FTA_SSL_EXT.1: The TOE can become locked immediately after a User initiates an explicit lock action
(i.e., pressing the power button) or after a configurable period of inactivity. As part of the transition to a
locked state, the TOE displays a lock screen that hides prior contents of the display. The TOE's lock screen
displays email notifications, calendar appointments, user configured widgets, text message notifications,
the time, date, call notifications, battery life, and WiFi signal strength. In order for the user to perform any
actions using these notifications, the user must authenticate. Only actions explicitly identified by
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 (see section 5.1.3.7) are permitted prior to user login. During power up, the TOE
presents the user with an initial power-up login screen (also known as the Cryptolock screen), where the
user can only make an emergency call or enter the user's password in order to allow the TOE to derive the
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key needed to be able to access the data partition. After successfully authenticating at the power-up login
screen, the TOE (when subsequently locked) presents the user with the normal user interface.
 FTA_TAB.1: The TOE can be configured to display a message on the login screen and on the lock screen
prior to user login.
 FTA_WSE_EXT.1: The TOE allows an administrator to specify (through the use of an MDM) a list of
wireless networks (SSIDs) to which the user may direct the TOE to connect to. When not enrolled with an
MDM, the TOE allows the user to control to which wireless networks the TOE is able to connect, but does
not provide an explicit list of such networks, rather the use may scan for available wireless network (or
directly enter a specific wireless network), and then connect. Once a user has connected to a wireless
network, the TOE will automatically reconnect to that network when in range and the user has enabled the
TOE's WiFi radio.
6.7 Trusted path/channels
The Trusted path/channels function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
 FTP_ITC_EXT.1: The TOE provides secured (encrypted and mutually authenticated) communication
channels between itself and other trusted IT products through the use of 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-
TLS, TLS, and HTTPS. The TOE permits itself and applications to initiate communicate via the trusted
channel, and the TOE initiates communicate via the trusted channel for connection to a wireless access
point. The TOE provides access to TLS via published APIs which are accessible to any application that
needs an encrypted end-to-end trusted channel.
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7. TSF Inventory
Below is a list of user-mode TSF binaries and libraries. All are built with the -fstack-protector option set. For each
binary/library, the name, path and security function is provided.
Name Path Securuty Function
libsecmem.so /system/lib/ Intel DRM
libselinux.so /system/lib/ SELinux
libiprouteutil.so /system/lib/ IP route
libsoftkeymaster.so /system/lib/ Android Soft Keymaster
libjavacrypto.so /system/lib/ Java Crypto
libssl.so /system/lib/ OpenSSL
libkcapi.so /system/lib/ Kernel crypto test
libkcapiwrap.so /system/lib/ Kernel crypto test
libkeystore_binder.so /system/lib/ Android keystore binder
libktest.so /system/lib/ Kernel crypto test
libmeimm.so /system/lib/ Intel MEI HAL
libmei.so /system/lib/ Intel MEI HAL
libcrcdataencryption.so /system/lib/ Auric FS
libcrcfejni.so /system/lib/ Auric FS
libcrypto.so /system/lib/ OpenSSL
libdrmframework_jni.so /system/lib/ DRM
libdrmframework.so /system/lib/ DRM
libdrm_intel.so /system/lib/ Intel DRM
libdrm.so /system/lib/ DRM
libnl.so /system/lib/ netlink
liboemcrypto.so /system/lib/ Widevine DRM
libopenssltest.so /system/lib/ Getac OpenSSL self-test
libwifi-service.so /system/lib/ WiFi Service
libwpa_client.so /system/lib/ WPA client
keystore.default.so /system/lib/hw/ Android softkeymaster
keystore.gmin.so /system/lib/hw/ Intel Keymaster
libkeystore.so /system/lib/ssl/engines/ Android Keystore