1
National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Getac Inc.
400 Exchange, Suite 100
Irvine, CA 92602, U.S.A
Getac MX50
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-10756-2017
Dated: April 6, 2017
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Security Agency
Information Technology Laboratory Information Assurance Directorate
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road STE 6940
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6940
®
TM
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Herbert Ellis
Meredith Hennan
Kenneth Stutterheim
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Tammy Compton
Raymond Smoley
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Catonsville, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary....................................................................................................... 4
2 Identification.................................................................................................................. 5
3 Architectural Information .............................................................................................. 6
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms ..................................................................................................6
3.2 TOE Architecture...............................................................................................................6
3.3 Physical Boundaries...........................................................................................................7
4 Security Policy............................................................................................................... 7
4.1 Cryptographic support........................................................................................................7
4.2 User data protection ...........................................................................................................7
4.3 Identification and authentication........................................................................................7
4.4 Security management.........................................................................................................8
4.5 Protection of the TSF.........................................................................................................8
4.6 TOE access.........................................................................................................................8
4.7 Trusted path/channels ........................................................................................................9
5 Assumptions................................................................................................................... 9
6 Clarification of Scope .................................................................................................... 9
7 Documentation............................................................................................................. 10
8 IT Product Testing ....................................................................................................... 10
8.1 Developer Testing............................................................................................................11
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.............................................................................11
9 Evaluated Configuration .............................................................................................. 11
10 Results of the Evaluation ............................................................................................. 11
10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE) .........................................................................12
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ...........................................................................12
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ..............................................................12
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ..................................................12
10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)...............................13
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)......................................................................13
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results.......................................................................................13
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations ..................................................................... 13
12 Annexes........................................................................................................................ 14
13 Security Target............................................................................................................. 14
14 Glossary ....................................................................................................................... 14
15 Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 15
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Getac MX50 mobile device provided by Getac
Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This
Validation Report is not an endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the
U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Catonsville, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in April 2017. The information in this report is largely derived from the
proprietary Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, summarized in
the Assurance Activity Report; all written by Gossamer Security Solutions. The evaluation
determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant,
and meets the assurance requirements defined in the U.S. Government Protection Profile for
Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0 as modified by the applicable NIAP Technical
Decisions.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Getac MX50 and associated TOE guidance
documentation.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 4), as interpreted by the Assurance Activities
contained in the MDF Protection Profile. This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE when configured as directed in the Getac MX50 Administrator Guidance
Instructions. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory presented in the proprietary evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units associated
with the Protection Profile and successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found
that the evaluation showed that the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and
assurance requirements stated in the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team
concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and
the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of the testing laboratory presented in
the evaluation sensitive Evaluation Technical Report are consistent with the evidence
produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Getac MX50
(MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 1.0, April 5, 2017 as configured using the Getac MX50
Administrator Instructions Version 0.8 April 2, 2017, and the analysis of evaluation evidence
performed by the Validation Team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) work units specific to the technology described by the PP
in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory Assessment Program (NVLAP)
accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Product Compliant
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
 The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
 The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
 The conformance result of the evaluation.
 The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
 The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Getac MX50
Protection Profile Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September
2014
ST Getac MX50 Security Target, Version 1.0, April 5, 2017
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Getac MX50 , version 0.3, April 5, 2017
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 4
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Getac Inc.
Developer Getac Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Tammy Compton, Raymond Smoley, Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
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Item Identifier
CCEVS Validators Herbert Ellis, Meredith Hennan, Kenneth Stutterheim, The Aerospace Corporation
3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a ruggedized mobile device designed to support military
and civil service users. Based upon Android 5.1.1, the TOE provides wireless and wired
connectivity out of the box.
Snapbacks can be used to add optional modules (e.g., cellular). The TOE includes a port to
attach a snapback module that adds WWAN, USB, USB storage encryption or a second
battery.
The evaluated TOE contains either 64GB/128GB of internal Flash storage and either
2GB/4GB of memory.
The TOE is the Getac Inc. MX50, a ruggedized tablet featuring a 5.7” (1280x720 HD)
display; an Intel Z8350 1.44 GHz x86 CPU; micro USB; Gleanair and AB Military
connector; microSD; 14-pin modular connector; WiFi/Bluetooth radio. The TOE runs
Android 5.1.1.
The MX50 does not have a cellular chip for mobile broadband. The MX50 only has a
WiFi/Bluetooth chip and Ethernet (via military connector or USB-to-Ethernet) for
networking (connecting to WiFi or Bluetooth networks).
3.1 TOE Evaluated Platforms
The evaluated configuration consists of a Getac MX50 running on Android 5.1.1.
3.2 TOE Architecture
The TOE provides an Application Programming Interface to mobile applications and
provides users installing an application the option to either approve or reject an application
based upon the API access that the application requires.
The TOE provides users with the ability to protect Data-At-Rest with AES encryption,
including all user and mobile application data stored in the user’s data partition. The TOE
affords protection to all user and application cryptographic keys stored in the TOE.
Moreover, the TOE provides users the ability to AES encrypt data and files stored on an SD
Card inserted into the device.
The TOE can interact with Mobile Device Management solutions to allow enterprise control
of the configuration and operation of the device to ensure adherence to enterprise-wide
policies.
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The TOE protects itself from tampering and bypass by offering a limited and controlled set
of functions at each of its physical interfaces to its environment. Communication via those
interfaces is either directed at the TOE for the purpose of administration or is directed through
the TOE for communication among network devices. In each case the TOE implements a set
of policies to control the services available and to protect and ensure the secure operation of
the TOE.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
The TOE’s physical boundary is the physical perimeter of its enclosure (without the rear
access cover present, so that one can access and replace the device’s battery).
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality provided by the Getac MX50:
1. Cryptographic support
2. User data protection
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security Management
5. Protection of the TSF
6. TOE access
7. Trusted path/channels
4.1 Cryptographic support
The TOE includes cryptographic modules with CAVP validated algorithms used for
cryptographic functions such as: asymmetric key generation and establishment, symmetric
key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message
authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key
derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key and
protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to implement
security protocols such as TLS and HTTPS and to encrypt the media (including the
generation and protection of data, right, and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many of
these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications running on the
TOE.
4.2 User data protection
The TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of
the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data
using encryption so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports features related to identification and authentication. From a user
perspective, a password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to
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unlock the TOE. Also, even when the TOE is unlocked the password must be re-entered to
change the password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the
TOE's display. The TOE limits the frequency of password entry and when a configured
number of failures occurs, the TOE takes an appropriate action such as performing a full
wipe of protected content or some other administrator-defined action. Passwords can be
constructed using upper and lower case characters, numbers, and special characters.
Passwords up to 14 characters in length are supported.
The TOE can serve as an IEEE 802.1X supplicant and to use X509v3 certificates and perform
certificate validation for a number of functions when applicable such as EAP-TLS, TLS, and
HTTPS exchanges.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions claimed in
the corresponding Security Target (and conforming to the MDFPP requirements) as well as
other functions commonly found in mobile devices. Some of the available functions are
available only to the mobile device users while others may be restricted to administrators
operating through a Mobile Device Management solution if the TOE has been enrolled. If
the TOE has been enrolled in a Mobile Device Management solution and is subsequently un-
enrolled, the TOE will perform a full wipe of protected data to complete the un-enrollment.
4.5 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements features to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.
It protects data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or exportable. It
provides a timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for
cryptographic operations and perhaps user accountability). It enforces read, write, and
execute memory page protections, uses address space layout randomization, and stack-based
buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. The TOE
includes the capability to protect itself from modification by applications as well as to isolate
the address spaces of applications from one another to protect those applications.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking
so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-test fails, the TOE will
not go into an operational mode. It also includes a mechanism (i.e., verification of the digital
signature of each new image) so that the TOE can be updated while ensuring that the updates
will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital signature
checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation.
4.6 TOE access
The TOE can be locked, thereby obscuring its display, either by a user or automatically after
a configured interval of inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an advisory
message (banner) when users unlock the TOE for use.
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4.7 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, IEEE 802.1X, and EAP-TLS to secure
communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices.
5 Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
 Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September
2014
That information has not been reproduced here and the MDFPP20 should be consulted if
there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
MDFPP20 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality included in
the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. Any other functionality provided by
the device needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about
their effectiveness.
6 Clarification of Scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
 As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile and
performed by the evaluation team).
 This evaluation covers only the specific device model and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
 This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
 The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the MDFPP and applicable Technical Decisions. Any
additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not covered by this
evaluation.
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7 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
 Getac MX50 Administrator Guidance Instructions, Version 0.8, April 2, 2017
Any additional customer documentation delivered with the product or that is available
through download was not included in the scope of the evaluation, and therefore should not
be relied upon when configuring or using the products as evaluated.
8 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report (MDFPP20) for
Getac MX50, Version 0.2, April 3, 2017 (DTR) and summarized in the Assurance Activity
Report (MDFPP20) for Getac Inc. MX50 Tablet, version 0.3, April 5, 2017, which is
publically available.
The following diagrams depict the test environments used by the evaluators.
Figure 1 Evaluator Test Setup 1
TOE Device
USB Connection
Network – Putty
Connection
Ubuntu
Linux
Windows
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8.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
8.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the MDFPP20 including the tests associated with
optional requirements.
9 Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated configuration consists of a Getac MX50 running on Android 5.1.1. To use the
product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified in Getac
MX50 Administrator Instructions Version 0.8 April 2, 2017.
10 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 4 and CEM version 3.1 rev 4. The evaluation determined the Getac MX50
to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs contained in the MDFPP v2.
Figure 2 Evaluator Test Setup 2
Linux
RADIU
S
Backtrack
Wireshark
TOE Device
TOE Device
Evaluator Sniffing Configuration
Evaluator Direct Connect
Configuration
Access Point
Linux
Windows
Network – Putty
Connection
USB Connection
USB Connection
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10.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement
of security requirements claimed to be met by the Getac MX50 product that are consistent
with the Common Criteria, and product security function descriptions that supported the
requirements.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides
the security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification
contained in the Security target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator
performed the assurance activities specified in the MDFPP20 related to the examination of
the information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how
to securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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10.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the MDFPP20 and recorded the results in an
evaluation sensitive Test Report, and summarized in the publically available AAR.
The validators reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis includes
a public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerabilities. All vulnerabilities have been addressed and are being distributed via
the carriers.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database located at URL:
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database URL:
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: "Getac", "MX50", "Getac
MX50", "Android", and “Openssl".
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
10.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy
of the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
11 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The evaluated configuration of the Getac MX50 did not include the testing of any of the
available optional Snapback modules, which are used to add capabilities such as WWAN,
USB, USB storage encryption or a second battery; none of those were tested, and no
assumptions should be made or inferred regarding their correct operation.
The MX50 does not have a cellular chip for mobile broadband, cellular capability can only
be added via a Snapback.
The device requires the use of a compatible Mobile Device Management solution to set the
device into its evaluated configuration. The vendor claims that any compatible Mobile
Device Management solution can be used, however the only MDM used for testing was the
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agent specified in the admin guide. The compatibility of any other MDM solution was not
verified through this evaluation, and consumers are solely responsible for ensuring their
enterprise solution is compatible.
12 Annexes
Not applicable
13 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Getac MX50 (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 1.0,
April 5, 2017.
14 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
 Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based
evaluations.
 Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
 Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
 Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
 Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
 Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation
under the CC.
 Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
 Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme.
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15 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2102.
[4] Protection Profile For Mobile Device Fundamentals, Version 2.0, 17 September 2014
[5] Getac MX50 (MDFPP20) Security Target, Version 1.0, April 5, 2017 (ST)
[6] Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP20) for Getac Inc. MX50 Tablet, Version 0.3,
April 5, 2017 (AAR)
[7] Detailed Test Report (MDFPP20) for MX50, Version 0.2, April 3, 2017 (DTR)
[8] Evaluation Technical Report for Getac MX50, Version 0.3, April 5, 2017 (ETR)
[9] Getac MX50 Administrator Guidance Instructions, Version 0.8, April 2, 2017
(AGD)