National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Cisco FTD 7.4 on Firepower 1000 Series
with FMC/FMCv
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11496-2025
Dated: February 19, 2025
Version: 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology Department of Defense
Information Technology Laboratory ATTN: NIAP, Suite 6982
100 Bureau Drive 9800 Savage Road
Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Fort Meade, MD 20755-6982
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
Sheldon Durrant
Randy Heimann
Lisa Mitchell
Linda Morrison
Lori Sarem
Chris Thorpe
The MITRE Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Douglas Kalmus
Linh Le
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary............................................................................................................1
2 Identification.......................................................................................................................2
3 Architectural Information...................................................................................................4
3.1 TOE Description.........................................................................................................4
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms...........................................................................................4
3.3 TOE Architecture .......................................................................................................4
3.4 Physical Boundaries ...................................................................................................5
4 Security Policy....................................................................................................................6
4.1 Security audit..............................................................................................................6
4.2 Communication ..........................................................................................................6
4.3 Cryptographic support................................................................................................6
4.4 User data protection....................................................................................................6
4.5 Identification and authentication ................................................................................7
4.6 Security management .................................................................................................7
4.7 Protection of the TSF..................................................................................................7
4.8 TOE access .................................................................................................................8
4.9 Trusted path/channels.................................................................................................8
4.10 Filtering ......................................................................................................................8
4.11 Intrusion preventions system......................................................................................9
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope.............................................................................10
6 Documentation .................................................................................................................12
7 IT Product Testing............................................................................................................13
7.1 Developer Testing ....................................................................................................13
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.....................................................................13
8 TOE Evaluated Configuration..........................................................................................14
8.1 Evaluated Configuration...........................................................................................14
8.2 Excluded Functionality.............................................................................................14
9 Results of the Evaluation..................................................................................................16
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)..................................................................16
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)....................................................................16
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD).......................................................16
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)...........................................17
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE).......................17
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN) ..............................................................17
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results ...............................................................................18
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations......................................................................19
11 Annexes ........................................................................................................................20
12 Security Target .............................................................................................................21
13 Glossary........................................................................................................................22
14 Bibliography.................................................................................................................23
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Cisco FTD 7.4 on Firepower 1000 Series with
FMC/FMCv solution provided by Cisco Systems, Inc. It presents the evaluation results, their
justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an endorsement of the
Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no warranty is either expressed
or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in February 2025. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part 2
Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the PP-
Configuration for Network Devices, Intrusion Prevention Systems, Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewalls, and Virtual Private Network Gateways, Version 1.2, 18 August 2023 (CFG_NDcPP-
IPS-FW-VPNGW_v1.2) which includes the Base PP: collaborative Protection Profile for
Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (NDcPP22e) with the PP-Module for Intrusion
Prevention Systems (IPS), 1.0, 11 May 2021 (IPS10), the PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020 (STFFW14e), and the PP-Module for
VPN Gateways, Version 1.3, 25 August 2023 (VPNGW13).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cisco FTD 7.4 on Firepower 1000 Series with
FMC/FMCv.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report (VR) has been evaluated
at a NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This VR applies only to the specific version of the
TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the
NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the conclusions of the testing
laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that the
product satisfies all the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in the
Security Target (ST). The validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s findings are
accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The conclusions of
the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Cisco FTD 7.4 on
Firepower 1000 Series with FMC/FMCv Security Target, version 1.0, January 29, 2025 and
analysis performed by the validation team.
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2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance results of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Cisco FTD 7.4 on Firepower 1000 Series with FMC/FMCv
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile PP-Configuration for Network Devices, Intrusion Prevention Systems, Stateful
Traffic Filter Firewalls, and Virtual Private Network Gateways, Version 1.2, 18
August 2023 (CFG_NDcPP-IPS-FW-VPNGW_v1.2) which includes the Base PP:
collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March
2020 (NDcPP22e) with the PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS),
1.0, 11 May 2021 (IPS10), the PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls,
Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June 2020 (STFFW14e), and the PP-Module
for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3, 25 August 2023 (VPNGW13)
ST Cisco FTD 7.4 on Firepower 1000 Series with FMC/FMCv Security Target,
version 1.0, January 29, 2025
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco FTD 7.4 on Firepower 1000 Series with
FMC/FMCv, version 0.2, February 6, 2025
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Cisco Systems, Inc.
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Item Identifier
Developer Cisco Systems, Inc.
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators The MITRE Corporation
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Cisco Firepower 1000 Series Appliances are purpose-built, firewall platforms with VPN
capabilities and Intrusion Prevention capabilities provided by Firewall Threat Defense (FTD)
software. The Firewall Management Center (FMC) physical and virtual appliances provide a
centralized management console and event database for the FTD, and aggregates and correlates
intrusion, discovery, and connection data from the FTD. In this deployment, the FTD provides
VPN, firewall filtering, network analysis, intrusion detection and access control functionalities.
The TOE includes one or more Firepower 1000 Series appliances running FTD that are
managed by a Firewall Management Center (FMC) appliance, and together the FMC and FTD
appliances form the TOE (Distributed TOE Use Case 3).
3.1 TOE Description
The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The TOE appliances are comprised of
the following: Firepower 1000 Series (1010, 1010E, 1120, 1140 and 1150) and Firewall
Management Center (FMC) (FMC1600, FMC2600, FMC4600, FMC1700, FMC2700,
FMC4700 and FMCv). The software is comprised of the FTD software image Release 7.4 and
FMC (or FMCv) version 7.4.
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Details regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.3 TOE Architecture
The TOE consists of hardware and software that provide connectivity and security services onto
multiple secure devices.
For firewall service, the TOE provides application-aware stateful packet filtering firewalls. A
stateful packet filtering firewall controls the flow of IP traffic by matching information
contained in the headers of connection-oriented or connection-less IP packets against a set of
rules specified by the authorized administrator for firewalls. This header information includes
source and destination host (IP) addresses, source and destination port numbers, and the
transport service application protocol (TSAP) held within the data field of the IP packet.
Depending upon the rule and the results of the match, the firewall either passes or drops the
packet. The stateful firewall remembers the state of the connection from information gleaned
from prior packets flowing on the connection and uses it to regulate current packets. The packet
will be denied if the security policy is violated.
In addition to IP header information, the TOE mediates information flows on the basis of other
information, such as the direction (incoming or outgoing) of the packet on any given firewall
network interface. For connection-oriented transport services, the firewall either permits
connections and subsequent packets for the connection or denies the connection and subsequent
packets associated with the connection.
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The application-inspection capabilities automate the network to treat traffic according to
detailed policies based not only on port, state, and addressing information, but also on
application information buried deep within the packet header. By comparing this deep-packet
inspection information with corporate policies, the firewall will allow or block certain traffic.
For example, it will automatically drop application traffic attempting to gain entry to the
network through an open port-even if it appears to be legitimate at the user and connection
levels-if a business's corporate policy prohibits that application type from being on the network.
The TOE provides intrusion prevention system (IPS) capabilities by combining the security of
a Next Generation IPS (NGIPS) with the power of access control, malware protection, and
URL/IP filtering (Block List/Do Not Block List) known as Security Intelligence. The TOE
monitors incoming and outgoing network traffic and performs real-time traffic analysis and
logging using the industry-leading Snort® engine. All packets on the monitored network are
scanned, decoded, preprocessed and compared against a set of rules to determine whether
inappropriate traffic, such as system attacks, is being sent over the network. The system
generates alerts or blocks the traffic when deviations of the expected network behavior are
detected or when there is a match to a known attack pattern.
The TOE also provides IPsec connection capabilities. All references within this ST to “VPN”
connectivity refer to the use of IPsec tunnels to secure connectivity to and/or from the TOE, for
example, gateway-to-gateway1
VPN or remote access VPN.
3.4 Physical Boundaries
The TOE is a hardware and software solution comprised of the components described in Section
8 below.
1
This is also known as site-to-site or peer-to-peer VPN.
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4 Security Policy
This section summarizes the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Communication
3. Cryptographic support
4. User data protection
5. Identification and authentication
6. Security management
7. Protection of the TSF
8. TOE access
9. Trusted path/channels
10. Filtering
11. Intrusion prevention system
4.1 Security audit
The TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to
cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The
TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event. The administrator configures auditable
events, performs back-up operations, and manages audit data storage. The TOE provides the
administrator with a circular audit trail where the TOE overwrites the oldest audit record with
the newest audit record when space is full. Audit logs are backed up over an encrypted channel
to an external audit server.
4.2 Communication
The TOE allows authorized administrators to control which FTD device is managed by the
FMC. This is performed through a registration process over TLS. The administrator can also
de-register an FTD device if he or she wish to no longer manage it through the FMC.
4.3 Cryptographic support
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. The TOE
provides cryptography in support of secure connections using IPsec and TLS, and remote
administrative management via SSHv2 and TLS/HTTPS. The cryptographic random bit
generators (RBGs) are seeded by an entropy noise source.
4.4 User data protection
The TOE ensures that all information flows from the TOE do not contain residual information
from previous traffic. Packets are padded with zeros. Residual data is never transmitted from
the TOE.
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4.5 Identification and authentication
The TOE performs two types of authentications: device-level authentication of the remote
device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the authorized administrator of the TOE or for
IPsec VPN clients. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel
with a trusted peer. The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the
other. Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec X509v3 certificate-based
authentication while user-level authentication from IPsec VPN clients uses certificate-based
authentication (all IPsec VPN sessions are terminated at the FTD, not the FMC/FMCv).
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users wishing to connect to the
TOEs secure CLI and GUI administrator interfaces. The TOE requires authorized
administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management
functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length between 1
and 127 characters for FTD and 8 and 127 characters for FMC as well as mandatory password
complexity rules. The TOE also implements a lockout mechanism when the number of
unsuccessful authentication attempts exceeds the configured threshold.
The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based
authentication can be performed on the serial console or SSH and HTTPS interfaces. The
SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys.
4.6 Security management
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE
configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration
occurs either through a secure SSHv2 or TLS/HTTPS session, or via a local console connection.
Optionally, the FTD component also supports tunneling the SSH connections in IPsec VPN
tunnels (peer-to-peer, or remote VPN client). Management of all security functions can be
performed via the FMC/FMCv component of the TOE, while a subset of management functions
can be performed on the FTD component. The TOE provides the ability to securely manage all
TOE administrative users; all identification and authentication; all audit functionality of the
TOE; all TOE cryptographic functionality; the timestamps maintained by the TOE; and the
information flow control policies enforced by the TOE including encryption/decryption of
information flows for VPNs. The TOE supports an “authorized administrator” role, which
equates to any account authenticated to an administrative interface (CLI or GUI, but not VPN),
and possessing sufficient privileges to perform security-relevant administrative actions.
When an administrative session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator-
configurable warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary by the
administrator. After a configurable period of inactivity, administrative sessions will be
terminated, requiring administrators to re-authenticate.
4.7 Protection of the TSF
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing
identification, authentication, and administrator roles to limit configuration to authorized
administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.
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Additionally, the TOE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to the TOE memory
space is restricted to only TOE functions.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time are used as the timestamp
that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s
clock manually via FMC or can configure the TOE to use NTP to synchronize the TOE’s clock
with an external time source. Additionally, the TOE performs testing to verify the correct
operation of the appliance itself and that of the cryptographic module. Whenever any system
failures occur within the TOE the TOE will cease operation.
The TOE provides the ability to manually upgrade firmware/software for security
administrators. Administrators can query the current executing version of the TOE’s
firmware/software and the most recently installed version via the FMC Web UI.
4.8 TOE access
When an administrative session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator-
configurable warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary by the
administrator. After a configurable period of inactivity, administrator and VPN client sessions
will be terminated, requiring re-authentication. The TOE also supports direct connections from
VPN clients and protects against threats related to those client connections. The TOE
disconnects sessions that have been idle too long and can be configured to deny sessions based
on IP, time, and day, and to NAT external IPs of connecting VPN clients to internal network
addresses.
4.9 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports establishing trusted paths between itself and remote administrators using
SSHv2 for CLI access on the FTD and FMC and TLS/HTTPS for web UI access on the FMC.
The TOE supports the use of TLS and/or IPsec for connections with remote syslog servers. The
TOE can establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer VPN tunnels using IPsec, and VPN client
tunnels using IPsec. Note that the VPN client is in the operational environment.
4.10 Filtering
The TOE provides stateful traffic firewall functionality including IP address-based filtering (for
IPv4 and IPv6) to address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information,
inappropriate access to services, misuse of services, disruption or denial of services, and
network-based reconnaissance. Address filtering can be configured to restrict the flow of
network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based on source and/or
destination IP addresses. Port filtering can be configured to restrict the flow of network traffic
between protected networks and other attached networks based on the originating (source)
and/or receiving (destination) port (service). Stateful packet inspection is used to aid in the
performance of packet flow through the TOE and to ensure that only packets are only forwarded
when they’re part of a properly established session. The TOE supports protocols that can spawn
additional sessions in accordance with the protocol RFCs where a new connection will be
implicitly permitted when properly initiated by an explicitly permitted session. The File
Transfer Protocol is an example of such a protocol, where a data connection is created as needed
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in response to an explicitly allowed command connection. System monitoring functionality
includes the ability to generate audit messages for any explicitly defined (permitted or denied)
traffic flow. TOE administrators have the ability to configure permitted and denied traffic
flows, including adjusting the sequence in which flow control rules will be applied, and to apply
rules to any network interface of the TOE.
The TOE also provides packet filtering and secure IPsec tunneling. The tunnels can be
established between two trusted VPN peers as well as between remote VPN clients and the
TOE. More accurately, these tunnels are sets of security associations (SAs). The SAs define the
protocols and algorithms to be applied to sensitive packets and specify the keying material to
be used. SAs are unidirectional and are established per the ESP security protocol. An authorized
administrator can define the traffic that needs to be protected via IPsec by configuring access
lists (permit, deny, log) and applying these access lists to interfaces using VPN policies.
4.11 Intrusion preventions system
The TOE provides intrusion policies consisting of rules and configurations invoked by the
access control policy. The intrusion policies are the last line of defense before the traffic is
allowed to its destination. All traffic permitted by the access control policy is then inspected by
the designated intrusion policy. Using intrusion rules and other preprocessor settings, these
policies inspect traffic for security violations and, in inline deployments, can block or alter
malicious traffic.
If the vendor-provided intrusion policies do not fully address the security needs of the
organization, custom policies can improve the performance of the system in the environment
and can provide a focused view of the malicious traffic and policy violations occurring on the
network. By creating and tuning custom policies, the administrators can configure, at a very
granular level, how the system processes and inspects the traffic on the network for intrusions.
Using Security Intelligence, the administrators can blocklist—deny traffic to and from—
specific IP addresses, URLs, and DNS domain names, before the traffic is subjected to analysis
by the access control rules. Optionally, the administrators can use a “monitor-only” setting for
Security Intelligence filtering.
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5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
(NDcPP22e)
• PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), 1.0, 11 May 2021 (IPS10)
• PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25
June 2020 (STFFW14e)
• PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3, 25 August 2023 (VPNGW13)
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP22e/IPS10/STFFW14e/
VPNGW13 should be consulted if there is interest in that material.
Clarification of scope
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP22e/IPS10/STFFW14e/VPNGW13 as described for this TOE in the Security Target.
Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other
functionality provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further
conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance activities
specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices and the Intrusion
Prevention, Firewalls, and VPN Gateways Modules and performed by the evaluation
team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in this
document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
Firewall, VPN Gateway, Router, Intrusion Prevention Systems models was not included
in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when configuring
or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The CEM
defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a minimum of
understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP22e/IPS10/STFFW14e/VPNGW13 and applicable
Technical Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE
were not covered by this evaluation.
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6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Cisco FTD v7.4 with FMC/FMCv Common Criteria Supplemental User Guide, Version
1.0, January 22, 2025
• Cisco FTD v7.4 with FMC/FMCv Common Criteria User Guide Supplement IPS & VPN
Functionality, Version 0.4, November 22, 2024
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available online,
was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not be relied upon when
configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as specified
in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to download the
configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured as evaluated.
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7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is derived
from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Cisco FTD 7.4 on
Firepower 1000 Series with FMC/FMCv, Version 0.2, February 6, 2025 (DTR), as summarized
in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP22e/IPS10/STFFW14e/VPNGW13 including
the tests associated with optional requirements. The Independent Testing activity is documented
in the AAR, which is publicly available, and is not duplicated here.
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8 TOE Evaluated Configuration
8.1 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE consists of at least one Firepower device (Firepower 1000 series) running the FTD
software and one or more physical FMC devices running the FMC software or virtual devices
running FMCv software. The TOE includes the following models:
TOE Configuration Software Version
FP1010
FP1010E
FP1120
FP1140
FP1150
FTD v7.4
FMC1600
FMC2600
FMC4600
FMC1700
FMC2700
FMC4700
FMC v7.4
FMCv running on ESXi 7.0 on
the Unified Computing System
(UCS) UCSC-C220-M5, UCSC-
C240-M5, UCSC-C480-M5,
UCSC-C220-M6, UCSC-C225-
M6, UCSC-C240-M6, UCSC-
C220-M7, UCSC-C240-M7and
UCS-E1100D-M6
FMCv v7.4
8.2 Excluded Functionality
The following functionality is excluded from the evaluation.
Excluded Functionality Exclusion Rationale
Telnet for management purposes Telnet passes authentication credentials in clear text
and is disabled by default.
Firepower Device Manager (FDM) Firepower Device Manager is a web-based local
manager. Use of FDM is beyond the scope of this
Common Criteria evaluation.
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Filtering of non-IP traffic provided by the
EtherType option when configuring information
flow policies is excluded from the evaluated
configuration
Use of non-IP traffic filtering is beyond the scope of
this Common Criteria evaluation.
Smart Call Home. The Smart Call Home feature
provides personalized, e-mail-based and web-based
notification to customers about critical events
involving their individual systems.
Use of Smart Call Home is beyond the scope of this
Common Criteria evaluation.
Root Shell Access The root shell access is only allowed for pre-
operational installation, configuration, and post-
operational maintenance and troubling shooting.
Timeout Exemption Option The use of the “Exempt from Browser Session
Timeout” setting is not permitted. This allows a user
to be exempted from the inactivity timeout feature.
REST API This feature is not evaluated as part of the
evaluation. REST API relies on HTTPS as the
underlying communication protocol and can be used
to build a management interface. This feature is not
tested and is out of scope.
Clustering This feature is not tested and is out of scope.
The services in the table above are disabled in the evaluated configuration. Any functionality
of the TOE that has not been discussed in Section 6 of this document is not included in the
evaluation. The exclusion of this functionality does not affect compliance to collaborative
Protection Profile for Network Devices (cpp_nd_v2.2e), PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter
Firewalls (mod_cpp_fw_v1.4e), PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways
(mod_vpngw_v1.3) and PP-Module for Intrusion Protection Systems (IPS)
(MOD_IPS_V1.0).
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC version
3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Cisco FTD 7.4 on
Firepower 1000 Series with FMC/FMCv TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs
contained in the NDcPP22e/IPS10/STFFW14e/VPNGW13.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Cisco FTD 7.4 on Firepower 1000 Series with
FMC/FMCv products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security
function descriptions that support the requirements.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally, the evaluator performed the
assurance activities specified in the NDcPP22e/IPS10/STFFW14e/VPNGW13 related to the
examination of the information contained in the TSS.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally, the
evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
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was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of tests
specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP22e/IPS10/STFFW14e/VPNGW13 and
recorded the results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluation team searched the following sources:
• National Vulnerability Database (https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search)
• Vulnerability Notes Database (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/)
• Rapid7 Vulnerability Database (https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities)
• Tipping Point Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories )
• cve.org CVE Database (https://www.cve.org/),
• Tenable Network Security (http://nessus.org/plugins/index.php?view=search)
• Offensive Security Exploit Database (https://www.exploit-db.com/)
The searches were performed on February 6, 2025 with the following search terms: “ftd 7.4”,
“FXOS 2.14”, “Firepower threat defense”, “Firepower management center”, “cisco ssl fom”,
“Virtual fmc fom”, “Cisco Security Crypto”, “Openssh”, “CiscoSSH”, “CiscoSSL”, “Snort”,
“ESXi 7.0”, “Intel Xeon Bronze”, “Intel Xeon Silver”, “Intel Xeon Gold”, “Intel Xeon
Platinum”, “Intel Xeon D”, “AMD EPYC”, and “Firepower 1000”.
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The validation team reviewed the work of the evaluation team and found that sufficient
evidence and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion
reached by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
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10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Cisco FTD v7.4 with FMC/FMCv
Common Criteria Supplement User Guide, Version 1.0, January 22, 2025, and the Cisco FTD
v7.4 with FMC/FMCv Common Criteria Supplemental User Guide & VPN Functionality,
Version 0.4, November 22, 2024. As stated in the Clarification of Scope, the evaluated
functionality is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in the ST,
and the only evaluated functionality was that which was described by the SFRs claimed in the
ST. All other functionality provided by the TOE needs to be assessed separately and no further
conclusions can be drawn about its effectiveness.
Consumers employing the TOE must follow the configuration instructions provided in the
Configuration Guidance documentation listed in Section 6 to ensure the evaluated configuration
is established and maintained. It is important to note the excluded functionality listed in Section
8.2 and follow the configuration instructions to ensure that this functionality is disabled.
Evaluation activities are strictly bound by the assurance activities described in the
NDcPP22e/IPS10/STFFW14e/VPNGW13 and accompanying Supporting Documents.
Consumers and integrators of this TOE are advised to understand the inherent limitations of
these activities and take additional measures as needed to ensure proper TOE behavior when
integrated into an operational environment.
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11 Annexes
Not applicable
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12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Cisco FTD 7.4 on Firepower 1000 Series with FMC/FMCv
Security Target, Version 1.0, January 29, 2025.
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13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more
TOEs that may be evaluated.
• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an IT
product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under the
CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue of
a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation and
for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
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14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1: Introduction
and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
(NDcPP22e).
[5] PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), Version 1.0, 11 May 2021 (IPS10).
[6] PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625, 25 June
2020 (STFFW14e).
[7] PP-Module for VPN Gateways, Version 1.3, 25 August 2023 (VPNGW13).
[8] Cisco FTD 7.4 on Firepower 1000 Series with FMC/FMCv Security Target, Version
1.0, January 29, 2025 (ST).
[9] Assurance Activity Report for Cisco FTD 7.4 on Firepower 1000 Series with
FMC/FMCv, Version 0.2, February 6, 2025 (AAR).
[10] Detailed Test Report for Cisco FTD 7.4 on Firepower 1000 Series with FMC/FMCv,
Version 0.2, February 6, 2025 (DTR).
[11] Evaluation Technical Report for Cisco FTD 7.4 on Firepower 1000 Series with
FMC/FMCv, Version 0.2, February 6, 2025 (ETR).
[12] Cisco FTD v7.4 with FMC/FMCv Common Criteria Supplement User Guide, Version
1.0, January 22, 2025 (AGD1).
[13] Cisco FTD v7.4 with FMC/FMCv Common Criteria Supplemental User Guide & VPN
Functionality, Version 0.4, November 22, 2024 (AGD2)